Tag: #SupremeCourt

CJI States Supreme Court is Looking for a New System to Transit Bail Electronically

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As changing time the old slow system should also be replaced with a new and faster system. As electronics have become such a crucial part of our lives so their need is felt in some parts of the Judiciary as well to faster the system. As the old and existing system of transiting bail always delays the release of the prisoners so on Friday Chief Justice of India NV Ramana stated his thought on bringing a new system to transit bail electronically to the prison authority so that there should not be any delay in the release of the prisoners as soon as bail is granted to them.

Chief Justice of India felt the need for this change while an order to release a prisoner is granted by the court but it is delayed just because the prison authority hasn’t received is a copy of it yet. After knowing this CJI said, “this is too much”. He also stated that in the generation where communication can be done in seconds, we are still looking at the skies for the pigeons to communicate the orders. As there is numerous case still pending and release of prisoners on are on just because we are lacking back with a change in time.

So Chief Justice directed the Secretary of the Supreme Court to come up within one month with a system to communicate the bail release electronically so that this outdated system can be detached from Supreme Court.

-Report by RIDDHI DUBEY

Supreme Court Denies Restoration of Possession of Land by an Encroacher

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-Report by ESHAN SHARMA

The current appeal has been filed by an encroacher on evacuee land of 0-14 acre-guntha of Survey No.191/2 in Godhara, Gujarat, since 1976, where he has been operating an auto shop known as Bharat Motor Garage. On October 24, 2013, the appellant’s writ suit challenging the eviction order dated 23.6.1992 was dismissed by the Learned Single Bench. The learned Division Bench sustained the order. The appellant, who is still aggrieved, has brought his case to this Court.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION

On 16.07.1992, the appellant filed a writ suit in the Gujarat High Court in Ahmedabad, bearing Special Civil Application (SCA) No. 4700 of 1992. Along with the SCA filed by the appellant, another SCA No.2940 of 1992 brought by one Srikant Deviprasad Joshi was heard. Shri Joshi claimed ownership of the property in question based on an allocation made to him on September 20, 1972, as enemy property. On December 6, 1974, the land assigned to Shri Joshi was annulled. On July 15, 1975, the appeal against the stated order was denied. Shri Joshi then filed an SCA with the High Court, which was dismissed on October 24, 2013. The said order had finally attained finality qua Shri Joshi.

KEY HIGHLIGHTS

  • On January 20, 2014, an order was issued in an intra-court appeal remanding both SCAs to the learned Single Bench. However, the application and the Letters Patent Appeal were both dismissed on March 10, 2014.
  • The learned counsel argued for the appellant before this court is founded upon the policy dated 20.6.1978 for allotment of evacuee land to encroachers and the resolution dated 8.1.1980 in respect of allotment of another public land to encroachers. The appellant as an encroacher is covered by one or both of the insurance, therefore, is entitled to claim regularization of his ownership.
  • On 24.10.2013, the appellant’s writ suit contesting the eviction order dated 23.6.1992 was dismissed by the Learned Single Bench. The ruling has been sustained by the learned Division Bench. The appellant is back in court, still aggrieved.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

The learned counsel count on the judgments in the cases of:

Ramesh Parsram Malani v. State of Telangana

Based on a government policy decision of 20.06.1978, the displaced person-respondent is claiming allotment. The evacuee land must be given to a displaced person because it is part of the compensation pool under Section 14 of the Act and can only be allotted under Section 20. Only one displaced person can be assigned to the evacuee land. After all of the displaced people have been settled, the allocation to non-displaced people can be considered. As a result, the paragraph in the policy dated 20.6.1978 that allows evacuee land to encroachers is contrary to the Act’s design and purpose. However, any allotment made to an encroacher that has reached finality will not be reopened. As a result, an encroacher has no right to regularize evacuee land in the presence of a displaced person entitled to the allotment to achieve the Act’s goal.

COURT JUDGEMENT

“The possession of the land was taken over by the government on January 24, 2014, according to the report. The appellant’s claim now is for restoration of possession by an encroacher, which is completely untenable in above observations.”

The rule is made an outright and present appeal and the same is dismissed.

Section 124A IPC: Supreme Court to hear Petition on JULY 27

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Kirechandra Wangkhemcha and Kanhaiyalal Shukla, two journalists from Manipur and Chhattisgarh, filed writ petitions at the Supreme Court requesting the court for a writ, order, or direction ordering Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, to be ruled unconstitutional and void. Counsel representing the two petitioners submitted to the Supreme Court that its decision in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962, may need to be reconsidered wherein the constitutional validity of the section was upheld.

Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code states that anyone who seeks to incite hatred or contempt for the government established by law in India through words, whether spoken or written, signs or visible representation, or any other means, shall be punished with imprisonment for life.

According to the petition, the restriction imposed by section 124A is irrational, hence, does not constitute a valid restriction under Article 19(2) of the Constitution. It infringes the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, which guarantees that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. Section 124A is extraneous to safeguard state security and public order.

Meanwhile, the Foundation of Media Professionals, journalist Shashi Kumar, and legal professor Sanjay S Jain have filed three applications in support of the petition challenging the constitutional validity of Section 124A of the IPC. According to Shashi Kumar in his application, the “vague nature” of section 124A allows it to be used as a “political weapon” to restrict free speech.

Attorney General KK Venugopal of India, who was issued notice on the petition by the court on April 30, and Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, who was representing the Union of India, both were granted two weeks to file their responses. The court will hear the matter on the 27th of July.

-Report by VANESSA RODRIGUES

Chitan J. Vaswani and Another V. State of West Bengal and Another

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Case Number

Criminal Appeal No. 300 of 1975

Equivalent Citation

1975 AIR SC 2473, 1975 SCC 2 829.

Bench

V.R Krishna Iyer, A.C Gupta, JJ.

Decided on

October 10, 1975

Relevant Act/ Section

The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956

Brief Facts and Procedural History

The location is the Isias Bar, which is located at 15, Free School Street in Calcutta. A midnight invitation to have a good time with sylphs is extended by a hall of enchantment. The entrance price is a pittance of Rs 15 per person, and there is energizing booze served inside. To the exhilarating tune of band music, scantily clad female flesh of sweet seventeen or thereabouts fly about. The stage is busy with many men and women moving from one room to other. Many bars or restaurants provide a suitable platform for the operation of brothels. Similarly in this case, when the men indulge in promiscuous sex, police and excise officers entered the scene. When the Act entered into effect, a prosecution was brought against numerous people under Section 7, and two people, the proprietor, and manager of the Isias Bar were found guilty and sentenced.

Procedural History

An appeal to the High Court was largely unsuccessful, while the State’s appeal was somewhat successful. The conviction was amended to some extent by the High Court, and the Supreme Court had to continue on the assumption that the accused had been found guilty of offenses under Sections 7(2)(a) and 3(1) but acquitted under Section 7(2)(b). The more pertinent element of the present appeal was that an order was made under Section 18(1) when read with Section 18(2) directed the occupiers of the portion of Premises Nos. 15 and 15.A, Isias Bar or the Free School Street to be evicted therefrom within a period of seven days from the date of that order and restore possession thereof to the owner landlord. The Supreme Court had given special leave to challenge this eviction order under Section 18(2), read with Section 18(1). (1).

Issues before the Court

The scope of the concerned arguments was limited to the right to evict the tenant of the guilty premises after conviction for Sections 3(1) and 7(2)(b) offenses, in addition to the term imposed.

Ratio of the Case

In Sub-Divisional Magistrate v. Ram Kali, AIR 1968 SC 1, this Court ruled that Section 18(1) applies to one class while Section 18(2) applies to another. Section 18(1) is a one-time method for shutting down obnoxious prostitution establishments without having to go through the lengthy process of criminal prosecution.

It’s a quick-reacting defense mechanism designed to put out the flames and promote immediate moral sanitation in locations like shrines, schools, hostels, and hospitals, all of which are socially vulnerable. Section 18(2), on the other hand, only applies to anyone who has been convicted of crimes under Sections 3 or 7. Thus the place is found to be engaged in prostitution trial. It follows to reason that if the goal of removing the business vice from that location is to be accomplished, the occupier must be ejected. In this scenario, this is exactly what has been done. Section 18(2) applies to all locations where prostitution activity has taken place, not only those within 200 yards of the offending distance.

Decision of the Court

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the Magistrate’s power to order eviction when a conviction under Section 3 or Section 7 occurs, confident that public power vested in a public functionary for the public good will be exercised whenever the conditions for doing so exist, achieving a broad social goal of moral clean-up of public places.

This case analysis is done by Vanshika Samir.

The editor of this post is Shreya Litoria.

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Reservation in India: Do we still need it?

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Introduction

When India got independence, there were a certain group of peoples who were not as socially, educationally developed as others and the makers of the Constitution wanted to help them and so the concept of reservation came into the picture. To put it out in layman terms, reservation is a system, according to which the above-mentioned group of socially, educationally disadvantaged peoples were provided with representations, by reserving a couple of open spots, with respect to jobs or in the entrance of an educational institute or their minimum mark to enter into an institute was held to be lower than the others to improve them socially and educationally. This is also mention in the Constitution under Article 15(4) and 16(4), which provides the State with the power to make any special provisions for the development of any socially and educationally backward group of citizens, which are known as the Scheduled Castes, and the Scheduled Tribes, like the above-mentioned reservations or allotting quotas, etc. for them.

Who is included?

The people to whom reservation is allotted, forms three main groups, are as follows:

  1. Scheduled Castes (SC) – the people who are included in this group are most commonly considered to be in the lower section of the caste hierarchy. These people were mostly manual laborers and daily wage workers, who were involved in works like agricultural laborers, manual scavenging, tannery, washing clothes, fishing, and more. Most of the works that these people did were considered to be disgusting and something that the people from a higher caste would never do. Article 341 of the Constitution defines who would be in Scheduled Caste. According to which the President has the power to decide if a particular caste, race or tribe, or their group will be considered to a part of SC or not, in regard with a State or Union Territory and in regard with a State, the President should consult with the governor of that State and in regard with a State, the President should consult with the governor of that State. The Parliament also has the power to include or exclude any castes, races or tribes or parts of or their groups in the list.
  2. Scheduled Tribes (ST) – the people who are included in this group are the indigenous people of India. Few of their primary characters are that they have primitive traits, distinct culture, were isolated from others and so did not have a lot of contact with other communities, and were not developed. Article 342 of the Constitution defines who would be in Scheduled Tribe and according to which, the President will decide if a particular tribe or tribal communities or their groups should be considered as a ST or not in a State or Union Territory and in regard with a State, the President should consult with the governor of that State. The Parliament also shall include or exclude and castes, races or tribes or parts of or their groups in the list.
  3. Other Backward Classes (OBC) – the people who are included in this group are those people who are also in socially, economically, and educationally in a backward position but they do not belong in the SCs and STs. The Indian Constitution does not talk about OBC. But, after the Supreme Court’s judgment in Indira Sawhney’s case, the Government enacted the National Commission for Backward Classes (NCBC) Act in April 1993. Under which Section 2 defines Backward classes as backward classes of citizens, other than the SCs and STs, as may be specified by the Central Government in the lists.

Reservation and the India Constitution

Article 16 (1) and (2) of the Constitution forbids discrimination on the ground of residence for employment, and Article 16 (3) and (4) are the exceptions for it. Article 16 (3) gives Parliament the power to make laws that would extend beyond the restriction mentioned in Article 16 (1) and (2). Article 16 (4) empowers the state to make special provisions, as needed, for the reservation in appointments of posts in favor of any backward class of citizens who the State considers are not adequately represented in the services under the State.

Articles 330-342 talk about the special provisions for reservation, representation, and commission for a certain class of people such as SCs, STs, Anglo –Indians, Linguistic minorities, and OBC. 

Article 335 of the Constitution plays a big role in balancing the process of allotting seats based on reservation. The article says that the state shall look into the claims of the members of the SC and ST regarding the seats in the administrative position, but only if appointing these members will improve the efficiency of the administrative position. The State does not require to grant the members solely based on their social standing. This article acts as a guiding principle for the State in performing its duties without it being restricted to the claims of SC and ST.

Views of the Supreme Court

One of the first cases that handled on the reservation was the State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, the Madras government reserved seats in the government’s medical and engineering colleges in different proportions for different communities based on religion, caste, and race. The plaintiff alleged that this is against the fundamental rights, and the state defended it on the grounds that this was enacted under the requirements of Article 46 of the DPSP to provide social justice for all the groups. This law was repealed by the Supreme Court because students are graded based on caste and religion, regardless of their merits. To change the validity of the decision, the Constitution ( 1st Amendment) Act of 1951 amended Article 15, and clause (4) was added in Article 15.

In the case, M.R. Balaji v. the State of Mysore, the State of Mysore issued an order, as per which all the communities except the Brahmin community were declared to be socially and educationally backward under Article 15 (4) and 75% of the seats in Educational Institutes were reserved in favor of the Socially and Economically Backward Class and the SCs and STs. This order was challenged in the Supreme Court under Article 32 and the Supreme Court struck down this order because it claimed that backwardness is both a social and educational factor, and though caste in relation to Hindus may be a relevant factor to consider, it cannot be made the sole and dominant test, in determining the social backwardness of a class of citizens. It also said that even though there are no definite rules for granting reservations, it should not exceed 50%.

In the case, State of UP v. Pradeep Tandon, an order issued by the State Government for the reservation of seats for students in medical institutes, which extended to candidates from rural areas, hill areas, and Uttarakhand, was challenged in the Supreme Court. The Court observed that the classification on geographical and territorial areas was made because the candidates from these areas were regarded as socially and culturally backward classes. The Court said the reservation to the students from hill areas and Uttarakhand was valid, because of the absence of a proper means of communication, technical processes, and educational facilities, the poor and illiterate people were kept in the remote and sparsely populated areas. But this did not include the candidates from rural areas, and it was held to be invalid because this division on the ground that the people in rural areas were poor, unlike those in urban was not supported by any relevant facts.

One of the leading landmark cases regarding reservation in the case of Indra Sawhney v. Union of India. In this case, the Supreme Court held that the decision of the Union Government to reserve 27% of the government jobs for backward classes is constitutionally valid, provided socially advanced persons- Creamy Layer- among them are eliminated. The reservation of the seats could include only the initial appointment and does not extend to the promotion and the total reservation should not exceed 50%. After this judgment Article 16 (4-A) and 16 (4-B) were added by the 77th Amendment and 81st Amendment respectively.

  • CREAMY LAYER:

The term ‘creamy layer’ was first coined in 1974 in the case of the State of Kerala vs N. M. Thomas where the judge noted that the benefits of reservation meant for the socially and economically backward persons were snatched by the people of the same community, but socially and economically developed, who was called as the top creamy layer, and leaving the rest for the weakest. This could be applied only for OBC and not to the SCs and STs. To put it down in simple words, ‘creamy layer’ consists of people who despite being a part of the OBC, are more economically and socially developed. The court developed the ‘creamy layer’ concept to prevent these people from using the policies and reservations made for the people who are economically and socially backward. 

Conclusion

So, there is a question in most people’s minds, that, “do we still need a reservation?’. It has been more than 70 years since India became a democratic nation and the reservation was implemented. But the position of the SCs, STs, and OBC have not changed a lot to say that reservation should be barred. In the present-day scenario, a lot of people in the creamy layer are misusing the allotment of reservation and so reservation does not fulfill the role it was established for. The one thing that can be done is that, while the process of reservation is going on, the people selected for a reservation should be chosen after looking into if they would fall into the ‘creamy layer’ category and the concept of ‘creamy layer should be extended to those in SCs and STs too. So, to conclude I would say that, yes, we still need a reservation, because the reason for the implementation of reservation, which is, the development of SCs, STs, and other backward groups, is not yet fulfilled.

This article is written by Santhiya V, who is pursuing BBA LLB (Hons.) at Alliance University.

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Dilution of the Statutory Protection Available to MSME: A Critique of the Supreme Court’s Judgment in Shilpi Industries

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-Report by ANAND PATIL

Introduction

The judgment of the Supreme Court would have the unintended consequence of exacerbating issues relating to non-payment of dues to MSME.

Facts

The respondent who in this case is Kerala state road transport corporation (KSRTC) invited the tenders for the supply of thread rubber for making tyres. The appellants who gave the purchase orders. As per terms of the agreement, 90% of the total purchase price was payable on the supply of materials and the other 10% was to be paid subject to the final performance. This condition was there as the thread rubber supplied by appellants was to run a minimum number of kilometers. When the other 10% was not paid as per the agreement of purchase order, the appellants approached the industrial facilitation council which is presently MSMED Act. Further arbitration was referred under provisions of the 1996 Act. The awards were passed in favour of appellants. And further, the respondents have appealed before Kerala high court and the order was passed in favour of appellants. Further, the respondents appeared before Supreme Court.

Petitioner Contention

Shri V. Giri learned senior counsel for appellants has contended that the various provisions under chapter V of the 2006 Act make it clear that conciliation and arbitration are referred to claims of the supplier only. It is also submitted that the 2006 Act is beneficial to micro and small scale enterprises and such a scope of the Act cannot be expanded the claims by the buyer. It is also submitted by the appellant that the object of the 2006 Act is to protect micro and small scale enterprises. If the claims are allowed from respondents then the scope of this Act would be expanded.

Respondent Contention

On the other hand Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, Advocate on behalf of the respondent stated by referring to section 16 of the Act, it is submitted that when any buyer fails to make payment to supplier, as required under section 15 the buyer shall notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement between buyer and supplier or any law for the time being in force be liable to pay the compound interest. They further claimed that referring to section 19 of the Act it is submitted that application filed for getting an award or order shall not be entrained until the appellant has deposited 75% of the amount in terms of award or order. Further, it is also submitted that when conciliation is failed according to the arbitration and conciliation Act 1996 are made applicable if there is an agreement between the parties under subsection (1) of section 7 of the 1996 Act. And further, the advocate pointed that no claim or counterclaim under section 18 is permissible. Further, it is submitted that in any event as the supply of goods and services were made much before the memo by the appellant the appellant cannot claim before the MSMED Act.

Judgment

The court while referring to the judgment of the high court in the case of Andhra Pradesh Power Coordination Committee and Ors v Lanco Kondapalli Power Ltd and Ors held that the limitation act 1963 applies to arbitrations covered by section 18(3) of the 2006 Act. And the reading of section 43 itself makes it clear that the limitation act 1963 shall apply to the arbitrations as it applies to the court proceedings. When there is no settlement concerning dispute necessarily the micro and small enterprises facilitation council shall take up the dispute for arbitration under section18(3) of the 2006 Act or it may also provide for the alternate dispute resolution services. Thus the court is of the view that no further elaboration is necessary on the issue and we hold that provision of limitation act 1963 will apply to arbitrations covered by section 18(3) of the 2006 Act. Hence the court dismissed the civil appeals.

Supreme Court to Hear Plea Urging the Cancellation of Rath Yatra

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The Supreme Court can these days take up the petition, seeking cancellation of Rath Yatra, scheduled to begin on July 12 in Puri, Odisha, given the surge in cases of Novel Coronavirus.

The bench, held by judge N.V. Ramana, can hear the plea filed by Odisha Vikash Parishad, seeking cancellation of the Chariot pageant dedicated to Lord by keeping view, seeable of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Earlier on June 21, the apex court had allowed the Puri Rath Yatra with restrictions asked the authorities and therefore the Centre to figure in tandem. A bench headed by then judge S.A. Bobde noted that the authorities have the liberty to prevent the Rath Yatra if it discovered a spike within the variety of COVID-19 cases in Puri.

During the hearing, the then judge had noted that the court was willing to change its June eighteen order, taking into view the Novel Coronavirus pandemic. The Court aforesaid the Jagannatha Temple management committee and authorities will conduct the Rath Yatra under the rules. The court directed the Rath Yatra in a very restricted manner while not permitting a devotee congregation. The Odisha government agreed to coordinate with the Centre.

-Report by PAROMITA MAITRA

Problems and Miseries of Migrant Labourer

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-Report by RAVINUTHALA VAMSI KRISHNA

The sue motto case was taken by the supreme court in May 2020 to deal with the problems of migrant workers during the national lockdown which disposed of with these directions. As we know Covid-19 entered into our Lives in March 2020.

Petitioner’s Contention:

In this sue motto case where we know Covid-19 entered into our Life’s in March 2020. First It was identified in China in the year 2019 December. So, in March 2020, our Government imposed a national wide Lockdown, the courts referred to some news and media reports where migrant workers were fighting for food and transportation because of this imposition of National wide lockdown. So, we saw the fight of this migrant worker, sudden abroad imposing of this lockdown that let to flight of this migrant workers. So, at that time, because of this national wide imposition of lockdowns, where we shut down the manufacturing factories, Construction sites, etc. so because of all this there is no proper livelihood, there is no proper work, and there is no income for this people and there is no transportation even to go to their home towns. And we saw many people have lost their lives. And there was an increase in poverty and an increase in hungry. So, because of all these things, The court also observed that is the fundamental right to life enshrined in Article 21 constitution of India may be interpreted to include the right to live with human dignity which may include the right to food and other necessities. Supreme Court gives some important decisions to Central and state governments. Supreme court said that, so this person also became our part of society, it is the role that it is the government responsible to take care of this people, because of this migrant people, even though Government is providing subsidies food grains to these people were not getting this because due to lack of Ration cards.

KEY HIGHLIGHTS

  • Supreme Court instructs the government to ensure that no migrant worker goes hungry.
  • Supreme Court ordered that we need to go for One Nation One Ration.

Judgment:

The Bench observed that it is the bound duty of all states and governments to provide food security to impoverished persons. So, The article mainly saying that Supreme Court give a deadline of July 31st and directed central as well as state to take some steps mainly for these migrant people. Supreme Court held that and ordered states and government’s that we need to go for One Nation One Ration.

Provisions Used In This Case:

Article 21 of the constitution of India
Right to Life and Personal Liberty: This may be interpreted to include the right to live with human decency which may include that the right to food and other necessities.

Zydus Cadila Covid-19 Vaccine For 12-18 Age Group to be Available Soon : Centre Tells Supreme Court

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On May 31, 2021, the Supreme Court of India raised a slew of questions in its order while hearing the suo-motu case related to Covid Management in India. In the said order, the Court criticized the Centre’s Covid vaccination policy and described it as prima facie arbitrary and irrational.

The bench of Justice DY Chandrachud also asked the Central Government to provide the details and information about how Rs. 35,000 crore, which was earmarked especially for procurement and supply of vaccines, has been spent so far and for the Centre to present all the relevant and important documents regarding the covid vaccination policy in front of the court.

The Union Government has stated that as per the projected midyear population of India for 2020, the total population aged 18 years and above is approximately 94 crore, and the administration of 2 doses to each citizen would require an estimated 188 crore vaccine doses.

In a 380-page affidavit, the Centre stated that it expects to procure the estimated requirement of around 188 crore doses from at least 5 manufacturers by the end of the year. It also stated that a poor person and a millionaire are equally entitled to get the Covid vaccine for free and that necessary actions are being taken to ensure the safe, accessible, and effective administration of vaccines. It further contended that along with the two major vaccines of the country, Covishield, and Covaxin, another Russian Coronavirus vaccine named Sputnik V has received Emergency Use Authorisation by the DCGI, India. Some other domestic vaccines from Biological E and Zydus Cadila are also in the final stages of clinical trials and once approved, will further increase the availability of vaccines.

The court, in its order dated 31.05.2021, also asked for the reasons behind the involvement of private hospitals in the process of administering vaccines. To this, the government stated that according to the statistics, almost 55% of the population gets medical care from private hospitals and the remaining 45% gets health care services from government-run hospitals. It argued that private hospitals have a wider range to vaccinate people and also lessens the stress on government facilities during a time of crisis.

The Health Ministry Of India on 26th June informed that Zydus Cadila, an Indian pharmaceutical company, will soon complete clinical trials for the vaccine against Covid-19 for citizens in the age bracket of 12-18 years and that the doses will most likely be available from July end or August.

-Report by Anuj Dhar

Case Analysis: Rupali Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 9 April 2019

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Case Number 

Criminal Appeal No. 71 of 2012

Bench

Hon’ble Justices Ranjan Gogoi, L. Nageswara Rao, Sanjay Kishan Kaul

Date of Judgment 

09 April 2019

Relevant Section 

Section 177 (CrPc), Section 178 (CrPc), Section 179 (CrPc), 498A (IPC)

Facts of the Case 

  • Marriage of petitioner and respondent: December, 1997

In December of 1997, the petitioner, who had her parents’ home in Deoria, Uttar Pradesh, married respondent no.2, who used to dwell in Mau with his family. Sufficient cash and dowry articles were given at the time of marriage, but the accused persons were not content and began harassing and maltreating the petitioner in her Sasural on account of a demand for Rs. 2 lacs in cash and a car. She told her father about it as well. Her father traveled to Mau and attempted to reason with the accused, who were resolute in their demand.

  • Petitioner gave birth to a child: 12 May, 1998

The petitioner gave birth to a son on 12.5.1998, who is now 7 years old. The petitioner’s harassment continued even after the birth of a son. When she became pregnant again, the accused admitted her to Dr. Saxena’s Ladies Clinic in Mau and forcibly terminated her.

  • Petitioner thrown out of Matrimonial home (Mau): July 2002

The petitioner was ejected from her matrimonial home in July 2002, and the accused individuals kept the male kid with them. Her father drove her to Deoria and tried unsuccessfully to appease the accused.

  • Petitioner went back to her matrimonial house: 14 April 2005

The accused persons, accompanied by certain Mau responsible persons, came to the petitioner’s house in Deoria on 14.4.2005 at about 4:00 p.m. for a compromise and expressed their desire to take the petitioner with them. After some hesitation, the petitioner returned to her sasural, but when she arrived, she discovered that a stranger woman was also living with the accused’s family, and upon more investigation, it was discovered that she was the petitioner’s husband’s second wife. When the petitioner objected, the accused beat her, locked her in a room, and forced her to sign blank papers.

  • Petitioner again turned out of Matrimonial house:27 May 2005

On 27.5.2005, the petitioner was kicked out of their house after signing divorce papers. The petitioner travelled to Deoria and told her father everything that had happened.

  • Petitioner lodged an F.I.R at Police Station Kotwali, Deoria: 17 September 2005

On September 17, 2005, petitioner filed an F.I.R. against respondent at Police Station Kotwali, Deoria, alleging violations of Sections 498A, 494, 313, and 504 of the Indian Penal Code.

Issues Raised

Rupali Devi vs. the State of Rajasthan has set a precedent for determining whether a woman forced to leave her matrimonial home due to acts of cruelty can initiate and access the legal process within the jurisdiction of the courts where she is forced to seek refuge with her parents or other family members.

Judgment

The Hon’ble Supreme Court concluded that Section 178 offers an exception to the “ordinary rule” engrafted in Section 177 by allowing courts in another local area to take cognizance of the offense. In addition, if an offense committed in one locality is repeated in another, the courts in the latter location are competent to hear the case. If an offense is committed in another jurisdiction as a result of the consequences of a criminal act, the court in that jurisdiction is likewise competent to take cognizance under Section 179. As a result, if an offense is committed in part in one location and part in another, the exception to the “ordinary rule” would be attracted if the offense is a continuing offense or if the consequences of a criminal act result in an offense being committed at a different location, and the courts within whose jurisdiction the criminal act is committed would lose exclusive jurisdiction to try the offense.

The Supreme Court accepted the appeal and overturned the High Court’s acquittal. It found the respondent guilty of the offense punishable under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and held that the courts in the location where the wife seeks refuge after fleeing or being driven from the matrimonial home due to acts of cruelty committed by the husband or his relatives also have jurisdiction to hear a complaint alleging commission of offenses under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code.

Critical Analysis

It is to be commended that the Supreme Court has said explicitly that women can file criminal charges related to cruelty from the location where they have sought refuge after leaving or being pushed out of their matrimonial home. The Supreme Court ruled that Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) covers both the wife’s mental and physical health. Even if a wife leaves her matrimonial home and returns to her parental home, the acts performed by the husband in the matrimonial home that constitute cruelty within the meaning of Section 498A can have negative consequences for her mental health in the parental home.

This Supreme Court ruling was necessary to prevent the rising number of cases of cruelty and domestic abuse directed at women, which result in suicides or serious injuries. The vulnerable women who are habitually beaten and tortured by their husbands and husband’s family members would be protected by the Hon’ble court’s decision.

This case analysis is written by Sanjana Suman student of Amity Law School, Amity University Jharkhand Ranchi.

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