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Case Law Analysis: Gulam Abbas & Ors. v. State of UP & Ors

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Case Number

Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 4939 of 1983, in Writ Petition No. 4676 of 1978

Equivalent Citations

1981 AIR 2198, 1982 SCR (1)1077, 1982 SCC (1) 71, 1981 SCALE (3) 1707

Bench

V.D. Tulzapurkar, D.A. Desai, A.P. Sen

Date of Judgment

3 November, 1981

Relevant Act/ Sections

The Wakf Act, 1995

Article 32 of the Constitution of India, 1949

Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Section 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Facts of the Case:

In Mohalla Doshipura of Varanasi City, there are two sects of Mohammedan-the Shias and the Sunnis. Both the sects revere the martyrdom of Hazrat Imam Hasan and Hazrat Imam Hussain, grand-sons of Prophet Mohammed, during the Moharram but in a different manner. The case of the petitioners and through them of the Shias of Mohalla Doshipura is that the members of their sect numbering about 4000 constitute a religious denomination having a common faith and they observe Moharram for two months and eight days in a year in memory of Hazrat Imam Hussain who along with his 72 followers attained martyrdom at Karbala in Iraq. The said religious belief is practiced by the men-folk and the women-folk of the Shia community by holding Majlises (religious discourses), Recitations, Nowhas, Marcia, doing Matam (wailing), and taking out processions with Tabut Tazia, Alama, Zuljinha, etc. For performing these religious rites, practices, and observances the Shia community has been customarily using from time immemorial the nine plots in Mohalla Doshipura and the structures on some of them. 

Tazia at Doshipura is a unique Tazia in the whole country, being made of fine wood carvings, about 15 ft. in height, having five floors, and decorated with gold and silver and would be of the value of not less than Rs. 3 lakhs. According to the petitioners, the entire period of Moharram is a period of mourning for the Shias whose staunch belief is that the whole purpose of their life is to carry out these religious practices and functions during the Moharram and that in case they do not perform all these rites, practices, observances and functions, including those relating to the Tazia, they will never be delivered and till these are performed the whole community will be in mourning and in none of their families any marriage or other happy function can take place. The aforesaid religious faith and the performance of the rites, practices, observances, and functions detailed above constitute their fundamental rights guaranteed to them under Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution and the members of the Shia community of Mohalla Doshipura have a customary right to perform these on the said nine plots and in or about the structures standing thereon from time immemorial.

From the year 1960 onwards the Sunnis, who were in majority and were able to muster the support of local politicians and the police, started creating trouble and interference by indulging in violence with a result that the Executive Authorities of Varanasi acting under sec. 144 Cr. P.C. but in abuse of the power thereunder started placing undue restrictions on the members of the Shia community in the performance of their religious functions and ceremonies. Thus, during the period 1960-66 the Executive power under sec. 144 Cr. P.C. came to be used each year to curtail the rights of the Shias to perform their religious practices and functions at the Baradari, other structures, and the appurtenant plots on the occasion of the Barawafat; sometimes restraints were also placed on the Sunnis. During the years 1967 to 1969 similar orders depriving the Shias of their legitimate rights on the occasion of Moharram, Chehulam, Pacha, and Barawafats under section 144 were issued by the district authorities. In subsequent years also similar orders were passed sometimes placing restrictions on one community and sometimes on the other, sometimes permitting certain observances on terms and conditions during the stated hours. More often than not under the pretext of imminent danger to peace and tranquillity both the communities were completely prohibited from carrying out their religious functions and ceremonies under such orders.

Procedural History

In the year 1973 on the occasion of Barawafat the City Magistrate, Varanasi by his order dated 12th April 1973 prohibited the Shias from performing Barawafat on the Baradari and its adjoining plots, and Sunnis were illegally permitted to observe Barawafat on Plot No. 602/1133 by reciting Qurankhani, Milad and Fathiha on 16th April 1963 from 9 A.M. to 12 Noon Gulam Abbas and other Shia Muslims filed a Writ Petition No. 2397 of 1973 in the Allahabad High Court for quashing the order of the City Magistrate and for prohibiting the City Magistrate and local authorities from passing or promulgating any order depriving the Shia of peaceful use and enjoyment of the Baradari and the adjoining plots appurtenant to it and also prohibiting them from permitting the Sunnis to make use of the Baradari and its adjoining plots. This Writ Petition and the connected criminal cases (being Criminal Revision and a Criminal Reference against similar earlier orders u./sec. 144 Cr.P.C.) were heard and disposed of by the High Court by a common judgment delivered on August 8, 1975. 

Notwithstanding the fact that the various impugned orders had exhausted themselves by efflux of time, the High Court felt that where a situation arose year after year making it necessary to take action u./sec. 144 Cr.P.C. it would be a proper exercise of its discretion to interfere with the impugned order if found to be illegal or improper, so that the Magistrate may not be encouraged to use his powers in the same manner again when the similar situation arose and that if a repetition of successive orders under sec. 144 resulted in a permanent interference with private legal rights it had to be deprecated and the High Court went on to give guide-lines to the Magistrates in the exercise of their discretionary power under sec. 144. 

On merits the High Court recorded its findings on the rights of the Shias in their favour in view of Civil Court’s decision in earlier litigation and quashed the City Magistrate’s order dated 12-4-1973 allowing the Sunnis and restraining the Shias from holding various religious functions on the occasion of Barawafat on the Baradari and the adjoining plots in question in Mohalla Doshipura and also passed appropriate orders in the connected criminal cases. 

Against this common judgment rendered by the High Court on August 8, 1975, Civil Appeal No. 941 of 1976 and Crl. As. Nos. 432 to 436 of 1976 were preferred by Mohammad Ibrahim, a Sunni Muslim, all of which were disposed of by this Court by a Common judgment dated 6-12-1976 and this Court held that the High Court should not have pronounced any view on the impugned orders under sec.144 when those orders had ceased to be operative and that the High Court should not have given findings on rights, title and property depending on disputed questions of facts in a writ petition the judgment and findings of the High Court were set aside and parties were relegated to have their rights agitated or settled in a civil suit. 

Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment, Gulam Abbas and others filed a Review Petition No. 36 of 1977 in Civil Appeal No.941 of 1976 which was dismissed by this Court on 16th December 1977.

Issues before the Court:

  1. Whether an Order made under Section 144 Criminal Procedure Code is judicial or quasi-judicial order or whether it is passed in exercise of executive power in performance of executive function amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution
  2. Whether the petitioners could be said to have made out any ground for challenging the impugned order passed by the City Magistrate, Varanasi on 24th November 1979 prohibiting both Shia and Sunni communities from holding their Majlises and imposing other restrictions on the occasion of the celebration of Moharram festival at the Baradari in Mohalla Doshipura.
  3. Whether the exercise of the power under the said provision has invariably been perverse and in utter disregard of the lawful exercise of the petitioners’ legal rights to perform their religious ceremonies and functions on the plots and structures in question
  4. Whether the petitioners have succeeded in proving their subsisting entitlement to the customary rights claimed by them.

Ratio of the Case

  • The question of whether an order under Section144 Criminal Procedure Code is a judicial order or an order in exercise of the executive power in performance of an executive function will have to be decided in the instant case by reference to the new Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 and not by reference to the old Criminal Procedure Code, 1898.
  • The position under the 1898 Code, wherein separation between the judicial functions and executive or administrative functions of Magistrates did not obtain, was quite different and the power to act in urgent cases of nuisance and apprehended danger to public tranquillity under Section144 of the Code had been conferred on “District Magistrates, Chief Presidency Magistrates, Sub-Divisional Magistrates, or other Magistrates specially empowered by the State Government”
  • The position under the new Criminal Procedure Code 1973 is entirely different whereunder the scheme of separation of judicial functions from executive functions of the Magistrates, as recommended by the Law Commission has been implemented to a great extent.
  • If certain sections of the present Code are compared with the equivalent sections in the Old Code it will appear clear that a separation between judicial functions and executive or administrative functions has been achieved by assigning substantially the former to the Judicial Magistrates and the latter to the Executive Magistrates.
  • The order under sec. 144 Cr.P.C. 1973 is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 32, the same being in the exercise of executive power in the performance of the executive function.
  • The challenge to this order was incorporated in the writ petition by way of an amendment that had been allowed by the Court. 
  • Since however, that impugned order has by now exhausted itself by efflux of time it would not be proper for us to go into either the grounds of challenge urged by the petitioners or the materials justifying the same put forward by the respondents for determining its legality or validity.
  • Without setting out verbatim the provisions of sec. 144 of the 1973 Code, we might briefly indicate the nature of power thereunder and what it authorizes the executive magistracy to do, and in what circumstances.
  • In urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger, where immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable, a District Magistrate, a Sub-Divisional Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf may, by a written order stating the material facts of the case, direct a particular individual, or persons residing in a particular place or area, or the public generally when frequenting or visiting a particular place or area, 
    • (i) to abstain from a certain act or 
    • (ii) to take certain order with respect to certain property in his possession or under his management, if he considers that such direction is likely to prevent or tends to prevent obstruction, annoyance or injury to any other person lawfully employed, or danger to human life, health or safety, or a disturbance of public tranquillity, or a riot or an affray.
  • As stated earlier sub-sec. (2) authorizes the issuance of such an order ex-parte in cases of emergency or in cases where circumstances do not admit of the serving in due time of a notice upon the person or persons against whom the order is directed but in such cases under sub-sec. (5) the executive magistrate, either on his own motion or on the application of the person aggrieved after giving him a hearing, may rescind or alter his original order. 
  • Under sub-section (4) no order under this section shall remain in force for more than two months from the making thereof unless under the proviso thereto the State Government by Notification directs that such order shall remain in force for a further period not exceeding six months.
  • The entire basis of action under Section 144 is provided by the urgency of the situation and the power thereunder is intended to be availed of for preventing disorders, obstructions, and annoyances with a view to secure the public weal by maintaining public peace and tranquillity.
  • Preservation of the public peace and tranquillity is the primary function of the Government and the aforesaid power is conferred on the executive magistracy enabling it to perform that function effectively during emergent situations and as such it may become necessary for the Executive Magistrate to over-ride temporarily private rights and in a given situation the power must extend to restraining individuals from doing acts perfectly lawful in themselves for, it is obvious that when there is a conflict between the public interest and private rights the former must prevail.
  • The Magistrate’s action should be directed against the wrong-doer rather than the wronged. 
  • Furthermore, it would not be a proper exercise of discretion on the part of the Executive Magistrate to interfere with the lawful exercise of the right by a party on the consideration that those who threaten to interfere constitute a large majority and it would be more convenient for the administration to impose restrictions which would affect only a minor section of the community rather than prevent a larger section more vociferous and militant.
  • They are basing their customary rights on two foundations, namely, decisions of competent Civil Courts adjudicating these rights in their favor and registration of Shia Wakfs concerning the plots and structures for the performance of these practices and functions under secs. 5 and 38 of the U.P. Muslim Wakfs Act, 1936
  • This is a clear case of an existing or established entitlement to the customary rights in favor of the Shias’ community to perform their religious ceremonies and functions over the plots and structures in question under the decree of competent Civil Court for the enforcement of which the instant Writ Petition has been filed.
  • It seems to us quite clear having regard to the six properties being specifically asked to be entered in the list of Shia Waqfs by Imam Ali Mahto in his application and the order made thereon, all the properties mentioned in the application must be regarded as having been entered in the list of Shia Waqfs by the Chief or Provincial Commissioner for Waqfs and the Notification under s. 5(1)
  • When these plots and structures, particularly these three plots were being registered as Shia Waqfs under the U.P. Muslim Waqfs Act 1936 by the Shia Board and Sanads of Certificates of Registration in respect thereof were being issued in December 1952, the two Sunni Lessees who are said to have obtained a Lease on 20.4.1952 did not raise any objection to such registration. The Shias customary rights acquired by prescription over these plots cannot thus be defeated by such derivative title.

Final Decision:

The Court held that the petitioners and through them the Shia community of Mohalla Doshipura, Varanasi has established their existing customary rights to perform their religious rites, practices, observances, ceremonies, and functions minus the recitation and utterance of Tabarra (detailed in the writ petition) over the Plots and structures in question and respondents 5 and 6 and the Sunni community of Mohalla Doshipura are permanently restrained by an injunction from interfering with the exercise of said rights in any manner by the petitioners or members of Shia community and respondents 1 to 4, particularly the executive magistracy of Varanasi is directed if action under section 144 Cr. P.C. is required to be taken, to issue their orders under the said provision having regard to the principles and the guidelines indicated on that behalf in this judgment. The writ petition is thus allowed but each party will bear its own costs.

This case law analysis is written by Prateek Chandgothia, a first-year BA LLB (Hons.) student at Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab.

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The Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad Denies Providing Custody of ‘Minor’ Husband to his ‘Major’ Wife, as it would amount to an Illicit Relationship between them

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-Report by Saksham Srivastava

The Hon’ble High Court of Judicature, Allahabad, refuses to grant custody of a ‘minor’ husband to his wedded ‘major’ wife. The Hon’ble Court says that such an act would amount to an offence under the POCSO Act. The bench headed by Justice J.J Muneer, is of the view, that the marriage between a minor and major is voidable at the option of the party, as given under the POCSO Act and if allowed to stay together, it would result in sanctioning cohabitation between a minor and major.

Petitioner’s Contention

The petitioner, named as Haushila Devi, is the mother of Manish, age 16 years and who is also made as to the petitioner number one by her mother, alleges in hon’ble court that the respondents, namely, Jyoti and her family members forced her son into procuring matrimonial ties with Jyoti, who is a major and is also the respondent number one in the aforesaid case. The learned counsel on behalf of Haushila Devi, claims that her son, Manish has been illegally confined in the house of the respondents, and the conspiracy of the said offence is carried by Jyoti, her mother Pamila Devi, and her two brothers. The petitioner has filed a writ of habeas corpus (to produce the body) in the Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to retain the care and custody of the minor child, Manish, back to her mother who is also the natural guardian of Manish, as claimed by the petitioner number two, Haushila Devi. The learned counsel argues further, that, Manish being a minor of age 16 years is under no competence to enter into any such life-long holy agreements like marriage. They claim that the marriage so performed is void under the provisions laid down in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006. The petitioner further claims that since Manish is a minor as per the law, hence, he cannot be entrusted with the decision-making choice of residing with the strangers, thereby the care and custody should be handed over to the natural guardian, i.e.- her mother, Haushila Devi, also the petitioner number two in the said case.

Respondent’ Contention

The learned counsel on behalf of the respondents, i.e.- Jyoti and her family members, contends that the legislature did not outlay any such provisions of the aftermath about the marriage being solemnized in breach of section 5 (3) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. He argues that the marriage is neither void nor voidable, but valid. As per the law, the penal punishment would be inflicted upon the party who was a major at the time of the commission of such foul act. The learned counsel is of the view that if both the party is minor at the time of such acts, then their parents upon whom the responsibility was bestowed, would be dealt as per the law. He further argues that no matter who suffers the penal consequences, the marriage cannot be solemnized being void or voidable. The learned counsel says that holding a marriage to be void under the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, it should strictly adhere to the stipulations laid down under section 12 of the said Act, else the marriage could be declared as voidable at the option of the party who was minor at the time of marriage. The respondents argued through their learned counsel that Manish who is a minor of 16 years, is about to attain majority and hence, should be bestowed upon with the responsibility of residing with whomsoever he chooses. Section 17 of the Wards Act, 1890 lays down the provision for the minor to chose his/her natural guardian through their own. Therefore since Manish does not want to stay wither mother, he cannot be compelled by the hon’ble court to do so.

Judgment

The bench of Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad, led by Justice J.J Muneer, in the aforesaid case of Manish and Anr v. State of U.P. and 7 others, that the marriage in the said case is voidable at the option of the party who is a minor, i.e.- Manish of age 16 years. The Hon’ble court said it loud and clear that they cannot allow the care and custody of the Manish to be entrusted with his wife as it would originate an event that could facilitate the cohabitation between the minor and the major, regarded as an offence under the POCSO Act, 2006. The court even considered the essential fact of the POCSO Act, that it prevents any sort of cohabitation between the major and the minor. The Lordship also highlighted the sections under the POCSO Act, which defines the offence and also inlays the penal consequences, under sections 3 & 4 respectively, irrespective of the age or sex of the offender. The Hon’ble court ordered to send the minor into the state facilities like ‘Child Home’ to reside till he attains the age of 18 years and thereby he can choose with whom to reside after completion of his age as major. If he still chooses to stay with her mother during the said period, he would have to apply the Child Welfare Committee Act, 2012. The order should comply immediately.

Petitioner is Allowed to Travel Abroad on Deposit of 50% Amount Recovered from Smuggling

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-Report by Muskan Chanda

Facts

  • It is purported based on some information that, 5 passengers namely Wang Wei Ting, Chen Po Shuo, Ms. Chen Hsui Yun, Liao Kuan Hua, and Ms. Chan Kai Li, holders of Republic of China (Taiwan) would be departing from IGI Airport, by Air India Flight No. AI 310 to Hong Kong with its Scheduled departure. It is averred that as per the information obtained, the mentioned passengers would be having a huge quantity of foreign currency on their persons or in hand baggage, and attempt to smuggle out the same.
  • It is alleged that the respondent officers reached the Airport and intercepted the said 5 passengers at Boarding Gate. It is alleged that their baggage was searched and a total amount of USD 4,49,600 was recovered. The said amount was seized. It is averred that the petitioner was enlarged on bail imposing the condition that the petitioner could not travel abroad without the court’s permission.
  • It is further alleged that the petitioner filed an application seeking permission to go to her native country for 6 months as the petitioner is a foreign resident, and is facing financial crises, and has no accommodation in India. Given the facts and circumstances of the case, the court allowed the petitioner to visit abroad for 6 months on some conditions. The said order was challenged by the Department-respondent before the District Judge, Delhi.
  • The respondent-Department has filed a reply. It is alleged that there is no infirmity or illegality in the impugned order. The petitioner is a foreigner so she has no interest in India and in case the petitioner is allowed to go abroad she would not return to India to face trial. It is further submitted that if the order of learned CMM is upheld and the petitioner is allowed to travel abroad, the petitioner shall be directed to deposit in FDR or cash for an amount of at least 50% of the foreign currency recovered from the petitioner. It is further submitted that the applicant has committed an offence punishable under section 135 of the Customs Act 1962. It is denied that the right to travel is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is further contended that the petitioner is a foreign national and is a part of the conspiracy and if she is allowed to go abroad, there is no chance of her returning and facing trial.

Petitioner’s Contention

The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner is a carrier and she tried to smuggle foreign. He further submitted that the petitioner has remained in India for about 18 months and the petitioner, being a woman aged about 54 years, is suffering from extreme hardship in living in Delhi. It is further submitted that the petitioner’s spouse, aged about 64 years, is suffering from various old aged ailments and requires a regular medical check-up and care and there is no one to take care of her family. He submitted that the sibling of the petitioner has met with an accident and is admitted to the hospital. It is further submitted that learned CMM, based on the medical report and photographs which were filed by the petitioner along with the application, Petitioner should be granted permission to visit her country and she would not misuse the freedom to go to her country. If permission is granted by this Court, she would appear in Court to face the trial. It is further submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that the respondent is not averse to the petitioner going abroad but subject to deposit 50% of the amount of recovered foreign currency from the petitioner, which is onerous. It is submitted that there is no allegation that the petitioner is a habitual offender.

Respondent’s Contention

The learned counsel for the respondent contended that the petitioner is allowed to travel to her country, but the petitioner shall be directed to deposit at least 50% of the foreign currency in the form of cash or the form of an FDR with this Court of the amount recovered.

Judgment

Petitioner, given the facts discussed above, is allowed to travel to her country, i.e. Taiwan, for 6 months on deposit of the amount of Rs.15,00,000/- lakhs in the form of an FDR in the name of Registrar General of this Court, and also subject to the following conditions:

  • The petitioner must also furnish an undertaking to report back in the Court on 08.12.2021, at the time of depositing FDR, failing which the amount of FDR shall stand forfeited without giving any further notice;
  • The petitioner must furnish her address during her stay aboard;
  • Petitioner should not seek an extension of her stay abroad on any ground including medical grounds;
  • The petitioner must authorize her counsel to receive notice on her behalf during her stay abroad;
  • During the stay of the petitioner abroad, no adjournment will be sought by her counsel for lack of instructions from her account;
  • The petitioner must surrender back her passport on her return from abroad;
  • Petitioner should not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case to dissuade her from disclosing such facts to the Court or any custom authorities or tamper with the evidence;
  • Petitioner should not indulge or commit such like offence(s) again – similar to the offence to which she is accused now.

The revision petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

The Plaintiff has Abused and Exploited the Method of Law: Juhi Chawla’s 5G Case

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-Report by Muskan Chanda

On the fourth of June, 2021, the High Court of Delhi dismissed Juhi Chawla’s civil proceedings against the launch of 5G and obligatory a significant penalty of twenty lakhs. The complainant is seeking leave to sue in representative interest on the bottom that the launch of 5G technology can cause stupendous damage to the public, as well as future generations, and also the proceedings, involve problems relating to public health of the current as well as future generations.

Plaintiff’s Submission

  • The complainant has been in public bell ringing against the technology and its aspect effects conjointly the aspect effects of electromotive force radiation for the last decade and has been approached by a vast range of individuals, requesting to begin legal proceedings against the “silent killer” that exists in our country’s air, and United Nations agency have expressed their want to hitch them in such proceedings.
  • While Section 91(1)(b) of the CPC has been invoked, it’s with all respect submitted that Section ninety one has been invoked solely regarding the “wrongful acts” of the defendants, the acts concerning the act of omission in not being aware of the health hazards of 5G before allowing any more activity therein field. The Supreme Court has settled the proposition that the ‘precautionary principle‟ stands embedded among the fold of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, thereby conferring fundamental rights upon the plaintiffs even of Section 91 of CPC.
  • Since the plaintiffs, themselves, have severally suffered special in addition to actual damages, it’s not the case of the plaintiffs that the suit cannot proceed if the permission beneath Order I Rule eight of the CPC is to be denied by this Court.
  • In different words, the complainant may without doubt rock the conscience of this Court into being sympathetic to the explanation for the present as well as future generation against what’s undeniably a “silent killer”.

Respondent’s Submission

The respondent contended that no case for grant of leave to institute the suit is created out under Section 91(1)(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure or to sue in representative interest under Order I Rule eight of the Code of Civil Procedure or to keep up the suit while not the said leave/permission because the plaintiffs’ suit is flawed and not rectifiable for the subsequent reasons:

  • Order VI Rule 2(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the plaint shall contain statements of fabric facts in an exceedingly pithy type however no proof by that they’re to be tried. However, the complainants haven’t complied with Order VI Rule read with the provision of Code of Civil Procedure as (i) The statements of the complainant don’t seem to be in pithy type and (ii) The plaintiff has incorporated the proof within the plaint.
  • Order VI Rule nine of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the contents of any document shall not become into being within the plaint unless the precise words of the document or any half therefrom area unit material. However, the complainant has not complied with Order VI Rule nine of the Code of Civil Procedure in addition and has reproduced the documents within the plaint.
  • The complainant has no personal information of any allegations created within the plaint. Thus, the full plaint is predicated on the data and legal recommendation received by the complainant, it seems that the plaintiffs wish Associate in Nursing inquiry to be conducted by this Court into the matter that isn’t permissible in law in these proceedings.
  • According to Section 34 of the Special Relief Act, 1963, someone entitled to any legal character will institute a suit against another one that denies or is interested to deny his right. within the scope of the case, the plaintiffs never approached the defendants claiming any right and so, the defendants didn’t have to be compelled to respond or deny the plaintiffs alleged rights. therein read of the matter, the maintainability of the declarative reliefs wanted by the plaintiffs is uncertain.

Judgment

The case is dismissed. The court expressed that The plaintiffs have abused and exploited the method of law that has resulted in an exceedingly waste of judicial time. The penalty of Rs.20 lakhs is obligatory on the plaintiffs. The plaintiff’s area unit was directed to deposit the price of Rs.20 lakhs with the metropolis State Legal Services Authority (DSLSA) within one week. If the price isn’t deposited within one week, it shall recover an equivalent from the complainant beneath the law. It shall utilize this price for the victims of road accidents. Moreover, the justice mentioned that It seems that the complainant has filed this suit to gain publicity and that is evident from the very fact that the complainant circulated the video conferencing link of this Court on her social media accounts, which resulted in the recurrent disruption of the Court proceedings.

Supreme Court Rescinds the Case Against Famous Journalist Vinod Dua

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-Report by Anuj Dhar

The Supreme Court of India on Thursday quashed the case against Dua for his alleged comments against Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his YouTube show. A bench consisting of Justices Uday Umesh Lalit and Vineet Saran decided to rescind FIR No.0053 and free the petitioner of charges.

Key Highlights

  • Vinod Dua, the petitioner, is an Indian journalist and also has a show on YouTube namely The Vinod Dua show.
  • On 30th March 2020, the petitioner made hurtful allegations against the government and stated unfounded facts against the Prime Minister of India.
  • On 6th May 2020, FIR No.0053 was filed by a BJP leader against the petitioner which pointedly referred to two segments in the talk show and generally dealt with the number of allegations made by the petitioner in said talk show to submit that the actions on part of the petitioner amounted to offences punishable under penal provisions referred to in the FIR.
  • After the review of the FIR, it was decided that the petitioner shall not be arrested in connection with the present crime. However, the petitioner shall fully cooperate with the Police force through Video Conferencing or Online mode.
  • On June 14th, 2020, the Supreme Court held a special sitting to take up a writ petition by Vinod Dua to quash the FIR lodged against him by a BJP leader in Shimla.

Contentions of the Petitioner

Being a renowned journalist, the petitioner was entitled to and did nothing more than critical analysis of the functioning and the actions of the Government.

  • He was touching upon issues of great concern so that adequate attention could be given to the prevailing problems.
  • The petitioner did his duty to bring forward the dispassionate and critical appraisal of the Government. Dua’s actions were covered by Explanations 2 and 3 of Section 124A, IPC3, and exception to Section 505 IPC3 and were within his Right of Free Speech and Expression guaranteed under Article 19 (1)(a) of the Constitution of India.
  • No FIR should be registered against a person belonging to media with at least 10 years of standing unless cleared by the Committee as suggested.

Contentions of the Respondent

Mr. Vinod Dua is spreading fake and malicious news by stating that the Prime Minister has garnered votes through acts of terrorism. This directly amounts to inciting violence amongst the citizens and will further disturb public tranquility. This is an act of instigating violence against the government of India and the Prime Minister. Whoever makes or circulates false claims, alarms, or warnings relating to a disaster or its severity or magnitude, leading to the panic of the citizens of the country, shall on conviction, will be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to 1 year or with fine.

The Decision by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court of India on Thursday quashed the case against Dua for his alleged comments against Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his YouTube show, saying a verdict of the year 1962, namely Kedar Nath Singh, entitles every journalist to protection. The prayer that no FIR be registered against a person belonging to media with at least 10 years of standing unless cleared by the Committee was rejected by the Supreme Court. Writ Petition was allowed to the aforesaid extent and FIR No.0053 dated 06.05.2020 registered at Police Station Kumarsain, District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh was quashed.

Relevant Sections

  • Indian Penal Code,1860 – Section 124A, 268, 501 and 505
  • Disaster Management Act – Section 52, 54.
  • Article 32 in The Constitution of India 1949
  • Article 19(1)(a) in The Constitution of India 1949