Tag: #DelhiHC

-Report by Deep Shikha 

The Hon’ble High court of Delhi in the case of Panasonic India Private Ltd vs. Shah Aircon Through its Proprietor Shadab Raza, held that the court cannot intervene in the arbitral proceedings as well as the parties can refer the disputes to arbitration even without an agreement but at some point of time in the course of the agreement must show the intention to refer the disputes to arbitration.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioner, hereby, entered into a distributorship agreement to sell electronic goods to the respondent. The agreement contains a clause of dispute resolution by arbitration saying that all issues relating to appointment of arbitrator or any petition to be made to the court under the applicable arbitration law with the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 or any issue arising out of arbitration proceedings and award shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of courts at New Delhi. 

The dispute arose between them over alleged unpaid invoices. Therefore, a legal notice was sent on behalf of the respondent dated 20.08.2020. It was further alleged that even after the distributorship agreement between them, petitioner sold goods to some dealer directly and bills were made in the name of respondent which resulted in huge loss to the respondent, but the payment was not received by them. In reply to legal notice, petitioner demanded a sum of Rs. 37,29,976/- in the event of failure of payment and invoked the arbitration clause contained in the agreement. This led to the present petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 on 15.07.2021. In response to it, the respondent contended to be the dispute of civil nature which can be resolved under the jurisdiction of court. 

There are mainly three issues addressed in this case namely:-

1. Whether the purported arbitration clause is a valid clause in an agreement?
2. Whether the distributorship agreement is under the limitations for the agreement to be made enforceable?
3. Whether the court has jurisdiction to resolve the dispute by way of civil nature?

Hence, it brings to the present petition for resolving civil disputes in arbitration rather under the jurisdiction of court.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

The learned counsel appearing from respondent’s side stated that it did not sign any agreement with the petitioner. Therefore, the arbitration clause in the agreement is not a valid clause as the term “can” and “shall” makes the agreement uncertain, cases like Jagdish Chander vs. Ramesh Chander and Ors. and Jyoti Brothers vs. Sree Durga Mining Company, were relied on.

It also pointed out the second issue of limitation of the agreement which is not mentioned in agreement is one year as per Clause II(xi) of the General Terms & Conditions of the agreement, to be read with Schedule II and III. In this present case, it is outside the limitation of the agreement making an agreement void. 

While addressing the third issue by the learned council from respondent side, it further questioned that the dispute is related to arrears in accounts, which provide jurisdiction to court through civil proceedings in Gurugram, Haryana. And the petitioner has no power to appoint any learned arbitrator. The respondent contended that courts lacked jurisdiction over the venue of arbitral proceedings.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION

The learned counsel appearing from appellant’s side made an application to address the first issue in the suit for reference to arbitration under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Since, the parties’ intention to take reference to arbitration is sufficient for the parties to mutually refer the dispute to Arbitral Tribunal even without any expressly or impliedly agreement under the reference of the Clause XXIV and XXV of the agreement, the arbitration clause stands forth under the provisions of Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

While addressing the second issue, on the question of limitation, they contended that this issue be adjudicated by the arbitral tribunal during arbitral proceedings. Further on the question of jurisdiction which is the last issue, exclusive jurisdiction of contract will prevail over the intention of the parties to signify the place for the conduct of arbitral proceedings.

JUDGEMENT

The Hon’ble High court of Delhi grants the petition of referring the dispute to Arbitral Tribunal. Addressing this, the court appointed an arbitrator for resolving the dispute and pronounced an Arbitral Award. The remuneration is to be calculated on the basis of Schedule IV of the Act. All rights and contentions of the parties are left open for adjudication under the Arbitral Tribunal by the learned Arbitrator.

-Report by Sanket Pawar

Delhi High Court grants bail to the petitioner (spouse of the co-accused, Vinod) whose vehicle was used for the transportation of Heroin, in the case of SIMRANJEET KAUR Vs STATE OF GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI.

Facts

A raid was conducted jointly by the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) and Delhi police upon receiving secret information on 29/09/17. The information said that a person named Imran, who resides at Dakshinpuri area of Delhi, will be bringing heroin from Bareilly, U.P. in large quantities. Imran would be bringing these large quantities of heroin at the instance and order of a person named Vinod a.k.a Rinku a.k.a. Mota Bhai. Imran could be caught on the road from Kalindi Kunj to Sarita Vihar near Drain (Nala) and opposite Shaheen Bagh at about 12:15 p.m. Accordingly, the raid was conducted and Imran was apprehended along with the vehicle in which he was transporting the heroin and 500g of heroin was recovered from him. Upon investigation, the name of Mota Bhai came forward, and a supplementary charge sheet was also filed with the Charge sheet of Imran. The supplementary charge sheet is also named the petitioner. The vehicle which Imran was using to transport the heroin was registered in the name of petitioner Simranjeet Kaur. She is the spouse of the co-accused Vinod a.k.a. Mota Bhai. Mota Bhai is a habitual offender and there are other FIRs registered in his name. The trial court had dismissed the bail application of the petitioner twice.

Petitioner’s Contention

The petitioner sought bail on the grounds that she was not aware of the recovery of any narcotic substances from her vehicle. It also argued that the phrase in Section 25 of the NDPS act “knowingly permitted” does not mention the transportation of narcotic substances by use of the vehicle. The counsel relied on the case of Sujit Tiwari vs the State of Gujarat, wherein the apex court granted bail to the accused on the ground that the accused was not aware of the illegal activities procured by his brother.

Respondent’s Contention

The Respondent argued that during the investigation the prime accused, Imran, revealed the vehicle which is registered in the name of the petitioner. The same vehicle was used for the transportation of heroin. The petitioner along with her husband, Mota Bhai, was absconding for a long time. The counsel claimed that the petitioner was having full knowledge of the transportation of the heroin which was to take place.

Judgement

The court observed that there has been no recovery of the heroin from the petitioner. The only allegation levelled against the petitioner is that she is the registered owner of the vehicle in which the heroin was transported by the prime accused. There is not any evidence which shows the major involvement of the petitioner in the commission of the crime. The court also relied on the judgement of the apex court in the case of Sujit Tiwari vs State of Gujarat. Relying on all the above factors the court decided to grant bail to the petitioner along with a bail bond of 50,000/-.

Case Number

CRL.A. 157/2013

Equivalent Citation

247 (2018) DLT 31

Bench

Justice S Muralidhar, Justice IS Mehta 

Decided On

November 30, 2017

Relevant Act/Section

• Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
• The Indian Electricity Act, 1910
• The Indian Penal code
• The Companies Act, 1956

Brief Facts and Procedural History

An exhaustive judgment given on September 15, 2016, allowed the allure. Notwithstanding, on that date, the Court gave a different choice featuring three worries that emerged in a bigger setting and selected Prof. (Dr.) G.S. Bajpai, Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice and Registrar, National Law University, Delhi, as amicus curiae to give guidance.

Issues before the Court

• Is the substantive law and procedure relating to the default in payment of a fine?
• Whether the existing law on suspension of sentence under Section 389 CrPC?
• Whether there is any provision that may enable the Court to suspend the order of conviction as normally what is suspended is the execution of the sentence?

Decision of the Court:

The Supreme Court communicated in Palaniappa Gounder v. State of Tamil Nadu¹ that “the fine discipline ought not to be pointlessly lavish”.

“However, there is the capacity to integrate a sentence of death or life imprisonment with a sentence of fine,” it was added. “That power should be polished with caution, considering that the life sentence is an outrageous discipline to force, and adding a fine to that grave discipline is not completely resolved to fill any accommodating need.”.”

The Supreme Court reaffirmed on account of Shantilal v. the State of M.P. that there was a total abuse of the arrangement of frameworks in Sections 63 to 70 IPC, causing legal to notice the instance of Shahejadkhan Mahebubkhan Pathan v. the State of Gujarat, where the Supreme Court totally abused the arrangement of frameworks in Sections 63 to 70 IPC.

Nonetheless, detainment for non-installment of fines is in another equilibrium. In the place where such a sentence is implemented, an individual is supposed to be detained in light of the fact that the person can’t pay the fine or won’t pay the fine. We are of the assessment that it is the occupant of the Court to keep an assessment of the case, the conditions under which it is held, the area of the case, the litigant, and other significant contemplations, for instance, the monetary conditions of the respondent in regard of and how much the offense prior to requesting that the culprit endure detainment when the individual in question is fined. The arrangements of Sections 63 to 70 of the IPC specify that the punishment rate ought not to be brutal or nonsensical. We additionally stress that in the case of a basic term of detainment, outlandish fines ought not to be forced by some other means than uncommon offenses. “

Clearly, no preparation is honored with use and purified in time that can’t be permitted to win in a circumstance where it attempts to cause disgrace. Each activity of the Court should be trailed by its governmental policy regarding minorities in society because of authentic worries about uniformity. Preparing not to give bail to an individual condemned to life detainment was going on in the High Courts and in this Court on the premise that assuming an individual is considered fit for preliminary and condemned to life detainment, the person ought not to be delivered. , as long as his endless sentence can be saved, yet the fundamental reason for this preparing was that the enticement of such an individual would be disposed of throughout some undefined time frame, so it was expected that he, at last, appeared to be dependable, he would have no need to endlessly remain in jail. The thought of this preparation may not have any significant bearing in the event that the Court isn’t in that frame of mind of interest for five or six years. Without a doubt, it would be a wrongdoing to compare and save an individual from jail for a time of five or six years for wrongdoing that at last seems to have not been carried out. When could the Court at any point pay him for his apparently outrageous captures? It would be fair regardless for the Court to tell the person: “We have admitted your enchantment as we suspect you are at legitimate fault for your appearance, yet tragically we have not had the potential chance to hear your temptation for a long time and, subsequently, up to this point. We hear your enticement, you ought to remain in jail, regardless of the way that you are straightforward? “the adjudicator could never have been overwhelmed by regret while eliminating such an individual in the wake of hearing the enticement? Could it not be an assault on his feeling of equity? in the past it ought to be reconsidered for quite a while as this Court isn’t in that frame of mind of hearing the temptation of the denounced as soon as possible, the Court ought to, except if there is valid justification to make a move regardless, delivering the indicted individual in situations where exceptional leave is taken into account the respondent to apply for conviction and sentence. “

Section 389 (1) states that in the repercussions of any allure against a respondent, the Court of Appeal may because it must be recorded as a held duplicate, demand that the sentence or allure be suspended in like manner, guaranteeing that he had the power, to be delivered on bail, or on his bond. This proviso acquaints the non-select power with suspending the condemning and award bail and notwithstanding suspending the activity of the basic allure.

This issue was completely inspected by a three-judge bench of this Court in Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang and Ors.²

The legal position, appropriately, is clear that the Court of Appeal may suspend or grant an application for sentencing. However, the person wishing to remain guilty must clearly state the consideration of the Court reversing the consequences of his or her conviction. Unless the Court’s decision is based on the possible consequences of a conviction, the convicted person will not be able to apply for conviction. In addition, the reward for remaining guilty can be converted to extraordinary cases depending on the shocking facts of the case. “

The legal status of the Supreme Court under Section 389 of the CrPC is very clear, it is enough for this Court to repeat it.

There is a real need, right, for a formal (proper) administration to provide relief and rehabilitation for the injured through extrajudicial executions and arrests. Whether this should be a law that governs everything or a system that specifically addresses the needs of the survivor, and those who are unjustly imprisoned, including the family and guardians of the detainee, or these should be governed by different rules or arrangements for discussion, consideration, and consultation with The purpose of the article is to pay for those who are unjustly detained, questions about the circumstances and circumstances in which such assistance can be obtained, in what structure and at what stage and are matters for consideration. This is the best work left in the main case of a body tasked with informing government officials of control measures expected to fill an undeniable hole.

The Court, appropriately, compels the Indian Law Commission to attempt a thorough investigation of the matter referred to in paragraphs 11 to 16 of this application and to make its recommendation to the Government of India.

Conclusion

In this case, the Delhi High Court expressed profound concern over the plight of innocent people who have been unfairly convicted and imprisoned for crimes they did not commit. The Court emphasized the urgent need for a legislative framework to provide relief and rehabilitation to victims of wrongful prosecution and incarceration and urged the Law Commission to conduct a thorough review of the aforementioned issues and submit recommendations to the Indian government.

In the current state of the criminal justice system in the country, an adequate reaction from the state to victims of a miscarriage of justice resulting in erroneous prosecutions is absent. There is also no statutory or regulatory framework detailing the state’s approach to the problem.

According to the solicitation made by the court, the Law Commission of India introduced a report to the Government of India in August 2018 named “Wrongful Prosecution (Miscarriage of Justice): Legal Remedies.” In this paper, the point is analyzed with regard to the Indian law enforcement framework, and the expression “wrongful prosecution” is suggested as the limit for a miscarriage of justice, rather than “wrongful conviction” and “wrongful imprisonment.” ‘Wrongful prosecution’ alludes to circumstances in which the blamed isn’t blameworthy for the wrongdoing, however, the police and additionally prosecution are occupied with bad behavior in exploring or potentially indicting the individual.

It would cover both cases in which the person served time in jail and those in which he did not; as well as those in which the accused was found not guilty by the trial court or was convicted by one or more courts but was ultimately found not guilty by the Higher Court. The report provides an outline of the various legal remedies and evaluates their shortcomings (also noted by the High Court in the aforementioned Order).

As a result, the Commission recommends enactment of a specific legal provision for wrongful prosecution redress – to provide monetary and non-monetary compensation to victims of wrongful prosecution within a statutory framework (such as counseling, mental health services, vocational / employment skills development, and so on). The Report lays out the core principles of the proposed framework, including defining “wrongful prosecution,” or cases in which a claim for compensation can be filed, naming a Special Court to hear these claims, the nature of the proceedings – timelines for deciding the claim, etc., financial and other factors to be considered in determining compensation, provisions for interim compensation in certain cases, and removing disqualification due to wrongful prosecution.

Hence, a legal (ideally legislative) framework for giving relief and rehabilitation to victims of wrongful prosecution and incarceration is urgently needed. In addition to the topic of paying persons who have been unfairly imprisoned, consideration should be given to the situations and conditions under which such relief would be available, as well as the form and stage at which such relief would be provided.

Citations:

1. (1977) 2 SCC 634
2. (1995) 2 SCC 513

This case analysis is done by Arryan Mohanty, a 2nd Year Student student of Symbiosis Law School.

-Report by GURPREET SINGH

The Court in this case refused to interfere in a settlement deed by invoking its inherent powers under Section 151 CPC, 1908 as pleaded by the petitioners.

FACTS OF THE CASE

A settlement deed was agreed upon by both parties by 3rd November 2016. The deed read that there shall be no further extension/enlargement for any reason whatsoever beyond 30.6. 2021. It further stated that the second party shall remove all its installations, fittings, and fixtures on or before 30.6.2021. The petitioner approached the court on 29.6.21 seeking a modification in terms of the deed.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION

The main contention of the petitioner was that at the time the deed was signed neither of the parties could predict the pandemic Covid-19 wreaking havoc on the world and due to lockdowns in place the petitioner submitted that they are granted 3 months to remove fixtures and furniture. They contended that in the interest of justice the petitioners be accorded adequate time to vacate the premises and respondent be restrained from seeking forceable eviction.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

The respondents raised doubts about the bona fides of the said petition as the petition the presented at the Nth hour, just a day before 30.6.2021. The respondent relied on Compack Enterprises India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Beant Singh and contended that the court rarely interferes in the settlement deed.

DECISION OF THE COURT

The Court refused to interfere with the settlement deed and dismissed the petition. The Court stated that the deed is clear and unambiguous and it warrants no more extension beyond the stipulated period. The court rejected the argument of petitioners that no one could have predicted the impact of Covid -19, by stating that if the court passes any order that would contravene the settlement deed. The court also rejected the plea of the petitioner that in the interest of justice, they shall be granted be an extension for removing furniture and fixtures by stating that the deed was signed about 5 years back and they had ample time to fulfill their obligations. The Court also relied on the Compack enterprise’s case, which ruled that consent decrees are not to be lightly interfered with by the court, except with the consent of parties involved in the transaction. The circumstances in which the court can modify the consent decrees are where there is a revised consent of the parties, the consent was obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake, and lastly where there is a clerical or arithmetical error. The Court after examining these circumstances stated that none of them apply to the present case.

-Report by GURPREET SINGH

FACTS

On 15.6.16, the prosecutrix, along with her niece around 9 P.M went to Narispur Sabzi Mandi to purchase vegetables. On reaching Buddha Jayanti Park, the accused obstructed her and forcefully took her to a secluded place in the park and raped her around 9.30-10 P.M . The Prosecuterix managed to run away from the clutches of the accused, got reunited with her niece, and narrated the incident to her. After the incident, they went straight to Shani Mandir, Dasratpur where they narrated the incident to the husband of the niece, who called the police, and the accused was apprehended as he was still following them. The Trial Court convicted the accused under section 354 D and 376 of the I.P.C. Aggrieved by the said order the accused approached the High Court in appeal.

CONTENTIONS

The learned counsel of the appellant contended that there was the consent of the prosecutrix in the act and the consent can be adduced by the fact that she did not raise an alarm on noticing the accused following her in the mandi. The counsel further contended that the appellant did not raise an alarm at the point of the time of the alleged rape incident as well. They further contended that the niece of the prosecutrix requested the appellant and prosecutrix to get ice cream for all of them and at that point in the time prosecutrix agreed to have sex with the appellant instead of money. They further contended that no external injuries were found on the prosecutrix and that contradicts their theory of rape.

DECISION OF THE COURT

The Court by pursuing the testimonies and other evidence on record concluded that the explanation of the prosecutrix in concluding that the accused might have been shopping in the mandi as others, on observing that he was following them. Further, on the point of prosecutrix not raising an alarm at the time of incidence, the court reasoned that the place of incidence was scheduled and there even if she had raised an alarm, it would have reached no one and the MSL report indicates injuries on the appellant that depicts resistance by the prosecutrix. The argument of the accused that he befriended the niece of the prosecutrix and when requested by her to get ice cream, he offered money to prosecutrix to have sex and she consented is an afterthought as he in his statement under section 313 C.R.PC stated that he refused to pay money to the prosecutrix after having sex with her on the premise that he did not possess an amount of Rs 300. This contradicts his statement. The Court further placed reliance on the State of Himachal Pradesh v Manga Singh, which held that the conviction can be based solely on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no corroboration be required. The Court confirmed the conviction of the accused and directed the trial court to consider compensation to the victim in light of the Delhi Victim Compensation Scheme.

The High Court of Delhi received a PIL by Advocate Nikhil Borwankar regarding the implementation of the new legislation on the police who are performing search and seizure in the advocate’s premises.

Advocate Prashant Bhushan appeared on the petitioner’s side stating that the police who perform search and seizure in the advocate’s premises are forcibly snatching the mobile of the Advocate which contains confidential data and conversations of their clients, which is in a draconian manner and is against the rule of law. By criticizing the incident of search and seizure performed by police in advocate’s premises dated 28, December 2020. He seeks to issue a notice to the government on this unduly intimidation of the police. And the plea also states that intimidating the Advocate’s professional digital devices is a grave and egregious violation of the privacy of the private citizen and that too with the member of the bar council who is always engaged with their clients. Hence, pray of the plea is that the issuance of the search warrant must be sanctioned by the director of the prosecution and the warrants issued by the court must have some alternative way to perform such search and seizures in the Advocate’s premises.

The Additional Solicitor General Chetan Sharma who represented on behalf of the Union of India stated that it is impossible to bring fresh legislation as per the petition. And he also opposed the plea stating that the search and seizure guild lines in according to the different acts. And he also pointed that the petition doesn’t contain any detail regarding whom and where such act of search and seizure took. At least the petition must have some names of the parties to the case. Or however, the national investigation agency and the intelligence bureau have to be parties in this case.

As per the request made by the Additional Solicitor General Chetan Sharma, the court asked to reply to the notice directed to the central government to hear this case further. Until then the court remarked that the court is simply adjourning by awaiting the reply of the central government, by deciding to hear remaining on September 3, 2021.

-Report by AJISHA

In response to a lawyer’s petition contesting the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, the Delhi High Court today requested the Central government’s answer (IT Rules, 2021). Uday Bedi, a practising lawyer, filed a petition alleging that the new IT Rules violate basic rights to free expression and privacy. The Union Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology has been served with a notice by the Court (MEITY). The case is set to be heard on September 13th.

Bedi claims that the new IT Rules violate his basic rights as a user of social media intermediaries (SMIs) including WhatsApp, Instagram, and Twitter. The challenged Rules are said to violate the Indian Constitution’s Articles 14 (right to equality, including the right against arbitrariness), 19 (freedom of speech and expression), and 21 (right to life and personal liberty, which is understood to include the right to privacy). News portals The Wire, The Quint, and AltNews, as well as the Press Trust of India, have challenged the IT Rules, 2021 in the Delhi High Court. The High Court earlier this month denied interim relief in cases brought by The Wire, The Quint, and AltNews while giving the Central government and other respondents time to respond to the claims.

Other challenges challenging the IT Rules have been filed in the Madras, Kerala, and Bombay High Courts. Because there are several petitions on the subject. The Centre has also filed a transfer petition with the Supreme Court, requesting that all matters be considered there. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has yet to order a stay on any of the High Court actions.

-Report by ESHAN SHARMA

-Report by MANASWA SHARMA

On July 5, the Delhi High Court, composed of Judge Sanjeev Narula, ruled that it was inappropriate to intervene in the ruling unless there were grounds for allegations of deliberate misconduct and prejudice against scholars. The arbitrator and the court found that if the court does not interfere with such a decision, the well-trained arbitrator will review all the documents in the minutes of the meeting very methodically and evaluate the evidence provided by both parties before concluding.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The motion attempted to set aside the arbitration award under Article 34 of the Arbitration and Mediation Act 1996. The sole learned arbitrator acknowledged the claim of the defendant Saptrishi Builders Private Limited (abbreviated as SBPL) and 1,30,02,314.13 rupees with interest on the date of award During the month, Veg Sanchar Vihar Cooperative Group Housing Society Ltd.’s interest was 12% of the prescribed amount. (VSV for short) has appointed SBPL as the contractor for 68 apartments. In Dwarka 6, District 19-B, New Delhi, under the tariffs and conditions stipulated there, SBPL stated that it had performed work under the specifications stipulated in the contract, but VSV refused to pay for the contract. SBPL had previously seen a legal notice dated July 14, 2010, went to the arbitration, and asked VSV to approve the appointment of Mr. P. Bhatia (colleague engineer) as the arbitrator. Controversial decision.

LAWSUIT OF THE APPLICANT

SAAM’s lawyer, Mr. V. V. Gautam, stated:

• The appointment of learned arbitrators allegedly violated Article 43 of the contract, which stipulates that arbitrators must be learned officials. From the Institute of Engineers (India) or Institute of Architects (India). The sole arbitrator, Mr. Vivekanand, did not meet any criteria, so his appointment should be invalid.
• Some people think that because of the subject matter contained in Articles 20-27 (except for Article 25), it does not fall within the scope of arbitration under Article 42(a). The arbitration will only be resorted to after the procedures in paragraph 42 have been implemented.
• It was argued that since the construction project, the quality, quantity, and quality of the materials used, as well as the invoices, have been overdue. 27 They are supervised and protected. The statement of the responsible arbitrator is unfounded and is deliberately disadvantageous to SAAM.

DEFENDANT’S ACTION:

SBPL Attorney, Shekhar Nanavaty made the following argument:

• It has been alleged that the arbitrator was appointed by this court under Article 11 of the Act at the request of the SBPL and therefore cannot currently be appointed to be questioned.
• It was further argued that at the time of appointment or according to Section 13 of the Act, no objections had been raised before the Scientific Arbitrator. No document was recorded demonstrating fraud or forgery by the Referee.
• It was further alleged that the learned arbitrator, after examining the competing allegations and evidence, approved a well-reasoned award that was free from weakness or illegality and should therefore not be interfered with by this court.

REASON’S AND JUDGEMNET OF THE COURT

The honorable court made the following determination:

• The arbitration is fully justified and corresponds to the contractual scheme. There is no contradiction to clause 42 of the contract. and the objection raised on this basis is untenable.
• The conclusions and reasoning of the experienced arbitrator based on the allegations and evidence are reasonable and cannot be objected to once the final invoice has been received. Therefore, the court found no merit, viz. Falsification or fraud in connection with the final invoice.
• The SAAM’s argumentation is not only vague, but it is also completely wrong and legally untenable. After carefully examining the documents, the scientific arbitrator awarded the amount in favor of the SBPL. In the light of the foregoing, the Court of First Instance found the present petition neither to be justified nor to have grounds capable of prejudice to the contested award.

The court today has declined to stay the release of the film Nyaay: the justice which is based on the life of Sushant Singh Rajput. So the K.K Singh had made an Appeal that the movie has been released on a website and he sought to stay on its release on any other OTT Platform and in cinema halls.

The division bench of Justice Anup Jairam Bhambhani and Jasmeet Singh, while issuing a notice for July 14 to the respondents in the Appeal filed by Singh, said that there was nothing in this movie that would affect the investigation in the SSR case.

The court further said that you have not written a script or a story that has been used by the filmmaker. There is nothing that they have or they could have had. Expect what is available in the public domain. Therefore, the movie is something which the public is interested in and they have made just a movie. The court stated. The bench further added that there does not seem to be any interference in the investigation because of the production of movies on Rajput’s life. It further said that is it your case that life story of that celebrity is itself copyrightable which is nothing in material form asked the court.

Senior Advocate Harish Salve, representing K.K Singh, said that the Rajput was an extremely successful actor and the filmmakers were using his personal life story. There is a right of a father to protect the reputation of his son. So K.K Singh’s lawyer said this in front of the court. The Bench further said that we will have it on 14th July, while hearing the application of Rajput’s father Krishna Kishore Singh, in the appeal against the single judge order refusing to stay the release of the film. And also said that I’m not disposed at this stage.

-Report by RAVINUTHALA VAMSI KRISHNA

On Friday, a hearing on plea on habeas corpus filed by Gulfisha Fatima, an accused of offences under UAPA, was adjourned which sought release from Judicial custody by Delhi HC. It was adjourned by a division bench of Justices Naveen Chawla and Asha Menon. It is adjourned to July 5, instead of the court being burdened with heavy load and lack of time for the said plea. The plea will be looked into by the roster bench after vacation.

Fatima was charged under various sections of UAPA for being involved in the riots that happened in North East Delhi from 22.02.2020 to 26.02.2020. She is also accused that she was part of a larger conspiracy behind inciting the Northeast Delhi Riots that took place in February 2020. Fatima also involved Natasha Narwa, Devangana Kalita, and Asif Iqbal who were released from Tihar jail on Thursday by the bail order by Delhi HC on 15 June’20. They are allegedly the masterminds of the conspiracy of the North-East Delhi violence in Feb2020, they are accused of wanting to disturb law and order to National Capital as a reaction to the Citizenship Amendment Act enacted last year.

The Supreme Court of Friday issued a notice in an appeal filed by Delhi Police which challenged the verdict of HC. It said that the impugned judgment shall not be relied on as a precedent by any of the parties before any court. “It is clarified that release of the respondents (Asif Iqbal Tanha, Devangana Kalita & Natasha Narwal) at this stage not interfered with,” it added.

-Report by Saksham Srivastava