-Report by Deepti Dubey

The Punjab and Haryana High Court, on 12th October quashed the FIR lodged against Kumar Vishwas, former Aam Aadmi Party leader, on the allegations of issuing provocative statements and other offenses on April 12, 2022. The controversial statements were made in regard to the separatist motive of AAP.


Mr. Kumar Vishwas gave an interview on 16th February, during Vidhan Sabha elections wherein he made accusations regarding the involvement of Mr. Arvind Kejriwal, CM of Delhi with anti-social elements, including separatist groups. The interview was widely spread all over social media and included deliberate intentions to associate every leader of the AAP (Aam Aadmi Party) with nefarious activities. 

On 12th April, 2022 as per the complaint, the complainant was faced by a group of 10-12 persons who attempted assault, following the victory of the AAP in Vidhan Sabha Elections. The complainant alleged that the incident was a result of the alleged incitement by Kumar Vishwas in his interview. 

A written complaint was given to the SHO, Police Station Sadar, Rupnagar, Punjab, based on the mentioned events, against the petitioner, following which an FIR was filed. On 15th April, the investigation was handled by the SIT. The Special Investigation Team [SIT], revealed that the hooligans had apprised the complainant that they had watched the interview of Kumar Vishwas who repeated the statements made in the interview. The petitioner was given a notice under S. 41-A of the CrPC, following which, he approached the court for quashing the FIR.


The petitioners contended that the FIR was driven by political motives. It was argued that the state machinery was being misused to avenge the petitioner’s defiance of AAP.

The complainant submitted that there is a prima facie case and the petition must be dismissed. The state contended that the investigation reveals that the interview flared up the sentiments and led to the outburst and hooliganism. 

The petitioner has been arraigned as an accused for violating sections 153, 153-A, 505, 505(2), 116, 143, 147, 323, 341, 120-B of IPC and Section 125 of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951. 


The court, while quashing the FIR, reasoned that there is no nexus between the incident in April and the interview in February. The allegations levelled in the FIR even if taken on face value and accepted in entirety, though not admitted, do not prima facie constitute any offense against the petitioner under the abovementioned sections. An act of provocation intended to cause a riot under S.153A of IPC involves a substantial factor of mens rea i.e. the intention. The court in the instant case held that there was no element of culpability, even if all investigations were to be considered valid. Consequently, The Court invoked the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC and held that none of the penal provisions under which Kumar Vishwas stood arraigned is prima facie made out against him.


The Punjab and Haryana High court in the instant judgment took a step further and referred to, S Rangarajan v. P Jagjivan Ram (1989) wherein the Supreme Court held in paragraph 45 that the anticipated danger to the freedom of speech should not be remote. It should have a proximate and direct nexus with the expression. The expression of thought should be intrinsically dangerous to the public interest.

It also referred to the Shreya Singhal judgment which highlighted three concepts which are fundamental in understanding the reach of this most basic of human rights, they are discussion, advocacy and incitement. It is only when the freedom of speech reaches incitement, should it be curbed to protect the public interest.

While upholding the foundation of democracy, the right to freedom, the court quashed the FIR against Kumar Vishwas, to prevent abuse of the process of law.


Bail Appl. No. 8346 of 2018


2019 SCC OnLine Ker 13012




Decided on January 24, 2019


The applicant is a PMSAMA Higher Secondary School Urdu teacher. He oversaw the NSS’s activities. On November 6, 2018, the victim, a minor child, and a student from a different school went to a camp at PMSAMA Higher Secondary School in Malappuram. The applicant is said to have complimented her on her accomplishments. He invited the victim to the principal’s chamber at 4 p.m. He took two pens from his drawer, one of which he gave to the sufferer. He then kissed her on the forehead after touching her hand. It was offensive to the victim since, according to her, it was done with sexual purpose. A complaint was filed on November 27, 2018, alleging these claims, which resulted in the subject offense being registered under Section 10 read with Section 9 of the Protection of Women from Sexual Offenses Act, 2012.


Under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this case was filed under the Hon’ble court. Section 438 of CrPC talks about anticipatory bail regarding the commencement of doing some nonbailable offense. Anticipatory bail means that a person who is apprehending an interest can apply for bail in advance. The addition of this provision was a recommendation made by the 41st Law Commission of India.


Is the accused liable under Section 10 read with Section 9 of the Protection of Women from Sexual Offences Act, 2012?

Section 9 of the POCSO Act: Talks about Aggravated Sexual Assault
Whoever conducts a sexual assault on a child while serving as a police officer: inside the confines of the police station or premises to which he is assigned; or (ii) within the confines of any station house, whether or not located within the police station to which he is assigned;
(iii) while performing his responsibilities or otherwise; or
(iv) where he is identified or known as a police officer; or

(b) whomsoever commits sexual assault on a child while serving in the armed forces or security forces in jail, remand home, protection home, observation home, or other places of custody or care and protection established by or under any government authority; or whoever commits sexual assault on a child in a hospital, whether government or private; or whoever is on the staff of management of a jail, protection home, remand home, observation home or other
place of custody or care and protection established by or under any government authority.

Hence, that a child is sexually assaulted by one or more members of a group in furtherance of their common goal, each of those members is deemed to have committed gang sexual assault within the meaning of this clause, and each of those members is liable for the act in the same way as if he had done it alone;

SECTION 10 of the POCSO Act: It talks about Punishment for aggravated Sexual Assault
Anyone who commits serious sexual assault faces a sentence of imprisonment of either kind for a period of not less than five years but not more than seven years, as well as a monetary fine.


The High Court of Kerala held that the entire dispute between the respondent and the petitioner was settled amicably. The bench of Justice Alexander Thomas in the judgment wrote that the dispute was settled amicably and ordered that petitioner’s mother was required to submit an affidavit stating that she had no problem with the quashing of FIR.


Justice M.R. Shah of the Supreme Court held in Laxmi Narayan that the High Court in that the case had not taken into account the relevant facts and circumstances of the case, particularly the seriousness of the offenses and their social impact while quashing the FIR as a result of the parties’ settlement, despite the fact that it was a non-compoundable offense. In that case, Justice Shah found that the High Court failed to assess the distinction between a personal or private wrong and a social wrong, as well as the societal impact.

During the hearing of the Kerala Government’s appeal against the ruling, the bench observed the government’s argument that quashing the FIR is not relevant in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in the case State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan & Ors (2019). Justice M.R. Shah of the Supreme Court held in Laxmi Narayan that the High Court in that the case had not taken into account the relevant facts and circumstances of the case, particularly the seriousness of the offenses and their social impact while quashing the FIR as a result of the parties’ settlement, despite the fact that it was a non-compoundable offense. In that case, Justice Shah found that the High Court failed to assess the distinction between a personal or private wrong and a social wrong, as well as the societal impact. In this case, the High Court has taken no pains to examine the complete set of facts in context and has quashed the criminal proceedings on a mechanical basis.

This is written by Dalima Pushkarna student at Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow.

The Tarak Mehta fame actress Munmun Dutta’s FIR for her alleged remarks hurting the sentiments of the SC community was ordered to be stayed by the Supreme Court.

A division bench led by Justices Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian issued a notice against a plea filed by Dutta against the FIR under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. In the petition filed by Dutta, she sought a stay on the FIRs against her while clubbing and consolidating the FIRs registered in various states. Puneet Bali, a senior advocate, represented Dutta and submitted that since Dutta is Bengali, she was unaware of the real meaning of the said word. To which the bench contended, “That is not true. You may not be informed. Everyone knows the meaning. The same word is used in Bangla.”

The Bench directed a stay on 5 FIRs registered on her in different states along with issuing a notice in the petition. The matter has been listed in court after 6 weeks.

-Report by Saksham Srivastava

The present article has been written by Gracy Singh, a 2nd Year student pursuing a BA.LLB (Hons.) from Mody University of Science and Technology, Lakshamangarh, Rajasthan.


FIR or First Information Report is the earliest form of information relating to the commission of cognizable offense recorded by the officer-in-charge of the Police Station. The term FIR is not defined anywhere but Section 154 of CrPC talks about information on cognizable offenses, while Section 155 (2) states the information on non-cognizable offenses. The purpose of FIR is to set the criminal law in motion, and to obtain first-hand information about any occurrence to exclude any fallacious story; it is the state’s duty to protect the society and to offer requital to the victim. 

 In, State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal It was held that if any information disclosing cognizable offense and satisfy the requirement of Section 154(1) comes before the officer in charge then, he has to accept to enter the substance in the prescribed form.

Evidentiary Value Of FIR 

FIR is important evidence but it cannot be considered as a substantive piece of evidence. This is because under FIR –

  1. Statements are not made under oath.
  2. Statements have no cross-examination in court.
  3. Statements are not made during the proceedings and trial.

Yet, the evidentiary value of FIR is important than any other statement in cognizable offenses or during the investigation because –

  1. to corroborate statements made by the informant 
  2. to refresh the informant’s memory 
  3. to cross-examination statements recorded by the informant 
  4. to impeach the creditworthiness of the informant
  5. to ascertain the information related to the commission of an offense.

In, Pandurang Chandrakant Mhatre v. the State of Maharashtra it was held that FIR is not a substantive piece of evidence. It can only be used to impeach the credibility of the testimony recorded by the maker but it cannot be used for contradicting the testimony of other witnesses. 

Exceptions Where FIR Is Accepted As Evidence

FIR can be accepted as substantial evidence –

  1. When the declaration is made by the person who is dead.
  2. When the incident took place in the presence of Station House Officers and the injured person makes the statement to the officer.
  3. When the informant does not remember the facts but is sure about the facts stated in the FIR.

Corroborative Value Of FIR

Although FIR is not a substantive piece of evidence it can have corroborative value under Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and can be used to contradict the informant under Section 145 of the same Act.

Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act deals only with the method of contradicting previous statements made by the witness in writing through cross-examination. The statement which has been made by the informant or the witness must be either written or by someone else. 

In the case, Ram Chandra v. the State of Haryana, it was held by the Supreme Court that the information of the FIR can be used only for contradicting and corroborating the facts stated by the informant or by any other witness.

Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act states that to be corroboration of any form of the previous statement must disclose the same facts or the time. It must be presented before any authority having the legal competence to investigate the particular fact and also proved in the court. 

In the case, Hasib v. the State of Bihar The Supreme Court held that as per Section 157 and 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, FIR can be used only for corroborating and contradicting the informant who lodged the FIR. 

In the case, State of Orissa v. Makund Harijan and Anr., it was held by the Orissa High Court that  FIR can be used to corroborate and contradict the informant but the omissions of certain important facts 

Dying Declaration In FIR

The term Dying Declaration means any written or verbal statement made by the person who is dead or the person who died while explaining the facts of his death. This concept was evolved from a legal maxim, ‘nemo moriturus praesumitur mentri’ which means a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth. Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 deals with the concept of dying declaration, and the statements are assumed to be relevant. 

In, K.R Reddy v. Public Prosecutor The court observed the evidentiary value of dying declaration that the dying declaration is permissible under Section 32, and through cross-examination, the truth could be tested as the statement is not made on oath. Before acting upon it, the closest inspection of the statement should be observed by the court. It is also assumed that the statement given by a dying person is of serious nature as the person is not likely to lie when he is on the verge of death. The statement is enough to prove the conviction if the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and not influenced. 

A dying declaration can be recorded by a doctor or a public servant if the victim is hospitalized and wants to make a statement. It is recommended to make a dying declaration to a magistrate or in his presence but if this is not possible it can be recorded by the public servants. Even though the dying declaration by police officers is inadmissible in the court but due to circumstances, the court has to consider such declaration.

In, Maniram v. State of Madhya Pradesh The dying declaration was documented by a doctor without authentication of the conscience report of the deceased as well as there was no thumb impression on the declaration. The credibility of the FIR was lost in this case. 


Fir is an important report, it can be provided as valuable evidence duly reported. FIR, under Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 can contradict the witness if the informant is present as a witness during the trial; under Section 157 of the same Act, it can corroborate the informant. In some cases, FIR can be considered as Substantial Evidence but mostly it is just an important piece of evidence. Therefore, it is necessary to lodge an FIR against any crime by the police officers and to initiate the investigation. 

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-Report by Saksham Srivastava

The Hon’ble High Court of Judicature, Allahabad, on last Friday, dismissed the anticipatory bail application of Azam Khan, the prominent leader of the Samajwadi Party and the Member of Parliament from his party. His motion was dismissed in kin with the unlawful appointment of more than one thousand clerks, stenographers, and engineers in the Jal Nigam of Uttar Pradesh, as he was the prime accused behind this unlawful act during his term as a minister in the SP government’s rule in the state of Uttar Pradesh.

Petitioner’s Contention

The learned counsel of the applicant moved an application under section 438 of CrPC, i.e.- anticipatory bail, to avail some sort of relief from the Hon’ble High Court, on the account of being arrest arrested, and further taken into judicial custody in kin with the Case Crime No. 02 of 2018, charged under section 409, 420, 120-B, 201 and section 13 (1) (d) of the PC Act, Police Station SIT of Lucknow District. The learned counsel on behalf of the applicant also contended that mereloy6 serving the jail authorities with B-warrant and communicating the same to the accused, nowhere signifies that the applicant has been retained in custody and hence the bail application under section 438 of the CrPC is maintainable. The learned counsel even argued, that even if the issuance of B-warrant has been done and communicated to the accused, yet the accused is entitled to bail as the charge sheet concerning this case was filed after the prescribed period of Ninety Days, by the investigation team.

Respondent’s Contention

The learned counsel on behalf of the state, contended that the F.I.R. was filed on 25.04.2018 on the grounds of the inquiry set up by the Special Investigating Team U.P., Lucknow regarding the felonies of biased enrichment, the disappearance of documents and destroying them, so that it cannot be laid as a piece of evidence against the criminal conspiracy of conspiring 1300 people on the post of Assistant Engineer, Junior Engineer, Clerk, and Stenographer.

It was further perceptible that the present F.I.R. was lodged against the other four by the conducting Investigation Officer. While the applicant was taken into custody concerning another case with F.I.R. No. 980 of 2019, under sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B I.P.C., P.S. Civil Lines, District Rampur, an F.I.R. No. 392 of 2019, under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 447, 201, 120-B I.P.C. and Section 3 of Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, P.S. Azeem Nagar, District Rampur and put in District Jail, Sitapur. There is sheer evidence of a B-warrant issued by the court, which was received by the Jail Authorities and communicated the same to the applicant within a day. The facts and figured were laid down. Given all the facts and analysis, the applicant is considered to be in custody concerning the current F.I.R. No. 2 of 2018 and issued B-Warrant issued by the competent court under the provisions of Section 267(1) CrPC.

The Court’s Order

The division bench of Hon’ble High Court, headed by Justice Rajeev Singh, reject the motion of filing the anticipatory bail application of the accused, Azam Khan, and observed while doing, that the accused is already under detention and a B-warrant has been issued against him by the competent court under the section 267 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, and has also been duly communicated to him. The Court further highlighted the fact that an FIR had already been lodged against the accused on the grounds of preliminary investigation, carried forward by the SIT, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow. The accused was held liable for the unlawful appointment of more than a thousand engineers, clerks, and stenographers giving them unjust enrichment, doing forgery, conspiracy, and destroying pieces of evidence for the same. The court also stated that “It is also evident that B-warrant was issued by the competent court on 18.11.2020 was received by the Jail Authorities of District Jail Sitapur who communicated the same to the applicant on 19.11.2020”. The division bench of the court also took into consideration, the case of Bobby (Paramveer) and Anr v. State of Uttar Pradesh, in which they highlighted the key feature that while the Criminal Court issues the B-warrant, it has to satisfy the fact that the issuance of the same is just and proper. The issuance of the same means that the accused is already under detention. Hence, the Hon’ble Court held that the application moved by the accused, Azam Khan under section 438 of the CrPC is not maintainable, yet the court opened a way for the accused to move under regular bail if he so desires.

Report by Muskan Chanda


  • An application was filed by the Respondent under Section 12 of the Protection of Women against Domestic Violence Act, 2005 ( DV Act) before the Chief Magistrate, Tis Hazari Court, stating that she was already married when she met the petitioner in the year 2009.
  • In 2014 respondent got married to the petitioner after obtaining a divorce from her husband. The respondent had a son, named Master Jatin, aged thirteen years, from her previous wedding. The petitioner had not disclosed his marital status to the respondent at the time they each met thus inducing the respondent to marry him. The petitioner executed a wedding Agreement to indicate his genuineness and responsibility towards the respondent and her kid.
  • Within the agreement it had been mentioned that the respondent was married and incorporates a son from her previous wedding. Later the petitioner herein told the respondent that his spouse is on dialysis and wouldn’t survive long and so he’s trying to find a life partner.
  • Further, the respondent took a divorce from her husband and got married to the petitioner in 2014. Another Agreement-cum-Marriage Deed was entered into between the petitioner and also the respondent on 22 November 2014.
  • The petitioner herein had organized a rental accommodation and both of them were living as husband and wife. The name of the petitioner is mentioned as the father of the kid of the respondent in the school records. In the bank accounts of the respondent, the petitioner is shown as a nominee.
  • Differences arose between the parties and also the respondent was subjected to physical and mental abuse by the petitioner. The respondent filed an FIR against the petitioner. The respondent prayed for an order restraining the petitioner from evicting the respondent from the rented accommodation. An application for a grant of interim maintenance has conjointly been filed by the respondent.

Petitioner’s Submission

The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that an application under Section 12 of the DV Act could be filed solely by an aggrieved person. According to the definition of “aggrieved person” under Section 2(a) of the DV Act. An aggrieved person has been defined as any woman who is or has been, in a domestic relationship with an individual and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by that person. He states that the respondent in her application has admitted that both the parties were married when they met. When the respondent knew that the petitioner was married to somebody else the respondent cannot claim any relief under the DV Act. Till the issue of maintainability is not decided, the decision to pay ad-interim maintenance to the respondent is unreasonable.

Respondent’s Submission

The learned counsel for the respondent contended that the respondent and petition got along in the year 2009 and got married in the year 2014 and they resided together for 6 years before the difference arose between them in the year 2020. He contends that it was not as if the petitioner was a casual visitor to the house. The learned counsel for the respondent states that the petitioner has filed an affidavit and entered into a contract with the respondent stating that he has married the respondent and that he would take care of the respondent and the child. He further stated that in school records the petitioner is shown as the father of the child and in the bank accounts of the respondent, the petitioner is shown as the nominee. Hence, the application filed by the respondent was maintainable and the orders of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate and the Additional Sessions Judge rejecting that directed the petitioner to pay ad-interim maintenance of Rs. ten thousand per month to the respondent does not warrant any interference.


The learned Metropolitan Magistrate passed an order on 26 October 2020, had directed the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs ten thousand per month to the respondent herein as an interim arrangement. The principal challenge is that the order could not be passed since the application under the DV Act was not maintainable as the respondent is not an aggrieved person.
In case the Metropolitan Magistrate, after evidence is led, concludes that the respondent herein was not entitled to the protection of the DV Act then adequate safeguards must be made to ensure that the respondent returns the amount received by her as interim maintenance in terms of the order dated 26 October 2020, passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate back to the petitioner with interest.

Allahabad HC’s Justice Om Prakash VII on Friday rejected the bail application of Bhadohi MLA Vijay Mishra alias Vijay Kumar Mishra, accused of several cases under several sections of Indian Penal Code and IT Act of Gopiganj Police Station in Sant Ravidas Nagar (Bhadohi dist.)

On August 4, 2020, an FIR was lodged by informant Krishan Mohan Tiwari against Ramlali Mishra and Vishnu Mishra, mentioning that applicant is a relative of the informant. After winning the election of block pramukh, he became active in politics. And since 2001, the applicant is alleged to be residing in the informant’s house and is busy with politics and his business without the complete consent of the applicant. He was forcibly residing and threatening and torturing them as he is a relative and presently the elected member of the Legislative assembly from Gyanpur.

The informants’ contractual work was also overtaken by the applicant and started doing all the work along with depositing the money from transactions in the account of his firm and his wife and son. He took possession of all the documents by forcibly getting signed on the cheques and using net banking in the name of the informant. The informant was unaware of all these acts.

The family and informant were threatened with dire consequences as the applicant is a dreaded criminal and the informant was in no position to file a complaint due to threats. The applicant is not only vacating the forcibly occupied house but is also pressuring the informant to execute the will in the name of the applicant’s son. On refusal, threats were extended. Informants’ apprehensions we’re shown in FIR as the applicant is a muscleman. The informant may become landless if the applicant is successful in his acts. A prayer was made to take legal action for securing the life and property of the informant and his family members and was submitted to Chaturvedi, Senior advocate, appearing for the applicant, that no prima facie case is made out against the applicant. The applicant is a reputed person in the Society and was elected four times as MLA. He was also Block Pramukh and President of Zila Panchayat of District Sant Ravidas Nagar.

Referring to the contents of the FIR, it was further submitted that offence under section 449 IPC is not attracted in this matter. Informant himself has admitted in the FIR that the applicant was residing in the said house with the consent of the informant.

It was further argued that if such was the position, offence of criminal trespass cannot be constituted in this matter. Simply it was a dispute of partnership business which is pure of civil nature. Efficacious remedies will be available to the parties in civil suits/arbitration cases. An appeal against the order passed in the arbitration matter is also pending before the Court. Referring to the copy of the Will deed annexed with the application, it was further argued that there was no occasion to obtain a Will deed in favor of Vishnu Mishra, the son of the applicant. The said Will has not been executed. This fact also shows that offences leveled in the matter are not attracted against the applicant.

A Senior Counsel appearing for the applicant also referred to the statement of the witnesses recorded under sections 161 and 164 CrPC and further argued that the applicant is suffering from several diseases. He is in jail since August 14, 2020, and further argued that in all the previous criminal cases against the applicant, they are either withdrawn or the applicant is acquitted. The pending cases are not heinous and some may be due to political rivalry. Also, the disputed property belongs to the applicant exclusively and the said transactions made were done with the complainant’s consent. The applicant should not be kept behind the bars on the grounds of no of cases lodged against him. As a law-abiding person, he was granted bail in 2013 against a criminal trial going considering the entire criminal cases pending against the applicant up to the year 2013.

But as per Additional Advocate General appearing for State and counsel for the informant, the applicant is an influential person and no one dares to lodge an FIR against him and he’s a participant in several heinous cases. The counsel for the informant also argued that no one dares to provide evidence against the applicant hence he was acquitted. The no of cases was withdrawn due to pressure or influence by the govt. Also, the will feed was being executed in the name of Vishnu Mishra, the applicant’s son, only because of pressure created over the informant, but since he left the Registry office, the deed was not executed. Referring to the counter affidavit, it was further argued that a criminal case for the offence under section 376 IPC is also pending against the applicant. If the applicant is enlarged on bail, he will put pressure upon the witnesses. Thus, prayer was made for the rejection of bail.

Thus, having considered the submissions raised across the bar and going through the entire record, and also looking to the nature of allegations leveled against the applicant, the apprehension shown by the informant in the F.I.R. cannot be denied particularly because of criminal antecedents of the applicant.

The Court believes that prayer made for bail in the application is not liable to be allowed and is hereby rejected”, the Court ordered.

-Report by Saksham Srivastava

-Report by Anuj Dhar

The Supreme Court of India on Thursday quashed the case against Dua for his alleged comments against Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his YouTube show. A bench consisting of Justices Uday Umesh Lalit and Vineet Saran decided to rescind FIR No.0053 and free the petitioner of charges.

Key Highlights

  • Vinod Dua, the petitioner, is an Indian journalist and also has a show on YouTube namely The Vinod Dua show.
  • On 30th March 2020, the petitioner made hurtful allegations against the government and stated unfounded facts against the Prime Minister of India.
  • On 6th May 2020, FIR No.0053 was filed by a BJP leader against the petitioner which pointedly referred to two segments in the talk show and generally dealt with the number of allegations made by the petitioner in said talk show to submit that the actions on part of the petitioner amounted to offences punishable under penal provisions referred to in the FIR.
  • After the review of the FIR, it was decided that the petitioner shall not be arrested in connection with the present crime. However, the petitioner shall fully cooperate with the Police force through Video Conferencing or Online mode.
  • On June 14th, 2020, the Supreme Court held a special sitting to take up a writ petition by Vinod Dua to quash the FIR lodged against him by a BJP leader in Shimla.

Contentions of the Petitioner

Being a renowned journalist, the petitioner was entitled to and did nothing more than critical analysis of the functioning and the actions of the Government.

  • He was touching upon issues of great concern so that adequate attention could be given to the prevailing problems.
  • The petitioner did his duty to bring forward the dispassionate and critical appraisal of the Government. Dua’s actions were covered by Explanations 2 and 3 of Section 124A, IPC3, and exception to Section 505 IPC3 and were within his Right of Free Speech and Expression guaranteed under Article 19 (1)(a) of the Constitution of India.
  • No FIR should be registered against a person belonging to media with at least 10 years of standing unless cleared by the Committee as suggested.

Contentions of the Respondent

Mr. Vinod Dua is spreading fake and malicious news by stating that the Prime Minister has garnered votes through acts of terrorism. This directly amounts to inciting violence amongst the citizens and will further disturb public tranquility. This is an act of instigating violence against the government of India and the Prime Minister. Whoever makes or circulates false claims, alarms, or warnings relating to a disaster or its severity or magnitude, leading to the panic of the citizens of the country, shall on conviction, will be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to 1 year or with fine.

The Decision by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court of India on Thursday quashed the case against Dua for his alleged comments against Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his YouTube show, saying a verdict of the year 1962, namely Kedar Nath Singh, entitles every journalist to protection. The prayer that no FIR be registered against a person belonging to media with at least 10 years of standing unless cleared by the Committee was rejected by the Supreme Court. Writ Petition was allowed to the aforesaid extent and FIR No.0053 dated 06.05.2020 registered at Police Station Kumarsain, District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh was quashed.

Relevant Sections

  • Indian Penal Code,1860 – Section 124A, 268, 501 and 505
  • Disaster Management Act – Section 52, 54.
  • Article 32 in The Constitution of India 1949
  • Article 19(1)(a) in The Constitution of India 1949