-Report by Gopal Kumar

This case is related to Judge’s power to put questions or order production to discover or obtain proper proof of relevant fact under section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act. 

FACTS

In this case, the appellant-accused along with the other co-accused were charged with kidnapping and murder of a person in the year 2000. The Trial Court convicted both the accused persons for offences under Section 302, Section 364, Section 392, Section 394, Section 201 and Section 34 of IPC and awarded a life sentence under Section 302 IPC, and the remaining accused was convictedlesser sentence, vide order dated July 11, 2003. Further, the appellant filed the case to   The Punjab and Haryana High Court which dismissed the file and upheld the conviction and sentence of the Trial Court vide order dated May 31, 2017. Hence, the appellant-accused filed the appeal before the Supreme Court.

In this case, the apex court found that the case of the prosecution is entirely based on circumstantial evidence and the ‘evidence’ of last seen and the “discoveries” made from the information given by the appellant.

The Court further observed that the case of the prosecution rests on two circumstantial pieces of evidence

1. The disclosure is given in police custody and the discovery is on its basis.

2. The evidence of last seen in the form of PW-10 (the neighbour of the complainant).

The court rightly points out that in the case of circumstantial evidence motive plays a significant role. The prosecution case is that the two accused killed the deceased only to steal his tractor. The prosecution case is that the deceased was kidnapped and murdered by the two accused, for his tractor which they had robbed from the deceased, after putting him to death. The Court pointed out that the facts that led to certain discoveries were already known to the police in the earlier discovery made by the co-accused. The Court further noted that the discoveries which were made on the pointing out of co-accused cannot be read against the present appellant.

According to section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act “If the disclosure has been made by the accused to the police while he was in their custody and such a disclosure leads to the discovery of a fact then that discovery is liable to be read as evidence against the accused. A fact discovered in a piece of information supplied by the accused in his disclosure statement is a relevant fact and that is only admissible in evidence if something new is discovered or recovered from the accused which was not within the knowledge of the police before recording the disclosure statement of the accused.

On the evidence of ‘last seen’ the Court noted:

“In this case, even if we take the time between the last seen and the approximate time of death as per the postmortem, which would go beyond 48 hours preceding the time of post-mortem the time of death can be stretched to the morning of May 9, 2000, which still begs an explanation from the prosecution as to the time gap, as the deceased was last seen with the two accused on 08.05.2000 at 7:00 P.M.” The Court further noted that the evidence of last seen itself is on a weak footing, considering the long gap of time between last seen by PW-10 and the time of death of the deceased, Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 would not be applicable to facts and the circumstances of the present case. When a person does an act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, the burden of proving that intention is upon him.

The court said “In order to establish a charge of guilt on the accused, the chain of evidence must be completed and the chain must point out to one and only one conclusion, which is that it is only the accused who have committed the crime and none else. 

RATIO DECIDENDI

The Court held that the evidence placed by the prosecution, in this case, does not pass muster the standard required in a case of circumstantial evidence.

JUDGEMENT

The judgement given by the division bench of Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia and Justice Sanjay Kumar noted:

In the present case, the prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence of last seen only leads up to a point and no further. It fails to link it further to make a complete chain. All we have here is the evidence of last seen, which as we have seen loses much of its weight under the circumstances of the case, due to the long duration of time between last seen and the possible time of death. The Court set aside the conviction of a murder accused on the ground that the evidence last seen on which the conviction was based, failed to make a complete chain of circumstantial evidence. 

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/44Lb5KM

-Report by Sejal Jethva

RITU TOMAR VS. STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS, in this case, the petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short “the Cr.P.C.”) for the quashing of the FIR for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 452, 324, 307, 342 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (for short “the IPC”).

FACTS

According to the prevailing tradition and practice, the marriage of the appellant’s sister, Ms. Rekha, the fourth respondent in this case, and the third respondent came to be solemnized on May 15, 2011, leading to its consummation and the birth of a baby girl who has since been given the name Tejal.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION

According to the said Ms. Rekha, who claimed she had been expelled from the marital home, she filed a petition under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which was registered as V. No. 230 of 2014 and is currently pending on the file of the Principal Family Judge. As a result, an order was made on July 22, 2017, requiring the third respondent to pay a sum of Rs. 5,000 per month. Additionally, on March 15, 2017, she filed a police report (FIR) with the Harsh Vihar Police Station in North East Delhi for Crime No. 73 of 2017 against the third respondent and others for offences punishable by Sections 498A, 406/34 of the IPC read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The jurisdictional police claimed to have started the inquiry based on the aforementioned FIR that was filed.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

When the aforementioned factual situation occurred, the third respondent filed an Application No. 41 of 2018 under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, alleging that the appellant and Respondent Nos. 4 to 7 had forcibly entered his home and attacked the complainant and his father with a knife on the applicant’s head with the intent to kill them when they refused to heed their demands to leave the village after selling the land and home. On the basis of the aforementioned complaint, which was brought before the Chief Judicial Magistrate-I, Gautam Budh Nagar, a report from the second respondent was requested; as a result, a report was submitted on March 11, 2018, opining that the accused parties, including the appellant, never visited the complainant’s home and that the incident in question had not occurred. However, the Learned Magistrate ordered the filing of a police report on May 3, 2018, and as a result, the second respondent filed a police report in Case Crime No. 55 of 2018 against the appellant and others for the violations listed above. As a result, a plea to nullify the aforementioned FIR was filed; however, when it was denied, the current appeal was submitted.

JUDGMENT

1. We have read the documents and listened to knowledgeable solicitors representing the parties. After giving the claim made by the appellant before the High Court careful consideration and repetition before this Court, we have concluded that the third respondent, who is the appellant’s sister’s husband and who had filed an application under Section 156(3) before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-Ist, Gautam Budh Nagar in application No.41 of 2018, has unquestionably passed away while the current proceedings were pending. His name was consequently removed by order dated January 20, 2020. Regarding responses 1 and 2, none have surfaced.

2. Despite the aforementioned facts and the fact that a dispute between two families had already led to the wife filing two cases, which led to the registration of an FIR against the complainant (the third respondent here) and his family members, as well as the fact that none of the villagers, including the complainant’s neighbours, had supported or testified about the occurrence of any incident on January 26, 2018, as claimed by the complainant.

3. Therefore, insofar as the appellant is concerned, we quash the proceedings filed by the second respondent as Crime No.97 of 2018 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 452, 324, 307, 342, and 506 of the IPC. Therefore, the appeal is granted. 

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3mWmir2

-Report by Srishti

Delhi High Court in the case of LOUIS VUITTON MALLETIER Vs SANTOSH & ORS. on April 18 passed an ex parte decision imposing a permanent injunction to restrain the defendant from using the plaintiff’s trademark for manufacturing and selling goods and granted other temporary reliefs.

FACTS:

The plaintiff company Louis Vuitton Malletier was set up in France and is a Frenchluxury fashion and leather goods company owning the brand named Louis Vuitton. In 2003, it established its first store in India and currently, there are three stores of the plaintiff in India. It uses its trademark ‘LV’ from the initials of the name of its owner Louis Vuitton. The plaintiff has been using its canvas designs since 1986 popularly known as ‘ Toile monogram’. The plaintiff has also registered its trademarks, ‘the LV’, ‘the Toile monogram pattern’, ‘the Damier pattern’, and ‘theLV flower pattern’. Their ‘LV’ trademark has also been included in the list of ‘well-known trademarks’ by the Indian Trademark Office.

Through the periodical market surveys in 2018, theplaintiff came to know about the selling and manufacturing of goods under histrademark by the defendant. Therefore the plaintiff appointed an investigator toascertain the activities of the defendant and the same was confirmed by theinvestigator. Accordingly, the suit was filed in the court for granting a permanentinjunction to restrain the defendant.

While keeping in view the irreversible damages that canbe caused to the plaintiff, the court on 23rd February 2018 granted an interiminjunction against the defendant until the delivery of the final order. Hence, thedefendant was temporarily restrained from using the registered trademarks of the plaintiff. Also, three local commissions were set up to seize the manufactured products by the defendant under the trademarks of the plaintiff.

PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTIONS:

1) The assertions made by the plaintiff had not been rebutted and therefore, it was established that the defendant was aware of his illegal acts.

2) He had proved his goodwill and his reputation in respect of the trademarksby registration of the same.

3) He also succeeded in establishing statutory and common law rights as he was using his ‘LV’ trademark for a long time.

Since the defendant was not appearing in the court despite summons, theplaintiff pleaded for a permanent injunction.

DEFENDANT’S CONTENTIONS:

The defendant did not appear in court despite the service of a summons andalso, no written statements were filed by him.

JUDGEMENT:

The court while referring to Hindustan Lever Ltd. Vs . Satish Kumar held ‘since, the defendant has maintained silence, therefore, the guilt of the defendantspeaks for itself’. Hence, it is evident that he’s aware of his illegal acts and has failed to contend the case on merits. Therefore, to avoid further irrevocable damages and to avoid deterioration of the plaintiff’s reputation, the court granted a permanent injunction against the defendant.

The defendants were ordered to provide compensation ofRs.5,00,000. to the plaintiff. As per the volume of seizure products, they were further liable to provide compensation of Rs.1,50,000 and the defendants engaged in manufacturing such products were made liable to compensateRs.3,50,000 in favour of the plaintiff. In total, Rs.9,59,413 was granted to the plaintiff which included fees of local commissions, court fees, and legal fees.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3mK9GTF

-Report by Sejal Jethva

Radhey Shyam & Ors VS State of Rajasthan, in this case, political rivalry between the family of the deceased & accused. The eyewitnesses the minor, who was the daughter of the deceased and who is the mother of the deceased.

FACTS

The family of the late Raghunath Singh and a few of the accused, who are members of the Ahir clan, found a party called the Azad party, have a history of political enmity. The incident happened on April 16, 1976. Shiv Raj Singh, PW6, filed a First Information Report. Shiv Raj Singh is the brother of the deceased Raghunath Singh (FIR). The dead were attacked by a bunch of Ahirs. The prosecution claims that PWs 2, 3, and 4 were the actual witnesses. The Trial Court disregarded PW2’s testimony but accepted PW3 Krishna, the deceased’s minor daughter, and PW4 Kanwarbai, the deceased’s mother, as credible witnesses.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION

PW3 is a young witness whose testimony must be scrutinised quite carefully. She drew our attention to PW­3 Krishna’s testimony and, in particular, her cross­examination, arguing that her testimony cannot be taken seriously, especially given the witness’s exceedingly dubious identification of the defendant in court. Furthermore, PW4 was unable to name a single accused present in court, making it risky to rely on her testimony. She further emphasised that the FIR was sent to the knowledgeable Magistrate with a 3-day delay. Political competition existed between the deceased person’s family and the accused’s political party, therefore during these three days, the accused must have been falsely implicated.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

The State argued that reading the child witness’s (PW3) responses to the opening questions demonstrate the witness’s high level of knowledge and intellect. He claimed that while she accurately recognised the first accused as the son of Ramchander, she accidentally revealed the name of Modu (the accused who was found not guilty), who was also the son of Ramchander. He claimed that there is a small inconsistency that does not suffice to invalidate the version of PW3. He asserted that PW­4 Kanwarbai mentioned five people as the defendants. According to his argument, PW4 was unable to recognise the accused by name. He asserted that the passage of time makes it simple for this to occur. He would contend that the judgments rendered by the High Court and the Sessions Court regarding the guilt of the appellants were correct and cannot be criticized.

JUDGEMENT

1. We discover that the prosecution’s case is solely supported by PWs 3 Krishna and 4 Kanwarbai’s evidence. At the time her testimony was recorded, PW 3 was 12 years old. PW 3’s testimony cannot be disregarded solely because she was 12 years old. But, because she is a child witness, her testimony needs to be evaluated extremely carefully and with additional caution because a child witness can always be readily instructed. As a result, her version has undergone a thorough examination.

2. PW3, a young witness, provided testimony. Her evidence reveals that even though the five accused she allegedly named were ordered to stand apart from the other accused, she struggled to identify at least two of them. Regarding the identity of the accused, PW-3 Krishna’s version does not arouse confidence. It is extremely risky, in any event, to convict the accused based on such testimony, particularly given that the sole other eye witness (PW-4) who was believed by the Trial Court was unable to identify even one accused in the Court. The learned Trial Judge observed that the courtroom had enough light and that the faces of the defendants were clearly visible.

3. As the identity of the listed accused as the assailants of the deceased has not been confirmed in court beyond a reasonable doubt, we are of the considered view that this is true. The only evidence left is the purported seizure of the assault rifles at the accused’s request. Only based on the supposed recovery may the conviction not be upheld.

4. As a result, the appellants are exonerated of the accusation brought against them, and their conviction under the in-question judgments and decrees is hereby quashed and set aside. Appellants are free on bail. Their sureties have been released. Hence, the appeal is granted.

READ FULL JUDGMENT: https://bit.ly/419VylD

-Report by Pranav Mathur

The Gwalior Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, on the 10th of February 2023, in the case of Narendra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, upheld the conviction of murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”) given to the present appellant. The date of the judgment given by the Trial Court was the 11th of October 2012, and the appellant was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment with the submission of a fine.

FACTS:


The appellant was a son born out of the confines of marriage. After the demise of his father, his mother remarried, and eventually passed away. Subsequently, his stepfather solemnized his marriage with another woman, who is the complainant represented by the respondent in the present appeal. The appellant wanted to sell his father’s land in a village, and would therefore frequently ask his step-father to execute the sale, only to be advised against it. One fateful night, after dinner, when the appellant went to sleep with his stepfather, the complainant woke up to the sound of the appellant assaulting his stepfather with an axe, eventually killing him. Due to the gathering of people caused by her screams, the appellant ran away, and a complaint against him was filed the next day. The appellant abjured guilt and signified his willingness to go to trial. He was eventually charged with murder by the Trial Court.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS:


The appellant contended that the Trial Court erred in appreciating the evidence in the case. It was further argued that the prosecution in the Trial Court failed to establish various key events that led to the appellant’s conviction. The complainant admitted during her cross-examination in the Trial Court that there were no sources of light to properly ascertain the face of the appellant and his alleged acts. It was further argued that no human blood had been found on the axe when it was seized from the appellant, and in conclusion, the appellant contended that the prosecution had failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:


Placing reliance on the competence of the Trial Court, the respondent contended that due care and attention had been given to the evidence on record, and was only then appreciated by the Court. They mainly argued that the statements given by the complainant and other spot witnesses were in perfect sync with each other, and therefore the case had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

JUDGMENT:


The Court took into consideration the group of witnesses examined by the prosecution. It carefully took into consideration the post-mortem report submitted by the concerned medical officer, and based on those facts, concluded that the death was homicidal in nature. The appellant did not challenge the medical report, and the statements of the witnesses, which painted the entire scenario, based on which the Court, also taking cognizance of the number and nature of wounds caused, concluded that it was an act of murder with the intention to do as well. The Court, after taking into consideration the examinations and the cross-examinations of the witnesses, and the objections raised against them, concluded that the version given by the complainant cannot be said to be unbelievable. The Court opined that the deceased was last seen alive with the appellant himself, and the appellant has not been able to give valid reasons for the injuries that the deceased sustained, which further supported the claim of the petitioner.


As held in the case of Gosu Jairami Reddy and Anr. v. State of A.P., when direct evidence for an alleged crime is available, there is no need to search for the motive. Based on this principle, the High Court concluded that the Trial Court made no error in law while convicting the appellant for murder under Section 302 of the IPC. The Court, therefore, upheld the decision of the Trial Court, however, since the period of life imprisonment in default of payment of the fine wasn’t mentioned, the Court modified the punishment from life imprisonment and a fine of twenty thousand rupees to just the term of life imprisonment. The judgment of the Trial Court was therefore affirmed with the aforesaid modification.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3ZDd6Wn

-Report by Arun Bhattacharya

The Supreme Court of India on Thursday 23rd of February, 2023 had to resolve a bizarre case of appeal by a by a mother who had allegedly strangulated her five-year old child in desperation and desire to live separately. The aforementioned matter has been dealt in VAHITHA versus STATE OF TAMIL NADU. 

FACTS:

A wife having to live without her husband finds herself in desperate need to live separately and not with her mother-in-law. Out of desire to remove the only obstacle in her way of liberation that in this case happens to be her five-year old child, strangulates and murders the child causing asphyxia. Trial court had found the woman to be guilty under the offence of Murder and sentenced her accordingly. Thehonourable High court also reiterated the stand taken by the lower court hence being aggrieved by the same; she filed the present appeal under a Special Leave Petition before the apex court of the nation.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION:

The appellant highlighted many of the discrepancies in the prosecution’s case specifically focussing on the fact that there was no motive for the appellant to commit such a heinous act. (Here it must be noted that motive is something which prompts a person to take action, intention is the act done in order to achieve the motive and knowledge is merely the awareness of the consequences of such acts.) Appellant tried to establish her plea of alibi as to the absence of her during the death of the child and that she was elsewhere with her fatherand was arrested at the bus stand while she was returning after hearing the news of her child’s demise. 

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:

The prosecution/respondents clarified that the evidences were satisfactory as to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and since it was established by the witnesses that the appellant was the person with whom the deceased child was last seen, the conviction by the learned Trial Court and the High Court was justified.

JUDGEMENT:

The Apex Court while referring to the guidelines as enshrined in Sharhad Bidhichand Sharda analysed the matter on the basis of circumstantial evidences rejected the plea of alibi by the appellant citing clear contradictions in the testimonies of the hostile witnesses and upheld the prosecution’s argument regarding motive of the appellant as to the desire to live separately.

Thus upholding the decision taken by the learned Trial Court and the honourable High Court, the Apex Court dismissed the appeal.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3XZQCxt

Report by Shreya Gupta

The petitioner in this case of LAL VEDANT NATH SHAH DEO v STATE (NCT OF DELHI) was Lal Vedant Nath Shah Deo and the respondent was the State. The petitioner filed the application for bail under section 439 of CrPC.

FACTS:


The sub-inspector Gajendra Singh found Raghav Mandal a 23-year-old student of Amity University with 334 grams of charas. He disclosed about the co-accused Himanshu Singh and Lal Vedant Nath Shah Deo who was also arrested. Lal Vedant was arrested under a non-bailable warrant. Raghav further disclosed that he used to get paid Rs. 500 to 1000 for every delivery. Their phones were checked and details of the Paytm account where they used to receive the payments were taken out. The Paytm account details showed that Himanshu Singh had credited a total sum of Rs. 4,70,390 and Rs. 28,03,561.11 to Lal Vedant. The petitioner was charged with section 82 of the CrPC and section 201 of the IPC.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:


The advocate of the petitioner contends that no incriminating material was obtained from the petitioner on the raid in his house and that his name was earlier not mentioned in the FIR. He states that the rigours of section 37 are not applicable. He stated that section 35 and 54 of the NDPS act is not applicable since there was no conscious and intelligible possession. He stated that only on the basis of the disclosures by the co-accused the petitioner can’t be denied bail. He stated that mere phone calls among the accused and Paytm transactions can’t be the means to deny bail since the accused were college friends.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:


The advocate contended that a total sum of Rs. 4,70,390 and Rs. 28,03,561.11 was credited to Lal Vedant. He contended that the petitioner tried to run away and was so charged with section 82 of the CrPC and section 201 of IPC for trying to disappear the evidence.

JUDGEMENT:


The court stated that the rigours of section 37 of the NDPS act are not applicable if the cannabis quantity is less than 1 kg and the quantity found in this case is only 334 grams. It further stated that since there is no evidence to show that the transaction between them took place for the recovery therefore it concludes that they were not involved in any other offence under the NDPS act except the buying and selling of drugs. The court stated that no useful purpose will be served by keeping the petitioner in custody and therefore the application for bail was passed on some terms and conditions and on the furnishing of a personal bond of Rs. 50,000. The Hon’ble Supreme Court to conclude referred to the Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2012.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT:

CITATION: 2023/DHC/000885

Introduction

Sting operations are the activities performed by people by hiding their true identity to investigate a matter and bring out the illegal activities performed by any person. Prevalently such Sting operations are conducted by Journalists and Police to uncover corrupt Legislative and administrative leaders and officers respectively. It is also performed to catch a criminal and make people aware of his criminality, who asserts to be innocent. Such operations raise an issue of Legality and Morality of these practices which are further discussed in the Article.

Impacts of Sting Operations

Sting Operations can have both Positive as well as Negative Impacts on society.

Positive Impacts – The positives are the legitimate concern for the overall population and planned to penetrate the cover of the government’s working procedure.

Negative Impacts– To increase Television Rating Points. Sometimes Media houses show fabricated Sting Operation videos to maintain the “Interest of People” in their channel rather than working for “Public Interest”.

Constitutionalism

  1. RIGHT TO PRIVACY

Constitution of India provides a Fundamental Right to Privacy under Article 21. Sting operation. In the landmark Judgment of K.Sv Puutuswamy Supreme Court stated that the Right to Privacy is an integral part of the Right to Life and Personal Liberty.

  1. RIGHT TO KNOW

Supreme Court in a landmark judgment of Maenka Gandhi stated that the people of India acquire the Right to Know under the Fundamental Rights of the Constitution.

  1. RIGHT TO REPUTATION

Article 19(2) states that nothing should bring defamation to a person while exercising freedoms guaranteed under the same Article clause 1. Therefore, Media is under the restriction of not to defame a person by presenting a fabricated video of a Sting Operation to the General public. 

Admissibility as Evidence in Court of Law

“It matters not how you get it; if you even steal it, it would be admissible as evidence.” The principle is applicable in the common law. However, there have been various contradictory views and orders of various Courts and different case laws. The evidence acquired as Sting Operation is considered as Extra-judicial Evidence as an electronic record given to a third party, makes it admissible. This concludes in respect of admissibility that courts have a discretionary power on Sting Operations.

Journalism vis a vis Sting Operation

Montesquieu in his book “Spirits of the Law” stated that Media is the fourth pillar of Democracy. Further in the Constitution of Freedom of Press is provided as a Fundamental Right under Article 19 with certain reasonable restrictions. People today live in a world of Technology and Social Media, therefore it is as easy as ABC to influence people on a large platform of the Internet, which increases the responsibility of Media in conducting its work in the most efficient, impartial, and ethical manner. The most watershed incident of Sting operation of History in India is the ‘Tehlka’ Sting operation. Some more prominent sting Operations conducted by Media were-

  1. Operation named ‘DURYODHAN’ – in which some member of Parliament were caught while receiving bribes for raising questions in parliament proceedings.
  2. Inspector General Ayaash- the officer was caught sexually harassing a woman.
  3. Members of Legislative Assembly of Bihar were caught in compromising position with prostitutes.

And a number of other Sting operations conducting by prominent media Channels like N.D.T.V, Aaj Tak, India T.V, Shara Samay, Star News, etc.

Judiciary’s Outlook

There is no particular legislation of provision provided under Indian laws related to validity and Legality of Sting operations which make Courts use their discretionary powers while deciding cases related to Sting operation.

This Evidence has been rendered inadmissible in the Court of Justice several times due to probabilities of editing, lack of clear audio, video imaging, unavailability of dates, time, and correct places. However, they have also been admissible in various cases such as Jessica Murder Case

State of U.P v. Raj Narain states “People of this country have all rights to know every Public Act”

Vijay Shekhar v. UOI – uphold Sting operations to be illegal with regard to corruption against eminent persons like former President Dr. A.P.J Abdul Kalam, former CJ Y.K. Sabjharwal.

Comparative Analysis with other Countries

United States of America

A sting operation in the USA is considered to be legal to uncover various offenses like drug trafficking, political and Judicial Corruption, prostitution, etc., the law there differentiates between the trap for innocents and trap for Criminals. The landmark case was Keith Jacoboson v. the United States.

United Kingdom

Allows Sting operations from a legal point of view- “A prosecution founded on entrapment would be an abuse of Courts’ process”

Conclusion

Sting operation needs to have legislation made on it which can guide the people at large, Judges and lawyers to decide whether such practice is acceptable if acceptable then up to what extent, what can be the elements and requirements to be admissible in the Courts, etc. while keeping in view every good and bad aspect of these operations. This makes it important to be a part of Law to maintain transparency and accountability of the Government as well as a detriment to society while infringing the privacy of people. The harmonious balance is the need of an hour with respect to the legality and morality of the Sting Operation to maintain a healthy Democratic character of the Country.

This article is written by Aakrati Thakur, student of BBA. LL.B 3rd Year in Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha  University, Delhi Metropolitan Education, Noida.

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The present article is written by  Mudit Jain pursuing B.B.A.LL.B.(H) from Indore Institute of Law.

Introduction

The goal of this study is to uncover the principle of “Leterm Mortem,” which means “words uttered before death” and is referred to as “Dying Declaration” in legal terms. The term “Dying Declaration” informs you what it means, however this project focuses on the topics that are important in the legal area when it comes to dying declaration. The research discusses those utterances that were turned into dying declarations, the many types of dying declarations that are allowed by law, their relevance in the law, and whether they have any value or not. And, if it does, what are the exceptions?

In some situations, a statement made by a cognizant individual who is aware that death is impending about what he or she thinks to be the cause or circumstances of death can be admitted into evidence during a trial.

A deathbed pronouncement is seen as reliable and trustworthy proof since it is widely assumed that most persons who are about to die do not lie. As a result, it is an exception to the Hearsay rule, which forbids using a statement made by someone other than the person who repeats it when testifying during a trial due to its inherent unreliability. If the individual who made the deathbed pronouncement had even the remotest chance of recovery, no matter how improbable, the statement is inadmissible in court. A person who makes a deathbed declaration must, however, be competent at the time the statement is made; otherwise, the statement is inadmissible. A dying declaration is generally brought by the prosecution, although it can sometimes be used on the accused’s side.

The term “Dying Declaration” refers to a written or spoken disclosure of significant facts made by a deceased individual. It is a statement made by a deceased individual describing the circumstances of his demise. This is founded on the adage ‘nemo mariturus presumuntur mentri,’ which means that a man will not face his maker with a lie on his lips. Our Indian law understands that ‘a dying man seldom lies.’Alternatively, ‘truth resides on the lips of a dying man.’ It is an exception to the rule against excluding hearsay evidence. In this case, the individual (victim) is the only eyewitness to the crime, and his confession would tend to negate the final goal of justice. Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act deals with instances involving people who are deceased or cannot be traced.

Section 32: Statements of important fact made by a person who is deceased or cannot be located. Statement, written or oral, or important facts provided by a person who is dead, cannot be traced, has become incapable of giving testimony, or whose attendance cannot be obtained without a degree of delay or expense that appears to the Court unreasonable in the circumstances of the case.

 (1) When it comes to the cause of death.

(2) Or is created in the course of business.

(3) Or against the maker’s interests.

(4) Or expresses an opinion on a public right, habit, or subject.

(5) Or refers to the presence of a relationship.

(6) Or is made in a will or deed pertaining to the family.

(7) Alternatively, in a document related to a transaction described in section 13, subsection (a).

(8) Or is created by a group of people and communicates thoughts about the subject at hand.

But in this situation, we’re looking at a concept called “dying declaration,” which deals with issues involving the cause of death. Subsection (1) of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act mentions it.

Such comments are significant regardless of whether the person who made them was or was not alive at the time they were made, with the exception of death, and regardless of the nature of the process in which the reason for his death is called into question.

ILLUSTRATIONS

The question is whether A was murdered by B, or if A was murdered by A.

A dies as a result of injuries sustained during a transaction in which she was ravished. The question is whether A was slain by B in such a way that A’s widow may file a lawsuit against B. Statements made by A about the reason of his or her death, pertaining to the murder, the rape, and the actionable wrong under consideration, are significant facts.

The Supreme Court ruled in Ulka Ram v. the State of Rajasthan that “when a statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death or as to any circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in the case in which the cause of his death comes in question is admissible in evidence, such statement in law is compendiously called dying declaration.”

In P.V. Radhakrishna v. State of Karnataka, the Supreme Court stated that “the basis on which a dying declaration is allowed in evidence is reflected in latin proverb, nemo morturus procsumitur mentri, a man would not meet his creator with a falsehood in his lips.” Under this clause, information submitted by a person who died later pertaining to the reason of his death is admissible in evidence.

In one prominent instance, the accused’s wife borrowed Rs. 3000 from the deceased at an interest rate of 18%. A number of letters related to his debt had been signed by the accused’s wife and recovered from the deceased’s residence after his death. On 20th March 1937, the dead K.N. got a letter that was not signed by anybody; it was pretty obvious that it would have come from the accused’s wife, who asked him to come to Berhampur that day or the following day.

K.N.’s widow informed the court that her husband had told him that Swami’s wife had invited him to Berhampur to get his money. The next day, K.N. left his residence for Berhampur, and his corpse, which had been chopped into seven parts, was discovered in a trunk in a train cabin at Puri on March 23rd. Because there was so much evidence against him, the accused was convicted of murder and condemned to death.

In Wazir Chand v. the State of Haryana, the Court noted the Pakala ruling and stated, “applying these to the facts of the case, their Lordships pointed out that the transaction in the case was one in which the deceased was murdered on March 21st & his body was found in a trunk proved to be bought on behalf of the accused.” The deceased’s remark on March 20th that he was going to the area where the accused was residing looked to be a statement about some of the circumstances of the transaction that ended in his death. As a result, the statement was correctly acknowledged.

The accused in R. v. Jenkins was charged with the murder of a lady. He assaulted her at midnight, but she recognized her since there was enough light to identify him. When the magistrate’s clerk inquired about the accused in order to record her statement, she stated that it was Jenkins who had committed the crime. When the clerk questioned if she said it with no prospect of rehabilitation, she said yes. However, when the clerk read the statement to her before she signed, she instructed her to include the term “at present” in the statement.

The court determined that the remark was not a deathbed declaration since her insistence on the words “at present” demonstrated that she had some, however flimsy, the chance of recovery.

Identifying Oneself through Dying Declaration

There is no specific type of dying declaration that is recognized or acceptable in court. However, with the correct identification, that must be operating as proof.

In another instance, the Supreme Court stated, “The core of the entire affair was as to who had stabbed the dead and why.” These critical details can be discovered in the dying declaration.”

1 Type of question and response

Where the deathbed pronouncement was not recorded in question-and-answer format, it was held that it could not be thrown out only for that reason. A statement recorded in the narrative may be more natural since it provides the victim’s interpretation of the occurrence.

2 Gestures and signals are the building blocks of communication.

The full bench of the Allahabad High Court held in the case of Queen-Empress v. Abdullah Accused had cut the throat of the deceased girl and as a result, she was unable to speak so, she indicated the name of the accused by the signs of her hand, it was held by the full bench of the Allahabad High Court “If the injured person is unable to speak, he can make a dying declaration by signs & gestures in response to the question. In another instance, the Supreme Court stated that “the usefulness of sign language would depend on who recorded the signs, what gestures and nods were made, what questions were posed, whether simple or difficult and how effective and intelligible the nods and gestures were.”

3. Statement language

Where the dead gave the statement in Kannada and Urdu, it was held that the statement could not be thrown out solely on that basis, or because it was only recorded in Kannada. Where the statement was in Telugu and the doctor recorded it in English, but another doctor took the care of interpreting the statement to the wounded person, the statement was deemed to be a genuine dying declaration.

4. Declaratory Statement

The Supreme Court underlined the need for verification of such declarations, particularly in a case like one where the wounded individual gave an oral statement to his mother, who was an interested witness. Such a proclamation must be approached with attention and discretion. A statement provided verbally by the individual who was knocked down with a lathi strike on the head and narrated as part of the F.I.R. by the witness who lodged the F.I.R. was recognized as a trustworthy statement for the purposes of Section 32.

5. Thumb Print

Because the victim had suffered 100 percent burns, a deathbed pronouncement confirmed by thumb impression was deemed dubious.

6. Statement Is Incomplete

The Supreme Court ruled that if a deceased does not complete the primary sentence (for example, the origin or reason for the crime), a dying declaration is untrustworthy. However, if the dead has told the entire narrative but fails to respond to the final formal query about what else he intended to say, the declaration can be relied on.

7. Where the declarer is still alive

In one case decided by the Supreme Court, the deceased who made the dying declaration was seriously injured but conscious throughout. The Court determined that the incoherence in his statement with relation to facts and circumstances was an insufficient reason not to rely on his statement, which was otherwise deemed to be genuine.

8. Lack of a medical fitness declaration

When a dowry victim’s deathbed declaration was challenged on the grounds that a doctor’s certificate of mental fitness for the statement was missing, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal since the case was not entirely based on the declaration. The facts were on record demonstrating that the wounded woman had gone to the hospital all alone changing cars on the way. This was substantial proof in itself to demonstrate her fitness.

9. At the location where interested witnesses were attending to the deceased

The Gauhati High Court ruled that where interested witnesses were present on the deceased when he was making a dying declaration and the deceased was neither physically nor mentally fit due to the injuries, no confidence could be placed on the dying statement, in the absence of proof demonstrating that the death was physically and mentally capable of making the deathbed statement and was not the subject of any tutoring.

10. When the statement is unrelated to the cause of death

When the individual giving the statement is not proven to have died as a result of the injuries sustained in the event, his statement cannot be claimed to be the cause of his death or any of the transactional conditions that culminated in his death.

11. Medical Report

The doctor at the hospital clearly wrote in the hospital’s Accident Register that the patient was aware, her orientation was fine, and she answered the question presented to her well. Her statement could not be dismissed based on her injury or post-mortem report, which said that “given the severity of the deceased’s injuries, she couldn’t possibly be in a position to make a remark. It was decided that if the medical assessment of fitness was accessible to the magistrate who was to record the statement, it was not essential for the magistrate to conduct an independent fitness investigation.

12. Doctor’s statement

In the case of a bride burning, the doctor who treated the dead testified that shortly after her admission, she told him that her husband had put kerosene on her garments and lit her fire. The doctor noted it in the case files. The doctor’s evidence was backed by the contemporaneous record. The doctor’s evidence was backed by the contemporaneous record. The doctor had no motivation, according to the Court, to fraudulently depose against the accused or produce fake case files.

13. FIR as a declaration of death

In K. Ramachand Reddy v. Public Prosecutor, it was determined that if an injured individual filed an FIR and subsequently died, the FIR was significant as a dying statement.

14. Dowry Death, Wife Burning, and Other Incidents

The Apex Court ruled that the death of a married lady in the marital home three or four months after her remarks expressing the risk to her life was a statement explaining the circumstances of her death. In a case of wife-burning, after recording her confession that her husband had set afire, she asked gently that her husband not be punished. It was alleged that she sought to clear her husband on this grounds. The court responded as follows:

This is a beautiful emotion that originates from the ideals of Indian femininity; a wife who has been set afire by her husband, according to custom, does not want her husband to be violently beaten. This emotion prompted a dying sad lady to declare that even if she were dying, her husband should not be abused. We don’t see how this remark can be turned into one that exonerates the guilty. In a subsequent application of this concept to a case involving “that horrible form of murder” known as woman burning, the Apex Court stated: “The three dying declarations confirmed by additional circumstances are sufficient in our opinion to bring home the offense.” The council has attempted to dismiss these assertions, failing to recognize that these are the moaning utterances of a dying lady in the grip of horrible anguish, which cannot be assessed by the standard of completeness of particulars that witnesses may provide in other instances. Discrediting such deathbed statements for short-falls here and there, or even in many areas, is unrealistic, unnatural, and immoral if there is any credibility at all. The heinous crime in this instance occurred in the house and in the presence of the spouse who was convicted. When a bride gave a statement to the physicians, she was 80 percent burned. However, physicians determined that she was in good enough health to make a statement. The court stated that based on the fact that she had 80 percent burns, no inference could be formed that she could not have made the remark. Where the dead wife’s declaration was only deposed by her mother, the Court ruled that this was insufficient evidence to convict.

15. Relatively made or implicated statements

In the subsequent case of Barati v. the State of U.P., the Supreme Court ruled that a deathbed declaration made to the deceased’s family can be trusted if adequately proven. In this case, the dead, who was slain by pouring acid on him, initially told his brother and son, The court ruled that the testimony was credible because it was repeated at the police station and again at the hospital charging the accused. Where the deathbed remark was recorded by the deceased’s wife, the Supreme Court did not dismiss it solely on that basis, adding that such evidence should be reviewed with care.

 Dying Declaration’s Evidentiary Value

The evidentiary value of a dying declaration was observed in K.R. Reddy v. Public Prosecutor as follows: “The dying declaration is undeniably admissible under section 32 & not being a statement on oath so that its truth could be tested by cross-examination, the court has to apply the scrutiny & the closest circumspection of the statement before acting upon it.” While the words of a dying man are held in high regard because a person on the verge of death is unlikely to tell lies or connect a case in such a way as to implicate an innocent person, the court must be wary of the deceased’s statement being the result of tutoring, prompting, or a product of his imagination. The court must be convinced that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to give the statement after he had a clear chance to witness and identify his assailants and that he was giving the statement freely and without resentment. Once the court is convinced that the deathbed confession is accurate and voluntary, it may suffice to establish the conviction even without more evidence.”

In Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay, the Supreme Court established the following rules concerning dying to dying declarations:

  1. There is no absolute rule of law stating that unless verified, a deathbed declaration cannot be used as the only ground for conviction. A genuine and voluntary declaration requires no verification.
  2.  A dying pronouncement is not less reliable than any other piece of evidence.
  3. Each case must be decided on its own facts, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the deathbed statement.
  4. A dying declaration is treated the same as any other piece of evidence and must be assessed in light of the surrounding circumstances and in accordance with the principle controlling the weight of evidence.
  5. A dying declaration that has been properly recorded by a competent Magistrate, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers and, as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration that is based on oral testimony, which may suffer from all the infirmities of human memory and human character.
  6. To assess the reliability of a dying declaration, the court must consider circumstances such as the dying man’s ability to observe, for example, whether there was sufficient light if the crime was committed at night; and whether the dying man’s capacity to remember the facts stated had not been impaired by circumstances at the time he made the statement beyond his control; that the statement was consistent throughout if he had several opportunities to make a dying declaration separate from the official record of it; and that the statement was made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by an interested party.”

Exception of Dying Declaration

There are several instances in which the dying person’s statement is not admissible in court. The following are the conditions:

  1. If there is no question concerning the deceased’s cause of death. For example, if a person states anything in his declaration that is not distant or has a link with the cause of death, the statement is irrelevant and hence not be admissible.
  2. The declarant must be competent to make a dying declaration; if the declaration is made by a child, the statement will not be admissible in court, as it was stated in the case of Amar Singh v. State of M.P that the statement would not be considered reliable without proof of mental and physical fitness.
  3. Inconsistent statements have no value and cannot be regarded as evidential in nature.
  4. The deceased’s remark should be devoid of any influential pressure and should be stated spontaneously.
  5. It is absolutely permissible for the court to reject any incorrect declaration that is contradictory in character.
  6. If the statement is deficient in the sense that it cannot answer the key questions that are required to be found guilty, and on the other hand, the statement delivers nothing, it will not be considered.
  7. The doctor’s judgment and the medical certificate should back up the deceased’s statement and demonstrate that he is capable of understanding what he says.
  8. If the statement contradicts the prosecution’s case. The following issues should be considered by the Supreme Court in this respect.

Conclusion

Section 32(1) of the IPC does not expressly reference the dying declaration. It is the statement made by the person who is about to die, and that statement will be used as evidence in court to determine how his death occurred and who the mugger is. There are many circumstances that rely on the dying statement, and it should be handled properly since the dying declaration is the weapon that condemned the accused and served as powerful proof. The admissibility of a dying declaration was allowed in our Indian court since the law presumes that a man will never lie in his final leaving words, i.e. in his last parting words, as no one will face his maker with a falsehood. This is because a guy who is about to die has all of his needs and wants to be met, and his interest in self-deeds has waned, thus he rarely lies. However, if the deathbed declaration is discovered to be made deliberately, the court has the authority to reject the statement. Or, as previously mentioned, there are additional events and circumstances that, when combined with a deathbed pronouncement, make it admissible.

REFERENCES

  • http://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/1682/Dying-Declaration-Section-32(1)-of-Indian-Evidence-Act.html
  • https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1959734/
  • https://kjablr.kar.nic.in/sites/kjablr.kar.nic.in/files/11.%20Dying%20Declaration%20-%20Its%20applicability%20in%20Criminal%20Cases.pdf
  • https://delhihighcourt.nic.in/writereaddata/upload/CourtRules/CourtRuleFile_P9S0NL6U.PDF
  • http://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-985-evidentiary-value-of-a-dying-declaration.html

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The present article is written by Muskan Harlalka, a 2nd-year law student from the School of Law, Mody University of Science and Technology, Lakshmangarh, Rajasthan.

Introduction

In common parlance, “trial” means the process by which a person is adjudicated as guilty or innocent. It starts with the framing of a charge and concludes with the acquittal or conviction. However, it is not defined in the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) of 1973. The trial in which the accusations imposed on a person accused of a crime are resolved is called a criminal trial.

In India, penal laws are mainly regulated by three acts – 

  1. Indian Penal Code, 1860
  2. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  3. Indian Evidence Act, 1872

CrPC is a procedural law that describes the mechanism for conducting a criminal trial. It includes the method of collecting evidence, interrogation of accused, arrests, bail, witness examination, method of conviction, etc. IPC is the primary penal law in India and it applies to all offenses except the ones which are covered under any other law in India. The Indian Evidence Act governs the various aspects of evidence in a trial such as its evidentiary value, manner of production of evidence, etc. 

Phases OF Trial

According to CrPC, the mechanism of determining the criminal liability of an accused has three phases. The first phase is the pre-trial phase which includes reporting the offense to the police or filing a complaint before the Magistrate, investigation by the police, or cognizance and inquiry by the Magistrate.

The second is the trial phase. This is the most crucial phase as it consists of the trial of the accused before the court to determine whether he will be acquitted or convicted. 

The third and last phase is the post-trial phase which mainly includes appeal and review by either of the parties.

Types of Criminal Trials in the Indian Legal System

CrPC provides for different types of criminal trials depending upon the nature of criminal cases. The trial process for serious offenses is more detailed and complex, on the other hand, the process for less serious offenses is more straightforward. Depending upon the nature of the offense, the trial of an accused can be of four types:-

  1. The trial before a Sessions court (Sessions Trial)
  2. Trial of Warrant cases by Magistrates (Warrant Trial)
  3. Trial of Summons cases  by Magistrates (Summons Trial)
  4. Summary Trials

These types are discussed below:

  1. The trial before a Sessions court (Sessions Trial): Trials in Warrant cases are more detailed and serious in comparison to Summons cases. A warrant case can be tried either by the Magistrate’s court or the sessions’ court. If a Magistrate is of the view that a case should be tried by the sessions court then he sends it to the sessions court for trial. This process is “committing it to sessions court”. Trial of Warrant cases by a Sessions Court is covered under Sections 225-237 of CrPC.

The various steps in a criminal trial before a sessions court are:

  • According to Section 229 after the committing of the case to the sessions court, the court frames charges against the accused and if the accused pleads guilty for these charges, the court has the discretion to convict the accused at that point. 
  • But if the accused does not plead guilty, then the court advances with the trial and sets a date for the prosecution to present their evidence. 
  • If after examining the prosecution’s evidence and the accused, the Court is of the view that the accused has not committed any offense, the accused is acquitted. 
  • However, if the prosecution’s evidence justifies the framing of charges against the accused, he is then called upon to present his defense. 
  • The prosecution then summarizes his pleadings and the defense is given another chance to put forward evidence in support of his client (the accused).
  • In the end, after hearing both sides, the court passes a judgment of conviction or acquittal of the accused according to Section 235 of CrPC.
  1. Trial of Warrant cases by Magistrates (Warrant Trial): Trial of Warrant cases by Magistrates is covered under Sections 238-250 of CrPC. Offenses that are punishable with death, imprisonment of life, or imprisonment for a term of more than two years come under the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates. A trial in a warrant case may start either by the filing of an FIR or by the filing of a complaint before a Magistrate. 

Steps in trial of Warrant cases by Magistrate when the case is instituted on a police report:

  • In such cases when the accused appears before the Court, the Magistrate should ensure that copies of all necessary and relevant documents such as FIR, Police Report, etc. have been provided to the accused.
  • Section 239 of CrPC provides that if upon examining all relevant documents, the Magistrate is of the view that the charges against the accused are not valid, then he can discharge the accused and state his reasons for the same.
  • If the Magistrate finds that grounds for accusation are valid, then he can proceed and frame the charges as per Section 240 of CrPC.
  • If after framing the charges, the accused pleads guilty then the Magistrate has the discretion under Section 241 to convict him.
  • However, if the accused does not plead guilty then the Court calls for the prosecution’s evidence. After the prosecution’s evidence has been presented, the defense gets the chance to do the same and their evidence is also recorded under Section 243.
  •  After that, the trial ends and the Court gives its verdict.

Steps involved in trial of Warrant cases by Magistrate when the case is instituted otherwise than on a police report:

  • Here the first step is the recording of the prosecution’s evidence. If upon examining the prosecution’s evidence the Magistrate concludes that the accusations against the accused are not valid, then he can discharge the accused.
  • But if the Magistrate is convinced that there are valid grounds for the accusation then he proceeds with the framing of charges.
  • The accused is then informed about the charges and if he pleads guilty for them, then the Magistrate has the discretion to convict him.
  • However, if the accused does not plead guilty, then the prosecution’s witnesses are called for cross-examination by the accused if he wants to do so.
  • The Magistrate then records the evidence for the defence and considers evidence of both the parties.
  • Then the Magistrate acquits or convicts the accused as per the provisions given in Section 248 of CrPC.
  1. Trial of Summons cases by Magistrates (Summons Trial): Summons cases are related to offenses that are punishable with imprisonment for a term of fewer than two years. Trial for summons cases is covered under Sections 251-259 of CrPC.

The process of criminal trial in summons cases by a Magistrate is as described below:

  • Instead of framing formal charges against the accused, he is issued a notice stating the accusation against him.
  • According to Section 251 of the Code, when the accused appears before the court, the Magistrate informs him about the particulars of the charges against him and asks him if he pleads guilty for the same. If he pleads guilty, then the court has the discretion to convict him.
  • Section 253 of CrPC provides for the plea of guilty in the absence of the accused in cases related to petty offences. This enables a pleader authorised by the accused to plead guilty on his behalf when the offence is punishable with fine only. In such cases, the Magistrate has the discretion of convicting the accused.
  • In case the accused does not plead guilty after the particulars of the accusation are stated to him, then as per Section 254 of the Code, the Magistrate proceeds with the evidence presented by both the parties and accordingly decides whether the accused is innocent or guilty.
  1. Summary Trials: Sections 260-265 of CrPC deal with Summary Trials. According to Section 262, sentences for imprisonment for a term exceeding three months cannot be passed in Summary trials. The main objective of summary trials is the speedy disposal of cases. If the accused does not plead guilty, then according to Section 264, the Magistrate will have to record a substance of the evidence and a judgment stating reasons for the same.

Since summary cases deal with petty offenses, the trial procedure is very simple. If a fine of not more than two hundred rupees has been imposed, then no appeal can be filed. But an application can be made to the High Court for revision.

Conclusion

A study of CrPC and its provisions related to stages of criminal trial makes it clear that every feature which is necessary for conducting a fair trial has been included. However, the process is very complex and the tendency of the code to protect the rights of the accused hinders the process of justice for the victim. Moreover, there is a huge backlog of cases that are pending. Thus, having a law that covers everything does not ensure justice, its effective implementation does.

Bibliography

  1. Process of Trial of Criminal cases in India, Lexology, https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7e8a100a-6593-414f-a2e3-b70fcd13b016.
  2. Sindhu A, What are the different kinds of trials in Criminal Procedure Code?, Law Times Journal (Mar. 15, 2020), https://lawtimesjournal.in/what-are-the-different-kinds–of-trials-in-criminal-procedure-code/. 
  3. Sugam Shine, Stages of Criminal Trial in India, Kith and Kin Attorneys, https://www.kithandkinattorneys.in/post/stages-of-criminal-trial-in-india.
  4. Types of Criminal Trials, Legal Formats India (Nov. 30, 2020), https://legalformatsindia.com/types-of-criminal-trials/.
  5. Vijay Pal Dalmia,  Process of Trial of Criminal Cases in India, Mondaq, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=https://www.mondaq.com/pdf/clientts/318472.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwjAqo3il6TxAhVYWysKHcgTB8AQFjAJegQlKhAC&usg=AOvVaw1llshhaxc4coHC8NhlabKF.
  6. Vivek Narayan Sharma, Know your rights: Criminal trials in India (Part-1), Times of India (Dec. 22, 2018), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/lawtics/know-your-rights-criminal-trials-in-india-part-1/.  

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