-Report by Utkarsh Kamal

In the present case supreme court discusses the conviction when the trails court records are absent and can not be obtained. White discussing the present case by the division bench of Justice Krishna Murari and Justice Sanjay Karol observed that the job of the Court of Appeal is not to depend on the lower Court’s judgment to uphold the conviction but, based on the record available before it duly called from the Trial Court and the arguments advanced before it, to come to a conclusion thereon…Had there been properly preserved records of the Trial Court, the issue in the present appeal as to whether the High Court could uphold a conviction having not perused the complete Trial Court record, would not have arisen they also talk about the digitalisation of the court for smoothening the judicial process.

Facts of the case:

The prosecution has been successful in proving that accused J.K Rode being working at the post of a   Public   Servant as   Assistant   Commercial Manager,   Northern   Railway,   Lucknow made a 2 demand of   Rupees   Five   Hundred from   Chief Ticket   Inspector   Shri   Jai   Prakash   Narayan Upadhyay on 03.05.95 to dispose of the charge sheet issued against him. He was caught red-handed receiving the bribe on 03.05.95. He received Rs. 500 (Rupees five hundred) from said J.P.N Upadhya being posted as a public servant misusing his post as a public servant for his gain in a corrupt and illegal manner.   Thus,   the offence under sections 7, 13(1) and 13(2) of the PC Act 1988 is proved against the accused and he is liable to be punished for these charges. Accused is on bail and his bail bonds are discharged. The accused should be taken into custody then the accused person moves to the High Court where the High Court upheld the conviction of the accused person.

Legal issue:

1)Whether in the absence of the records of the Court of Trial, the appellate Court could have upheld the conviction and enhanced the quantum of the fine.

2)Whether, given the language employed under Section 385 of CrPC, the present situation constitutes a violation of the accused’s fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Indian constitution

Related laws:

1)Sec 7 of the Prevention of corruption act: Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act.—Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Central Government or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State or with any local authority, corporation or Government company referred to in clause (c) of section 2, or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less than six months but which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine.

2) Sec 13(1),Sec13(2) of the prevention of the corruption act 

3)SEC.385. of Criminal Procedure code Procedure for hearing appeals not dismissed summarily.—(1) If the Appellate Court does not dismiss the appeal summarily, it shall cause notice of the time and place at which such appeal will be heard to be given—

(i) to the Appellant or his pleader;

(ii) to such officer as the State Government may appoint on this behalf;

(iii) if the appeal is from a judgment of conviction in a case instituted upon complaint to the complainant;

Appellant’s contention:

On the surface of the record, it is clear that the relevant portions of the record, in particular, could never have been recreated by the relevant District Court. Despite this, the Court sustained the conviction on the basis of the partially reconstructed record, which only contained a few documents, such as the FIR. The knowledgeable attorney for the appellant claims that the law is clear on the matter and that without these records, it is impossible to say that a conviction was obtained on solid evidence and is therefore subject to being overturned.

Respondent’s contention : 

Not every conviction alters a person’s personality forever. A conviction may occasionally have little to no effect on a person’s behaviour and character. Furthermore, even though key evidence was lacking, it would be reasonable to uphold the conviction in particular circumstances. Although 500 rupees may not seem like much, if the evidence leads to a conviction, the accused should still be held accountable for their acts. The absence of an appeal does not necessarily imply that the defendant is innocent or deserves a second chance. Instead, in order to reach a fair and just judgment, the relevant data should be thoroughly analyzed and taken into account

Judgment: 

The Court of Appeal’s responsibility is to reach a decision on the matter “based on the record available to duly called from the Trial Court and the arguments advanced before it,” rather than relying on the lower court’s decision to affirm the conviction. The Court further held that in the absence of a fair legal process, the protection of Article 21 rights includes the freedom from any restrictions thereon. This includes the right of the person filing an appeal to contest the findings of fact made by the trial court, which can only be done when the record is available to the Court of Appeal. We hold that noncompliance with the mandate of the section, in certain cases contingent upon specific facts and circumstances of the case, would result in a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which we find to be the case in the instant case. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, it is not within prudence to lay down a straightjacket formula.

As a result, the Court overturned the appellant’s conviction.

Court also directed the High Court to the digitization of the lower courts so these kinds of situations could not arise in the future.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3oRvPjS

Report by Pranav Mathur

The Madhya Pradesh High Court, on 31st January 2023, dismissed an appeal filed before it by a murder convict, in the case of Ashok Malviya v. State of Madhya Pradesh. It deliberated on provisions of law related to Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”), which prescribes punishments for the commission of murder, and for the commission of culpable homicide relating to murder. It also dived into the question of whether the facts of the case represent a culpable homicide amounting to murder as given under Section 304 of the IPC, or not.

FACTS:


The incident occurred on the 21st of December 2011, approximately three years after their marriage. After the passage of a year of their marriage, the appellant had started physically assaulting the deceased, mainly because she was incapable of bearing a child, due to the size of her uterus. On the date of the incident, the appellant and the deceased were in their home, and around 10 pm when the parents of the appellant came back after their day’s work, they found the deceased lying on the bed, and subsequently to this, called a few relatives to their place to assess the situation. Two of those relatives went to the police station and filed a complaint against him. He was arrested on the 23rd of December 2011. The police also recovered the dupatta that had been used to strangle the deceased.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS:


The appellant outrightly denied committing the offence and signified his intention to move the case to trial. The first and foremost contention of the appellant was the lack of eyewitnesses to corroborate the sequence of events. His parents, and then his relatives did not, with their own eyes, see him strangle her, and therefore the court relying on the testaments of the witnesses should not have been enough to decide the case. It was also contended that the neck injury, even if proved was caused by the appellant, isn’t sufficient enough to attract the charge of murder, rather the charge of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, under Section 304 of the IPC. The counsel for the appellant placed huge reliance on the cases of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Abdul Latif and Lavghanbhai Devjibhai Vasava v. State of Gujarat, which had held the contentions presented in the form of applicable judgments.

COURT’S OBSERVATION AND THE JUDGMENT:


Initially, the Court deliberated upon the issue of whether the particular death was a homicide or not, and a thorough inspection of the medical records and investigations that had been submitted concluded that it indeed was a case of homicide. It considered the cross-examinations of various relatives of the appellant who were witnesses and concluded that the deceased was previously married, from which she had obtained a divorce, and the appellant had the knowledge of her uterus and still made the voluntary decision of marrying her. According to the post-mortem report of the deceased, she had ante-mortem injuries, and the cause of death was revealed to be asphyxiation, which was concluded from the mark on her neck. The Court further held that the appellant had a clear motive to commit the offence. The relations between the deceased and the appellant had grown severe after her inability of conceiving a child started frustrating him, and their relations were also corroborated by the examinations in chief of the witnesses. The Court was of the opinion that the crime did not occur pursuant to a sudden quarrel, which may have given provocation to the appellant, and therefore ruled out Section 304 of the IPC, and instead, charged the appellant with culpable homicide amounting to murder, which is punished under Section 302 of the IPC. Therefore, observing how the essentials of Section 300 of the IPC, which defines and gives exceptions to and of murder, were fulfilled in the present scenario and also observing how the minimal sentence possible had been given to the appellant by the Trial Court, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dismissed the appeal.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/40Jp9Tm

Report by Anjali Pandey

Without commenting further on the merits of the case, keeping the facts and circumstances in mind and the fact that the trial is likely to take some time, I am satisfied that the applicant has made out a case for a grant of regular bail. In the event of there being any FIR/DD entry/ complaint lodged against the applicant, it would be open to the State to seek redressal by way of seeking cancellation of bail. It is also made clear that the observations made in the present case are only to consider the bail application and should not influence the outcome of the trial and not be taken as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.

FACTS:

The FIR was registered on a complaint made by the father of the deceased, Shri Sarvesh Kumar, alleging that the son of the applicant, Sonu was married to the deceased, Neha, who committed suicide on 19.09.2021, due to harassment and torture, being caused by her husband, Sonu, and his family members, including the applicant, Ram Ashre. The applicant is the father-in-law of the deceased.

Learned Counsel for the applicant submits that the accused, husband and the mother-in-law of the deceased who has been specifically named by the complainant are in judicial custody. He submits that no role has been alleged to the applicant and a vague allegation has been made that the entire family of the husband was responsible for the dowry death.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:

Learned Counsel for the applicant submits that the accused, husband and the mother-in-law of the deceased who has been specifically named by the complainant are in judicial custody. He submits that no role has been alleged to the applicant and a vague allegation has been made that the entire family of the husband was responsible for the dowry death.

He further submits that the learned Trial Court, by order dated 12.11.2021, has already granted pre-arrest bail to the brother-in-law of the deceased, specifically noting that the prime witness, Anisha, whose statement has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution, had only named the husband, Sonu, the mother-in-law, Maya Devi, and she had also specifically said in the statement that the deceased did not take anyone else’s name.

JUDGMENT:

Without commenting further on the merits of the case, keeping the facts and circumstances in mind and the fact that the trial is likely to take some time, I am satisfied that the applicant has made out a case for a grant of regular bail.

The applicant is, therefore, directed to be released on bail on furnishing a bail bond for a sum of ₹50,000/- (rupees Fifty thousand only) with two sureties of the like amount to the satisfaction of learned Trial Court / Duty Metropolitan Magistrate on the following conditions:a) He shall under no circumstance leave Delhi without informing the concerned IO / SHO.b) He shall not take adjournment and attend the Trial Court proceedings on every date.c) He shall join and cooperate in further investigation.d) The applicant shall not, in any manner, try to contact any of the witnesses.e) He shall provide his mobile number to the investigating officer (IO) concerned/SHO concerned at the time of release which shall be kept in always working conditions.

In the event of there being any FIR/DD entry/ complaint lodged against the applicant, it would be open to the State to seek redressal by way of seeking cancellation of bail.

Case Number 

  • CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.271 OF 2011

Equivalent Citation 

  • (2011) 3 SCC 650

Bench

  • Altamas Kabir 
  • Cyriac Joseph

Decided on 

  • 31 January 2011

Respondents 

  • (R1) Manoj Bhimrao Wankhade 
  • (R2) Ramabai, Appellant’s mother-in-law 
  • (R3) Appellant’s sister-in-law

Relevant Act/ Section 

  • Section 2(q) of The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
  • Section 498-A of India Penal Code

Brief Facts and Procedural History 

  • Although the main body of Section 2(q) expressly states that a respondent is a “adult male person,” the proviso broadens the scope of the proceedings by allowing an aggrieved wife or female in a relationship in the nature of marriage to file a complaint against a relative of her husband/male partner. This refutes the claim that the legislation was written with the intention of excluding women. The appeal was granted, with the Trial Courts directed to consider R2 and R3 as respondents in the case.

Issues before the Court 

  • Do females fall under the definition of “respondents” in the Domestic Violence Act’s Section 2(q)? 
  • Are females excluded from prosecution under the Domestic Violence Act?

Facts of the Case 

  • The appellant lived with R1, R2, and R3 for over a year following her marriage in 2005, during which time her marriage was disrupted. She reported her husband to the police under section 498-A IPC For attacking her. She also filed a complaint against all three respondents. The First-Class Judicial Magistrate approved it, directing R1 to pay on a monthly basis maintenance. All respondents were also barred from evicting the appellant from her matrimonial home. Criminal appeals and applications brought before the Sessions Judge by an aggrieved R1. The appeals to the Supreme Court and the High Court were both dismissed.
  • R2 and R3 went before the First-Class Magistrate, but their request was denied. They filed an appeal, arguing that women cannot be named respondents in domestic violence cases. The Court agreed and overturned the order, allowing appellant to be evicted from her marriage home, which was solely owned by R2. As a result, it was not a “shared house.” The Court, on the other hand, ordered R1 to furnish separate accommodations or make additional payments for it.
  • The appellant’s appeal in Sessions Court was dismissed based on the determination that “females” are not included among “respondents.” The HC took a similar stance, striking R2 and R3’s names from the proceedings and ordering the appellant to evacuate the matrimonial home. As a result, this appeal has been made.

Decision of the Court 

  • Although the main body of Section 2(q) expressly states that a respondent is a “adult male person,” the proviso broadens the scope of the proceedings by allowing an aggrieved wife or female in a relationship in the nature of marriage to file a complaint against a relative of her husband/male partner. This refutes the claim that the legislation was written with the intention of excluding women. The appeal was granted, with the Trial Courts directed to consider R2 and R3 as respondents in the case.

The case analysis has been done by Shrey Hasija.

The case analysis has been edited by Shubham Yadav, pursuing B.com LL.B.(4th Year) from Banasthali Vidyapith.

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