Tag: #DelhiHighCourtJudgment

-Report by Deep Shikha 

The Hon’ble High court of Delhi in the case of Panasonic India Private Ltd vs. Shah Aircon Through its Proprietor Shadab Raza, held that the court cannot intervene in the arbitral proceedings as well as the parties can refer the disputes to arbitration even without an agreement but at some point of time in the course of the agreement must show the intention to refer the disputes to arbitration.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioner, hereby, entered into a distributorship agreement to sell electronic goods to the respondent. The agreement contains a clause of dispute resolution by arbitration saying that all issues relating to appointment of arbitrator or any petition to be made to the court under the applicable arbitration law with the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 or any issue arising out of arbitration proceedings and award shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of courts at New Delhi. 

The dispute arose between them over alleged unpaid invoices. Therefore, a legal notice was sent on behalf of the respondent dated 20.08.2020. It was further alleged that even after the distributorship agreement between them, petitioner sold goods to some dealer directly and bills were made in the name of respondent which resulted in huge loss to the respondent, but the payment was not received by them. In reply to legal notice, petitioner demanded a sum of Rs. 37,29,976/- in the event of failure of payment and invoked the arbitration clause contained in the agreement. This led to the present petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 on 15.07.2021. In response to it, the respondent contended to be the dispute of civil nature which can be resolved under the jurisdiction of court. 

There are mainly three issues addressed in this case namely:-

1. Whether the purported arbitration clause is a valid clause in an agreement?
2. Whether the distributorship agreement is under the limitations for the agreement to be made enforceable?
3. Whether the court has jurisdiction to resolve the dispute by way of civil nature?

Hence, it brings to the present petition for resolving civil disputes in arbitration rather under the jurisdiction of court.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

The learned counsel appearing from respondent’s side stated that it did not sign any agreement with the petitioner. Therefore, the arbitration clause in the agreement is not a valid clause as the term “can” and “shall” makes the agreement uncertain, cases like Jagdish Chander vs. Ramesh Chander and Ors. and Jyoti Brothers vs. Sree Durga Mining Company, were relied on.

It also pointed out the second issue of limitation of the agreement which is not mentioned in agreement is one year as per Clause II(xi) of the General Terms & Conditions of the agreement, to be read with Schedule II and III. In this present case, it is outside the limitation of the agreement making an agreement void. 

While addressing the third issue by the learned council from respondent side, it further questioned that the dispute is related to arrears in accounts, which provide jurisdiction to court through civil proceedings in Gurugram, Haryana. And the petitioner has no power to appoint any learned arbitrator. The respondent contended that courts lacked jurisdiction over the venue of arbitral proceedings.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION

The learned counsel appearing from appellant’s side made an application to address the first issue in the suit for reference to arbitration under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Since, the parties’ intention to take reference to arbitration is sufficient for the parties to mutually refer the dispute to Arbitral Tribunal even without any expressly or impliedly agreement under the reference of the Clause XXIV and XXV of the agreement, the arbitration clause stands forth under the provisions of Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

While addressing the second issue, on the question of limitation, they contended that this issue be adjudicated by the arbitral tribunal during arbitral proceedings. Further on the question of jurisdiction which is the last issue, exclusive jurisdiction of contract will prevail over the intention of the parties to signify the place for the conduct of arbitral proceedings.

JUDGEMENT

The Hon’ble High court of Delhi grants the petition of referring the dispute to Arbitral Tribunal. Addressing this, the court appointed an arbitrator for resolving the dispute and pronounced an Arbitral Award. The remuneration is to be calculated on the basis of Schedule IV of the Act. All rights and contentions of the parties are left open for adjudication under the Arbitral Tribunal by the learned Arbitrator.

-Report by Sanket Pawar

Delhi High Court grants bail to the petitioner (spouse of the co-accused, Vinod) whose vehicle was used for the transportation of Heroin, in the case of SIMRANJEET KAUR Vs STATE OF GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI.

Facts

A raid was conducted jointly by the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) and Delhi police upon receiving secret information on 29/09/17. The information said that a person named Imran, who resides at Dakshinpuri area of Delhi, will be bringing heroin from Bareilly, U.P. in large quantities. Imran would be bringing these large quantities of heroin at the instance and order of a person named Vinod a.k.a Rinku a.k.a. Mota Bhai. Imran could be caught on the road from Kalindi Kunj to Sarita Vihar near Drain (Nala) and opposite Shaheen Bagh at about 12:15 p.m. Accordingly, the raid was conducted and Imran was apprehended along with the vehicle in which he was transporting the heroin and 500g of heroin was recovered from him. Upon investigation, the name of Mota Bhai came forward, and a supplementary charge sheet was also filed with the Charge sheet of Imran. The supplementary charge sheet is also named the petitioner. The vehicle which Imran was using to transport the heroin was registered in the name of petitioner Simranjeet Kaur. She is the spouse of the co-accused Vinod a.k.a. Mota Bhai. Mota Bhai is a habitual offender and there are other FIRs registered in his name. The trial court had dismissed the bail application of the petitioner twice.

Petitioner’s Contention

The petitioner sought bail on the grounds that she was not aware of the recovery of any narcotic substances from her vehicle. It also argued that the phrase in Section 25 of the NDPS act “knowingly permitted” does not mention the transportation of narcotic substances by use of the vehicle. The counsel relied on the case of Sujit Tiwari vs the State of Gujarat, wherein the apex court granted bail to the accused on the ground that the accused was not aware of the illegal activities procured by his brother.

Respondent’s Contention

The Respondent argued that during the investigation the prime accused, Imran, revealed the vehicle which is registered in the name of the petitioner. The same vehicle was used for the transportation of heroin. The petitioner along with her husband, Mota Bhai, was absconding for a long time. The counsel claimed that the petitioner was having full knowledge of the transportation of the heroin which was to take place.

Judgement

The court observed that there has been no recovery of the heroin from the petitioner. The only allegation levelled against the petitioner is that she is the registered owner of the vehicle in which the heroin was transported by the prime accused. There is not any evidence which shows the major involvement of the petitioner in the commission of the crime. The court also relied on the judgement of the apex court in the case of Sujit Tiwari vs State of Gujarat. Relying on all the above factors the court decided to grant bail to the petitioner along with a bail bond of 50,000/-.

-Report by Anette Abraham

In a Delhi HC ruling, Hon’ble Justices Suresh Kumar Kait and Saurabh Banerjee directed Kirori Mal College, to pay arrears to a faculty whose permanent appointment was inappropriately deterred. In this case, Kirori Mal College v. Dr. Kusum Lata, the Hindi Lecturer, who was expected to receive permanent employment under the provisions of the PWD quota was deprived of her post in a slight that occurred in 1998. 

FACTS

The lecturer, Dr. Kusum Lata, was visually impaired and fell under the provisions of the Persons with Disability Act, 1995. She applied to Kirori Mal College under the advertisement that posted two vacancies: one for the permanent Hindi Lecturer post and another for part-time Hindi Lecturer. She was given the post of part-time lecturer on 16^th July, 1997.

 In the year 2000, another advertisement was posted by the college which detailed the availability of two posts, one – the post of Permanent Hindi teacher under the Scheduled Caste category and the other – a temporary post against leave vacancy. Dr. Kusum was allotted the position of temporary post on 16^th April, 2001. Two more permanent posts for Permanent Lecturer were opened where one was reserved for candidates under Persons with Disability, the respondent was given the post of permanent employee on 4^th March, 2006. 

Kusum filed a writ petition in the year 2001, assailing the reservation that occurred in 2001 and contesting the lack of appointment she faced. The Court held that Kirori Mal College had failed to implement the reservation aptly and directed the college to pay for the arrears. 

The College was told to pay a sum of Rs. 8,84,583/- to Dr. Kusum to make up for the loss in income she suffered due to incorrect appointment. Further, they were instructed to provide a detailed calculation sheet for the arrears and put the funds in a Fixed Deposit that Dr. Kusum could access within eight weeks. This judgement was then modified slightly by the Delhi High Court where the college was only expected to pay arrears from the year 2001 forward when she was slighted of her position and also the year the petition was filed. 

APPELLANT’S ARGUMENT 

1. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has argued that the petition in which the impugned judgment was rendered was only filed in 2008, and that there was no challenge to the selection process undertaken in 1997, under which the Respondent was appointed on a part-time basis, prior to the filing of the said petition. Thus, the Petitioner’s challenge in the writ petition to the non-grant of the reservation to physically challenged category applicants in the 1997 selection process was greatly delayed and prevented by laches.
2. The Counsel proceeded to contend that Dr. Kusum’s petition did not stand under the ambit of reservation since the quota that she falls under, physically challenged, is a horizontal reservation (Article 16 (1) ) and that of the Scheduled Tribe Reservation is a vertical reservation (Article 16 (4) ). 
3. The appellant additionally claims that the respondent provided inaccurate calculation(s), citing inconsistencies in the values for “Transport Allowance” and “Dearness Allowance.” Finally, the appellant claims that the respondent is incorrectly claiming promotion to Reader with effect from January 1, 2007, as well as concomitant advantages accruing to the higher pay scale as a result of such promotion.

COURT’S DECISION

The Delhi HC held that the circumstances of the case and the court proceedings show that the college freely paid a sum of Rs. 8,84,583/- before the Registrar General, without providing any calculations and on its own free choice. Furthermore, the appellant hasn’t charged Dr. Kusum Lata with any fraud or deception, nor has it made the argument that the money it deposited was more than what was owed to the respondent or that it was an error on its side. Last but not least, the appellant has never requested release of the aforementioned deposited sum on its own and has only made a brief mention of it in its response to the respondent’s application without pressing the matter. 

Further, the Hon’ble Court held that, in light of the facts and the aforementioned conduct of the college, they strongly believe that the appellant, would have deposited the said amount of Rs. 8,84,583/- after making proper calculations and tallying it with the records available, to which it has not objected or raised a dispute. This caused the Court to draw the obvious conclusion that the respondent has a right to the aforementioned already-deposited sum of Rs. 8,84,453/-. Therefore, they concluded that the respondent is qualified to collect the aforementioned amount as the appellant had no good reason to voluntarily deposit it before the Registrar General. After more than four years have passed with no provocation or fault attributable to the respondent, the appellant cannot be permitted to undertake an improper endeavour to collect the previously voluntarily deposited sum. 

-Report by Shagun Sharma

Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition in the case of Jitinder Tiwar vs. Union of India and Ors. filed against the departmental proceedings. The bench consists of the HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE and the HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD.

FACTS

The petitioner was serving as a Sub Inspector of Police. He, along with one Om Prakash Ahlawat, was subjected to disciplinary proceedings. The allegations leveled against the petitioner and Om Prakash Ahlawat reveal that while posted at Police Station Paschim Vihar they detained Smt. Santosh Jain and Smt. Anita Jain along with her two minor children in the absence of any male family member of the family.

The action was taken by the petitioner as well as Om Prakash Ahlawat based upon a complaint filed by Smt. Meenu Jain. They had ignored the earlier complaint of Smt. Santosh Jain and her PCR calls, and action were taken against her. They were allegedly humiliated and threatened to vacate the house. Due to such treatment, Smt. Santosh Jain fell sick and she was hospitalized at Muni Maya Ram Jain Hospital, Pitampura. The Petitioner accompanied Smt. Meenu Jain to
Flat No. GH-9/149, Paschim Vihar in the absence of the owner Smt. Santosh Jain and her family, permitted her to take possession of the house by breaking the locks.

The petitioner also got an FIR registered under Sections 341, 506 and 34 IPC at Police Station Paschim Vihar against Smt. Santosh Jain and her family without proper verification. Based upon the complaint made by Smt. Santosh Jain, a charge sheet was issued on 12.11.2002 keeping in view the Delhi Police Establishment Punishment and Appeal Rules, 1980. The imputation of misconduct was issued against the Petitioner.

After examining the prosecution witnesses and the defense witnesses, the Enquiry Officer submitted its report in the matter. The disciplinary authority furnished a copy of the inquiry report to the petitioner as well as the other charged official. A final order was passed by the disciplinary authority on 23.11.2006. The disciplinary authority has inflicted punishment of forfeiture of 2 years of approved service permanently and entailing a proportionate reduction in pay of both Jitinder Tiwari (the present petitioner) and Om Prakash Ahlawat.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION

The petitioner and the other charged official preferred an appeal in the matter and the appeal was dismissed by a speaking order. Then only the petitioner challenged the order of punishment and the co-charged official has not preferred any writ petition before the Tribunal. The petitioner stated that he has brought on record the entire evidence and the evidence does not establish the guilt of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also argued before this Court that the departmental inquiry was not completed within 3 months, as required under Standing Order Number 125/01, issued by the Commissioner of Police, Delhi and, therefore, the entire proceedings and the subsequent punishment order stands vitiated.

He has also argued that some of the statements of the prosecution witnesses which were recorded during preliminary
the inquiry were accepted and relied upon in the departmental inquiry. Learned counsel has also minutely scanned the evidence before this Court and it was vehemently argued that the complaint submitted by Smt. Santosh Jain was a concocted complaint and was only to harass and humiliate the petitioner and the other charged official.

COURT’S DECISION

The High Court relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. N. Gangaraj, (2020) 3 SCC 423 wherein the scope of interference in departmental enquiries was discussed. The court observed:

“In the present case, the evidence on record establishes the guilt of the Petitioner and in absence of violation of principles of natural justice and fair play or any procedural irregularity, the interference by this Court does not
arise.”

The court held that the departmental enquiry was according to the procedure laid in Delhi Police Establishment Punishment and Appeal Rules, 1980. The writ petition was therefore dismissed.

–Report by Rhea Mistry

The Delhi High Court in the case of Meta Platforms INC. v. Noufel Malol & ANR passed an injunction order, restraining the Bangalore Pastry making company from using domain names similar to Facebook. On 12^th November 2020, this court passed an interim order stating that the defendants, its agents and the employees are restrained from using the mark “Facebake” or any other mark, which is in any way similar to the plaintiff’s trademark.

Even after passing the order, the defendants incorporated the company naming it “Ehrlich Foods and Beverages Pvt. Ltd. on 21^st January 2021, with the intention to use the trademark of “Facecake” and applied for registration of the same on 30^th March 2021. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. No one appeared on behalf of the defendants in both the proceedings and hence ex-parte orders were granted.

In this case, the plaintiff has put forward that they are a company incorporated in the USA and adopted Facebook in the year 2004. The plaintiff’s company is considered to be a world-famous social networking platform and has launched a mobile application along with its website. With various key products and features of the same being launched in October 2016 and May 2020, all the applications for registration of trademarks have been submitted by the plaintiff.

The trade dress of “Facebook” has a theme of blue and white with a distinguishing color, layout, and visual impressions. The plaintiffs’ brand is known to be among the10 most famous brands in India across all segments of businesses. It is a highly used brand in India with a large user base. They further contend that they have been recognized time and again in a number of magazines and have also been recognized as “famous” or “well-known” in several international jurisdictions.

According to section 2(1) (zb) read with Section 2(1) (z) of the Trademark act 1999, the plaintiff presented that Facebook is a “well-known” trademark. The “Facebake” mark by defendant no. 1 mimics the plaintiff’s trademark, visual impressions, and theme. The plaintiff asserted that the defendants are using a similar trademark as their own with an
intention of trading with the goodwill of the plaintiff. He has filed the representations of the defendants with the court showing their marks similar to their own.

The activity of this kind came to be known by the plaintiff when they were surfing through the trademarks journal and
saw an application seeking registration of the mark “Facebake”. Following this, they filed an application against the registration stating that the defendants are using a very alike mark, which is infringing their statutory as well as common law rights. Its outcome is dilution, and unfair competition to the plaintiff.

Even though the order was passed, the defendants changed their mark from “Facebake” to “Facecake” which is a change in just one alphabet and incorporated their company. The mark of “Facecake” is still very similar to the mark of the plaintiffs’ company. The plaintiff relied on a number of judgments of the Supreme court to support his arguments.

After considering the submissions and affidavits made by the plaintiff, the court said that under the Trademarks Act, 1999, section 11 provides the criteria on which the application for registration can be refused. The court stated that u/s 11(6), (7) and (9), an application can be refused for the reason that the mark is already registered and a well-known trademark. The court observed:

“In the present case, though there is some distinction between the marks of the plaintiff and of the defendants, the overall visual representation adopted by the defendants, clearly depicts the mala fide intent of the defendants in obtaining unfair advantage by the use of the mark similar to that of the plaintiff and also leads to the dilution of the mark of the plaintiff. It can lead to an unwary consumer being at least interested in taking note of the defendants as having some kind of connection with the plaintiff. The mala fide intent of the defendants is also evident from the fact that upon the knowledge of the ad-interim injunction passed by this Court, the defendants changed the mark from “facebake‟ to “facecake‟ thereby changing only one alphabet, however, chose not to appear before this Court to defend the suit in spite of service.”

This suit is decreed by permanently restraining the defendants, directors, employees, its franchises, subsidies, offices, and anyone acting on their behalf from using the “facebake” marks, its domain name, their email ids, the “facecake” marks, and the visual representations of the Facebook or any other mark similar to that of the plaintiff. The defendants are to damages amounting to Rs. 50,000/- to the plaintiff and also the costs that were incurred by the plaintiff in the present suit. Any marks, locks, stationery, etc. that are alike with the plaintiff’s mark shall be delivered to the plaintiff for the purpose of destruction and erasion.

Case Number

CRL.A. 157/2013

Equivalent Citation

247 (2018) DLT 31

Bench

Justice S Muralidhar, Justice IS Mehta 

Decided On

November 30, 2017

Relevant Act/Section

• Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
• The Indian Electricity Act, 1910
• The Indian Penal code
• The Companies Act, 1956

Brief Facts and Procedural History

An exhaustive judgment given on September 15, 2016, allowed the allure. Notwithstanding, on that date, the Court gave a different choice featuring three worries that emerged in a bigger setting and selected Prof. (Dr.) G.S. Bajpai, Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice and Registrar, National Law University, Delhi, as amicus curiae to give guidance.

Issues before the Court

• Is the substantive law and procedure relating to the default in payment of a fine?
• Whether the existing law on suspension of sentence under Section 389 CrPC?
• Whether there is any provision that may enable the Court to suspend the order of conviction as normally what is suspended is the execution of the sentence?

Decision of the Court:

The Supreme Court communicated in Palaniappa Gounder v. State of Tamil Nadu¹ that “the fine discipline ought not to be pointlessly lavish”.

“However, there is the capacity to integrate a sentence of death or life imprisonment with a sentence of fine,” it was added. “That power should be polished with caution, considering that the life sentence is an outrageous discipline to force, and adding a fine to that grave discipline is not completely resolved to fill any accommodating need.”.”

The Supreme Court reaffirmed on account of Shantilal v. the State of M.P. that there was a total abuse of the arrangement of frameworks in Sections 63 to 70 IPC, causing legal to notice the instance of Shahejadkhan Mahebubkhan Pathan v. the State of Gujarat, where the Supreme Court totally abused the arrangement of frameworks in Sections 63 to 70 IPC.

Nonetheless, detainment for non-installment of fines is in another equilibrium. In the place where such a sentence is implemented, an individual is supposed to be detained in light of the fact that the person can’t pay the fine or won’t pay the fine. We are of the assessment that it is the occupant of the Court to keep an assessment of the case, the conditions under which it is held, the area of the case, the litigant, and other significant contemplations, for instance, the monetary conditions of the respondent in regard of and how much the offense prior to requesting that the culprit endure detainment when the individual in question is fined. The arrangements of Sections 63 to 70 of the IPC specify that the punishment rate ought not to be brutal or nonsensical. We additionally stress that in the case of a basic term of detainment, outlandish fines ought not to be forced by some other means than uncommon offenses. “

Clearly, no preparation is honored with use and purified in time that can’t be permitted to win in a circumstance where it attempts to cause disgrace. Each activity of the Court should be trailed by its governmental policy regarding minorities in society because of authentic worries about uniformity. Preparing not to give bail to an individual condemned to life detainment was going on in the High Courts and in this Court on the premise that assuming an individual is considered fit for preliminary and condemned to life detainment, the person ought not to be delivered. , as long as his endless sentence can be saved, yet the fundamental reason for this preparing was that the enticement of such an individual would be disposed of throughout some undefined time frame, so it was expected that he, at last, appeared to be dependable, he would have no need to endlessly remain in jail. The thought of this preparation may not have any significant bearing in the event that the Court isn’t in that frame of mind of interest for five or six years. Without a doubt, it would be a wrongdoing to compare and save an individual from jail for a time of five or six years for wrongdoing that at last seems to have not been carried out. When could the Court at any point pay him for his apparently outrageous captures? It would be fair regardless for the Court to tell the person: “We have admitted your enchantment as we suspect you are at legitimate fault for your appearance, yet tragically we have not had the potential chance to hear your temptation for a long time and, subsequently, up to this point. We hear your enticement, you ought to remain in jail, regardless of the way that you are straightforward? “the adjudicator could never have been overwhelmed by regret while eliminating such an individual in the wake of hearing the enticement? Could it not be an assault on his feeling of equity? in the past it ought to be reconsidered for quite a while as this Court isn’t in that frame of mind of hearing the temptation of the denounced as soon as possible, the Court ought to, except if there is valid justification to make a move regardless, delivering the indicted individual in situations where exceptional leave is taken into account the respondent to apply for conviction and sentence. “

Section 389 (1) states that in the repercussions of any allure against a respondent, the Court of Appeal may because it must be recorded as a held duplicate, demand that the sentence or allure be suspended in like manner, guaranteeing that he had the power, to be delivered on bail, or on his bond. This proviso acquaints the non-select power with suspending the condemning and award bail and notwithstanding suspending the activity of the basic allure.

This issue was completely inspected by a three-judge bench of this Court in Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang and Ors.²

The legal position, appropriately, is clear that the Court of Appeal may suspend or grant an application for sentencing. However, the person wishing to remain guilty must clearly state the consideration of the Court reversing the consequences of his or her conviction. Unless the Court’s decision is based on the possible consequences of a conviction, the convicted person will not be able to apply for conviction. In addition, the reward for remaining guilty can be converted to extraordinary cases depending on the shocking facts of the case. “

The legal status of the Supreme Court under Section 389 of the CrPC is very clear, it is enough for this Court to repeat it.

There is a real need, right, for a formal (proper) administration to provide relief and rehabilitation for the injured through extrajudicial executions and arrests. Whether this should be a law that governs everything or a system that specifically addresses the needs of the survivor, and those who are unjustly imprisoned, including the family and guardians of the detainee, or these should be governed by different rules or arrangements for discussion, consideration, and consultation with The purpose of the article is to pay for those who are unjustly detained, questions about the circumstances and circumstances in which such assistance can be obtained, in what structure and at what stage and are matters for consideration. This is the best work left in the main case of a body tasked with informing government officials of control measures expected to fill an undeniable hole.

The Court, appropriately, compels the Indian Law Commission to attempt a thorough investigation of the matter referred to in paragraphs 11 to 16 of this application and to make its recommendation to the Government of India.

Conclusion

In this case, the Delhi High Court expressed profound concern over the plight of innocent people who have been unfairly convicted and imprisoned for crimes they did not commit. The Court emphasized the urgent need for a legislative framework to provide relief and rehabilitation to victims of wrongful prosecution and incarceration and urged the Law Commission to conduct a thorough review of the aforementioned issues and submit recommendations to the Indian government.

In the current state of the criminal justice system in the country, an adequate reaction from the state to victims of a miscarriage of justice resulting in erroneous prosecutions is absent. There is also no statutory or regulatory framework detailing the state’s approach to the problem.

According to the solicitation made by the court, the Law Commission of India introduced a report to the Government of India in August 2018 named “Wrongful Prosecution (Miscarriage of Justice): Legal Remedies.” In this paper, the point is analyzed with regard to the Indian law enforcement framework, and the expression “wrongful prosecution” is suggested as the limit for a miscarriage of justice, rather than “wrongful conviction” and “wrongful imprisonment.” ‘Wrongful prosecution’ alludes to circumstances in which the blamed isn’t blameworthy for the wrongdoing, however, the police and additionally prosecution are occupied with bad behavior in exploring or potentially indicting the individual.

It would cover both cases in which the person served time in jail and those in which he did not; as well as those in which the accused was found not guilty by the trial court or was convicted by one or more courts but was ultimately found not guilty by the Higher Court. The report provides an outline of the various legal remedies and evaluates their shortcomings (also noted by the High Court in the aforementioned Order).

As a result, the Commission recommends enactment of a specific legal provision for wrongful prosecution redress – to provide monetary and non-monetary compensation to victims of wrongful prosecution within a statutory framework (such as counseling, mental health services, vocational / employment skills development, and so on). The Report lays out the core principles of the proposed framework, including defining “wrongful prosecution,” or cases in which a claim for compensation can be filed, naming a Special Court to hear these claims, the nature of the proceedings – timelines for deciding the claim, etc., financial and other factors to be considered in determining compensation, provisions for interim compensation in certain cases, and removing disqualification due to wrongful prosecution.

Hence, a legal (ideally legislative) framework for giving relief and rehabilitation to victims of wrongful prosecution and incarceration is urgently needed. In addition to the topic of paying persons who have been unfairly imprisoned, consideration should be given to the situations and conditions under which such relief would be available, as well as the form and stage at which such relief would be provided.

Citations:

1. (1977) 2 SCC 634
2. (1995) 2 SCC 513

This case analysis is done by Arryan Mohanty, a 2nd Year Student student of Symbiosis Law School.