Tag: #SupremeCourtjudgement

Citation

1979 AIR 621, 1979 SCR (2) 641

Date of Judgment

12/12/1978

Court

Supreme Court of India

Bench

• Justice P.N. Bhagwati
• Justice V.D. Tulzapulkar

Introduction

According to the Promissory Estoppel doctrine, the promisor will refrain from breaking the promise if it would be unfair for him to do so whenever an unambiguous promise is made with the intent to establish a legal relationship or affect one that will arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the other party and is in fact acted on. This is the main referred law in this present case. If parties who had already agreed to clear-cut terms involving specific legal outcomes later engage in negotiation, it may be assumed that Promissory Estoppel only applies to situations in which the parties are already bound by a legal or contractual relationship and one of them promises the other that strict legal rights under the contract won’t be enforced. However, the court found that the theory of promissory estoppel, even as it was originally stated by Lord Denning in the High Trees case, did not contain any such limitation, and thus it cannot apply in the current case, Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills.

Background of the Case

The appealing party in this instance was a limited sugar production company. His main line of work was producing and selling sugars. On October 10th, 1968, news broke that the respondent (In this case- The state of Uttar Pradesh) had decided to exempt all new modern units in the State of Uttar Pradesh from the Tax charges for a period of three years under Section 4-A of the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948. On October 11th, 1968, the appealing party spoke with the Director of Industries, stating that the party sought confirmation of the exemption and wished to establish a factory to produce vanaspati in light of the business charge occasion given by the administration. The appointment was confirmed by the director of industries. The Chief Secretary of the Government of Uttar Pradesh made an affirmation with a similar effect too.

The appealing party went ahead and built up the processing plant after receiving these certifications. The Uttar Pradesh State government reexamined the issue of exclusion in May 1969 and suggested the litigant attend a gathering. The representative of the appealing party testified at the meeting that the plaintiff had continued constructing the manufacturing facility on the affirmation and assurance of the respondent (the legislature of Uttar Pradesh). He took out a sizable loan and began to pay it back under the impression that the government had exempted him from paying taxes. But after some time, the government reconsidered its tax exemption strategy. It requested the petitioner attend a meeting discussing this matter and called for one to be held. To attend the meeting, the petitioner dispatched a representative. In any case, the State Government of Uttar Pradesh made the strategic decision on January 20th, 1970, to grant a small reduction in the deals charge to new vanaspati units that began operations by September 30th, 1970. Once again, however, the State govt. went back even on this promise denying any concession to be given. Plaintiff sued the government on account of promissory estoppel.

Issues Raised

The issues raised in this case are-

1. Whether the plaintiff’s acceptance of a partial exemption rendered his entitlement to have a cause of action?
2. Whether the plaintiff has a claim based on promissory estoppel?
3. Is it possible to take such action against the government when it is functioning in such capacities as government, sovereign, or administrative?
4. Given that the plaintiff did not experience any harm, would the theory of Promissory Estoppel apply in the current situation?

Contentions of Parties

Arguments of Petitioner- The main defence put forth on behalf of the appellant was that the respondent had made a categorical assurance on behalf of the State Government that the appellant would be exempt from payment of sales tax for a period of three years from the date of commencement of production. This assurance was made knowing or intending that the appellant would act on it, and in fact, the appellant did act in reliance on it and the State Government changed its position. The appellant argued that since waiver was a factual issue that needed to be pled and since it wasn’t addressed in the affidavit submitted by the State Government in opposition to the writ petition, the State Government was ineligible to rely on the waiver argument. It was claimed by the appellant that even if the waiver defence was allowed to be raised, despite the fact that it had no mention in the pleadings, no waiver had been established because there was no evidence to support the circumstances under which it had sent the letter. It was also impossible to claim that the appellant, with full knowledge of its right to claim complete exemption from payment of sales tax, had sent the letter.

Arguments from Respondent side- On the other hand, the State Government vigorously advanced the waiver argument, arguing that by addressing the letter dated June 25, 1970, the appellant had expressly forfeited its entitlement to full exemption from payment of sales tax. The State Government further argued that, even in the event of a waiver, the appellant would not be permitted to enforce the assurance provided by the fourth respondent because the State Government was not a party to the assurance, and that, in addition, in the absence of notification under section 4A, the State Government could not be prevented from enforcing the appellant’s obligation to pay sales tax under the terms of the Act. The State Government argued that there could not be a promissory estoppel against the State Government in order to prevent it from developing and carrying out its policies in the public interest. These were essentially the opposing arguments put out on behalf of the parties, and we will now analyse them.

Judgement

Though the division bench of the High Court rejected the plea for seeking promissory Estoppel against the respondents, the honourable Supreme Court held that-

1. The decision of the High Court of not granting Promissory Estoppel on the ground that the petitioner has waived that right and so can not have his course of action was wrong.
2. The waiver is a factual issue that needs to be adequately argued and proven. No plea of waiver may be raised unless it is pleaded and the facts supporting it are set forth in the pleadings.
3. Waiver is the act of giving up a right; it can be expressed or inferred from behaviour, but it must be “an intentional act with knowledge” in order to be considered valid. There can be no waiver unless the individual who is supposed to have done so is fully aware of his rights and intentionally gives them up while doing so.
4. ‘Promissory estoppel’ is a legal theory that was developed by equity to prevent injustice when a promise is made by someone who knows that it will be carried out and who is the person to whom it is made and in fact it is so. It is unfair to permit the party making the promise to break it after it has been acted upon. Despite being known as promissory estoppel, this legal doctrine has nothing to do with contracts or estoppel. The interposition of equity, which has always acted in accordance with form to lessen the burdens of strict law, serves as the foundation of the concept.
5. The true meaning of promissory estoppel is that when one party makes a clear and unambiguous promise to another party through words or conduct that is intended to forge a future legal relationship, knowing or intending that the other party will act on the promise, and that the other party actually does act on the promise, the promise will be enforceable against the party who made it and he will be bound by it whether there is a pre-existing relationship between those parties or not. In a situation when justice and fairness call for it, equity will prevent a person from insisting on stringent legal rights even when they originate from his own title deeds or from legislation rather than under any contract.
6. The same limiting estoppel in the strict meaning of the word cannot prevent the notion of promissory estoppel. It is an equitable concept that the Courts developed for the purpose of upholding justice, thus there is no reason why it should only be applied sparingly as a form of defence or used as a shield rather than a sword to establish a claim. It might serve as the impetus for legal action.
7. The Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the request of the promisee even though there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required when the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and the promisee, acting in reliance on it, changes his position.
8. The doctrine of promissory estoppel must give way when equity demands it since it is an equitable doctrine. The Court would not raise equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against the Government if the Government could demonstrate that, given the facts as they have developed, it would be unfair to hold it to the promise it made.
9. The moral standards of the society must be in accordance with the law for it to be legitimate and win social approval. Closing the gap between morality and law and achieving as close to a match as feasible between the two should be the constant goal of legislatures and courts. A key judicial advancement in that direction is the promissory estopped concept.
10. The distinction between a private person and a public body cannot be made in terms of the promissory estoppel theory.  This idea also applies to a government entity like a city council. This approach, however, cannot be used to circumvent a legal responsibility or liability. It cannot be used to force the government or even a private person to carry out an unlawful act. Additionally, promissory estoppel cannot be used to prevent the exercise of legislative power. By using the promissory estoppel concept, the Legislature can never be prevented from doing its legislative duties.

Conclusion

The case turned out to be very important in other cases. The court attempted to define promissory estoppels in this instance. This case did a good job of demonstrating how promissory estoppel could be a defence. However, it must be used with the doctrine of consideration if it is to be used as a weapon. This case demonstrated how important it is for society to stop fraud and injustice. This certificate appeal brings up a significant issue in the area of public law. Although it is a relatively new doctrine, it has the potential to be so prolific and packed with development opportunities that traditional attorneys are concerned it could upend established doctrines, which are viewed almost reverently and have held the line for decades.

This article is authored by Dibyojit Mukherjee, a student at the Institute of Law, Nirma University.

RELEVANT POST:

Doctrine of Estoppel

Case Number

Civil Appeal No. 230 of 1977.

Equivalent Citation

1957 AIR 540

Bench

The Supreme Court of India

Decided On

1st February 1957

Relevant Acts / Sections

The sections that are relevant in the case of Garikapatti Veeraya v N. Subbiah Choudhury are:

• Article 133 of the Constitution of India¹, deals with the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the appeals that can be filed before it.
• Order XLV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, which provides the procedure for filing Special Leave Petitions before the Supreme Court.
• Section 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908², allows for appeals to the Supreme Court in civil cases if certain conditions are fulfilled.
• Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908³, lays down the grounds on which a second appeal can be filed before a High Court.
• Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908⁴, which defines a “decree” is the official statement of a judgment that definitively settles the rights of the parties concerning one or more of the contested issues.
• According to Section 2(14) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908⁵, a “judgment” is defined as the pronouncement made by a judge based on a decree or order.

Brief Facts and Procedural History

OVERVIEW

This legal case concerns an application for special leave to appeal, which arises from a previous lawsuit that was filed on April 22, 1949, and had a value of Rs. 11,400. On February 10, 1955, the high court overruled the decision of the trial court, which had earlier dismissed the suit. However, when the applicant sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, the high court refused the application, arguing that the value of the lawsuit did not meet the minimum requirement of Rs. 20,000.

The applicant contended that they had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court, which was the highest court in the land at the time the suit was instituted, and that this right of appeal had been transferred to the Supreme Court under Article 135 of the Constitution⁶. The applicant argued that they were therefore entitled to appeal to the Supreme Court as a matter of right.

The court held, with Chief Justice Das and Justices Bhagwati, B. P. Sinha, and S. K. Das concurring and Justice Venkatarama Ayyar dissenting, that the applicant’s contention was well-founded. 

The court held that the right to appeal was a significant right that could be utilized only in situations where the verdict was unfavourable. However, it stated that this right was subject to the laws applicable at the commencement of the legal action and included all subsequent appeals from one court to another, effectively forming a single proceeding. The court also held that such a right could be taken away only by a subsequent enactment either expressly or by necessary intendment.

The court cited the case of Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. v. Irving (1905) A.C. 369⁷ and held that the vested right of appeal was a matter contemplated by Article 135 of the Constitution. The court ruled that Article 135 could not be limited to cases where the right of appeal had actually arisen in a concrete form and that the appeal was entertainable by the Supreme Court.

The court also held that Article 133 of the Constitution had no application to such cases. It was not intended to have a retrospective operation so as to take away this vested right, nor did it do so either in express terms or by necessary intendment. To summarize, the court ruled that the applicant had an inherent right to appeal to the Federal Court, and under Article 135 of the Constitution, he had the right to appeal to the Supreme Court. The court also held that Article 133 of the Constitution did not apply to such cases. Furthermore, the appellant’s vested right of appeal acquired under the old law fell under the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

Appellant’s Argument: Acquisition of Vested Right to Appeal to the Federal Court

The appellant in this case argued that he had a vested right to appeal to the Federal Court from the time he filed the suit on April 22, 1949. He contended that the Indian Independence Act of 1947 expanded the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to allow it to hear appeals that previously went to the Privy Council. 

As per the Act, starting from the appointed day, i.e., February 1, 1948, any decision falling under the purview of the Act could be appealed to the Federal Court. The appellant argued that he was entitled to appeal to the Supreme Court as of right under Article 135 of the Constitution, and Article 133 of the Constitution did not apply to cases like his.

Respondent’s Argument: Inapplicability of Article 135 and Refusal of Special Leave

The respondent argued that the appellant’s reliance on Article 135 of the Constitution was misplaced, as Article 133 was the relevant provision. They claimed that there was no vested right to appeal to the Federal Court immediately before the Constitution came into effect, and therefore, Article 133 applied. The respondent contended that since the jurisdiction to hear appeals to the Federal Court ceased to exist, the appellant had no right to appeal to the Supreme Court. Consequently, they maintained that the application for special leave to appeal should be dismissed.

Issues before the Court

• Should the petition for special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution⁸ be granted or not, in relation to the judgment and decree dated March 4, 1955, of the Andhra High Court?

In this particular case, the main issue revolved around the petitioner’s entitlement to appeal to the Supreme Court. The petitioner claimed that he had a vested right to appeal to the Federal Court, which was replaced by the Supreme Court. This right, according to the petitioner, was acquired at the time of the suit’s institution, which occurred before the Constitution came into force. In contrast, the respondent argued that the case fell under the jurisdiction of Article 133 of the Constitution, and there was no vested right to appeal to the Federal Court. As per the respondent’s argument, the petitioner had no right to appeal since the Constitution had extinguished this right.

Therefore, the court was required to determine whether the petitioner had a valid claim to appeal under the previous law and whether Article 135 or Article 133 of the Constitution was applicable to the case. Ultimately, the correct interpretation of these articles was key to the final decision, and whether the petitioner’s right to appeal had been preserved despite the constitutional changes.

Decision of the Court

After considering the opinions of several courts, the final decision was reached in this case. The majority of the courts agreed that the appellant should be granted Special Leave to Appeal to the Court on usual terms. In its judgment, the Court clarified the interpretation of Article 133 and stated that it applies to all appeals against judgments, decrees, and final orders of the High Courts in India, regardless of whether the proceedings were initiated before or after the Constitution’s commencement in civil proceedings.

The Court’s decision provides a clear and consistent legal framework for all appeals against the High Courts’ judgments. This interpretation ensures that all appeals are treated uniformly, irrespective of the time the proceedings were instituted. It also provides clarity to litigants seeking to appeal a decision, as they can now have a clear understanding of the legal provisions applicable to their case.

The Court’s ruling is an essential milestone in Indian legal history, as it resolves the ambiguity surrounding the interpretation of Article 133 and provides much-needed clarity on the scope of appeals against the High Court’s decisions. This decision will have far-reaching implications for future cases, as it provides a standard framework for interpreting and applying Article 133 in all cases involving appeals against the High Court’s decisions.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of India’s ruling in the case of Garikapatti Veeraya v N. Subbiah Choudhury, handed down in 1957, is a significant milestone in the legal history of India. This ruling provided valuable insights into the interpretation of Article 133 of the Indian Constitution, which applies to all appeals against judgments, decrees, and final orders of the High Courts in India, irrespective of when the proceedings were initiated in civil cases. As a result, this case established a uniform and unambiguous legal framework, ensuring fair and equitable treatment for all litigants.

The Garikapatti Veeraya case underscores the importance of having a clear and consistent legal system that provides clarity and consistency in the interpretation and application of the law. This landmark decision has far-reaching implications for future cases, emphasizing the need for uniformity and consistency in legal rulings. The Court’s decision, in this case, serves as a guiding light for Indian courts and legal practitioners, helping to establish a clear and uniform legal framework for the entire nation. Overall, the Garikapatti Veeraya case is a crucial milestone in India’s legal history, representing a significant step forward in ensuring the fair and equitable treatment of all litigants.

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Endnotes:

1. INDIA CONST. art. 133.
2. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, § 109.
3. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, § 100.
4. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, § 2(2).
5. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, § 2(14).
6. INDIA CONST. art 135.
7. Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving, (1905) A.C. 369.
8. INDIA CONST. art. 136.

This case is analysed by Sohini Chakraborty, a first-year law student at RGNUL Patiala.

S.no	Contents
1.	Right to Suit
2.	Right to Appeal
3.	Scope of Right to Appeal in Statutory Law
4.	Historical Overview
5.	Legal Frameworks
6.	Conclusion

Right to Suit

An individual or organization has a legal entitlement known as the “right to sue” that enables them to initiate a lawsuit against another individual or organization in a court of law. This right is considered fundamental since it allows them to pursue legal action and seek remedy or recourse for any perceived harm or wrongdoing caused by the other party. Typically, the right to sue is granted to individuals or organizations who are capable of demonstrating that they have suffered legal harm or damages resulting from the actions or omissions of another party. Such circumstances may include but are not limited to a breach of contract, personal injury, property damage, or infringement of intellectual property rights, among others. It is essential to note that the right to sue is subject to legal constraints or limitations, and may not be an absolute right. Furthermore, the process of initiating legal proceedings can be intricate, requiring the guidance of legal experts to navigate it effectively.

It is crucial to acknowledge that the right to sue is not an unrestricted right, as there may be legal limitations or restrictions on the individuals or entities who can initiate legal proceedings and the situations in which they can do so. Moreover, the process of commencing a lawsuit can be intricate and costly and may necessitate the guidance of legal experts to navigate it competently.

Right to Appeal

The legal entitlement of a party to challenge a lower court or tribunal’s decision in a higher or appellate court is known as the right to appeal. This right permits parties to contest the factual or legal conclusions reached by a lower court or tribunal and seek a different outcome.

Under Article 21 of the Constitution of India^[1], which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty, the right to appeal is recognized in India. It is a fundamental component of the Indian legal system and is intended to ensure equitable and impartial administration of justice.

The procedure for filing an appeal in India is dependent on the type of case and the court or tribunal involved. Generally, a written petition outlining the grounds for the appeal must be submitted within a specified timeframe after the lower court’s decision. The higher court then assesses the evidence and legal arguments presented by both parties before reaching a decision. The right to appeal is accessible at various levels of the Indian judiciary system, from district courts to the Supreme Court of India. Both civil and criminal cases can be appealed, and the appellate court may either uphold, modify, or reverse the lower court’s decision.

Scope of Right to Appeal in Statutory Law

The right to appeal is not an inherent right and is only granted through specific statutes. It is considered a substantive right, rather than merely procedural. This right is conferred upon the litigant from the beginning of the case, although it is exercised only when an unfavourable judgment is pronounced. Consequently, the law that applies to the right to appeal is the one that was in force at the time the lawsuit was filed, not the law that applies at the time of decision or when the appeal is filed. These vested rights can only be taken away by a subsequent statute if it explicitly provides for it.

It is important to note that as this right is created by statute, the statute can impose conditions for its exercise. The forum of appeal may also be altered by the statute, and the litigant does not have the right to choose the forum for appeal. As Justice Khanna once stated, the right of appeal is a product of statute, and there is no reason why the legislature cannot impose conditions for exercising this right as long as those conditions are not excessively restrictive to the point of rendering the right almost meaningless.

Historical Overview

The Indian legal system has evolved to recognize two fundamental rights, namely the right to sue and the right to appeal. These rights have been shaped by diverse legal traditions and cultures, and their historical development in India is a topic of great significance.

The right to access justice, commonly referred to as the right to sue, has been an integral facet of the Indian legal system since ancient times. In ancient India, justice was founded upon the principle of dharma, which denotes righteousness, and it was the responsibility of the king to ensure that justice was dispensed impartially. During this period, individuals were granted the right to approach the king or local courts to seek redressal.

Subsequently, during British rule in India, a formal legal system was introduced, and the English legal system became prevalent. This system placed great emphasis on the right to sue and the right to a fair trial. Consequently, the Indian Civil Procedure Code (CPC) was enacted in 1908, which laid down the procedural framework for filing a civil suit in India. The code ensured that every individual was entitled to the right to sue, and could approach a court of law to seek justice.

The notion of the right to appeal gradually developed during the period of British governance in India. Under their rule, the appellate system was introduced, permitting litigants to challenge a lower court’s decision by appealing to a higher court. In 1898, the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) was passed, recognizing the right to appeal in criminal cases. This legislation allowed accused individuals to appeal their conviction or sentencing from a lower court to a higher court.

Following India’s independence in 1947, significant changes were made to the country’s legal system. In 1950, the Constitution of India was enacted, enshrining the right to access justice as a fundamental right. Furthermore, the Constitution established the Supreme Court as the highest court in the nation, providing the right to appeal to it. Additionally, the Constitution conferred the authority on high courts to hear appeals from subordinate courts.

Throughout the years, the Indian legal system has been subject to diverse influences from various legal traditions and cultures. The ancient Hindu legal system, which was predominant in India, prioritized the fundamental right to access justice and provided for the amicable resolution of conflicts through mediation and arbitration. Meanwhile, the Islamic legal system, which emerged during the Mughal era, accentuated the significance of a just and fair trial process and guaranteed the right to appeal. These legal traditions have left a profound impact on the Indian legal system and continue to shape its development to this day.

Legal Frameworks

1. Right to Suit

In India, individuals have the right to initiate legal action against another person or entity in a court of law, which is commonly known as the right to sue. This right is enshrined in the Indian Constitution, which ensures that every citizen has access to justice as per Article 39A^[2]. The Indian legal system provides for various types of civil suits, including breach of contract, recovery of money, specific performance, and injunctions, among others. The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908^[3] governs the process of initiating a civil suit.

• Initiating a Suit: Parties, Framing, and Institution

The process of initiating a civil case involves two parties, the plaintiff and the defendant, as per Order 1 which deals with Parties to suit. The plaintiff is responsible for bringing the case against the defendant, who is the other party that must provide a defence against the allegations made by the plaintiff in civil court.

Once the parties to the suit are recognized, the next step is to frame the suit as provided under Order 2. This involves the plaintiff approaching the civil court with their suit, which is referred to as the Frame of Suit. Framing of suit indicates that a legal action has been brought by one party against another. According to Rule 2 of Order 2, the plaintiff must include their entire claim in the suit, which serves as the cause of action against the defendant. The framed suit needs to be instituted before the civil court, but the question of who the institution is answered by Order 3 of the Code.

• Agents and Pleaders

Order 3 of the Code of 1908 deals with recognized agents and leaders, who are essential for the plaintiff to institute a suit framed before the civil court. The plaintiff requires the help of a legal professional or pleader who has expertise in the field of law to take the framed suit before the court on their behalf. Rule 2 and Rule 4 of Order 3 respectively provide guidelines for recognizing agents and pleaders. Once a recognized agent or pleader is hired, it becomes their responsibility to institute the suit before the civil court on behalf of the plaintiff. This brings us to Order 4 of the Code, which discusses the proper institution of suits. To institute a suit, the plaintiff needs to present a plaint before the court, the meaning of which is explained under Order 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

It is crucial to note that compliance with sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 1 of Order 4 is mandatory for the proper institution of the suit. Sub-rule (1) requires the presentation of a plaint to institute a suit before the court of law. Sub-rule (2) provides that no plaint as provided in the previous rule can escape the rules provided under Orders 6 and 7 of the Code.

2. Right to appeal

As per Section 96 of the CPC, an aggrieved party to any decree passed by a court while exercising its original jurisdiction has the right to appeal to a higher authority designated for this purpose, except in cases where any statute makes an exception. This grants the aggrieved party at least one right of appeal.

However, Sections 97, 98, and 102 of the CPC specify certain conditions under which no further appeal is allowed, therefore limiting the right of appeal to a single opportunity.

It is important to note that no person has the right to appeal against a decision unless they are a party to the suit, unless they have been granted special leave of the court. The question of whether a person is adversely affected by the decision or suit is a factual matter that needs to be determined on a case-by-case basis.

The case of Garikapati Veeraya v. Subbiah Chaudhary^[4] established that the right to appeal to the Federal Court that existed prior to the establishment of the Supreme Court still remained valid. The court recognized the shift in the judicial system from the Federal Court to the Supreme Court but emphasized the preservation of the right to appeal that was created under the old law. It should be noted, however, that the continuation of this right is subject to the provisions of the Constitution.

• Appeals and Conversions under CPC

The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides for various types of appeals and their maintainability. Under Section 96 of the CPC^[5], a regular first appeal may or may not be maintainable against certain adjudications, as indicated by a combined reading of Sections 2(2), 2(9), and 96 of the CPC. A first appeal lies from a decree passed by any court exercising original jurisdiction to the authorized appellate courts, except where expressly prohibited.

Furthermore, Section 100 of the CPC^[6] provides for a second appeal under this code. A decree passed in the first appeal by a subordinate court can be appealed to the High Court unless there are provisions indicating otherwise. However, the scope of exercise of jurisdiction under this section is limited to a substantial question of law framed at the time of admission of appeal or otherwise.

Regarding the conversion of an appeal into a revision, the court’s inherent powers allow it to pass orders that may be required to meet the ends of justice, as held in the case of Bahori v. Vidya Ram^[7]. In the absence of a specific provision in the CPC for converting an appeal to a revision or vice versa, Section 151^[8] governs the court’s exercise of power. The conversion is allowed, as long as the proper procedure was followed during the filing of the original appeal or revision. However, the only precondition to such conversion is that due procedure is adhered to during the filing of the original appeal/revision.

• Who has the right to appeal under Section 96 of the CPC?

Section 96 of the CPC provides that a regular first appeal can be preferred by any party to the suit who has been adversely affected by the decree. This includes the legal representatives of the deceased party under Section 146. Additionally, a transferee of the interest of such a party, whose name is entered on the record of the suit, may also appeal. In the event of an order in execution setting aside the sale on the basis of fraud, the purchaser at auction has the right to file an appeal.

However, no person other than a party to the suit is entitled to appeal under Section 96 unless special leave is granted by the appellate Court. This means that a person who is not a party to the suit can only prefer an appeal from a decree or order if they are bound, aggrieved or prejudicially affected by it and if special leave of the appellate Court is granted.

• Who is barred from appealing?

A party who has waived their right to appeal a judgment is precluded from filing an appeal at a later stage. The principles of estoppel may also apply where a party has accepted the provisions of a judgment and has acknowledged it as final and binding. The doctrine of estoppel prevents such a party from appealing the same judgment in a higher forum. Scrutton L.J. has expressed the view that a party cannot simultaneously accept the benefits of a judgment and then appeal against it as being unfavourable.

• Role and Standards of Review in Indian Appellate Courts

Appellate courts in the Indian legal system are higher courts that review and revise the decisions of lower courts, including district courts and tribunals. These courts include the High Courts, the highest courts in each state or union territory, and the Supreme Court of India, the highest court in the country.

Appellate courts use two standards of review when examining lower court decisions: one for questions of fact and one for questions of law. The standard of review on questions of fact is deferential to the lower court’s decision and will only be overturned if the findings of fact are clearly erroneous or not supported by evidence. The standard of review on questions of law, on the other hand, is less deferential and will closely examine the legal reasoning and interpretation used by the lower court, often applying its own interpretation of the law.

In criminal cases, the standard of review is higher due to the higher stakes and severe consequences of an erroneous decision. The decisions of appellate courts have significant implications for the parties involved and for the development of the law in India. Overall, the role of appellate courts in the Indian legal system is to ensure the fair administration of justice by reviewing and correcting lower court decisions.

Conclusion

To conclude, the right to sue and appeal in India represent fundamental pillars of the legal system, enabling access to justice for all citizens. These rights are duly recognized by the Indian Constitution, and the procedures for initiating legal action are regulated by the relevant statutes and rules. The Supreme Court of India has provided crucial interpretations of these rights, ensuring that they align with the principles of natural justice and the fundamental right to access justice. By having these rights in place, individuals in India can seek legal remedies in cases of disputes or breaches of the law, contributing to the promotion of a just and equitable society.

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Endnotes:

1. Article 21 of the Indian Constitution
2. Article 39A of the Indian Constitution
3. Code of Criminal Procedure (India), Act No. 2, 1974
4. Garikapati Veeraya v. Subbiah Chaudhary, (1979) 1 SCC 16.
5. Civil Procedure Code § 96 (India).
6. Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 5, 1908, §100, India Code (2019)
7. Bahori v. Vidya Ram, (1978) 1 SCC 1.
8. Civil Procedure Code, § 151 (India).
9. Civil Procedure Code, § 146 (India).

This article was authored by Sohini Chakraborty, a first-year law student at RGNUL Patiala.

S.no	Contents
1.	Introduction
2.	Stigmas Related to Inter Religion Marriages in India
3.	Introduction to Special Marriage Act, 1954 and its Basic Outline
4.	Inter Religion Marriages under Special Marriage Act 1954
5.	Recent Judgement Related to Inter Religion Marriages
6.	Case Laws Pertaining to Significant Inter Religion Marriage Judgements
7.	Conclusion

Introduction

We all vision our Nation to be at the top of its zenith, be it economically, culturally, socially or politically. But the obstacles we face aren’t just limited to poverty or corruption or mere resolves. The major issue we face every day is fighting the restricted and orthodox mentalities of people. While it’s the common man/woman who helps the Nation progress, it’s they who pull it back with the burden of their thoughts.

While we could flaunt discussing the legality of Same Sex Marriages in India, and say that the taboo of Inter Religion Marriage has been totally eliminated, the case on the ground isn’t that simple.

Inter-religion marriage is a union between two individuals belonging to different religious communities. In India, inter-religion marriage is a socially and culturally sensitive topic, especially when it involves Hindu and non-Hindu communities. The complexity of this issue arises from the fact that India is a country of diverse cultures, languages, religions, and social customs. The practice of inter-religion marriage is often met with social and familial opposition and can even result in legal complications. India is home to many religions, including Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, Sikhism, Buddhism, and Jainism. Each religion has its own set of beliefs, customs, and practices, which can influence inter-religion marriages.

The issue of inter-religion marriage has been the subject of debate in India for several years. While some argue that inter-religion marriage can promote social harmony and unity, others view it as a threat to cultural and religious identities. The Supreme Court of India has consistently upheld the right of individuals to marry the person of their choice, irrespective of religion or caste.

In India, inter-religion marriage is governed by different personal laws that vary according to the religion of the parties involved. For instance, the Hindu Marriage Act 1955, governs Hindu marriages, while the Special Marriage Act 1954^[1], governs marriages between individuals of different religions. The Muslim Personal Law governs marriages in the Muslim community. Further, light is thrown on the Societal issues and taboos related to Inter Religion Marriage, briefly explains all the provisions under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, talks about how Inter Religion Marriages are governed under this law and finally a conclusion with some recent judgements and the Author’s views related to the Topic

Stigmas Related to Inter Religion Marriages in India

Inter-religion marriages in India are still considered taboo in many parts of the country. While the issues are prevalent in different spheres of society, all the possible efforts to culminate it have been effective, but not as effective as expected. The situation can be summarized in the following points which put up a clearer perspective of the antagonistic situation^[2]:

• Social stigma: In India, inter-religion marriages are often frowned upon, and couples can face social stigma and discrimination from their families, communities, and even the society at large.

• Legal hurdles: While inter-religion marriages are legal in India, couples often face legal hurdles when it comes to obtaining marriage registration and other legal documents. This can be especially challenging when one partner belongs to a minority religion.

• Religious barriers: Some religious communities in India do not permit inter-religion marriages, and couples who belong to these communities can face significant opposition from their families and religious leaders.

• Family pressure: In many cases, families put immense pressure on their children to marry within their own religion, which can cause significant stress and strain on the couple’s relationship.

• Violence and threats: In extreme cases, inter-religion couples can face violence and threats from their families and communities, which can make it difficult for them to live together in peace and safety.

• Lack of acceptance: Despite the legal recognition of inter-religion marriages, many people in India still do not accept such unions as legitimate, which can make it difficult for couples to live and work in certain communities.

• Need for social change: Given the challenges faced by inter-religion couples in India, there is a need for greater social acceptance and support for such unions. This requires a change in attitudes and beliefs about marriage and religion, as well as greater legal protection and support for inter-religion couples

Introduction to Special Marriage Act, 1954 and its Basic Outline

The Special Marriage Act 1954 is a legal framework that provides for the solemnization of marriages between individuals of different religions, castes, and nationalities. It is designed to allow for civil marriages and to create a legal mechanism to register such marriages. It provides legal recognition to civil marriages and protects couples from social stigma and discrimination. The Act has been instrumental in promoting secularism and unity in diversity in India. The Act is applicable to the whole of India, except for the state of Jammu and Kashmir^[3]. Some of the Key Provisions of the Act which are evident in the Daily Court Procedures are: –

• Applicability: The Special Marriage Act is applicable to any Indian citizen who wishes to solemnize a marriage regardless of their religion, caste, or creed. It applies to any person who is a resident of India or domiciled in the country, as well as to those who are outside India and intend to marry in the country.

• Notice of Intended Marriage: The Act mandates that both parties intending to marry under this Act must give notice of their intention to do so. The notice must be given in writing to the Marriage Officer of the district where at least one of the parties resides.

• Objections to the Marriage: Once the notice of intended marriage is given, the Marriage Officer must display it in a prominent place in the office for thirty days. If no objections are raised during this time, the marriage can be solemnized. However, if objections are raised, the Marriage Officer must conduct an inquiry to determine whether the objections are valid or not.

• Solemnization of Marriage: Once the Marriage Officer is satisfied that there are no objections to the intended marriage, the marriage can be solemnized in the presence of three witnesses, including the Marriage Officer. The ceremony must conform to the provisions of the Act and can be performed by a registered Marriage Officer, a Registrar of Marriages, or any person authorized by the government to do so.

• Registration of Marriage: After the marriage is solemnized, the Marriage Officer must enter a certificate of marriage in the Marriage Register. The certificate must be signed by the parties to the marriage, the witnesses, and the Marriage Officer. The certificate is conclusive proof of the marriage, and a certified copy can be obtained from the Marriage Officer upon request.

• Dissolution of Marriage: The Special Marriage Act also provides for the dissolution of marriage by mutual consent or on grounds of adultery, cruelty, desertion, or conversion to another religion. The procedure for obtaining a divorce under the Act is similar to that of obtaining a decree of divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, of 1955.

• Miscellaneous Provisions: The Act also contains provisions relating to maintenance, custody of children, and the rights of children born out of wedlock. It also provides for the registration of marriages performed outside India under this Act.

Inter Religion Marriages under Special Marriage Act 1954

In India, inter-religion marriage can be solemnized under the Special Marriage Act 1954. The Act provides for the registration of marriages between persons of different religions, castes, or creeds. Here are the legal sections and conditions for inter-religion marriage under the Special Marriage Act 1954:

• Eligibility: Any two individuals who are of marriageable age (21 years for the groom and 18 years for the bride) can marry under the Special Marriage Act, irrespective of their religion, caste, or creed. The conditions laid down for the eligibility have been mentioned by Section 4^[4] of the Special Marriage Act 1954, for it also says that they must not be within the degree of a prohibited relationship, and they must not have a living spouse at the time of the marriage.

• Notice of Intended Marriage: The first step is to give a notice of intended marriage to the Marriage Registrar of the district in which at least one of the parties has resided for a minimum of 30 days prior to giving the notice. Section 5 ^[5] of the Special Marriage Act is responsible for this clause of the law.

• Objections: After the notice is published, any person may file an objection to the marriage if they have a valid reason for doing so. According to Section 7^[6] of the Special Marriage Act 1954, Any person may object to the intended marriage within 30 days of the publication of the notice by filing an objection in writing to the Marriage Officer. The Marriage Officer is required to investigate the objection and decide on the validity of the objection.

• Waiting Period: After the notice is published and there are no objections, a waiting period of 30 days is mandatory before the marriage can be solemnized. Based upon Section 6^[7] of the Special Marriage Act 1954, Upon receipt of the notice of intended marriage, the Marriage Officer is required to display the notice at a conspicuous place in his office and issue a copy of the notice to the parties involved.

• Declaration: Both parties must sign a declaration stating that they are not related to each other within the prohibited degrees of the relationship as specified in the Act.

• Solemnization: The marriage can be solemnized in the presence of a Marriage Officer and two witnesses. The Marriage Officer will register the marriage and issue a certificate of marriage. Section 12^[8] of the Special Marriage Act lays down the conditions for the Solemnisation and Registration of the marriages, which are either inter-religious or inter-caste.

• Registration: The marriage must be registered within 90 days of the solemnization, failing which the registration may be done only with the permission of the Marriage Officer and on payment of a penalty.

It is important to note that the Special Marriage Act 1954 does not allow for any religious ceremony or rites during the solemnization of the marriage. The marriage is considered a civil contract and is governed by the provisions of the Act.

Recent Judgement Related to Inter Religion Marriages 

Recently, the Supreme Court turned down a public interest lawsuit recently that contested elements of the Special Marriage Act that require posting interfaith spouses’ personal information ahead of their wedding.

According to Sections 6^[9] and 7^[10] of the law, couples have 30 days before their wedding to invite or consider objections by posting a public notice in a visible place or on the notice board in the marriage officer’s office. Their names, phone numbers, dates of birth, ages, occupations, addresses, and identifying information are all included in the notice’s details.^[11]

The appeal against these two Act clauses, as well as the portions allowing anybody to object to the marriage and the marriage officer’s ability to inquire into a couple’s past, was rejected by a bench of Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and Bela M Trivedi. According to the petitioner’s attorney, his client wed a guy of a different religion in accordance with the Special Marriage Act. The bench answered, “It ceases to be a PIL if it is your personal cause.

The Act had begun to take force in 1954, the court also found, citing Bar and Bench. It asked the attorney, “Where’s your cause of action?” as it rejected the PIL.

Case Laws Pertaining to Significant Inter Religion Marriage Judgements 

• Smt. Lata Singh v. State of UP^[12]: This case marks the Supreme Court announced that a person has the right to choose their life partner and that inter-caste and inter-religion marriages should be encouraged. The court also directed the police to provide protection to couples who marry against the wishes of their parents.

• Salamat Ansari v. State of UP^[13]: Being a legendary case in the history of Family Laws in India, the Judgement of the Supreme Court in the case said that an inter-religious marriage solemnized under the Special Marriage Act is valid and that the consent of parents or guardians is not required.

• Ramesh Kumar v. State of Haryana^[14]: In this case, the Supreme Court held that the choice of an adult to marry a person of their choice is a fundamental right guaranteed under the Constitution of India and that interference by family members or society in such marriages is illegal.

• K. Srinivas Rao v. D.A. Deepa^[15]: As per the Supreme Court, the Special Marriage Act allows parties to register their marriage without any religious ceremonies, and parties to an inter-religious marriage can choose to follow the customs and traditions of their respective religions.

• Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India^[16]: For all those who are well-versed in the case laws of India, they would understand the significance of this specific case. Supreme Court in this Judgement held that a person cannot convert to another religion just for the purpose of marrying a person belonging to that religion and that such conversions are illegal and void. The court also directed the government to enact a law to prevent such conversions

Conclusion to the Unfathomable Taboo of Inter Religion Marriage

Inter-religion marriage has been taboo in India for a long time, and it has been the subject of political and social debate for many years. The laws related to inter-religion marriage have evolved over time to address this issue and provide legal protection to couples who wish to marry outside their religion or caste.

The Special Marriage Act 1954, provides a legal framework for inter-religion and inter-caste marriages in India. It lays down the conditions for the solemnization of special marriages and mandates that the parties involved must give notice of their intention to get married to the Marriage Officer. The Act also provides for objections to the marriage, and the procedure for solemnization of the special marriage.

Despite the legal framework in place, inter-religion marriage continues to face opposition from certain sections of society. Some political parties have also used this issue to further their own agendas. However, in recent years, there has been a shift in the public perception of inter-religion marriage, with more and more people accepting it as a personal choice.

The law has also evolved to keep pace with changing social norms. In 2018, the Supreme Court of India passed a landmark judgement, decriminalizing adultery, which was a major step towards recognizing the individual autonomy of adults in their personal relationships. This judgement, along with other legal developments, has provided greater legal protection to couples in inter-religion and inter-caste marriages.

Inter-religion marriage is often met with resistance from society and families, which can lead to social ostracism and even violence. Families may object to inter-religion marriages on the grounds of cultural and religious differences. The couple may also face legal challenges, such as cases of abduction, forced conversion, and even honour killing.

In conclusion, inter-religion marriage continues to be a contentious issue in India, with social and political factors influencing public perception. However, the legal framework has evolved to provide greater protection to couples who wish to marry outside their religion or caste. While there is still a long way to go, there are signs that society is becoming more accepting of inter-religion marriage, and this is reflected in the changing legal landscape.

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Endnotes:

1. Special Marriage Act, 1954
2. Maharashtra sets up panel to track interfaith, intercaste marriages, The Indian Express (Dec. 19, 2022), https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/mumbai/maharashtra-sets-up-panel-to-track-interfaith-intercaste-marriages-8323158/
3. Section 1 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954
4. Section 4 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954
5. Section 5 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954
6. Section 7 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954
7. Section 6 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954
8. Section 12 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954
9. Ibid 7
10. Ibid 6
11. Press Trust of India, Government response awaited on the law on inter-faith marriages, The Hindu (Jan. 24, 2022), https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/government-response-awaited-on-law-on-inter-faith-marriages/article38278975.ece.
12. Smt. Lata Singh v. State of UP, (2006) 5 SCC 475 (Sup. Ct. 2006)
13. Salamat Ansari v. State of UP, (2008) 2 SCC 202 (Sup. Ct. 2008).
14. Ramesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2017) 12 SCC 588 (Sup. Ct. 2017).
15. K. Srinivas Rao v. D.A. Deepa, (2013) 5 SCC 226 (Sup. Ct. 2013).
16. Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 635 (Sup. Ct. 1995)

This article is authored by Rishaan Gupta, a 1st year Student at National Law University, Delhi.

Introduction

The law of torts is a significant part of the Indian legal system, providing remedies to individuals who have suffered harm due to the wrongful acts of others. Over the years, the law of torts in India has witnessed significant growth and development, thanks to the active role played by the judiciary. The courts have interpreted and applied tort law principles in various cases, shaping and expanding the scope of the law. In this context, this discussion will examine the growth of the law of torts in India and the role of the judiciary in shaping it. We will also explore how the Indian courts have relied on the principles of tort law in other common law jurisdictions to fill gaps in the Indian law of torts.

Relevance

The law of torts in India has seen significant growth and development over the years, with the judiciary playing a crucial role in shaping and expanding the scope of the law. Tort law refers to civil wrongs or injuries that are committed by one party against another, resulting in harm or loss, and for which the aggrieved party can seek compensation.

The growth of the law of torts in India can be traced back to the colonial period when the British introduced the concept of negligence and other tortious liability concepts to the Indian legal system. Over time, Indian courts have expanded the scope of the law to include various types of torts, such as nuisance, defamation, and trespass.

One of the key factors that have contributed to the growth of the law of torts in India is the changing socio-economic and political landscape of the country. As India has developed into a more complex and diverse society, the legal system has had to adapt to meet the changing needs and demands of its citizens. The growth of tort law has been driven by a need to protect individual rights and interests, as well as to promote social justice and equity.

Another factor that has played a significant role in shaping the law of torts in India is the role of the judiciary. The Indian judiciary has been proactive in interpreting and expanding the scope of tort law, often relying on international legal principles and jurisprudence to guide its decisions. Through its judgments, the judiciary has not only clarified the legal principles and concepts of tort law but has also established new precedents that have had far-reaching implications for the development of the law.

One example of the judiciary’s role in shaping the law of torts in India is the landmark case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India^[1]. In this case, the Supreme Court of India recognized the concept of absolute liability, which holds industries strictly liable for any harm caused by their activities, regardless of whether they were negligent or not. This decision has had a significant impact on the development of environmental law in India, as it has provided a powerful tool for holding polluting industries accountable for their actions.

Another example of the judiciary’s role in shaping the law of torts in India is the recent case of Shayara Bano v. Union of India^[2]. In this case, the Supreme Court of India declared the practice of triple talaq (instant divorce) among Muslims to be unconstitutional and violative of the fundamental rights of women. This decision has not only had a significant impact on the rights of Muslim women but has also expanded the scope of tort law to include violations of fundamental rights as a tortious acts.

In conclusion, the growth of the law of torts in India has been driven by a need to protect individual rights and interests, promote social justice and equity, and adapt to the changing needs and demands of society. The judiciary has played a critical role in shaping and expanding the scope of the law, through its proactive interpretation and application of legal principles and concepts. As India continues to evolve, it is likely that the law of torts will continue to grow and develop, driven by the changing needs and demands of its citizens and the role of the judiciary in shaping the law.

Criticism of Growth of Torts

The law of torts in India has seen significant growth and development over the years, and the judiciary has played a crucial role in shaping the law. Tort law is concerned with providing remedies for civil wrongs or injuries caused by one party to another. The development of the law of torts in India can be traced back to the colonial period when the British introduced the concept of tort law in India.

One of the significant contributions of the judiciary in shaping the law of torts in India has been the recognition and expansion of the scope of tort liability. In the landmark case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India^[3], the Supreme Court recognized the principle of absolute liability, which holds that any enterprise engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity must pay compensation to those who suffer harm from such activity, irrespective of whether or not the enterprise has been negligent. This decision expanded the scope of tort liability and ensured that victims of industrial accidents and environmental disasters received compensation for their losses. Another important contribution of the judiciary has been the recognition of new causes of action in tort law.

For instance, in the case of Vishakha v. State of Rajasthan^[4], the Supreme Court recognized sexual harassment at the workplace as a violation of a woman’s fundamental rights and awarded compensation to the victim. Similarly, in the case of R.K. Anand v. Delhi High Court^[5], the court recognized the tort of criminal contempt, which had not been previously recognized in India.

The judiciary has also played a crucial role in developing the principles of vicarious liability in India. Vicarious liability holds that an employer is liable for the torts committed by its employees in the course of their employment. The doctrine of vicarious liability has been expanded to cover not only traditional employer-employee relationships but also situations where a person has a sufficient degree of control over the activities of another person.

However, there are also some criticisms of the growth of the law of torts in India and the role of the judiciary in shaping the law. One of the main criticisms is that the development of tort law in India has been slow and inconsistent, and there is a lack of clarity on many tort law principles. For instance, there is no clear definition of what constitutes a tortious act, and the standards for determining negligence are not well-defined. This lack of clarity has led to uncertainty and confusion in the application of tort law in India.

Another criticism is that the judiciary’s role in shaping the law of torts has been too expansive, and this has led to judicial activism. Some argue that the courts have taken on a policymaking role in developing tort law, which should be left to the legislature. Judicial activism has also led to an increase in litigation and the clogging of the court’s dockets. In conclusion, while the growth of the law of torts in India and the judiciary’s role in shaping the law have been significant, there are also criticisms of the slow and inconsistent development of the law and the judiciary’s expansive role in policymaking. There is a need for greater clarity and coherence in tort law principles to ensure greater certainty and predictability in their application.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the law of torts has seen significant growth and development in India over the years. The judiciary has played a crucial role in shaping the law through its interpretations and rulings on various tort cases. The courts have often applied principles from other common law jurisdictions to fill gaps in the Indian law of torts. Additionally, the judiciary has expanded the scope of tort liability by recognizing new causes of action and extending the boundaries of existing torts. Overall, the growth of the law of torts in India and the role of the judiciary in shaping it have been instrumental in providing a remedy to individuals who have suffered harm due to the wrongful acts of others.

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Endnotes:

1. M.C.Mehta v. Union of India, 1987 SCR (1) 819; AIR 1987 965
2. Shayara Bano v. Union of India, AIR 2017 9 SCC 1 (SC)
3. Ibid 1
4. Vishaka and Ors. v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011
5. R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, 2009 8 SCC 106

This article is written by Aehra Tayyaba Hussain, a 1st-year B.A. LLB student at Symbiosis Law School Hyderabad. 

S.no	Contents
1.	Introduction
2.	Safeguard Of Liberty
3.	Essential elements in Safeguards of Liberty
4.	Safeguards the protected liberty of Indian citizens
5.	Right in Safeguard of Liberty
6.	Landmark Judgment
7.	Conclusion

“Without freedom of thought, there can be no such thing as wisdom – and no such thing as public liberty without freedom of speech”

By Benjamin Franklin

Introduction

Safeguards of Liberty in India was to protect people who are suffering and aged 16 or above 16 and also who needed it. Liberty Protection Safeguards(LPS) care for those people and treated their mental capacity with the proper agreement. In India basic right of the human being is liberty, the right to live life without fall of dignity. 

Every Individual who could have a Liberty Protection Safeguards authorization incorporate those with dementia, mental imbalance, and learning handicaps who come up short on the pertinent limit.

The Liberty Protection Safeguards were presented in the Mental capacity (amendment) Act 2019 and will supplant the Hardship of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS) framework. The Liberty Protection Safeguards will convey further developed results for individuals who are or who should be denied their liberty. The Liberty Protection Safeguards have been intended to put the privileges and wishes of those individuals at the focal point of all dynamics on the hardship of liberty.

The liberty protection safeguards are wanted to come into force in April 2022.[1]

Safeguard Of Liberty

Liberty is the most valuable thing for an individual and viable advances are required for its safeguards. From days of yore, there is a tussle between the state’s power and individuals’ liberties. An individual appreciates more freedoms assuming that the power of the state is abridged. Liberty can’t exist in a domineering state. Prof. Laski calls attention to specific strides for protecting freedom. “Opportunity, right off the bat, won’t be accomplished for the mass of men clear under unique certifications” and it can’t “exist in that frame of mind of honor”. Besides, “extraordinary honor is incongruent with opportunity”. Thirdly, “liberty can’t be acknowledged in that frame of mind in which the privileges of some rely on the joys of others”. Fourthly, “What is the state’s fundamental duty for safeguards liberty”.

Essential elements in Safeguards of Liberty

• The democratic form of Government

Democracy system is a type of govern­ment where everyone has an offer in the organization. Just democrat; states can give an amiable environment to the turn of events: human character. It is helpful for the full pleasure in liberty.

The Foundation of a majority rule framework is a fundamental shield of freedom. Both liberty and a democratic rules system are valuable to each other. We can’t imagine a majority rules government without the presence of common, financial, political, and individual freedom. Moreover, without even a trace of the right to opportunity, there can be no genuine majority rules government. Liberty is more secure and safer in the Majority rules system than in some other type of government. Popularity-based government is the public authority of individuals though in different types of government (like Outright Government and Fascism) all powers are focused and brought together under the control of one individual or a gathering of people. The individual in power or a gathering of people in power can’t endure his or their analysis. The nature of A majority rules system inverse gatherings is given due regard in Majority rules government. The contrary gatherings structure the public authority after the disappointment of the decision party. Analysis of the public authority is invited in Majority rule government.

• Fundamental Rights

There should be a reasonable and unambiguous rundown of essential fundamental rights in the Constitution. Individuals should be con­versant with their freedoms and the public authority should know about the limita­tion of abilities. These freedoms are justiciable and any demonstration that contradicts the arrangements of the Constitution can be announced ultra vires.

One of the vital strategies for safeguarding liberty is to consolidate a sanction of central privileges and opportunities in the constitution of the State. Alongside it, legal insurance ought to be given privileges. They safeguard our freedom to an exceptionally extraordinary degree. These basic freedoms likewise restrict the power of the state. In the presence of crucial freedoms, the state can’t meddle in that frame of mind of individual life. Without a trace of key freedoms freedom of the individual is never out of risk and without freedom improvement of human character is preposterous.

• Separation of Power

The powers of the public authority ought to be isolated among the chief, law-making body, and legal executive. This will help in forestalling any organ of the public authority. To turn out to be outright. Each organ of the public authority. Will work in its system. As indicated by popular French Researcher Montesquieu, detachment of abilities is a fundamental condition for pleasure in the freedom and the nations where there is the partition of abilities, individuals appreciate more freedom. This interaction is finished through the utilization of balanced governance. Lord  Acton believes that “Power taints an; outright power undermines totally.” Power has an internal pattern for abuse and power ought to go about as a check to drive.

• Responsible Government

An administration framed by the representa­tives of individuals will undoubtedly be capable. Any error concerning the public authority will sound its mark of the end and the resistance will exploit it. A bi-party framework with solid resistance will guarantee essential safeguards for liberty.

• Love for Liberty

For the security of freedom, individuals ought to have limitless love for freedom. On the off chance that it is thus, individuals might never want to lose their freedom and will be ready to make each penance for its insurance. During the opportunity battle, lakhs of Indians made penances of their lives as they went to gallows and prisons for the fulfilment of opportunity for their homeland.

• Rule of law

The idea of Law and order implies all people are equivalent under the watchful eye of law and regulation. This law and Regulation see no difference between the rich and poor, the high and low.

The rule of law is laid out in Britain, the U.S.A. also, and India. The idea of Law and order implies that all individuals are equivalent under the steady gaze of regulation. Regulation makes no separation between rich and poor, the high the low. All individuals ought to be under similar regulations and limited by similar sorts of commitments. Nobody ought to be above regulation. No honours will be given to an individual having a place with a specific class nor will there be any arrangement for insusceptibility. No individual will be rebuffed or saved in care for quite a while until and except if his wrongdoing is demonstrated.

• Constitution

Just the constitution limits the power of the state. It sets out specific obstructions and these hindrances are not to be crossed by the state while utilizing its power. For the most part, the constitution is acknowledged as the incomparable law of the nation, and if any organ of the public authority disregards any arrangement of the const., that act is pronounced unlawful by the courts. In brief, every organ of the public authority. Will undoubtedly work inside the structure of the constitution and this way the constitution safeguards the liberties of individuals.

• Independent Judiciary

There should be a free and fair judiciary for the assurance and conservation and individual liberty. The judiciary should be free of chief and authoritative control.

The autonomous, strong, and fair-minded legal executive is the greatest defender of freedom. Thus, arrangements ought to be made to keep the legal executive free. Assuming that the Legal executive is subordinate to the Leader or on the other hand on the off chance that it isn’t liberated from the impact of the Chief, it can not grant equity nor can it safeguard the major freedoms of man. In socialist nations or in nations that have Fascism, basic privileges are given to individuals, yet the Legal executive isn’t liberated from the impact of the Chief. In such nations, the safeguards and security of central privileges, constitution, and freedom aren’t exactly imaginable and freedom becomes simply a joke. Here, just keen and fair-minded people ought to be delegated as judges. They ought to be paid significant compensation and adequate annuity after retirement. Their residency ought to be long.

Safeguards the protected liberty of Indian citizens

• Right to life and individual freedom

 Article 21[2] gives that no individual will be denied his life or individual freedom besides as per technique laid out by regulation.

• Habeas Corpus

Habeas Corpus is a writ that is accustomed to bringing an individual who has been kept or detained under the watchful eye of a court. This writ is utilized to safeguard the liberty of a person.

• Legal Review

 Legal Survey is the force of the legal executive to survey the activities of the leader and authoritative parts of government. This power is utilized to guarantee that the public authority doesn’t abuse the central privileges of residents.

• Partition of power

Division of Abilities is a successful protection for individual freedom. The blend of a chief, administrative or legal powers in a similar individual or set of people could bring about the maltreatment of abilities and loss of individual freedom.

• Right to constitutional remedies

The Constitution accommodates different cures, for example, writs, orders, and headings that can be utilized by residents to authorize their central freedoms.

• Freedom of speech and expression

The right to speak freely of discourse and articulation is a principal right ensured by the Constitution of India. It permits residents to offer their viewpoints unreservedly unafraid of oversight or discipline.

• Right to information

 The Right to Information Act, of 2005[3] accommodates admittance to data held by open specialists. This right permits residents to consider public specialists responsible and guarantees straightforwardness in administration.

Right in Safeguard of Liberty

Article 5[4] says that safeguards are for anyone who is being arrested or detained. It is for all the people who suffer and those who are detained those people are sent to judge. Detention can be challenged if it is lawful. Victims get compensation for unlawful detention.

Some Restriction

A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras[5] it was contended that the ‘procedure established by law’ implied equivalent to ‘due process of law’. Both the terms are equivalent and similar security is being given in both nations with a distinction that ‘due process of law’ covers considerable and procedural regulation yet ‘methodology laid out by regulation’ covers just procedural law.

In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India[6], Chandrachud J. said that the system must be simple, fair and sensible, not whimsical, abusive, or erratic and Krishna Iyer J. said that the ‘law’ signifies sensible regulation and no established piece.

Landmark Judgment

This idea originally came up on account of A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras[7]. In this situation, the solicitor was confined under Preventive Detainment Act. He tested this in the court that it be violative of his right to opportunity of development, which is the quintessence of individual freedom under Article 21[8]. The Supreme Court gave the significance of individual freedom in an extremely tight sense. It said that individual freedom incorporates just the actual opportunity of the body like independence from capture or unjust repression. It likewise said that the term ‘law’ is the state-made regulation as it were. The High Court held that Article 19[9] has no association and relevance to Article 21.

On account of Satwant Singh Sahney v. Identification Officer[10], the option to travel abroad is remembered as ‘personal liberty’ and no individual can be denied his entitlement to go besides according to the technique laid out by regulation. Refusal to give the identification of the individual with practically no reasons allotted for it adds up to an unapproved hardship of individual freedom as given under Article 21.

There was another instance of the State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Pandurang[11]. In this situation, it was seen that the detainee does not stop being an individual not having key privileges. The right to compose a book and get it distributed by a detenu is his major right and its forswearing without the power of regulation disregarded Article 21.

Conclusion

Every one of the previously mentioned focuses addresses the manners by which we can defend a singular’s liberty. These are just conceivable when every single individual no matter what their situation in the general public no matter what their positions no matter what component can make discrimination attempts to guarantee that freedom as a guideline or element pervasive in the general public isn’t compromised. Freedom is an essential element that guarantees that the Majority rule government in space wins. On the off chance that it falls flat, that Democracy is no Democracy and acts as a joke to freedom all in all.

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Endnotes:

1. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/liberty-protection-safeguards-factsheets/liberty-protection-safeguards-what-they-are
2. Constitution of India, Article 21
3. Right to Information Act, of 2005, https://rti.gov.in/rti-act.pdf
4. Constitution of India, Article 5
5. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27
6. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597
7. ibid 5
8. ibid 2
9. Constitution of India, Article 19
10. Satwant Singh Sawhney vs D. Ramarathnam, Assistant Passport Officer, 1967 AIR 1836, 1967 SCR (2) 525
11. State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Pandurang, 1966 AIR 424, 1966 SCR (1) 702

This article is authored by Pranita Dhara, a student of Lloyd Law College.

S.no	Contents
1.	FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
2.	ISSUES RAISED
3.	LAWS RELATED
4.	ANALYSIS
5.	CONCLUSION

CITATION

1984 AIR 469

DATE

6/02/1984.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Background of the case

Laxmi Kant Pandey, an advocate practising in the Supreme Court of India, wrote a letter in the form of a complaint regarding various welfare agencies and social organisations indulging in various malpractices through the adoption of Indian children by foreign parents. It was found out that the letter was based on a detailed investigation report carried out by a reputed foreign magazine called “The Mail.” It was alleged that when foreign parents adopt Indian children, they are prone to long, tedious journeys and are ill-treated by placing them in shelter homes. Moreover, they are prone to be treated as beggars and prostitutes and other sexual harassment and exploitations. This letter came to be recognized as a writ petition on 1st September 1982. A notice was issued by the Supreme Court to the Indian Council of Social Welfare, Indian Council of Child Welfare, and the Government of India to assist the court in answering the writ petition by stating the principles and rules to decide the matter of adoption by foreign parents as well as to lay down the guidelines to ensure the maximum safety and welfare of the child while being adopted to foreign countries by foreign parents.

Written Submissions and Later Developments

On 30th September 1982, the first set of reports and written arguments based on the court’s notice was submitted by the Indian Council of Social Welfare. Various essential suggestions and recommendations were laid down in the report, which the court must take care of while setting out the guidelines and rules for approving the adoption law. Many organizations like Barnes Framfoer Allt Adoption (Swedish organization), S.O.S Children’s villages of India, etc., and social welfare communities voluntarily expressed their desire to submit their reports and arguments to help the court and participate in the court’s hearing. 

The writ petition was further adjourned to 9th November 1982 as the court issued an order allowing these organizations to submit their arguments. As Indian Council for Child Welfare and Indian Council for Social Welfare were already engaged in offering the adoption of Indian children abroad, the Supreme Court directed the Union of India to gather the submissions and required information from every other organization except these two. 

Union of India, Indian Council for Child Welfare, and Indian Council for Social Welfare were also asked to provide the court with the names of foreign agencies that are engaged in aiding foreign parents to find Indian children. 

By 9th November 1982, the Supreme Court recognised eight specified institutions and permitted them to submit of the affidavit before 27th November 1982. The State of West Bengal was asked to submit its affidavit by the Supreme Court before 9th November 1982. Also, a quarterly report regarding the orders made in the last five years in the Guardians and Wards act, 1890, entrusting the custody of Indian children to foreign parents, was asked to be submitted by the court to the Superintendent of Tees Hazari courts. The final hearing of the writ petition was adjourned to 1st December 1982. The first judgment was passed in the year 1984 followed by a supplement judgment dated 27^th September 1985 stating the norms and guidelines for inter-country adoptions.

ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether the Honourable Supreme Court should accept the writ petition or reject it in the name of no substantial law being involved considering the severity of the issue raised.
2. Whether the Honourable Supreme Court should provide more laws for better clarity after affirming the fact that the laws existing with respect to inter-country adoption are not sufficient.

LAWS RELATED

Guardians And Wards Act

Certain rights and duties of the guardian are covered under the Guardians and Wards Act of 1890. 

Section 7 gives the court the authority to issue a guardianship order. According to this clause, the court may appoint guardians for the benefit of minors.  A guardian will be able to look after the minor and their belongings. The court may terminate any guardian. The court can also remove the guardian who is chosen by the court

Section 8 of this act discusses the child’s welfare and states that the child’s welfare should be the primary motive for adoption. The procedures and norms to be followed in the matter of adoption to safeguard the children’s rights were stated in this act.

Section 9 of the Guardians and Guardians Act 1890 gives the court jurisdiction to consider the application. If the application concerns the guardianship of a minor, the court in which the minor’s guardian resides enjoys jurisdiction.

If the application involves the property of a minor, the district court may have jurisdiction either where the minor lives or where the property is located.

Section 11 outlines the application qualification process. This provision states that the court will set a preliminary hearing once it is convinced of the basis for the proceedings. The notification was sent as the C.P.C. (Civil Procedure Code 1908) authorized.

Section 17 lists factors to take into account when choosing a guardian.  The court will decide based on the minor’s interests, development, and overall case conditions. In accordance with section 17 (5) of the statute mentions that the court cannot appoint a guardian contrarily or oppose the minor’s wishes.

Section 26 concerns excluding the minor from its ambit. If the child disappears from or is separated from the possession of guardians whom the court appoints, then the court will issue an order for the return of the ward to the guardians.

Article 14

Article 14 of the Indian constitution discussed equality before the law and equal protection of the law. Clause (3) of Article 15 is an exception and states that special provisions can be made for children and women. Article 15 was brought to light in this case.

Article 24

Article 24 abolishes child labour and states that children under 14 should not be made to work in hazardous industries, mines, or factories. This article discussed the importance of child welfare and safeguarding them from being exploited in this case.

Article 39

Article 39(e) and (f) mention that the state is required to guide its policies towards ensuring that young children are not molested and that they are not coerced into careers that are out of character for the children’s age, ability, and capacity to grow in a positive way out of financial necessity.

CARA- Central Adoption Resource Authority 

It is a legislative body with the authority to oversee and control both domestic and international adoptions of Indian children. It serves as the coordinating body for such adoptions. With its affiliated, reputable adoption agencies, CARA deals with the adoption of orphan, abandoned, and surrendered children. The parents who want to adopt a kid must be authorised by a social organisation or child welfare organisation approved by the nation’s government where the international pair lives. It is a legislative body with the authority to oversee and control domestic and international adoptions of Indian children. It serves as the coordinating body for such adoptions. With its affiliated, reputable adoption agencies, CARA deals with adopting orphan, abandoned, and surrendered children. The parents who want to adopt a kid must be authorized by a social organization or child welfare organization approved by the nation’s government where the international pair lives.

ANALYSIS

The adoption of children is a concept that has existed in Indian culture since time immemorial. The importance placed on having a “firstborn son” in Hinduism resulted in the notion of adopted sons to conduct family rituals and rites. The established prevalence of adoption in India has ensued in drafting laws, such as the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956[1], to ensure that the adoption process is overseen by agencies entrusted with regulating it. However, the pre-existing adoption laws failed to foresee inter-country adoption’s emergence.

Inter-country adoption is a way of adoption that developed due to the improved connectivity of countries with the advent of technology and better transportation methods. It allowed foreign parents to adopt underprivileged children from other countries, usually from countries with lower economic statuses, to provide them with a better life and opportunities. The United Nations validated it in the Draft Guidelines of Procedures Concerning Inter-Country Adoption in 1981. It was seen as a method to ensure that the underprivileged children would receive a congenial environment to grow up in, as they would with their biological parents. Though the thought behind the idea was noble, the lack of regulations made it susceptible to human trafficking, wherein the system in place would be misused. Thus, many children who underwent the process of inter-country adoption would end up getting trafficked and subjected to inhumane living conditions, a stark contrast to the life they were promised. 

The case of Laxmi Kant Pandey vs Union of India[2], which shed light on the severe lack of regulations surrounding inter-country adoption and the need for a legal framework to protect the rights of the adopted children, saw the judiciary take part in judicial activism to ensure that the process of inter-country adoption from India would be as shielded from malicious activities as possible. This was done by ensuring that every step of adoption from India would be precise and regulated.

In the judgment for Laxmi Kant Pandey vs Union of India, the Supreme Court laid out guidelines for inter-country adoption. It thus ushered in a new era concerning adoption in India, wherein the government had till then not taken much cognisance of the lack of guidelines regarding inter-country adoption. The judgment, which was delivered by a three-judge bench headed by Justice P.N Bhagwati, recognised the lack of safeguards with respect to inter-country adoption and chose to formulate a detailed set of guidelines to ensure that the adoption of children from India by foreign guardians would only occur under exceptional circumstances, and only if it was deemed that the children were adopted in a hospitable environment, similar to what they would ideally receive from their biological parents.

The bench made one explicitly clear: adopting the child would put the child’s welfare first and foremost. This was in conjunction with the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child[3], where a child’s right to be loved and grow up in an environment where they can receive the affection they deserve was recognised. The judgment stated that the primary focus of the adoption agencies should be to ensure that the child could be reunited with its biological parents, as the care provided by the child’s biological parents would be the ideal environment for the child to grow up in. To ensure this, the adoption agencies should take the necessary steps to track the biological parents and attempt to reunite the child with them. If needed, social service agencies can facilitate these families in reuniting as, in many instances, the children may be given up by their parents due to financial difficulties or mental incapacity to take care of the child. Only if all attempts by the social service agencies fail after 3 months can the adoption agencies move to the next step: aiding the adoption process of the child domestically

The court noted that, as the welfare of the children is what is essential, the next best step other than reuniting the children with their biological parents would be to find adoptive parents for the child in India, as they would thus grow up in the same environment that they are familiar with and would not have to deal with the stress of adapting to a new country’s culture and norms at their tender age. Securing adoptive parents from the native country would be done for two months. At that point, if the child has not been adopted domestically, the adoption agencies will allow applications for inter-country adoption.

As there is no statutory enactment in India providing for the adoption of a child by foreign parents or laying down the procedures to be followed in such cases, the court has instructed that the provisions of the Guardian and Wards Act 1890[4] should be used to facilitate such adoption. This act provides for the appointment of a guardian by a court for the care of a minor or a person of unsound mind.

In the guidelines issued for foreign adoption in the country, the apex court stated that all applications from foreigners seeking to adopt a child must be sponsored by a social or child welfare agency recognised or licensed by the government of the country in which the foreigner resides. It is important to note that social welfare agencies in India working in inter-country adoption or institutions where the juvenile court commits children should not entertain applications directly from foreigners. The bench also emphasised the child’s age’s importance in inter-country adoption cases. The court has stated that a child should be adopted before the age of three in such cases, allowing the child to assimilate more easily into the new environment and culture.

The process for foreign adoption of Indian children involves applying to the court for appointment as guardian, with notice sent to a child welfare agency. The agency must be licensed and maintain a register of children proposed for adoption. The court must be satisfied that the child is legally available for adoption, and the application must be sponsored by a recognised agency in the foreigner’s country of residence. 

The judgment in Laxmi Kant Pandey vs Union of India was instrumental in ensuring that inter-country adoption would not fall victim to malpractices like human trafficking and thus helped secure the rights of adopted children in India. Following the judgment, the Government of India instituted the Central Adoption Resource Agency (CARA). CARA serves as a centralised source of information for monitoring both domestic and international adoptions. 

This judgment also influenced the creation of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act 1986, revised in 2000[5]. This new legislation considered the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child[6] and other pertinent international treaties. The law adopted a child-centric approach, ensuring that children requiring care and protection receive appropriate care, protection, treatment, and rehabilitation.

Though no formal legislation was enacted to solely overlook the process of inter-country adoption in India, the precise nature of this judgment has ensured that the scope for malpractices with the process of inter-country adoption has decreased gradually and has thus made the process more secure and favourable for the adopted children and the foreign guardians. 

CONCLUSION

The case of Laxmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India was and will serve to be the landmark judgement not only for the statutes and amendments that the judgment brought in but also from a petition letter turning into a writ petition. The significance is that the modification of the judgement in 1987 clarified the guidelines. This case also became sensational, starting from one petitioner, i.e. a litigator of S.C., to six petitioners filing six applications. Also, how Indians and other executives came to know about the scam of illegal sale of babies under the cap of Inter-country adoption. This case is considered one of the substantial ones as it not only dealt with exploitation or trafficking that happens in adopting Indian Children by foreigners but also explained how the guidelines and provisions are to be followed. This was due to population restraint and various policies like the one-child policy by developed countries. So this increased the scope for various illegal and non-reputable adopting agencies that sell Indian children for reasonable sums, and the adopted child ended up as a beggar and prostitute. The case will serve and is serving a scrutinised adoption procedure to adopt Indian children, which will create fear in the minds of illegal or profit-making adoptive agencies. 

The case of Laxmi Kant Pandey vs Union of India brought in the most productive and safe guidelines and procedures like the three to five-tier adoptive process. Starting from whether the adoptive parents can care for the child to create a fixed deposit for the adopted child. The court also ensured that the child being adopted would be able to adapt to the surroundings and culture of the adoptive country and the people around. The other significant outcome of the judgment is how the maintenance of registers by the Social Welfare Department of India and the Embassy of the country the child is being adopted to keep an eye on the address and other details of the adopted kid from time to time ensure the safety kid. Then the modified judgment also solved and provided remedies for a quick adoption process yet a safer one as there was a delay in inter-country adoption. The big question is whether the judgment is efficacious on inter-country adoption. This case also served as an inevitable precedent that led to the introduction of the Central Adoption Resource Agency (CARA) and later following a few more judgments leading to the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children). Also, the statistics show that during the past four years, close to 2,134 Indian children have been adopted by parents from five countries.

This case is an excellent illustration of how procedure development in public interest litigation has eased standing limitations in India, leaving the judicial framework more accessible to disadvantaged members of society. It also serves as an illustration of the Indian Supreme Court’s judicial activism. The Supreme Court did not think twice about setting specific instructions to control adoptions and safeguard kids from prostitution and enslaved labour when faced with a legislative gap on a significant social concern. In totality, talking about inter-country adoption is like a double-edged sword with advantages and disadvantages On the one hand, international adoption may be a lifeline for kids who have been abandoned, orphaned, or abused. It may give kids’ devoted families access to higher education and superior medical care. It can also allow escaping poverty, prejudice, and other harsh conditions.

Conversely, international adoption may be troublesome if not conducted ethically and openly. The global adoption system has seen child trafficking, corruption, and abuse. Additionally, some critics contend that international adoption may contribute to exploiting marginalised people and perpetuating system imbalances.

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Endnotes

1. The Hindu Adoptions And Maintenance Act, 1956, No. 78, Act of Parliament, 1956 (India).
2. Laxmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India, 1987 AIR 232.
3. UN General Assembly, Declaration of the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1959, A/RES/1386(XIV).
4. The Guardians And Wards Act, 1890, Act No. 8 Of 1890.
5. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, No. 56, Act of Parliament, 2000 (India).
6. UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United Nations, Treaty
   Series, vol. 1577, p. 3.
7. http://lexpeeps.in/child-abuse-and-the-laws-to-prevent-it/

This case analysis is done by Vishal Menon, from Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad.

S.no	Contents
1.	Introduction
2.	Constant Turbulence Between Article 13 and Article 368
3.	The Parliament’s Comeback
4.	The Conflict Between the Judiciary and Former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi: 39th Amendment
5.	The Contextual Constitution
6.	Conclusion

The Preamble, which is incorporated into the basic structure of the Constitution, demonstrates the relevance of Article 368[1] even to the present day. Recent amendments to the Constitution concerning fundamental rights are made by Parliament. The Constitution, including its fundamental rights, was initially drafted in response to the socio-political requirements deemed necessary at the time. These requirements may not be sufficient or appropriate for the rapidly expanding socio-economic, technological, and legal climate of today. As a result, it is always necessary to amend the Constitution. 

For instance, the 86th Amendment to the Constitution in 2002 made the right to education a fundamental right. In a similar vein, Articles 19(f) and 31 of the Constitution were struck down by the 44th Amendment in 1978, rendering the right to property non-essential. The extent of Article 368’s authority to modify fundamental rights has been interpreted by higher  Indian courts. 

In Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan[2], for instance, the dissenting opinion stated that Article  368 did not grant the Parliament absolute powers and could not be used indiscriminately to usurp citizens’ fundamental rights. Even though there is a lot of literature on how to look at  Article 368 from the point of view of changing the basic structure as a whole, very few recent cases have focused on specifically changing fundamental rights from a legal point of view.  Therefore, I as an author want to fill that knowledge gap. 

From Shankari Prasad v. Union of India[3] in the First Constitutional Amendment Act of 1951 to Waman Rao v. Union of India[4], I will aim to trace the path. I will sincerely put efforts into determining the reasoning behind the bench’s various decisions challenging or upholding certain Parliamentary amendments to fundamental rights, as well as include their own opinion on the subject in the analysis section. I will be using doctrinal methods for in-depth research, also I will address the principles of the law and the constitution, as well as provide a sociopolitical context for the decisions made. 

Introduction

The basic structure of the Indian Constitution includes the fundamental or essential elements that run throughout the document or serve as its foundation. It joins significant arrangements of our Constitution, without the ground standards is outlandish. 

Because of its goal of achieving equity, for instance, the 2019 Constitution (One Hundred and  Third Amendment) Act, which makes reservations for economically disadvantaged groups,  has implications for Article 14 of the Constitution, which is the first fundamental right.

Additionally, on February 4, 2022, the Rajya Sabha debated K.J. Alphons, a BJP Kerala MP,’s proposal to amend the Preamble of the Constitution with a private member’s bill. This was gone against by the RJD MP Manoj Jha and MDMK MP Vaiko in December 2021, on the grounds of abusing the standard in the Kesavananda judgment which was that law and order are essential for the fundamental construction of the Indian Constitution. 

As a result, Parliament would be unable to alter any aspect of the Constitution’s fundamental structure. Fundamental rights are included in the Constitution’s fundamental structure in Part III. According to A.V. Dicey, a nation is said to adhere to the rule of law only if it upholds citizens’ liberties. Article 368 of the Constitution both grants and restricts Parliament’s powers to amend specific sections of the Constitution. 

Constant Turbulence Between Article 13 and Article 368

First Constitutional  Amendment According to Article 13 of the Indian Constitution[5], the Parliament cannot enact laws that restrict, infringe, or violate the fundamental rights outlined in Part III. In contrast,  Parliament is empowered to amend specific sections of the Constitution by Article 368. There is still no answer to the question of whether the two articles can coexist harmoniously. 

The fundamental rights, Preamble, basic structure, and other elements necessary to regulate the three organs of governance and the Indian people are all encapsulated in the Constitution,  according to many. The amount of power Parliament has under Article 368 to amend the  Indian Constitution is symbolized by the scissors used to cut or change the cloth into something else. 

The Constitution only contained seven fundamental rights when the 1st Constitutional  Amendment Act of 1951 was enacted, including the right to property under Articles 31A and  31B[6], which was later eliminated by the 44th Constitutional Amendment. 

The introduction of this right at the time of independence was motivated by two reasons: first and foremost, to boost agricultural production; secondly, to provide farmers, cultivators, and the rural population, who were oppressed by the pre-independence zamindari system, with opportunities, land, and job security. 

They used socialist-welfarist methods and set limits on how much land a person could own to prevent too much land and power from being concentrated in a few hands; a term that is comparable to constitutionalism. In addition, the State was permitted to legally seize someone’s property instead of providing compensation for rehabilitation following displacement. 

A revolutionary policy of the Indian National Congress later led to the establishment of such an exploitative structure to close the gap between the widespread inequality in land ownership. Further changes were set up by the ideological group through the Agrarian Changes Council with Administrator J.C. Kumarappa, overcoming the need to keep the right to property as a key right in a free India.

The 9th Schedule and reasonable restrictions stipulated in Article 19(1)(g)[7] were also included in the First Amendment Act, making it possible for the government to completely or partially acquire the person of any individual. Many citizens were dissatisfied with this Act because it reduced the scope of the most important aspect of the Constitution—the fundamental rights— and gave the Centre too much power to interfere with their lives. 

They filed a case against this Amendment Act in the Supreme Court of India because the Parliament did not have the authority to change fundamental rights. This case became known as Shankari Prasad v. Union of India[8], which was a landmark decision. 

The Supreme Court held that Article 368 allowed Parliament to amend any of the fundamental rights through Constitutional Amendments and that the changes made by the first Constitutional Amendment stand. This proportion smothered the fight for control between the lawmaking body and the legal executive since they explained that Article 13  simply applied to common privileges and not Protected Revisions. 

Numerous state governments incorporated their respective Land Reforms Acts into the 9th Schedule of the Constitution as a result of this decision. This had a significant impact because, normally, any law that violates fundamental rights would be invalidated; however,  by including it in the 9th Schedule, the laws would not be invalidated regardless of whether they violate fundamental rights. 

In Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan[9], this provision of the 17th Constitutional Amendment was challenged. With a 3:2 vote, the five-judge bench decided that the 17th Constitutional Amendment Act does not fall under Article 13. Chief Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar looked into the deeper intentions of the people who wrote the Constitution and concluded that they didn’t want to protect fundamental rights completely because they didn’t put in place a clause that said fundamental rights couldn’t be changed. As a result, both Shankari and Sajjan appeared to favour Article 368 over Article 13. 

The disagreeing assessment given by Equity M. Hidayatullah and Equity J. R. Mudholkar set forward the inquiry with regards to whether changing an essential element of the Constitution would be considered as a revision or as a revamping, and thus, whether the ability to roll out this improvement was presented by Article 368. 

This reexamining of the composers’ aim drove the Court to allude the case to a bigger seat,  forming it into the Golaknath v. State of Punjab[10], which tested the Sajjan choice. By the majority’s decision in Sajjan, the 11-judge bench ruled that the parliamentary powers granted by Article 368 were not absolute and that the Parliament cannot curtail fundamental rights because they are included in Part III, giving them a transcendental status outside of the  Parliament’s purview. In addition, it stated that any amendment violating a fundamental right granted by Part III is unconstitutional, restricting the Parliament’s authority and requiring a  judicial review. 

Golaknath, in contrast to Shankari and Sajjan, prioritized Article 13 over Article 368 because the Supreme Court ruled that Parliament can enact a Constitutional Amendment. This decision by a larger bench of the Supreme Court effectively overturned its previous two decisions and sided with those who opposed amending fundamental rights. 

The Parliament’s Comeback

The 24th Constitutional Amendment, which removed the right to property as a fundamental right that had been included in the 1st Constitutional  Amendment, was challenged in the courts shortly after Golaknath by a large number of cases brought by the general public. The Supreme Court had to clarify that Golaknath would apply retroactively to previous amendments to prevent all of this chaos. 

The Golaknath case narrowed the scope of Parliament’s powers, while the first constitutional amendment restricted the scope of fundamental rights. The decision to enact the 24th Constitutional Amendment, which effectively added a fourth sub-clause to both Articles 13 and 368, was made by Parliament to expand its power to amend. 

The 24th Amendment stated in Article 368(4) that if Parliament enacts another Constitutional  Amendment, it will not apply to Article 13, whereas Article 13(4) stated the opposite to reverse the Golaknath decision. As a result, following the passage of the 24th Amendment  Act, the position was that Parliament could alter any section of the Constitution, including fundamental rights. 

Following the 24th amendment, additional constitutional amendments were enacted to repeal previous amendments that restricted citizens’ rights. The 29th Amendment introduced land reforms, while the 25th Amendment restricted property rights. In 1947, the Privy Purse, a  payment made to ruling families to give up their powers and merge their princely states, was made obsolete by the 26th Constitutional Amendment. In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala[11] and Golaknath’s position as well, the 24th, 25th, 26th, and 29th Constitutional Amendments were challenged. 

The Supreme Court made it clear that Parliament has the full power to change fundamental rights even before the 24th and 26th Amendments to the Constitution. The 24th Constitutional Amendment, which clarified parliamentary powers, was also upheld by the  Court. In this instance, the issue of how much power the Parliament has over the applicability of fundamental rights came up once more. The Court decided to take a balanced approach in support of a harmonious interpretation, which is referred to as the basic structure doctrine. It did not investigate whether Article 13 or Article 368 is more powerful. 

The Conflict Between the Judiciary and Former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi: 39th Amendment

On the twelfth of June 1975, Allahabad High Court set out a verifiable choice wherein they suppressed the discretionary triumph of Indira Gandhi’s administration, referring to proof of constituent misrepresentation. They also decided that no one in her cabinet could hold an election office position for six years as punishment. 

After that, Indira Gandhi appealed to the Supreme Court. Just one day before the hearing, she enacted the 39th Constitutional Amendment Act and declared a national emergency on the grounds of internal unrest.

The 39th CAA resulted in the addition of Article 329A and the elimination of Article 71. The dispute over the election was still before the Court at this point. According to Article 329A,  an independent body would handle all electoral disputes involving the Speaker of the Lok  Sabha, the Prime Minister (at the time, Indira Gandhi), the President, or the Vice President. 

Because of the death of this CAA, the forthcoming legal dispute against her could as of now not be active. As a result, the 39th CAA’s goal was clear: to allow Indira Gandhi to continue serving as India’s Prime Minister without interference. The constituent outcomes incidentally showed that Janata Dal Party won the political decision overwhelmingly, making Morarji  Desai the new State head. 

As a result, Indira Gandhi was forced to resign from her position reluctantly. The ruling party then decided to remove Article 329A, which was found to be unconstitutional in the case of  Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain[12], applying the principles of the Kesavananda case, to undo everything the previous government had done wrong, including the 39th CAA and the unsolicited national emergency. Article 71 was likewise brought back, which offered back the powers to attempt constituent questions to the High Court. 

The Contextual Constitution

After the emergency period under Indira Gandhi’s rule in  1975, the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution made a significant number of changes to prevent similar power abuses from occurring again. It underwent two significant modifications: To begin, it added sub-clause 4 to Article 31C, which discusses property rights; Second, it added paragraphs 4 and 5 to Article 368. 

Article 368(4) stated that Parliament can amend, alter, or remove any fundamental rights under Part III and cannot be subjected to judicial review like Article 31C(4). On the other hand, Article 31C(4) stated that any law could be put in Part IV under the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP), even if it violates fundamental rights under Part III. This made it immune to even someone challenging it before the courts. 

As a result, Parliament can add or change any provision in Parts III and IV. The Parliament was granted absolute amending powers by Article 368 (5). Since the legal powers were diminished and the decent methodology in Keshavananda, the 42nd Established Alteration was tested in Minerva Mills v. Union of India and Ors[13]. 

Conclusion

The petitioners in Minerva owned the Bombay Minerva Mills company, which the government occupied under the guise of nationalization. In this case, the Supreme Court  ruled that the 42nd Amendment and all of its amendments were unconstitutional because of  the following three fundamental characteristics: 

First, judicial review, in which rights granted by courts of law are regarded as fundamental  features and cannot be suppressed through an amendment by Parliament; 

Second, Parliament’s limited amending power, which means that Parliament cannot use its limited amending power to expand its capabilities; Thirdly, the balance between Parts III and IV must be maintained so that DPSPs and fundamental rights do not conflict.

All the Established Alteration Acts after the Kesavananda essential regulation case were tested in Waman Rao v. Union of India[14], where the most relevant issue that emerged under the watchful eye of the court was regardless of whether these alterations sabotaged the fundamental construction. 

The Court provided an odd solution to this question by stating that the Kesavananda-based basic structure test will be applied in future amendments and laws. As a result, the Court made it clear that any amendment to the Constitution made after April 24, 1973, can be challenged if it does not adhere to the basic structure doctrine. 

As a result, this case reaffirmed the significance of the Kesavananda rule by allowing  Parliament to alter a portion of the fabric—representing the Constitution—but not the entire fabric. Even though Parliament had the power to change any part of the Constitution,  including the Fundamental Rights, this did not mean that the Constitution’s fundamental structure could be changed even by a Constitutional Amendment. This shows how strong the  Constitution still is in the social and political context of today. 

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Endnotes

1. The Indian Constitution, Article 368
2. Sajjan Singh v. State Of Rajasthan, 1965 AIR 845, 1965 SCR (1) 933
3. Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, AIR. 1951 SC 458
4. Waman Rao v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 362
5. The Indian Constitution, Article 13
6. The Indian Constitution, Article 31(A) and Article 31(B)
7. The Indian Constitution, Article 19(1)(g)
8. Ibid 3
9. Ibid 2
10. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR. 1967, SC 1643
11. Kesavanand Bharti v. State of Kerala, AIR. 1973 SC 1461
12. Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 S.C. 2299
13. Minerva Mill Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC, 625
14. Ibid 4

This article is written by Shaurya Sharma, a third-year law student from Fairfield Institute of Technology and Management.

S.no	Contents
1.	Facts of the Case
2.	Issues of the case
3.	Rationale
4.	Judgment
5.	Generalis Specialibus Non-Derogant

Year

1958

Case No.

122 of 1958

Equivalent Citation

1959 AIR 396

Date of Judgment

12/12/1958

Court

The Supreme Court of India

Bench

Chief Justice Sudhi Ranjan Das, Justice Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Justice K. Subbarao, Justice K.N. Wanchoo.

Introduction

Certain privileges are being provided to the parliament collectively as well as individually so that they can effectively discharge their functions without any kind of hesitation. Article 105[1] deals with the power and privileges of the house of parliament whereas Article 194[2] deals with the power and privileges of the house of Legislators. The case of Pandit M.S.M. Sharma v. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha and Others[3] not only deals with the conflict between the legislator and the court but also between the legislator and a citizen. In the Judgment part of this case, it was held by the court of law that the legislative assembly does have the power to regulate the publication of debate and other proceedings. However, this act might curtail an individual’s Fundamental Rights i.e. Right to Freedom of Speech[4], in this case, analysis, we will critically analyze why the court has given such implications and what is the validity of such implications.

Facts of the Case

In the case, the petitioner M.S.M. Sharma was a journalist at the “Searchlight” which was an English Newspaper operated in Patna, Bihar. On May 30, 1957, one of the members of the Bihar Legislative assembly whose name was, Maheshwar Prasad Narayan Sinha delivered a speech in Bihar Legislative Assembly in his speech he made some statements regarding Mahesh Prasad Singh that he was the one who guided the Chief Minister in the selection process of the other ministers and he also cited certain instances of favouritism. Further, it was alleged by Maheshwar Prasad Narayan Sinha in his speech that ministers were not given the proper ministries to which they were entitled and for which the conventional process should have been followed for the appointment. Many other instances regarding corruption were mentioned by him in the speech, he took the example of the District Judge who was only transferred from one place to another but was not discharged as per the advice of the Chief Justice of the High Court, Bihar. Further many other instances were discussed by him which were regarding the corruption and criticism of the prevailing government.

The Speaker of the assembly held that the part of the speech made by Maheshwar Prasad Narayan Sinha was objectional and directed it to be expunged. However, no specific directions were given to the Press, the speaker meant by saying this that the publication of the part of the speech which criticized the government must not be made.
On May 31, 1957, the part of the speech that was expunged by the speaker and was directed by him that publication of these parts must not be done, was published by the newspaper “Searchlight”. On 10th June 1957 Nawal Kishore Sinha, a member of the state legislative assembly questioned the same in the assembly. The matter was soon transferred to the Privilege Committee. After the evaluation of the entire facts for almost after more than a year on 18th August 1958 M.S.M. Sharma was summoned before the Privilege Committee and was asked to reply as to why an action against him must not be taken as he has done the breach of subsisting privileges. Further, the proceeding regarding the breach of privilege was initiated against the editor. M.S.M. Sharma moved to the court under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution for quashing the said proceeding and he raised the question was whether the said privilege under Article 194 was subject to the Fundamental Right under Article 19(1)(a)[5].

Issues of the case

1. Does the legislative assembly have a power under Article 194(3) of the Indian Constitution to prohibit the publication of the statement which is being done publicly in the house?
2. Do the legislative assembly privileges under Article 194 of the Indian Constitution prevail over the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Indian Constitution specifically Freedom of Speech and Expression?[6]

Rationale

Arguments from the Petitioner’s side:

• The notice issued by the committee and the proceeding initiated by them violates his fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution as well as it violates his personal life and liberty assured under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.
• They further argued that as the petitioner of the newspaper petitioner is entitled to Freedom of the Press.
• The notice which was issued by the privilege committee was invalid as the Chief Minister of Bihar was the chairman of the Privilege Committee.

Arguments from the Respondent’s side:

• The respondent relied on the Article 194 of the Indian Constitution.
• They argued that the state legislative assembly can exercise similar powers, privileges, and immunities as the British House of Commons, where the proceedings of the assembly cannot be published.
• They further argued that the part of the speech which was directed to be expunged cannot be published by anyone under any circumstances as it was expressly prohibited.
• If a such publication is being made which was being prohibited then such publication is a breach of the privileges of the Assembly.

Judgment

The court of law held that in accordance with Article 194(3) of the Indian Constitution, the state legislative assembly of Bihar does have the same immunities, privileges and power as the British House of Commons. It was said that since Bihar legislative assembly did not have passed any law concerning the power, privileges, and immunities of the legislative assembly and hence legislative assembly of Bihar will enjoy similar power privileges, privileges, and immunities as that of the British House of Commons. In the British House of Commons, there is a framed order that no member shall give a copy or publish any kind of stuff that has happened during the preceding of the House i.e. no publication of the statement must be made that has taken place in the House. Therefore while dealing with the issue of publication regarding the proceeding of parliament or the legislative assembly the law and order of the British House of Commons should be taken into the consideration.

The petitioner said that Article 194(3) is curtailing his Fundamental Rights under Article 19(1) (a) the court has interpreted this question of has concluded that the legislative privilege under Article 194(3) does not abridge the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Indian Constitution under Article 19(1) (a) and explanation regarding the same was given. The court of law said that in (1) it is being mentioned that “subject to the provisions of the constitution” whereas in clauses (2) to (4) it has not been stated as subject to. Therefore it can be assumed that Constitutional makers did not intend that that clause should be subject to the provisions of the Indian constitution and hence Article 194(3) does not breach the Fundamental Rights which are guaranteed by the Indian Constitution. Further, the court of law stated that if any provision of the Indian Constitution takes away or abridges the Fundamental Right then in that case it is a violation of Article 13 and the provision that violates the Fundamental Right must be void. But, since Article 194(3) is perfectly valid it can be inferred that it does not violate Article 13 of the Indian Constitution.

However in this case the dissenting opinion was given by Justice Subbarao he quotes the case of Gunupati Keshavram Reddy v. Nafisul Hasan[7] and said that Article 194(3) is subjected to Part III i.e. Articles 12 to 35 which deals with Fundamental Rights.

Generalis Specialibus Non-Derogant

The meaning of above stated legal maxim is – where there is a special right, general rights will not be applicable. From the above discussion, we can infer that the Parliamentary Privileges or the State Legislative Privileges are special rights, and in case the Fundamental Rights are the General Rights. In the case of Pandit M.S.M. Sharma v. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha and Others[8], this was one of the key areas where consideration could have been taken and to a certain extent, it was taken. Therefore, the general principles or general rules won’t be applicable in cases where there is a special right. The same was with the condition of Article 194(3) these are the special rights that are being given to the parliament for their effective and efficient working so that they can effectively discharge their functions. And the Fundamental Rights given under 19(1) (a) is the general right that is not applicable in the circumstances in which there is a special privileges/rights and the fines example of the situation is the case of Pandit M.S.M. Sharma v. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha and Others[9].

In the case of Azad Transport Co. v. State of Bihar it was considered that the VAT is a special provision and rules in CrPC are considered to be general.

Conclusion

From the above discussion and the analysis of facts, issues, and the judgment of the case it can be said that the court in its majority decision tries to establish the harmonious construction between the prevailing Fundamental Rights and the privileges given to the parliament and the state legislature. The significance judgment of this case is of paramount importance as it serves as the judicial precedent after this particular case. After the decision was delivered by the court, the assembly was prorogued several times and the privilege committee was reconstructed which issued a fresh notice of petition in the court of law against M.S.M. Sharma. As a result, M.S.M. Sharma moved to the court seeking to reopen the same issue. The court held that the principle of res judicata is applicable in this particular case and held that the matter is already decided which is binding on the petitioner.

However, one question remained open in this case and that was whether Article 21 is being affected because of the privileges given to the parliament or state legislative. The question regarding the subjection of Article 19(1) (a) was solved by the court of law i.e. Article 19(1) (a) is not subject to the privileges. But the court of law failed in this case to answer the question relating to Article 21, whether it overrides the privileges or not.

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Endnotes

1. INDIA CONST, art. 105
2. INDIA CONST, art. 194
3. Pandit M.S.M. Sharma v. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha and Others, 1959 AIR 396
4. INDIA CONST, art. 19(1)(a)
5. Supra note iv
6. Ibid
7. Gunupati Keshavram Reddy v. Nafisul Hasan, AIR 1954 SC 636
8. Supra note iii
9. Ibid

This case analysis is authored by Prashant Prasad, a second-year law student from University Law College.

S.no	Contents
1.	Introduction
2.	The Consumer Protection Act
3.	Features of The Consumer Protection Act 2019
4.	Rights of The Consumers
5.	The Consumers Protection Act 2019 Authority
6.	Issues with Consumer Protection Act, 1986
7.	Consumer Protection Act 2019 Amendment
8.	Consumer Protection Act Demonstration and Direct Selling
9.	Supreme Court Cases
10.	Different Features of the Consumer Protection Act 1986 and 2019
11.	Conclusion

Introduction

Each person purchases different goods and services in their everyday life. Anything they purchase needs to Pay for itself and get fulfilment from its utilization and use. But now and again they don’t feel happy with the item they buy. This might be a record of low quality of the item, cheating by the retailer, lower nature of constants, deceiving promoting, etc.^[1]

The digital era has guided and immensely filled in this new period of online business and acquired its degree new assumptions and wants of the shoppers. It has now become effectively available, with more extensive decisions to the customers, and gives viable techniques for business.

Because such a transformation is achieved by digitalization, the consumer protection act, of 1986 had a few difficulties and confronted numerous mishaps which required quick consideration. Be that as it may, the public authority achieved an extraordinary change and presented the Buyer Security Act, 2019 which came into force on 20 July 2020. This previous sanctioning had been reconsidered once in a while to get it congruity with changes achieved by globalization, financial progression, digitalization of items and administrations, and so on be that as it may, its execution was far to accomplish its ideal goal of financial regulation which looked to give security of the interests of the customers. While then again the new Buyer Insurance Act, 2019 will fortify and upgrade the extent of assurance given to the purchasers by redoing the promoting claims, supports, disciplines, prison terms, organization of the debates, and different variables.

The Consumer Protection Act

Consumer Protection Act^[2] is a law that protects consumers from unfair, harmful methods by businesses and sellers of goods and services. First Consumers Protection Act came in 1986 and the parliament of India elected it. It also gives consumers the right to Safety, Choice. Also, the Consumers Protection Act imposes duties and liabilities on producers. It gives hope for the bits of help of helpless consumers. This Consumers Protection Act came as a “Panacea” for consumers all over the country. The Consumers Protection Act makes a system name “three-tier” it is set up at the State, District, and National levels. The Consumer Protection Act was replaced by the Government as The Consumers Protection Act 2019.

Features of The Consumer Protection Act 2019

The Consumer Protection Act 2019 has some features that are: 

• The Consumer Protection Act defines a consumer as a person who buys goods and services with careful thought. 
• Consumer Protection Act does not allow goods and services for commercial purposes. 
• Consumers Protection Act covers transactions with all modes online, and offline through electronic, also multi-level marketing. 
• For Consumer Protection Act central Government made set up it was CCPA (Central Consumer Protection Authority). 
• It protects and enforces the right of consumers CCPA impose a penalty for those who supply goods up to 10 lacks and two-year imprisonment for any false advertisement.
•  For subsequent offense fine extend to Rs 50 lakh and imprisonment for five years.

Rights of The Consumers

In The Consumer Protection Act 2019, Consumers have some rights that are:

• Consumers have the right to know all the information related to the goods and services, like goods and services quality, quantity, how much pure, and also the prices should inform the consumer. 
• Sometimes consumers’ right to protect goods and services can be dangerous to their life and property. Rights to protect from hazardous goods and services.
•  The consumer has the right to be protected from unfair trade practices. 
• They have the right to access a variety of goods and services.
•  Consumers should have the right remedy or compensation for any losses or suffering.
• Right to give consumers proper education.
• Also, the consumer has the right to need a clean and healthy environment.

The Consumers Protection Act 2019 Authority

• The central government establish an authority to protect consumer goods and services, which is CCPA (Central Consumer Protection Authority) as a regulatory authority.
•  CCPA protects consumer rights and regulated some cases that are related to unfair trade practices. 
• CCAP gives power to consumers.
• Consumers can take Suo-Moto action, recall the product and cancel licenses. 
• CCAP has the right to investigate consumer law violations.

Product of Goods and Services Liability

The huge expansion to the 2019 demonstration is the arrangement for item obligation by which the makers or specialist co-ops have been made dependable to repay the purchaser for any mischief, injury, or misfortune experienced because of damaged items, or lack of help. This additionally incorporates web-based business inside its ambit and even they can’t get away from the fury of the go-about as now the item responsibility has been stretched out to the specialist co-ops and not simply restricted to the producers.

• The defeat of some Design. 
• Responsible for all the compensation for injuries and damages. 
• Services of the product provided faulty.

Issues with Consumer Protection Act, 1986

• Remove all the  imperfections from the goods;
• Substitution of the goods;
• Discount of the prices which are paid;
• Give compensation to the consumer for all the losses or injuries;
• Withdrawal of the hazardous goods from being made available for purchase; or Giving satisfactory expenses to parties.
• Evacuation of deformities or lacks in the administrations;
• Discontinuance of unjustifiable exchange rehearses or prohibitive exchange practices or course not to rehash them.

Consumer Protection Act 2019 Amendment^[3]

• In chapter one section 2 sub-clauses(4),(13),(14),(16),(40)
• In chapter two sections 3 to 9 both are inclusive
• In chapter four sections 28 to 73 both are inclusive. Except for some sub-clauses (iv) of clause (a) of sub-section(1) of section 58.
• In chapter five sections 74 to 81 both are inclusive
• In chapter six sections 82 to 87 also both are inclusive
• In chapter seven sections 90 and 91 except sections 88,89,92&93
• In chapter eight  sections 95,98,100 sections 101 except for some clauses (f) and clauses (zg), (zh), and (zi) of the sub-sections 2
• Sections 102,103,105, 106, 107 except sections 94,96,97,99,104

Monetary Limit

The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commissions(NCDRC) will hear grievances where the debate esteem is worth more than Rs. 10 crores. The State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commissions will hear objections where the contested worth is more than Rs 1 crore but not as much as Rs 10 crore. While the Locale Buyer Questions Redressal Commissions will engage in protests when the worth of products or administration depends on Rs 1 crore.

Consumer Protection Act Demonstration and Direct Selling

One more change was connected with online business working as per the regulations set for direct selling. The rules make it obligatory for the e-organizations to uncover the dealer’s subtleties like their location, site, email, and so on, and data connected with discount, return, assurance and guarantee, conveyance, shipment, instalment choices, the wellbeing of instalment, complaint taking care of the instrument and so on. This step is fundamental as in the developing universe of online businesses damaged and lacking items and administrations are given and through this arrangement the organizations could be punished for something very similar.

“Under the new Demonstration, the web-based business will be represented like direct selling in India and online stages for selling labour and products, or conglomerating administrations will be expected to take responsibility for any infringement of customer privileges or embracing any out-of-line exchange rehearses,”^[4] Mehta said

Supreme Court Cases

• Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank LTD.^[5] (This Judgement came in November 2019) Judgement given by Ranjan Gogoi Chief justice of India Leave Granted.
• Association For Consumer Welfare And Aid v. Granite Properties Private Limited (2019) This case was dealt with by the Supreme Court of India. The Judgement of the Court delivered by DR. D.Y. Chandrachud, j. Civil appeal no 259 of 2019 The National consumer disputes redressal commission(NCDR). “ The consumer on whose behalf this complaint is instituted did not hire or avail the services of opposite party 1 and therefore they cannot be said to its consumers.“^[6]

Current cases:

• M/S. Texco Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. TATA  AIG General Insurance Company Ltd (2022)
• Ibrat Faizan v. Omaxe Buildhome Pvt.Ltd.(2022)
• Shankarlal Nandani v. South Indian Bank LTD.(2022)
• Texco Marketing Private Limited v. Tata Aig General Insurance Company Limited And Others. (2022)
• Sunil Kumar Maity v. State Bank of India and another(2022)

Different Features of the Consumer Protection Act 1986 and 2019

In consumer protection act there is some kind of differences we find between the consumer protection act 1986 and the consumer protection act 2019 that’s are:

• Regulator:
  In Consumer Protection Act 1986 there is no separate regulator but in Consumer Protection Act 2019 there is an authority formed that is CCPA(Central consumer protection act)
• Consumer Court:
  In the consumer act, 1986 complaint was filed in the consumer court where the sellers or the defendant’s office is located but in Consumer Protection Act 201complaintsed filed the consumer court where the complaints are worked. 
• Product Liability: 
  In Consumer Protection Act 1986 there is no such provision of product liability consumers can apply in civil court but not in consumer court. In Consumer Protection Act 2019 consumers have product liability they get their compensation for any kind of harm caused by the services. 
• Mediation Cells: 
  In Consumer Protection Act 1986 there is no such legal provision for Mediation cells but in Consumer Protection Act 2019 court refer settlement through the mediation cells.

Conclusion

The Consumer Protection Act 2019 is a productive step that would bear natural products later on. The act incorporates inside itself a few new ideas which were the need of great importance and the prospect of executing a similar in a nation like India would give a palatable outcome. In the developing universe of digitalization steps like e-recording of cases, and procedures through video conferencing will change, create and upgrade customer freedoms by and large. However, one can’t deny and scrutinize the execution of down-to-earth earth use of the arrangements. For any law and regulation to find actual success, fundamental its execution ought to be done appropriately and productively. Hence, for the 2019 demonstration to become useful it needs to defeat its disadvantages and slack ought to be given to realize the help for the shoppers. Consumer Protection Act gives a law designed to ensure fair competition and free of truthful information in the market areas. The law is designed to prevent businesses that are engaged in fraud or UTP(Unfair Trade Practices). The Consumer Protection Act 2019, is a Constructive Step that would bear fruits in the Future.

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Endnotes:

1. Consumer Protection Act 1987, https://www.which.co.uk/consumer-rights/regulation/consumer-protection-act-1987-a5xTL3w6L9OI
2. THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 1986, https://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A1986-68_0.pdf
3. The Consumer Protection Act, 2019, https://consumeraffairs.nic.in/sites/default/files/CP%20Act%202019.pdf
4. Draft Consumer Protection (Direct Selling) Rules, 2021, https://consumeraffairs.nic.in/sites/default/files/file-uploads/latestnews/Draft%20Consumer%20Protection%20%28Direct%20Selling%29%20Rules%2C%202021.pdf
5. Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Limited, (2020) 6 Supreme Court Cases
6. Shipra Singh, Here’s how consumers will benefit under the new Consumer Protection Act, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/wealth/spend/heres-how-consumers-will-benefit-under-the-new-consumer-protection-act/articleshow/70711304.cms?from=mdr

This article is written by Pranita Dhara, a student of Lloyd Law College.