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Case Number

Civil Appeal no. 2030/1968

Equivalent Citation

1978 AIR 1613, 1979 SCR (1) 218

Petitioner

R. G. Anand

Respondent

Delux Films & ors.

Bench

Justice Syed Murtaza Fazalali, Justice Jaswant Singh, Justice R. S. Pathak

Decided on

August 18, 1978

Relevant Act/Section

Section 2 of the Copyright Act, 1957.

Brief Facts and Procedural History

The appellant-plaintiff is a theater play producer, playwright, and dramatist. A number of plays were written and staged by the appellant. On the other hand, the play ‘Hum Hindustani’ is what the appeal is about. He wrote this play in 1953, and it was performed for the first time in 1954. Since then, the piece has gained popularity. The second defendant, Mr. Mohan Sehgal, wrote the appellant a letter in November 1954 asking for a copy of the play, so that he could decide whether or not to make a movie about it. The appellant and defendant No. 2 afterward got together in Delhi. The second defendant announced the making of the motion picture ‘New Delhi’ in May 1955. Delhi saw the film’s release in September 1956. The movie was seen by the appellant.

In his lawsuit, the appellant claimed that the play “Hum Hindustani” served as the only inspiration for the movie “New Delhi,” that he had told defendant No. 2 about the play and had dishonestly mimicked it in his movie, violating the plaintiff’s copyright as a result. As a result, the appellant filed a lawsuit seeking compensation for damages, an accounting of the defendant’s profits, and a permanent order barring the defendants from showing the movie. The defendants denied liability in the lawsuit. The defendants argued that defendant No. 2, a film director, producer, and director of Delux Films, met the appellant at the invitation of a mutual friend, Mr. Gargi, and saw the play’s script, concluding that the play was unsuitable to produce a feature-length, mass-market motion picture. The defendants argued that there could not be a copyright on the topic of provincialism that anyone might use or adopt in their own way. The defendants additionally argued that both in terms of content, spirit, and climax, the movie differed significantly from the play. The simple fact that there are some similarities between the movie and the play can be explained by the fact that both the play and the film share a common source: provincialism.

The appellant was found to be the owner of the copyright in “Hum Hindustani” by the trial court, which also determined that there had been no infringement of the appellant’s copyright. After that, the appellant appealed to the Delhi High Court. The Delhi High Court’s Division Bench upheld the decision rejecting the appellant’s lawsuit.

Issues before the Court

1. Whether the film ‘New Delhi’ is an infringement of the copyright of the play name ‘Hum Hindustani’?
2. Whether Respondents-Defendants have infringed the copyright of the Appellants-Plaintiffs by making the movie named ‘New Delhi’?

Decision of the Court

The Supreme Court of India’s decision in this case which dealt with copyright under intellectual property rights was significant. A copyright violation in the area of cinematography is the subject of the lawsuit. When an original creative work is used or duplicated without the creator’s consent, copyright is violated.

The plaintiff was unable to show that the defendant in any way imitated his play. A reasonable inference of colorable imitation can be made if there are significant and unavoidable similarities between the copied work and the original. The Court ruled that an infringement action may only be brought if an infringement may be identified by a regular person. Since no obvious comparison could be found in this instance, the film was not perceived as a copy of the original play. As a result, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal since there was no copyright infringement.

The learned counsel representing the appellant claimed that the Trial Court had applied the relevant legislation in an improper manner. The court also disregarded the legal arguments made regarding the copyright violation by courts in India, England, and the USA. The experienced attorney further claimed that the movie and the appellant’s play are inextricably linked. The setting was the same as the play’s, and the plot was essentially the same. The Punjabi and Madrasi backgrounds of the families involved were similar, and the play’s leading heroine was fond of singing and dancing. Finally, the knowledgeable attorney argued that the respondent attempted to imitate the stage performance, violating the appellant’s copyright, and produced the movie without obtaining the appellant’s permission.

On the other hand, the learned counsel representing the respondent in court categorically refuted the appellant’s assertions. He claimed that the play and the movie were very different from one another. Both of them featured various occurrences, and their core differences were substantial. The experienced attorney added that the Trial Court’s assessment was accurate. Therefore, there was no question that the appellant’s copyright had been violated.

The court’s verdict, which was presided over by Justice Fazal Ali, found that despite the fact that both the play and the movie are founded on the idea of “Provincialism,” the two are very different. The movie also shows other facets of “Provincialism,” such as “Provincialism” when renting out outhouses, which are not included in the play’s portrayal of “Provincialism” during the marriage. The film also shows the negative aspects of dowries, something the play does not. Although there may be some similarities because the idea in both the play and the movie is the same, the Court rejected the Appellants’ claim because it is well-established law that an idea cannot be protected by copyright. The court cited N.T. Raghunathan Anr. v. All India Reporter Ltd., Bombay¹. The court determined that a regular person would not view the play and the movie as being identical. The assertion that the copyright has been breached by the appellants cannot be upheld because the play and movie are so different from one another.

Ratio decidendi

According to the Court, there is no copyright for an idea or a storyline; rather, the manner, arrangement, or expression of such an idea can be protected. Some similarities are unavoidable if the source of the works is shared, but the court must determine whether or not those similarities are significant enough to amount to infringement. It is an infringement if a regular person describes the in question work as a copy or reproduction of the original work after viewing it. The concept need just be repeated, but it must be depicted in a unique way to qualify as fresh original work. If there are more differences than similarities, there was a bad purpose to duplicating.

Obiter Dicta

It becomes particularly challenging for the dramatist in circumstances when the plaintiff must demonstrate infringement of his copyright against a movie, according to Justice Fazal Ali. Because a movie is more able than a play to express broad concepts and ideas. However, it is considered infringement if, after watching both the play and the movie, it appears that the latter is a copy of the former. According to Justice Pathak, it is possible for someone who is using a copyrighted work to their advantage to cover broader topics and make minor adjustments here and there to the theme to demonstrate differences from the original work and elude detection of plagiarism. Additionally, Justice Pathak stated that he might have had a different opinion from the High Court if the facts of the current case had been reopened before this Court. However, as the District Judge and High Court, the Courts of Fact, have both dismissed the Appellant’s claim, this Court would not needlessly interfere with their choice.

The Supreme Court issued the following guidelines:

• No idea, subject, theme, story, or historical or fabled fact can be protected by copyright, and in such cases, copyright infringement is only allowed in the form, style, arrangement, and presentation of the idea used by the author of the copyrighted work.
• Whether the viewer, after reading or viewing both works, is certain and has the unmistakable impression that the later work appears to be a copy of the original.
• It must be established whether the similarities represent fundamental or important aspects of the expressive style of the copyrighted work. There is a need for substantial or significant copying.
• If the same idea is used but is expressed and portrayed differently, there is no copyright infringement.
• It is not regarded as a copyright violation when the published work contains significant variances or unintentional coincidences.
• Copyright infringement has been proven if the viewer comes to the conclusion following the incident that the movie is practically an exact clone of the original play.
• The burden of proof rests with the plaintiff when a film director violates a theatrical performance.

The Court decided in the Respondents’ favor on both issues and found no infringement as a result. The Supreme Court’s ruling in the relevant case is still used as a benchmark when copyright violations are involved. Even Section 13 of the Indian Copyright Act offers three categories under which copyright may exist, providing greater relief to the court system. It’s important to note that none of them refer to ‘ideas’ as a component of this specific intellectual property right.

References

1. AIR 1971 Bom 48, 1982 (2) PTC 342 (Bom).

This article is written by Sanskar Garg, a last year student of School of Law, Devi Ahilya University, Indore.

CITATION

78/2019; 77/2019; 79/2019; 76/2019

BENCH

Justice Manojit Bhuyan; Justice Soumitra Saikia

FACTS AND BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

In the present-day, internet and social media platforms have gained importance over a period of time. The government’s frequent action of shutting down internet services for one region or another on the ground of ‘Public Safety’ has now become a hindrance in the life of people. Despite recognition of Right to Internet under Article 21 of Indian Constitution, it failed to provide relief to citizens. Due to the widespread protests in regions of north eastern areas, it led to chaotic situation in country, resultantly government was forced to shut down internet services as claimed by government of various states. In the instant case there were four petitioners namely Advocate Banashree Gogoi, Deva Kanya Doley, Randeep Sharma and Journalist Ajit Kumar Bhuyan who filed a Public Interest Litigation to challenge the notifications of Government of State of Assam that suspended the internet services on 11^th December 2019. Government banned internet services in 10 of its districts for a complete day and reasoned its action as to stop further protest that may happen due to the newly amended Citizenship Act.

LAWS INVOLVED

Article 32: The right of every citizen to move to Supreme Court if his/her any fundamental right is violated. Supreme Court can issue writs to any government authority, private authority or private individual for that matter.

Article 226: It provides power to High Court for enforcement of fundamental rights or other legal rights by way of issuing writs to any government authority, private authority or private individual for that matter.

Indian Telegraph Act, 1885: It provides that Indian Government has exclusive jurisdiction over maintain, establishment, operating, licensing and oversight over systems either wired or wireless. 

Section 5 (2) Indian Telegraph Act, 1885: It gives authority to governments both at central and state level for preventing of transmission of messaging during a situation of public emergency or for public safety or in the interests of sovereignty, integrity and security of India.

Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services (Public Emergency or Public Safety), 2017: It empowers the government to shutdown internet services in any particular region by way of notification based up on public emergency.  

ISSUE

Whether the State Government of Assam had enough reasons for contentment of public to justify the further continuation of ban on internet services?

DECISION OF COURT

It was recalled by court that an order dated 17-12-2019 has already been passed, that despite of restoration of normal conditions in state the Government of Assam refused to lift the ban on internet services; this results in freezing the entire working of cities. Due to the problems faced by many locals of state in their day-to-day lives, the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed an order that suggests the state government to restore internet services for fewer hours and to justify their action of continuing suspension. It was contented by petitioner that the term ‘Law and Order’ and term ‘Public order’ have different meanings and State Government is not making any effort for assessing the situation for peaceful ‘Public Order’. Whereas, State Government claimed it reviewed its decision where they put forward those inputs from various agencies and a meeting among State Authorities regarding the issue led to decision’s continuation.

It was argued the restoration of broadband services and lifting of curfew itself shows that ‘grave’ law and order situation has already waved away. Court stated that respondents have no reasons to justify that internet services disrupts law and order situation. Finally, court states that internet services play a major role in lives of people with advancement of Science and Technology, shutting down internet services would only cause further chaos in lives of people. The state government when issued notifications there was reasonable apprehension regarding law and order in society. Law surely does permit suspension of internet services whenever necessary however, in the current situation the State Authorities failed to assess the situation and to justify the continuation of ban on internet services. Court directed the Government of State of Assam to restore internet services on 19-10-2019 at 5.00 P.M. State is free to take any steps for stopping any violence that may take place in the future. The decision by court protects and extends the ambit of an individual Right to Receive and impart information providing no exception to state’s justification for ban. It gives a broad view over the protection of fundamental rights not based on mere apprehension of threat to ‘Public Safety’. The government must have enough reasons for internet shutdowns or for hindrance in way of any fundamental right if it failed to contentment of public for any action that harms one’s fundamental rights, it may suffer consequences.    

This case analysis is written by Simran Gulia, currently pursuing BA LLB from Maharaja Agrasen Institute of Management Studies.

INTRODUCTION

The reservation policy is the process of arranging in advance some percentage of seats for backward divisions of the society, scheduled caste, and tribes, in government institutions, jobs, etc. However reservation policy in India is an old-fashioned policy that has been carried out since ancient times, the theory of this policy is from the time when untouchability and ‘Varna’ systems were dominant in society (even though they still are) and when Hindu civilization was divided into 4 classes of Hindus:

1. The Brahmas
2. The Kshatriya
3. The Vaishya
4. The Sudra

Some communities belonged to no category and they were called untouchables. These were deemed to be impure and excluded from the other 4 classes. They were not permitted to inhabit the village and they had no social privileges. In some areas of the countries, people were convinced that even if their silhouette falls on the individual who belongs to one of the four classes, the person got impure. The savage system of the society was based on the theory of purity and impurity. It was an unbearable approach that was stalked and had a bad impact on the evolution of the people who were called untouchables. The design of reservations back at that time to be allowed to those castes of individuals was to furnish them with equal status and occasions in society and to raise them socially.

The pre-independence era blemished the dawning of reservation policy with the beginning of the Government Act of 1919. There were many mends in this act that were initiated by the Indian government at that time which conveyed many affairs of the minority. But the post-independence period had a particular scenario and the reservation policy attained even more admiration than in the pre-independence era. There was a formal presentation of the constituent assembly by Dr. BR Ambedkar who designed certain reservation articles and policies in the Indian Constitution devoted to the same purpose.

PROVISIONS IN THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION

• Article (15) (4) provisos for the evolution and growth of backward classes

Article 15(4) was instigated as an exception to Article 15(1) and (2) and was affixed with the first Constitutional amendment 1951 in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Champakam Dorairajan¹. A judgment was taken by the judge in this case which altered Article 15 and introduced a discrete clause for the improvement of socially and educationally backward classes of the society including scheduled castes and tribes. Article 15(5) was affixed by the Constitutional 93rd amendment Act 2006 that provided for the provisos for reservation of backward classes in private academic institutions. This was presented through a three-judge bench decision of Supreme Court cases T M Pai foundation vs. the State of Karnataka, Islamic academy vs. the State of Karnataka and, P A Inamdar vs. the State of Maharashtra.

Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992, nine-judge bench)- The court held that Article 16(4) is an authorizing provision and liberal in character while investigating whether a luscious lawyer should be prohibited from the horizon of reservation. The specification, the court noted, is an origin of reservation for allotments in services for people of backward classes.

Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab (1999, five-judge bench)- This case linked to the reservation in promotions and in case the reserved candidates, who get promotion would be authorized to claim rank over general candidates who earn a promotion at precedent in time.

• Article 16

Another article was proposed for the reservation of posts in public employment on the grounds of inhabitancy under Article 16(3) which was an exception to Article 16(2) that forbids prejudice on grounds of inhabitancy. Article 16(4) was also proposed for reservation for backward classes in public employment. Some other articles that veil the reservation policies are

1. Article 17 deals with the abrogation of untouchability.
2. Article 39A, the directive principles of state policies that guarantee equal justice to all.
3. Article 45 enforces an obligation on the state to maintain quality of living.
4. Article 332, 342 also proposed special provisos for divergent classes of people, like SC, ST, minority, etc.

While the reservation has been a vital part of the Indian legal system, a large number of people are opposed to the idea of the reservation which always triggers controversy. The chief purpose is not to inculpate reservation for minorities but to conquer the deficiency of job openings that have been produced because of the policies, especially on the basis of caste reservations.

BACKGROUND

Reservations, these days are rooted in caste is something which is opposing society and its interest. This sort of reservation is escalating hatred in society and generates an intuition of inequality between each other which is totally inconsistent with the purpose of reservation. A few years ago there was a reservation that was given to the Jain community on minority grounds but on the other side Jain community was regarded to be one of the richest sections in India and yet reservation was allocated to them. There is always a proverb that the caste system is inferior and some people are against it but at the same time, others are okay with it. This behavior is nothing but two sets of rules and hypocrite. The Government of India should take up this issue and give it a prime concern and remove this peril. The feasibility of abolition of reservation on the grounds of caste is a tough task, to eliminate it in one go is not possible but it surely can be eliminated over a span of 10 to 15 years. An expectation of bold commitment to these measures from the government for the elimination of the reservation is hoped from the society at large. Many analysts argue that the policies of the caste-based reservation have only been the critic lines in the Indian caste system and there are some politicians who have boldly elevated their concerns against the system asserting that it is not helping the reason for which it was meant and the founding father of the country didn’t visualize reservation system been arrange in a way in order to win votes.

Today events have come up to such an extent that each community senses that they have been maltreated and the requests have been refused because of this so-called caste-based reservation. Contemplating the fact of Dr. Ambedkar said that castes reservation should have been terminated in 1960 but we are still staggering under it in 2020. The key lectures of Dr. Ambedkar can be deliberately read and perceived that the allocation (quota) based on scientific social research is what sounds better with the perception of India which he thought were the reservation advantages would reach those populations that actually need it and not one who can go up on a ladder without creating efforts for it. In a simpler sense, people who have already achieved the ‘creamy layer’ do not require such kind of reservation in 2020. Unfortunately, this is not the process of working in India nowadays. Everyone can just babble about slashing down the caste-based reservation policies but when it comes to enforcing such things the big issue that lies is that 70% of the population of India belongs to the resort category and this is the figure from the 2011 report.

Therefore if any pass is taken to abolish the caste-based reservation it would clearly mean going against 70% of the population and the political party will venture not to go to that length. Therefore, it is required that Indians who wish to see the end of caste-based systems clearly go against it themselves because reservations do not solve the purpose of it. But it must also be acknowledged that it is not a utopia because there are a number of countries that have carried out this step, for example, the Bangladesh reservation system in government jobs was permanently abolished when the number of students trooped to the capital Dhaka to protest. Therefore, India should proceed towards a system free from caste where any person assures a seat in a college or government job only on the grounds of his or her merit and without any restrictions of the caste-based reservation.

ARGUMENTS OFFERED BY RESERVATIONISTS

1. Reservations are a bureaucratic demand in India.
2. Although Reservation policies do erode the grade of education but quite fair action has aided many people if not everyone from under-privileged groups to flourish and hold top spots in the leading industries of the world.
3. Even though Reservation policies do erode the standard, they are required to give social justice to the most underprivileged and vulnerable which is their human right.
4. Meritocracy is illogical without fairness. Basically, all people must be derived to a similar level, whether it uplifts a section or ease up another, despite merit.
5. Reservations have solely decelerated the procedure of “Rich becoming richer and Poor becoming poorer”.

ARGUMENTS OFFERED BY ANTI-RESERVATIONISTS

1. Intellectuals and philanthropists accept that reservation will segregate India. Reservation is tantamount to internal division because apart from being a form of caste discrimination, it also builds walls against inter-religious and inter-caste marriages. Most voters are discriminating against the newly created minority.
2. Caste Based Reservation only sustains the idea of caste in society and does not undermine it as a factor of social thought, as visualized by the constitution. Reservation is a means to fulfill narrow political ends.
3. Fair treatment can be given at a more broad level taking into account many factors of prohibition such as economic conditions, caste, gender, education, etc. The global plan of Fair treatment would be more helpful than reservations in directing concerns of social justice.
4. Assigning quotas is a type of discrimination which is conflicting with the right to
   equality.
5. As per the Mandal commission, 52% of the Indians come under the OBC category, while as per the National Sample Survey (1999-2000), this static is only 36% (32% excluding Muslim OBCs).
6. This scheme of the government has already provoked an increase in brain ooze and may annoy further. Graduates and undergraduates will initiate moving to overseas universities for higher education

EWS RESERVATION

The Central Government of India recently instigated EWS Reservation. 10% quota is given for the Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) between the General Category candidates in educational institutions and government jobs. This is implemented in the Indian Constitution (103rd Constitution Amendment Act, 2019) by including clauses for the same.

CONCLUSION

Therefore the reservation policy acquired in India with a sight to raise specific caste of people should be executed for the same reason only and not pull away the rights of people of the general class. Because the very purpose of presenting reservation is fading its essence in the 21st century. However, it is urgent to maintain the point and originality of the reservation policy, and not providing prejudice means two people reached the stairs of profit without even taking it.

REFERENCES

1. 1951 AIR 226, 1951 SCR 525.

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This article is written by Ashmita Dhumas, who has completed her BA LLB from Agra College and is doing a diploma in Corporate Law from Enhelion.

Case Number

WP (Criminal No.) 115 of 2009

Equivalent Citation

AIR 2011 SC 1290, 2011 AIR SCW 1625

Petitioner

Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug

Respondent

Union of India, State of Maharashtra, Dean- KEM Hospital Mumbai

Bench

Justice Markandey Katju, Justice Gyan Sudha Misra

Decided on

March 07, 2011

Relevant Act/Section

Article 21 of Constitution of India, Section 309, 306 of Indian Penal Code

Brief Facts and Procedural History

Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug, the petitioner in this case, was a nurse at the King Edward Memorial Hospital in Parel, Mumbai. On the evening of November 27, 1973, a sweeper from the same hospital attacked her and used a dog chain to yank her back while wrapping it around her neck. Additionally, the sweeper attempted to rape her; however, when he discovered she was menstruating, he sodomized her instead. He tightened the chain around her neck in order to stop her from moving or causing any havoc. A cleaner discovered her body the following day, unconscious and covered in blood. It was thought that the chain’s strangulation caused the brain’s oxygen supply to stop, which led to brain damage. She entered a permanent vegetative state as a result of this incident, which permanently injured her brain (PVS). Later, journalist and activist Pinki Virani petitioned the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, claiming there was no chance of her being resurrected and recovering. She ought to be released from her suffering and allowed to die through passive euthanasia.

The respondent parties, KEM Hospital, and Bombay Municipal Corporation submitted a counter-petition in response to this petition. The gaps between the two groups widened as a result. Due to the discrepancies, the Supreme Court appointed a group of three distinguished doctors to conduct an investigation and provide a report on the precise mental and physical state of Aruna Shanbaug. They thoroughly researched Aruna Shanbaug’s medical background and concluded that she is not brain dead. She responds differently depending on the situation. She favors fish soups and gentle religious music, for instance. If there are many people there, she feels uneasy and becomes upset. When there are fewer people around, she is at ease. The KEM Hospital personnel were adequately caring for her. She was constantly kept tidy. Additionally, they found no indication from Aruna’s body language that she was willing to end her life. Additionally, the KEM Hospital nursing team was more than happy to take care of her. Thus, the doctors opined that euthanasia in this matter is not necessary. She held this job for 42 years before passing away in 2015.

Issues before the Court

1. Is it acceptable to remove a person’s life support systems and equipment if they are in a permanent vegetative state (PVS)?
2. Should a patient’s preferences be honored if they have previously said that they do not want to undergo life-sustaining measures in the event of futile treatment or a PVS?
3. Does a person’s family or next of kin have the right to request the withholding or removal of life-supporting measures if the individual has not made such a request already?

Decision of the Court

This decision was made on March 7, 2011, by the prestigious Supreme Court of India Division Bench, which also included Justices Markandey Katju and Gyan Sudha Mishra. The Transportation of Human Organs Act of 1994’s definition of brain death and the doctor’s report were both used by the court to rule that Aruna wasn’t brain dead. She didn’t need the assistance of a machine to breathe. She used to exhibit various signs and felt things. She was in a PVS, but she was still in stable condition. The justifications offered here are insufficient to end her life. It wouldn’t be acceptable. In addition, the court stated during its discussion of the matter that Pinki Virani would not be the next-of-kin in this particular situation, but rather the personnel of the KEM Hospital. Therefore, KEM Hospital has the authority to make any such choice on her behalf. In this instance, it was the food that she was relying on for survival. As a result, removing life-saving measures, in this case, would entail denying her sustenance, which is not permitted by Indian law in any way.

The Supreme Court recognized passive euthanasia under specific circumstances. The High Court would have to approve the decision to end a person’s life after following the proper procedure, the court decided, in order to prevent future abuse of this option.

When a request for passive euthanasia is made to the High Court, the Chief Justice of the High Court must convene a Bench of at least two justices to decide whether the request should be accepted or denied. Before rendering a decision, the Bench should take into account the advice of a panel of three reputable physicians. The Bench also proposes these physicians after consulting with the pertinent medical professionals. Along with appointing this committee, the court also has to notify the state, kin, family, and friends and provide them a copy of the committee of doctors’ report as soon as it is practical. After the court has heard from all parties, it should then issue its ruling. In India, this method must be followed up till relevant legislation is passed.

Aruna Shaunbaug was refused euthanasia in the end after taking into account all of the relevant facts of the case. The High Court further ruled that if the hospital staff ever feels the need for the same thing, they may petition the High Court in accordance with the established procedures. By giving a comprehensive framework of standards that must be fulfilled, the decision in this case has helped to clarify the concerns surrounding passive euthanasia in India. The court also suggested that Section 309 of the IPC be repealed. Every aspect of the case has been covered in detail. Now, let’s talk about the appearance of two crucial characteristics that emerged in this situation and have been addressed previously. The court also advocated for the abolition of IPC Section 309.

India is now among the nations that have legalized passive euthanasia. However, there are still flaws in the way passive euthanasia is carried out. It was a laborious process because it was mandated that every case obtain approval from the High Court after the Shanbaug case. Passive euthanasia is now more difficult to put into practice thanks to the new ruling, which calls for the execution of the directive in the presence of two witnesses, verification by a judicial magistrate, approval from two medical boards, and a jurisdictional collector. The fundamental goal of passive euthanasia is to terminate the suffering of the person in question, therefore this delay is a significant obstacle. On the other hand, if the process is made too liberal and simple, it is always open to serious abuse.

The Supreme Court established standards for passive euthanasia in the case of Aruna Shanbaug. These regulations allowed for the removal of a person’s life support system, which might ultimately result in death. Passive euthanasia is now legal in India under certain circumstances that will be ruled by the High Court. Later in 2018, the Supreme Court issued a new ruling in the case of Common Cause v. Union of India¹, reinstating the right to a dignified death, legalizing passive euthanasia, and granting permission to remove life support from patients who are terminally ill and in a life-long coma. The Court also introduced the idea of “living wills” along with this. In these cases, the directions to be followed are-

1. A Passive Euthanasia application must be pending with the relevant High Court. In any case, two appointed authorities must make up the Bench that the Chief Justice of the High Court appoints, and they will decide whether or not to approve the grant.
2. The Bank must first consider the opinions of a three-person medical committee that it will select before making a decision. One of the three professionals should be an expert in the nerve system, while the other two should be specialists and therapists.
3. When a person goes missing, the High Court Bench will notify the State and those closest to the missing individual, such as guardians, companions, siblings, and sisters.
4. When it becomes available, the Court must send them a copy of the expert council report.
5. After hearing from each gathering, the High Court’s seat must announce its decision.
6. The Supreme Court must make a decision immediately. The court expressed its extreme gratitude to the KEM staff for their dedication over an extended period of time.

This case clarified the euthanasia-related concerns and established criteria for widespread euthanasia. In addition, the court recommended that Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code be repealed. The subject of passive euthanasia, which was previously hardly ever considered, started with this case. It significantly broadens the scope of Article 21 of our Constitution and explains the stance on the right to a dignified death. In the Indian context, this decision is hailed as progressive.

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REFERENCES

1. WP © 215/2005

This article is written by Sanskar Garg, a last year student of School of Law, Devi Ahilya University, Indore.

CITATION

1992 AIR 1858, 1992 SCR (3) 658

APPELLANT

Miss Mohini Jain     

RESPONDENT

State Of Karnataka And Ors.

BENCH

Kuldip Singh (J)

DECIDED ON

30 July, 1992

ACTS/SECTIONS

Constitution of India, 1950-Articles 41, 45-Right to Education, Karnataka Educational  Institutions  (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1984 ( Section 3)

BRIEF FACTS

Mohini Jain was a young lady initially from Meerut, Uttar Pradesh, and needed to seek after MBBS from a confidential school in Karnataka named Sri Sriddharatha Medical College, Agalokote, Tumkur. As per the Karnataka Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, it was laid out by the state government that Private Medical Colleges will charge just ₹2000 per annum from understudies conceded on Government seats, ₹25,000 from understudies from the territory of Karnataka and ₹60,000 from understudies of the other states in India. Aside from this, no expense ought to be requested from the understudy. This step was taken to guarantee that the Private Medical Colleges don’t charge cash from understudies in return for affirmation.

The administration of the school illuminated her that she would need to present an amount of ₹60,000 for each year however her dad passed on to the specialists that ₹60,000 is an enormous measure of cash and he was unable to manage the cost of that. On this premise, she was denied confirmation in the school. Miss Jain later affirmed that separated from the ₹60,000 the school likewise requested ₹4,50,000 as a capitation charge however this was denied by the school.

The Respondents guaranteed that she was approached to pay a measure of Rs. 60,000, and thusly, the Management got a call from the Petitioner’s dad who pronounced that he didn’t possess the ability to pay the extreme sum.

The Petitioner guaranteed that she was approached to pay an extra amount of around four and a half lakhs as capitation expense, which was denied by the Respondents energetically. Ms. Jain recorded a request under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution testing the notice of the Karnataka Legislature that considers requesting such excessive sums from understudies for the sake of educational cost.

The appeal guaranteed that the warning was violative of Articles 12, 14, 21, and 41 of the Indian Constitution as it conspicuously denied the Right to training to Indian residents on an erratic premise. The expense charged could without much of a stretch be recognized as a capitation charge. It was, in this manner, violative of Section 3 of the Act and against the excellencies of Right to Equality and Right to Education.

ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT

• Whether the Right to Education is ensured to the residents of India in consonance with Fundamental Rights, and whether charging a capitation expense infracts something similar?
• Whether the charging of capitation expense is violative of the fairness statement cherished in Article 14?
• Whether the criticized warning allowed the charging of a capitation expense dishonestly?
• Whether the notice is violative of the arrangements of the Act restricting the charging of such expenses?

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

The Petitioner battled that the burden of such colossal charges for training by the confidential school is against the different articles under the Indian Constitution.

For this situation, the Respondent battled at first that the rules which have been continued in the confidential school with respect to the capitation expenses are not chargeable from those understudies who were equipped for the Government situates yet just from those understudies who were from various classes. They additionally contended that as they were following such grouping of seats in the school under merit list or under nonmeritorious list, which suggests that Government seats for up-and-comers who were under merit rundown and other people who were not. Accordingly, the administration leading group of the school has the option to charge expenses from the individuals who didn’t go under the legitimacy list.

One more contention by the Respondent was that as they were a confidential clinical school and there was no monetary guide which was given from the public authority Karnataka or the focal government furthermore basically these confidential clinical universities used to cause 5 Lakh Rupees as use for MBBS course. Ultimately, they additionally battled that the confidential clinical universities have consistently observed the Guideline of regulation and submitted to every one of the regulations for the smooth working of the organization and were legitimate in charging the capitation expenses.

HELD

After hearing the contentions from both the gatherings the Apex Court held that however the Right to Education isn’t explicitly referenced as a Fundamental Right; Articles 38, 39(a), (f), 41, and 45 of the Indian Constitution, it is clarified that the of the constitution makes it required for the State to instruct its residents. Article 21 of the constitution peruses “No individual will be denied of his life or individual freedom besides as indicated by the technique laid out by regulation”. Under Article 21 of the constitution and a singular’s poise can’t be guaranteed except if he has a Privilege of Education and taught himself. Further, the Court thought about the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, by the United Nations and a few cases that held that the Right to Life envelops more than “life and appendage” including necessities of life, sustenance, haven, and education.

Charging immense expenses limits admittance to instruction to the lower layers of society and makes it accessible just to the more extravagant segment of individuals. Poor meriting up-and-comers can not get confirmation because of the failure to pay the endorsed charges and as a result, in instructive establishments, a resident’s “All in all correct to Education” gets denied. Further, permitting the charging of an exceptionally high capitation expense disregards Article 14 of the Constitution of India the Court noted. The main strategy for admission to clinical universities ought to be founded on merit alone. The court likewise said that the judgment cannot is applied reflectively and cases past this cant receive the reward of the judgment.

CONCLUSION

The Hon’ble Court displayed its choice of standards of social government assistance and value. 10 years and a half before ‘Right to Education’ was officially presented in the Constitution. The judgment is moderate and somewhat radical. The Court was constant in its understanding of what summed as a capitation expense and its relevance — or deficiency in that department. Its exhaustive assessment of Fundamental Rights interlinked with the Right to training was exemplary. The Court underscored the Right to rise to the opportunity being similarly essentially as vital as the Right to uniformity itself. An extreme assertion in the recently changed Indian setting, the idea that the Right to training moved from the Right to life honored the philosophies of the days of yore. The Court put import on merit as opposed to monetary capital, a demonstration that should have been visible as an obstruction against privatizing instruction.

This article is written by Arpita Kaushal, a student of UILS, PUSSGRC, HOSHIARPUR.

INTRODUCTION

The age-old Contempt of Courts laws’ history comes way back from the period of Regulating Act enacted by the British in India, where, the Mayor’s Court was given the authority which is equal to that of the English King’s Bench court for assigning punishment for the offence of contempt of court.

The first Contempt of Courts Act was enacted in 1926. The Act gave the authority to the three High Courts in Colonial India- Bombay, Madras and Calcutta to penalise any person for the offence of contempt on itself and also its inferior courts. The punishment was imprisonment for a minimum of 6 months or a fine or both for committing the Act. However, on an apology submitted by the accused, he/ she would be discharged.

After India acquired independence, the Act of 1926 was replaced by the Contempt of Courts Act 1952. The highest court of India, i.e., the Supreme Court also known as the Court of Record has been given powers that the High Courts during British India had along with the power to penalise for contempt by Article 129 of the Constitution of India. The Act of 1954 had many shortcomings in it. The committee headed by the Former Additional Solicitor General, H. N. Sanyal, reviewed the contempt laws in 1971 after a decade of its enforcement. The Committee was mandated to: 

(i) review the law pertaining to court contempt generally, and in particular, the law pertaining to the sanctioning process;

(ii) to propose changes therein in order to (whenever necessary) clarify and revise the law; and

(iii)  to offer suggestions for the codification of the legislation.

The lacunae present in the previous Acts have been corrected and the present Contempt Courts Act 1971 was formulated as per which, it is “An Act to define and limit the powers of certain courts in punishing contempt of courts and to regulate their procedure in relation thereto.”

CONTEMPT OF COURTS

In general terms, we can understand that anyone who disrespects the court or its legal authorities or disobeys the order of the court, the judge has the right to impose fines on them or can sentence imprisonment for some time if found guilty of the act. This phrase can also be taken in terms of the judiciary’s freedom from restrictions. As is common knowledge, every judge has the authority to grant judicial proceedings within the bounds of the law. Anything that restricts or prevents a judge from granting a necessary judicial action can be considered contempt of court.

According to Section 2 (a) of The Contempt of Courts Act 1971, Contempt of Court is defined as civil or criminal contempt.¹

The Constitution of India has 2 two Articles regarding the Contempt of Courts.

1. Article 129²– This Article gives the power to Supreme Court to be the ‘Court of Record’ and it has the authority to penalise for contempt of itself and its inferior courts.
2. Article 142(2)³– The Supreme Court shall have absolute authority to issue an order for the purpose of securing any person’s attendance, the discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself, subject to the requirements of any law established in this regard by Parliament.
3. Article 215⁴– The High Courts have the right to punish for the contempt of courts and its lower courts.

CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT 1971

The Contempt of Courts Act 1971, is the only act which has defined the terms ‘Contempt of Courts’ in the enactment. As mentioned earlier, contempt of court is defined as civil or criminal contempt. In Noorali Babul Thanewala v. K.M.M. Shetty⁵, a person provided a court with an undertaking during civil proceedings. The court sanctioned a course of action based on the assumption that the undertaking was accurate, yet the undertaking appears to be false. As a result, this was viewed as misbehaviour and court contempt. There are various clauses in this legislation which state that doing so does not constitute contempt of court.

The Act specifies under Sections 3 to 7 that innocent publication and distribution of matter, accurate report of the proceedings, fair criticism, complaint against presiding officers of subordinate courts, and publication of information relating to proceedings in chambers or camera do not amount to contempt. Any other defences except mentioned under the act don’t affect. The Act gives the power to the high courts to try the contempt of courts cases and also the punishments are prescribed, procedures, etc., are mentioned.

Types of Contempt:

1. Civil Contempt:

Civil contempt is defined in Section 2 (b) as “wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other processes of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court;”⁶

Essentials of Civil Contempt:

• The disobedience or breach must be done wilfully.
• The act must be done deliberately.
• A genuine court order being issued, the respondent being aware of the order, and their capacity to comply.
• It does not include careless, negligent, honest, or unintended behaviour or a real incapacity to follow the requirements of the order.

Cases:

In Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh⁷, the Supreme Court has held that mere disobedience of the decree is not enough to prove civil contempt. The element of willingness is important to charge within the Act. In the case of Dr. Sajad Majid v. Dr. Zahoor Ahmed⁸, the court stated that mere pendency of the appeal in the appellate jurisdiction does not protect him from contempt of court if there is a non-compliance of the order and that would cause him risk since it’s done without any legal justification.

• Criminal Contempt:

According to section 2(c), “ ‘criminal contempt’ means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which— (i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court; or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner.”⁹

Cases:

In the case of Jaswanth Singh v. Virender Singh¹⁰, a lawyer made a scandalous and insulting attack on the High Court judge. A petition for an election was submitted to the High Court by an advocate. In order to hear more arguments in an election petition and to transfer election petitions, he wished to ask to remain. These things undermine the High Court’s judicial process and have a propensity to embarrass the Court. In this instance, it was determined that there had been an attempt to intimidate the High Court judge and obstruct the conduct of a fair trial.

In Anantha Lal Singh v. Alfred Henry¹¹, it was held that any comment upon the advocate who is handling the suit amounts to contempt of court on the same principle, which is applicable to the judges or the judgement.

Punishments under The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971:

Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971, mentions the punishments for the offence of contempt. The Act states that there can be simple imprisonment which extends to 6 months or with a fine, which extends to Rs. 2,000 or both. However, on the accused apologising for the act committed, he can be discharged or the punishment can be remitted. The Supreme Court has the authority to award punishment to its subordinate courts as well.

In the case of Re: Arundhati Roy¹², Supreme Court made the observation that legitimate criticism of a judge’s behaviour or the role of the judiciary as an institution may not constitute contempt if it is offered in good faith and for the benefit of the general public. The editors of the Times of India and the Indian Express were charged with contempt in 1978 as a result of the publication of articles that criticized the Supreme Court’s ruling in the habeas corpus case, ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla¹³, where the Supreme Court declined to defend the right to habeas corpus during the Emergency.

LACUNAE

The list continues, but on two fronts, the Act receives harsh criticism. The term “scandalizing the court,” which is used in Section 2(c)(i), is unable to identify action that scandalizes or incites biases against the judicial establishments, leaving a grey area. The meaning of contempt has not been adequately and precisely provided.

In Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India¹⁴, it was held –

• that scandalizing the court is not only an offence under the Act but is sui generis. While courts are not unduly sensitive to fair or even outspoken comments, in the larger interest of protecting the administration of Justice, no one can be permitted to distort orders of the court and deliberately give a slant to its proceedings and bring it to ridicule.
• Courts succumbing to the pressure tactics of litigants would result in negation of rule of law. Threats of public protests, meetings and undertaking satyagrahis against orders of Supreme Court prima facie appear to be an attempt to prejudice or interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings.
• Courts cannot be forced by pressure tactics of litigants to change their decisions, by organizing protests against court orders in pending judicial proceedings.
• Supreme Court’s shoulders are broad enough to shrug off comments and no action in contempt is needed to be initiated.

Criticism of the Court and restrictions on free speech – A PIL attorney named Prashant Bhushan was found guilty of contempt of court in 2020. He had criticized the judiciary for paying only partial attention to hearing cases during the lockdown after sharing a news photo of India’s then-Chief Justice, Sharad Bobde, riding a motorcycle without a face mask during the Covid-19 epidemic.

The Legal Fraternity has attacked it as having a chilling effect on this right as well since its definition is too broad and imprecise, allowing it to be used to shield the judges from criticism, and because the Freedom of Speech is constrained by the court’s power of contempt. The constitutionality of the Contempt of Courts Act was also challenged by Bhushan and others; this case is still pending.

The Supreme Court declared that merely criticizing the court does not amount to contempt of court in PN Dua v. Shiv Shankar & Ors¹⁵. The Court ruled that as long as criticisms of the legal system or of judges don’t interfere with or obstruct the administration of justice, they should be welcomed in the public realm. However, some people have thought that criticism is being linked with diminishing the authority of courts, which is completely untrue.

CONCLUSION

The Contempt of Courts Act 1971 can be said as a colonial act due to its presence in society. The act provides the provisions that protect the dignity of the courts and the judges. Contempt of court is a concept whose remedy is to prove that the information is true. There also are provisions in the act which provide exceptions for the contempt of courts. However, there is also the perspective that, the extent of the contempt authority is constrained by giving it a clear and specific meaning, making it impossible to employ it carelessly or indiscriminately.

It is undeniable that the judiciary has exceptional power when it comes to contempt. The aforementioned authority must be used to uphold the Rule of law, not the supremacy of any particular judge. The rule of law frequently manifests itself through court and tribunal judgements. Therefore, the Court’s inherent authority to protect the majesty and dignity of the courts is the Contempt Jurisdiction.

REFERENCES

1. The Contempt of Courts Act 1971, s. 2(a).
2. The Constitution of India, art. 129.
3. The Constitution of India, art. 142 (2).
4. The Constitution of India, art. 215.
5. Noorali Babul Thanewala v. K.M.M. Shetty, 1990 AIR 464.
6. The Contempt of Courts Act 1971, s. 2(b).
7. Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh, AIR 2002 SC 1405.
8. Dr. Sajad Majid v. Dr. Zahoor Ahmed, 1989 Crl.L.J. 2065
9. The Contempt of Courts Act 1971, s. 2(c).
10. Jaswanth Singh v. Virender Singh, 1994 suppl. (5) SCR 336 
11. Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh, AIR 1931 Cal 257.
12. Re: Arundhati Roy…. … vs — on, 2002 AIR (SCW) 1210.
13. Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, AIR 2010 SC 2221.
14. Re: Prashant Bhushan & Anr. …. Alleged Contemnor(S)
15. P.N. Dua v Shiv Shankar & Ors, 1988 AIR 208.

This article is written by K. Mihira Chakravarthy, first year BA LLB student from Damodaram Sanjivayya National Law University (DSNLU).

CASE NUMBER

1708  of 2015

CITATION

(2015), 834 SC

APPELLANT

RAJIV SINGH

RESPONDENT

STATE OF BIHAR

BENCH

V. Gopala Gowda, Amitava Roy

DECIDED ON

December 16, 2015

ACTS / SECTIONS

Sections 304B, 201, 498A of the Indian Penal Code , Section 365, Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, Section 323 Cr.P.C, Section 313, Section 293 Cr.P.C.

BRIEF FACTS

An affectionate vacation excursion of a recently marry youthful couple met with a sad end, with the puzzling vanishing of the spouse from the organization of her significant other, on the train where they were going coming back home. The litigant, the spouse, in the orderly realities and conditions, stands charged and sentenced under Sections 304B, 201, 498A of the Indian Penal Code, what’s more, has been condemned to go through thorough detainment for shifting terms for the offenses in question. The High Court of judicature at Patna, having avowed the conviction and sentence recorded by the learned preliminary court, the litigant looks for a change in the moment procedures, challenge being laid to the judgment and request dated 16.05.2014 delivered in Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 1169 of 2011.

A short introduction to the horrendous episode is imperative. Rani Archana Sinha got hitched on 29.04.2007 with the appealing party as indicated by Hindu rituals and had properly joined the marital home. Archana was a rehearsing advocate and had shown up in a cutthroat assessment in which, according to the outcomes proclaimed on 10.08.2007, she was not chosen. The couple arranged their special night outing to Darjeeling and continued thereto, by Capital Express on a similar date. They landed at New Jalpaiguri Station, and in the wake of visiting the spots of their advantage, as planned, they on 14.08.2007 boarded a similar help for the return venture at 1500 hrs. As the realities have unfurled from the First Information Report stopped by the appealing party with the Mokamah G.R.P.S. on 15.08.2007, the couple ate at Katihar Junction at 2000 hrs whereafter they turned in their particular billets No. 33 (appealing party) and negative. 35 (Archana) in mentor S 1 of sleeper class roughly at 2100 hrs.

According to the adaptation of the appealing party, he awakened at 0510 hrs on 15.08.2007 at Bakhtiarpur Station, to observe that his better half was absent from her introduction to the world whereafter, he began looking for her on the running train. As per him, when the train arrived at Patna Junction, he searched for her on different trains likewise thereat. His supplication is that on being enquired, the travelers in his mentor avowed that the woman was accessible in the train up to 0400-0430 hours. The litigant’s statement arranged subsequently, he revealed the matter first with the GRP, Patna, and at last stopped the First Information Report with Mokamah G.R.P.S.

ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT

• Whether Archana had vanished of consumption or real wounds or whether her passing had happened in any case than in typical conditions? Assuming such passing is demonstrated, whether it very well may be incidental and neither self-destructive nor desperate?
• Whether soon before her passing, she had been exposed to brutality and provocation by the litigant and any of his family members for or regarding interest for settlement?

HELD

In the current realities of the current case, the assumption engrafted under Sections 304B IPC and 113B of the Indian Evidence Act isn’t accessible to the arraignment as the fundamental central realities to set off such assumption have stayed unproved. The indictment has neglected to lay out for certain the demise of Archana. To repeat, the proof all in all bearing on endowment interest and provocation or abuse in association therewith is likewise not persuading.

On a combined examination of the proof on record, we are consequently compelled to hold that in current realities and conditions of the case, the indictment has neglected to demonstrate the charge under Sections 304B/498A/201 IPC against the litigant. The courts underneath, in our gauge, have neglected to look at and assess the proof on record in the right point of view both genuine and legitimate, and consequently have horribly failed in returning a finding of responsibility against him on the above charges.

It is very much dug on a basic level of a criminal statute that a charge can be supposed to be demonstrated just when there is sure and express proof to warrant lawful conviction and that no individual can be held liable on unadulterated moral conviction. Howsoever grave the supposed offense might be, generally blending the inner voice of any court, doubt alone can’t replace legitimate evidence. The deeply grounded cannon of law enforcement is “fouler the wrongdoing higher the evidence”. In undeniable terms, it is the command of regulation that the indictment prevails in a criminal preliminary and needs to demonstrate the charge(s) without question.

Doubt, despite how grave it very well might be, can’t replace evidence, and there is an enormous contrast between something that “maybe” demonstrated and “will be proved”. In a criminal preliminary, doubt regardless of areas of strength how should not be allowed to happen during verification. This is for the explanation that the psychological distance between “maybe” and “must be” is very enormous and separates ambiguous guesses from sure ends. In a lawbreaker case, the court has an obligation to guarantee that simple guesses or doubts don’t replace legitimate confirmation. The huge distance between “maybe” valid and “must be” valid, should be covered via clear, fitting, and irreproachable proof created by the indictment, before a blamed is censured as a convict, and the fundamental and brilliant rule should be applied.

In supplementation, it was held in confirmation of the view taken in Kali Ram versus Province of H.P. (1973) 2 SCC 808 that assuming two perspectives are conceivable on the proof cited for the situation, one highlighting the responsibility of the denounced and the other to his blamelessness, the view which is positive for the charged ought to be taken on.

This Court, among others, in Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah versus Focal Bureau of Investigation and another (2013) 6 SCC 348, while underlining the vitality of a fair, top to bottom examination had seen that researching officials are the head bosses in the law enforcement framework and dependable examination is the main step towards confirming total equity to the survivors of the case. It was decided that regulating law enforcement is a two-end process, where watching the guaranteed freedoms of the denounced under the Constitution is pretty much as basic as guaranteeing equity to the person in question.

This article is written by Arpita Kaushal, a student of UILS, PUSSGRC , HOSHIARPUR.

INTRODUCTION

A self-governing group of people associated with the same class, appear together voluntarily to tend to ordinary, social, economic, and cultural programs and conditions through an endeavor that is jointly owned and administered democratically by such individuals, known as a Credit Cooperative Society. It works for the motive of encouraging the economy, aligning credit at a competitive fare, and providing other financial amenities to its members. It reveals the willingness of the society to help each other for balancing social responsibility and mutual aid for the welfare of its members. The purpose of encouraging the economy and society is vital for its members.

Any person can be part of the Credit Cooperative Society

• A certificate from the bank is entailed to proclaim the credit balance in support of it.
• It ought to have a minimum of fifty members.
• It must have the promoter’s name and list.
• No demur certificate of the vigorous inquiry letter.
• The board members must have at least seven and a maximum of twenty-one.
• Particulars and copy of pre-registration of the conference are needed which involves capital, members, the board and the operation, etc.
• The endorsed name by the members of the Credit Cooperative Society.

WHO CAN APPLY

The enrolment of the individual is laid down in section 5 of the Cooperative Society Act which opinions that no individual be a single member of the enrolled society if he is below the age of 18 years, provided that the regulations of the society impose the minimum age to be the member of the society.

TYPES OF COOPERATIVE SOCIETY

• Producer Cooperative: It safeguards the affairs of small producers which covers farmers, landholders, or owners of the fishing operations, etc. To maximize the production capability and marketing possibilities. It aids in minimizing the costs and strains in per capita area with mutual profit to the producers.
• Consumer Cooperative: They are controlled by consumers of a specific area for their complimentary benefit. They try to furnish necessary commodities at rational prices rather than creating their profit.
• Credit Unions: Their main purpose is to assist people for which they give credit and financial amenities to the members at combative prices. Everyone has the privilege to be a member of the group.
• Marketing Cooperative Society: Their object is to assist the small producers in trading their products. The producers who want to obtain rational prices for their products are the members of this group. It hoards the production of the individual members. Numerous market functions are executed by society to trade the products with a rational price.
• Housing Cooperative Society: They assist the people who desire to build a house with a restricted income. Their goal is to resolve the housing issues of the members. They build the houses and offer the option to pay the installment to acquire the house.

THE COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES ACT, 1912

This Act includes ten chapters which comprise 50 sections that mostly discuss the liability of society to design the funds to be loaned to its members, and of which most of the members are agriculturists, and of which no member is an enrolled society shall be unbounded. Section 3 talks about the Registrar, the state government may nominate a person to be Registrar for the state or any portion of it and may specify persons to help such registrar.

Section 8 of the act gives the power which says that the query shall be decided by the Registrar, and whose decision shall be last. Section 48 talks about the assistance of the Indian Companies Act, 1882 shall not appeal to registered societies. No person other than a registered society shall commerce or bear on business under any label, tag, or title of which the word Cooperative is a bit without the authorization of the state government. The requirements and the process for the application of the registration are also defined under sections 7 and 8 of this Act.

RBI GUIDELINES

The Madhava Das Committee had proposed that there is a necessity to cease the practice of primary or initial credit societies beginning banking business without initial acquiring a license from the RBI. According to the amendment in the Act, these societies will have to obey the criterion stipulated by the RBI within 1 year of it being announced. The Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (AACS), Section 5 (CCII) of a cooperative credit society is explained as a cooperative society, “the principal object of which is to furnished financial abodes to its members and covers a cooperative land mortgage bank.” These types of establishments are thrift societies. The difference between a primary or initial credit society and a cooperative credit society is a source of their essence of business.

The initial aim or principal business of a primary credit society is the trade of banking business. When its contributed capital and reserves achieve the level of Rs.1 lakh, a primary credit society inevitably becomes a primary cooperative bank. However, even after a primary credit society set off a cooperative bank, it has to register with RBI for a license to bring on banking business. But it can bring on banking business until it is authorized a license or notified that a license cannot be authorized to it.

Sanjay Lodha And Ors vs Reserve Bank Of India And Ors on 5 December 2019

Bench: S.C. Dharmadhikari, R. I. Chagla September 24, 2019.

Apprehensive depositors tackling with bank employees at Maharashtra Co-operative Bank, Akruli branch of Punjab & to withdraw money in Mumbai. The Reserve Bank of India has assigned Mumbai-based Punjab and Maharashtra Cooperative Bank under measures for six months to the wind-up of business of the bank on September 23, 2019. The depositors will be granted to withdraw a sum not exceeding ₹ 1,000 of the total balance in each current bank account or savings account or any other deposit account, subject to conditions imposed in the RBI Directions.

Thomas, and two entrepreneurs in a fresh Rs 111 crore loan cheating case. Thomas has been in prison since October 2019 for his asserted role in relation to a previous Rs 4,355 crore loan fraud case. The recovery department of the bank had registered an FIR alleging fraud. All the accused have been charged under IPC sections 405, 408, and 409 for breach of trust, cheating (Section 419), and criminal conspiracy (Section 120 B). In the 2019 case, investigation officers said that 21,049 fabricated accounts were used to channel money and the accounts were password-protected and controlled by companions of Thomas.

THE BIGGEST BANK SCAMS IN INDIA

• Nirav Modi Bank Scam

Nirav Modi v State of Maharashtra on 18 October 2019;

Commissioner of Income Tax v Nirav Modi on 14 December 2016

Bench – S.S. Shinde

This scam is known as a substantial scam (Rs 11,400 crore) in the banking zone of India. The prime accused of the crime are billionaire jeweler Neerav Modi and Mehul Surakshi (his uncle and the owner of Gitanjali James). Both of them had been presented with the “Letter of Undertaking” from the agreement of the employees of PNB’s Mumbai branch and withdrawn the funds from the foreign banks on the assurance of Punjab National Bank. However, the Enforcement Directorate has seized holdings of Neerav worth approx. Rs 5870 crore.

• Bank Scam by Vijay Mallya

Dr. Vijay Mallya v Union of India on 3 December 2018.

Bench – A.A. Sayed.

Mallya’s Kingfisher Airlines had loaned ₹ 9,432 crores from 13 banks before February 2018. The State Bank of India was the biggest moneylender with ₹1600 crore accompanied by the PNB ₹800 crores, IDBI ₹650 crores, and the Bank of Baroda loaned ₹ 550 crores. Mallya skedaddled India on March 2, 2016, and was held up in London and the government of India is struggling for his extradition to date.

CONCLUSION

Cooperative banks play a vital role in the execution of evolution programs and are important for the productive functioning of the banking system in India. India is labeled as an underbanked country, and after so many scandals and scams, it is the need of the hour to take essential measures to remedy the deficiency and to raise the confidence and beliefs of the public in the banking system.

This article is written by Ashmita Dhumas, who has completed her BA LLB from Agra College and is doing a diploma in Corporate Law from Enhelion.

Data security is one of the most overwhelming errands for itself and info-sec experts. Every year, organizations of all sizes spend a sizable part of their IT security financial plans safeguarding their associations from programmers’ goal of accessing information through beast force, taking advantage of weaknesses, or social designing. All through this guide are joined that will assist you with more deeply studying the difficulties connected with getting touchy information, guaranteeing consistency with government and industry commands, and keeping up with client security. Alongside the difficulties, you’ll track down guidance on the most proficient method to tackle them.

Aarogya Setu is a versatile application created by the Government of India which interfaces the different fundamental wellbeing administrations with individuals of India. The application is assuming a critical part in our consolidated battle against COVID-19 and presently, has developed as the National Health application to serve individuals of India excellently. The application has concocted an instinctive User Interface and extensive highlights like ABHA (Health ID) creation, disclosure, and connecting of wellbeing records to empower longitudinal computerized wellbeing records, Simplified Consent Management for sharing these records, and a Seamless Search element to find Nearby Hospitals, Labs and Blood Banks.

Aarogya Setu, a COVID-19 following Indian application created by the National Informatics Center under the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, was sent off on 2 April 2020. This application is intended to monitor every one of its clients whether they are experiencing the Corona infection illness or have been in ongoing contact with any such individual. The application targets expanding the drives of the Government of India, especially the Health Department in proactively contacting and educating the clients regarding the application concerning the dangers, practices to stay away from them, and significant warnings relating to the regulation of COVID-19. It likewise interfaces fundamental well-being administrations with the resident to battle against COVID-19.

On 14 April, Prime Minister Narendra Modi addressed the entire country to download the App. This App utilizes the telephone’s Bluetooth and GPS framework to keep a record of the well-being status, everything being equal. These records are put away till the client tests positive or pronounces side effects through a self-evaluation study by the application. The information gathered by the application is extensively partitioned into 4 areas segment information (name, portable number, age, orientation, and so forth), contact information (like the general distance between people), self-evaluation information (client’s reaction to the review by Aarogya Setu) and area information (geological area of contact with different clients), altogether known as reaction information.

WORKING ON THE APP

After introducing the application, it gets going with requesting verification joined by the client’s versatile number, trailed by security and protection notice about subtleties which the application will gather. The application demands admittance to the gadget’s Bluetooth and GPS and afterward start the self-evaluation review for certain extremely fundamental inquiries like name, age, orientation, country, side effect agenda (for hack, fever, diabetes, lung sickness, coronary illness, and so on), nations went in most recent 30 days and expert subtleties (medical services laborers/conveyance labor force/police/policing/drug specialist/supermarket specialist/drug specialist/industry laborers). Then, at that point, the dashboard of the application includes the gamble level box illuminating whether the individual is under okay or high gamble class.

DATA COLLECTED AND MANNER OF COLLECTION

(a) When you register on the App, the accompanying data is gathered from you and put away safely on a server worked and oversaw by the Government of India (Server) – (I) name; (ii) telephone number; (iii) age; (iv) sex; (v) calling; and (vi) nations visited over the most recent 30 days. This data will be put away on the Server and a special computerized id (DiD) will be pushed to your App. The DiD will from that point be utilized to distinguish you in all resulting App-related exchanges and will be related to any information or data transferred from the App to the Server. At enrollment, your area subtleties are likewise caught and transferred to the Server.

(b) When two enlisted clients come surprisingly close to one another, their Apps will consequently trade DiDs and record the time and GPS area at which the contact occurred. The data that is gathered from your App will be safely put away on the cell phone of the other enrolled client and won’t be opened by such another client. On the occasion such other enrolled client tests positive for COVID-19, this data will be safely transferred from his/her cell phone and put away on the Server.

(c) Each time you complete a self-evaluation test the App will gather your area information and transfer it alongside the consequences of your self-appraisal and your DiD to the Server.

(d) The App constantly gathers your area information and stores safely on your cell phone, a record of the relative multitude of spots you have been at brief stretches. This data might be transferred to the Server alongside your DiD, (i) assuming you test positive for COVID-19; or potentially (ii) assuming your self-proclaimed side effects demonstrate that you are probably going to be tainted with COVID-19.

(e) If you have tried positive for COVID-19 or on the other hand assume a high probability of you is being tainted, you have the choice to press the Report button on the App which will permit you to either demand a test or report that you have tried positive for COVID-19. The back-end server investigates the bluetooth contacts transferred by enrolled clients who have tried positive for COVID-19. Assuming you have interacted with such people, in light of the contacts transferred from their cell phones your gamble level will be fittingly refreshed. At your only choice, you can likewise get more refined contact following outcomes by squeezing the Report button/Upload information button and consenting to transfer contact information from your cell phone to the Server. On such occasion the information gathered under Clauses 1(b) and (d) and safely put away on your gadget will be transferred to the Server with your assent. At the point when you press the Report button/Upload information button or potentially consent to transfer your information to refine contact following outcomes, the information gathered under Clauses 1(b) and (d) and safely put away on your gadget will be transferred to the Server with your assent.

(f) The App will gather the name, age, orientation, telephone number, address, and ID Proof data of the client, with the end goal of enrollment for COVID-19 inoculation. The enlistment for COVID-19 immunization is discretionary and the information will be gathered with the client’s assent, assuming the client selects enrollment with Coronavirus inoculation through Aarogyasetu App.

(g) The App will work with the confirmation of the User character through the Aadhaar Number of the client with the end goal of enlistment for COVID-19 immunization. The Aadhaar number will not be put away by Aarogyasetu App.

(h) The App will work with the download and reserving of COVID-19 immunization endorsement and COVID-19 inoculation enrollment slip/receipt, through verification of the recipient’s versatile number and recipient ID. For working with this download, the application will require media access consent on the client’s gadget.

CONVENTION BY GOVERNMENT

The convention for the COVID-19 following application was given by the Ministry of Electronics and Information resting rules for sharing the information of Aarogya Setu clients with government organizations and outsiders also. This then brought about the discussion of the protection of the information shared on the application. As indicated by the convention, the reaction information might be shared where it is “stringently important to figure out or carry out suitable wellbeing reaction straightforwardly”.

The information might reach the application’s designer i.e., National Informatics Center, Health Ministry, branches of state/UT/neighborhood government, National Disaster Management Authority, general wellbeing organizations of focus, and state and nearby bodies. The convention additionally sets out that the information been shared will stay for 180 days and afterward naturally erased after the period. This convention will be in force just for a half year from the date of issue.

BARRIERS FOR ADOPTION

For Aarogya Setu to be powerful, the application should be introduced on however many telephones as would be prudent, and clients should routinely refresh their wellbeing status so local area communications can be delineated. The improvement group expressed that no less than half of the populace ought to in a perfect world have the application introduced on their telephones, however, this edge might differ among metropolitan and provincial regions. The tele-thickness in India is extremely slanted in the metropolitan regions when contrasted with the country’s hinterlands. In this way, while it very well may be simpler to raise a ruckus around town limits in huge metropolitan urban communities, it will be undeniably more challenging to guarantee inclusion in provincial regions subsequently reducing the viability of the application in recognizing cases in the medium term as the pandemic spread expansions in country regions.

The Karnataka high court has likewise limited the Center and the National Informatics Center from sharing information of clients who got through the application without their agreement because of a request documented by protection dissident Anivar Aravind.

“At first sight, we hold that there is no educated assent regarding clients of Aarogya Setu application taken for sharing of reaction information as given in the Aarogya Setu Data Access and Knowledge Sharing Protocol, 2020, as there is no reference to the expressed convention in the terms of purpose and security strategy accessible on the application,” a division seat of Chief Justice Abhay Sreenivas Oka and Justice Viswajith Shetty said.

The court, notwithstanding, declined to remain the utilization of the application or utilization of information of the clients previously gathered through it. During the pendency of the request, the solicitor had looked for a heading from the court to limit the Center from continuing with the application and with the information gathered, in any way, whether the assortment of information from the individuals from people, in general, is expressed to be deliberate or compulsory.

PRIVACY ISSUES

The Aarogya Setu application is like the contact following application created by Google and Apple and depends on Bluetooth innovation. In any case, not at all like Apple and Google, it additionally gathers GPS area information. Once introduced, the application first gathers the accompanying segment information from clients: name, orientation, age, calling, travel history and phone number. These subtleties are then hashed to a special gadget ID and transferred to a focal information base. Regardless, the server will be on Amazon Web Services and then, at that point, moved to a NIC server. The application requires Bluetooth and GPS to be turned on constantly and takes administrator access to the Bluetooth settings. Administrator access to gadgets is a security risk as the application can take a lot of information than required.

At the point when two gadgets come into nearness, they trade these IDs with one another. Specialists call attention to the fact that the application utilizes pseudo-static ID rather than the more security safeguarding dynamic pseudo ID similar to Singapore’s contact following application. The area and Bluetooth gadget communication records are put away locally on the telephone, however, when a client begins enlisting side effects of COVID-19, the framework will transfer this information to the local server. Their gadget cooperations are then followed and outlined to show bunches or on the other hand assuming that there are COVID-19 positive patients close by. Authorities say that 15,000 individuals’ area and Bluetooth information has been transferred to the local server.

Additionally, there is no regulation insight regarding the insurance of the web-based protection of Indians, making the clients of the Aarogya Setu application acknowledge the security strategy given by the public authority. There ought to be more straightforwardness in regards to the internal working of the application, particularly when it is advanced by the public authority itself and requests individual subtleties of the resident of the country.

CONCLUSION

The pandemic is a general well-being crisis and individual privileges should be tempered with public reason and everyone’s benefit. Notwithstanding, the Indian government will in general view residents’ information as a characteristic asset to be taken advantage of and adapted. It turns out to be more critical than Aarogya Setu fix its concerns of prohibition for viable wellbeing observing as opposed to building more capabilities. There is a requirement for the public authority to show the viability of the application to fabricate trust among residents and bleeding edge well-being laborers.

REFERENCES

1. Aarogya Setu: Conflicts, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/aarogya-setu-app-many-conflicts-67442/ ( last accessed on 17 July, 2022).
2. Data Governance Policy and the Road Ahead, https://www.barandbench.com/columns/data-governance-policy-and-the-road-ahead ( last accessed on 17 July, 2022).
3. Aarogya Setu and Data Privacy, https://thewire.in/law/karnataka-high-court-aarogya-setu-data-privacy ( last accessed on 17 July, 2022).

This article is written by Arpita Kaushal, a student of UILS, PUSSGRC , HOSHIARPUR.

Orphans or vagrants are the people who are deserted kids and have hardly any familiarity with their parents or their parents left their youngsters unattended. They might have been abandoned deliberately too. The Orphan Child (Provision Of Social Security) Bill, 2016 characterizes a “vagrant youngster” as a kid who has been deserted or has lost either guardians or whose guardians’ personality isn’t known and incorporates a kid who isn’t ‘considered’ important as a part of a family. These adolescents deal with multiple social issues as they are constantly denied affection and care.

As per United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), India has 29.6 million stranded and abandoned kids.

“…. We are guilty of many errors and many faults, but our worst crime is abandoning the children, neglecting the fountain of life. Many of the things we need can wait. The child cannot. Right now, is the time his bones are being formed, his blood is being made, and his senses are being developed. To him we cannot answer ‘Tomorrow,’ his name is today.”

– Gabriela Mistral

DEFINITIONS

Different lawmaking bodies characterize the term ‘kid’ in India, regulations connected with work and business like The Child Labor (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986, and The Plantation Labor Act 1951 among others guarantee a youngster to be under 14 years old, while as of late, corrected Juvenile Justice Act expresses that youngsters in age 16-18 can be treated as grown-ups in the event of terrible wrongdoings. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) in 1992, characterizes a youngster as an individual under 18 years old. Subsequently, there is by all accounts an overall uncertainty on one acknowledged meaning of ‘kid.’ The uncertainty isn’t due to the meaning of youngsters, the term vagrant also doesn’t find a right clarification in Indian lawmaking bodies, a lacuna that has gone about as a block previously.

Even though UNICEF characterizes a vagrant as a “person under 18 years old, who has lost one or the two guardians”, the by and large existing idea inside the nation confines a vagrant both, to a lost youngster or one who has been deserted and taken over to a CCI. India, being the second-most crowded country on the planet, is home to an enormous number of stranded youngsters. As India battles with neediness, yearning, and debasement, numerous kids either lose their folks or are deserted by their families. As per UNICEF, there were around 25 million stranded youngsters in India in 2007. With the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, the quantity of vagrants in India has quickly expanded. Thus, it is vital to investigate the current lawful structure in India that tries to safeguard vagrants.

As indicated by Article 39(f) of the Indian Constitution, the state can make arrangements to guarantee that youngsters are furnished with satisfactory open doors and assets, which are crucial for their development and to shield them from double-dealing and relinquishment. Much of the time, just a halfway house can furnish stranded kids with fundamental necessities like food, sanctuary, dress, and instruction till the age of 14. In this manner, the state is enabled to make regulations to guarantee that halfway houses in the nation are all around kept up with and get satisfactory financing to safeguard the privileges of stranded youngsters.

LAWFUL PRIVILEGES OF ORPHANS IN INDIA

There is no different regulation overseeing the privileges of vagrants in India in essence, subsequently, the freedoms revered upon kids by the constitution alongside different regulations safeguarding the privileges of youngsters in India and the UNCRC are likewise moved by a vagrant. Article 14 and 15 of the Constitution gives the right of uniformity to every one of the residents and the right to be not segregated separately, including vagrant youngsters as well, Article 15(3) additionally gives the express power to make extraordinary honors to enable ladies and kids. Article 21 of the Indian Constitution additionally concedes the right of life and freedom to all people, and in Mohini Jain v. Province of Karnataka, the apex court held that the Article additionally incorporates different privileges significant for character and not referenced in that frame of mind of the constitution, like the right to schooling. Further, Article 21A, as embedded after the 86th amendment additionally gives the right to all youngsters matured 6 to 14 years, and Articles 23 and 24 likewise disallow work for kids under 14 years old individually. Article 47 additionally guides the state to increase living expectations by expanding the sustenance of all (consequently including vagrants).

Act and Bill related to vagrant:

Halfway Houses and other Altruistic Homes (Management and Control) Act 1960

An Act to deliver management and control of halfway houses, homes for dismissed ladies and young people, and other like organizations and for issues associated with such matters.

Bills related to Orphan:

The Orphan Youngster (Arrangement of Federal Retirement Aide) Bill 2016

To accommodate Social Security and government assistance measures to vagrant youngsters and for issues associated therewithin.

Adolescent Equity (Care and Protection of Children) Bill, 2015

The bill presents a charge in India. Families will sign up for tutelage and deserted, stranded kids, or those struggling with regulation are shipped off. Such families will be observed and will get help from the state.

GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE PLANS FOR ORPHAN KIDS

Adolescent equity (care and security of youngsters) Act, 2015 states that vagrant kids in the nation are youngsters needing care and insurance, and the principal obligation or we will say essential obligation of the execution of the demonstration lies with the association domain/states. For supporting the children in various conditions, the service of women and youngster improvement is executing halfway supported kid security plans and prime liabilities lie with the system/UT organization.

Monetary help is given to them by the focal government for undertaking a situational examination of young people in troublesome conditions. Under the plan youngsters struggling with regulation and children needing care and assurance are given in kid care foundations. This plan likewise applies for non-institutional consideration and here help is reached out for guardianship, sponsorship, and reception.

EXISTING LEGITIMATE PRIVILEGES OF VAGRANTS

Right to life – Article 21 of the Indian constitution ensures the assurance of the life and freedom of every individual. This would safeguard vagrants as they are very helpless. Article 21 maintains their entitlement to live and practice freedom very much like every other person.

Right to wellbeing- The understanding of Article 21 is comprehensive of the right to well-being. Each vagrant kid has the option of great physical and emotional well-being.

Right to citizenship- Part II of the Indian Constitution explains the right to citizenship. Each vagrant has the option to have a name that is lawfully recorded and citizenship to any country. This guarantees that any state would safeguard its government assistance.

Assurance from double-dealing- Articles 23 and 24 of the Indian Constitution safeguards the vagrants from dealing, constrained work and, work in perilous spots if they are beneath the age of fourteen.

Right to instruction- Article 21-A commits all kids between the age of six and to fourteen that they will get free instruction. This puts the obligation on the state to guarantee that vagrants get essential instruction very much like different youngsters.

Adoption is a huge piece of an orphan’s life. Notwithstanding, adoption falls in the topic of Personal Laws. Since there is no uniform common code in India for Personal Laws, there is a noticeable absence of consistency in applying such regulations. More often than not, religion represents a boundary for the guardians to take on a youngster. Regardless of whether reception happens, the guardians are not lawfully permitted to call themselves the embraced kid’s folks. Over and over, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has shown full help for presenting a Uniform Civil Code in the current Personal Laws. In Mohammad Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, Justice Y.V. Chandrachud said “A uniform common code will help with public unification by diminishing unique lawful loyalties in view of restricting philosophies”. In this manner, presenting a Uniform Civil Code will prompt the use of similar regulations for every one of the residents in India, which will additionally guarantee that there is no single childless parent in the country.

CONCLUSION

Stranded youngsters are perhaps the weakest gathering in India. Like each and every other youngster, they also have privileges and interests which need assurance. As they are bound to be taken advantage of and mishandled, they require additional consideration and care. Giving them just food, sanctuary, attire and education isn’t sufficient. They are likewise expected to be cherished and focused on as they are resources of our country. It is fundamental to furnish them with a sound climate so they can develop and foster like different youngsters.

However, vagrants in India can be safeguarded by their far-off family members or child care, institutional consideration given by halfway houses is the most favored mode as India is a creating and low-pay country. Clearly, in spite of having administrative bodies and rules for guidelines, these foundations are not consistently reviewed. The physical and emotional well-being of stranded kids frequently continues without some kind of restraint. Numerous establishments experience the ill effects of a lack of talented and prepared staff. The unfortunate foundation at shelters makes it much more significant for us to advance child care and work with a simpler reception process.

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REFERENCES

1. Legal Rights of Orphan Children in India, CRCC-NLU, https://www.crccnlu.org/post/legal-rights-of-orphan-children-in-india-ranjul-malik ( Last accessed on 15 July,2022).
2. COVID-19 devastated many lives heart-wrenching to see the survival of children at stake: SC, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/covid-19-devastated-many-lives-heart-wrenching-to-see-survival-of-children-at-stake-supreme-court/articleshow/85759859.cms?from=mdr ( Last accessed on 15 July,2022).
3. Constitution of India.
4. Mohini Jain v. Province of Karnataka, 1992 AIR 1858, 1992 SCR (3) 658.
5. Orphanages and Other Charitable Homes (Supervision and Control ) Act 1960.
6. Mohammad Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, 1985 AIR 945, 1985 SCR (3) 844.

This article is written by Arpita Kaushal, a student of UILS, PUSSGRC , HOSHIARPUR.