In the case of STATE OF GUJARAT VS DR. P. A BHATT, the question of whether Allopathy doctors and doctors of indigenous medicine can be said to be performing “equal work” so as to be entitled to “equal pay” is answered.
FACTS
A High-Power Committee was established on May 3, 1990, with Shri R.K. Tikku as its chairman, to enhance the working conditions and career prospects for doctors employed by the government. This was done by a Memorandum of Settlement signed by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare on August 21, 1989, and the Joint Action Council of Service Doctors Organisation. This committee held 30 meetings between June 1990 and October 1990, and on October 31, 1990, it issued a report with its recommendations. The recommendations in this Report were only applicable to service physicians with MBBS degrees, post-graduate medical degrees, degrees in super-specialities, and individuals working on both the teaching and nonteaching sides of medicine.
The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare established a second High-Power Committee on November 19, 1990, with the same person serving as its chairman—Shri R.K. Tikku—toconsider career advancement and cadre restructuring for practitioners of Indian Systems of Medicine and Homoeopathy. On February 26, 1991, this Committee issued a second Report that was limited to individuals who practised alternative systems of medicine and had degrees in Ayurveda, Unani, Siddha, or homoeopathy.
The Local Fund Audit, Ahmedabad requested clarifications via letters dated 04.03.1998 and 21.04.1998, as to whether the same benefits are available to non-MBBS medical officers holding qualifications such as G.A.F.M/LMP, following the implementation of the recommendations of the Tikku Committee dated 31.10.1990 in respect of allopathic doctors in the State of Gujarat by the Government Resolution dated 17.10.1994.
In response, the Gujarati government’s Health and Family Welfare Department published a government resolution stating that non-MBBS medical officers are also qualified for the benefit. In addition, this letter indicated that, by a government resolution dated 01.07.1997, the Tikku Committee’s recommendations were extended to physicians who were covered by the Employees State Insurance Scheme.
The respondents in this case, who were initially hired on an as-needed basis under the “Community Health Volunteer Medical Officers Scheme” put forth by the Government of India and who were subsequently absorbed by the State of Gujarat in May 1999, filed four writ petitions on the file of the High Court of Gujarat seeking an extension of the benefit of higher pay scales based on the recommendations of the Tikku Pay Commission. The Medical Officers (Ayurved) Association, made up of individuals initially appointed as Medical Officers Class-III, filed a separate writ petition. This Association requested a similar remedy to that outlined in the group of four writ petitions.
The High Court’s Division Bench dismissed all intra-court appeals, ruling that (i) non-MBBS doctors and MBBS doctors both belong to the same cadre and that, as a result, there may be no discrimination based on educational background; and (ii) non-MBBS doctors were performing the same duties and functions as MBBS doctors and even manning primary health centres independently, making them equally qualified for employment.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION
On behalf of the State, it is argued that the recommendations of the Tikku Pay Commission for raising pay scales were per se applicable only to MBBS doctors; that the revision of pay scales in favour of allopathic physicians was justified by the ongoing shortage of allopathic physicians; and that the State Government had to fulfil its constitutional duty to provide adequate healthcare infrastructure.
The assailed order is incorrect in law and law and on facts because the High Court shamefully failed to recognize the fundamentally distinct nature of duties and responsibilities undertaken by Allopathy doctors and AYUSH doctors.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION
The learned attorney for the respondents responds by arguing that both Allopathy and AYUSH doctors are appointed to the position of Medical Officer falling under Class-II of Gujarat Medical Services; that once individuals with various qualifications are appointed to one unified cadre with a common pay scale and governed by one set of rules, then at a later stage, the Government cannot make a classification; and that all Medical Officers, regardless of their educational backgrounds, are subject to the same rules.
The appeals are likely to be dismissed because the findings of fact made by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court that both types of doctors are conducting equivalent work do not call for any interference under Article 136 of the Constitution.
JUDGEMENT
In our judgment, two issues come up for discussion in these appeals. They are: (i) Is it possible to set different pay scales for officers appointed to the same cadre based on their educational backgrounds? (ii) Can allopathic physicians and practitioners of indigenous medicine be deemed to have “equal work” to warrant “equal pay”?
This Court determined that the classification of Tracers into two pay scales—one for matriculates with a higher pay scale and the other for nonmatriculated with a lower pay scale—does not violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
Doctors who practice allopathy must handle emergencies and treat trauma patients. The emergency duties and trauma care that Allopathy doctors are capable of executing, as well as the advancements in science and current medical technology, cannot be performed by Ayurvedic doctors due to the nature of their practice and the advancements in science and modern medical technology.
Ayurved doctors are also unable to assist surgeons in undertaking difficult surgeries, but MBBS doctors can. We do not intend for this to imply that one medical system is better than another. It is well known that MBBS doctors are required to care for hundreds of patients during outpatient days (OPD) in ordinary hospitals in cities and towns, however, this is not the case with Ayurvedic doctors.
We are unable to distinguish between Ayurvedic physicians who have already obtained some benefits thanks to the temporary injunction issued by this Court and those who have not.Additionally, we cannot ignore the fundamental rule that states a person cannot be permitted to keep a benefit obtained through an interim order issued by a court if the case’s final result was averse to that person.
As a result, all appeals are granted, the High Court’s contested order is revoked, and the respondents’ writ petitions are denied. All interlocutory applications, including the impleadment application(s), and the contempt petitions are likewise rejected. No fees
In the present case supreme court discusses the conviction when the trails court records are absent and can not be obtained. White discussing the present case by the division bench of Justice Krishna Murari and Justice Sanjay Karol observed that the job of the Court of Appeal is not to depend on the lower Court’s judgment to uphold the conviction but, based on the record available before it duly called from the Trial Court and the arguments advanced before it, to come to a conclusion thereon…Had there been properly preserved records of the Trial Court, the issue in the present appeal as to whether the High Court could uphold a conviction having not perused the complete Trial Court record, would not have arisen they also talk about the digitalisation of the court for smoothening the judicial process.
Facts of the case:
The prosecution has been successful in proving that accused J.K Rode being working at the post of a Public Servant as Assistant Commercial Manager, Northern Railway, Lucknow made a 2 demand of Rupees Five Hundred from Chief Ticket Inspector Shri Jai Prakash Narayan Upadhyay on 03.05.95 to dispose of the charge sheet issued against him. He was caught red-handed receiving the bribe on 03.05.95. He received Rs. 500 (Rupees five hundred) from said J.P.N Upadhya being posted as a public servant misusing his post as a public servant for his gain in a corrupt and illegal manner. Thus, the offence under sections 7, 13(1) and 13(2) of the PC Act 1988 is proved against the accused and he is liable to be punished for these charges. Accused is on bail and his bail bonds are discharged. The accused should be taken into custody then the accused person moves to the High Court where the High Court upheld the conviction of the accused person.
Legal issue:
1)Whether in the absence of the records of the Court of Trial, the appellate Court could have upheld the conviction and enhanced the quantum of the fine.
2)Whether, given the language employed under Section 385 of CrPC, the present situation constitutes a violation of the accused’s fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Indian constitution
Related laws:
1)Sec 7 of the Prevention of corruption act: Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act.—Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Central Government or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State or with any local authority, corporation or Government company referred to in clause (c) of section 2, or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less than six months but which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine.
2) Sec 13(1),Sec13(2) of the prevention of the corruption act
3)SEC.385. of Criminal Procedure code Procedure for hearing appeals not dismissed summarily.—(1) If the Appellate Court does not dismiss the appeal summarily, it shall cause notice of the time and place at which such appeal will be heard to be given—
(i) to the Appellant or his pleader;
(ii) to such officer as the State Government may appoint on this behalf;
(iii) if the appeal is from a judgment of conviction in a case instituted upon complaint to the complainant;
Appellant’s contention:
On the surface of the record, it is clear that the relevant portions of the record, in particular, could never have been recreated by the relevant District Court. Despite this, the Court sustained the conviction on the basis of the partially reconstructed record, which only contained a few documents, such as the FIR. The knowledgeable attorney for the appellant claims that the law is clear on the matter and that without these records, it is impossible to say that a conviction was obtained on solid evidence and is therefore subject to being overturned.
Respondent’s contention :
Not every conviction alters a person’s personality forever. A conviction may occasionally have little to no effect on a person’s behaviour and character. Furthermore, even though key evidence was lacking, it would be reasonable to uphold the conviction in particular circumstances. Although 500 rupees may not seem like much, if the evidence leads to a conviction, the accused should still be held accountable for their acts. The absence of an appeal does not necessarily imply that the defendant is innocent or deserves a second chance. Instead, in order to reach a fair and just judgment, the relevant data should be thoroughly analyzed and taken into account
Judgment:
The Court of Appeal’s responsibility is to reach a decision on the matter “based on the record available to duly called from the Trial Court and the arguments advanced before it,” rather than relying on the lower court’s decision to affirm the conviction. The Court further held that in the absence of a fair legal process, the protection of Article 21 rights includes the freedom from any restrictions thereon. This includes the right of the person filing an appeal to contest the findings of fact made by the trial court, which can only be done when the record is available to the Court of Appeal. We hold that noncompliance with the mandate of the section, in certain cases contingent upon specific facts and circumstances of the case, would result in a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which we find to be the case in the instant case. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, it is not within prudence to lay down a straightjacket formula.
As a result, the Court overturned the appellant’s conviction.
Court also directed the High Court to the digitization of the lower courts so these kinds of situations could not arise in the future.
An individual or organization has a legal entitlement known as the “right to sue” that enables them to initiate a lawsuit against another individual or organization in a court of law. This right is considered fundamental since it allows them to pursue legal action and seek remedy or recourse for any perceived harm or wrongdoing caused by the other party. Typically, the right to sue is granted to individuals or organizations who are capable of demonstrating that they have suffered legal harm or damages resulting from the actions or omissions of another party. Such circumstances may include but are not limited to a breach of contract, personal injury, property damage, or infringement of intellectual property rights, among others. It is essential to note that the right to sue is subject to legal constraints or limitations, and may not be an absolute right. Furthermore, the process of initiating legal proceedings can be intricate, requiring the guidance of legal experts to navigate it effectively.
It is crucial to acknowledge that the right to sue is not an unrestricted right, as there may be legal limitations or restrictions on the individuals or entities who can initiate legal proceedings and the situations in which they can do so. Moreover, the process of commencing a lawsuit can be intricate and costly and may necessitate the guidance of legal experts to navigate it competently.
Right to Appeal
The legal entitlement of a party to challenge a lower court or tribunal’s decision in a higher or appellate court is known as the right to appeal. This right permits parties to contest the factual or legal conclusions reached by a lower court or tribunal and seek a different outcome.
Under Article 21 of the Constitution of India[1], which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty, the right to appeal is recognized in India. It is a fundamental component of the Indian legal system and is intended to ensure equitable and impartial administration of justice.
The procedure for filing an appeal in India is dependent on the type of case and the court or tribunal involved. Generally, a written petition outlining the grounds for the appeal must be submitted within a specified timeframe after the lower court’s decision. The higher court then assesses the evidence and legal arguments presented by both parties before reaching a decision. The right to appeal is accessible at various levels of the Indian judiciary system, from district courts to the Supreme Court of India. Both civil and criminal cases can be appealed, and the appellate court may either uphold, modify, or reverse the lower court’s decision.
Scope of Right to Appeal in Statutory Law
The right to appeal is not an inherent right and is only granted through specific statutes. It is considered a substantive right, rather than merely procedural. This right is conferred upon the litigant from the beginning of the case, although it is exercised only when an unfavourable judgment is pronounced. Consequently, the law that applies to the right to appeal is the one that was in force at the time the lawsuit was filed, not the law that applies at the time of decision or when the appeal is filed. These vested rights can only be taken away by a subsequent statute if it explicitly provides for it.
It is important to note that as this right is created by statute, the statute can impose conditions for its exercise. The forum of appeal may also be altered by the statute, and the litigant does not have the right to choose the forum for appeal. As Justice Khanna once stated, the right of appeal is a product of statute, and there is no reason why the legislature cannot impose conditions for exercising this right as long as those conditions are not excessively restrictive to the point of rendering the right almost meaningless.
Historical Overview
The Indian legal system has evolved to recognize two fundamental rights, namely the right to sue and the right to appeal. These rights have been shaped by diverse legal traditions and cultures, and their historical development in India is a topic of great significance.
The right to access justice, commonly referred to as the right to sue, has been an integral facet of the Indian legal system since ancient times. In ancient India, justice was founded upon the principle of dharma, which denotes righteousness, and it was the responsibility of the king to ensure that justice was dispensed impartially. During this period, individuals were granted the right to approach the king or local courts to seek redressal.
Subsequently, during British rule in India, a formal legal system was introduced, and the English legal system became prevalent. This system placed great emphasis on the right to sue and the right to a fair trial. Consequently, the Indian Civil Procedure Code (CPC) was enacted in 1908, which laid down the procedural framework for filing a civil suit in India. The code ensured that every individual was entitled to the right to sue, and could approach a court of law to seek justice.
The notion of the right to appeal gradually developed during the period of British governance in India. Under their rule, the appellate system was introduced, permitting litigants to challenge a lower court’s decision by appealing to a higher court. In 1898, the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) was passed, recognizing the right to appeal in criminal cases. This legislation allowed accused individuals to appeal their conviction or sentencing from a lower court to a higher court.
Following India’s independence in 1947, significant changes were made to the country’s legal system. In 1950, the Constitution of India was enacted, enshrining the right to access justice as a fundamental right. Furthermore, the Constitution established the Supreme Court as the highest court in the nation, providing the right to appeal to it. Additionally, the Constitution conferred the authority on high courts to hear appeals from subordinate courts.
Throughout the years, the Indian legal system has been subject to diverse influences from various legal traditions and cultures. The ancient Hindu legal system, which was predominant in India, prioritized the fundamental right to access justice and provided for the amicable resolution of conflicts through mediation and arbitration. Meanwhile, the Islamic legal system, which emerged during the Mughal era, accentuated the significance of a just and fair trial process and guaranteed the right to appeal. These legal traditions have left a profound impact on the Indian legal system and continue to shape its development to this day.
Legal Frameworks
Right to Suit
In India, individuals have the right to initiate legal action against another person or entity in a court of law, which is commonly known as the right to sue. This right is enshrined in the Indian Constitution, which ensures that every citizen has access to justice as per Article 39A[2]. The Indian legal system provides for various types of civil suits, including breach of contract, recovery of money, specific performance, and injunctions, among others. The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908[3] governs the process of initiating a civil suit.
Initiating a Suit: Parties, Framing, and Institution
The process of initiating a civil case involves two parties, the plaintiff and the defendant, as per Order 1 which deals with Parties to suit. The plaintiff is responsible for bringing the case against the defendant, who is the other party that must provide a defence against the allegations made by the plaintiff in civil court.
Once the parties to the suit are recognized, the next step is to frame the suit as provided under Order 2. This involves the plaintiff approaching the civil court with their suit, which is referred to as the Frame of Suit. Framing of suit indicates that a legal action has been brought by one party against another. According to Rule 2 of Order 2, the plaintiff must include their entire claim in the suit, which serves as the cause of action against the defendant. The framed suit needs to be instituted before the civil court, but the question of who the institution is answered by Order 3 of the Code.
Agents and Pleaders
Order 3 of the Code of 1908 deals with recognized agents and leaders, who are essential for the plaintiff to institute a suit framed before the civil court. The plaintiff requires the help of a legal professional or pleader who has expertise in the field of law to take the framed suit before the court on their behalf. Rule 2 and Rule 4 of Order 3 respectively provide guidelines for recognizing agents and pleaders. Once a recognized agent or pleader is hired, it becomes their responsibility to institute the suit before the civil court on behalf of the plaintiff. This brings us to Order 4 of the Code, which discusses the proper institution of suits. To institute a suit, the plaintiff needs to present a plaint before the court, the meaning of which is explained under Order 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
It is crucial to note that compliance with sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 1 of Order 4 is mandatory for the proper institution of the suit. Sub-rule (1) requires the presentation of a plaint to institute a suit before the court of law. Sub-rule (2) provides that no plaint as provided in the previous rule can escape the rules provided under Orders 6 and 7 of the Code.
Right to appeal
As per Section 96 of the CPC, an aggrieved party to any decree passed by a court while exercising its original jurisdiction has the right to appeal to a higher authority designated for this purpose, except in cases where any statute makes an exception. This grants the aggrieved party at least one right of appeal.
However, Sections 97, 98, and 102 of the CPC specify certain conditions under which no further appeal is allowed, therefore limiting the right of appeal to a single opportunity.
It is important to note that no person has the right to appeal against a decision unless they are a party to the suit, unless they have been granted special leave of the court. The question of whether a person is adversely affected by the decision or suit is a factual matter that needs to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
The case of Garikapati Veeraya v. Subbiah Chaudhary[4] established that the right to appeal to the Federal Court that existed prior to the establishment of the Supreme Court still remained valid. The court recognized the shift in the judicial system from the Federal Court to the Supreme Court but emphasized the preservation of the right to appeal that was created under the old law. It should be noted, however, that the continuation of this right is subject to the provisions of the Constitution.
Appeals and Conversions under CPC
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides for various types of appeals and their maintainability. Under Section 96 of the CPC[5], a regular first appeal may or may not be maintainable against certain adjudications, as indicated by a combined reading of Sections 2(2), 2(9), and 96 of the CPC. A first appeal lies from a decree passed by any court exercising original jurisdiction to the authorized appellate courts, except where expressly prohibited.
Furthermore, Section 100 of the CPC[6] provides for a second appeal under this code. A decree passed in the first appeal by a subordinate court can be appealed to the High Court unless there are provisions indicating otherwise. However, the scope of exercise of jurisdiction under this section is limited to a substantial question of law framed at the time of admission of appeal or otherwise.
Regarding the conversion of an appeal into a revision, the court’s inherent powers allow it to pass orders that may be required to meet the ends of justice, as held in the case of Bahori v. Vidya Ram[7]. In the absence of a specific provision in the CPC for converting an appeal to a revision or vice versa, Section 151[8] governs the court’s exercise of power. The conversion is allowed, as long as the proper procedure was followed during the filing of the original appeal or revision. However, the only precondition to such conversion is that due procedure is adhered to during the filing of the original appeal/revision.
Who has the right to appeal under Section 96 of the CPC?
Section 96 of the CPC provides that a regular first appeal can be preferred by any party to the suit who has been adversely affected by the decree. This includes the legal representatives of the deceased party under Section 146. Additionally, a transferee of the interest of such a party, whose name is entered on the record of the suit, may also appeal. In the event of an order in execution setting aside the sale on the basis of fraud, the purchaser at auction has the right to file an appeal.
However, no person other than a party to the suit is entitled to appeal under Section 96 unless special leave is granted by the appellate Court. This means that a person who is not a party to the suit can only prefer an appeal from a decree or order if they are bound, aggrieved or prejudicially affected by it and if special leave of the appellate Court is granted.
Who is barred from appealing?
A party who has waived their right to appeal a judgment is precluded from filing an appeal at a later stage. The principles of estoppel may also apply where a party has accepted the provisions of a judgment and has acknowledged it as final and binding. The doctrine of estoppel prevents such a party from appealing the same judgment in a higher forum. Scrutton L.J. has expressed the view that a party cannot simultaneously accept the benefits of a judgment and then appeal against it as being unfavourable.
Role and Standards of Review in Indian Appellate Courts
Appellate courts in the Indian legal system are higher courts that review and revise the decisions of lower courts, including district courts and tribunals. These courts include the High Courts, the highest courts in each state or union territory, and the Supreme Court of India, the highest court in the country.
Appellate courts use two standards of review when examining lower court decisions: one for questions of fact and one for questions of law. The standard of review on questions of fact is deferential to the lower court’s decision and will only be overturned if the findings of fact are clearly erroneous or not supported by evidence. The standard of review on questions of law, on the other hand, is less deferential and will closely examine the legal reasoning and interpretation used by the lower court, often applying its own interpretation of the law.
In criminal cases, the standard of review is higher due to the higher stakes and severe consequences of an erroneous decision. The decisions of appellate courts have significant implications for the parties involved and for the development of the law in India. Overall, the role of appellate courts in the Indian legal system is to ensure the fair administration of justice by reviewing and correcting lower court decisions.
Conclusion
To conclude, the right to sue and appeal in India represent fundamental pillars of the legal system, enabling access to justice for all citizens. These rights are duly recognized by the Indian Constitution, and the procedures for initiating legal action are regulated by the relevant statutes and rules. The Supreme Court of India has provided crucial interpretations of these rights, ensuring that they align with the principles of natural justice and the fundamental right to access justice. By having these rights in place, individuals in India can seek legal remedies in cases of disputes or breaches of the law, contributing to the promotion of a just and equitable society.
Endnotes:
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution
Article 39A of the Indian Constitution
Code of Criminal Procedure (India), Act No. 2, 1974
Garikapati Veeraya v. Subbiah Chaudhary, (1979) 1 SCC 16.
Civil Procedure Code § 96 (India).
Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 5, 1908, §100, India Code (2019)
Bahori v. Vidya Ram, (1978) 1 SCC 1.
Civil Procedure Code, § 151 (India).
Civil Procedure Code, § 146 (India).
This article was authored by Sohini Chakraborty, a first-year law student at RGNUL Patiala.
In the recent judgement of YOGESH NAVINCHANDRA RAVANI v. NANJIBHAI SAGRAMBHAI CHAUDHARY & ORS, an appeal is filed by the appellant challenging the final judgement of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad whereby the High Court passed strictures against the appellant and restored the second appeal to its original number and status.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND:
One Jesangbhai Kachrabhai Parmar (hereinafter referred to as “original plaintiff”) had filed a suit before the Additional Senior Civil Judge, Mehsana challenging the sale deed dated 14 September 2000 which was executed by Nanjibhai Sagrambhai Chaudhary in favour of Sureshbhai Hirabhai Chaudhary with respect of suit property. The said suit was dismissed by the Additional Civil Judge and this order was passed on 12 June 2008. But it is to be noted that the original plaintiff had died on 31 December 2006 i.e. during the pendency of the suit. Therefore, a further suit is presented by his legal representatives (“LRs” for short).
The first appeal was filed by the LRs of the original plaintiff including the appellant- Lalitbhai Jesangbhai Parmar who is the son of the original plaintiff. This appeal was filed before the Additional District Judge. It was dismissed vide judgment and order dated 23 July 2015.
Thereafter, a second appeal was filed in the High Court by the LRs of the original plaintiff including the appellant. In this appeal, it was displayed that all the LRs of the original plaintiff are appellants. It is to be noted that this appeal was preferred by Vitthalbhai Maganbhai Parmar who was the Power of Attorney holder of the original plaintiff. It was executed in his favour before the death of the original plaintiff. Another Power of Attorney was also executed in his favour by the appellant i.e. Lalitbhai Jesangbhai Parmar. The appellant was Power of Attorney holder only for him and not for other LRs of the original plaintiff on whose behalf the appeal was preferred. Furthermore, the Vakalatnama was not signed by other LRs of the original plaintiff.
The High Court after recognising the said discrepancy raised office objections as to whether the Vakalatnama had been signed by all the appellants or not. In spite of repeated opportunities, these objections were not removed. Therefore, the second appeal was dismissed by High Court on 27 November 2015. Thereafter the application was filed for restoration of the second appeal wherein it was stated that the Power of Attorney holder i.e. Vitthalbhai Maganbhai Parmar had informed the registry of the High Court about his inability to obtain an authority letter from all the LRs of the original plaintiff. Thereby, their transposition as defendants were requested. The HC allowed the said application and restored the second appeal.
The appellant on coming to know about the filing of the second appeal by his Power of Attorney holder cancelled the Power of Attorney through public notice because this appeal was filed without his knowledge or instruction. Furthermore, he engaged Yogesh Navinchandra Ravani, an advocate, to file a pursis for withdrawal of the second appeal. The High Court considered the said pursis and permitted the withdrawal of the second appeal.
However, even after the cancellation of Power of Attorney, Vitthalbhai Maganbhai Parmar filed a Misc. Civil Application in HC for review of its order and consequent restoration of the second appeal. He also seeks condonation of delay. The HC allowed this application and restored the second appeal to its original number and status. In addition to it, costs were imposed upon the appellant- Lalitbhai Jesangbhai Parmar and strictures were passed against the appellant- Yogesh Navinchandra Ravani for his conduct as an advocate while seeking withdrawal of the second appeal.
Hence the present appeal was filed in the Supreme Court challenging the final judgement or order of the High Court.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:
➢ The learned counsel for the appellant submits that application filed by Vitthalbhai Maganbhai Parmar was not maintainable because the Power of Attorney executed in favour of him stood cancelled via Public Notice.
➢ The learned counsel further submits that the application for review which was filed using earlier Power of Attorney could not have been filed as on the death of the original plaintiff he had no authority to continue with the proceedings.
➢ It was further stated that once the appellant had filed an application for transposing of the other LRs as defendants and once the HC had allowed the said application, he became the dominus litis.
➢ It is submitted that the strictures passed by HC against the appellant- Yogesh Navinchandra Ravani who was only a lawyer appearing on the behalf of appellant, were totally unwarranted and uncalled for.
➢ Therefore, it was urged that the second appeal should not be restored and the strictures passed against the appellant- Yogesh Navinchandra Ravani should be cancelled by this court.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:
➢ The respondent no. 5 to 7 has filed their reply stating that they had not executed any Power of Attorney in favour of said Vitthalbhai Maganbhai Parmar.
➢ Therefore, this reply was used by the appellants and through this they submitted that they also did not intend to challenge the order passed by the Additional District Judge.
JUDGEMENT:
The Supreme Court after considering the facts and contentions of both the parties held that the application filed by said Vitthalbhai Maganbhai Parmar was not tenable as the Power of Attorney executed in his favour by the appellant- Lalitbhai Jesangbhai Parmar stood cancelled by issuing public notice. The position of the appellant- Lalitbhai Jesangbhai Parmar being a dominus litis, has a right to withdraw the second appeal. After the withdrawal of the such appeal, an application for restoration of said appeal filed by the Power of Attorney holder whose Power of Attorney stood cancelled was not at all tenable.
The Apex Court further stated that the observations made by High Court against appellant- Yogesh were totally unwarranted and uncalled for. Thereby it was held that the decision and order passed by High Court is not sustainable in law. The same is quashed and set aside.
In this case, according to the Supreme Court, the State Government cannot argue that Rules of Business were not followed throughout its decision-making process when the Cabinet establishes a committee and the latter’s acts are approved by the Minister and the rest of the Council. The Rajasthan Industrial Development and Investment Corporation Ltd. v. M/s Arfat Petrochemicals Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. case was decided by a bench consisting of Justice Surya Kant and Justice Vikram Nath, and they upheld the subcommittee’s decisions by ruling that the rules of business were followed because the subcommittee was only carrying out its duties on behalf of the entire Council of Ministers.
FACTS:
To J.K. Synthetics Ltd. (“JKSL”) in the Large-Scale Industrial Area of Kota (“LIA, Kota”), the State of Rajasthan granted a leasehold allocation of land (“Land”). The allocation was decided in accordance with the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act of 1956 and the State Government’s industrial policy. The Rajasthan State Industrial and Mineral Development Corporation Ltd. (“RSIMDC”) were established to carry out development projects throughout the State while the lease was still in effect. Following its division into two parts, Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation Ltd. (“RIICO”) took over as the immediate successor to RSIMDC. The RIICO Disposal of Land Rules, 1979 (“1979 Rules”) were established to manage RIICO’s operations with regard to areas under its ownership. In 1998, JKSL was deemed to be a sick firm, and on the directives of the Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (“AAIFR”), M/s. Arfat Petrochemicals Pvt. Ltd. (“Respondent No.1”) took over JKSL’s operations. A change was made to the lease of land originally granted to JKSL in favour of Respondent No. 1. After a while, Respondent No. 1 was unable to resuscitate JKSL’s industrial divisions. Respondent No. 1 then presented a plan to RIICO for changing the leased land’s use from industrial to commercial and for subdividing the land. In 2018, RIICO authorized the subdivision and conversion of land; nevertheless, the Model Code of Conduct went into effect the very following day in anticipation of the forthcoming Rajasthan State Assembly Elections. Following the 2018 elections in Rajasthan, which resulted in a new administration, the conversion of leased land came under examination. On January 1, 2019, the newly elected Council of Ministers established a Cabinet Committee to examine actions performed by the former ruling administration during the six-month period prior to the elections. The approvals granted to Respondent No. 1 were revoked by order of the State Government to RIICO. Which were newly won the state assembly election so respondent no.1 file the case in the High Court under article 226 of the constitution. The Cabinet Committee’s decision and RIICO’s actions to revoke the allocation to Respondent No. 1 were both overturned by the High Court. Following that, RIICO and the State Government chose to appeal to the Supreme Court.
LAW RELATED TO THE CASE:
Article 138. Enlargement of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
(1) The Supreme Court shall have such further jurisdiction and powers with respect to any of the matters in the Union List as Parliament may by law confer
(2) The Supreme Court shall have such further jurisdiction, and powers with respect to any matter as the Government of India and the Government of any State may by special agreement confer if Parliament by law provides for the exercise of such jurisdiction and powers by the Supreme Court
Article 226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs
(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders, or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibitions, quo warranto, and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose
LEGAL ISSUE
1) Whether the action taken by the Riico without the cabinet interference is valid or not
2) Whether the Riico has the power to allot the land to the petitioner or not
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
The first Respondent contested the appeal on the grounds that the government judgment is illegal if it does not follow the Rules of Business established under Article 166(3) of the Indian Constitution. The Industries Department is responsible for handling RIICO-related issues, and the Minister for Industries would serve as the nodal authority for making final decisions in this regard. The decision to revoke the lease and subdivide the land is invalid because the Minister for Industries was not involved in the Cabinet Committee or when the final decision was made. Riico is not allowed to allot the land to anyone, so the land allotted to the petitioner is invalid
APPELLANT’S CONTENTION:
The lease deed was renewed by the District Collector and not by the RIICO since the State Government, which is a party to the petitioner’s proceedings, was involved. According to the notification dated 18.09.1979, the State Government transferred the industrial areas developed and maintained by the Department of Industries to RIICO. As a result, the largest industrial area in Kota, where the subject land is located, was also transferred to RIICO by the State Government via a notification dated 28.09.1979. Therefore, as it is also authorized for the lands that have already been allocated, the RIICO is qualified to provide permissions or approvals under Rule 12 of the Rules of 1959. In order to build affordable housing under the CMJAY program, the petitioner company requested permission from the District Collector. Under this particular program, the District Collector had the right to provide permission regardless of whether the land was owned by the State Government or the RIICO. The fact that the District Collector personally sought the RIICO’s advice in this matter is clear evidence that the RIICO controlled the aforementioned land.
JUDGMENT:
One cannot claim that the State Government violated the Rules of Business when the Cabinet Sub-Committee is only acting on behalf of the entire Council of Ministers. The Bench noted that the Committees had been established by the Council of Ministers to investigate various anomalies. The investigation of the actions taken by RIICO and its alleged abuse of inexistent powers in favour of Respondent No. 1 was also given to a specific committee. It was stated that governance needed to be done in a practical and effective way. The Rules of Business also advocates for collective governance by the Council of Ministers in terms of recommendations made to the Governor. As a result, the Bench determined that the Council had a collective say in the decision to form subcommittees to review decisions made by the previous administration, including those involving activities by RIICO. The Bench determined that the subcommittee was acting on behalf of the full Council of Ministers when it advised Respondent No. 1 to revoke the licenses and approvals. As a result, the Rajasthan Rules of Business were not broken. The decision of the High Court has been overturned
To be known as the World’s Largest and Fastest Growing Democracy isn’t as easy as it seems to be on paper. The daily reports and the Analysis would present the Nation to be at the zenith of its Democratic Practices, but deep down, are some rooted issues which are highlighted quite scarcely
The halls of Parliament are often filled with heated debates, passionate arguments, and fiery rhetoric. However, amidst all the chaos, there is one thing that is essential for maintaining order and decorum – the power to suspend or dismiss a member.
The functioning of a parliament or legislative assembly is essential for any democracy. It is the place where representatives of people sit together to discuss and make laws for the welfare of the country. But what happens when the power to suspend or dismiss a member is abused? What happens when the disciplinary mechanism is used as a tool to suppress dissent or opposition? These questions have become increasingly relevant in recent times, as lawmakers around the world grapple with issues of free speech, political correctness, and political correctness gone wrong.
In such cases, the speaker or the presiding officer of the house has the power to take action against the errant members by suspending or dismissing them from the house. This article aims to discuss the difference between suspension and dismissal and their relevance in parliamentary proceedings.
The power to suspend or dismiss a member is derived from the rules and procedures of the house, as well as the Constitution in some cases. The presiding officer of the house, such as the Speaker in the UK or the Lok Sabha in India, is typically responsible for enforcing disciplinary actions.
Recently, in the Indian parliament, several opposition MPs were suspended for their unruly behaviour during the monsoon session. The speaker suspended them for the remaining period of the session, which led to a controversy over the extent of the speaker’s powers to suspend members. This incident once again highlighted the need to understand the difference between suspension and dismissal.
What is Suspension?
Suspension means to bar a member from attending the house proceedings for a specific period. The presiding officer of the house has the power to suspend a member if they violate the rules of the house or indulges in any disruptive behaviour. The power to suspend a member is derived from Article 105(2) of the Indian Constitution[1], which grants each house of parliament the power to punish its members for contempt or disorderly conduct. The rules and procedures of the house further elaborate on the circumstances under which a member can be suspended.
According to Rule 373 of the Lok Sabha Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business[2], a member can be suspended for any of the following reasons:
Continuous disregard for the authority of the Chair
Wilful obstruction of the business of the house
Use of unparliamentary language or making defamatory remarks
Display placards or shout slogans in the house
Physical attack or assault on another member or a member of the house staff
Similarly, Rule 256 of the Rajya Sabha Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business[3] provides for the suspension of a member for any of the following reasons:
Gross disorderly conduct
Wilful obstruction of the business of the house
Refusal to obey the Chair’s order
Use of unparliamentary language or making defamatory remarks
Display placards or shout slogans in the house
Once a member has been suspended, he or she is barred from attending any meetings of the house or any committee of which he or she may be a member. The member is also not allowed to enter the parliamentary premises during the period of suspension.
The period of suspension can vary depending on the severity of the offence and the discretion of the presiding officer of the house. In some cases, a member may be suspended for a few days or weeks, while in other cases, the suspension may last for the entire duration of the session.
It is important to note that a suspended member continues to be a member of the house, and his or her seat is not declared vacant. However, during the period of suspension, the member is not entitled to receive any salary or allowance from the parliament.
What is Dismissal?
In the Indian Parliament, dismissal refers to the expulsion of a member from the house. It is a severe disciplinary action that is taken when a member has committed a serious offence that is considered to be a breach of the privilege of the house.
The power to dismiss a member is derived from Article 105(3) of the Indian Constitution[4], which grants each house of parliament the power to expel its members for misconduct or breach of privilege. The rules and procedures of the house further elaborate on the circumstances under which a member can be dismissed.
According to Rule 374 of the Lok Sabha Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business[5], a member can be dismissed for any of the following reasons:
Breach of the privileges of the house
Refusal to obey the Chair’s order
Wilful disregard of the authority of the Chair
Use of unparliamentary language or making defamatory remarks
Physical attack or assault on another member or a member of the house staff
Similarly, Rule 256 of the Rajya Sabha Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business[6] provides for the dismissal of a member for any of the following reasons:
Breach of the privileges of the house
Refusal to obey the Chair’s order
Wilful disregard of the authority of the Chair
Use of unparliamentary language or making defamatory remarks
Physical attack or assault on another member or a member of the house staff
Once a member has been dismissed, his or her seat is declared vacant, and a by-election is held to fill the vacancy. The member is also not eligible to contest any by-elections for the remainder of the term of the house. It is important to note that the power to dismiss a member is a discretionary power of the house, and is exercised only in the most extreme cases. The decision to dismiss a member is taken by a vote of the house and requires the support of a majority of the members present and voting.
Dismissal stands to be a severe disciplinary action that is used in the Indian Parliament to maintain discipline and uphold the privilege of the house. The power to dismiss a member is derived from the Constitution and the rules and procedures of the house and is exercised only in the most extreme cases. The decision to dismiss a member requires the support of a majority of the members present and voting, and the seat of the dismissed member is declared vacant.
Decoding the Differences between Suspension and Dismissal in the Indian Parliament
Suspension and dismissal are two different disciplinary actions that can be taken against a member of the Indian Parliament for breach of privilege or misconduct. While both actions involve the removal of a member from the house, there are significant differences between the two.
Meaning and duration: Suspension refers to the temporary removal of a member from the house for a specific period, while dismissal refers to the permanent expulsion of a member from the house.
Severity: Suspension is a less severe disciplinary action than dismissal. Suspension is used to maintain discipline and order in the house and to deter members from engaging in misconduct. Dismissal, on the other hand, is a more severe disciplinary action that is taken only in the most extreme cases of misconduct or breach of privilege.
Process: The process for suspension and dismissal is also different. In the case of suspension, the Speaker or the Chairman of the house can order the member to withdraw from the house for a specific period. The decision to suspend a member can also be taken by the house, based on a motion moved by another member. The decision to dismiss a member, on the other hand, can only be taken by the house, and requires the support of a majority of the members present and voting.
Duration of the process: The process of suspension is usually quicker than that of dismissal. In most cases, the decision to suspend a member is taken on the same day as the incident of misconduct or breach of privilege. The process of dismissal, on the other hand, is more time-consuming and requires a more detailed inquiry into the conduct of the member.
Consequences: The consequences of suspension and dismissal are also different. In the case of suspension, the member is not allowed to attend the house for a specific period but retains his or her membership in the house. In the case of dismissal, the member loses his or her membership in the house, and the seat is declared vacant. The dismissed member is also not eligible to contest any by-elections for the remainder of the term of the house.
Effect on the member’s reputation: Suspension and dismissal also have different implications for the reputation of the member. While suspension may be seen as a minor blemish on the member’s record, dismissal is a severe strain on the member’s reputation and can have serious consequences for his or her political career.
Precedence: Suspension is a more common disciplinary action than dismissal in the Indian Parliament. Dismissal is used only in the most extreme cases of misconduct or breach of privilege, while the suspension is used to maintain discipline and order in the house.
While both suspension and dismissal are disciplinary actions that can be taken against a member of the Indian Parliament, there are significant differences between the two. Suspension is a less severe disciplinary action than dismissal and is used to maintain discipline and order in the house. Dismissal is a more severe disciplinary action that is taken only in the most extreme cases of misconduct or breach of privilege. The process and consequences of suspension and dismissal are also different, and the implications for the reputation of the member are also different.
Their Similarities
Although suspension and dismissal differ in severity and the decision-making process, they share some similarities.
Both are disciplinary actions taken against members who violate the rules and regulations of the house.
Both can be used to maintain the decorum and dignity of the house.
Both affect the rights and privileges of the members concerned.
Legal Statutes Involving Suspension and Dismissal
The power to suspend a member is derived from the rules and procedures of the house. In India, the power to suspend a member of parliament is given to the speaker under Rule 374 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha[7]. Similarly, in the UK, the power to suspend a member of the House of Commons is given to the speaker under Standing Order No. 44[8]. The rules and procedures of the house also provide for the procedure of suspension, including the duration of the suspension and the appeal process.
The power to dismiss a member is derived from the constitution and the rules of the house. In India, Article 102 of the Constitution[9] provides for the grounds for disqualification of a member of parliament.
The Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1959[10], provides for some exemptions from disqualification, but the power to dismiss a member is subject to the Constitution. Similarly, in the UK, the power to dismiss a member of the House of Commons
There have been several legal judgments and case laws related to the power of suspension and dismissal in parliamentary proceedings. In 2019, the Supreme Court of India upheld the power of the speaker to suspend a member under Rule 374 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha. The court also held that the decision of the speaker to suspend a member cannot be questioned in a court of law, as it falls within the scope of the internal proceedings of the house.
Similarly, in the UK, the House of Commons Standards Committee recommended the suspension of a member of parliament for seven days for using derogatory language towards a fellow member in 2020. The recommendation was accepted by the house, and the member was suspended for the said period.
Case Laws Pertaining to the Provisions of Suspension vs Dismissal in Parliament
Certainly! The power to suspend or dismiss a member of parliament is a crucial aspect of parliamentary proceedings, and several famous case laws have helped to define the scope and limitations of this power. Let us take a closer look at some of these case laws.
In this case, Subramanian Swamy, a member of the Rajya Sabha, was suspended for his alleged derogatory remarks against the Prime Minister of India. Swamy challenged his suspension in the Supreme Court, arguing that the power to suspend a member should not be used as a tool to stifle dissenting voices.
The Supreme Court, while upholding Swamy’s suspension, held that the power to suspend a member is an essential component of the disciplinary mechanism of the house. The court also observed that the power to suspend should be exercised judiciously and with caution, and should not be used as a tool to suppress dissent or opposition.
Michael Martin MP (2009)
In the UK, the Speaker of the House of Commons has the power to suspend a member for disorderly conduct. In 2009, Michael Martin, the Speaker at the time, suspended a member of parliament for calling him a “little Hitler.”
The member challenged his suspension, arguing that the Speaker had exceeded his authority. However, the courts upheld the Speaker’s power to suspend a member for disorderly conduct and rejected the member’s challenge
Jeremy Corbyn MP (2020)
In 2020, Jeremy Corbyn, a former leader of the UK Labour Party, was suspended from the party for his response to a report on anti-Semitism within the party. Corbyn had suggested that the issue had been overstated for political reasons. The suspension sparked a controversy, with some members of the party supporting Corbyn and others calling for his expulsion. Eventually, after an internal investigation, Corbyn’s suspension was lifted, and he was readmitted to the party.
This case highlights the importance of the disciplinary mechanisms within political parties and the need to balance the right to free speech with the need to maintain party discipline.
In this case, the Lok Sabha (the lower house of the Indian parliament) suspended Vijay Kumar Malhotra, a member of parliament, for his alleged involvement in a corruption scandal. Malhotra challenged his suspension in the Delhi High Court, arguing that the power to suspend a member was arbitrary and violated his fundamental rights.
The Delhi High Court rejected Malhotra’s challenge, holding that the power to suspend a member was a necessary component of the disciplinary mechanism of the house. The court also observed that the power to suspend was subject to judicial review but only on limited grounds.
These case laws highlight the importance of the power to suspend or dismiss a member in maintaining discipline and decorum within parliamentary proceedings. However, it is equally important to ensure that the power is exercised judiciously and in accordance with the rules and procedures of the house.
Conclusion
In conclusion, suspension and dismissal are two disciplinary actions that are used in parliamentary proceedings to maintain decorum and discipline. Suspension is a temporary punishment, and the power to suspend a member is derived from the rules and procedures of the house. Dismissal is a permanent punishment, and the power to dismiss a member is derived from the Constitution and the rules of the House. Although the two punishments differ in severity and decision-making process, they share some similarities, and both affect the rights and privileges of the members concerned.
In the UK, for example, the power to suspend a member for disorderly conduct has been used to punish members for everything from shouting in the house to using derogatory language. In some cases, the punishment has been seen as excessive or arbitrary, leading to calls for reform of the disciplinary process.
Similarly, in India, the power to suspend a member has been used to punish members for everything from sleeping in the house to making controversial statements. Some have argued that the power to suspend is being used to stifle dissent and opposition, leading to concerns about the erosion of democratic values.
Of course, not all suspensions and dismissals are controversial or unjustified. In many cases, these disciplinary actions are necessary for maintaining order and decorum within parliamentary proceedings. But it is essential to ensure that the power is not being abused and that the rights and privileges of members are not being unduly curtailed.
In conclusion, the power to suspend or dismiss a member of parliament is a crucial aspect of parliamentary proceedings, but it is equally important to ensure that the power is being exercised judiciously and in accordance with the rules and procedures of the house. As lawmakers continue to grapple with issues of free speech, political correctness, and the role of the disciplinary mechanism in maintaining order and decorum, it is essential to strike a balance between discipline and democracy. Recent legal judgments and case laws have upheld the power of the presiding officer of the house to suspend a member and the power of the house as a whole to dismiss a member in appropriate cases. It is essential to maintain the decorum and dignity of the house, and the power to suspend or dismiss a member should be exercised judiciously and in accordance with the rules and procedures of the house.
Endnotes:
Constitution of India art. 105(2) (as amended by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978)
Lok Sabha Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business, Rule 373
Rajya Sabha Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business, Rule 256
Constitution of India art. 105(3) (as amended by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978)
Lok Sabha Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business, Rule 374
Rajya Sabha Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business, Rule 256
Lok Sabha Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business, Rule 374
Standing Orders of the House of Commons, Standing Order No. 44
Constitution of India art. 102
The Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1959, Act No. 10 of 1959 (India)
Subramanian Swamy v. Raju, (2011) 6 SCC 617
Lok Sabha Secretariat v. Re Vijay Kumar Malhotra, [2006] Delhi High Court 269
This article is authored by Rishaan Gupta, a 1st year Student at National Law University, Delhi.
RITU TOMAR VS. STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS, in this case, the petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short “the Cr.P.C.”) for the quashing of the FIR for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 452, 324, 307, 342 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (for short “the IPC”).
FACTS
According to the prevailing tradition and practice, the marriage of the appellant’s sister, Ms. Rekha, the fourth respondent in this case, and the third respondent came to be solemnized on May 15, 2011, leading to its consummation and the birth of a baby girl who has since been given the name Tejal.
APPELLANT’S CONTENTION
According to the said Ms. Rekha, who claimed she had been expelled from the marital home, she filed a petition under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which was registered as V. No. 230 of 2014 and is currently pending on the file of the Principal Family Judge. As a result, an order was made on July 22, 2017, requiring the third respondent to pay a sum of Rs. 5,000 per month. Additionally, on March 15, 2017, she filed a police report (FIR) with the Harsh Vihar Police Station in North East Delhi for Crime No. 73 of 2017 against the third respondent and others for offences punishable by Sections 498A, 406/34 of the IPC read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The jurisdictional police claimed to have started the inquiry based on the aforementioned FIR that was filed.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION
When the aforementioned factual situation occurred, the third respondent filed an Application No. 41 of 2018 under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, alleging that the appellant and Respondent Nos. 4 to 7 had forcibly entered his home and attacked the complainant and his father with a knife on the applicant’s head with the intent to kill them when they refused to heed their demands to leave the village after selling the land and home. On the basis of the aforementioned complaint, which was brought before the Chief Judicial Magistrate-I, Gautam Budh Nagar, a report from the second respondent was requested; as a result, a report was submitted on March 11, 2018, opining that the accused parties, including the appellant, never visited the complainant’s home and that the incident in question had not occurred. However, the Learned Magistrate ordered the filing of a police report on May 3, 2018, and as a result, the second respondent filed a police report in Case Crime No. 55 of 2018 against the appellant and others for the violations listed above. As a result, a plea to nullify the aforementioned FIR was filed; however, when it was denied, the current appeal was submitted.
JUDGMENT
1. We have read the documents and listened to knowledgeable solicitors representing the parties. After giving the claim made by the appellant before the High Court careful consideration and repetition before this Court, we have concluded that the third respondent, who is the appellant’s sister’s husband and who had filed an application under Section 156(3) before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-Ist, Gautam Budh Nagar in application No.41 of 2018, has unquestionably passed away while the current proceedings were pending. His name was consequently removed by order dated January 20, 2020. Regarding responses 1 and 2, none have surfaced.
2. Despite the aforementioned facts and the fact that a dispute between two families had already led to the wife filing two cases, which led to the registration of an FIR against the complainant (the third respondent here) and his family members, as well as the fact that none of the villagers, including the complainant’s neighbours, had supported or testified about the occurrence of any incident on January 26, 2018, as claimed by the complainant.
3. Therefore, insofar as the appellant is concerned, we quash the proceedings filed by the second respondent as Crime No.97 of 2018 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 452, 324, 307, 342, and 506 of the IPC. Therefore, the appeal is granted.
In the case of DELMA LUBNA COELHO VS EDMOND CLINT FERNANDES, the petitioner filed the petition seeking the transfer of the pending case before the family judge at Mangaluru, Karnataka to the family court at Bandra, Mumbai, Maharashtra.
FACTS
The couple met on Facebook in December 2019 and married on December 5, 2020, according to Christian rites and customs at Our Lady of Miracles Church in Mangaluru. Following the marriage, the petitioner lived with the respondent in her matrimonial house in Mangaluru, where she was abused, insulted, and humiliated by the respondent and his family members.
She was accused of everything, and foul language was used against her. Under the guise of providing her with a 10-15day break, the respondent booked a one-way ticket for the petitioner and despatched her to Mumbai on January 15, 2021.
After COVID19 Pandemic limitations were lifted on July 5, 2021, the petitioner returned to Mangaluru. The defendant and his family members, however, refused her admission into her matrimonial house. She was completely distraught. She went to the Pandeshwar Police Station in Mangaluru and filed a complaint.
The Superintendent of Police intervened and summoned the respondent to the Police Station. The respondent replied that he has already served a divorce notice and that his divorce petition is being prepared. Despite the petitioner’s repeated appeals, the respondent did not change his behaviour. On 06.08.2021, she responded to the legal notice, claiming that she is ready and eager to come to her matrimonial home and want to live a happily married life. On October 10, 2021, she received a summons from the Court, along with a copy of the divorce petition filed in the Mangaluru Family Court.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION
The petitioner’s learned counsel stated that she lives in Mumbai with her elderly parents. No one at her home can accompany her from Mumbai to Mangaluru to defend the petition, which is over 1,000 km away. She doesn’t even know the Kannada language. The respondent, on the other hand, will experience no difficulties if the petition is relocated to Mumbai (Maharashtra).
The petitioner claims that if given the chance, she would try to rework the marriage. The petitioner was obliged to obtain a job with a bank because the respondent failed to financially support her. If she routinely travels to Mangaluru to attend the proceedings, she risks losing her job as a newbie. She will be unable to bear the additional expenditure.
The petitioner has filed a petition for restitution of marital rights in response to the respondent’s Divorce Petition.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION
On the other hand, experienced counsel for the respondent contended that, even though the parties met on social media, one year before their marriage, she had visited Mangaluru after the COVID19 Pandemic/restrictions were removed and they met often.
She was well aware of the respondent’s familial background as well as the condition of his family. The petitioner’s behaviour was not the same after the marriage as it was before the marriage.
The petitioner, a permanent resident of Canada, was accustomed to such a way of life. The marriage was just intended to ruin the respondent’s life, even though she first claimed to love Indian culture and traditions. Though it is claimed that the respondent forced the petitioner to leave the matrimonial home, the petitioner chose to leave on her own. She applied for a job with ICICI Bank immediately after arriving in Mumbai and resigned from the organizationon February 19, 2021, where she was working with the respondent.
The marriage was irretrievably broken since the parties could not reconcile despite several mediations. Without the parties’ consent, this Court may issue divorce under Article 142 of the Indian Constitution.
JUDGEMENT
In marriage disputes, several Transfer Petitions are filed, typically by wives requesting transfer of the matrimonial procedures launched by the husband. Normally, the court accepts the prayer given while being lenient towards ladies.
Given the status of the parties and the fact that it is a petition filed by the wife seeking transfer of the husband’s case from Mangaluru, Karnataka to Mumbai, Maharashtra, we believe no case is made out for transfer of the petition from Mangaluru, Karnataka to Mumbai, Maharashtra. The wife is a Canadian permanent resident. She must travel abroad frequently.
She can travel to Mangaluru to attend the case hearing and can also request an exemption from the appearance when necessary. Despite this, we do not believe that there is a basis for ordering the respondent to reimburse the petitioner’s travel expenses to Mangaluru based on the financial circumstances of the parties as they currently stand. However, if she wishes to seek compensation for expenses, she may do so by applying with the appropriate court, which will be considered on its own merits.
We do not believe this is a suitable case for exercising power under Article 142 of the Indian Constitution, despite the parties’ good faith. The judgments relied on by the respondent’s learned counsel are distinguishable, as in those cases, there was adequate evidence on file, and the cause on which the marriage was dissolved in the exercise of power under Article 142 of the Indian Constitution was an irretrievable breakdown of marriage, which is not a ground for dissolution of marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
We do not believe the current petition has substance for the reasons stated above. As a result, the same is dismissed.
The recent judgment of ISOLATORS AND ISOLATORS THROUGH ITS PROPRIETOR MRS. SANDHYA MISHRA V/S MADHYA PRADESH MADHYA KSHETRA VIDYUT VITRAN CO. LTD. & ANR.is concernedwith the debarring of the contractor in course of tender.
FACTS:
The appellant, a sole proprietorship company, has been in the transformer manufacturing and maintenance industry for the past 30 years. Its facility is located at Govind Pura, Bhopal. The appellant’s only clients are distribution businesses (Discoms). Two renders were issued by the respondent Madhya Pradesh Madhya Kshetra Vidyut Vitran Company Limited. No response on rescheduling the delivery and due to extraordinary storm accompanied by heavy rains caused the roof of their plant to collapse. Half of the project is ready to be delivered and the same was asked to defer by the respondent. Chief General Manager has cancelled all the purchase orders and debarred the company for 3 years and also imposed a fine of 27,98,960. The aggrieved party approached the high court Also high court didn’t even consider the other part(penalty) of the review petition. Nevertheless, the High Court issued an order that was identical to the chief general manager’s order.
APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS:
The learned counsel for the appellant contended that there has been a violation of natural justice and there was no reason specified by the respondent for debarring the appellant. TS-494, the appellant had supplied 300 out of 586 transformers and as regards TS-532, the appellant had supplied all 63 KVA transformers. It was unlawful to terminate the order for the delivery of the remaining transformers after a significant quantity of transformers had been provided against purchase. The respondent intentionally had not considered the heavy rainsresulting in damage to the plant and loss of raw material.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:
It was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the appellant has not performed on the terms and conditions of the contract and debarring was done after the hearing opportunity given to the appellant. The order has been given in the exercise of the relevant clauses of the purchase order. The termination order had never been challenged by the appellant and the same has attained finality. The learned counsel, imposition of penalty has been consequential to the aforesaid order the same had been as per the terms and conditions of the rate/contract/purchase order.
JUDGEMENT:
The court has quashed and set aside in debarment of the appellant and imposition of penalty, no recovery shall be made from the appellant thereunder and if any amount has been recovered, the same shall be refunded to the appellant within a month from today or else, it shall carry simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of recovery and until the date of repayment.
The further court explained that:-
1) Imposing of penalty
A) the appellant was only made aware of the potential debarment in the show-cause notice, and nothing concerning the proposed imposition of penalty was included in the notice.
B) Without explaining why the maximum penalty was sought to be applied, the relevant body has gone ahead and levied the maximum fine of 10% of the deficit supply. The appellant’s list of pertinent considerations could not have been completely disregarded. The respondents have not provided a particular amount of loss in order to support the imposition of the maximum penalty.
Therefore, the lack of particular show-cause notice, the application of a penalty against the appellant cannot be allowed and it is to be set aside.
2) Debarring the appellant for 3 years
The respondent themselves postponed taking the balance of delivering further there has been no instructions, or communication provided by the respondent to resume the supply. The debarment judgment had been made against the appellant without taking into account the evident factual situation, in which the appellant could not have been solely blamed or held responsible.
Court has also referred to a case Gorkha Security Services v. State (NCT of Delhi) where it was ruled that a prior show-cause notice granting a reasonable opportunity to be heard is a crucial component of all administrative decision-making, especially when those decisions involve blacklisting and carry serious repercussions for the entity being blacklisted. In these situations, providing a legitimate show-cause notice is essential, and failing to do so would render any order of blacklisting based on said order null and void.
Therefore, debarring the appellant for 3 years is also set aside.❖ Both of the orders could only be disapproved because the High Court failed to approach the situation correctly, whether in deciding the writ case or the review petition.
We all vision our Nation to be at the top of its zenith, be it economically, culturally, socially or politically. But the obstacles we face aren’t just limited to poverty or corruption or mere resolves. The major issue we face every day is fighting the restricted and orthodox mentalities of people. While it’s the common man/woman who helps the Nation progress, it’s they who pull it back with the burden of their thoughts.
While we could flaunt discussing the legality of Same Sex Marriages in India, and say that the taboo of Inter Religion Marriage has been totally eliminated, the case on the ground isn’t that simple.
Inter-religion marriage is a union between two individuals belonging to different religious communities. In India, inter-religion marriage is a socially and culturally sensitive topic, especially when it involves Hindu and non-Hindu communities. The complexity of this issue arises from the fact that India is a country of diverse cultures, languages, religions, and social customs. The practice of inter-religion marriage is often met with social and familial opposition and can even result in legal complications. India is home to many religions, including Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, Sikhism, Buddhism, and Jainism. Each religion has its own set of beliefs, customs, and practices, which can influence inter-religion marriages.
The issue of inter-religion marriage has been the subject of debate in India for several years. While some argue that inter-religion marriage can promote social harmony and unity, others view it as a threat to cultural and religious identities. The Supreme Court of India has consistently upheld the right of individuals to marry the person of their choice, irrespective of religion or caste.
In India, inter-religion marriage is governed by different personal laws that vary according to the religion of the parties involved. For instance, the Hindu Marriage Act 1955, governs Hindu marriages, while the Special Marriage Act 1954[1], governs marriages between individuals of different religions. The Muslim Personal Law governs marriages in the Muslim community. Further, light is thrown on the Societal issues and taboos related to Inter Religion Marriage, briefly explains all the provisions under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, talks about how Inter Religion Marriages are governed under this law and finally a conclusion with some recent judgements and the Author’s views related to the Topic
Stigmas Related to Inter Religion Marriages in India
Inter-religion marriages in India are still considered taboo in many parts of the country. While the issues are prevalent in different spheres of society, all the possible efforts to culminate it have been effective, but not as effective as expected. The situation can be summarized in the following points which put up a clearer perspective of the antagonistic situation[2]:
Social stigma: In India, inter-religion marriages are often frowned upon, and couples can face social stigma and discrimination from their families, communities, and even the society at large.
Legal hurdles: While inter-religion marriages are legal in India, couples often face legal hurdles when it comes to obtaining marriage registration and other legal documents. This can be especially challenging when one partner belongs to a minority religion.
Religious barriers: Some religious communities in India do not permit inter-religion marriages, and couples who belong to these communities can face significant opposition from their families and religious leaders.
Family pressure: In many cases, families put immense pressure on their children to marry within their own religion, which can cause significant stress and strain on the couple’s relationship.
Violence and threats: In extreme cases, inter-religion couples can face violence and threats from their families and communities, which can make it difficult for them to live together in peace and safety.
Lack of acceptance: Despite the legal recognition of inter-religion marriages, many people in India still do not accept such unions as legitimate, which can make it difficult for couples to live and work in certain communities.
Need for social change: Given the challenges faced by inter-religion couples in India, there is a need for greater social acceptance and support for such unions. This requires a change in attitudes and beliefs about marriage and religion, as well as greater legal protection and support for inter-religion couples
Introduction to Special Marriage Act, 1954 and its Basic Outline
The Special Marriage Act 1954 is a legal framework that provides for the solemnization of marriages between individuals of different religions, castes, and nationalities. It is designed to allow for civil marriages and to create a legal mechanism to register such marriages. It provides legal recognition to civil marriages and protects couples from social stigma and discrimination. The Act has been instrumental in promoting secularism and unity in diversity in India. The Act is applicable to the whole of India, except for the state of Jammu and Kashmir[3]. Some of the Key Provisions of the Act which are evident in the Daily Court Procedures are: –
Applicability: The Special Marriage Act is applicable to any Indian citizen who wishes to solemnize a marriage regardless of their religion, caste, or creed. It applies to any person who is a resident of India or domiciled in the country, as well as to those who are outside India and intend to marry in the country.
Notice of Intended Marriage: The Act mandates that both parties intending to marry under this Act must give notice of their intention to do so. The notice must be given in writing to the Marriage Officer of the district where at least one of the parties resides.
Objections to the Marriage: Once the notice of intended marriage is given, the Marriage Officer must display it in a prominent place in the office for thirty days. If no objections are raised during this time, the marriage can be solemnized. However, if objections are raised, the Marriage Officer must conduct an inquiry to determine whether the objections are valid or not.
Solemnization of Marriage: Once the Marriage Officer is satisfied that there are no objections to the intended marriage, the marriage can be solemnized in the presence of three witnesses, including the Marriage Officer. The ceremony must conform to the provisions of the Act and can be performed by a registered Marriage Officer, a Registrar of Marriages, or any person authorized by the government to do so.
Registration of Marriage: After the marriage is solemnized, the Marriage Officer must enter a certificate of marriage in the Marriage Register. The certificate must be signed by the parties to the marriage, the witnesses, and the Marriage Officer. The certificate is conclusive proof of the marriage, and a certified copy can be obtained from the Marriage Officer upon request.
Dissolution of Marriage: The Special Marriage Act also provides for the dissolution of marriage by mutual consent or on grounds of adultery, cruelty, desertion, or conversion to another religion. The procedure for obtaining a divorce under the Act is similar to that of obtaining a decree of divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, of 1955.
Miscellaneous Provisions: The Act also contains provisions relating to maintenance, custody of children, and the rights of children born out of wedlock. It also provides for the registration of marriages performed outside India under this Act.
Inter Religion Marriages under Special Marriage Act 1954
In India, inter-religion marriage can be solemnized under the Special Marriage Act 1954. The Act provides for the registration of marriages between persons of different religions, castes, or creeds. Here are the legal sections and conditions for inter-religion marriage under the Special Marriage Act 1954:
Eligibility: Any two individuals who are of marriageable age (21 years for the groom and 18 years for the bride) can marry under the Special Marriage Act, irrespective of their religion, caste, or creed. The conditions laid down for the eligibility have been mentioned by Section 4[4] of the Special Marriage Act 1954, for it also says that they must not be within the degree of a prohibited relationship, and they must not have a living spouse at the time of the marriage.
Notice of Intended Marriage: The first step is to give a notice of intended marriage to the Marriage Registrar of the district in which at least one of the parties has resided for a minimum of 30 days prior to giving the notice. Section 5 [5] of the Special Marriage Act is responsible for this clause of the law.
Objections: After the notice is published, any person may file an objection to the marriage if they have a valid reason for doing so. According to Section 7[6] of the Special Marriage Act 1954, Any person may object to the intended marriage within 30 days of the publication of the notice by filing an objection in writing to the Marriage Officer. The Marriage Officer is required to investigate the objection and decide on the validity of the objection.
Waiting Period: After the notice is published and there are no objections, a waiting period of 30 days is mandatory before the marriage can be solemnized. Based upon Section 6[7] of the Special Marriage Act 1954, Upon receipt of the notice of intended marriage, the Marriage Officer is required to display the notice at a conspicuous place in his office and issue a copy of the notice to the parties involved.
Declaration: Both parties must sign a declaration stating that they are not related to each other within the prohibited degrees of the relationship as specified in the Act.
Solemnization: The marriage can be solemnized in the presence of a Marriage Officer and two witnesses. The Marriage Officer will register the marriage and issue a certificate of marriage. Section 12[8] of the Special Marriage Act lays down the conditions for the Solemnisation and Registration of the marriages, which are either inter-religious or inter-caste.
Registration: The marriage must be registered within 90 days of the solemnization, failing which the registration may be done only with the permission of the Marriage Officer and on payment of a penalty.
It is important to note that the Special Marriage Act 1954 does not allow for any religious ceremony or rites during the solemnization of the marriage. The marriage is considered a civil contract and is governed by the provisions of the Act.
Recent Judgement Related to Inter Religion Marriages
Recently, the Supreme Court turned down a public interest lawsuit recently that contested elements of the Special Marriage Act that require posting interfaith spouses’ personal information ahead of their wedding.
According to Sections 6[9] and 7[10] of the law, couples have 30 days before their wedding to invite or consider objections by posting a public notice in a visible place or on the notice board in the marriage officer’s office. Their names, phone numbers, dates of birth, ages, occupations, addresses, and identifying information are all included in the notice’s details.[11]
The appeal against these two Act clauses, as well as the portions allowing anybody to object to the marriage and the marriage officer’s ability to inquire into a couple’s past, was rejected by a bench of Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and Bela M Trivedi. According to the petitioner’s attorney, his client wed a guy of a different religion in accordance with the Special Marriage Act. The bench answered, “It ceases to be a PIL if it is your personal cause.
The Act had begun to take force in 1954, the court also found, citing Bar and Bench. It asked the attorney, “Where’s your cause of action?” as it rejected the PIL.
Case Laws Pertaining to Significant Inter Religion Marriage Judgements
Smt. Lata Singh v. State of UP[12]: This case marks the Supreme Court announced that a person has the right to choose their life partner and that inter-caste and inter-religion marriages should be encouraged. The court also directed the police to provide protection to couples who marry against the wishes of their parents.
Salamat Ansari v. State of UP[13]: Being a legendary case in the history of Family Laws in India, the Judgement of the Supreme Court in the case said that an inter-religious marriage solemnized under the Special Marriage Act is valid and that the consent of parents or guardians is not required.
Ramesh Kumar v. State of Haryana[14]: In this case, the Supreme Court held that the choice of an adult to marry a person of their choice is a fundamental right guaranteed under the Constitution of India and that interference by family members or society in such marriages is illegal.
K. Srinivas Rao v. D.A. Deepa[15]: As per the Supreme Court, the Special Marriage Act allows parties to register their marriage without any religious ceremonies, and parties to an inter-religious marriage can choose to follow the customs and traditions of their respective religions.
Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India[16]: For all those who are well-versed in the case laws of India, they would understand the significance of this specific case. Supreme Court in this Judgement held that a person cannot convert to another religion just for the purpose of marrying a person belonging to that religion and that such conversions are illegal and void. The court also directed the government to enact a law to prevent such conversions
Conclusion to the Unfathomable Taboo of Inter Religion Marriage
Inter-religion marriage has been taboo in India for a long time, and it has been the subject of political and social debate for many years. The laws related to inter-religion marriage have evolved over time to address this issue and provide legal protection to couples who wish to marry outside their religion or caste.
The Special Marriage Act 1954, provides a legal framework for inter-religion and inter-caste marriages in India. It lays down the conditions for the solemnization of special marriages and mandates that the parties involved must give notice of their intention to get married to the Marriage Officer. The Act also provides for objections to the marriage, and the procedure for solemnization of the special marriage.
Despite the legal framework in place, inter-religion marriage continues to face opposition from certain sections of society. Some political parties have also used this issue to further their own agendas. However, in recent years, there has been a shift in the public perception of inter-religion marriage, with more and more people accepting it as a personal choice.
The law has also evolved to keep pace with changing social norms. In 2018, the Supreme Court of India passed a landmark judgement, decriminalizing adultery, which was a major step towards recognizing the individual autonomy of adults in their personal relationships. This judgement, along with other legal developments, has provided greater legal protection to couples in inter-religion and inter-caste marriages.
Inter-religion marriage is often met with resistance from society and families, which can lead to social ostracism and even violence. Families may object to inter-religion marriages on the grounds of cultural and religious differences. The couple may also face legal challenges, such as cases of abduction, forced conversion, and even honour killing.
In conclusion, inter-religion marriage continues to be a contentious issue in India, with social and political factors influencing public perception. However, the legal framework has evolved to provide greater protection to couples who wish to marry outside their religion or caste. While there is still a long way to go, there are signs that society is becoming more accepting of inter-religion marriage, and this is reflected in the changing legal landscape.
