Tag: #SupremeCourtofIndia

-Report by Nehha Mishra

In the case of VIRENDRA SINGH VS THE ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER, the appellant was disqualified under Sections 40 and 16(1)(i) of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961.

FACTS

The appellant was elected as a member of the Zilla Parishad, Chimthane Block, Taluq Shindkheda, District Dhule, as a candidate of a recognized party. He was, however, disqualified from this office by an order issued by the Divisional Commissioner, Nashik, in response to a plea made by the respondent, who had lost the Zilla Parishad election.

The respondent sought the appellant’s disqualification because the appellant had abused his elected position for personal financial advantage. This financial gain is said to have occurred due to the appellant’s role in adopting a resolution by which the Aarave Gramme Panchayat sanctioned the repairing and tarring of a road from Aarave Phata to Mauje Aarave.

Following that, the appellant’s Zilla Parishad, Dhule, granted administrative sanction to the project. This sanction order documents that the Zilla Parishad, Dhule, sanctioned the project for Rs. 15 lakhs by exercising its powers under Section 125 of the aforementioned Act.According to Sections 40 and 16(1)(i) of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961, the respondent filed the plea. 

An e-tender was floated by the Aarave Gram Panchayat upon the sanctioning. The appellant’s son was successful against the other two candidates who had applied. As a result, he got the tender and was assigned the work of repairing roads at Mauje Aarave for a sum of Rs 14,62,871/-  

The Divisional Commissioner observed that it was obvious the appellant would be able to influence the same because the Aarave Gram Panchayat was in the Chimthane Block, which was under the jurisdiction of Zilla Parishad, Dhule. Additionally, it was noted that there was no proof that the son of the appellant had received work orders from any other blocks under the jurisdiction of the Dhule Zilla Parishad, and as a result, there was a prima facie indication of misuse, which was sufficient to disqualify the appellant under Section 16(1)(i) of the aforementioned Act.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION

The appellant’s main argument was that Zilla Parishad Dhule, not Gram Panchayat Aarave, had assigned his son work. The allocation was carried out using an electronic tendering procedure that was made public on the Maharashtra Government website. Although it was formally approved by the Zilla Parishad, the Gram Panchayat also paid the appellant’s son for the work. 

The second argument was that the appellant had no personal stake in his son’s business and that they didn’t even live in the same house.

Third, it was argued that in disqualifying the appellant, the Divisional Commissioner did not follow the rules of natural justice. It was urged that an elected official cannot be hastily dismissed from office without investigation.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

Learned counsel for respondent no.3 attempted to emphasize the goal of Section 16 of the impugned Act, namely, to inject probity into the operation of the Zilla Parishads.

In this situation, the job was done on the instruction of the Zilla Parishad, and the payment was also made through the Zilla Parishad. As a result, it was argued that the facts fit fully within the purview of Section 16(1)(i) of the aforementioned Act, and the disqualification was obvious.

There were some controversial changes in the translated version of the Gram Panchayat Resolution, which has served the purpose of awarding benefit to the appellant’s son in one way or the other.

JUDGEMENT

It is undeniably true that elected officials should not be disqualified on frivolous grounds.However, we are also obligated by the statutory mandate, which states that activities that undermine the goal of transparency should not be tolerated.

The only contract he received was one in which funds were sent to the Gramme Panchayat from the Zilla Parishad, of which the appellant was a member. The appellant attempted to excuse the circumstance by arguing that his son was registered as a contractor shortly after the appellant’s election since he had just finished his studies. This fact, in our opinion, raises more questions regarding the appellant’s involvement in his son’s business.

The Zilla Parishad’s issuing of the work order dated 09.06.2020 demonstrates the Zilla Parishad’s supervisory and sanctioning role in the contract, which falls within the broad reach of Section 16(1)(i) of the aforementioned Act.

As a father, the appellant had a higher responsibility to ensure that his son did not sign into a contract that is sanctioned by the Zilla Parishad itself. We can see from the lower courts’ findings of fact that nothing had been put on record to demonstrate even a separation of residence between the son and the father, other than a ration card purporting to show that the son was living with his grandmother.

The appeal was accordingly dismissed. The consequential disqualification would take place from the date of the judgement.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3GOupNa

-Report by Arunima Jain

The Supreme Court on Thursday announced its decision on the long-standing appeal of the petitioner in this case of a triple murder. The Constitution Bench has determined that the HighCourt or, in the event of a subsequent appeal, the Supreme Court, and not any other Court inthis country, may exercise power to impose a fixed term sentence or modified punishmentthat can be derived from the IPC. When a Constitutional Court determines that even though a case does not fall under the category of “rarest of the rare,” taking into account the seriousness and nature of the offence, as well as all other pertinent factors, it can always impose a fixed term sentence, preventing the accused from benefiting from statutory remission, etc. In addition to the same, the Court has the power to alter a lower court’s judgement to the said punishment, whether it lowers or upgrades it, depending on the gravity of the crime committed and the application of judicial conscience appropriate to the offence that was judged to have been committed.

FACTS

In the matter at hand, the appellant had been involved in the gruesome murder of three peoplealongside other co-accused persons in March 2006. Upon the case reaching the SessionsCourt, the appellant was convicted for the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The three co-accused in the case were also convicted for the same offence and all those convicted were sentenced to life imprisonment. After the initial judgement, an appeal waspreferred in

the High Court, which further went on to affirm the lower court’s judgement. On finding norecourse, the appellant came to the present Court.

CONTENTIONS

Appellant

The appellant’s learned counsel has challenged the High Court conviction on the basis ofwrongful identification of the accused in the matter. The counsel has submitted that there isno compelling evidence to prove the involvement of the appellant in the murder. As per thelearned counsel,         he has taken the precedent of Union of India v. V. Sriharan aliasMurugan & Ors., to further his case that the current sessions court has no jurisdiction to deal in the matter in regards to the punishment of life imprisonment. According to the appellant’s counsel, when it came to commuting a death sentence, only the Constitutional Courts can usesuch a power.

Respondent

Contrary to the petitioner’s counsel, the respondent’s learned counsel submits that both theCourts preceding the present Hon’ble court have considered the evidence provided and thetestimony of witnesses so given. The Court has the jurisdiction and power to modify and/orrectify the provided judgement of the High Court in such a manner.

JUDGEMENT

Upon giving due regard to the facts and law in the above-mentioned case, it is contended bythe Hon’ble Court that pursuant to the contested judgements, the appellant’s conviction isaffirmed.    Although the arrangement of the sentence has been tweaked a bit. The appellant is to serve a set term of 30 years of solitary confinement under strict supervision. Moreover, the appellant has been stripped of the opportunity to opt for recourse or remission under the Codeof Criminal Procedure. The appeal was thus partly allowed.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3zZYCoH

-Report by Mehul Jain

It was held by the Supreme Court of India in the case of GUJARAT URJA VIKAS NIGAM LIMITED & ORS VS RENEW WIND ENERGY (RAJKOT) PRIVATE LIMITED & ORS that on April 13, it held that the concurrent findings and orders of the State Commission and APTEL cannot be sustained. They are 51 accordingly set aside. The appeals are allowed, with costs payable to the appellants. It is the conclusion of the Supreme Court of India.

FACTS

The judgment is made by the learned Double Judge bench “Hon’ble Mr Justice S. Ravindra Bhat, Hon’ble Mr Justice Dipankar Datta” On 13 April 2023. The Judgment Is Given By “Hon’ble Mr Justice S. Ravindra Bhat”.

The current civil appeals,1 under Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003, challenge orders of the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (hereafter, “APTEL”), dated 06.12.2018 (“first impugned order”) and order dated 24.07.2020 (“second impugned order”). The APTEL had, by those orders, rejected the appeals preferred by the present appellant, and the review petition, as well. Resultantly, the order of the Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission (hereafter “the State Commission”), dated 01.07.20154 was affirmed.

The first appellant – Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited (hereafter “Gujarat Urja”) had approached this court previously challenging the order of APTEL, which was disposed of by this court granting liberty to it, to seek review/rectification. Gujarat Urja then preferred a review petition, which was rejected by APTEL, by the second impugned order. When this appeal was taken up for hearing, on 14.10.2020, this court issued a notice and stayed the impugned order of APTEL.

Gujarat Urja procures power in bulk on behalf of distribution licensees in the state of Gujarat; it is an authorized licensee within the meaning of the term under the Act. The second, third, fourth and fifth appellants are distribution licensees in the State of Gujarat. The first respondent, Renew Wind Energy (Rajkot) Pvt Ltd (hereafter “RWE”) is a wind generator which had set up 25.2 MW Wind Turbine Generators at District Rajkot, Gujarat under the Renewable Energy Certification scheme notified by the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (hereafter, “Central Commission”). The second respondent is the Wind Independent Power Producers Association (hereafter “Association”). Respondent No 3, Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission (hereinafter “theState Commission”) is the regulatory commission under the Act, for the State of Gujarat. The fourth respondent, Wish Wind Infrastructure LLP (“Wish Wind” hereafter) is a wind generator.

On 11.07.2013, Central Commission amended the REC Regulations 2010 (hereafter “Second Amendment”) and replaced “at a price not exceeding the pooled cost of the power purchase “with” at the pooled cost of power purchase”14 along with the relevant statement of reasons for the said amendment. It was clarified in the amendment that PPAs already executed before this amendment at a tariff lower than APCC would not be affected. The first two respondents were aggrieved by the order of the Central Commission. They filed a petition before the State Commission arguing that the terms of the PPA had to be changed because of the change in the REC regulations. This petition was allowed by the State Commission directing that the order of the Central Commission was general and was therefore applicable to all similarly situated wind power generators. Aggrieved by the order of the State Commission, Gujarat Urja had preferred an appeal16 before APTEL. This appeal was rejected by APTEL by order dated 06.12.2018. The appellants preferred a review petition against APTEL’s order rejecting their appeal against State Commission’s order; that too was dismissed by APTEL vide order dated 24.07.2020.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION

The learned senior counsel for the appellant, Mr C.A. Sundaram submitted that governing regulations for the PPAs in question were the CERC Regulations 2010. Therefore, the State Commission had no jurisdiction to decide the tariff contrary to the agreement. Further, counsel argued that Central Commission itself has clarified by the Second Amendment that in respect of PPAs entered into before 11.07.2013, tariffs mutually agreed upon between the parties would be valid for the entire duration of the PPA (i.e.25 years) and they could not be substituted or re-determined by the State Commission. It was further argued that had the appellants known about the APPC on a year-on-year basis at the time of signing the agreement, they would not have adopted the REC mechanism but instead would have availed a different method whereby prices were fixed and appellants would have been entitled to RPO benefits as well. Reliance was placed on this court’s judgment in “Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. Solar Semi-Conductors Power Limited Company (India) Private Limited” to argue that if the State Commission re-determines the tariff amongst the parties, then the aggrieved party cannot be compelled to continue the said agreement or enter into a new agreement on such increased tariff.

It is further argued that there is no Regulation of the state or central commissions prohibiting a term being incorporated in PPA which permits an option to either party to switch from REC mechanism to Preferential Tariff Mechanism. The impugned order had not considered judgments referred to by the appellants on clauses granting power to one party to cancel the contract. Inthis regard, reliance is placed on “Central Bank of India v Hartford Fire Insurance Co. Ltd” and “Her Highness Maharani Shantidevi P Gaikwad v Savjibai Haribai Patel & Ors.”

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

Mr Shyam Divan and Mr Dhruv Mehta learned senior counsels appearing for the first two respondents urged that State Commission had jurisdiction in the present case. Reliance was placed on the definitional clause of the PPA (Article 1.1) to submit that commission meant ‘State Commission’. It was urged that in terms of the extant regulatory framework, (which provided for regulatory oversight by the appropriate commission), PPAs executed by generating companies and distribution licensees necessarily required approval by the appropriate commission. Firstly, Section 86(1)(b) of the Act specifically vests the State Commission with the power to regulate the electricity purchase and procurement process of distribution licensees including the price at which electricity shall be procured from the generating companies. Secondly, under the Multi-Year Tariff Regulations, 2011 (hereafter “GERC (Multi Year Tariff) Regulations”) notified by the State Commission, PPAs are to be mandatorily approved for them to be considered effective and enforceable. 

It was also submitted that Section 86(1)(b) of the Act empowers the state commission to modify, alter or vary the terms of the agreement of PPAs, to ensure their compliance following the regulatory framework established under the Act. It was further submitted that taking into consideration the definition of APPC, it is evident that floor price and forbearance price are dynamic and APPC is associated with the floor price and the forbearance price is also required to be determined on a year-to-year basis so that the guaranteed return to the generators is not affected.

JUDGEMENT

The crisis arising out of, and the enormous environmental cost involved in the continued use of fossil fuels has led governments, the world over, to promote alternative and renewable sources of energy. The rapid growth of renewable energy over the decade and a half has witnessed that solar and wind power are now the cheapest sources of energy in many countries in the world. Once green energy was an expensive alternative, however, it is now helping to reduce energy bills.

The rapidly changing economics of such sources has led, the Union government to realize that solar and other renewables can potentially transform the energy landscape, increase access and help India meet its climate change objectives. Grid transmission capacity has been a barrier; however, distributed and off-grid solar solutions provide a viable solution for increasing energy access. Being dependent primarily on cheap coal-based power generation, traditional thinking on energy has been that increase in renewable energy’s share of electricity generation would further impair local distribution companies’ poor financial situation.

In the present case, this salutary rule was thrown to the wind, by the State Commission. In this court’s opinion, APTEL, in the most cavalier fashion, virtually rubber-stamped the State Commission’s findings on coercion, regarding the entering into the PPA by the parties. There was no shred of evidence, nor any particularity of pleadings, beyond a bare allegation of coercion, alleged against Gujarat Urja. As a judicial tribunal, dealing with contracts and bargains, which are entered into by parties with equal bargaining power, APTEL is not expected to casually render findings of coercion, or fraud, without proper pleadings or proof, or without probing into evidence. The findings of coercion are, therefore, set aside.

Given the foregoing discussion, it is held that the concurrent findings and orders of the State Commission and APTEL cannot be sustained. They are accordingly set aside. The appeals are allowed, with costs payable to the appellants.

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-Report by Utkarsh Kamal

In this case, The Supreme Court has reaffirmed that the State cannot be forced to create posts and hire qualified individuals without sanctioned positions. In this case, the Bench comprising Justice Ajay Rastogi and Justice Bela M. Trivedi was deciding a case pertaining to the reinstatement and regularisation of members of the ‘Makkal Nala Paniyalargal’, or Village Level Workers were members of the Makkal Nala Paniyalargal (MNP) organizations who worked in Tamil Nadu.

FACTS:

A program offering jobs to educated youngsters in rural regions who had completed the 10th standard was started by the Tamil Nadu government in 1989. In the entire State, 25,234 MNPs (Makkal Nala Paniyalargal/Village Level Workers) were employed. The program was abandoned by the government in 1991. As a result, those hired through the program had their employment terminated. The scheme was reinstated in 1997 by government order, and it was abandoned once more in 2001. The government devised a plan in 2006 to transfer those who had been hired as Panchayat Assistants and part-time clerks to any scale as of September 1st, 2006. The Government announced in an order dated 2008 that it would take into account filling 50% of open positions in the cadre of record clerks, office assistants, night watchmen, and analogous posts from MNP. The government hired 600 MNPs to work as night watchmen and official assistants in local panchayats. The period of MNPs was extended by two years till May 31, 2012, subject to absorption. However, the Government disbanded MNPs in the interim on November 8, 2011. The Government order was contested before the Madras High Court, and the Single Judge permitted it. The decision made by the single judge was upheld by the Division Bench. In response to an appeal, the Supreme Court gave notice and suspended the High Court’s decision. The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Jobs Guarantee Scheme is a program that the State Government started in 2022 to give jobs to educated unemployed youth. The majority of the 13,500 MNPs had enrolled in the program, while 489 MNPs had declined the chance.

LAW:

The schedule of the Act included the State of Tamil Nadu. According to Section 3 of the Act, each State must implement a program that offers every household in rural areas covered by the Scheme, whose adult members agree to perform unskilled manual labour, at least 100 days of guaranteed employment in a fiscal year. The Court remarked that the 2005 Act’s provision of the benefit made by the State of Tamil Nadu’s plan remains in effect.

ISSUE:

Whether the government can be compelled to create posts and absorb those in service in the absence of sanctioned posts?

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION:

The appeals court would be the least qualified to determine whether the government acted honestly in creating a post or refusing to create a post or whether its decision suffers from malice (legal or factual), according to the appellants, who argue that creation and abolition of posts rest with the government and is a matter of government policy, which can always be exercised in the interest and necessity of internal administration.Because these appointments were not made in accordance with the State Government’s formation against a cadre post, the service conditions of which are governed by the service regulations established in accordance with the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. The current appointments are made solely to give educated youngsters in rural regions employment as MNPs in the implementation of various schemes at the village level for an honorarium that has periodically been updated.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:

A court must review every government decision to create or eliminate posts, especially if it goes against established service rules or constitutional clauses. The respondent may contend that the creation of positions purely to give educated children in rural areas work is not a proper use of public funds and may not be a valid government policy. The respondent may further argue that rather than being subject to arbitrary periodic modifications, the service conditions of such posts should be governed by established regulations.

JUDGMENT:

The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act was passed by the Central Government in 2005 to provide direct supplemental wage employment to rural citizens, the Supreme Court remarked. In a fiscal year, it guaranteed at least 100 days of paid employment. The schedule of the Act included Tamil Nadu as a state. According to Section 3 of the Act, each State must adopt a program that offers every household in rural areas covered by the program, whose adult members agree to perform unskilled manual labour, at least one hundred days of guaranteed work in a fiscal year. The Court determined that the 2005 Act-adopted benefit offered by the State of Tamil Nadu’s plan is still in effect. The court took note of the High Court’s ruling that employees who lost their jobs as a result of the government order disbanding the program in 2011 are not only entitled to reinstatement but also to be regularised in service after the post was created. 

According to the Supreme Court, judges cannot command the creation of jobs. The MNPs were hired through a system and received honoraria rather than compensation for holding a cadre position.

After the scheme expired, the Divisional Bench ruled that MNPs were not eligible for reinstatement or regularisation of service. Hench overruled the judgment of the High Court.

READ FULL JUDGMENT: https://bit.ly/419WE0D

-Report by Harshit Yadav

In the case of Anwar @Bhugra V. State of Haryana, the Supreme Court set aside the judgement of the trial court, which was confirmed by the High Court. The trial court convicted two accused under Section 394 and 397 IPC and the third accused under Section 25 of the Arms Act.

FACTS:

The complainant purchased and was going back to his village Rana Majra meanwhile he was apprehended by three persons near the cremation ground around 8:00 pm. They asked him to hand over things to them but he only had grocery items. On hearing this, they give him leg blows and fists and took his wristwatch. Seeing a  tractor coming from the side of the village and he cried for help. On seeing this, two persons helped the complainant. Those three men inflicted injury on all these persons. Mahindra Singh a resident of village Balehra came to the spot and apprehended one person who was with a knife. He disclosed his name as Satpal and the other members were Anwar and Bablu. Taking advantage of darkness, Satpal flew from the place. An FIR was lodged by the Complainant. The trial court convicted Anwar and Bablu for a punishment of seven years and ₨ 2000. The High Court also confirmed the decision of the Trial Court.

CONTENTIONS:

Appellant:

The appellant contended that the story built by the prosecution on the basis of the complaint is concocted. Such incident was never has taken place. Recovery of the pistol is in doubt as the memo of personal search after the arrest of the appellant mentioned that nothing was found at that time. The memo of pistol says that the pistol was found when the arrest of the appellant was done. It is contrary to the memo of personal search. The allegation of the purse is also in doubt as nothing such allegation was made in the FIR. Many witnesses were declared hostile.

Respondent:

The counsel from the respondent said that the entire prosecution was duly supported by witnesses. Merely few witnesses were declared hostile, which does not demolish the case. The concurrent findings of facts were recorded by the lower courts and there is no call for interference by this Court.

JUDGEMENT:

In this case, the Apex Court held that the recovery and memos of the pistol are highly doubtful as the memo of personal search says that no pistol was found, but the memo of pistol says that it was found in the right pocket of the appellant when he was arrested which was highly doubtful in the view of Apex Court and can demolish the case by this reason only. The medical report of the pistol also suggests that it was never used. Witnesses turning hostile also holds importance, and material witness was not presented by the prosecution. Therefore on these findings by the Apex Court, the Court set aside the impugned judgement of the Trial Court which was confirmed by the High Court. The appeal was allowed thereafter.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/41h77af

Introduction

The law of torts is a significant part of the Indian legal system, providing remedies to individuals who have suffered harm due to the wrongful acts of others. Over the years, the law of torts in India has witnessed significant growth and development, thanks to the active role played by the judiciary. The courts have interpreted and applied tort law principles in various cases, shaping and expanding the scope of the law. In this context, this discussion will examine the growth of the law of torts in India and the role of the judiciary in shaping it. We will also explore how the Indian courts have relied on the principles of tort law in other common law jurisdictions to fill gaps in the Indian law of torts.

Relevance

The law of torts in India has seen significant growth and development over the years, with the judiciary playing a crucial role in shaping and expanding the scope of the law. Tort law refers to civil wrongs or injuries that are committed by one party against another, resulting in harm or loss, and for which the aggrieved party can seek compensation.

The growth of the law of torts in India can be traced back to the colonial period when the British introduced the concept of negligence and other tortious liability concepts to the Indian legal system. Over time, Indian courts have expanded the scope of the law to include various types of torts, such as nuisance, defamation, and trespass.

One of the key factors that have contributed to the growth of the law of torts in India is the changing socio-economic and political landscape of the country. As India has developed into a more complex and diverse society, the legal system has had to adapt to meet the changing needs and demands of its citizens. The growth of tort law has been driven by a need to protect individual rights and interests, as well as to promote social justice and equity.

Another factor that has played a significant role in shaping the law of torts in India is the role of the judiciary. The Indian judiciary has been proactive in interpreting and expanding the scope of tort law, often relying on international legal principles and jurisprudence to guide its decisions. Through its judgments, the judiciary has not only clarified the legal principles and concepts of tort law but has also established new precedents that have had far-reaching implications for the development of the law.

One example of the judiciary’s role in shaping the law of torts in India is the landmark case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India^[1]. In this case, the Supreme Court of India recognized the concept of absolute liability, which holds industries strictly liable for any harm caused by their activities, regardless of whether they were negligent or not. This decision has had a significant impact on the development of environmental law in India, as it has provided a powerful tool for holding polluting industries accountable for their actions.

Another example of the judiciary’s role in shaping the law of torts in India is the recent case of Shayara Bano v. Union of India^[2]. In this case, the Supreme Court of India declared the practice of triple talaq (instant divorce) among Muslims to be unconstitutional and violative of the fundamental rights of women. This decision has not only had a significant impact on the rights of Muslim women but has also expanded the scope of tort law to include violations of fundamental rights as a tortious acts.

In conclusion, the growth of the law of torts in India has been driven by a need to protect individual rights and interests, promote social justice and equity, and adapt to the changing needs and demands of society. The judiciary has played a critical role in shaping and expanding the scope of the law, through its proactive interpretation and application of legal principles and concepts. As India continues to evolve, it is likely that the law of torts will continue to grow and develop, driven by the changing needs and demands of its citizens and the role of the judiciary in shaping the law.

Criticism of Growth of Torts

The law of torts in India has seen significant growth and development over the years, and the judiciary has played a crucial role in shaping the law. Tort law is concerned with providing remedies for civil wrongs or injuries caused by one party to another. The development of the law of torts in India can be traced back to the colonial period when the British introduced the concept of tort law in India.

One of the significant contributions of the judiciary in shaping the law of torts in India has been the recognition and expansion of the scope of tort liability. In the landmark case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India^[3], the Supreme Court recognized the principle of absolute liability, which holds that any enterprise engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity must pay compensation to those who suffer harm from such activity, irrespective of whether or not the enterprise has been negligent. This decision expanded the scope of tort liability and ensured that victims of industrial accidents and environmental disasters received compensation for their losses. Another important contribution of the judiciary has been the recognition of new causes of action in tort law.

For instance, in the case of Vishakha v. State of Rajasthan^[4], the Supreme Court recognized sexual harassment at the workplace as a violation of a woman’s fundamental rights and awarded compensation to the victim. Similarly, in the case of R.K. Anand v. Delhi High Court^[5], the court recognized the tort of criminal contempt, which had not been previously recognized in India.

The judiciary has also played a crucial role in developing the principles of vicarious liability in India. Vicarious liability holds that an employer is liable for the torts committed by its employees in the course of their employment. The doctrine of vicarious liability has been expanded to cover not only traditional employer-employee relationships but also situations where a person has a sufficient degree of control over the activities of another person.

However, there are also some criticisms of the growth of the law of torts in India and the role of the judiciary in shaping the law. One of the main criticisms is that the development of tort law in India has been slow and inconsistent, and there is a lack of clarity on many tort law principles. For instance, there is no clear definition of what constitutes a tortious act, and the standards for determining negligence are not well-defined. This lack of clarity has led to uncertainty and confusion in the application of tort law in India.

Another criticism is that the judiciary’s role in shaping the law of torts has been too expansive, and this has led to judicial activism. Some argue that the courts have taken on a policymaking role in developing tort law, which should be left to the legislature. Judicial activism has also led to an increase in litigation and the clogging of the court’s dockets. In conclusion, while the growth of the law of torts in India and the judiciary’s role in shaping the law have been significant, there are also criticisms of the slow and inconsistent development of the law and the judiciary’s expansive role in policymaking. There is a need for greater clarity and coherence in tort law principles to ensure greater certainty and predictability in their application.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the law of torts has seen significant growth and development in India over the years. The judiciary has played a crucial role in shaping the law through its interpretations and rulings on various tort cases. The courts have often applied principles from other common law jurisdictions to fill gaps in the Indian law of torts. Additionally, the judiciary has expanded the scope of tort liability by recognizing new causes of action and extending the boundaries of existing torts. Overall, the growth of the law of torts in India and the role of the judiciary in shaping it have been instrumental in providing a remedy to individuals who have suffered harm due to the wrongful acts of others.

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Endnotes:

1. M.C.Mehta v. Union of India, 1987 SCR (1) 819; AIR 1987 965
2. Shayara Bano v. Union of India, AIR 2017 9 SCC 1 (SC)
3. Ibid 1
4. Vishaka and Ors. v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011
5. R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, 2009 8 SCC 106

This article is written by Aehra Tayyaba Hussain, a 1st-year B.A. LLB student at Symbiosis Law School Hyderabad. 

-Report by Bhavana Bhandari

In a landmark decision case Income Tax Officer vs Vikram Sujitkumar Bhatia, the Supreme Court of India held that the Assessing officer under the Income Tax Act 1961 shall be authorized to initiate proceedings under Section 153C of the Act even against person non-searched persons, and the same shall have a retrospective effect for searches were conducted before the amendment in 2015.

FACTS:

On 11.09.2012, the original writ petitioner filed his Return of Income for the Assessment Year (A.Y.) 2012-13, declaring a total income of around 44 Lakhs as business income from a partnership firm and other income. A notice dated 08.02.2018 was issued by the Income Tax Assessing Officer to begin proceedings against the assessee under Section 153C of the Act, 1961. In a letter dated 01.05.2018, the assessee submitted his response and his income tax return, and the assessed officer received it to his satisfaction. Although no evidence was found against the petitioner, the assessing officer seized a hard disc containing an Excel sheet containing data from the searched person, which included references to the petitioner’s name.

The writ petitioner objected to the actions taken following Section 153C of the Income-Tax Act of 1962, claiming that the requirement that any money, bullion, jewelry, or other valuable item or thing be “belongs or belong to” a person other than the searched child was not met. In response to a writ petition submitted by the petitioner, the Gujarat High Court ruled that Section 153C of the Act of 1961 is a mechanism for determining the assessee’s income who is on search by authorities.

The Assessment Officer was satisfied with the evidence and directed the court to summon an assessee if books of account or documents about him or containing information about him were found during the search. However, the Amendment Act of 2015 went into effect, and petitioners who were not included during the search were now sought to be included because the satisfaction notes and notices under the Income Tax Act of 1961 were issued after the amendment went into effect. The Gujarat High Court’s decision to invalidate the notice under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act 1961 was challenged by the Income Tax Department in the current set of appeals and a Special Leave petition to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

The primary issue for the Apex Court to address was whether the Finance Act of 2015’s amendment to Section 153C of the Income Tax Act of 1961 would apply to searches conducted according to Section 132 of the Act of 1961 before 01.06.2015, the amendment’s effective date.

CONTENTIONS:

Appellant’s Contentions:

When arguing against the current appeals, the attorney representing the assesses vehemently asserted that the point of applicability of the existing law in search cases specifically, whether Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, as amended with effect from 01.06.2015 would apply to cases where the search is initiated before that date—was the subject of contention in the current group of appeals. It is further argued on behalf of the respective assessees that the Department’s position—that Section 153C of the Act, 1961 is a procedural and machinery provision—means that the amendment, even though it took effect on June 1, 2015, is retroactive and, as a result, applies to situations in which searches were conducted before the amendment but notices under Section 153C of the Act, 1961 were issued after the amendment.

Respondent Contentions:

The Additional Solicitor General of India appearing for the respondent submitted that the concerned amendment in Section 153C was necessary given the observation made by the Delhi High Court in the case of PepsiCo India Holdings Private Limited v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, wherein the High Court observed that the words “belong or belong to” should not be confused with the words “relates to or refers to,” making the former much narrower than the latter. Due to this, the court determined that the provision could only be used if the documents or other materials “belong” to a third party (other than the searched person).

JUDGEMENT:

Relying on the Delhi High Court in the case PepsiCo India Ltd. vs Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (2014) had given a restrictive meaning to the words “belong/belongs, the Supreme Court held that Section I53C of the Finance Act of 2015 was amended to replace the words with “pertain/pertains to.” It is incorrect to claim that a document “belongs” to someone simply because copies of it were taken from them because the originals were with someone else.

The Supreme Court further observed that the amendment to Section 153C of the Act, 1961 without the inclusion of incriminating materials in the form of books of account or documents or assets relating to them from the premises of the searched person may not be subjected to the proceedings under Section153C solely on the ground that the search was conducted before the amendment is accepted.
The Court must avoid any interpretation that might undermine the law’s or statute’s fundamental goals and purposes. The judgment stated that the amendment to Section 153C of the Income Tax Act would not apply to searches conducted under Section 132 of the Income Tax Act before 01.06.2015, the amendment’s effective date, which is in the revenue’s favor and against the assesses.

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-Report by Bhavana Bhandari

In Madhyamam Broadcasting v. Union of India & ors, the Supreme Court decided that the State cannot claim complete immunity from the disclosure of materials essentially by asserting the information related to national security. The idea of national security does not enable the principles of natural justice to be suspended, and the Court shall be the appropriate authority to determine whether the request for non-disclosure has a proper and suitable linkage to the claim for national security.

FACTS:

In 2011, the Ministry of Home Affairs granted the appellant Madhyamam Broadcasting Limited (MBL) “MediaOne” security clearance for 10 years of operation. However, within six years, the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting issued a notice to show cause to MBL, ordering the security clearance to be revoked. Furthermore, the respondent refused to renew the license based on national security, but the specific reasons were not disclosed.

To contest the MIB’s order “revoking” Media One’s permission to uplink and downlink the decisions of the Division Bench of the High Court, the appellants brought an action under Article 136 of the Constitution. Based on the information provided to the court in a sealed cover by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs, the High Court of Kerala dismissed the petitions filed by MBL and other respondents, stating that license revocation may be necessary when constitutional considerations are prevalent. Following this, the appellants filed an appeal with India’s Supreme Court.

CONTENTIONS:

Appellant’s Contention

The appellant’s counsel asserted that MIB’s revocation of the permission granted to uplink and downlink the channel, Media One, was unconstitutional. Only the granting of permission to operate a channel and not the renewal of existing permission are subject to the requirement of security clearance. Even if it goes beyond the logical limitations on press freedom outlined in Article 19(2) of the Constitution, it cannot be denied. The restrictions outlined in Article H(2) must be read in conjunction with Section 4(6) of the Republications Act of 1995 and the Cable Television Networks (Regulations) Act of 1995 to determine whether or not security clearance will be granted or denied.

The security clearance was not revoked between 2011 and 2022, but the renewal should have been granted if the show cause notice did not allege any violation of the terms of the agreement. By providing information in a “sealed cover,” the Union of India violated the principles of an open court and party fairness. The respondent only stated that the material was sensitive and that the denial was made in the interests of national security and no reason was disclosed for the reasons for such denial by the respondents.

Respondent’s Arguments

Mr. K. M. Nataraj, Additional Solicitor General, representing each of the respondents, argued that MIB was justified in revoking the permission given to Media One because security clearance is a prerequisite for license renewal. The Centre asserted that judgments in the case Ex-Army Men’s Protection Services Private Limited v. Union of India and Others (2014) and Digi Cable and Network (India) Private Limited v. Union of India and Others (2019) have already established that the natural justice principle shall not be applicable in case of natural security.

ISSUES:

1. Whether security clearance is one of the conditions required for renewal of permission under the Uplinking and Downlinking Guidelines; 
2. Whether rejecting a license renewal and the decisions made by the Division Bench of the High Court infringed the appellants’ procedural rights under the Constitution.
3. Whether the order refusing renewal of license was an arbitrary restriction on the appellant’s right to freedom of speech and expression.

JUDGEMENT:

Justices CJI D.Y. ChandraChud and Justice Hima Kohli made up the two-judge panel that delivered the decision. Granting blanket immunity to the reports of all the investigative agencies from disclosure is negating to a transparent and accountable system, and these reports have a deeper impact on decisions affecting the life, liberty, and profession of individuals and entities. 

Thus, it is possible to obstruct the release of any investigative reports in any way. Even when national security concerns are used to justify the withholding of information, the courts should still take a less rigorous course of action.

To fairly exclude materials after a successful public interest immunity claim, courts should take the recourse of redacting confidential portions of the sealed cover document and providing a summary of the document’s contents.

The Court continued by saying that it can still examine whether the State’s refusal to disclose has any connection to national security although it is acknowledged that confidentiality and national security are both respectable objectives. Referring to the Pegasus case (ML Sharma v. Union of India), it was stated that the courts would not take a “hands-off” stance simply because national security claims were made.

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-Report by Harshit Gupta

In the case of “The Chairman & Managing Director City Union Bank Ltd. & Anr. V. R, Chandramohan“, the apex court held that the burden of proving the deficiency in service is on the aggrieved party, and in the present case, the respondent-aggrieved was not able to prove that there was any deficiency in service.

FACTS:

The present appeal was from the order dated 01.02.2007 passed by National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Circuit Bench at Chennai hereinafter “National Commission.” The National Commission confirmed the judgment and order dated 23.12.2004 of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Chennai “State Commission.” The facts behind the case are that the respondent here was a complainant against the appellants before the State Commission for a deficiency in service on the side of banks. The respondent is a Managing Director of “D-Cube Constructions (P) Ltd” and has its office in Chennai. Shri R. Thulasiram and Shri R. Murali were the other directors of the same company. An NRI named Ravindra sent two drafts one for 5 lakhs and another one for 3 lakhs INR. On checking out, the respondent found that the drafts have not been credited to his account. Later the respondent came to know that appellant No. 2 was presented and the same was paid to the City Union Bank, Ram Nagar Branch. The respondent requested that appellant No. 2 to re-credit the amount to his account. Respondent found that another account in the name of “D-Cube Construction” is being operated and the drafts were credited into that account. He thereafter filed a complaint in the State Commission and was decided in the favour of the complainant by granting him rupees 8 lakhs along with one lakh as compensation. Being aggrieved by the order of the State Commission, the appeal was filed in the National Commission and was dismissed by the National Commission.

CONTENTIONS:

Appellants:

The counsel for the appellants contended that both the Commissions had erred while giving Judgement and Order in this case as there was no fault or imperfection from the side of the Bank and there was no deficiency in service under section 2(1)(g) of Consumer Protection Act, 1986. He relied on cases “Ravneet Singh Bagga V. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines and Anr. ” and “Branch Manager, Indigo Airlines Kolkata and Anr. V. Kalpana Rani Debbarma and Ors” that the complaint was not even maintainable before the State Commission and the respondent had failed to prove any deficiency in service on the part of the appellants. He also contended that drafts were issued in the name of “D-Cube Construction” only.

Respondent:

The counsel for the respondent contended that two forums had consistently held the appellants liable for the deficiency in service. He further added that the banks are vicariously liable for the actions of their employees. He further relied on the cases “Kerala State Cooperative Marketing Federation V. State Bank of India and Ors.” and “Indian Overseas Bank V. Industrial Chain Concern.”

JUDGEMENT:

In the current case, the main issue was that was there any deficiency in service as required by the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and in answer to this question the Court held that there was any willful neglect in deficiency in service or imperfection or shortcoming. The Court relied on the appellants’ case of Bagga. The court said that since some disputes were among the director, therefore, the bank cannot hold them liable if they acted bona fide and followed the due procedure. The Court further added that the burden to prove is on the aggrieved party and here the respondent was unable to prove that there was any deficiency in service on the part of the bank. Hence the order of the National Commission and State Commission was set aside.

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-Report by Harshit Gupta

Anticipatory bail was granted to all accused in the case of Mahmood Bava V. Central Bureau of Investigation decided on 20-03-2023. 

FACTS:

This case involves many accused, who were booked under sections 420, 466, 467 471 read with section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and section 13(2) read with section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In this case, M/s. NaftoGaz India Pvt Ltd. secured a loan from a consortium of banks led by SBI. After 27.07.2012 the account of the bank was showing signs of sickness and on 22.11.2012, the account was classified as NPA, and on 03.02.2015, the account was declared fraudulent account. One property as security was found to be in litigation and another property was overvalued. Thereafter, the Loan Company lodged the FIR on 26.06.2019, and none of the accused was taken into custody by CBI. It seemed to the court that each accused cooperated in the investigation and the final report was filed by CBI on 31.12.2021, and after this, special courts issued summons for the appearance of all accused in the court on 07.03.2022. Therefore, apprehending arrest, the appellants moved to the special court with the application of Anticipatory Bail, which was rejected by the said Court and was confirmed by the High Court of Allahabad. Therefore, the Appellants approached Supreme Court. 

CONTENTIONS:

Respondent:

Accused no. 2, Shri Mahdoom Bava, is stated to be the promoter/director of the Company and he is alleged to be the kingpin. Accused no. 3, Shri Deepak Gupta is a third party who has allegedly given his personal guarantee. According to the prosecution, he claimed title to the property based on fictitious documents and he sold away some proportions of his property before the mortgage. Accused No. 10 was alleged to have created bogus bills and fake lorry receipts, in connivance with accused No. 2, to enable the Company to have the bills discounted. Accused 14 namely Yatish Sharma was alleged to have operated the account of M/s Shri Radhey Traders. The respondent also contended that the prime accused, no. 2, Mahdoom Bava, is also involved in 11 other cases.

JUDGEMENT:

In this, the judgement was delivered by Justice V. Rama Subramanian by granting SLP, as the criminal appeal arose from the SLPs. The judgement was so delivered and granted anticipatory bail to the accused on the basis that they cooperated through the investigation, and they would do so in future if they were summoned during the trial. The prayer of anticipatory bail was opposed vehemently by the respondent. But the court was of the view that there were three factors which tilted the balance in the favour of the accused. Factor one was that the custody of all accused was not required during the investigation, therefore, it is now hard to digest that custody is now required at this stage. Factor two is that in the case of Shree Deepak Gupta, CBI took the stand before the special court that the presence of the accused during the investigation is not required but it will surely need during the trial. Therefore, the Apex Court considered this as the only presence of all accused is required not the custody during the trial to face the trial. Factor three the Apex Court considered is that the complaint is borne out of records and the primary focus is on documentary evidence, so the court did not understand the arrest of all accused during this time as the offence was committed a decade ago. In the respondent’s contention of 11 cases, appeal arouse from 3 cases and 7 were of 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The eighth case is filed by an income tax officer for non-payment of the TDS amount. In this case, anticipatory bail was granted by the Court to all accused based on the findings of the Court. 

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