Tag: #caseanalysis

Citation

1979 AIR 621, 1979 SCR (2) 641

Date of Judgment

12/12/1978

Court

Supreme Court of India

Bench

• Justice P.N. Bhagwati
• Justice V.D. Tulzapulkar

Introduction

According to the Promissory Estoppel doctrine, the promisor will refrain from breaking the promise if it would be unfair for him to do so whenever an unambiguous promise is made with the intent to establish a legal relationship or affect one that will arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the other party and is in fact acted on. This is the main referred law in this present case. If parties who had already agreed to clear-cut terms involving specific legal outcomes later engage in negotiation, it may be assumed that Promissory Estoppel only applies to situations in which the parties are already bound by a legal or contractual relationship and one of them promises the other that strict legal rights under the contract won’t be enforced. However, the court found that the theory of promissory estoppel, even as it was originally stated by Lord Denning in the High Trees case, did not contain any such limitation, and thus it cannot apply in the current case, Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills.

Background of the Case

The appealing party in this instance was a limited sugar production company. His main line of work was producing and selling sugars. On October 10th, 1968, news broke that the respondent (In this case- The state of Uttar Pradesh) had decided to exempt all new modern units in the State of Uttar Pradesh from the Tax charges for a period of three years under Section 4-A of the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948. On October 11th, 1968, the appealing party spoke with the Director of Industries, stating that the party sought confirmation of the exemption and wished to establish a factory to produce vanaspati in light of the business charge occasion given by the administration. The appointment was confirmed by the director of industries. The Chief Secretary of the Government of Uttar Pradesh made an affirmation with a similar effect too.

The appealing party went ahead and built up the processing plant after receiving these certifications. The Uttar Pradesh State government reexamined the issue of exclusion in May 1969 and suggested the litigant attend a gathering. The representative of the appealing party testified at the meeting that the plaintiff had continued constructing the manufacturing facility on the affirmation and assurance of the respondent (the legislature of Uttar Pradesh). He took out a sizable loan and began to pay it back under the impression that the government had exempted him from paying taxes. But after some time, the government reconsidered its tax exemption strategy. It requested the petitioner attend a meeting discussing this matter and called for one to be held. To attend the meeting, the petitioner dispatched a representative. In any case, the State Government of Uttar Pradesh made the strategic decision on January 20th, 1970, to grant a small reduction in the deals charge to new vanaspati units that began operations by September 30th, 1970. Once again, however, the State govt. went back even on this promise denying any concession to be given. Plaintiff sued the government on account of promissory estoppel.

Issues Raised

The issues raised in this case are-

1. Whether the plaintiff’s acceptance of a partial exemption rendered his entitlement to have a cause of action?
2. Whether the plaintiff has a claim based on promissory estoppel?
3. Is it possible to take such action against the government when it is functioning in such capacities as government, sovereign, or administrative?
4. Given that the plaintiff did not experience any harm, would the theory of Promissory Estoppel apply in the current situation?

Contentions of Parties

Arguments of Petitioner- The main defence put forth on behalf of the appellant was that the respondent had made a categorical assurance on behalf of the State Government that the appellant would be exempt from payment of sales tax for a period of three years from the date of commencement of production. This assurance was made knowing or intending that the appellant would act on it, and in fact, the appellant did act in reliance on it and the State Government changed its position. The appellant argued that since waiver was a factual issue that needed to be pled and since it wasn’t addressed in the affidavit submitted by the State Government in opposition to the writ petition, the State Government was ineligible to rely on the waiver argument. It was claimed by the appellant that even if the waiver defence was allowed to be raised, despite the fact that it had no mention in the pleadings, no waiver had been established because there was no evidence to support the circumstances under which it had sent the letter. It was also impossible to claim that the appellant, with full knowledge of its right to claim complete exemption from payment of sales tax, had sent the letter.

Arguments from Respondent side- On the other hand, the State Government vigorously advanced the waiver argument, arguing that by addressing the letter dated June 25, 1970, the appellant had expressly forfeited its entitlement to full exemption from payment of sales tax. The State Government further argued that, even in the event of a waiver, the appellant would not be permitted to enforce the assurance provided by the fourth respondent because the State Government was not a party to the assurance, and that, in addition, in the absence of notification under section 4A, the State Government could not be prevented from enforcing the appellant’s obligation to pay sales tax under the terms of the Act. The State Government argued that there could not be a promissory estoppel against the State Government in order to prevent it from developing and carrying out its policies in the public interest. These were essentially the opposing arguments put out on behalf of the parties, and we will now analyse them.

Judgement

Though the division bench of the High Court rejected the plea for seeking promissory Estoppel against the respondents, the honourable Supreme Court held that-

1. The decision of the High Court of not granting Promissory Estoppel on the ground that the petitioner has waived that right and so can not have his course of action was wrong.
2. The waiver is a factual issue that needs to be adequately argued and proven. No plea of waiver may be raised unless it is pleaded and the facts supporting it are set forth in the pleadings.
3. Waiver is the act of giving up a right; it can be expressed or inferred from behaviour, but it must be “an intentional act with knowledge” in order to be considered valid. There can be no waiver unless the individual who is supposed to have done so is fully aware of his rights and intentionally gives them up while doing so.
4. ‘Promissory estoppel’ is a legal theory that was developed by equity to prevent injustice when a promise is made by someone who knows that it will be carried out and who is the person to whom it is made and in fact it is so. It is unfair to permit the party making the promise to break it after it has been acted upon. Despite being known as promissory estoppel, this legal doctrine has nothing to do with contracts or estoppel. The interposition of equity, which has always acted in accordance with form to lessen the burdens of strict law, serves as the foundation of the concept.
5. The true meaning of promissory estoppel is that when one party makes a clear and unambiguous promise to another party through words or conduct that is intended to forge a future legal relationship, knowing or intending that the other party will act on the promise, and that the other party actually does act on the promise, the promise will be enforceable against the party who made it and he will be bound by it whether there is a pre-existing relationship between those parties or not. In a situation when justice and fairness call for it, equity will prevent a person from insisting on stringent legal rights even when they originate from his own title deeds or from legislation rather than under any contract.
6. The same limiting estoppel in the strict meaning of the word cannot prevent the notion of promissory estoppel. It is an equitable concept that the Courts developed for the purpose of upholding justice, thus there is no reason why it should only be applied sparingly as a form of defence or used as a shield rather than a sword to establish a claim. It might serve as the impetus for legal action.
7. The Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the request of the promisee even though there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required when the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and the promisee, acting in reliance on it, changes his position.
8. The doctrine of promissory estoppel must give way when equity demands it since it is an equitable doctrine. The Court would not raise equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against the Government if the Government could demonstrate that, given the facts as they have developed, it would be unfair to hold it to the promise it made.
9. The moral standards of the society must be in accordance with the law for it to be legitimate and win social approval. Closing the gap between morality and law and achieving as close to a match as feasible between the two should be the constant goal of legislatures and courts. A key judicial advancement in that direction is the promissory estopped concept.
10. The distinction between a private person and a public body cannot be made in terms of the promissory estoppel theory.  This idea also applies to a government entity like a city council. This approach, however, cannot be used to circumvent a legal responsibility or liability. It cannot be used to force the government or even a private person to carry out an unlawful act. Additionally, promissory estoppel cannot be used to prevent the exercise of legislative power. By using the promissory estoppel concept, the Legislature can never be prevented from doing its legislative duties.

Conclusion

The case turned out to be very important in other cases. The court attempted to define promissory estoppels in this instance. This case did a good job of demonstrating how promissory estoppel could be a defence. However, it must be used with the doctrine of consideration if it is to be used as a weapon. This case demonstrated how important it is for society to stop fraud and injustice. This certificate appeal brings up a significant issue in the area of public law. Although it is a relatively new doctrine, it has the potential to be so prolific and packed with development opportunities that traditional attorneys are concerned it could upend established doctrines, which are viewed almost reverently and have held the line for decades.

This article is authored by Dibyojit Mukherjee, a student at the Institute of Law, Nirma University.

RELEVANT POST:

Doctrine of Estoppel

Case Number

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 22nd June 1965 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Application No. 613 of 1965. Criminal Appeal No. 107 of 1965, decided on the 6th day of September 1965.

Equivalent Citation

1966 AIR 424 1966 SCR (1) 702.

Bench

• Hon’ble Justice K. Subba Rao.
• Hon’ble Justice K.N Wanchoo.
• Hon’ble Justice J.C Shah.
• Hon’ble Justice S.M Sikri.
• Hon’ble Justice V. Ramaswami.

Decided On

06/09/1965

Introduction

The law on the rights of detainees has been a developing one. It involves the most extreme disgrace that a nation like India doesn’t have classified laws on the rights of prisoners. There is additionally no thorough regulation to manage prisoners’ privileges and direct their lead while in jail. Notwithstanding, the legal executive of the nation has given due acknowledgement to the convicts and held their fundamental rights time once more. Without exhaustive regulation, it has figured out how to start trends and standards maintaining the different privileges of detainees that guide as well as tie every one of the courts in India.

Brief Facts

Prabhakar Pandurang Sanzgiri was kept by the Government of Maharashtra under Section 30(1)(b) of the Protection of India Rules, 1962, in the Bombay Region Jail to keep him from acting in a way biased to the safeguard of India, public security, and support of the public request. With the consent of the public authority, Sanzgiri composed a book in Marathi named “Anucha Antarangaat” (Inside the Atom). The High Court passed judgment on investigating the book’s chapter-by-chapter guide and reasoned that it managed the hypothesis of elementary particles equitably and expected to teach individuals and disperse information regarding the quantum hypothesis. The book was absolutely of logical interest and couldn’t make any bias in the protection of India, public wellbeing, or upkeep of public request The High Court of Bombay held that the request for confinement didn’t control Sangir’s social equality and freedoms and that he could carry on his exercises inside the circumstances overseeing his detainment. The State of Maharashtra pursued against the High Court’s organization, The Bombay Conditions of Detention Order, 1951, which regulates the particulars of Sanzgirt’s detainment, doesn’t permit him to compose a book and send it out of jail for distribution. Be that as it may, the Maharashtra Government didn’t depend on this standard, and it just applies to letters to and from security detainees and doesn’t control the conveying of jail books for distribution.

Issues before the Court

Whether the High Court’s choice that Sanzgiri’s book was simply of logical interest and couldn’t make any bias in the guard of India, public wellbeing, or upkeep of public request was right, and whether Sanzgini’s social equality and freedoms were controlled by the request for confinement?

Arguments

The request passed by the High Court was right, and the appeal fizzled and was excused.

The High Court decided to survey the book’s chapter-by-chapter list and inferred that it managed the hypothesis of elementary particles equitably and expected to instruct individuals and scatter information regarding the quantum hypothesis. The book was absolutely of logical interest and couldn’t make any bias against the guard of India, public wellbeing, or support of the public request. The High Court of Bombay held that the request for detainment didn’t control Sanzgari’s social equality and freedoms and that he could carry on his exercises inside the circumstances overseeing his confinement.

The Bombay States of Detainment Request, 1951, which directs the particulars of Sanzgini’s confinement, doesn’t permit him to compose a book and send it out of the jail for distribution. Nonetheless, the Maharashtra Government didn’t depend on this standard, and it just applies to letters to and from security detainees and doesn’t direct the conveying of jail books for distribution. Whether or not this standard applies to the conveying of jail books for distribution might emerge on the off chance that a suitable condition is forced limiting the freedom of an accused in this.

The decision of the Court

1. Prabhakar Pandurang Sanzgiri, who has been kept by the Public authority of Maharashtra under R. 30 (1) (b) of the Safeguard of India Rules, 1962, in the Bombay District Jail to keep him from acting in a way biased to the protection of India, public wellbeing and support of the public request, has composed, with the consent of the said Government, a book in Marathi under the title “Anucha Antarangaat” (Inside the Atom). The learned Adjudicators of the High Court who had gone through the chapter-by-chapter guide of the book offered their viewpoint on the book subsequently:
   
   “We are satisfied that the manuscript book deals with the theory of elementary particles objectively. The manuscript does not purport to be a research work, but it purports to be a book written to educate the people and disseminate knowledge regarding quantum theory”.
   
2. The book is, thusly, simply of logical interest and it couldn’t make any bias in the protection of India, public security, or upkeep of public request. In September 1964, the accused applied to the public authority of Maharashtra looking for consent to send the composition out of the prison for distribution yet the Government by its letter, dated Walk 27, 1965, dismissed the solicitation He again applied to the Administrator, Arthur Street Jail, for authorization to send the original copy out and that also was dismissed. From that point, he documented a petition under Art, 226 of the Constitution In the High Court of Maharashtra at Bombay for guiding the Province of Maharashtra to allow him to convey the composition of the book composed by him for its possible distribution. The Public authority of Maharashtra in the counter-sworn statement didn’t affirm that the distribution of the said book would be biased to the objects of the Protection of India Act, yet asserted that the Public authority was not legally necessary to allow the accused to distribute books while in detainment. The High Court of Bombay held that the social equality and freedoms of a resident were not the slightest bit checked by the request for detainment and that it was generally open to the revenue to carry on his exercises inside the circumstances overseeing his confinement. It further held that no standards were disallowing an accused from sending a book outside the prison to get it distributed. In that view, the High Court guided the Public authority to permit the composition book to be sent by the accused to his significant other for its possible distribution. The Province of Maharashtra has favoured the current allure against the expressed request of the Great Court.
   
3. The conflicts of the took in Extra Specialist General might be momentarily expressed thus: When an individual is kept he loses his opportunity; he is as of now not a liberated person and, consequently, he can practice just such honours as are given on him by the request for confinement. The Bombay States of Detainment Request, 1951, which manages the details of the primary respondent’s confinement, doesn’t give him any honour or right to compose a book and send it out of the jail for distribution. On the side of his conflict, he depends upon the perceptions of Des, 1, as he then was, in A. K. Gopalan vs State of Madras, wherein the learned Appointed authority has communicated the view, with regards to principal privileges, that assuming a resident loses the opportunity of his individual because of a legal detainment, he can’t guarantee the privileges under Craftsmanship. 19 of the Constitution as the evenings revered in the said article are just the characteristics of a liberated person.
   
4.  Mr. Garg learned counsel for the accused, raised before us the accompanying two focuses: (1) a limitation of the nature forced by the Public authority on the accused must be made by a request given by the suitable Government under Cls. (f) and (h) of sub(1) of R. 30 of the Guard of India Rules, 1962, hereinafter called the Remnants, and that too in severe consistency with s. 44 of the Guard of India Act, 1962, hereinafter called the Demonstration, and that as the reprimanded limitation was neither made by such a request nor did it consent to S. 44 of the Demonstration, it was an unlawful limitation on his freedom; and sub(2) neither the confinement request nor the states of detainment which administered the primary respondent’s confinement empowered the Public authority to keep the expressed respondent from sending his original copybook out of the jail for distribution, and consequently, the request for the Public authority dismissing the said respondent’s solicitation in such manner was unlawful.

Conclusion

Prisoners don’t stop being people when put in bars. The Supreme Court and numerous different courts in India have repeated this situation in a few cases with the goal that detainees don’t turn into a casualty themselves. Furthermore, are furnished with a legitimate rehabilitative climate to help them improve and turn out to be better creatures. It is officeholder upon the Focal and State legislatures to not just furnish the detainees with empathetic circumstances professionally yet additionally teach them about their privileges, so it isn’t manhandled by the strong inside the prison.

One might say that the legal executive of the nation plays a vital impact in defending the privileges of detainees at whatever point the regulative and leader have failed. It has gone about as the deliverer of the convicts and maintained their essential freedoms endlessly time once more. It has completely practised its abilities through legal activism and has more than once concocted new cures and instruments to safeguard the common freedoms to life and individual freedom. Be that as it may, much actually should be finished. In such a manner, the wide dissemination of basic liberties accessible to prisoners, immense exposure of prisoners’ rights in the media, and corner-to-corner observation in prison could be a portion of the keys to maintaining the freedoms of prisoners and guaranteeing their place of refuge in the prison.

This case analysis is done by Pranita Dhara, a student of Lloyd Law College.

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A Legal Take on Safeguards of Liberty in India

Case Number

Civil Appeal No. 230 of 1977.

Equivalent Citation

1957 AIR 540

Bench

The Supreme Court of India

Decided On

1st February 1957

Relevant Acts / Sections

The sections that are relevant in the case of Garikapatti Veeraya v N. Subbiah Choudhury are:

• Article 133 of the Constitution of India¹, deals with the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the appeals that can be filed before it.
• Order XLV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, which provides the procedure for filing Special Leave Petitions before the Supreme Court.
• Section 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908², allows for appeals to the Supreme Court in civil cases if certain conditions are fulfilled.
• Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908³, lays down the grounds on which a second appeal can be filed before a High Court.
• Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908⁴, which defines a “decree” is the official statement of a judgment that definitively settles the rights of the parties concerning one or more of the contested issues.
• According to Section 2(14) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908⁵, a “judgment” is defined as the pronouncement made by a judge based on a decree or order.

Brief Facts and Procedural History

OVERVIEW

This legal case concerns an application for special leave to appeal, which arises from a previous lawsuit that was filed on April 22, 1949, and had a value of Rs. 11,400. On February 10, 1955, the high court overruled the decision of the trial court, which had earlier dismissed the suit. However, when the applicant sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, the high court refused the application, arguing that the value of the lawsuit did not meet the minimum requirement of Rs. 20,000.

The applicant contended that they had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court, which was the highest court in the land at the time the suit was instituted, and that this right of appeal had been transferred to the Supreme Court under Article 135 of the Constitution⁶. The applicant argued that they were therefore entitled to appeal to the Supreme Court as a matter of right.

The court held, with Chief Justice Das and Justices Bhagwati, B. P. Sinha, and S. K. Das concurring and Justice Venkatarama Ayyar dissenting, that the applicant’s contention was well-founded. 

The court held that the right to appeal was a significant right that could be utilized only in situations where the verdict was unfavourable. However, it stated that this right was subject to the laws applicable at the commencement of the legal action and included all subsequent appeals from one court to another, effectively forming a single proceeding. The court also held that such a right could be taken away only by a subsequent enactment either expressly or by necessary intendment.

The court cited the case of Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. v. Irving (1905) A.C. 369⁷ and held that the vested right of appeal was a matter contemplated by Article 135 of the Constitution. The court ruled that Article 135 could not be limited to cases where the right of appeal had actually arisen in a concrete form and that the appeal was entertainable by the Supreme Court.

The court also held that Article 133 of the Constitution had no application to such cases. It was not intended to have a retrospective operation so as to take away this vested right, nor did it do so either in express terms or by necessary intendment. To summarize, the court ruled that the applicant had an inherent right to appeal to the Federal Court, and under Article 135 of the Constitution, he had the right to appeal to the Supreme Court. The court also held that Article 133 of the Constitution did not apply to such cases. Furthermore, the appellant’s vested right of appeal acquired under the old law fell under the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

Appellant’s Argument: Acquisition of Vested Right to Appeal to the Federal Court

The appellant in this case argued that he had a vested right to appeal to the Federal Court from the time he filed the suit on April 22, 1949. He contended that the Indian Independence Act of 1947 expanded the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to allow it to hear appeals that previously went to the Privy Council. 

As per the Act, starting from the appointed day, i.e., February 1, 1948, any decision falling under the purview of the Act could be appealed to the Federal Court. The appellant argued that he was entitled to appeal to the Supreme Court as of right under Article 135 of the Constitution, and Article 133 of the Constitution did not apply to cases like his.

Respondent’s Argument: Inapplicability of Article 135 and Refusal of Special Leave

The respondent argued that the appellant’s reliance on Article 135 of the Constitution was misplaced, as Article 133 was the relevant provision. They claimed that there was no vested right to appeal to the Federal Court immediately before the Constitution came into effect, and therefore, Article 133 applied. The respondent contended that since the jurisdiction to hear appeals to the Federal Court ceased to exist, the appellant had no right to appeal to the Supreme Court. Consequently, they maintained that the application for special leave to appeal should be dismissed.

Issues before the Court

• Should the petition for special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution⁸ be granted or not, in relation to the judgment and decree dated March 4, 1955, of the Andhra High Court?

In this particular case, the main issue revolved around the petitioner’s entitlement to appeal to the Supreme Court. The petitioner claimed that he had a vested right to appeal to the Federal Court, which was replaced by the Supreme Court. This right, according to the petitioner, was acquired at the time of the suit’s institution, which occurred before the Constitution came into force. In contrast, the respondent argued that the case fell under the jurisdiction of Article 133 of the Constitution, and there was no vested right to appeal to the Federal Court. As per the respondent’s argument, the petitioner had no right to appeal since the Constitution had extinguished this right.

Therefore, the court was required to determine whether the petitioner had a valid claim to appeal under the previous law and whether Article 135 or Article 133 of the Constitution was applicable to the case. Ultimately, the correct interpretation of these articles was key to the final decision, and whether the petitioner’s right to appeal had been preserved despite the constitutional changes.

Decision of the Court

After considering the opinions of several courts, the final decision was reached in this case. The majority of the courts agreed that the appellant should be granted Special Leave to Appeal to the Court on usual terms. In its judgment, the Court clarified the interpretation of Article 133 and stated that it applies to all appeals against judgments, decrees, and final orders of the High Courts in India, regardless of whether the proceedings were initiated before or after the Constitution’s commencement in civil proceedings.

The Court’s decision provides a clear and consistent legal framework for all appeals against the High Courts’ judgments. This interpretation ensures that all appeals are treated uniformly, irrespective of the time the proceedings were instituted. It also provides clarity to litigants seeking to appeal a decision, as they can now have a clear understanding of the legal provisions applicable to their case.

The Court’s ruling is an essential milestone in Indian legal history, as it resolves the ambiguity surrounding the interpretation of Article 133 and provides much-needed clarity on the scope of appeals against the High Court’s decisions. This decision will have far-reaching implications for future cases, as it provides a standard framework for interpreting and applying Article 133 in all cases involving appeals against the High Court’s decisions.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of India’s ruling in the case of Garikapatti Veeraya v N. Subbiah Choudhury, handed down in 1957, is a significant milestone in the legal history of India. This ruling provided valuable insights into the interpretation of Article 133 of the Indian Constitution, which applies to all appeals against judgments, decrees, and final orders of the High Courts in India, irrespective of when the proceedings were initiated in civil cases. As a result, this case established a uniform and unambiguous legal framework, ensuring fair and equitable treatment for all litigants.

The Garikapatti Veeraya case underscores the importance of having a clear and consistent legal system that provides clarity and consistency in the interpretation and application of the law. This landmark decision has far-reaching implications for future cases, emphasizing the need for uniformity and consistency in legal rulings. The Court’s decision, in this case, serves as a guiding light for Indian courts and legal practitioners, helping to establish a clear and uniform legal framework for the entire nation. Overall, the Garikapatti Veeraya case is a crucial milestone in India’s legal history, representing a significant step forward in ensuring the fair and equitable treatment of all litigants.

---

Endnotes:

1. INDIA CONST. art. 133.
2. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, § 109.
3. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, § 100.
4. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, § 2(2).
5. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, § 2(14).
6. INDIA CONST. art 135.
7. Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving, (1905) A.C. 369.
8. INDIA CONST. art. 136.

This case is analysed by Sohini Chakraborty, a first-year law student at RGNUL Patiala.

Case Number

158 Ind Cas 554

Equivalent Citation

(1935) 37 BOMLR 461

Bench

The Bombay High Court

Decided On

12.03.1935

Relevant Act / Section

• The Indian Contract Act, 1872
• The Insurance Act, 1938

Brief Facts and Procedural History

Introduction

This legal case centres around a minor named Madanlal Sonulal, who initiated legal proceedings against The Great American Insurance Co. Ltd. for failing to fulfil a contractual promise. The agreement was made between the minor’s guardian and the insurance company and was deemed valid. Madanlal was the only surviving son of a joint Hindu family that operated a business in Devalgaum. The family had taken out a fire insurance policy with the defendant company to cover their cotton bales. However, when the cotton bales were destroyed in a fire, the plaintiff sued the defendant company for the recovery of their loss. The defendant company, which was incorporated in New York, USA, was conducting business in Bombay, India. To represent him in the case, Madanlal was aided by his next friend, Goverdhandas Mohanlal, who was the husband of the plaintiff’s sister and with whom the plaintiff was living.

The case raises several legal issues, including the enforceability of contracts entered into by minors, the obligations of an insurance company under a fire insurance policy, and the jurisdiction of foreign companies operating in India. The court had to determine whether the contract was binding on the minor, whether the insurance company had fulfilled its obligations, and whether the court had jurisdiction to hear the case. The case has significant implications for Indian contract law, particularly in relation to minors and the obligations of insurance companies. Ultimately, the court’s ruling would have a profound impact on the rights of Indian citizens in similar legal disputes.

Facts

This is an appeal case regarding a point of law arising from Mr Justice Kania’s decision. The plaintiff, Madanlal Sonulal, is represented by Goverdhandas Mohanlal, his next friend, and has filed a lawsuit against The Great American Insurance Co., Ltd. This company is based in New York, USA, but operates in Bombay at Apollo Street within the Fort of Bombay. According to the lawsuit, the plaintiff is the only surviving coparcener of a joint Hindu family that carries on a joint family business in Devalgaum under the name Surajmal Sonulal. The plaintiff lives with his sister’s husband, Goverdhandas Mohanlal, who oversees the firm’s operations. The plaintiff had effected an insurance policy against fire with the defendant company on certain cotton bales Nevertheless, at the precise moment when the ultimate insurance was granted to the plaintiff’s company, the bales were set on fire, prompting the plaintiff to file a lawsuit seeking compensation for the resulting loss through the insurance policy. The defence raised in the written statement is that there was collusion between the agent of the defendant company and the persons who affected the insurance and that the insurance was affected after the fire. The defendants did not plead that the plaintiff was a minor and that the insurance policy was void. However, during the proceedings, the defendant’s counsel drew the attention of the learned Judge to the fact that the plaintiff was a minor and invited the Court to raise an issue as to whether the contract was void on the ground of a minority of the plaintiff. The learned Judge raised such an issue, but at the trial, he came to the conclusion that it was not necessary to answer the issue since the minority had not been pleaded.

The defendants have appealed the judgment of the learned Judge. They have not challenged the findings of fact. However, they contend that the insurance policy is void because the plaintiff is a minor, relying on the well-known decision of the Privy Council in Mohori Bibee v. Dhurmodas Ghose^[1]. The Privy Council held that any contract by a minor is wholly void under the Indian Contract Act since the Act requires that parties to a contract should be persons competent to contract, and if one of the parties is a minor, he is not competent to contract, and therefore, no contract results.

The learned Judge had found that the contract was valid and negatived the case of fraud and collusion set up by the defendant company, and gave judgment for the plaintiff. The only answer raised by the defendants is that the insurance is void because the plaintiff is a minor. This contention is alarming since it means that the property of minors cannot be insured 

In numerous joint family enterprises, minors inherit ownership rights, and typically an adult member of the family manages the business under the minor’s name. However, if this family member is unable to secure insurance on behalf of the minor, it can create a highly precarious situation. Nonetheless, the evidence indicates that the agreement was actually established by Goverdhandas, who acted as a representative through his agent Trimbaksha. In other words, the minor who entered into the contract did so through the agent Trimbaksha, who was serving as the minor’s guardian. The Court need not delve into the principles of the previous cases since the answer to the defendants’ contention is a simple one. The contract was made by the guardian of the minor, and not by the minor himself. Thus, the insurance policy is not void.

Before this case, in Mohori Bibee and Ors. Vs. Dharmodas Gosh (1903), the Privy Council had held that a contract by a minor is void-ab-initio. Yet, the Privy Council ruled in Sri Kakulam Subrahmanyam Vs. Kurra Subba Rao (1948)^[2] that an agreement made by a guardian on behalf of a minor for their advantage is considered legally binding. In Suraj Narain Dube v. Sukhu Aheer and Anr (1928)^[3], the Allahabad High Court held that the old consideration by the minor is not valid consideration for a fresh contract. In the case of Kunwarlal Daryavsingh vs Surajmal Makhanlal And Ors. (1963)^[4], the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that a minor is liable to pay rent for the property given to him on rent due to necessities for living and continuing study.

The case of General American Insurance Co v/s Madanlal Sonulal^[5] thus stands in line with the legal precedents established by the above cases, where the validity of a contract made on behalf of a minor or involving a minor was challenged and resolved.

Issues Of The Case

• Validity of the insurance made by the minor: An important matter to be addressed in this case pertains to the validity of the insurance policy made by the minor. As the minor is not legally competent to enter into a contract, the enforceability of the policy is uncertain. Thus, the court must decide whether the policy is binding or whether it should be rendered void on account of the minor’s legal incapacity.
• Liability of the insurance company to pay losses under the policy: A second matter for the court to consider is whether the insurance company is responsible for covering the losses under the policy. In the event that the policy is deemed valid, the court must then decide whether the insurance company is legally required to fulfil the terms and conditions outlined in the contract. In making this determination, the court may need to evaluate various factors such as the nature of the loss, the degree of damage incurred, as well as any provisions or restrictions included in the policy.

The case of Madanlal Sonulal v. The Great American Insurance Co. Ltd. dealt with several legal issues, including:

1. Whether a policy of insurance is void if entered into on behalf of a minor by an adult member of their family.
2. Whether the defendant could raise the defence that the contract was void on the ground of the minority of the plaintiff, citing the well-known decision of the Privy Council in Mohori Bibee v. Dhurmodas Ghose.
3. Whether the contract was actually made by the minor’s guardian acting through an agent, or whether it was made directly by an adult member of the minor’s family.
4. Whether the defendant could use technical defences to policies, especially in cases involving minors and joint family businesses.
5. Whether the law strikes an appropriate balance between protecting the rights of minors and ensuring the smooth functioning of businesses and transactions involving minors.

Decision Of The Court

In the case at hand, Defendant had raised a claim in their written statement that there was collusion between Plaintiff and the agent of Defendant’s company. According to Defendant, the insurance came into effect after the occurrence of the fire, and therefore, they were not liable for the damages. The Plaintiff’s minority was not pleaded, and as a result, the learned judge concluded that since the issue of the minority was not raised, it was not necessary to address it. The judge further held that the insurance was valid and ruled in favour of the Plaintiff in the case of collusion and fraud.

However, Defendant appealed this decision on the grounds that Plaintiff was a minor at the time the insurance was taken out, and therefore, the insurance should be considered void ab initio. The court analyzed the circumstances surrounding the insurance policy and found that it had been entered into by Goverdhandas on behalf of the minor through the agent Trimbaksha with Puranmal on behalf of the Defendant’s company. The court further noted that Puranmal had knowledge of the Plaintiff’s minority, which made the Defendant’s company aware of the Plaintiff’s status as a minor.

The court then considered whether Goverdhandas could be considered a guardian within the meaning of the relevant Act. The Act defines a guardian as a person who has the care of the person of a minor or of their property, or both. In this case, the insurance was made for the benefit of the minor and their property, and Goverdhandas had acted on behalf of the minor in entering into the insurance agreement. Therefore, the court held that the insurance was valid and dismissed the Defendant’s appeal with costs.

In light of the court’s decision, the parties agreed that the insurance company would pay Rs. 7000 to the Plaintiff. This decision reflects the court’s careful consideration of the legal issues at play, including the definition of a guardian under the relevant Act and the circumstances surrounding the insurance policy in question.

Conclusion

The case of Madanlal Sonulal v. The Great American Insurance Co. Ltd. serves as a reminder of the importance of understanding the legal implications of contracts entered into on behalf of minors and the role of guardians in such transactions. In this case, the defendant raised the defence that the contract was void on the grounds of the plaintiff’s minority, citing the decision of the Privy Council in Mohori Bibee v. Dhurmodas Ghose (1903).

However, the court ultimately ruled that the contract was not made by the minor but by Goverdhandas, acting through his agent Trimbaksha. Thus, it was the person acting as the guardian for the minor who entered into the contract through the agent. This ruling underscores the importance of understanding who the contracting parties are and whether the person entering into the contract has the legal authority to do so on behalf of the minor.

Furthermore, this case highlights the need for insurance companies to carefully consider technical defences to policies, especially in cases involving minors and joint family businesses. Insurance companies must be diligent in their review of the policy and ensure that the person who enters into the contract on behalf of the minor has the legal authority to do so.

In conclusion, while the law seeks to protect minors from entering into contracts that may be detrimental to their interests, it is essential to balance the need to protect their rights with the smooth functioning of businesses and transactions involving minors. It is important to take into account the role of guardians in such transactions and to ensure that all parties understand the legal implications of the contract before entering into it. Overall, this case serves as a valuable reminder to all parties involved in contractual relationships to be aware of the legal implications of their actions and to seek legal advice where necessary.

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Endnotes:

1. Mohori Bibee v. Dhurmodas Ghose, (1903) 30 Cal. 539 (India).
2. Sri Kakulam Subrahmanyam v. Kurra Subba Rao, AIR 1948 Mad 207 (India).
3. Suraj Narain Dube v. Sukhu Aheer and Anr, AIR 1929 All 210 (India).
4. Kunwarlal Daryavsingh v. Surajmal Makhanlal and Ors., AIR 1964 SC 193 (India).
5. Madanlal Sonulal v. The Great American Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 439 (India).

This case is analysed by Sohini Chakraborty, a first-year law student at RGNUL Patiala.

RELATED POST: When Age Matters: Examining the Implications of Minors Entering into Contracts

Year

1950

Citation

AIR 1950 SC 27

Court

The Supreme Court of India

Bench

Harilal Kania (C.J.), Justice M. Patanjali Sastri, Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, Justice B.K. Mukherjee and Justice Sudhi Rajan Das, Justice Fazal Ali Saiyid.

Introduction

A.K. Gopalan was the political opponent of the government. He filed the writ petition of habeas corpus. Habeas Corpus which means you may have the body is a writ that institutes the court to determine whether a criminal defendant has been lawfully imprisoned or not. A.K. Gopalan filed this writ petition challenging Article 19(1) (d)[1] which is the right to freedom of movement and article 21[2] which states the right to life and personal liberty. He filed this writ petition against the detention in pursuance of an order of detention made under the Prevention Detention Act, of 1950[3].

Prevention Detention Act detains the person without giving any valid reason and detention is being done because that detention is important. He challenged the validity of the order given by the court in pursuance of the Prevention Dentition Act to be “Mala Fide”.

Facts of the case

Since December 1947 A.K. Gopalan was detained several times illegally and even after the order of the court which makes him free he was kept under detention by the government under the Prevention Detention Act, of 1950. So, he filed a writ petition under article 32 for seeking the writ of habeas corpus of The Indian Constitution. He challenged the legality of order by the government as it opposes some of the articles of The Indian Constitution. He further argued that Sections 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 of the Prevention Detention Act, 1950 violate Articles 13, 19, and 21 of the Indian Constitution. But majorly he asked for this writ on the ground that the Preventive Detention Act[4] curtails his personal liberty under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. He contended that the law under Article 21 is not just the enacted law but it also includes the Principle of Natural Justice as well as some others laws associated with it that deprives the individual’s personal life and liberty. 

Petitioner contention

M.K. Nambiar appeared as a petitioner’s council. Some of the arguments put forward by the petitioner’s side were –

• The first and foremost argument was about the legality and validity of the provision of the Preventive Detention Act, of 1950 which they believed had violated Articles 13, 19, 21, and 22.
• We have article 19(1) (d) of the Indian Constitution which states the freedom to move freely within the territory of India but in this case, the State Government of Madras restricted this right by the detention of A.K. Gopala even after the decision by the court which made him free.
• The provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, of 1950 were against article 19 and challenged the statute’s failure as the petitioner’s freedom of speech and expression was revoked.
• Article 21 is in the Right to Life and personal liberty but after the prolonged detention, it seems to have no importance of Article 21 for the petitioner.
• The detention order was also arbitrary as it violates article 22. Article 22 deals with protection against arrest and detention in certain cases.
• Section 14 of the Preventive Detention Act, of 1950 violates the fundamental right under article 13 of the Indian Constitution

Respondent’s Contention

Advocate K. Rajah Ajyar (Advocate General of Madras), and M.C. Setalvad (Attorney General of India) appeared as respondent’s council 

• The respondent said that Articles 19 and 21 should not be read together as it depends on the perspective and the nature of the case in which context both the articles should be read together.
• Detention that is being done is not arbitrary, according to Article 22 which states protection against arrest and detention in certain cases.
• The legal procedure that is followed, everything is as per the constitution of India. 
• Detention does not violate any of the rights of the petitioner i.e. of articles 12, 19, 21, and 22.
• The Prevention Detention Act is completely legal and not arbitrary.
• There is no point in filing a writ petition of habeas corpus under article 32 of the Indian Constitution.

Issues raised in the case

• The Prevention Detention Act, of 1950 does violate the prevailing articles 19 and 21.
• Article 19 – Protection of certain rights regarding, speech and expression, assembly, association, residence, and profession. Article 21 – Protection of life and personal liberty is there any kind of relation between these two, and can they be read together? This was one of the major issues as it could turn out to be the deciding factor.
• Due process is a requirement that legal matters are resolved according to the established rules and principles and everyone should be treated fairly. So the issue raised was whether the procedure established by law under Article 21 is the same as that of due process of law.

Judgment

This case is a landmark case in constitutional law and is popularly known as the Prevention Detention case. After extensive discussion and wide research, the bench of judges came to the last point of the case where they were expected to give the judgment on this particular case. The court rejected the argument that Article 19 and Article 21 of the Indian Constitution are being violated because of the Prevention Detention Act, of 1950. The next particular topic on the discussion was being done was that whether the Prevention Detention Act, 1950 is ultra-vires or not, however in this particular question section 14 of the act was declared as the ultra-vires as it violates the rights guaranteed by Article 22(5) of the Indian Constitution. The court also said that being ultra-vires of section 14 of the act does not affect the validity of the whole act. The next question was whether article 19 and article 21 should be read together and if there is any kind of relationship between both articles. The court rejected this argument and said that both article is distinct and must not be read together.

The judgment of this case was given by the 6 judge’s constitutional bench in a ratio of 5:1. The decision of Justice Fazal Ali was opposite to the decision given by the other judges and his decision can be regarded as the dissenting opinion. The court said that personal liberty only means the freedom of the physical body and nothing beyond that. In the nutshell, we can say that the Supreme Court rejected the petition filed by A.K. Gopalan and said that the Prevention Detention Act, 1950 does not violate article 19(1) (d) and article 21 of the Indian Constitution.

• Dissenting opinion by Justice Fazal Ali

In this case, the dissenting opinion was given by Justice Fazal Ali; he observed that preventive detention violates the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the constitution. According to him, the Constitution recognized that personal liberty and preventive detention are arbitrary and could be misused by the government to suppress political dissent. He further argued that personal liberty was a fundamental right and could only be curtailed in accordance with the law and that the Preventive Detention Act, of 1950, did not satisfy this requirement.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Fazal Ali noted that the right to personal liberty is one of the essential parts of the freedom and dignity of the individual, and it is necessary to protect this right from arbitrary interference by the state. He said preventive detention violates this right hence it is unconstitutional.

Therefore, in the case of A.K. Gopalan vs. The State of Madras, Justice Fazal Ali highlights a commitment to a person’s rights and restricting the power of the state to interfere with personal liberty.

• Protection of Personal Liberty

The Article 21 of our Indian constitution reads “No person shall be deprived of his personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law”[5]. The word “person” that is being used in this article signifies that this Article is applicable to the citizen as well as non-citizens as everyone is entitled to personal liberty. The Article further states that this liberty cannot be taken away unless there is a procedure established by law has been followed. Concerning the fact regarding personal liberty the difference between “Due process of law” which means the process must be fair and reasonable and “procedure established by law” which means the procedure should take place in a way that the parliament has signified, was taken into consideration. However, in the judgment of this case the meaning of Article 21 was taken in a narrow sense i.e. in this case the meaning of personal liberty was taken as personal liberty is just protection of body parts and the state cannot harm the individual’s body part. Also, it was held that there is no link between Articles 14, 19, and Article 21.

After 30 years in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India[6], personal liberty was interpreted in a different sense i.e. in a wider sense. The court took the wider view of Article 21. It was held that there is a connection between Articles 19 and 21. It was also held that there is no difference between personal liberty and liberty. In personal liberty, every other liberty has been included. Therefore the concept of personal liberty was taken into consideration in a different sense before and after the case of A.K Gopalan v. State of Madras[7] thereby leading to the rejuvenation of a new concept of personal liberty in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India[8].

• Co-relation of Article 14, 19, and Article 21 before and after the case

Articles 14, 19, and Article 21 are the basic and vital Articles of the constitution, and the connection between both them is to be taken into consideration for the better interpretation of these Articles. Article 14, 19, and Article 21 are connected with each other as there forms the bedrock of the Fundamental Right guaranteed to every citizen of India. Before the case of A.K Gopalan (1950), these articles used to be taken into consideration as a separate and distinct identity. Article 14 ensures equality before the law and equal protection of the law. Article 19 guarantees six freedom to the citizens of India these freedoms are – Freedom of speech and expression, Freedom to assemble peacefully, Freedom to form associations and unions, Freedom to move freely throughout the territory of India, Freedom to reside and settle in any part of the country and the last is the freedom to practice any profession, occupation, trade or business. Article 21 guarantees the right to life and personal liberty to every citizen.

In the case of A.K Gopalan, the Supreme Court of India held that the right to personal liberty under Article 21 is limited to procedural aspects. This means the government can deprive an individual of their personal liberty as long as the procedure for doing so was legal. This decision in the case of A.K Gopalan was criticized by many as an individual could be detained infinitely without facing any trial until the procedure allows doing that.

However, in the subsequent cases, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of Article 21 to include substantive rights as well such as a free trial, the right to privacy, and the right to education, etc. under this Article. This inculcation of substantive rights in the purview of this Article 21 gives the interconnection of Articles 14, 19, and Article 21.

Conclusion

In the case of A.K. Gopalan vs. The State of Madras, the court restricted the meaning of Article 19 and Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. However, after several years in the case of Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, the court overruled this judgment and said that the opinion of Justice Fazal Ali was correct. The court further said that the scope of Article 21 and Article 19 has a wider view. From the above analysis of the case, we can conclude to the fact that the Right to life and personal liberty is not only recognized under the Indian Constitution but also intentionally recognized on the basis of the principles of natural justice. The case of A.K Gopalan is one of the most important cases of Independent India as in this case the question pertaining to Article 21 was raised for the first time after the Independence of India. However, the court took Article 21 in a narrow sense and makes it in accordance with the procedure established by the law. Almost after 30 years this decision was overruled and lastly, Article 21 was taken into a broader sense. Lastly, the court widen the view of Article 21 and said that the procedure established by the law must be just, fair, and reasonable. Therefore, from the above discussion, we can say that the case of A.K. Gopalan vs. The State of Madras (1950), was a landmark case in the Indian Constitution.

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Endnotes

1. INDIA CONST. art. 19(1) (d)
2. INDIA CONST. art. 21
3. Prevention Detention Act, 1950, Act No. 4 of 1950
4. Ibid
5. INDIA CONST. art. 21
6. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597
7. A.K Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27
8. Supra note vii

This case analysis is authored by Prashant Prasad, a second-year law student from University Law College.

CITATION

(2017) 9 SCC 1

INTRODUCTION

The case of Shayara Bano vs Union of India refers to a landmark judgment by the Supreme Court of India in 2017 that upheld the constitutional validity of the practice of Triple Talaq or instant divorce among Muslims in India. The case was filed by Shayara Bano, a Muslim woman from Uttarakhand, who challenged the practice of Triple Talaq, which allows Muslim men to divorce their wives by saying “Talaq” three times in one go, without giving any reasons or going through the legal process.

FACTS

Shayara Bano vs Union of India is a landmark case that challenged the practice of Triple Talaq or instant divorce among Muslims in India. The case was filed by Shayara Bano, a Muslim woman from Uttarakhand, who had been married to Rizwan Ahmed for 15 years and had two children. In October 2015, her husband divorced her by sending a letter with the word “Talaq” written thrice. Shayara Bano was devastated by the sudden and arbitrary divorce and decided to challenge the practice of Triple Talaq in court.

Shayara Bano’s petition challenged the legality of Triple Talaq, Nikah Halala, and polygamy, which are practices prevalent among the Muslim community in India. Triple Talaq is a practice that allows Muslim men to divorce their wives by saying “Talaq” three times in one go, without giving any reasons or going through the legal process. Nikah Halala is a practice where a divorced woman has to marry another man, consummate the marriage, and then get divorced again before remarrying her former husband. Polygamy is a practice where Muslim men are allowed to have multiple wives. Shayara Bano argued that these practices violated her fundamental rights as a woman and went against the principles of gender justice and equality enshrined in the Indian Constitution. She contended that the practices were arbitrary, and discriminatory, and left Muslim women vulnerable to abuse and injustice. She also argued that the practices were not essential to the practice of Islam and should be declared unconstitutional.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The case of Shayara Bano vs Union of India was filed in the Supreme Court of India on February 2016. Shayara Bano, the petitioner, challenged the constitutionality of the practice of Triple Talaq, which allows Muslim men to divorce their wives by saying the word “Talaq” three times in one go.

The case was assigned to a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court, which held several rounds of hearings and considered arguments from both sides. The bench was headed by Chief Justice J.S. Khehar and included Justices Kurian Joseph, Rohinton Fali Nariman, Uday Umesh Lalit, and Abdul Nazeer. The first hearing in the case was held on May 11, 2017, and the court directed the Union of India to file its response to the petition. The All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) was also allowed to intervene in the case and present its arguments.

The Union of India, represented by the Attorney General, took a neutral stand on the issue and argued that it was up to the Supreme Court to decide whether Triple Talaq was constitutional or not. The AIMPLB, on the other hand, supported the practice of Triple Talaq and argued that it was a matter of personal law and should be left to the community to decide.

The court held several rounds of hearings over the next few months and heard arguments from both sides. The bench also received submissions from several other Muslim women who had been victims of Triple Talaq and other similar practices.

Finally, on August 22, 2017, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment on the case.

JUDGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

This case is a landmark judgment that has inspired many women to make bold movements and is famously known as the judgment that changed India. This landmark case is also known for its unique diversity in the religion of the judges as it was headed by a Sikh Judge followed by judges from other religions namely, Christianity, Islam, Parsi, and a Hindu judge. In this case, Shayara Bano along with 4 other Muslim women was subjected to talaq e biddat also known as instant triple talaq. They demanded that talaq e biddat should be declared unconstitutional because they believed that it violated their fundamental rights. Hence the five-bench constitution bench mentioned before they were formed. It is also quite ironic that there was no women judge on the bench given the fact that the case dealt with gender justice. The verdict of this case was quite unexpected as the Supreme Court neither constitutionally banned nor legally, instead, they set aside the Muslim Personal law related to triple talaq. 2 out of the 5 judges namely CJI Khehar and Justice Nazeer said this law cannot be banned and the other 2 judges namely justice R.F.Nariman and Justice U.U.Lalit declared it unconstitutional. It was read perhaps for the first time that a Muslim Personal Law is also a fundamental right as the law comes under the religion of Islam and people have the right to practice any religion as a fundamental right. Thus, they said the law must not be banned.

On the other hand, the other two judges declared that the act was arbitrary, that is without any application of logic and also violating the fundamental rights of the women, the law is unconstitutional. They read that the Muslim personal is a pre-constitutional law that is not arbitrary and thus is to be banned. The last judge, Justice Kurian Joseph said that triple talaq is unislamic. He went on to justify his statement by stating that for talaq to occur, there are two prerequisites for the same. Justice Kurian Joseph said that for talaq to be valid, there must be reconciliation and arbitration and that in the form of triple talaq, there is no scope for either as it is irrevocable. Reconciliation and arbitration are two essentials of Islam divorce law where both parties may plan to reunite after marriage. Even though the judges did not declare it unconstitutional, it was sent forth to the parliament for implementation. Eventually, on 28 December 2017, the Lok Sabha passed the bill with a majority. 

The question here is whether the passing of the bill is a violation of the Islamic principle or a stepping stone toward women’s empowerment. 

We can see how patriarchal the laws are as the only way in which Muslim women can get separated from their Muslim husbands is by Talaq-e-Tafweez. The wife can approach the court for the dissolution of the marriage under the Muslim Marriage Act, of 1939 if any of the said conditions are practised by the husband. Moreover, it is like an agreement, they don’t have the option to pronounce talaq in different ways as Muslim men do. When talaq-e-biddat was banned in Shayara Bano v. Union of India., some sort of legal protection was awarded to the Muslim women and this landmark judgment was a ray of hope for them. 

Under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, Muslim women at the time of divorce can ask their husbands for maintenance only until the Iddat period. If the woman is not in a position to maintain herself and she has not married again, she is not entitled to ask her former husband for maintenance. Its constitutional validity was challenged in the landmark case of Daniel Latifi & Anr., v. Union of India.^[1], where it was argued that the rights of Muslim women are violated under articles 14, 15, and 21 of the constitution. Therefore, it was held that women are to be awarded maintenance under section 125 of CrPC. This section ensured that women in general is protected from destitution and vagrancy and were secular in nature.

These two landmark cases ensured the protection of the rights of women and a better position in society along with giving a wide interpretation of article 44 and the Uniform Civil Code. 

CONCLUSION

Men under Muslim law have the right to marry 4 women at a time whereas women can contractually enter only a single marriage. This clearly shows the patriarchy that women face and their plight when compared to men. In the present world of advanced science, technology, and advanced thinking, where there are different methods that have been developed for the rescue of people like adoption, IVF, etc. the procreation capacity of women cannot be considered a justification for polygamy. In such a scenario, UCC needs a safe and secure future for women in society. This is an important issue in the current scenario because, in many of Islam-practicing countries like Iran, Tunisia, Pakistan, etc. polygamy has already been abolished. It is high time for a country like India which give immense importance to human rights and equality to consider the same.

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ENDNOTES:

1. Daniel Latifi & Anr., v. Union of India., (2001) 7 SCC 740

This case analysis is done by Vishal Menon, from Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad.

This case analysis is authored by Prashant Prasad, a second-year law student from University Law College.

Case No.

Appeal (crl.) 1207 of 1997

Equivalent Citation

AIR 1998 SC 2120

Date of Judgment

17/04/1998

Court

The Supreme Court of India

Bench

S.C. Agrawal, G.N. Ray, A.S. Anand, S.P. Bharucha, S. Rajendra Babu

Facts of the Case 

During the 10th Lok Sabha election which was held in the year 1991, the congress party was the leading party and subsequently, it formed the government with P.V. Narasimha Rao as a Prime Minister. However, everything was going well in the party unless during the monsoon session of Lok Sabha in July 1993 a ‘No Confidence Motion’ was moved against the existing government of P.V. Narasimha Rao. Now, the party was in minority so they gave bribes to a few members of JMM (Jharkhand Mukti Morcha) and urge them to vote against the motion. The party somehow managed to defeat the motion with 251 members voting in the favor of the motion and 265 voting against the motion. 

After the motion got defeated the party once again came into power. But on February 28, 1996, a person named Shri Ravindra Kumar of Rashtriya Mukti Morcha filed a complaint with the CBI wherein it was alleged that some members of parliament were bribed during the no-confidence motion in Lok Sabha in July 1993. The CBI based on information received registered a complaint under Section 13(2)^[1], Section 13(1) (d) (iii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act^[2] against the Suraj Mandal, Shibu Soren, Simon Marandi, and Shallendra Mahto, members of JMM. In short, a criminal prosecution was launched against the bribe-taking and bribes giving members of the Parliament under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988^[3] and Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code^[4]. The cognizance was taken by the special Jude Delhi, the person who sought to be charged as aforesaid, filed a petition in Delhi High Court seeking to quash the charge the High court dismissed the petition. Therefore an appeal was filed in the Supreme Court of India and then referred to the constitutional bench. 

Issues of the case 

1. Whether under Articles 105(1) and 105(2), a member of parliament can claim immunity from prosecution before a criminal court on a charge of bribery concerning the proceeding of the parliament.
2. Is a member of parliament a public servant under the Prevention of Corruption Act, of 1988?

Rationale 

Arguments from the Appellant’s side:

• The counsel from the appellant’s side argued that the immunity under Article 105(2)^[5] must be taken into wide sense so that the members of the parliament can exercise their right to vote without any kind of fear.
• It was further contended by the appellant’s side that offers and acceptance of a bribe do not amount to a criminal offense either under the Indian Penal Code^[6] or under the Prevention of Corruption Act^[7].
• Also, neither charge of conspiracy under section 120-B of IPC^[8] nor any offense mentioned under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 evokes against them. 

Arguments from the State headed by the Attorney General:

• The attorney general argued that there are no sets of rules or laws that say whether these particular things fall under the purview of Parliamentary Privileges or not which are being enjoyed by the members of the parliament. This argument relied on the judgment of the U.S. Supreme Court in Brewster^[9]. The acceptance of bribes by the members is a breach of the privileges.
• Along with this many contentions were put forward from both sides which form the basis of the case.

Judgment 

The Five Judge bench split their verdict in the ratio of 3:2; the court has taken judgment based on articles 105(1) and 105(2) in literal interpretation. The court of law increased the scope of these articles and held that the members are immune from any kind of proceedings against them in respect of any vote in the parliament. In this particular case, members who have given the bribe did not enjoy immunity from prosecution. The court further held that based on the literal interpretation of the Articles under question the JMM members who have taken the bribe and voted against the motion are not guilty of corruption. But one member who has taken the bribe but did not vote was held guilty of prosecution.

P.V. Narasimha Rao was acquitted of all charges in the JMM bribery case. The judgment was delivered by a special court in Delhi, India, which found that there was insufficient evidence to support the charges against Rao and others. The judgment was a significant one, as it marked the first time that a former Prime Minister of India was acquitted in a corruption case. The case was widely watched and had a major impact on Indian politics, with many people viewing it as a test of the Indian judiciary’s independence and its ability to deal with high-profile corruption cases. The verdict in the JMM bribery case was seen as a victory for P.V. Narasimha Rao and his supporters, who had argued that the charges against him were politically motivated and aimed at tarnishing his legacy as one of India’s most transformative Prime Ministers. Despite his acquittal, the case remains a matter of public record and continues to be discussed and debated in the Indian media and political circles.

Implications for parliamentary privileges in India regarding this case

The JMM bribery case had important implications for parliamentary privileges in India. Parliamentary privileges are certain rights and immunities that are granted to members of Parliament to enable them to carry out their duties effectively. One of the key privileges is immunity from criminal prosecution for words spoken or acts done in the course of parliamentary proceedings. In the JMM bribery case, some of the accused, who were members of Parliament at the time, claimed that the charges against them were covered by parliamentary privilege and that they could not be prosecuted for bribery and corruption. This argument was rejected by the court, which held that the charges against the accused related to acts that were not covered by parliamentary privilege.

The JMM bribery case, therefore, clarified the scope of parliamentary privilege in India and established that members of Parliament are not immune from prosecution for criminal offenses, including bribery and corruption that are committed outside of parliamentary proceedings. The case was seen as a positive development for accountability and transparency in Indian politics, as it demonstrated that public officials, including members of Parliament, can be held accountable for their actions. The verdict in the JMM bribery case reinforced the principle that no one is above the law and that all citizens, regardless of their status or position, must be subject to the same legal standards and procedures.

Conclusion 

The conclusion of the case marked the end of a long and contentious legal battle that had far-reaching consequences for Indian politics. The case was widely watched and was seen as a test of the independence of the Indian judiciary and its ability to deal with high-profile corruption cases. While the verdict was seen as a victory for P.V. Narasimha Rao and his supporters, the case continues to be a matter of public record and remains a source of discussion and debate in India. The JMM bribery case serves as a reminder of the importance of ensuring the transparency and accountability of public officials, and the role that the judiciary can play in upholding the rule of law and protecting the rights of citizens.

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References:

1. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Section 13(2), Act No. 49 of 1988
2. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Act No. 49 of 1988
3. Ibid
4. Indian Penal Code, 1860, Act No. 45 of 1860
5. INDIA CONST, art. 105(2)
6. Supra note iv
7. Supra note ii
8. Indian Penal Code, 1860, section 120-B, Act No. 45 of 1860
9. United State v. Brewster, 33 L Ed 507

The Indra Sawhney vs Union of India case, also known as the Mandal Commission case, was a landmark case in the history of the Indian judiciary. The case, heard by a nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court, dealt with the issue of reservation in government jobs and education for the socially and economically backward classes of Indian society, also known as Other Backward Classes (OBCs). The judgment, in this case, has had far-reaching implications for Indian society and polity.

Background and facts

The Mandal Commission, formally known as the Socially and Educationally Backward Classes Commission, was set up by the Indian government in 1979 to identify socially and educationally backward classes (SEBCs) in India and make recommendations for their advancement. In 1980, the Commission submitted its report to the government, recommending that 27% of all government jobs and seats in educational institutions be reserved for SEBCs. This recommendation was implemented in 1990 by then Prime Minister V.P. Singh, leading to protests and agitation across the country.

The implementation of the Mandal Commission recommendations in 1990 was met with widespread protests and opposition, particularly from upper-caste communities, who argued that it violated the principle of meritocracy and was unconstitutional. The government defended the policy, arguing that it was necessary to provide opportunities to historically marginalized communities and to address the historical injustices of caste discrimination. Several petitions were filed in various high courts challenging the implementation of the reservation policy for OBCs, and eventually, the matter reached the Supreme Court. The apex court, in its judgment in the Indra Sawhney vs Union of India case, addressed several issues related to reservation and its implementation.

The case was first heard by a nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court in 1992, which delivered a split verdict.

Procedural History

The procedural history of the case can be divided into the following stages:

The Mandal Commission Report: In 1979, the Mandal Commission was constituted by the Government of India to identify the socially and educationally backward classes (SEBCs) in the country and recommend measures for their upliftment. In 1980, the Commission submitted its report, which recommended that 27% of government jobs and seats in educational institutions be reserved for SEBCs.

Implementation of the Mandal Commission Report: The implementation of the Mandal Commission Report was challenged in various courts across the country. In 1990, the government issued an office memorandum implementing the recommendations of the Commission. This led to widespread protests and agitation by various groups, including students and job seekers.

The Indra Sawhney Case: In 1992, a group of petitioners led by Indra Sawhney, a former civil servant, filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court challenging the implementation of the Mandal Commission Report. The petitioners contended that the reservation policy violated the fundamental right to equality enshrined in the Indian Constitution.

Constitution Bench: The case was heard by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court comprising nine judges. The hearings began in 1992 and continued for almost five years. The bench heard arguments from both sides and also received inputs from various experts and stakeholders.

Interim Orders: During the pendency of the case, the Supreme Court issued several interim orders. In 1993, the court directed that the reservation policy would not be applicable to posts and seats meant for technical and professional courses. In 1997, the court directed that the creamy layer among the SEBCs should be excluded from the benefits of reservation.

Judgment: In 1999, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court delivered its judgment in the case. The court upheld the constitutional validity of the reservation policy but imposed certain restrictions and conditions. The court held that the reservation should not exceed 50% and that it should be reviewed periodically. The court also held that the creamy layer among the SEBCs should be excluded from the benefits of reservation.

Controversies and Criticisms: The judgment in the Indra Sawhney case has been the subject of several controversies and criticisms. Some have criticized the court for diluting the concept of equality by upholding the reservation policy. Others have criticized the court for imposing arbitrary restrictions and conditions on the policy. However, the judgment remains a landmark in Indian legal history and continues to shape the discourse on reservations in the country.

Judgment

The Supreme Court of India rendered a historic decision in the 1992 case of Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, also referred to as the Mandal Commission case. The issue concerned the implementation of reservations for the socially and economically underprivileged sectors of Indian society in government employment and educational institutions. The Supreme Court’s nine-judge panel issued the ruling, which upheld the constitutionality of OBC reservations in government employment and educational settings. However, it also set certain limitations and conditions for the implementation of reservations.

One of the main issues before the court was whether the classification of the OBCs as a separate category was constitutional. The court held that the classification was based on intelligible differentia and was therefore constitutionally valid. The court also addressed the issue of the maximum limit for reservations. It held that the total reservation should not exceed 50% of the available seats or posts. However, it also allowed for exceptional circumstances where a higher percentage of reservations may be justified.

The court further emphasized that reservations should not be granted on the basis of economic criteria alone and that social and educational backwardness should be the primary criterion for determining eligibility for reservations. The judgment also dealt with the issue of creamy layer exclusion, which refers to excluding the relatively well-off members of the reserved categories from the benefits of reservations. The court held that the creamy layer exclusion should be applied to the OBCs as well and that the exclusion should be based on economic criteria. The court also directed the central government to create a permanent body to regularly review the implementation of reservations and to identify the backward classes that are in need of affirmative action.

Overall, the Indra Sawhney v. Union of India judgment has had a significant impact on the implementation of reservations in India. It has helped to ensure that reservations are not granted arbitrarily or on the basis of economic criteria alone and has set clear guidelines for the implementation of reservations in a fair and just manner.

Analysis

Reservations for Other Backward Classes were implemented as a result of the Mandal Commission Report (OBCs).

The “Creamy Layer” theory was developed by the court to deny the benefits of reservation to specific OBC groups based on their socioeconomic standing.

The Indra Sawhney judgment is a landmark judgment for several reasons. First, it upheld the constitutional validity of reservation for OBCs, but with certain restrictions. The court held that the total reservation, including reservations for SCs and STs, should not exceed 50% of the vacancies. The court also held that the reservation policy should not be based solely on caste but on the backwardness of the classes. The court further held that the creamy layer, i.e., the socially and economically advanced among the OBCs, should be excluded from the benefits of reservation.

Second, the court gave a detailed analysis of the concept of social backwardness and its relationship with caste. The court observed that social and educational backwardness can be caused by several factors, including poverty, lack of access to education, and geographical isolation. The court held that caste can be a factor in determining social backwardness but cannot be the sole criterion.

Third, the court recognized the importance of affirmative action in ensuring social justice and equality in a society marked by historical discrimination and oppression. The court observed that the Constitution of India envisages a society based on equality and social justice, and affirmative action is necessary to ensure that the benefits of development reach all sections of society.

Fourth, the court recognized the need to balance the competing claims of different sections of society. The court observed that while reservation is an important tool for social justice, it should not be at the cost of efficiency and merit. The court held that reservation should be a temporary measure and should be reviewed periodically to ensure that it does not perpetuate backwardness or lead to reverse discrimination.

Fifth, the court recognized the importance of diversity in a democratic society. The court held that diversity is a source of strength and vitality in a democracy, and any attempt to homogenize society would be against the spirit of the Constitution.

The Indra Sawhney judgment has had a significant impact on Indian society and polity. First, it has led to the implementation of reservation for OBCs in government jobs and educational institutions, leading to greater representation of OBCs in the public sphere. The judgment has led to a debate on the efficacy of reservation as a tool for social justice. While some have argued that reservation has led to the empowerment of the socially and economically backward classes, others have argued that it has perpetuated caste-based discrimination and led to a decline in the standards of education and administration.

Conclusion and Suggestions

The Supreme Court upheld the government’s decision to provide reservations for SEBCs in a limited manner, while also placing certain restrictions on the quantum of reservation and the definition of SEBCs.

The case’s conclusion and suggestions include:

The government can provide reservations for SEBCs, but it should be based on their social and educational backwardness, not their economic status. The reservation for SEBCs should not exceed 50% of the total seats/jobs, and there should be no reservation for the creamy layer. The government should regularly review the list of SEBCs to ensure that only the truly backward classes receive the benefits of reservation. The reservation policy should not undermine the merit-based selection process, and the reserved category candidates must meet the minimum qualifying standards. The government should also work on improving the educational and social status of the backward classes to reduce their dependence on reservations.

This case analysis is done by Vishal Menon, from Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad.

Case Number

Criminal Appeal No. 34 of 2015 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 2961 of 2013), Criminal Appeal No. 35 of 2015 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 3161 of 2013) and Criminal Appeal Nos. 36-37 of 2015 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 3326-3327 of 2013)

Citation

AIR 2015 SC 923 or (2015) 4 SCC 609 

Forum

Supreme Court of India

Bench

H L Dattu CJI., Madan B Lokur, A K Sikri JJ.

Decided on

January 9, 2015

Introduction

The criminal liability of directors is a core concept in corporate criminal law; it helps regulatory authorities and courts control, prosecute and punish crimes of a corporate nature. Given the artificial nature of companies and corporates, it is the employees and executives of the company that act as its agents. Executives are the ones who take the major decisions on behalf of the company. They can easily control the acts and omissions of the company on a short and long-term basis. Given the enormous controlling power that executives possess, it is vital to have laws, regulations and principles governing the actions of these executives. This ensures that they do not violate the law without fear of repercussions and do not use certain concepts of law to evade punishment. 

In the case discussed below, there is a clear explanation of the requirements for holding executives responsible for the acts of their companies, especially in the context of the executives’ names being unlisted in the charge sheet. 

Rule of Law decided upon by the Bench

The rule of law in this case is: 
Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, read with Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 

Facts & Procedural History of the case

The central allegation, in this case, was regarding the 2G spectrum case. An additional spectrum that was beyond the usual spectrum that the Telecom Ministry approves. This approval of an additional spectrum was done with a 1% additional revenue share. Multiple cases had been registered, coupled with investigations by authorities. This transaction caused losses to Government Revenue. It was alleged in multiple investigations that this plan resulted from a conspiracy between Mr Ghosh, the then Telecom Minister and certain Cellular Operators.

The case in question is an appeal against an impugned order by a Special Judge, which had issued a summons to the accused in a charge sheet. This order, passed in March 2013, mentioned that the Special Judge was satisfied with the incriminating material recorded so that a summons could be issued against the accused. The Special Judge also stated that the summons was being issued to three executives – Mr Sunil Mittal of Bharti Cellular Ltd., Mr Asim Ghosh of Hutchison Max Telecom Ltd., and Mr Ravi Ruia of Sterling Cellular Ltd. 

The Special Judge went on to specify the doctrine of ‘alter ego’ and applied the same to this case. He held that these executives (the appellants in the case) are the alter ego of their companies. So through vicarious liability, they shall be prosecuted for the crimes of their companies. It is pertinent to note that the Special Judge mentioned that their state of mind is the companies’ state of mind, and any acts of the companies shall be attributed to them. Notably, he had not mentioned the reasons for issuing an order of summons to the three executives. 

The order was sought to be challenged by two of the three executives, to the extent of the order implicating them as the accused. 

Issues raised in the Court of law

A singular issue was raised. However, the Court opined on a variety of topics concerning the issue below: 

Is the impugned order of the Special Judge, which stated that the Appellants were not named in the charge sheet, valid in law?

The decision of the Court on the issues drafted

The Court decided that the order must be set aside, given the ambiguity in the impugned order and the wrongful application of a principle to the issue at hand. They had also mentioned clearly that they were not stating that the executives were free of guilt; they merely quashed the impugned order. It is up to the Special Judge to review the incriminating material again and issue fresh summons to the Appellants. Based on the evidence uncovered, the Special Judge may apply Section 319 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, to include the Appellants in the proceedings to prosecute them further. 

Analysis of the judgement

The judgement, which Justice A K Sikri wrote, was systematic in its breakdown of the facts and circumstances of the case, along with an analysis of the principle of alter ego and criticism of its application in the present case. 

Initially, the counsel for the Appellants contended that the impugned order was erroneous in two parts. The first three paragraphs of the order are regarding Mr Ghosh and the cellular companies involved. The Special Judge had perused all the documents submitted on record to conclude that these accused persons can be further proceeded against. In paragraph four, the Judge detailed the principle of alter ego and stated that the executives of the three cellular companies were responsible for the acts of their respective companies. The Judge had connected these paragraphs to conclude that the three executives (two of whom are appellants) must be issued a summons. Explaining all this, Senior Advocate Salve (counsel for the Appellant) stated that the Judge’s order was erroneous and did not hold good in law. 

Continuing, he detailed that the doctrine of ‘alter ego’ has been applied in reverse and that the companies were accused first rather than the directors. For the doctrine to apply, the directors must be held guilty, and so they shall be deemed guilty for the acts of the corporate body. Only when the principle is correctly applied can the agency mode of liability also be applied. For the same, he relied on Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc.¹, Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. v. Datar Switchgear Ltd.², and Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Ltd.³, which are all landmark judgements by the Supreme Court of India. 

Sr. Adv. Salve closed his arguments by pointing out that the CBI had investigated and concluded that there was no information or submitted material to implicate the Appellant. 

Other counsels for the Appellants seconded these arguments and mentioned that some of the appellants were not mentioned in the charge sheet in the first place. 

In terms of the arguments for the respondents, Senior Counsel K K Venugopal refuted the appellants’ submissions by bringing to the forefront the reasoning behind the decision to implicate the appellants. He stated that once companies are charged with mens rea offences, they need to be punished for the same, and the only way to do that is to punish their Directors or Officers. He then pointed out the actions of these executives on behalf of their companies, which had resulted in the 2G Scam. In a nutshell, Sr. Adv. Venugopal has reinforced the human agency doctrine and stated that, despite the omission of appellants’ names in the charge sheet, the Special Judge had powers to make an order such as the one in question. 

In support of his arguments, the cases of M C Mehta v. Union of India (Taj Corridor Scam)⁴, Kishun Singh v. State of Bihar⁵ and Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana⁶ were used.  

In a rejoinder, counsel for the Appellant, Mr Fali Nariman, argued that for vicarious liability to be applied, there is a need for a statutory provision or something to be imputed. Therefore, the Special Judge has wrongfully applied the principle of alter ego. 

After listening to the extensive arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court began examining the order and applying the principle of alter ego. 

The Bench refused to discuss the comments made by the appellants concerning the 2G scam itself, making it clear that the matter is beyond the scope of their appeals. 

Firstly, the impugned order was dissected. At the outset, the Court admitted the trial courts could issue that summons to persons not mentioned as accused in the charge sheet. The only requirement is that there must be sufficient incriminating material on record to empower the Judge to issue a summons. The question, in this case, is not about the incriminating material; instead, it is about the lack of a convincing reason behind the Judge’s decision to issue a summons. The Judge has not clearly stated why he had decided to implicate the three executives as accused and issue summons. He had merely stated that the executives were or are in control of their company’s affairs – this makes them the mind and will of the companies and that this makes them the alter ego of their companies. 

Secondly, the doctrine of alter ego was dealt with. The Court reiterated a landmark Judgement from 2005 – Standard Chartered v. Directorate of Enforcement⁷, and explained that the Bench, in that case, opined that companies could be prosecuted and punished for offences with mandatory imprisonment. Then, the Iridium Infra case was discussed, wherein the same subject was discussed, with the addition of mens rea element. The judgement held that the criminal intent would be imputed to the corporate body. That is to say, the group of people controlling the company must have criminal intent, which will implicate the company to have criminal intent and therefore be punished. 

In the case at hand, the company was first held guilty of criminal intent, following which the executives were held to have criminal intent. The Special Judge had applied the principle in reverse – the company’s criminal intent had been established first, and then its executives were implicated. Thus, applying this principle in this manner makes it erroneous to apply the theory of vicarious liability to the case. 

Thirdly, the Court discussed the circumstances when the company is accused, and its executives can also be prosecuted. It is mainly concerning intent that the decision is made. There must be sufficient evidence for the same. In other cases, the statute in question must refer to the vicarious liability of the company’s executives. Cases discussed included Jethsur Surangbhai v. State of Gujarat.⁸, Sham Sunder v. State of Haryana⁹, Hira Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati v. CBI¹⁰ and Sharon Michael v. State of TN¹¹ among others. 

Based on these discussions, the Court concluded that the Special Judge had used an inaccurate principle of law. It is essential to the case that the Judge mention the reasons for his satisfaction with the incriminating material. However, the Judge failed to do the same. 

After making a brief statement on the powers of the Special Judge to issue summons when the accused is not on the charge sheet, the Court went on to conclude its analysis of the case. They held the impugned order invalid in law as the Special Judge failed to adequately explain the reasons or grounds behind his act of proceeding with the case by issuing a summons. Therefore, the impugned order was quashed and set aside, and the appeal was allowed. However, the Special Judge does have the power to revisit the case, review the documents, and prepare a fresh order that lists the reasons for the satisfaction of incriminating material clearly and in a prima facie manner.    

Conclusion

As seen from the case analysis above, Judges and legal professionals must be careful in their acts and omissions, as an error may lead to the entire proceedings being vitiated. While everything else on the part of the Special Judge’s order was abiding by the law, two points left the entire order of a significant financial scandal quashed. Therefore, it is vital that essential points are included in documents and that the law is followed to a T. 

On the other hand, it is equally essential to ensure that executives of companies do not evade punishment on procedural or theoretical grounds. In order to recover money from white-collar crimes, theories of vicarious liability should be prudently applied in relevant circumstances. 

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Citations

1. Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., (2011) 1 SCC 74 (India)
2. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. v. Datar Switchgear Ltd., (2010) 10 SCC 479 (India)
3. Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661 (India)
4. M C Mehta v. Union of India, (2007) 1 SCC 110 (India)
5. Kishun Singh v. State of Bihar, (1993) 2 SCC 16 (India)
6. Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana, (2014) 3 SCC 306 (India)
7. Standard Chartered v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2005) 4 SCC 530 (India)
8. Jethsur Surangbhai v. State of Gujarat, (1984) Supp. SCC 207 (India)
9. Sham Sunder v. State of Haryana, (1989) 4 SCC 630 (India)
10. Hira Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati v. CBI, (2003) 5 SCC 257 (India)
11. Sharon Michael v. State of TN, (2009) 3 SCC 375 (India)

This case analysis is authored by Vibha Chinni Krishnan, a student of Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad.

Case Citation

1981 SCR (2) 408, 1981 SCC (1) 627

Bench

Bhagwati, P.N.

Decided on

19/12/1980

Relevant Act/Section/Article

Articles 21 & 22 of the Constitution of India, 1950, Sections 50, 56, 57,167, etc. of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Introduction

With about 70% of the country’s population living below the poverty line and perhaps more legally illiterate, it will be difficult for the judiciary of the world’s largest democracy to bring justice to everyone. Legal aid and representation are important elements in the legal remedy of wrongdoing by the guilty, and in countries like India, poor living conditions and financial constraints make it difficult to find oneself before the country’s justice system. Lack of representation is common. The provision of free legal aid under Article 39A¹ of the Indian Constitution, introduced by the 42nd Amendment to the Indian Constitution, is encouraged. But the inclusion of such a provision came at the cost of, an insight into, despicable injustices committed in the past.

Facts of the case

Between 1979 and 1980 there were reports that police poured acid into the eyes of 33 pre-trial detainees in Bhagalpur, Bihar. It was reportedly the worst case of police torture and has come to be known as one of the darkest times in independent India’s history. Bhagalpur Blindings case is another name for this case. Prisoners on trial were blinded by the police and brought before a judge, who failed to investigate any injuries intentionally or unintentionally inflicted on the defendant, and the district and session courts judges visited the alleged Bhagalpur Jail only once a year to review prison conditions. The blind prisoners were later admitted to the Rajendra Prasad Eye Institute in New Delhi, but their eyesight was severely impaired and could not be restored by surgery or treatment. Several briefs were submitted to the Supreme Court and the Court decided to hear them all together.

Issues of the Case

• Whether the state was liable to pay compensation to blinded prisoners for violation of the fundamental right under Article 21² of the Constitution.
• Whether the state failed to provide legal representation to the accused.
• Whether the magistrate failed to discharge his duty of offering free legal aid to the
• accused.

Petitioner Arguments

Articles 21 and 22³ require the state to provide free legal aid to all those in need. It is important to ensure that those accused of crimes receive a proper, fair, and just trial. Article 22(1) expressly guarantees an individual’s fundamental right to be represented by an attorney of their choice. Detainees were blinded intentionally and it violated their constitutional right to live with dignity under Article 21. In many cases, the accused were not brought before judicial authorities at their first appearance and remained in prison without judicial authorities ordering pretrial detention of the accused.

Article 21 implies an obligation to compensate a person who has been deprived of life or personal liberty by means other than those provided for by law. As a result, the state is obliged to compensate blind prisoners. Furthermore, it may not be safe for prisoners released from the Eye Institute to return to Bhagalpur. Arrangements should be made to have them housed in New Delhi at the state’s expense.

In some cases, the accused were not handed over to judicial authorities within 24 hours of arrest, which is a violation of Article 22(2) of the Constitution and Sections 56 and 57 of the 1973 CrPC⁴. They also did not investigate prisoners for “eye injuries.” Most of the blind prisoners said in statements to the Registrar that they had never been brought before a judicial officer, implying that the judicial officers merely signed the review order. In other cases, the accused were detained without remand. District and session magistrates did not inspect Bhagalpur’s central prison at any point in 1980. This is in clear violation of Supreme Court rules regarding joint and personal routine visits to prisons by District Judges, Sessions Magistrates, and Chiefs of Police. The independent judiciary fails to protect constitutional rights.

Respondent Arguments

None of the detainees sought legal assistance. As a result, the judge did not ask if he wanted legal representation at state expense. Financial constraints make it difficult for states to provide free legal aid. The state already bears many costs. As a result, it has become financially and administratively impossible to provide free legal assistance to the accused. It is not yet clear that the prisoner was blinded by the police and the investigation is still ongoing. There is currently no evidence that the state violated the victim’s right to life and personal freedoms beyond the judicial process. The defendant’s testimony alone cannot be trusted. It’s just hearsay evidence with no legal basis. An investigation into the pre-trial detention of suspects by police officers is ongoing. Therefore, the conclusion that the state is responsible at this time is not valid. Even if the police blinded someone and there was a violation of the fundamental rights enshrined in article 21, the state could not be held responsible for compensating the victims. There is no indication of improper conduct by the judicial officer. The blind person’s testimony to the Registrar that he was not brought before judicial authorities have not been substantiated. The accused’s unilateral testimony should not be taken seriously.

Judgment

Courts are in the constitutional obligation to provide free legal assistance to the accused at all stages of a trial if the defendant suffers poverty or hardship to achieve the goals of justice., ruled that it failed to do so. The court must inform the third judge and all courts at large that the judicial officer is entitled to render legal aid free of charge to the accused, if necessary, at the cost of instructing the state to pay for it. The court barred draconian action against the accused who failed to appear before a judge within 24 hours and called on state police to step up vigilance going forward. The court also held the state responsible for its egregious encroachment on the lives and liberties of prisoners by the police and ordered the state to compensate the victims, since the police are directly employed by the state and are also the means of the state.⁵

Analysis of the Judgement

The court began its argument by expressing its disappointment that the defendants were not granted or provided legal assistance by the judge simply because they did not request it. In the case of Hussainara Khatoon v. Secretary of the Interior⁶, the court held that the right to free legal advice is a fundamental right of a person accused of a criminal offense even if the defendant can afford it. The Court’s decision, in this case, is a clear law as illustrated by binding case law under Article 14(1) of the Indian Constitution. And the Court has expressed its displeasure that most states in the country have failed to heed its decisions or make efforts in that direction. The submissions made by the state that the financial condition of the state was not good enough to provide legal assistance to the accused, cannot be used as an excuse to avoid responsibility. To back this up, the court in the case of Rhem v. Malcolm⁷ said, “No government is permitted by law to deprive its citizens of their constitutional rights based on poverty.”

It quotes Justice Black in Jackson v. Bishop, who said, “Humane considerations and constitutional requirements are not to be measured by dollar considerations in this day and age.” The court emphasizes that the constitutional obligation to provide free legal aid to an accused applies not only when the trial begins, but also when remand orders are issued and when the accused is presented before the court from time to time. It makes use of the fact that approximately 70% of people living in rural areas are illiterate, and even more are legally uneducated and unaware of their legal rights and entitlements, which compensates for the additional burden on the state and the judiciary to ensure that such people are served justice. The legal aid movement is mentioned, and it is claimed that leaving the practice of rights to the sole efforts of an uneducated populace would make a mockery of the legal system and that legal aid would end up being a mere paper promise. The court orders that prisoners be transferred to the Blind Relief Association of Delhi after they are released from the hospital, as it may not be possible to return them to jail, where their safety may be jeopardized. It also finds that some of the accused were not brought before a magistrate within 24 hours of their arrest, which is a violation of every person’s legal right under Article 228⁸ and Sections 56 and 57 of the CrPC 1973. It is also shocking that the state continues to detain the accused without remand of orders, which violates the personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21.

The court condemns the police for such fundamental violations of arrest and detention rules and warns them not to repeat the same mistakes. As to whether Bihar is responsible for blinding detainees, the court was right for making them accountable that it was because the police officers were public servants in Bihar and were working for the state. The Court was also disappointed to learn that an inspection of Bhagalpur Prison by the District Court and the present court in 1980 had not taken place in violation of Supreme Court rules, and asked the High Court to thoroughly consider the matter and ordered law enforcement to conduct a thorough investigation to ensure law enforcement. The whole judgment is quite impressive and right. The court has given due regard to the principles of natural justice and made decisions that empower the poor and marginalized while bringing the guilty to conviction.

Conclusion

It is one of the most commendable decisions that has been given by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The decision was made by Justice P.N. Bhagwati, a pioneer in the judicial movement and one of the Supreme Court’s most prominent jurists. This is a brutal and shameful way in which the state police, paid and stationed solely to maintain peace and harmony, and public safety, exercise their power to hold the lower courts wrong. On the one hand, the decision remains as important as it is today, providing a strong precedent and hopefully serving as a strong deterrent against similar events in the future. The ruling strongly supports the provision of free legal aid and brings justice to those who cannot afford it, as the court articulated in the Hussainara Khatun case.

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References

1. The Constitution of India,1950, Art. 39 A
2. The Constitution of India,1950, Art. 21
3. The Constitution of India,1950, Art. 22
4. The Code of Criminal Procedure,1973, Sec. 56 and 57
5. Khatri vs State Of Bihar 1981 SCR (2) 408, 1981 SCC (1) 627
6. Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar 1979 AIR 1369 1979 SCR (3) 532 1980 SCC (1) 98
7. Rhem v. Malcolm, 377 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
8. The Constitution of India,1950, Art. 228

This case commentary is authored by Jay Kumar Gupta, a student of the School of Law, NMIMS Bangalore, currently in the second year of BBA LL.B.(Hons.).