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S.no	Contents
1.	Facts of the Case
2.	Issues of the case
3.	Rationale
4.	Judgment
5.	Generalis Specialibus Non-Derogant

Year

1958

Case No.

122 of 1958

Equivalent Citation

1959 AIR 396

Date of Judgment

12/12/1958

Court

The Supreme Court of India

Bench

Chief Justice Sudhi Ranjan Das, Justice Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Justice K. Subbarao, Justice K.N. Wanchoo.

Introduction

Certain privileges are being provided to the parliament collectively as well as individually so that they can effectively discharge their functions without any kind of hesitation. Article 105[1] deals with the power and privileges of the house of parliament whereas Article 194[2] deals with the power and privileges of the house of Legislators. The case of Pandit M.S.M. Sharma v. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha and Others[3] not only deals with the conflict between the legislator and the court but also between the legislator and a citizen. In the Judgment part of this case, it was held by the court of law that the legislative assembly does have the power to regulate the publication of debate and other proceedings. However, this act might curtail an individual’s Fundamental Rights i.e. Right to Freedom of Speech[4], in this case, analysis, we will critically analyze why the court has given such implications and what is the validity of such implications.

Facts of the Case

In the case, the petitioner M.S.M. Sharma was a journalist at the “Searchlight” which was an English Newspaper operated in Patna, Bihar. On May 30, 1957, one of the members of the Bihar Legislative assembly whose name was, Maheshwar Prasad Narayan Sinha delivered a speech in Bihar Legislative Assembly in his speech he made some statements regarding Mahesh Prasad Singh that he was the one who guided the Chief Minister in the selection process of the other ministers and he also cited certain instances of favouritism. Further, it was alleged by Maheshwar Prasad Narayan Sinha in his speech that ministers were not given the proper ministries to which they were entitled and for which the conventional process should have been followed for the appointment. Many other instances regarding corruption were mentioned by him in the speech, he took the example of the District Judge who was only transferred from one place to another but was not discharged as per the advice of the Chief Justice of the High Court, Bihar. Further many other instances were discussed by him which were regarding the corruption and criticism of the prevailing government.

The Speaker of the assembly held that the part of the speech made by Maheshwar Prasad Narayan Sinha was objectional and directed it to be expunged. However, no specific directions were given to the Press, the speaker meant by saying this that the publication of the part of the speech which criticized the government must not be made.
On May 31, 1957, the part of the speech that was expunged by the speaker and was directed by him that publication of these parts must not be done, was published by the newspaper “Searchlight”. On 10th June 1957 Nawal Kishore Sinha, a member of the state legislative assembly questioned the same in the assembly. The matter was soon transferred to the Privilege Committee. After the evaluation of the entire facts for almost after more than a year on 18th August 1958 M.S.M. Sharma was summoned before the Privilege Committee and was asked to reply as to why an action against him must not be taken as he has done the breach of subsisting privileges. Further, the proceeding regarding the breach of privilege was initiated against the editor. M.S.M. Sharma moved to the court under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution for quashing the said proceeding and he raised the question was whether the said privilege under Article 194 was subject to the Fundamental Right under Article 19(1)(a)[5].

Issues of the case

1. Does the legislative assembly have a power under Article 194(3) of the Indian Constitution to prohibit the publication of the statement which is being done publicly in the house?
2. Do the legislative assembly privileges under Article 194 of the Indian Constitution prevail over the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Indian Constitution specifically Freedom of Speech and Expression?[6]

Rationale

Arguments from the Petitioner’s side:

• The notice issued by the committee and the proceeding initiated by them violates his fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution as well as it violates his personal life and liberty assured under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.
• They further argued that as the petitioner of the newspaper petitioner is entitled to Freedom of the Press.
• The notice which was issued by the privilege committee was invalid as the Chief Minister of Bihar was the chairman of the Privilege Committee.

Arguments from the Respondent’s side:

• The respondent relied on the Article 194 of the Indian Constitution.
• They argued that the state legislative assembly can exercise similar powers, privileges, and immunities as the British House of Commons, where the proceedings of the assembly cannot be published.
• They further argued that the part of the speech which was directed to be expunged cannot be published by anyone under any circumstances as it was expressly prohibited.
• If a such publication is being made which was being prohibited then such publication is a breach of the privileges of the Assembly.

Judgment

The court of law held that in accordance with Article 194(3) of the Indian Constitution, the state legislative assembly of Bihar does have the same immunities, privileges and power as the British House of Commons. It was said that since Bihar legislative assembly did not have passed any law concerning the power, privileges, and immunities of the legislative assembly and hence legislative assembly of Bihar will enjoy similar power privileges, privileges, and immunities as that of the British House of Commons. In the British House of Commons, there is a framed order that no member shall give a copy or publish any kind of stuff that has happened during the preceding of the House i.e. no publication of the statement must be made that has taken place in the House. Therefore while dealing with the issue of publication regarding the proceeding of parliament or the legislative assembly the law and order of the British House of Commons should be taken into the consideration.

The petitioner said that Article 194(3) is curtailing his Fundamental Rights under Article 19(1) (a) the court has interpreted this question of has concluded that the legislative privilege under Article 194(3) does not abridge the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Indian Constitution under Article 19(1) (a) and explanation regarding the same was given. The court of law said that in (1) it is being mentioned that “subject to the provisions of the constitution” whereas in clauses (2) to (4) it has not been stated as subject to. Therefore it can be assumed that Constitutional makers did not intend that that clause should be subject to the provisions of the Indian constitution and hence Article 194(3) does not breach the Fundamental Rights which are guaranteed by the Indian Constitution. Further, the court of law stated that if any provision of the Indian Constitution takes away or abridges the Fundamental Right then in that case it is a violation of Article 13 and the provision that violates the Fundamental Right must be void. But, since Article 194(3) is perfectly valid it can be inferred that it does not violate Article 13 of the Indian Constitution.

However in this case the dissenting opinion was given by Justice Subbarao he quotes the case of Gunupati Keshavram Reddy v. Nafisul Hasan[7] and said that Article 194(3) is subjected to Part III i.e. Articles 12 to 35 which deals with Fundamental Rights.

Generalis Specialibus Non-Derogant

The meaning of above stated legal maxim is – where there is a special right, general rights will not be applicable. From the above discussion, we can infer that the Parliamentary Privileges or the State Legislative Privileges are special rights, and in case the Fundamental Rights are the General Rights. In the case of Pandit M.S.M. Sharma v. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha and Others[8], this was one of the key areas where consideration could have been taken and to a certain extent, it was taken. Therefore, the general principles or general rules won’t be applicable in cases where there is a special right. The same was with the condition of Article 194(3) these are the special rights that are being given to the parliament for their effective and efficient working so that they can effectively discharge their functions. And the Fundamental Rights given under 19(1) (a) is the general right that is not applicable in the circumstances in which there is a special privileges/rights and the fines example of the situation is the case of Pandit M.S.M. Sharma v. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha and Others[9].

In the case of Azad Transport Co. v. State of Bihar it was considered that the VAT is a special provision and rules in CrPC are considered to be general.

Conclusion

From the above discussion and the analysis of facts, issues, and the judgment of the case it can be said that the court in its majority decision tries to establish the harmonious construction between the prevailing Fundamental Rights and the privileges given to the parliament and the state legislature. The significance judgment of this case is of paramount importance as it serves as the judicial precedent after this particular case. After the decision was delivered by the court, the assembly was prorogued several times and the privilege committee was reconstructed which issued a fresh notice of petition in the court of law against M.S.M. Sharma. As a result, M.S.M. Sharma moved to the court seeking to reopen the same issue. The court held that the principle of res judicata is applicable in this particular case and held that the matter is already decided which is binding on the petitioner.

However, one question remained open in this case and that was whether Article 21 is being affected because of the privileges given to the parliament or state legislative. The question regarding the subjection of Article 19(1) (a) was solved by the court of law i.e. Article 19(1) (a) is not subject to the privileges. But the court of law failed in this case to answer the question relating to Article 21, whether it overrides the privileges or not.

---

Endnotes

1. INDIA CONST, art. 105
2. INDIA CONST, art. 194
3. Pandit M.S.M. Sharma v. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha and Others, 1959 AIR 396
4. INDIA CONST, art. 19(1)(a)
5. Supra note iv
6. Ibid
7. Gunupati Keshavram Reddy v. Nafisul Hasan, AIR 1954 SC 636
8. Supra note iii
9. Ibid

This case analysis is authored by Prashant Prasad, a second-year law student from University Law College.

-Report by Harsh Singh Rajput

In the case of Delhi Development Authority and Govt. of NCT of Delhi vs Batti and others, the respondents in this case i.e., Batti and others filed a writ petition in Delhi high court to claim the compensation of the land which was taken by them 20 years back for the development project and later the two authorities i.e., plaintiffs appeal before SC against the compensation requested by respondents.

FACTS:

Delhi development authority and Govt. of NCT of Delhi appeal before the SC with the Civil Appeal no 2402/2008. Under section 4 of the land acquisition act, 1894(for short ‘the Act’) an order was passed on 23-06-1989 for the acquisition of land measuring about 3,500 hectares for the development of part of Delhi and this order was further followed up by notification under sec 6 of ‘the Act’ on 20 June 1990.

The respondent was the wife of Mange Ram who was the son of the Late Harkesh. The issue was that the late Father-in-law of respondent i.e., Mr. Harkesh was asserted as the owner of the 1/12th share i.e., (01 bighas and 19 biswas and 03 biswansi from the land area measuring upto 23 bights and 2 biswas having khasra no. 281/4(10-11). 282/4(10-3) and 80(2-8)).

Now writ petition was filed by the respondent in 2015. They stated that the other party hasn’t paid them the compensation and also the possession of land hasn’t been taken and the acquisition has lapsed. But the high court stated that the land was handed over to the forest department as per the facts after the possession of the land was taken. And it was taken because the land comes under the ‘O’ zone. And HC also stated the fact that land was also vested in Gaon Sabha. Therefore, the respondent will not be given any compensation and due to the dispute over the titles regarding land, the issue related to compensation was kept open.

The constitution bench stated two conditions to prove the acquisition which are as follows:

1. Taking over the possession of the land or,
2. Payment of compensation

And the bench stated that from the facts, we came to know that the acquisition was done after the land was taken in possession, and due to the dispute in the title, the HC also had kept the question of title open.

The question of acquisition which was holdup by the Delhi high court in this case by relying upon the judgment of this court (SC) in the case of Pune municipal corporate and another’s case ‘supra’ was overruled by relying on the judgment of this court in the Indore Development Authority.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:

Learned counsel on behalf of the respondent provided the facts that respondent no. 1 is the daughter-in-law of later. Harkesh. Harkesh was entitled to compensation as he was the owner of the land as per the records and he also have the Bhoomidari rights. And they submitted that the land was not been taken up also by the authorities.

JUDGEMENT:

The honourable Supreme Court allowed the present appeals of the plaintiff and stated that there will not be any compensation to the predecessor or respondent due to the dispute regarding the title of the land, also the land was found to be recorded in the name of Gaon Sabha.

Also, there were no records of any action or step for seeking compensation on behalf of the respondents and the person who owned the land 20 years ago. So by putting aside the impugned order of HC, the present appeals are allowed and the writ petition of respondents in HC is dismissed.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3ZdLcPQ

-Report by Harshit Yadav

In this case, four individuals were accused of various offences related to a fraudulent loan obtained by a company called M/s NaftoGaz India Pvt. Ltd. from a consortium of banks led by the State Bank of India. The accused individuals had applied for anticipatory bail, which was rejected by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. The Supreme Court heard the appeals challenging the rejection of anticipatory bail and made its decision based on various factors. The main point being made by the Hon’ble supreme court is that there were certain factors that favoured the grant of anticipatory bail to the accused individuals, despite the serious nature of the allegations against them.

FACTS:

The case involves an FIR registered by Corporation Bank alleging offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 read with Section 120B IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The accused, namely Shri Mahdoom Bava, Shri Deepak Gupta, Shri Akash Gupta, and Shri Yatish Sharma have filed appeals challenging the orders of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad rejecting their applications for anticipatory bail. The accusations involve the alleged creation of a fraudulent account by M/s NaftoGaz India Pvt. Ltd., which secured certain credit facilities from a consortium of banks led by the State Bank of India. The prosecution alleges that the Company connived and conspired with advocates and valuers hired by the consortium of banks, and therefore the promoters/directors of the Company, the guarantors as well as those involved in the sanction of the loan were guilty of the offences complained. The Supreme Court granted anticipatory bail to the accused based on three factors: (i) CBI did not require the custodial interrogation of the accused during the period of investigation from 29.06.2019 (date of filing of FIR) till 31.12.2021 (date of filing of the final report), (ii) CBI only required the presence of the accused before the Trial Court to face trial, and (iii) all transactions out of which the complaint had arisen, seem to have taken place during the period 2009-2010 to 2012-13.

ISSUES RAISED:

1. Whether the accused persons are entitled to anticipatory bail in the light of serious allegations levelled against them in the FIR filed by the Corporation Bank, under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 read with Section 120B IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
2. Whether the custodial interrogation of the appellants is required, given that the CBI did not require their custodial interrogation during the investigation period, and whether the custody of the appellants is necessary at this stage.
3. Whether the presence of the accused is required before the trial court for trial or not, and whether opposing the anticipatory bail request at this stage is justified in light of the CBI’s stand that only the presence of the accused before the Trial Court is required.
4. Whether the transactions in question took place during the period 2009-2010 to 2012-2013, and whether the accused should be granted anticipatory bail in the absence of any evidence of their involvement in the alleged fraud.

CONTENTIONS:

The appellants, in this case, have challenged the order of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, which rejected their application for anticipatory bail. The appellants have argued that they are entitled to anticipatory bail despite the serious allegations levelled against them in the FIR filed by the Corporation Bank. They have contended that the CBI did not require their custodial interrogation during the investigation period, and therefore, their custody is not necessary at this stage. The appellants have also argued that the CBI only required their presence before the trial court for trial, and opposing their anticipatory bail request at this stage is not justified.

On the other hand, the respondents have opposed the appellants’ request for anticipatory bail, arguing that the allegations against them are serious in nature, and their custodial interrogation is necessary to unearth the truth. The respondents have argued that the appellants cannot be granted anticipatory bail merely because the CBI did not require their custody during the investigation period. They have also contended that the presence of the accused before the trial court is not enough, and their custody is necessary to ensure that they do not tamper with the evidence or influence witnesses.

JUDGEMENT:

In this case, several accused individuals have appealed against the rejection of their applications for anticipatory bail by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. The First Information Report in the case was registered on 29.06.2019 at the instance of the Corporation Bank, for alleged offences under various sections of the Indian Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The allegations involved a company securing credit facilities from a consortium of banks and committing fraud, with the accused including the company’s promoters/directors, guarantors, and those involved in sanctioning the loan. The CBI completed its investigation and filed a final report on 31.12.2021, with the Special Court issuing a summons for the appearance of the accused on 07.03.2022. The appellants sought anticipatory bail, which was rejected by the Special Court and confirmed by the High Court. However, the Supreme Court found that the CBI did not require the custodial interrogation of the appellants during the investigation period and that the CBI only wanted the presence of the accused before the Trial Court to face trial, which may not be proper grounds to oppose anticipatory bail at this stage. Therefore, the Supreme Court granted anticipatory bail to the appellants.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3yX4kad

-Report by Harshit Yadav

The present case involves a revision petition filed by tenants who are challenging an eviction order passed by the Senior Civil Judge-cum-Rent Controller in Delhi. The landlord had filed an eviction petition on the grounds of the bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises, which is a shop measuring 83.4 sq. ft. The landlord, who owns the subject property, which consists of ground-floor shops, had been running his business in one of the shops, which was not sufficient for his business requirements. The tenants, in their application seeking leave to defend, had failed to raise any triable issues, and the court had dismissed their application and passed the eviction order in favor of the landlord. The tenants have challenged the order on the grounds that the landlord has sufficient alternate suitable accommodation for carrying on his business from other shops in the same property and has no bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises.

FACTS:

A revision petition was filed by tenants against an eviction order passed by the Senior Civil Judge-cum-Rent Controller in Delhi. The tenants were occupying shop no. 3 on the ground floor of a property owned by the landlord. The landlord had filed an eviction petition on the grounds of the bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises for expanding his business of sale of utensils. The tenants had challenged the eviction order by stating that the landlord had sufficient alternative accommodation for his business, but the Trial Court had dismissed their application seeking leave to defend. The present revision petition has been filed against the said order. The document contains the submissions of the parties, relevant facts, and the findings of the Court.

ISSUES RAISED:

Whether the Petitioners’ leave to defend failed to raise any triable issues and the contents of the said application failed to rebut the presumption of bona fide requirement of the Respondent?

Whether the Respondent has no bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises as he has sufficient pension income post-retirement and has possession of shop nos. 1, 2 and 4 in the subject property?

Whether the plea of the Respondent that he intends to carry on business from the tenanted premises is a triable issue, which the Trial Court ought to have appreciated and thus granted the leave to defend?

Whether shop nos. 1 and 2, being used by the sons of the Respondent for carrying out their separate and independent businesses, are not available to the Respondent to carry on his own business and thus, the tenanted premises are required by the Respondent for properly keeping his stock so as to display the same and invite customers, as the space available in the existing shop no. 4 is grossly insufficient?

CONTENTIONS:

The Petitioners’ counsel contended that the Respondent has no bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises as he has sufficient pension income post-retirement, and he has possession of shop nos. 1, 2, and 4 in the subject property. Therefore, the Respondent has alternate suitable accommodation for carrying on his business. However, the Respondent’s counsel submitted that shop nos. 1 and 2 are being used by his sons for carrying out their independent businesses, and shop no. 4, which the Respondent uses for his business, is very small in size. He stated that the Respondent needs the tenanted premises to display his stock properly and invite customers.

The Court considered the submissions of both parties and perused the record. It held that the Respondent has a bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises for expanding his business, as shop no. 4, where he currently operates his business, is not sufficient for him. The Court also noted that the Respondent’s sons are using shops nos. 1 and 2 for their independent businesses, and shop no. 4 is too small for the Respondent’s business. Therefore, the Court dismissed the Petitioners’ revision petition and upheld the eviction order passed by the Trial Court in favour of the Respondent.

JUDGEMENT:

In this case, the tenants have filed a revision petition challenging the eviction order passed by the Senior Civil Judge-cum-Rent Controller in RC ARC No. 5589/16, whereby the Petitioners’ application seeking leave to defend was dismissed, and the impugned eviction order was passed in favor of the landlord with respect to shop no.3.

The Respondent, the landlord, filed an eviction petition for the recovery of the tenanted premises, which abuts his shop no.4, as it was not sufficient for carrying on his business. The Trial Court found that the Petitioners’ leave to defend failed to raise any triable issues and the contents of the said application failed to rebut the presumption of bona fide requirement of the Respondent.

The learned counsel for the Petitioners argued that the Respondent has no bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises, as he has sufficient pension income post-retirement and has alternate suitable accommodation for carrying on his business. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the Respondent argued that shop nos. 1 and 2 are being used by the sons of the Respondent for their independent businesses, and shop no.4, which admeasures 8.5 sq. ft, is being used by the Respondent for running his independent sale of utensils etc.

After considering the submissions of the parties and perusing the record, this Court finds that the Respondent has a bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises. Admittedly, shop nos. 1 and 2 are being used by the sons of the Respondent for their independent businesses, and shop no.4, which admeasures 8.5 sq. ft, is being used by the Respondent for running his independent sale of utensils etc.

The Respondent has stated that the tenanted premises are required for properly keeping his stock so as to display the same and invite customers, as the space available in the existing shop no. 4 is grossly insufficient. This Court finds that the Respondent has a genuine need for the tenanted premises, and the Petitioners have failed to raise any triable issues in this regard.

Therefore, this Court upholds the impugned eviction order passed by the Trial Court and dismisses the present revision petition filed by the Petitioners. The Respondent is entitled to possession of the tenanted premises. The Petitioners are directed to hand over vacant possession of the tenanted premises to the Respondent within a period of four weeks from the date of this judgment.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3JVacal

-Report by Harsh Singh Rajput

In the case of GPSK CAPITAL PRIVATE LIMITED (FORMERLY KNOWN AS MANTRI FINANCE LIMITED) vs THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA, the said company appealed to get an exemption from the registration fees because of Shrikant Mantri, from who they have acquired the membership card of CSE(Calcutta Stock Exchange) and that appeal, got rejected by The Securities and Exchange Board of India.

FACTS:

On 30th Nov 1992, Shrikant Mantri became a member of CSE(Calcutta Stock Exchange) and got registered as a stockbroker with it. And later in 1997, he decided to transfer his membership card CSE to Mantri Finance Ltd. (hereinafter being referred to as ‘company’). This company was a member of NSE. And on the 17th of October, 1995 it also obtained the membership of NSE as a stock broker. After the membership card is given to the company. It got itself registered as a stockbroker on 1st April 1998.

Now, the company raised the issue that Shrikant Mantra had already paid the fees for registration. So, it should be exempted from the payment of registration fees for the period for which Shrikant Mantra had already paid. It further stated that the company is also entitled to compensation as all the conditions prescribed under para 4 of Schedule 3rd to the Regulation were also fulfilled.

But the board rejected this appeal of the company by order dated 7th May 2007. The board justify this action by saying that Shrikant in his three years of the period of membership acted only as a director of the company and as he was not the permanent director, therefore the company will not be entitled to such exemption as the condition under para 4 of schedule 3rd were also not followed properly.

Then the company filed an appeal against the order of the Board dated 07 May 2007 and highlighted the two issues.

Those two issues were read as:

(i) Whether the stock broker requires multiple registrations to operate on more than one stock exchange(s) or a single registration will suffice for all the stock exchanges.

(ii)Whether the appellant-Company is entitled to fee continuity benefits provided under para 4 of Schedule III.

For issue no 1., The learned tribunal held that single registration will be sufficient, even after having multiple memberships by the stockbroker. So, with ordering the board, the learned tribunal said to the board to calculate the registration fee payable again based on registration w.e.f 17th Oct 1995.

For issue no 2., the learned tribunal held that the appellant will not be exempted from the payment fee for which Shrikant Mantri had already paid, as the company fails to satisfy the conditions of clause (4) of Schedule 3rd to the registration.

And both sides were aggrieved by this decision by the tribunal, they preferred the appeal being Civil Appeal No(s). 2402 and CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 5636 against the impugned judgment by tribunal dated 09th Aug 2007.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION:

The learned counsel on behalf of the company submitted that Shrikant Mantra applies for conversion of his membership to a corporate identity and membership of the old entity under para 4 of schedule 3rd.

The learned counsel also stated that the board made an apparent error even after all the conditions are being fulfilled as indicated in para 4.

He also added that the interpretation of para 4 should also be done with the intention with which it was added. And stated that para 4 also mandates that from the converted corporate entity, no fresh fee will be collected.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:

Learned counsel on behalf of the respondent submitted that if an individual or partnership is being converted to a corporate entity then, a director( not being a temporary director ) and the corporate entity are entitled to claim exemption from paying the registration fees.

And in this case, he also added that Shrikant Mantra transferred his membership card CSE to the company and did not convert himself into a corporate identity.

They also supported the board’s decision not to give the appellant exemption.

JUDGEMENT:

The honourable Supreme Court after taking into consideration para 4 of schedule 3rd of the regulation, 1992, and both sides’ facts stated that Shrikant Mantra is not the whole time director, transferred his membership. And also there is nothing that shows the designation of Shrikant Mantra as a full-time director rather he’s been designated as ‘Director’.

And the appellant company failed to satisfy the condition that prevailed in para 4 of schedule 3rd of the regulation.

So, the honourable court dismissed the appeal of the appellant and held that the company will not be exempted from the registration fees.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3nanwP9

Year

1950

Citation

AIR 1950 SC 27

Court

The Supreme Court of India

Bench

Harilal Kania (C.J.), Justice M. Patanjali Sastri, Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, Justice B.K. Mukherjee and Justice Sudhi Rajan Das, Justice Fazal Ali Saiyid.

Introduction

A.K. Gopalan was the political opponent of the government. He filed the writ petition of habeas corpus. Habeas Corpus which means you may have the body is a writ that institutes the court to determine whether a criminal defendant has been lawfully imprisoned or not. A.K. Gopalan filed this writ petition challenging Article 19(1) (d)[1] which is the right to freedom of movement and article 21[2] which states the right to life and personal liberty. He filed this writ petition against the detention in pursuance of an order of detention made under the Prevention Detention Act, of 1950[3].

Prevention Detention Act detains the person without giving any valid reason and detention is being done because that detention is important. He challenged the validity of the order given by the court in pursuance of the Prevention Dentition Act to be “Mala Fide”.

Facts of the case

Since December 1947 A.K. Gopalan was detained several times illegally and even after the order of the court which makes him free he was kept under detention by the government under the Prevention Detention Act, of 1950. So, he filed a writ petition under article 32 for seeking the writ of habeas corpus of The Indian Constitution. He challenged the legality of order by the government as it opposes some of the articles of The Indian Constitution. He further argued that Sections 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 of the Prevention Detention Act, 1950 violate Articles 13, 19, and 21 of the Indian Constitution. But majorly he asked for this writ on the ground that the Preventive Detention Act[4] curtails his personal liberty under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. He contended that the law under Article 21 is not just the enacted law but it also includes the Principle of Natural Justice as well as some others laws associated with it that deprives the individual’s personal life and liberty. 

Petitioner contention

M.K. Nambiar appeared as a petitioner’s council. Some of the arguments put forward by the petitioner’s side were –

• The first and foremost argument was about the legality and validity of the provision of the Preventive Detention Act, of 1950 which they believed had violated Articles 13, 19, 21, and 22.
• We have article 19(1) (d) of the Indian Constitution which states the freedom to move freely within the territory of India but in this case, the State Government of Madras restricted this right by the detention of A.K. Gopala even after the decision by the court which made him free.
• The provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, of 1950 were against article 19 and challenged the statute’s failure as the petitioner’s freedom of speech and expression was revoked.
• Article 21 is in the Right to Life and personal liberty but after the prolonged detention, it seems to have no importance of Article 21 for the petitioner.
• The detention order was also arbitrary as it violates article 22. Article 22 deals with protection against arrest and detention in certain cases.
• Section 14 of the Preventive Detention Act, of 1950 violates the fundamental right under article 13 of the Indian Constitution

Respondent’s Contention

Advocate K. Rajah Ajyar (Advocate General of Madras), and M.C. Setalvad (Attorney General of India) appeared as respondent’s council 

• The respondent said that Articles 19 and 21 should not be read together as it depends on the perspective and the nature of the case in which context both the articles should be read together.
• Detention that is being done is not arbitrary, according to Article 22 which states protection against arrest and detention in certain cases.
• The legal procedure that is followed, everything is as per the constitution of India. 
• Detention does not violate any of the rights of the petitioner i.e. of articles 12, 19, 21, and 22.
• The Prevention Detention Act is completely legal and not arbitrary.
• There is no point in filing a writ petition of habeas corpus under article 32 of the Indian Constitution.

Issues raised in the case

• The Prevention Detention Act, of 1950 does violate the prevailing articles 19 and 21.
• Article 19 – Protection of certain rights regarding, speech and expression, assembly, association, residence, and profession. Article 21 – Protection of life and personal liberty is there any kind of relation between these two, and can they be read together? This was one of the major issues as it could turn out to be the deciding factor.
• Due process is a requirement that legal matters are resolved according to the established rules and principles and everyone should be treated fairly. So the issue raised was whether the procedure established by law under Article 21 is the same as that of due process of law.

Judgment

This case is a landmark case in constitutional law and is popularly known as the Prevention Detention case. After extensive discussion and wide research, the bench of judges came to the last point of the case where they were expected to give the judgment on this particular case. The court rejected the argument that Article 19 and Article 21 of the Indian Constitution are being violated because of the Prevention Detention Act, of 1950. The next particular topic on the discussion was being done was that whether the Prevention Detention Act, 1950 is ultra-vires or not, however in this particular question section 14 of the act was declared as the ultra-vires as it violates the rights guaranteed by Article 22(5) of the Indian Constitution. The court also said that being ultra-vires of section 14 of the act does not affect the validity of the whole act. The next question was whether article 19 and article 21 should be read together and if there is any kind of relationship between both articles. The court rejected this argument and said that both article is distinct and must not be read together.

The judgment of this case was given by the 6 judge’s constitutional bench in a ratio of 5:1. The decision of Justice Fazal Ali was opposite to the decision given by the other judges and his decision can be regarded as the dissenting opinion. The court said that personal liberty only means the freedom of the physical body and nothing beyond that. In the nutshell, we can say that the Supreme Court rejected the petition filed by A.K. Gopalan and said that the Prevention Detention Act, 1950 does not violate article 19(1) (d) and article 21 of the Indian Constitution.

• Dissenting opinion by Justice Fazal Ali

In this case, the dissenting opinion was given by Justice Fazal Ali; he observed that preventive detention violates the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the constitution. According to him, the Constitution recognized that personal liberty and preventive detention are arbitrary and could be misused by the government to suppress political dissent. He further argued that personal liberty was a fundamental right and could only be curtailed in accordance with the law and that the Preventive Detention Act, of 1950, did not satisfy this requirement.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Fazal Ali noted that the right to personal liberty is one of the essential parts of the freedom and dignity of the individual, and it is necessary to protect this right from arbitrary interference by the state. He said preventive detention violates this right hence it is unconstitutional.

Therefore, in the case of A.K. Gopalan vs. The State of Madras, Justice Fazal Ali highlights a commitment to a person’s rights and restricting the power of the state to interfere with personal liberty.

• Protection of Personal Liberty

The Article 21 of our Indian constitution reads “No person shall be deprived of his personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law”[5]. The word “person” that is being used in this article signifies that this Article is applicable to the citizen as well as non-citizens as everyone is entitled to personal liberty. The Article further states that this liberty cannot be taken away unless there is a procedure established by law has been followed. Concerning the fact regarding personal liberty the difference between “Due process of law” which means the process must be fair and reasonable and “procedure established by law” which means the procedure should take place in a way that the parliament has signified, was taken into consideration. However, in the judgment of this case the meaning of Article 21 was taken in a narrow sense i.e. in this case the meaning of personal liberty was taken as personal liberty is just protection of body parts and the state cannot harm the individual’s body part. Also, it was held that there is no link between Articles 14, 19, and Article 21.

After 30 years in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India[6], personal liberty was interpreted in a different sense i.e. in a wider sense. The court took the wider view of Article 21. It was held that there is a connection between Articles 19 and 21. It was also held that there is no difference between personal liberty and liberty. In personal liberty, every other liberty has been included. Therefore the concept of personal liberty was taken into consideration in a different sense before and after the case of A.K Gopalan v. State of Madras[7] thereby leading to the rejuvenation of a new concept of personal liberty in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India[8].

• Co-relation of Article 14, 19, and Article 21 before and after the case

Articles 14, 19, and Article 21 are the basic and vital Articles of the constitution, and the connection between both them is to be taken into consideration for the better interpretation of these Articles. Article 14, 19, and Article 21 are connected with each other as there forms the bedrock of the Fundamental Right guaranteed to every citizen of India. Before the case of A.K Gopalan (1950), these articles used to be taken into consideration as a separate and distinct identity. Article 14 ensures equality before the law and equal protection of the law. Article 19 guarantees six freedom to the citizens of India these freedoms are – Freedom of speech and expression, Freedom to assemble peacefully, Freedom to form associations and unions, Freedom to move freely throughout the territory of India, Freedom to reside and settle in any part of the country and the last is the freedom to practice any profession, occupation, trade or business. Article 21 guarantees the right to life and personal liberty to every citizen.

In the case of A.K Gopalan, the Supreme Court of India held that the right to personal liberty under Article 21 is limited to procedural aspects. This means the government can deprive an individual of their personal liberty as long as the procedure for doing so was legal. This decision in the case of A.K Gopalan was criticized by many as an individual could be detained infinitely without facing any trial until the procedure allows doing that.

However, in the subsequent cases, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of Article 21 to include substantive rights as well such as a free trial, the right to privacy, and the right to education, etc. under this Article. This inculcation of substantive rights in the purview of this Article 21 gives the interconnection of Articles 14, 19, and Article 21.

Conclusion

In the case of A.K. Gopalan vs. The State of Madras, the court restricted the meaning of Article 19 and Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. However, after several years in the case of Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, the court overruled this judgment and said that the opinion of Justice Fazal Ali was correct. The court further said that the scope of Article 21 and Article 19 has a wider view. From the above analysis of the case, we can conclude to the fact that the Right to life and personal liberty is not only recognized under the Indian Constitution but also intentionally recognized on the basis of the principles of natural justice. The case of A.K Gopalan is one of the most important cases of Independent India as in this case the question pertaining to Article 21 was raised for the first time after the Independence of India. However, the court took Article 21 in a narrow sense and makes it in accordance with the procedure established by the law. Almost after 30 years this decision was overruled and lastly, Article 21 was taken into a broader sense. Lastly, the court widen the view of Article 21 and said that the procedure established by the law must be just, fair, and reasonable. Therefore, from the above discussion, we can say that the case of A.K. Gopalan vs. The State of Madras (1950), was a landmark case in the Indian Constitution.

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Endnotes

1. INDIA CONST. art. 19(1) (d)
2. INDIA CONST. art. 21
3. Prevention Detention Act, 1950, Act No. 4 of 1950
4. Ibid
5. INDIA CONST. art. 21
6. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597
7. A.K Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27
8. Supra note vii

This case analysis is authored by Prashant Prasad, a second-year law student from University Law College.

–Report by Harshit Yadav

In the case of Raj Kumar Versus. The State, National Capital Territory Of Delhi, the petitioner/applicant, Mr. Raj Kumar Singh, has been accused of pushing his sister-in-law off the terrace of her matrimonial house, resulting in grievous injuries. The victim has alleged that she was subjected to cruelty and harassment by her in-laws for dowry and was restrained from communicating with her parents and husband. The applicant denied the allegations and claimed that the victim had jumped off the terrace herself. The court has dismissed the applicant’s previous bail applications, and the present application is being heard.

FACTS:

The petitioner is seeking regular bail in FIR No. 512/2022 under Sections 307/498A/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), registered at PS Ranhola, New Delhi. The FIR was registered on June 21, 2022, after a PCR call was received at PS Ranhola, Delhi regarding a lady (complainant) falling from the roof of her matrimonial house. Upon receiving information, the SDM Punjabi Bagh reached the hospital and recorded the statement of the victim. The victim alleged that she had married Mr. Ram Kumar and Rs. 2.5 lakhs were paid as dowry. After her marriage, she was taunted, beaten, and threatened for dowry as well as restrained from communicating and or meeting with her parents and husband. The victim has alleged that on June 21, 2022, by reason of her request to meet her mother, the present applicant, Mr. Raj Kumar Singh (brother-in-law) along with other accused persons namely, Nempal Singh (father-in-law), Mamta (mother-in-law), & Monica (sister-in-law) dragged her to the terrace and pushed her from there. During the course of investigation, the statement of an eyewitness, Ms. Babita was recorded, she stated that the complainant herself jumped from the roof. However, during the further course of the investigation, the said eyewitness retracted her previous statement. During the investigation, Call Detail Records were obtained & analyzed as well as a supplementary statement of the complainant was also recorded under Section 161 of CrPC. After the completion of the investigation, a chargesheet was filed before the Court of competent jurisdiction. The present applicant had filed two bail applications, which were dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-05 and learned Additional Sessions Judge-09. The present application seeks grant of regular bail.

ISSUES RAISED:

Whether the petitioner/applicant is entitled to be granted regular bail under Sections 439 and 482 of the CrPC in FIR No. 512/2022 under Sections 307/498A/34 of the IPC.

Whether the allegations of cruelty and dowry harassment against the petitioner/applicant and other co-accused persons are true or false.

Whether the complainant jumped from the terrace of her matrimonial home or was pushed by the petitioner/applicant and other co-accused persons.

Whether the eyewitness, Ms. Babita, retracted from her previous statement due to any pressure or influence from the petitioner/applicant and other co-accused persons.

Whether the supplementary statement of the complainant under Section 161 of CrPC and the call records support the allegations made against the petitioner/applicant and other co-accused persons.

Whether the grant of anticipatory bail to Ms. Monica, the wife of the petitioner/applicant, is relevant to the present case.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:

The applicant’s counsel has contended that the allegations are false and no specific allegations have been made against the present applicant. They have argued that the complainant herself jumped off the terrace, and this has been corroborated by an eye witness. They have also pointed out that the complainant’s husband has not been accused in the case.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:

The prosecution, on the other hand, has argued that there is sufficient evidence to establish the involvement of the present applicant in the crime. They have presented the complainant’s statement alleging cruelty and dowry demands by the accused, corroborated by the supplementary statement of an eye witness. They have also cited the recovery of three handwritten slips thrown by the complainant, requesting help from her relatives, and the admission of the complainant in her additional statement that she communicated with her family through the accused’s phone.

JUDGEMENT:

In this case, the petitioner/applicant has sought regular bail in FIR No. 512/2022 under Sections 307/498A/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), registered at PS Ranhola, New Delhi. The petitioner is accused of pushing his sister-in-law from the terrace of her matrimonial home, among other charges.

The court has considered the facts of the case, including the statement of the victim, who alleges that she was taunted, beaten, and threatened for dowry, and was restrained from communicating or meeting with her parents and husband. The victim has also alleged that the present applicant, along with other accused persons, dragged her to the terrace and pushed her from there.

During the course of the investigation, an eye witness initially stated that the complainant had jumped from the roof, but later retracted her statement and stated that the complainant was hanging from the roof and fell down due to a loosening of her grip. The complainant admitted to communicating with her mother, brother, and husband through the phone of the present applicant and his wife, and stated that her relatives witnessed her being abused and misbehaved at the hands of the present applicant and his family. She further stated that the present applicant, along with the other co-accused persons, threw her from the terrace after she expressed a desire to leave her matrimonial home.

The court has also considered the fact that the present applicant’s wife, Ms. Monica, was granted anticipatory bail by the Additional Sessions Judge-09, Tis Hazari Courts.

Based on the above facts and circumstances, the court is of the opinion that the allegations against the present applicant are serious in nature and require further investigation. The court further notes that the applicant’s previous bail applications have been dismissed by the competent courts.

The court, therefore, finds no ground to grant regular bail to the present applicant at this stage. The application is dismissed

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–Report by Radhika Mitta

This is a case summary of an application for anticipatory bail in FIR No. 512/2022 under Sections 307/498A/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), registered at PS Ranhola, New Delhi.

FACTS:

The incident involved a lady who fell from the roof of her matrimonial house and sustained grievous injuries. She alleged that she was taunted, beaten, and threatened for dowry and was restrained from communicating or meeting with her parents and husband. The victim accused the present applicant, Ms. Mamta (mother-in-law), along with other accused persons of dragging her to the terrace and pushing her from there. During the course of the investigation, the statement of an eyewitness was recorded, who initially stated that the complainant herself jumped from the roof but later retracted her statement. The complainant admitted to communicating with her mother, brother, and husband through the phone of the present applicant’s son and his wife. The complainant’s father and brother-in-law also visited her matrimonial house and witnessed her being abused and misbehaved with at the hands of the present applicant and his family. The present applicant was not found at her expected address during the investigation as she was undergoing treatment at a hospital. A chargesheet was filed, and the anticipatory bail application of the present applicant was dismissed. A non-bailable warrant was issued against the present applicant by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Tis Hazari Courts.

PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTIONS:

The contentions of the plaintiff/complainant are not explicitly stated in the given case summary. However, it can be inferred that the complainant had filed a First Information Report (FIR) against the applicant (present respondent) and had made serious allegations against her, including allegations of cruelty and harassment at her matrimonial home.

DEFENDANT’S CONTENTIONS:

The learned counsel for the applicant (present respondent) argued that the allegations made in the FIR were false and that no specific allegations had been made against the applicant. The counsel also submitted that the complainant had jumped from the terrace of her matrimonial home and that an eyewitness had corroborated this fact. The counsel further urged that the applicant was an old woman with health issues and required frequent medical attention. The defence counsel argued that no material had been placed on record to substantiate the prosecution’s claim that the applicant posed a threat to the complainant or could tamper with evidence.

JUDGEMENT:

In view of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the application for anticipatory bail is allowed. In the event of her arrest in connection with the present FIR, the applicant is directed to be released forthwith, upon her furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand) along with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the Investigating Officer/Arresting Officer. In case it is established that the applicant tried to tamper with the evidence, the bail granted to the applicant shall stand cancelled forthwith.

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-Report by Sejal Jethva

ASHUTOSH SAMANTA (D) BY LRS. & ORS. VS SM. RANJAN BALA DASI & ORS., In this case, 3 related brothers’ property was distributed by will. In this case sections 68,69 and 71 of the Indian Evidence Act discuss.

FACTS

Three sons, Upendra, Anukul, and Mahadev were born to one Gosaidas Samanta (hence, “testator”). He left a will dated 16.11.1929 behind when he passed away, leaving behind his widow Bhagbati Das and three boys. Three heirs received the testator’s estate: his sons Anukul and Mahadev, as well as his grandson Shibu, who is the son of Upendra (who was not granted any share). A division deed was drawn between these three co-sharers on February 21, 1945. Upendra, who signed a disclaimer document for one portion of the assets Shibu sold with his share, appears to have accepted this arrangement.

The current appellant filed a claim in 1952, claiming that he was in possession of some of the testator’s real estate and that he had acquired them from Upendra.

APPELLANTS CONTENTION

Mr. Ranjan Mukherjee, Ld. Advocate contended on behalf of the appellant that the courts below could not have relied on the will and given the letters of administration in the absence of any proof that the will was properly performed. Given that the propounder had made several arguments, including one for adverse possession in a prior suit for division, it was argued that there were suspicious circumstances surrounding the will’s execution that raised questions about its veracity. Additionally, it was claimed that the lower courts could not have accepted the will based on Section 90 of the Evidence Act of 1872 and relied on the 1945 partition document or the ‘Nabadi’ alleged to have been

The appellant’s principal contention is that the courts below erred by relying on Section 90 of the Evidence Act of 1872 because the application for letters of administration was submitted after a significant amount of time had passed.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

On the other hand, Mr. Bikash Kar Gupta, Ld. Advocate argued on behalf of the respondents that this court should not intervene in the current matter because the courts have made concurring factual findings. It was argued that the will had been properly proved and that there was no need to wait to ask the court for letters of administration.

The respondent argued that both the trial court and the High Court consistently expressed satisfaction that the elements required to prove the will had been met and that the courts did not base their conclusions solely on the assumption that the document was old. The respondent relied on the record and the findings made by both the trial court and the High Court.

JUDGEMENT

1. Wills cannot be proved only based on their age; wills must also be proven in accordance with Sections 63(c) of the Succession Act of 1925 and Section 68 of the Evidence Act of 1872, which preclude the use of Section 90’s presumption regarding the regularity of papers older than 30 years.

2. There are frequently circumstances when wills that would have otherwise met the legal conditions for being attested cannot be proven in accordance with the aforementioned two sections because the attesting witnesses are unavailable or if one of the witnesses denies having attested the will. Evidence Act of 1872 Sections 69 and 71.

3. In addition to the testimony of witnesses, the trial court also referred to the partition agreement that gave it effect and in which shares were distributed in line with the conditions of the will. This document was registered, and the appellant’s predecessor, the late Upendra, also signed a document acknowledging the will’s existence.

4. There can be only one conclusion, i.e., that the will was duly executed, and the propounder/respondent herein was successful in proving it, if all the aforementioned circumstances are taken into account in their entirety and one also keeps in mind the fact that none of Upendra’s heirs contested the grant of letters of administration.

5. After considering the discussion above, this court concludes that the conclusions in the High Court’s contested judgement are sound. As a result, the appeal is denied and rejected. There won’t be a cost-related order.

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