In the case of S. Athilakshmi v. The State of Rep. by the Drugs Inspector reported on 15-03-2023 in the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. This is a case where criminal proceedings were initiated by the state against a medical practitioner for selling medicines within her house.
FACTS:
S. Athilakshmi (hereinafter Appellant) is a registered medical practitioner working as an Associate Professor and the Head of the Dermatology Department, in the Govt. Omandurar Medical College, Chennai. The appellant was carrying medical practice in her private capacity at premises which is No. 87 Red Hills Road(North), Villivakkam Chennai. She meets and examines her patients. An inspector on 16.03.2016, inspected the aforesaid place and found 18 medicines at the said place. He also found some bills. He obtained the sanction from the office of the Director of Drugs Control, Tamil Nadu, Chennai-06, on 22.09.2016 which was given to him on 23.01.2018. Thereafter he initiated criminal proceedings before the court of X Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore to hold liable her under section 18(c) punishable with section 27(b)(ii) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. Aggrieved by the proceedings, she applied section 482 of CrPC, 1973 before the High Court of Madras for quashing Criminal proceedings against her. Her petition was dismissed by the LD. Single Judge on 21.06.2022. Aggrieved by this, she filed an SLP(Special Leave Petition) in the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS:
It was contented by the appellant that she is a registered medical practitioner in dermatology and has an M.D. (DVL) degree in this specialization. She is protected by the law if she was practicing medicines while she was not on her official duty. She has produced the required bills and necessary documents asked by the court to support her side.
RESPONDANT’S CONTENTIONS:
The respondent contended that she had stocked the medicines in her capacity. Therefore, the criminal proceedings shall remain to be continued.
JUDGEMENT:
This case was decided by a two-judge bench, and they set aside the impugned order of the High Court of Madras. The judgment was delivered by Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia as the Court granted the leave and held that since she is a registered medical practitioner and thus protected by law to practice medicines independently. The Court also emphasized the word ‘stocked’ in section 18(c). The Court held that most of the drugs were lotions and ointments in small quantities therefore they can not fall under the ambit of ‘stocked.’ The court said that a small number of drugs can be found in the room or office of a registered medical practitioner. The court also emphasized the timeline of incidents that occurred in this case. “The search was carried out on 16.03.2016 and sanction was sought on 22.09.2016 and it was granted on 23.01.2018” this is the whole timeline from search to granting sanction. The court observed that there is a very wide difference in time. And there is no explanation for this too. The court relied on the case “Hasmukhlal D. Vohra and Anr. V. State of Tamil Nadu.” In this case, criminal proceedings were quashed against the petitioner considering the delay in the proceedings, and the court in his judgment para 25 said that the respondent i.e., the State of Tamil Nadu, has not explained the extraordinary delay of more than four years between the initial site inspection, the show cause notice, and the complaint. This delay prompted Court to infer some sinister motive behind initiating the criminal proceedings. This Court in the case of “Manshukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat”in this case, the court highlighted the importance of prior sanction. In the case of “Mohd. Shabir V. State of Maharashtra” in this case, the court observed that possession simpliciter would not itself be an offense, but the prosecution had to prove the essential under section 27 which was that even a stock of medicine was for sale. By observing that sanctioning authority had not examined at all whether a practicing doctor could be prosecuted under the facts of the case, the Court quashed the Criminal proceedings against the appellant.
“Without freedom of thought, there can be no such thing as wisdom – and no such thing as public liberty without freedom of speech”
By Benjamin Franklin
Introduction
Safeguards of Liberty in India was to protect people who are suffering and aged 16 or above 16 and also who needed it. Liberty Protection Safeguards(LPS) care for those people and treated their mental capacity with the proper agreement. In India basic right of the human being is liberty, the right to live life without fall of dignity.
Every Individual who could have a Liberty Protection Safeguards authorization incorporate those with dementia, mental imbalance, and learning handicaps who come up short on the pertinent limit.
The Liberty Protection Safeguards were presented in the Mental capacity (amendment) Act 2019 and will supplant the Hardship of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS) framework. The Liberty Protection Safeguards will convey further developed results for individuals who are or who should be denied their liberty. The Liberty Protection Safeguards have been intended to put the privileges and wishes of those individuals at the focal point of all dynamics on the hardship of liberty.
The liberty protection safeguards are wanted to come into force in April 2022.[1]
Safeguard Of Liberty
Liberty is the most valuable thing for an individual and viable advances are required for its safeguards. From days of yore, there is a tussle between the state’s power and individuals’ liberties. An individual appreciates more freedoms assuming that the power of the state is abridged. Liberty can’t exist in a domineering state. Prof. Laski calls attention to specific strides for protecting freedom. “Opportunity, right off the bat, won’t be accomplished for the mass of men clear under unique certifications” and it can’t “exist in that frame of mind of honor”. Besides, “extraordinary honor is incongruent with opportunity”. Thirdly, “liberty can’t be acknowledged in that frame of mind in which the privileges of some rely on the joys of others”. Fourthly, “What is the state’s fundamental duty for safeguards liberty”.
Essential elements in Safeguards of Liberty
The democratic form of Government
Democracy system is a type of government where everyone has an offer in the organization. Just democrat; states can give an amiable environment to the turn of events: human character. It is helpful for the full pleasure in liberty.
The Foundation of a majority rule framework is a fundamental shield of freedom. Both liberty and a democratic rules system are valuable to each other. We can’t imagine a majority rules government without the presence of common, financial, political, and individual freedom. Moreover, without even a trace of the right to opportunity, there can be no genuine majority rules government. Liberty is more secure and safer in the Majority rules system than in some other type of government. Popularity-based government is the public authority of individuals though in different types of government (like Outright Government and Fascism) all powers are focused and brought together under the control of one individual or a gathering of people. The individual in power or a gathering of people in power can’t endure his or their analysis. The nature of A majority rules system inverse gatherings is given due regard in Majority rules government. The contrary gatherings structure the public authority after the disappointment of the decision party. Analysis of the public authority is invited in Majority rule government.
Fundamental Rights
There should be a reasonable and unambiguous rundown of essential fundamental rights in the Constitution. Individuals should be conversant with their freedoms and the public authority should know about the limitation of abilities. These freedoms are justiciable and any demonstration that contradicts the arrangements of the Constitution can be announced ultra vires.
One of the vital strategies for safeguarding liberty is to consolidate a sanction of central privileges and opportunities in the constitution of the State. Alongside it, legal insurance ought to be given privileges. They safeguard our freedom to an exceptionally extraordinary degree. These basic freedoms likewise restrict the power of the state. In the presence of crucial freedoms, the state can’t meddle in that frame of mind of individual life. Without a trace of key freedoms freedom of the individual is never out of risk and without freedom improvement of human character is preposterous.
The powers of the public authority ought to be isolated among the chief, law-making body, and legal executive. This will help in forestalling any organ of the public authority. To turn out to be outright. Each organ of the public authority. Will work in its system. As indicated by popular French Researcher Montesquieu, detachment of abilities is a fundamental condition for pleasure in the freedom and the nations where there is the partition of abilities, individuals appreciate more freedom. This interaction is finished through the utilization of balanced governance. Lord Acton believes that “Power taints an; outright power undermines totally.” Power has an internal pattern for abuse and power ought to go about as a check to drive.
Responsible Government
An administration framed by the representatives of individuals will undoubtedly be capable. Any error concerning the public authority will sound its mark of the end and the resistance will exploit it. A bi-party framework with solid resistance will guarantee essential safeguards for liberty.
Love for Liberty
For the security of freedom, individuals ought to have limitless love for freedom. On the off chance that it is thus, individuals might never want to lose their freedom and will be ready to make each penance for its insurance. During the opportunity battle, lakhs of Indians made penances of their lives as they went to gallows and prisons for the fulfilment of opportunity for their homeland.
Rule of law
The idea of Law and order implies all people are equivalent under the watchful eye of law and regulation. This law and Regulation see no difference between the rich and poor, the high and low.
The rule of law is laid out in Britain, the U.S.A. also, and India. The idea of Law and order implies that all individuals are equivalent under the steady gaze of regulation. Regulation makes no separation between rich and poor, the high the low. All individuals ought to be under similar regulations and limited by similar sorts of commitments. Nobody ought to be above regulation. No honours will be given to an individual having a place with a specific class nor will there be any arrangement for insusceptibility. No individual will be rebuffed or saved in care for quite a while until and except if his wrongdoing is demonstrated.
Constitution
Just the constitution limits the power of the state. It sets out specific obstructions and these hindrances are not to be crossed by the state while utilizing its power. For the most part, the constitution is acknowledged as the incomparable law of the nation, and if any organ of the public authority disregards any arrangement of the const., that act is pronounced unlawful by the courts. In brief, every organ of the public authority. Will undoubtedly work inside the structure of the constitution and this way the constitution safeguards the liberties of individuals.
There should be a free and fair judiciary for the assurance and conservation and individual liberty. The judiciary should be free of chief and authoritative control.
The autonomous, strong, and fair-minded legal executive is the greatest defender of freedom. Thus, arrangements ought to be made to keep the legal executive free. Assuming that the Legal executive is subordinate to the Leader or on the other hand on the off chance that it isn’t liberated from the impact of the Chief, it can not grant equity nor can it safeguard the major freedoms of man. In socialist nations or in nations that have Fascism, basic privileges are given to individuals, yet the Legal executive isn’t liberated from the impact of the Chief. In such nations, the safeguards and security of central privileges, constitution, and freedom aren’t exactly imaginable and freedom becomes simply a joke. Here, just keen and fair-minded people ought to be delegated as judges. They ought to be paid significant compensation and adequate annuity after retirement. Their residency ought to be long.
Safeguards the protected liberty of Indian citizens
Right to life and individual freedom
Article 21[2] gives that no individual will be denied his life or individual freedom besides as per technique laid out by regulation.
Habeas Corpus
Habeas Corpus is a writ that is accustomed to bringing an individual who has been kept or detained under the watchful eye of a court. This writ is utilized to safeguard the liberty of a person.
Legal Review
Legal Survey is the force of the legal executive to survey the activities of the leader and authoritative parts of government. This power is utilized to guarantee that the public authority doesn’t abuse the central privileges of residents.
Division of Abilities is a successful protection for individual freedom. The blend of a chief, administrative or legal powers in a similar individual or set of people could bring about the maltreatment of abilities and loss of individual freedom.
Right to constitutional remedies
The Constitution accommodates different cures, for example, writs, orders, and headings that can be utilized by residents to authorize their central freedoms.
The right to speak freely of discourse and articulation is a principal right ensured by the Constitution of India. It permits residents to offer their viewpoints unreservedly unafraid of oversight or discipline.
Right to information
The Right to Information Act, of 2005[3] accommodates admittance to data held by open specialists. This right permits residents to consider public specialists responsible and guarantees straightforwardness in administration.
Right in Safeguard of Liberty
Article 5[4] says that safeguards are for anyone who is being arrested or detained. It is for all the people who suffer and those who are detained those people are sent to judge. Detention can be challenged if it is lawful. Victims get compensation for unlawful detention.
Some Restriction
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras[5] it was contended that the ‘procedure established by law’ implied equivalent to ‘due process of law’. Both the terms are equivalent and similar security is being given in both nations with a distinction that ‘due process of law’ covers considerable and procedural regulation yet ‘methodology laid out by regulation’ covers just procedural law.
In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India[6], Chandrachud J. said that the system must be simple, fair and sensible, not whimsical, abusive, or erratic and Krishna Iyer J. said that the ‘law’ signifies sensible regulation and no established piece.
Landmark Judgment
This idea originally came up on account of A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras[7]. In this situation, the solicitor was confined under Preventive Detainment Act. He tested this in the court that it be violative of his right to opportunity of development, which is the quintessence of individual freedom under Article 21[8]. The Supreme Court gave the significance of individual freedom in an extremely tight sense. It said that individual freedom incorporates just the actual opportunity of the body like independence from capture or unjust repression. It likewise said that the term ‘law’ is the state-made regulation as it were. The High Court held that Article 19[9] has no association and relevance to Article 21.
On account of Satwant Singh Sahney v. Identification Officer[10], the option to travel abroad is remembered as ‘personal liberty’ and no individual can be denied his entitlement to go besides according to the technique laid out by regulation. Refusal to give the identification of the individual with practically no reasons allotted for it adds up to an unapproved hardship of individual freedom as given under Article 21.
There was another instance of the State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Pandurang[11]. In this situation, it was seen that the detainee does not stop being an individual not having key privileges. The right to compose a book and get it distributed by a detenu is his major right and its forswearing without the power of regulation disregarded Article 21.
Conclusion
Every one of the previously mentioned focuses addresses the manners by which we can defend a singular’s liberty. These are just conceivable when every single individual no matter what their situation in the general public no matter what their positions no matter what component can make discrimination attempts to guarantee that freedom as a guideline or element pervasive in the general public isn’t compromised. Freedom is an essential element that guarantees that the Majority rule government in space wins. On the off chance that it falls flat, that Democracy is no Democracy and acts as a joke to freedom all in all.
The defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in O.S. No.6456 of 1993 filed an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, calling in question the judgment and decree dated 09.09.2010 passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in RFA No.1966 of 2007. During the pendency of the captioned appeal, the second appellant died and his legal heirs were impleaded as additional appellants 2.1 to 2.4. The original first appellant and the impleaded legal heirs of the deceased second appellant are collectively described as ‘appellants’. The plaintiff prayed for a judgment for decree of permanent injunction restraining the first and second defendants from interfering in the plaintiffs right, title and interest over and in the suit schedule property.
FACTS:
The appellants filed a written statement contending that the suit is not maintainable, that there is no prayer for possession, that the suit was not valued correctly, and that the real owners of the suit property were not arraigned as parties. Subsequently, they amended the plaint by adding schedules A, B and ‘C’ and prayers qua them. The prayers in the amended plaint read as under: a judgment and decree of perpetual injunction directing the defendants to restore the possession of the schedule premises to the plaintiff and not to interfere in the plaintiffs’ lawful possession and enjoyment of the schedule property.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:
The plaintiff/respondent adduced oral and documentary evidence in support of his claims, but the defendant did not lead any evidence. The Trial Court partially decreed the suit as per judgment dated 04.07.2007, holding that the plaintiff was entitled to recover possession of suit ‘B’ schedule property from the defendants and directed the defendants to vacate and deliver it to the plaintiff within two months. The surviving defendants challenged the judgment and decree before the High Court in RFA No.1966 of 2007. They did not adduce any evidence before the trial court. The plaintiff objected to the maintainability of the appeal as the original suit was filed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The High Court dispelled the objection and remanded the matter to the Trial Court for fresh disposal. Leave was granted and the Civil Appeal was disposed of as per judgment dated 03.09.2009. The trial Court was directed to record the evidence and submit a report to the High Court to dispose of the appeal within the time stipulated. The
Court to which the case is remanded has to comply with the order of remand and acting contrary to it is contrary to law. In this case, the High Court remanded the matter to the trial Court for fresh disposal and directed the trial Court to record the evidence as directed by the High Court and forward it along with report to enable the High Court to dispose of the appeal taking into account the additionally recorded evidence of the defendants.
RESPONDANT’S CONTENTIONS:
The High Court dismissed the appeal of the appellants and confirmed the judgement and decree of the Trial Court. The appellants had raised multiple grounds to assail the judgment, including that the plaintiff/the respondent had failed to establish his possession over plaint ‘B’ schedule property. The High Court failed to consider the contention that the subject suit was abated due to the failure of the respondent to bring on record the legal representatives of Sri Hanumaiah, the third respondent, and Sri Rama @ Ramamurthy, the deceased second defendant, who had purchased the suit property from Sriman Madhwa Sangha and Sri Vittal Rao as per sale deed executed on 05.10.2000.
JUDGEMENT:
The High Court held that the defendants did not disclose their defence in their written statement and did not even contend that they are in possession of the suit property, which is based on the maxim ‘Possessio contra omnes valet praeter eur cui ius sit possessionis‘. The High Court is also correct in holding the question of maintainability of the suit in the affirmative and in favour of the respondent. The appellants argued that the suit ought to have been held as abated against all the defendants due to non-substitution of the legal representatives of the deceased defendant No. 3 upon his death, but the courts below have held that the original defendants failed to raise sufficient and appropriate pleadings in the written statement that they have better right for possession. The appeal is dismissed and there will be no order as to costs.
In a recent judgment, the Supreme Court of India held that a simple and literal interpretation of the severe requirements under Section 37 of the NDPS Act 1985 would make bail difficult to grant. The court was considering a criminal appeal in the case Mohd Muslim vs State (NCT) of Delhi to adjudicate whether grant bail to an undertrial prisoner who was arrested seven years ago under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 for alleged participation in the distribution of a prohibited drug.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND:
The case involved the seizure of 180 kg of marijuana from a total of four co-accused individuals seven years ago, namely Nitesh Ekka, Sanjay Chauhan, Sharif Khan, and Virender Shakiyar/Sakyabar @ Deepak and afterward Mohd Muslim. When the co-accused were found in possession of the prohibited drug, the appellant, Mohd Muslim, was implicated based on a confessional statement. When his co-accused was granted bail, the Delhi high court refused him bail. Nevertheless, despite Mohd Muslim was not found in possession of ganja, the assistant attorney general of India, Vikramjit
Banerjee stated that ” he prima facie looks to be the brains behind the supply and transportation of narcotic drugs from Chhattisgarh.”
APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS:
The appellant stated that because he has been imprisoned for more than seven years and the criminal the prosecution is only midway, the impugned judgment invalidated his plea for ordinary release under Sections 439 and 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (hereafter “CrPC”) before the Delhi High. The court, even if he was not found in possession of any drugs. Yet, his co-accused were granted bail despite this.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:
According to the prosecution, the four accused people who were allegedly in possession of 180 kg of marijuana—Nitesh Ekka, Sanjay Chauhan, Sharif Khan, and Deepak—were apprehended by the police as a result of secret details that were provided to authorities.
As part of the inquiry, the co-accused Nitesh Ekka was transported to Chhattisgarh to be identified, and on his request, the current appellant Mohd. Muslim was put into custody from the night of October 3, 2014, to October 4, 2015.
Based on several considerations, including the gravity of the alleged offenses, the severity of the sentence, and the appellant’s claimed involvement, the district court denied the appellant’s request for bail. It was observed that he had been in constant touch with his co-accused during the commission of the crime and that key witnesses had not yet been interviewed.
Further, the challenged decision states that the present accused was in prima facie frequent touch with other co-accused, as evidenced by phone records, and that the main accused, Virender Singh @ Beerey had made payments to the appellant’s bank account repeatedly. During the trial, one of the witnesses reportedly stated that the current appellant gave him Rs. 50,000.
As there was a prima facie case against him and no justification for relying on Section 37 of the NDPS Act’s exclusions, the application for normal bail was denied, and the trial court was ordered to accelerate and conclude the matter within six months.
JUDGEMENT:
This observation was stated in the judgment by a bench of Justices S. Ravindra Bhat and Dipankar Datta considered that the requirement of Section 436A, which applies to offenses implies that the grant of bail based on an unreasonable delay in the trial cannot be considered to be restricted by Section 37 of the Act. The bench observed that section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1985 positions that a court may only issue bail to an accused person if it is convinced that there are reasonable reasons to believe that he is innocent of the crime and that he is not likely to commit another crime.
The Supreme Court further cited the decision of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kajad [(2001) 7 SCC 673, which said that a ‘liberal’ approach to Section 37 of the NDPS Act should not be applied. The bench ruled that to effectively rule out the grant of bail completely, the appellant’s request for release must be evaluated ” within the framework of the NDPS Act, specifically Section 37.”
CONCLUSION:
As a response, the bench led by Justice Bhat remarked that the supreme court had maintained such stringent conditions in light of the balance between two conflicting goals, namely, the right of an accused to enjoy freedom based on the presumption of innocence and the interest of society at large. And yet, it also acknowledged that the only way a particular condition in law, like the one in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, could be taken into account within the bounds of the constitution is by relying on a prima-facie finding of the matter based on the evidence on the record. The bench ruled unequivocally that any alternative reading would result in a person accused of offenses such as those authorized under Section 37 of the NDPS Act is completely denied bail.
Therefore, since the appellant has been in detention for more than 7 years and 4 months and the the trial is moving at a snail’s pace, bail cannot be denied to an accused charged with NDPS Act offenses due to the operation of Section 37 where there has been an excessive delay in the trial.
In the case of Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, the IPC’s Section 302 was used to punish the offence. A portion of the appeal is upheld.
FACTS
The appellant was a 22-year-old man. He emphasized the appellant’s young wife, young child, and elderly parents. He also has no priors and doesn’t pose a threat to society. Also, he has displayed consistently good behaviour while incarcerated, and he even finished a B.A. degree course while incarcerated. Last but not least, he emphasised that the appellant had served roughly seventeen years and two months of his sentence.
The Indian Criminal Code, 1860 (often referred to as the “IPC”) punishes the appellant for offences that fall within Sections 366, 376, and 302. The penalty for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC is the only issue under dispute. The appellant was given a life sentence of harsh imprisonment by the learned Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court). To contest the verdict and sentence, the appellant chose to appeal to the High Court. The appeal for a longer sentence was preferred by the State Government. By the contested judgment, the High Court dismissed both appeals. This Court merely gave notice of sentences on April 21, 2017.
APPELLANT’S CONTENTION
Knowing the law established by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias Murugan & Ors.1, the learned solicitor representing the appellant-accused argued that only the Constitutional Courts, not the Sessions Courts, have the authority to impose a modified sentence. He argued that the Constitutional Courts can only commute an accused person’s death sentence if they also grant a life sentence, whether it be for all eternity or for a set amount of time. The courts have no authority to impose a different punishment if the death penalty is not applied. Additionally, he cited the court’s ruling in Swami Shraddananda alias Murali Manohar Mishra v. State of Karnataka.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION
Even though the death penalty has not been imposed, the learned attorney representing the respondent-State contends that the Constitutional Courts are not helpless to impose modified sentences taking into account the seriousness of the offence, the behaviour of the accused, and other pertinent factors. He argued that the Constitutional Courts’ authority to provide a modified sentence could not be curtailed by claiming that they can only do so when the issue is whether to commute a death sentence. He argued that the most severe sentence was considered in this case’s facts by citing the Trial Court and High Court’s rulings. In any event, he argued, by imposing a sentence that would last the remainder of the appellant’s life, the High Court had, after taking into account all the relevant factual circumstances, reiterated the Sessions Court’s position.
JUDGEMENT
1. The facts are such that they will shock any court’s conscience. The deceased woman, who was happily married, worked for a reputable corporation with an office in Bengaluru’s Electronic City. She had to work till late at night or even early in the morning due to the nature of her job. Her transportation was previously provided by the employer in the form of a car. The business used to give staff automobiles to drive on various predetermined routes. The dead departed the workplace that fateful day at 2:00 a.m. in a car provided by the business. She previously rode in a car that travelled Route 131. She was told by the appellant, the driver, that day that the vehicle used for route 131 was not available. She was informed by the appellant that she would have to use his vehicle, which is on Route 405 to get there. Therefore, the deceased sat down in the car that the accused was operating. The deceased’s maternal uncle filed a complaint and claimed that the person was missing. Finally, at the appellant’s request, her deceased body was found. The deceased’s clothing, shoes, and other personal effects were discovered close to the body. The charge of both the offence under Section 366 of the IPC and the offence under Section 376 of the IPC was successfully established by the prosecution. Additionally, the appellant-accused was found guilty of the crime under Section 302. The victim, who was 28 years old, had his life brutally taken from him.
2. In light of this, we change the Trial Court’s original sentence for the offence covered by Section 302 of the IPC. We order that the appellant be sentenced to life in prison. Additionally, we order that the appellant not be freed until he has served his full 30-year sentence. The appeal is partially upheld to the extent stated above.
On 24.03.2023, the Supreme Court of India dismissed a plea by a prisoner seeking to allow parole granted during the COVID-19 outbreak to be included as a part of his actual term since it was compulsory in the case of Anil Kumar v. State of Haryana and Others. Taking reference from an earlier court decision, the bench unanimously decided that the period of parole should be aloof when deciding the term of imprisonment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND:
Anil Kumar, the petitioner, and prisoner, was released on emergency parole as a result of the decision taken by the High-Powered Committee, which was established following the instructions provided by the Supreme Court in SWM (C) No.1/2020. The subsequent directives said that prisoners who had been freed earlier on emergency parole under the High-Powered Committee’s decision should not be ordered to surrender until further orders and not on any application filed by the petitioner or by Section 3(3) of the Haryana Good Behaviour Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 1988, led to the petitioner’s release (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1988). Whereupon, the petitioner prayed that the court considers the time of parole as part of his real punishment.
APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS:
The appellant’s counsel argued that in some states, the term of release on interim parole is directed to be considered against the entire duration of imprisonment of the convict/prisoner. If the petitioner had not been granted temporary parole and had instead served his sentence after a predetermined amount of time, he would have been eligible for remission. Moreover, since the petitioner was discharged on interim parole, his entitlement to request a remission would be further prolonged, which would be against the interests of the petitioner if the period in question is not taken into account when calculating the petitioner’s complete sentence.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:
The learned counsel for the State stated that the petitioner was convicted of the charges under Sections 302/34 of the IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment. Since then, the Apex Court has maintained the conviction and sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, in line with the law and the punishment pronounced by the learned Trial Court, the petitioner must serve and complete his full term of life imprisonment.
RELIANCE ON FACTS:
The court relied on the legal guidelines established in its January 5 decision on a petition submitted by Rohan Dhungat, who is now serving a life sentence for the murder of a person. In Rohan Dhungat’s case, the Apex Court had rejected a challenge to a decision made by the Goa Bench of the Bombay High Court on Rule 335 of the Goa Prison Regulations and Section 55 of the Prisoners Act 1894 (Extramural care, control, and employment of inmates), which states that the period of furlough and parole shall be considered as part of the sentence except in case there is a breach committed by the prisoner. However, noting that if the inmates’ request for the parole period to be taken into account when calculating the 14 years of real imprisonment is permitted, any prisoner who may be prominent might receive parole several times because there are no constraints on how many times it can be given. If the prisoners’ application is granted, it could undermine the entire goal and purpose of actual imprisonment.
JUDGEMENT:
The three-judge bench comprising Justices MR Shah, CT Ravikumar, and Sanjay Karol stated that the court had ruled that this time of release must be disregarded when determining the length of real incarceration. To avoid overcrowding, inmates were granted a term of parole during the COVID-19 pandemic, however, this time cannot be added to the prisoner’s real length of imprisonment. In this instance, the legal issue was whether the Covid leave time of a parolee’s probation may be taken into account when determining the length of the prisoner’s actual sentence. The bench ruled that the petitioner convicted under section 302 (the punishment for murder) must serve the period specified and that the emergency parole term must be subtracted from the sentence; as a result, the court cannot provide relief. While Ms. Ritu Kumar, experienced counsel, addressed the appellant, Ms. Bansuri Swaraj represented the respondents on behalf of the State.
FINAL WORDS:
Therefore, the bench declared in its verdict that the suo-moto decision of parole to be granted to convicts during Covid was exclusively to avoid overcrowding and ensure the general health welfare of the prisoners, and shall not be deemed to be part of their real imprisonment in any manner.
Laxmi Kant Pandey, an advocate practising in the Supreme Court of India, wrote a letter in the form of a complaint regarding various welfare agencies and social organisations indulging in various malpractices through the adoption of Indian children by foreign parents. It was found out that the letter was based on a detailed investigation report carried out by a reputed foreign magazine called “The Mail.” It was alleged that when foreign parents adopt Indian children, they are prone to long, tedious journeys and are ill-treated by placing them in shelter homes. Moreover, they are prone to be treated as beggars and prostitutes and other sexual harassment and exploitations. This letter came to be recognized as a writ petition on 1st September 1982. A notice was issued by the Supreme Court to the Indian Council of Social Welfare, Indian Council of Child Welfare, and the Government of India to assist the court in answering the writ petition by stating the principles and rules to decide the matter of adoption by foreign parents as well as to lay down the guidelines to ensure the maximum safety and welfare of the child while being adopted to foreign countries by foreign parents.
Written Submissions and Later Developments
On 30th September 1982, the first set of reports and written arguments based on the court’s notice was submitted by the Indian Council of Social Welfare. Various essential suggestions and recommendations were laid down in the report, which the court must take care of while setting out the guidelines and rules for approving the adoption law. Many organizations like Barnes Framfoer Allt Adoption (Swedish organization), S.O.S Children’s villages of India, etc., and social welfare communities voluntarily expressed their desire to submit their reports and arguments to help the court and participate in the court’s hearing.
The writ petition was further adjourned to 9th November 1982 as the court issued an order allowing these organizations to submit their arguments. As Indian Council for Child Welfare and Indian Council for Social Welfare were already engaged in offering the adoption of Indian children abroad, the Supreme Court directed the Union of India to gather the submissions and required information from every other organization except these two.
Union of India, Indian Council for Child Welfare, and Indian Council for Social Welfare were also asked to provide the court with the names of foreign agencies that are engaged in aiding foreign parents to find Indian children.
By 9th November 1982, the Supreme Court recognised eight specified institutions and permitted them to submit of the affidavit before 27th November 1982. The State of West Bengal was asked to submit its affidavit by the Supreme Court before 9th November 1982. Also, a quarterly report regarding the orders made in the last five years in the Guardians and Wards act, 1890, entrusting the custody of Indian children to foreign parents, was asked to be submitted by the court to the Superintendent of Tees Hazari courts. The final hearing of the writ petition was adjourned to 1st December 1982. The first judgment was passed in the year 1984 followed by a supplement judgment dated 27th September 1985 stating the norms and guidelines for inter-country adoptions.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether the Honourable Supreme Court should accept the writ petition or reject it in the name of no substantial law being involved considering the severity of the issue raised.
Whether the Honourable Supreme Court should provide more laws for better clarity after affirming the fact that the laws existing with respect to inter-country adoption are not sufficient.
LAWS RELATED
Guardians And Wards Act
Certain rights and duties of the guardian are covered under the Guardians and Wards Act of 1890.
Section 7 gives the court the authority to issue a guardianship order. According to this clause, the court may appoint guardians for the benefit of minors. A guardian will be able to look after the minor and their belongings. The court may terminate any guardian. The court can also remove the guardian who is chosen by the court
Section 8 of this act discusses the child’s welfare and states that the child’s welfare should be the primary motive for adoption. The procedures and norms to be followed in the matter of adoption to safeguard the children’s rights were stated in this act.
Section 9 of the Guardians and Guardians Act 1890 gives the court jurisdiction to consider the application. If the application concerns the guardianship of a minor, the court in which the minor’s guardian resides enjoys jurisdiction.
If the application involves the property of a minor, the district court may have jurisdiction either where the minor lives or where the property is located.
Section 11 outlines the application qualification process. This provision states that the court will set a preliminary hearing once it is convinced of the basis for the proceedings. The notification was sent as the C.P.C. (Civil Procedure Code 1908) authorized.
Section 17 lists factors to take into account when choosing a guardian. The court will decide based on the minor’s interests, development, and overall case conditions. In accordance with section 17 (5) of the statute mentions that the court cannot appoint a guardian contrarily or oppose the minor’s wishes.
Section 26 concerns excluding the minor from its ambit. If the child disappears from or is separated from the possession of guardians whom the court appoints, then the court will issue an order for the return of the ward to the guardians.
Article 14
Article 14 of the Indian constitution discussed equality before the law and equal protection of the law. Clause (3) of Article 15 is an exception and states that special provisions can be made for children and women. Article 15 was brought to light in this case.
Article 24
Article 24 abolishes child labour and states that children under 14 should not be made to work in hazardous industries, mines, or factories. This article discussed the importance of child welfare and safeguarding them from being exploited in this case.
Article 39
Article 39(e) and (f) mention that the state is required to guide its policies towards ensuring that young children are not molested and that they are not coerced into careers that are out of character for the children’s age, ability, and capacity to grow in a positive way out of financial necessity.
CARA- Central Adoption Resource Authority
It is a legislative body with the authority to oversee and control both domestic and international adoptions of Indian children. It serves as the coordinating body for such adoptions. With its affiliated, reputable adoption agencies, CARA deals with the adoption of orphan, abandoned, and surrendered children. The parents who want to adopt a kid must be authorised by a social organisation or child welfare organisation approved by the nation’s government where the international pair lives. It is a legislative body with the authority to oversee and control domestic and international adoptions of Indian children. It serves as the coordinating body for such adoptions. With its affiliated, reputable adoption agencies, CARA deals with adopting orphan, abandoned, and surrendered children. The parents who want to adopt a kid must be authorized by a social organization or child welfare organization approved by the nation’s government where the international pair lives.
ANALYSIS
The adoption of children is a concept that has existed in Indian culture since time immemorial. The importance placed on having a “firstborn son” in Hinduism resulted in the notion of adopted sons to conduct family rituals and rites. The established prevalence of adoption in India has ensued in drafting laws, such as the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956[1], to ensure that the adoption process is overseen by agencies entrusted with regulating it. However, the pre-existing adoption laws failed to foresee inter-country adoption’s emergence.
Inter-country adoption is a way of adoption that developed due to the improved connectivity of countries with the advent of technology and better transportation methods. It allowed foreign parents to adopt underprivileged children from other countries, usually from countries with lower economic statuses, to provide them with a better life and opportunities. The United Nations validated it in the Draft Guidelines of Procedures Concerning Inter-Country Adoption in 1981. It was seen as a method to ensure that the underprivileged children would receive a congenial environment to grow up in, as they would with their biological parents. Though the thought behind the idea was noble, the lack of regulations made it susceptible to human trafficking, wherein the system in place would be misused. Thus, many children who underwent the process of inter-country adoption would end up getting trafficked and subjected to inhumane living conditions, a stark contrast to the life they were promised.
The case of Laxmi Kant Pandey vs Union of India[2], which shed light on the severe lack of regulations surrounding inter-country adoption and the need for a legal framework to protect the rights of the adopted children, saw the judiciary take part in judicial activism to ensure that the process of inter-country adoption from India would be as shielded from malicious activities as possible. This was done by ensuring that every step of adoption from India would be precise and regulated.
In the judgment for Laxmi Kant Pandey vs Union of India, the Supreme Court laid out guidelines for inter-country adoption. It thus ushered in a new era concerning adoption in India, wherein the government had till then not taken much cognisance of the lack of guidelines regarding inter-country adoption. The judgment, which was delivered by a three-judge bench headed by Justice P.N Bhagwati, recognised the lack of safeguards with respect to inter-country adoption and chose to formulate a detailed set of guidelines to ensure that the adoption of children from India by foreign guardians would only occur under exceptional circumstances, and only if it was deemed that the children were adopted in a hospitable environment, similar to what they would ideally receive from their biological parents.
The bench made one explicitly clear: adopting the child would put the child’s welfare first and foremost. This was in conjunction with the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child[3], where a child’s right to be loved and grow up in an environment where they can receive the affection they deserve was recognised. The judgment stated that the primary focus of the adoption agencies should be to ensure that the child could be reunited with its biological parents, as the care provided by the child’s biological parents would be the ideal environment for the child to grow up in. To ensure this, the adoption agencies should take the necessary steps to track the biological parents and attempt to reunite the child with them. If needed, social service agencies can facilitate these families in reuniting as, in many instances, the children may be given up by their parents due to financial difficulties or mental incapacity to take care of the child. Only if all attempts by the social service agencies fail after 3 months can the adoption agencies move to the next step: aiding the adoption process of the child domestically
The court noted that, as the welfare of the children is what is essential, the next best step other than reuniting the children with their biological parents would be to find adoptive parents for the child in India, as they would thus grow up in the same environment that they are familiar with and would not have to deal with the stress of adapting to a new country’s culture and norms at their tender age. Securing adoptive parents from the native country would be done for two months. At that point, if the child has not been adopted domestically, the adoption agencies will allow applications for inter-country adoption.
As there is no statutory enactment in India providing for the adoption of a child by foreign parents or laying down the procedures to be followed in such cases, the court has instructed that the provisions of the Guardian and Wards Act 1890[4] should be used to facilitate such adoption. This act provides for the appointment of a guardian by a court for the care of a minor or a person of unsound mind.
In the guidelines issued for foreign adoption in the country, the apex court stated that all applications from foreigners seeking to adopt a child must be sponsored by a social or child welfare agency recognised or licensed by the government of the country in which the foreigner resides. It is important to note that social welfare agencies in India working in inter-country adoption or institutions where the juvenile court commits children should not entertain applications directly from foreigners. The bench also emphasised the child’s age’s importance in inter-country adoption cases. The court has stated that a child should be adopted before the age of three in such cases, allowing the child to assimilate more easily into the new environment and culture.
The process for foreign adoption of Indian children involves applying to the court for appointment as guardian, with notice sent to a child welfare agency. The agency must be licensed and maintain a register of children proposed for adoption. The court must be satisfied that the child is legally available for adoption, and the application must be sponsored by a recognised agency in the foreigner’s country of residence.
The judgment in Laxmi Kant Pandey vs Union of India was instrumental in ensuring that inter-country adoption would not fall victim to malpractices like human trafficking and thus helped secure the rights of adopted children in India. Following the judgment, the Government of India instituted the Central Adoption Resource Agency (CARA). CARA serves as a centralised source of information for monitoring both domestic and international adoptions.
This judgment also influenced the creation of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act 1986, revised in 2000[5]. This new legislation considered the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child[6] and other pertinent international treaties. The law adopted a child-centric approach, ensuring that children requiring care and protection receive appropriate care, protection, treatment, and rehabilitation.
Though no formal legislation was enacted to solely overlook the process of inter-country adoption in India, the precise nature of this judgment has ensured that the scope for malpractices with the process of inter-country adoption has decreased gradually and has thus made the process more secure and favourable for the adopted children and the foreign guardians.
CONCLUSION
The case of Laxmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India was and will serve to be the landmark judgement not only for the statutes and amendments that the judgment brought in but also from a petition letter turning into a writ petition. The significance is that the modification of the judgement in 1987 clarified the guidelines. This case also became sensational, starting from one petitioner, i.e. a litigator of S.C., to six petitioners filing six applications. Also, how Indians and other executives came to know about the scam of illegal sale of babies under the cap of Inter-country adoption. This case is considered one of the substantial ones as it not only dealt with exploitation or trafficking that happens in adopting Indian Children by foreigners but also explained how the guidelines and provisions are to be followed. This was due to population restraint and various policies like the one-child policy by developed countries. So this increased the scope for various illegal and non-reputable adopting agencies that sell Indian children for reasonable sums, and the adopted child ended up as a beggar and prostitute. The case will serve and is serving a scrutinised adoption procedure to adopt Indian children, which will create fear in the minds of illegal or profit-making adoptive agencies.
The case of Laxmi Kant Pandey vs Union of India brought in the most productive and safe guidelines and procedures like the three to five-tier adoptive process. Starting from whether the adoptive parents can care for the child to create a fixed deposit for the adopted child. The court also ensured that the child being adopted would be able to adapt to the surroundings and culture of the adoptive country and the people around. The other significant outcome of the judgment is how the maintenance of registers by the Social Welfare Department of India and the Embassy of the country the child is being adopted to keep an eye on the address and other details of the adopted kid from time to time ensure the safety kid. Then the modified judgment also solved and provided remedies for a quick adoption process yet a safer one as there was a delay in inter-country adoption. The big question is whether the judgment is efficacious on inter-country adoption. This case also served as an inevitable precedent that led to the introduction of the Central Adoption Resource Agency (CARA) and later following a few more judgments leading to the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children). Also, the statistics show that during the past four years, close to 2,134 Indian children have been adopted by parents from five countries.
This case is an excellent illustration of how procedure development in public interest litigation has eased standing limitations in India, leaving the judicial framework more accessible to disadvantaged members of society. It also serves as an illustration of the Indian Supreme Court’s judicial activism. The Supreme Court did not think twice about setting specific instructions to control adoptions and safeguard kids from prostitution and enslaved labour when faced with a legislative gap on a significant social concern. In totality, talking about inter-country adoption is like a double-edged sword with advantages and disadvantages On the one hand, international adoption may be a lifeline for kids who have been abandoned, orphaned, or abused. It may give kids’ devoted families access to higher education and superior medical care. It can also allow escaping poverty, prejudice, and other harsh conditions.
Conversely, international adoption may be troublesome if not conducted ethically and openly. The global adoption system has seen child trafficking, corruption, and abuse. Additionally, some critics contend that international adoption may contribute to exploiting marginalised people and perpetuating system imbalances.
Endnotes
The Hindu Adoptions And Maintenance Act, 1956, No. 78, Act of Parliament, 1956 (India).
Laxmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India, 1987 AIR 232.
UN General Assembly, Declaration of the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1959, A/RES/1386(XIV).
The Guardians And Wards Act, 1890, Act No. 8 Of 1890.
The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, No. 56, Act of Parliament, 2000 (India).
UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3.
The Preamble, which is incorporated into the basic structure of the Constitution, demonstrates the relevance of Article 368[1] even to the present day. Recent amendments to the Constitution concerning fundamental rights are made by Parliament. The Constitution, including its fundamental rights, was initially drafted in response to the socio-political requirements deemed necessary at the time. These requirements may not be sufficient or appropriate for the rapidly expanding socio-economic, technological, and legal climate of today. As a result, it is always necessary to amend the Constitution.
For instance, the 86th Amendment to the Constitution in 2002 made the right to education a fundamental right. In a similar vein, Articles 19(f) and 31 of the Constitution were struck down by the 44th Amendment in 1978, rendering the right to property non-essential. The extent of Article 368’s authority to modify fundamental rights has been interpreted by higher Indian courts.
In Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan[2], for instance, the dissenting opinion stated that Article 368 did not grant the Parliament absolute powers and could not be used indiscriminately to usurp citizens’ fundamental rights. Even though there is a lot of literature on how to look at Article 368 from the point of view of changing the basic structure as a whole, very few recent cases have focused on specifically changing fundamental rights from a legal point of view. Therefore, I as an author want to fill that knowledge gap.
From Shankari Prasad v. Union of India[3]in the First Constitutional Amendment Act of 1951 toWaman Rao v. Union of India[4], I will aim to trace the path. I will sincerely put efforts into determining the reasoning behind the bench’s various decisions challenging or upholding certain Parliamentary amendments to fundamental rights, as well as include their own opinion on the subject in the analysis section. I will be using doctrinal methods for in-depth research, also I will address the principles of the law and the constitution, as well as provide a sociopolitical context for the decisions made.
Introduction
The basic structure of the Indian Constitution includes the fundamental or essential elements that run throughout the document or serve as its foundation. It joins significant arrangements of our Constitution, without the ground standards is outlandish.
Because of its goal of achieving equity, for instance, the 2019 Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, which makes reservations for economically disadvantaged groups, has implications for Article 14 of the Constitution, which is the first fundamental right.
Additionally, on February 4, 2022, the Rajya Sabha debated K.J. Alphons, a BJP Kerala MP,’s proposal to amend the Preamble of the Constitution with a private member’s bill. This was gone against by the RJD MP Manoj Jha and MDMK MP Vaiko in December 2021, on the grounds of abusing the standard in the Kesavananda judgment which was that law and order are essential for the fundamental construction of the Indian Constitution.
As a result, Parliament would be unable to alter any aspect of the Constitution’s fundamental structure. Fundamental rights are included in the Constitution’s fundamental structure in Part III. According to A.V. Dicey, a nation is said to adhere to the rule of law only if it upholds citizens’ liberties. Article 368 of the Constitution both grants and restricts Parliament’s powers to amend specific sections of the Constitution.
Constant Turbulence Between Article 13 and Article 368
First Constitutional Amendment According to Article 13 of the Indian Constitution[5], the Parliament cannot enact laws that restrict, infringe, or violate the fundamental rights outlined in Part III. In contrast, Parliament is empowered to amend specific sections of the Constitution by Article 368. There is still no answer to the question of whether the two articles can coexist harmoniously.
The fundamental rights, Preamble, basic structure, and other elements necessary to regulate the three organs of governance and the Indian people are all encapsulated in the Constitution, according to many. The amount of power Parliament has under Article 368 to amend the Indian Constitution is symbolized by the scissors used to cut or change the cloth into something else.
The Constitution only contained seven fundamental rights when the 1st Constitutional Amendment Act of 1951 was enacted, including the right to property under Articles 31A and 31B[6], which was later eliminated by the 44th Constitutional Amendment.
The introduction of this right at the time of independence was motivated by two reasons: first and foremost, to boost agricultural production; secondly, to provide farmers, cultivators, and the rural population, who were oppressed by the pre-independence zamindari system, with opportunities, land, and job security.
They used socialist-welfarist methods and set limits on how much land a person could own to prevent too much land and power from being concentrated in a few hands; a term that is comparable to constitutionalism. In addition, the State was permitted to legally seize someone’s property instead of providing compensation for rehabilitation following displacement.
A revolutionary policy of the Indian National Congress later led to the establishment of such an exploitative structure to close the gap between the widespread inequality in land ownership. Further changes were set up by the ideological group through the Agrarian Changes Council with Administrator J.C. Kumarappa, overcoming the need to keep the right to property as a key right in a free India.
The 9th Schedule and reasonable restrictions stipulated in Article 19(1)(g)[7] were also included in the First Amendment Act, making it possible for the government to completely or partially acquire the person of any individual. Many citizens were dissatisfied with this Act because it reduced the scope of the most important aspect of the Constitution—the fundamental rights— and gave the Centre too much power to interfere with their lives.
They filed a case against this Amendment Act in the Supreme Court of India because the Parliament did not have the authority to change fundamental rights. This case became known as Shankari Prasad v. Union of India[8], which was a landmark decision.
The Supreme Court held that Article 368 allowed Parliament to amend any of the fundamental rights through Constitutional Amendments and that the changes made by the first Constitutional Amendment stand. This proportion smothered the fight for control between the lawmaking body and the legal executive since they explained that Article 13 simply applied to common privileges and not Protected Revisions.
Numerous state governments incorporated their respective Land Reforms Acts into the 9th Schedule of the Constitution as a result of this decision. This had a significant impact because, normally, any law that violates fundamental rights would be invalidated; however, by including it in the 9th Schedule, the laws would not be invalidated regardless of whether they violate fundamental rights.
InSajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan[9], this provision of the 17th Constitutional Amendment was challenged. With a 3:2 vote, the five-judge bench decided that the 17th Constitutional Amendment Act does not fall under Article 13. Chief Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar looked into the deeper intentions of the people who wrote the Constitution and concluded that they didn’t want to protect fundamental rights completely because they didn’t put in place a clause that said fundamental rights couldn’t be changed. As a result, both Shankari and Sajjan appeared to favour Article 368 over Article 13.
The disagreeing assessment given by Equity M. Hidayatullah and Equity J. R. Mudholkarset forward the inquiry with regards to whether changing an essential element of the Constitution would be considered as a revision or as a revamping, and thus, whether the ability to roll out this improvement was presented by Article 368.
This reexamining of the composers’ aim drove the Court to allude the case to a bigger seat, forming it into the Golaknath v. State of Punjab[10], which tested the Sajjan choice. By the majority’s decision in Sajjan, the 11-judge bench ruled that the parliamentary powers granted by Article 368 were not absolute and that the Parliament cannot curtail fundamental rights because they are included in Part III, giving them a transcendental status outside of the Parliament’s purview. In addition, it stated that any amendment violating a fundamental right granted by Part III is unconstitutional, restricting the Parliament’s authority and requiring a judicial review.
Golaknath, in contrast to Shankari and Sajjan, prioritized Article 13 over Article 368 because the Supreme Court ruled that Parliament can enact a Constitutional Amendment. This decision by a larger bench of the Supreme Court effectively overturned its previous two decisions and sided with those who opposed amending fundamental rights.
The Parliament’s Comeback
The 24th Constitutional Amendment, which removed the right to property as a fundamental right that had been included in the 1st Constitutional Amendment, was challenged in the courts shortly after Golaknath by a large number of cases brought by the general public. The Supreme Court had to clarify that Golaknath would apply retroactively to previous amendments to prevent all of this chaos.
The Golaknath case narrowed the scope of Parliament’s powers, while the first constitutional amendment restricted the scope of fundamental rights. The decision to enact the 24th Constitutional Amendment, which effectively added a fourth sub-clause to both Articles 13 and 368, was made by Parliament to expand its power to amend.
The 24th Amendment stated in Article 368(4) that if Parliament enacts another Constitutional Amendment, it will not apply to Article 13, whereas Article 13(4) stated the opposite to reverse the Golaknath decision. As a result, following the passage of the 24th Amendment Act, the position was that Parliament could alter any section of the Constitution, including fundamental rights.
Following the 24th amendment, additional constitutional amendments were enacted to repeal previous amendments that restricted citizens’ rights. The 29th Amendment introduced land reforms, while the 25th Amendment restricted property rights. In 1947, the Privy Purse, a payment made to ruling families to give up their powers and merge their princely states, was made obsolete by the 26th Constitutional Amendment. In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala[11]andGolaknath’s position as well, the 24th, 25th, 26th, and 29th Constitutional Amendments were challenged.
The Supreme Court made it clear that Parliament has the full power to change fundamental rights even before the 24th and 26th Amendments to the Constitution. The 24th Constitutional Amendment, which clarified parliamentary powers, was also upheld by the Court. In this instance, the issue of how much power the Parliament has over the applicability of fundamental rights came up once more. The Court decided to take a balanced approach in support of a harmonious interpretation, which is referred to as the basic structure doctrine. It did not investigate whether Article 13 or Article 368 is more powerful.
The Conflict Between the Judiciary and Former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi: 39th Amendment
On the twelfth of June 1975, Allahabad High Court set out a verifiable choice wherein they suppressed the discretionary triumph of Indira Gandhi’s administration, referring to proof of constituent misrepresentation. They also decided that no one in her cabinet could hold an election office position for six years as punishment.
After that, Indira Gandhi appealed to the Supreme Court. Just one day before the hearing, she enacted the 39th Constitutional Amendment Act and declared a national emergency on the grounds of internal unrest.
The 39th CAA resulted in the addition of Article 329A and the elimination of Article 71. The dispute over the election was still before the Court at this point. According to Article 329A, an independent body would handle all electoral disputes involving the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, the Prime Minister (at the time, Indira Gandhi), the President, or the Vice President.
Because of the death of this CAA, the forthcoming legal dispute against her could as of now not be active. As a result, the 39th CAA’s goal was clear: to allow Indira Gandhi to continue serving as India’s Prime Minister without interference. The constituent outcomes incidentally showed that Janata Dal Party won the political decision overwhelmingly, making Morarji Desai the new State head.
As a result, Indira Gandhi was forced to resign from her position reluctantly. The ruling party then decided to remove Article 329A, which was found to be unconstitutional in the case of Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain[12], applying the principles of the Kesavananda case, to undo everything the previous government had done wrong, including the 39th CAA and the unsolicited national emergency. Article 71 was likewise brought back, which offered back the powers to attempt constituent questions to the High Court.
The Contextual Constitution
After the emergency period under Indira Gandhi’s rule in 1975, the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution made a significant number of changes to prevent similar power abuses from occurring again. It underwent two significant modifications: To begin, it added sub-clause 4 to Article 31C, which discusses property rights; Second, it added paragraphs 4 and 5 to Article 368.
Article 368(4) stated that Parliament can amend, alter, or remove any fundamental rights under Part III and cannot be subjected to judicial review like Article 31C(4). On the other hand, Article 31C(4) stated that any law could be put in Part IV under the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP), even if it violates fundamental rights under Part III. This made it immune to even someone challenging it before the courts.
As a result, Parliament can add or change any provision in Parts III and IV. The Parliament was granted absolute amending powers by Article 368 (5). Since the legal powers were diminished and the decent methodology in Keshavananda, the 42nd Established Alteration was tested in Minerva Mills v. Union of India and Ors[13].
Conclusion
The petitioners in Minerva owned the Bombay Minerva Mills company, which the government occupied under the guise of nationalization. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the 42nd Amendment and all of its amendments were unconstitutional because of the following three fundamental characteristics:
First, judicial review, in which rights granted by courts of law are regarded as fundamental features and cannot be suppressed through an amendment by Parliament;
Second, Parliament’s limited amending power, which means that Parliament cannot use its limited amending power to expand its capabilities; Thirdly, the balance between Parts III and IV must be maintained so that DPSPs and fundamental rights do not conflict.
All the Established Alteration Acts after the Kesavananda essential regulation case were tested in Waman Rao v. Union of India[14], where the most relevant issue that emerged under the watchful eye of the court was regardless of whether these alterations sabotaged the fundamental construction.
The Court provided an odd solution to this question by stating that the Kesavananda-based basic structure test will be applied in future amendments and laws. As a result, the Court made it clear that any amendment to the Constitution made after April 24, 1973, can be challenged if it does not adhere to the basic structure doctrine.
As a result, this case reaffirmed the significance of the Kesavananda rule by allowing Parliament to alter a portion of the fabric—representing the Constitution—but not the entire fabric. Even though Parliament had the power to change any part of the Constitution, including the Fundamental Rights, this did not mean that the Constitution’s fundamental structure could be changed even by a Constitutional Amendment. This shows how strong the Constitution still is in the social and political context of today.
Endnotes
The Indian Constitution, Article 368
Sajjan Singh v. State Of Rajasthan, 1965 AIR 845, 1965 SCR (1) 933
Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, AIR. 1951 SC 458
Waman Rao v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 362
The Indian Constitution, Article 13
The Indian Constitution, Article 31(A) and Article 31(B)
The Indian Constitution, Article 19(1)(g)
Ibid 3
Ibid 2
Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR. 1967, SC 1643
Kesavanand Bharti v. State of Kerala, AIR. 1973 SC 1461
Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 S.C. 2299
Minerva Mill Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC, 625
Ibid 4
This article is written by Shaurya Sharma, a third-year law student from Fairfield Institute of Technology and Management.
In the case of Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam Home Department and anr. 2023 (SC) 234, the Supreme Court ruled on Friday that membership in an organization deemed unlawful by the Central government is sufficient to establish an offence under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA). In the decision, the court reversed its previous ruling from 2011, in which it had concluded that mere membership in a prohibited organization under the Act could not be grounds for conviction unless it was accompanied by some overt violent behaviour. Whereas the Solicitor General of India represented the respondents, Senior Advocate Sanjay Parikh represented the appellants.
FACTS:
In 2011, a two-judge bench comprising justices Markandey Katju and Gyan Sudha Mishra exonerated Arup Bhuyan and Indra Das for the violations of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA). The judgment was reached relying on an alleged confession statement and that mere membership in a prohibited organization under the Act could not be considered a valid ground for conviction under the Act.
In State of Kerala v. Raneef, the 2011 Bench made the pertinent observation that, among other things, the American Bill of Rights and a few US Supreme Court decisions maintaining that Section 3(5) of the Act cannot be properly interpreted without violating Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, a person is not necessarily a criminal just because they belong to a prohibited organization until they use violence, inspire others to use violence, or cause a commotion by using violence or inciting others to use violence. “
When the Union Government filed a request for reference in 2014, a two-judge panel composed of Justices Dipak Misra and AM Sapre referred the case to a larger bench. The matter was finally heard on February 8, 2023, and a conclusion was reached on March 24, 2023.
APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS:
Senior Attorney Sanjay Parikh argued for an intervenor-NGO that in cases involving substantive rights, such as personal liberty, provisos might be read down even when not directly challenged. He argued that as civil freedoms are protected by the Indian and American constitutions, it would be improper to invalidate the orders that are being challenged because they were based on US court decisions.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:
Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, appearing as counsel for the Central Government asserted that it was intrinsically difficult to show formal involvement in prohibited organizations since the requirements mentioned were a barrier and a safeguard. The SG further emphasized that under the current structure, terrorist activity might be permitted as long as it wasn’t ostensibly committed under the banner of groups that were outlawed or considered a terrorist.
The Union government and certain state governments contended that the supreme court’s reading of the UAPA cases had effectively read down the aforementioned proviso by referencing the American Bill of Rights, making it more challenging to fight terrorism. The Central Government argued that the Court could not pronounce the contents of an anti-terror law unconstitutionally without first hearing its defences and relying on probable legal abuse.
The Court’s reliance on the Bill of Rights was improper in light of the Supreme Court’s prior decision in Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra, which was decided by a five-judge panel. Consequently, American jurisprudence could not be authorized under the constitution as there are not any provisions in the American Constitution that equate to Article 19 Clauses (2) through (6).
JUDGEMENT:
The decision came from a three-bench judge comprising of justices MR Shah, CT Ravikumar, and Sanjay Karol holding the validity of section 10(a)(i) of the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA). Since the primary intention of the UAPA act is to prevent certain unlawful activities and penalize people who are members of such unlawful groups under the Act. As a result, Section 10(a)(i) is fully compliant with Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(2) of the Constitution and, as a result, with the purposes of the UAPA.
Another issue that the Court had to address was whether or not sections of central legislation may be read down in a situation where those provisions were not challenged and the central government had not been heard. In this regard, the Court found that the State would suffer severe injury if the same was not heard. The Centre was required to submit arguments to support 10(1)(i) and to establish the goals and objectives. Hence, this Court should not have read down Section 10(a)(i), especially when the Section’s constitutionality was not in doubt.
FINAL WORDS:
The bench stated in its ruling today that the 2011 decisions were made in bail petitions when the constitutionality of the rules was not contested. In addition, past decisions have upheld the constitutionality of the UAPA and TADA. The 2011 pronouncements were also heavily criticized for interpreting the laws without addressing the Union of India.
In the matter of BHUSHAN KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. vs. RAJINDER KUMAR GUPTA, Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 19081, the drawl of a preliminary decree of partition with regard to property is requested.
FACTS
The late Sh. Hem Chander Gupta unquestionably bought the suit property on September 12, 1976. The following information about Sh. Hem Chander Gupta’s wife and five boys who he is said to have left behind after his intestate death on December 31, 1999: –
i. Smt. Premwati Gupta
ii. Shri Mange Ram Gupta
iii. Shri Rajinder Kumar Gupta
iv. Shri Santosh Kumar Gupta
v. Shri Satish Chander Gupta
vi. Mr. Bhushan Kumar Gupta
On July 12, 2018, the mother, Premwati Gupta, also passed away intestate. Her 1/6th undivided portion in the suit property, therefore, passed to her five surviving sons, and the plaintiffs claim that as a result, each of the five surviving sons acquired a 1/5th undivided stake in the suit property.
According to reports, Sh. Mange Ram Gupta, the oldest son of the late Sh. Hem Chander Gupta and Smt. Premwati Gupta gave his daughter-in-law Smt. Shalini Gupta his 1/5th undivided share. It is important to highlight that the plaintiffs in the current lawsuit are Sh. Santosh Kumar Gupta, Sh. Satish Chander Gupta, Sh. Bhushan Kumar Gupta, and Smt. Shalini Gupta. Only Sh. Rajender Kumar Gupta, the other son of the late Sh. Hem Chander Gupta and Smt. Premwati Gupta, and Smt. Premwati Gupta, are opposed to the relief for division.
APPELLANT’S CONTENTION
The plaintiffs addressed the defendant to request a mutually agreeable division of the subject property, with each party having a right to a 1/5th portion. It is claimed that the plaintiffs approached the defendants regarding a partition that would be impacted by metes and bounds. The current lawsuit was filed on April 18, 2022, as a result of the aforementioned request not being granted.
Learned lawyers appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs argued that, given the accepted position in the parties’ briefs that the property was itself acquired, the plea of oral division could be clearly rejected. Furthermore, since the property was acquired by the father of the parties himself and he remained the owner during his lifetime, there could have been no division, at least until his death, according to which the property could have been divided between his legal heirs. It was also claimed that if the father wished at all, the property could have been transferred either by gift or by transfer. It was argued that neither the plea of oral division nor the plea of such division raised by the father while he was alive could possibly stand.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION
In these proceedings, the defendant has submitted a written statement. It is important to note that the written declaration does not contest the fact that the suit property was bought by the late Sh. Hem Chander Gupta. The property would unquestionably be seen as having been bought by the late Sh. Hem Chander Gupta on his own. The sole argument put out is that the late Sh. Hem Chander Gupta, who was the Class-1 legal heir, requested all of his sons during his lifetime to divide the suit property on or around March 1999. According to the defendant, parties agreed to an equitable split of the suit property and that an oral partition came about at that time.
JUDGEMENT
1. The Court is adamant that the presented defence is completely unworthy of consideration after giving it full attention. The defendant has not provided any evidence to support how an oral partition could have been created or established during the father’s lifetime. It was also uncontested that the fathers of the parties were the only ones to obtain the land.
2. As a result, a preliminary partition decree for the property at 14/1 Shakti Nagar, Delhi, is issued, designating plaintiffs Bhushan Kumar Gupta, Satish Chander Gupta, Santosh Kumar Gupta, Shalini Gupta, and defendant Rajinder Kumar Gupta as each owning a fifth undivided portion of the property.
3. The creation of a preliminary decision for division.
4. It is regarded as necessary to give the parties some time to decide if they can divide the property by metes and bounds. If not, a definitive decree of partition and/or sale of the property, including through the parties placing inter se bids, shall be made on the next hearing date.
