Tag: #SupremeCourtofIndia

S.no	Contents
1.	Introduction
2.	The deep-rooted gender stereotypes and their legal consequences
3.	Landmark Cases
4.	Legal and Media Reactions to Gender Stereotyping.
5.	Legal Interventions
6.	Workplace Gender Bias: Legal Options and the Situation Today
7.	Conclusion

Introduction: Examining Gender Stereotypes in Indian Society

Deeply embedded in all communities, gender stereotypes frequently uphold social norms that specify anticipated behaviours, roles, and characteristics depending on a person’s perceived gender. In India, a nation rich in variety and cultural tradition, gender stereotypes have long affected the lives and opportunities of millions of individuals. This article examines the negative effects gender stereotypes have on Indian society as well as the initiatives taken to combat them.

The historical records and cultural perspectives have perpetuated gender stereotypes for a long time. As a result, they promote unequal power dynamics and prejudiced attitudes. These prejudices frequently limit the potential of people and uphold gender norms that favour one gender over the other. Such practices not only contravene the equality values stated in the Indian Constitution, but they also inhibit the development of a society that is inclusive.

This article emphasises the importance of the legal system in changing cultural beliefs by highlighting important court decisions that have contested pervasive gender stereotypes¹. It also looks at the legal measures put in place to control such representations as well as how media portrayals continue to reinforce these stereotypes². The article also addresses initiatives in workplaces where gender discrimination still exists as well as in educational institutions, where the foundations of these biases frequently take hold³.

Dismantling deeply embedded gender stereotypes calls for a multifaceted strategy as we navigate the complex web of legal frameworks, societal dynamics, and cultural perspectives. This article seeks to add to the ongoing discussion about changing the legal system to promote a more equal and impartial society for all people, regardless of gender, by examining legal changes, significant cases, and current difficulties.

The deep-rooted gender stereotypes and their legal consequences

Deep-seated gender stereotypes still have a significant impact on legal issues and inequalities in society, casting a wide shadow over social institutions. These stereotypes frequently take the form of presumptions about traditional gender roles and talents, which has an impact on people’s access to opportunities, care, and resources. Therefore, these skewed viewpoints go against the equality values stated in the Indian Constitution and impede the development of a just and inclusive society.

The historic case National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (2014)⁴ emphasised the need for laws to recognise and defend the rights of transgender people while also highlighting how difficult it is to combat gender stereotypes in the context of the law. Additionally, the 2013 passage of the Gender Sensitization and Sexual Harassment of Women in the Workplace Act⁵ emphasised the legal commitment to fostering impartial and safe workplaces. Legal changes that reframe societal standards are necessary to combat these preconceptions, creating an environment where the law can be a powerful weapon for eliminating ingrained gender biases.

Legal Conflicts Against Gender Stereotyping: Landmark Cases.

In the continuous battle against deeply embedded gender stereotypes in Indian society, landmark judicial decisions have become significant battlegrounds. These instances not only show the discriminatory effects of such preconceptions but also demonstrate how the judicial system has the ability to question and change social norms.

National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (2014)⁶ is a landmark case that recognised the rights of transgender people and the need to combat stereotyping. A landmark framework to combat workplace sexual harassment was established by the Supreme Court’s involvement in Vishakha v. State of Rajasthan (1997)⁷, which recognised the need for safe and impartial workplaces free from gender-based discrimination. These examples show how the judiciary has actively interfered to combat the persistence of gender biases, defying conventional wisdom.

Society confronts the damaging effects of gender stereotypes by delving into these incidents. These court cases raise people’s awareness and promote discussions that advance society. They show that eradicating long-held preconceptions necessitates both society’s joint efforts and the judicial system’s authoritative position.

Legal and Media Reactions to Gender Stereotyping. 

The media has a significant impact on how society perceives things, but it also frequently reinforces negative gender stereotypes that impede the advancement of gender equality. This influence has a double-edged effect, reflecting and strengthening existing prejudices. To buck this trend, however, legal responses are starting to emerge.

The National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (2014)⁸ case brought attention to the media’s influence on public opinion and the need for regulation to stop the spread of damaging stereotypes. In order to meet the need to confront gender biases rather than perpetuate them, the legislative framework places a strong emphasis on the need for responsible media portrayal. By controlling media content, society makes progress towards eradicating entrenched stereotypes and promoting gender equality.

These legal actions serve as a reminder of the media’s significant influence on society’s views as well as its capacity to accentuate good change. Not only must media representations be changed, but legal measures that will assure their implementation must also be acknowledged in order to effectively combat gender stereotypes.

Legal Interventions: How Educational Institutions Can Drive Change

While educational institutions are important for breaking down gender stereotypes, they can also unintentionally reinforce prejudice. Legal actions are crucial in converting these settings into places that support inclusion and gender equality. Legal actions to combat gender stereotypes and promote diversity have been taken against educational institutions, which play a significant role in forming cultural attitudes. Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India⁹ is one of these important cases in which the Supreme Court emphasised that educational institutions must uphold gender equality and ensure a setting free from prejudice and stereotypes. This case supports the requirement for institutions to stop discriminatory behaviour.

The Gender Sensitization and Sexual Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2013, also broadens its application to educational institutions and requires a proactive strategy to combat gender-based discrimination. The value of education in influencing society’s perceptions and achieving equality is reaffirmed by these legal actions.

Workplace Gender Bias: Legal Options and the Situation Today

Strong legal remedies that change with the times are needed to address workplace gender bias. By focusing on equal compensation for equal work, a significant case—Air India v. Nergesh Meerza, (1981)¹⁰—expressed the judiciary’s position against gender discrimination. The precedent set by this decision served as the foundation for later legal systems.

A key piece of legislation that demands harassment-free workplaces and provides remedies for preventing it is the Gender Sensitization and Sexual Harassment of Women in the Workplace Act, 2013, which was passed in 2013. In terms of recognising and eradicating gender stereotypes in the workplace, this 2013 law is a positive step.

M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (2004)¹¹, another significant case, demonstrates the judiciary’s dedication to eradicating gender-based discrimination. Even though it wasn’t specifically about the workplace, this decision demonstrated the Supreme Court’s commitment to environmental justice and gender equality, showing how the two legal fields interact and affect gender bias.

Despite these legislative developments, the labour environment today is nevertheless complicated. There are still gender pay gaps, a shortage of women in senior positions, and covert biases. Legal remedies have set the stage, but ongoing efforts from groups, people, and governments are necessary to create a truly equal working environment.

Conclusion: Using the law to eliminate gender stereotypes.

In conclusion, India’s legal system has greatly changed to address the deeply ingrained gender stereotypes that support inequality and prejudice. Through significant decisions like National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (2014) and Vishakha v. State of Rajasthan (1997), the judiciary has emphasised its responsibility to combat these prejudices and promote a more equal society.

The legislative instruments created to redefine educational institutions as hubs of inclusivity and gender sensitivity are best illustrated by legislation like the Gender Sensitization and Sexual Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2013, and the Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India (2008) case. The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Act, 2013, and the Air India v. Nergesh Meerza (1981) case further highlights the struggle against workplace discrimination.

These legal avenues, linked to developing societal knowledge, highlight how crucial it is to destroy gender stereotypes. A more just and inclusive future is made possible by the Indian judicial system’s dedication to maintaining constitutional ideals and advancing equality.

As we proceed on this road, it becomes increasingly obvious how important it is for institutions, society, and legal systems to work together continuously. India is moving closer to a future in which gender stereotypes are a thing of the past by persistently questioning conventions and pushing for change.

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Endnotes:

1. National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438.
2. Vishakha v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241.
3. Gender Sensitization and Sexual Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2013.
4. Ibid
5. Gender Sensitization and Sexual Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2013.
6. Ibid
7. Vishakha v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241.
8. Ibid
9. Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India, (2008) 3 SCC 1.
10. Air India v. Nergesh Meerza, (1981) 4 SCC 335.
11. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (2004) 12 SCC 118.

This article is authored by Srishti Singh, a pass-out student at O P Jindal Global University, Sonipat

About the Mr. Justice Sanjiv Khanna

Justice Sanjiv Khanna enrolled as an Advocate with the Bar Council of Delhi in 1983. He began his practice in the District Courts at Tis Hazari in Delhi and soon shifted his practice to Delhi High Court.

His area of practice was wide and varied from writ petitions in public law matters, direct tax appeals, income tax prosecutions, arbitration cases, commercial suits, and environmental and pollution laws matters, besides medical negligence cases before consumer forums and company law cases before the Company Law Board.

About Opportunity

The chamber of Hon’ble Mr Justice Sanjiv Khanna, Judge, Supreme Court of India, is accepting applications for internship on a rolling basis for September and October 2023.

Available Internship Slots

1. 1st September 2023 to 30th September 2023
2. 1st October 2023 to 31st October 2023

If you wish to apply for more than one slot, please fill out separate applications for each slot.

Since the office receives a large number of applications for each slot, it would not be possible to intimate each applicant of the status of their application. If you do not hear from the office 4 weeks prior to the start of the desired internship slot, please consider your application as not accepted.

Shortlisted candidates will be contacted telephonically/via email 4-6 weeks before the start of the desired internship slot.

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2. Law students in their 2nd or 3rd year of the 3-year LL.B. course.

NOTE: The internship is open only to law students in their 3 or 5-year law course. Those who have completed their law degrees are not eligible to apply.

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Citation

1979 AIR 621, 1979 SCR (2) 641

Date of Judgment

12/12/1978

Court

Supreme Court of India

Bench

• Justice P.N. Bhagwati
• Justice V.D. Tulzapulkar

Introduction

According to the Promissory Estoppel doctrine, the promisor will refrain from breaking the promise if it would be unfair for him to do so whenever an unambiguous promise is made with the intent to establish a legal relationship or affect one that will arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the other party and is in fact acted on. This is the main referred law in this present case. If parties who had already agreed to clear-cut terms involving specific legal outcomes later engage in negotiation, it may be assumed that Promissory Estoppel only applies to situations in which the parties are already bound by a legal or contractual relationship and one of them promises the other that strict legal rights under the contract won’t be enforced. However, the court found that the theory of promissory estoppel, even as it was originally stated by Lord Denning in the High Trees case, did not contain any such limitation, and thus it cannot apply in the current case, Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills.

Background of the Case

The appealing party in this instance was a limited sugar production company. His main line of work was producing and selling sugars. On October 10th, 1968, news broke that the respondent (In this case- The state of Uttar Pradesh) had decided to exempt all new modern units in the State of Uttar Pradesh from the Tax charges for a period of three years under Section 4-A of the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948. On October 11th, 1968, the appealing party spoke with the Director of Industries, stating that the party sought confirmation of the exemption and wished to establish a factory to produce vanaspati in light of the business charge occasion given by the administration. The appointment was confirmed by the director of industries. The Chief Secretary of the Government of Uttar Pradesh made an affirmation with a similar effect too.

The appealing party went ahead and built up the processing plant after receiving these certifications. The Uttar Pradesh State government reexamined the issue of exclusion in May 1969 and suggested the litigant attend a gathering. The representative of the appealing party testified at the meeting that the plaintiff had continued constructing the manufacturing facility on the affirmation and assurance of the respondent (the legislature of Uttar Pradesh). He took out a sizable loan and began to pay it back under the impression that the government had exempted him from paying taxes. But after some time, the government reconsidered its tax exemption strategy. It requested the petitioner attend a meeting discussing this matter and called for one to be held. To attend the meeting, the petitioner dispatched a representative. In any case, the State Government of Uttar Pradesh made the strategic decision on January 20th, 1970, to grant a small reduction in the deals charge to new vanaspati units that began operations by September 30th, 1970. Once again, however, the State govt. went back even on this promise denying any concession to be given. Plaintiff sued the government on account of promissory estoppel.

Issues Raised

The issues raised in this case are-

1. Whether the plaintiff’s acceptance of a partial exemption rendered his entitlement to have a cause of action?
2. Whether the plaintiff has a claim based on promissory estoppel?
3. Is it possible to take such action against the government when it is functioning in such capacities as government, sovereign, or administrative?
4. Given that the plaintiff did not experience any harm, would the theory of Promissory Estoppel apply in the current situation?

Contentions of Parties

Arguments of Petitioner- The main defence put forth on behalf of the appellant was that the respondent had made a categorical assurance on behalf of the State Government that the appellant would be exempt from payment of sales tax for a period of three years from the date of commencement of production. This assurance was made knowing or intending that the appellant would act on it, and in fact, the appellant did act in reliance on it and the State Government changed its position. The appellant argued that since waiver was a factual issue that needed to be pled and since it wasn’t addressed in the affidavit submitted by the State Government in opposition to the writ petition, the State Government was ineligible to rely on the waiver argument. It was claimed by the appellant that even if the waiver defence was allowed to be raised, despite the fact that it had no mention in the pleadings, no waiver had been established because there was no evidence to support the circumstances under which it had sent the letter. It was also impossible to claim that the appellant, with full knowledge of its right to claim complete exemption from payment of sales tax, had sent the letter.

Arguments from Respondent side- On the other hand, the State Government vigorously advanced the waiver argument, arguing that by addressing the letter dated June 25, 1970, the appellant had expressly forfeited its entitlement to full exemption from payment of sales tax. The State Government further argued that, even in the event of a waiver, the appellant would not be permitted to enforce the assurance provided by the fourth respondent because the State Government was not a party to the assurance, and that, in addition, in the absence of notification under section 4A, the State Government could not be prevented from enforcing the appellant’s obligation to pay sales tax under the terms of the Act. The State Government argued that there could not be a promissory estoppel against the State Government in order to prevent it from developing and carrying out its policies in the public interest. These were essentially the opposing arguments put out on behalf of the parties, and we will now analyse them.

Judgement

Though the division bench of the High Court rejected the plea for seeking promissory Estoppel against the respondents, the honourable Supreme Court held that-

1. The decision of the High Court of not granting Promissory Estoppel on the ground that the petitioner has waived that right and so can not have his course of action was wrong.
2. The waiver is a factual issue that needs to be adequately argued and proven. No plea of waiver may be raised unless it is pleaded and the facts supporting it are set forth in the pleadings.
3. Waiver is the act of giving up a right; it can be expressed or inferred from behaviour, but it must be “an intentional act with knowledge” in order to be considered valid. There can be no waiver unless the individual who is supposed to have done so is fully aware of his rights and intentionally gives them up while doing so.
4. ‘Promissory estoppel’ is a legal theory that was developed by equity to prevent injustice when a promise is made by someone who knows that it will be carried out and who is the person to whom it is made and in fact it is so. It is unfair to permit the party making the promise to break it after it has been acted upon. Despite being known as promissory estoppel, this legal doctrine has nothing to do with contracts or estoppel. The interposition of equity, which has always acted in accordance with form to lessen the burdens of strict law, serves as the foundation of the concept.
5. The true meaning of promissory estoppel is that when one party makes a clear and unambiguous promise to another party through words or conduct that is intended to forge a future legal relationship, knowing or intending that the other party will act on the promise, and that the other party actually does act on the promise, the promise will be enforceable against the party who made it and he will be bound by it whether there is a pre-existing relationship between those parties or not. In a situation when justice and fairness call for it, equity will prevent a person from insisting on stringent legal rights even when they originate from his own title deeds or from legislation rather than under any contract.
6. The same limiting estoppel in the strict meaning of the word cannot prevent the notion of promissory estoppel. It is an equitable concept that the Courts developed for the purpose of upholding justice, thus there is no reason why it should only be applied sparingly as a form of defence or used as a shield rather than a sword to establish a claim. It might serve as the impetus for legal action.
7. The Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the request of the promisee even though there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required when the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and the promisee, acting in reliance on it, changes his position.
8. The doctrine of promissory estoppel must give way when equity demands it since it is an equitable doctrine. The Court would not raise equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against the Government if the Government could demonstrate that, given the facts as they have developed, it would be unfair to hold it to the promise it made.
9. The moral standards of the society must be in accordance with the law for it to be legitimate and win social approval. Closing the gap between morality and law and achieving as close to a match as feasible between the two should be the constant goal of legislatures and courts. A key judicial advancement in that direction is the promissory estopped concept.
10. The distinction between a private person and a public body cannot be made in terms of the promissory estoppel theory.  This idea also applies to a government entity like a city council. This approach, however, cannot be used to circumvent a legal responsibility or liability. It cannot be used to force the government or even a private person to carry out an unlawful act. Additionally, promissory estoppel cannot be used to prevent the exercise of legislative power. By using the promissory estoppel concept, the Legislature can never be prevented from doing its legislative duties.

Conclusion

The case turned out to be very important in other cases. The court attempted to define promissory estoppels in this instance. This case did a good job of demonstrating how promissory estoppel could be a defence. However, it must be used with the doctrine of consideration if it is to be used as a weapon. This case demonstrated how important it is for society to stop fraud and injustice. This certificate appeal brings up a significant issue in the area of public law. Although it is a relatively new doctrine, it has the potential to be so prolific and packed with development opportunities that traditional attorneys are concerned it could upend established doctrines, which are viewed almost reverently and have held the line for decades.

This article is authored by Dibyojit Mukherjee, a student at the Institute of Law, Nirma University.

RELEVANT POST:

Doctrine of Estoppel

-Report by Harshita Kaul

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was enacted with the object of resolving disputes within a certain time framework which will promote confidence among the individuals who are opting for this Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism.

Therefore, the view of the Supreme Court was in the right direction that the applications filed must be decided within a specific time period as provided in the Act to foster and protect the very idea for which the Act was enacted in the first place.

Facts

On 06.10.2010, M/s Shree Vishnu Constructions, who was the applicant in this case entered into a Contract Agreement with Engineer in Chief, Military Engineering Services and others, who were the respondents for the construction of two blocks of Admin-cum-Technical accommodation with double storey in RCC framed structure with PCC solid block masonry along with connected services.

During this period, certain modifications were requested by the Respondents, and accordingly, the Applicant carried out the required modifications as per the instructions. The dispute arose when the Applicant requested for the release of payment and even after making persistent requests, the Respondent kept postponing the same as according to them the items used for modifications were not scheduled items.

When the dispute was not been able to settle amicably, the Applicant on 30.03.2013 issued a notice to the Respondents for appointment of the Arbitrator within 30 days as per the conditions 70 and 71 of IAFW-2249 under the contract but the Respondents did not give any reply to the notice. Due to this unresolved issue, an Arbitration Application was filed by the Applicant under Section 11(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the High Court for the State of Telangana seeking to appoint an Arbitrator for resolution of the dispute between the parties.

On 30.06.2020, the Application filed under Section 11(5) of the Act was dismissed by the High Court on the basis that in the case no Arbitral Dispute exists as satisfaction and accord was established.

Aggrieved by the impugned final judgment and order passed by the High Court, for the appointment of an Arbitrator, a Special Leave Petition was filed by the Applicant before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.

Judgement

Pursuant to the earlier orders, the respective High Courts have sent the statements regarding the pending applications under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, pending in the respective High Courts. It is seen that the number of applications under Sections 11(5) and 11(6) of the Arbitration Act are pending for more than one year. In many High Courts, applications for appointment of the arbitrator(s) are pending for more than four to five years. Even, in the statement of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur, many applications are pending, which are found to be defective. Some of the defective applications are pending since 2016 onwards. The pendency of a large number of applications under Sections 11(5) and 11(6) of the Arbitration Act, shows a very sorry state of affairs.

The arbitration proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act are said to be a part of the Alternative Dispute Resolution System. Having found that it takes a number of years in deciding and disposing of suits by the civil courts for a variety of reasons and with a view to see that Commercial disputes are decided and disposed of and resolved at the earliest, the Arbitration and Conciliation Act has been enacted and hence, the Arbitration proceedings have been accepted as an effective Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism. Therefore, if the arbitrators are not appointed at the earliest and the applications under Sections 11(5) and 11(6) of the Arbitration Act are kept pending for a number of years, it will defeat the object and purpose of the enactment of the Arbitration Act and it may lose the significance of an effective Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism. If the Commercial disputes are not resolved at the earliest, not only it would affect the commercial relations between the parties but it would also affect the economy of the country. It may affect the ease of doing business in the country. If the country has to compete with global business, confidence has to be fostered that in our country commercial disputes are resolved at the earliest and it does not take a number of years in resolving such Commercial disputes.

Even the amended Arbitration Act as well as the Commercial Courts Act mandate that the Commercial disputes are to be decided and disposed of within a period of one year. Further, the Arbitrators are mandated to declare the award within a period of one year. Therefore, if the applications under Sections 11(5) and 11(6) of the Arbitration Act for the appointment of arbitrators are kept pending for a number of years, it would defeat the object and purpose of the enactment of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act as well as the Commercial Courts Act. The litigant may lose faith in the justice delivery system, which may ultimately affect not only the rule of law but commerce and business in the country. Therefore, the applications under Sections 11(5) and 11(6) of the Arbitration Act and other applications, either for substitution and/or change of the Arbitrator have to be decided and disposed of at the earliest.

In that view of the matter, we request all the Chief Justices of the respective High Courts to ensure that all pending applications under Sections 11(5) and 11(6) of the Arbitration Act and/or any other applications either for substitution of arbitrator and/or change of arbitrator, which are pending for more than one year from the date of filing, must be decided within six months from today. The Registrar General(s) of the respective High Courts are directed to submit the compliance report on completion six months from today. All endeavours shall be made by the respective High Courts to decide and dispose of the applications under Sections 11(5) and 11(6) of the Arbitration Act and/or any other like application at the earliest and preferably within a period of six months from the date of filing of the applications.

Conclusion

A key step towards strengthening the process of appointing arbitrators is to amend the Act in light of the Supreme Court’s direction in Shree Vishnu Constructions and prescribe a time limit for the Courts’ appointment of arbitrators. Second, the government should notify the 2019 Amendment at the earliest by establishing arbitral institutions and providing a procedure for the appointment of arbitrators by such institutions. Further, it could adopt international best practices which allow for the quick and timely appointment of arbitrators while also involving the disputing parties in the process of constituting an arbitral tribunal. In the meantime, the respective High Court could, in its first hearing, designate an existing arbitral institution to appoint arbitrators as per institutional rules. These measures will not only help address the issue of the pendency of arbitration applications but also streamline the entire process in the long term.

Arbitration provides a sense of confidence to the parties to resolve their dispute but the delay in disposing the case not only dilutes the purpose of the Act, but the litigants may also lose faith in the justice delivery system. It will raise the question of Arbitration as an effective mechanism to resolve the dispute and will also affect the ease of doing business as well as the economy of the country.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/42tHQuH

Case Number

Civil Appeal No. 230 of 1977.

Equivalent Citation

1957 AIR 540

Bench

The Supreme Court of India

Decided On

1st February 1957

Relevant Acts / Sections

The sections that are relevant in the case of Garikapatti Veeraya v N. Subbiah Choudhury are:

• Article 133 of the Constitution of India¹, deals with the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the appeals that can be filed before it.
• Order XLV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, which provides the procedure for filing Special Leave Petitions before the Supreme Court.
• Section 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908², allows for appeals to the Supreme Court in civil cases if certain conditions are fulfilled.
• Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908³, lays down the grounds on which a second appeal can be filed before a High Court.
• Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908⁴, which defines a “decree” is the official statement of a judgment that definitively settles the rights of the parties concerning one or more of the contested issues.
• According to Section 2(14) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908⁵, a “judgment” is defined as the pronouncement made by a judge based on a decree or order.

Brief Facts and Procedural History

OVERVIEW

This legal case concerns an application for special leave to appeal, which arises from a previous lawsuit that was filed on April 22, 1949, and had a value of Rs. 11,400. On February 10, 1955, the high court overruled the decision of the trial court, which had earlier dismissed the suit. However, when the applicant sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, the high court refused the application, arguing that the value of the lawsuit did not meet the minimum requirement of Rs. 20,000.

The applicant contended that they had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court, which was the highest court in the land at the time the suit was instituted, and that this right of appeal had been transferred to the Supreme Court under Article 135 of the Constitution⁶. The applicant argued that they were therefore entitled to appeal to the Supreme Court as a matter of right.

The court held, with Chief Justice Das and Justices Bhagwati, B. P. Sinha, and S. K. Das concurring and Justice Venkatarama Ayyar dissenting, that the applicant’s contention was well-founded. 

The court held that the right to appeal was a significant right that could be utilized only in situations where the verdict was unfavourable. However, it stated that this right was subject to the laws applicable at the commencement of the legal action and included all subsequent appeals from one court to another, effectively forming a single proceeding. The court also held that such a right could be taken away only by a subsequent enactment either expressly or by necessary intendment.

The court cited the case of Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. v. Irving (1905) A.C. 369⁷ and held that the vested right of appeal was a matter contemplated by Article 135 of the Constitution. The court ruled that Article 135 could not be limited to cases where the right of appeal had actually arisen in a concrete form and that the appeal was entertainable by the Supreme Court.

The court also held that Article 133 of the Constitution had no application to such cases. It was not intended to have a retrospective operation so as to take away this vested right, nor did it do so either in express terms or by necessary intendment. To summarize, the court ruled that the applicant had an inherent right to appeal to the Federal Court, and under Article 135 of the Constitution, he had the right to appeal to the Supreme Court. The court also held that Article 133 of the Constitution did not apply to such cases. Furthermore, the appellant’s vested right of appeal acquired under the old law fell under the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

Appellant’s Argument: Acquisition of Vested Right to Appeal to the Federal Court

The appellant in this case argued that he had a vested right to appeal to the Federal Court from the time he filed the suit on April 22, 1949. He contended that the Indian Independence Act of 1947 expanded the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to allow it to hear appeals that previously went to the Privy Council. 

As per the Act, starting from the appointed day, i.e., February 1, 1948, any decision falling under the purview of the Act could be appealed to the Federal Court. The appellant argued that he was entitled to appeal to the Supreme Court as of right under Article 135 of the Constitution, and Article 133 of the Constitution did not apply to cases like his.

Respondent’s Argument: Inapplicability of Article 135 and Refusal of Special Leave

The respondent argued that the appellant’s reliance on Article 135 of the Constitution was misplaced, as Article 133 was the relevant provision. They claimed that there was no vested right to appeal to the Federal Court immediately before the Constitution came into effect, and therefore, Article 133 applied. The respondent contended that since the jurisdiction to hear appeals to the Federal Court ceased to exist, the appellant had no right to appeal to the Supreme Court. Consequently, they maintained that the application for special leave to appeal should be dismissed.

Issues before the Court

• Should the petition for special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution⁸ be granted or not, in relation to the judgment and decree dated March 4, 1955, of the Andhra High Court?

In this particular case, the main issue revolved around the petitioner’s entitlement to appeal to the Supreme Court. The petitioner claimed that he had a vested right to appeal to the Federal Court, which was replaced by the Supreme Court. This right, according to the petitioner, was acquired at the time of the suit’s institution, which occurred before the Constitution came into force. In contrast, the respondent argued that the case fell under the jurisdiction of Article 133 of the Constitution, and there was no vested right to appeal to the Federal Court. As per the respondent’s argument, the petitioner had no right to appeal since the Constitution had extinguished this right.

Therefore, the court was required to determine whether the petitioner had a valid claim to appeal under the previous law and whether Article 135 or Article 133 of the Constitution was applicable to the case. Ultimately, the correct interpretation of these articles was key to the final decision, and whether the petitioner’s right to appeal had been preserved despite the constitutional changes.

Decision of the Court

After considering the opinions of several courts, the final decision was reached in this case. The majority of the courts agreed that the appellant should be granted Special Leave to Appeal to the Court on usual terms. In its judgment, the Court clarified the interpretation of Article 133 and stated that it applies to all appeals against judgments, decrees, and final orders of the High Courts in India, regardless of whether the proceedings were initiated before or after the Constitution’s commencement in civil proceedings.

The Court’s decision provides a clear and consistent legal framework for all appeals against the High Courts’ judgments. This interpretation ensures that all appeals are treated uniformly, irrespective of the time the proceedings were instituted. It also provides clarity to litigants seeking to appeal a decision, as they can now have a clear understanding of the legal provisions applicable to their case.

The Court’s ruling is an essential milestone in Indian legal history, as it resolves the ambiguity surrounding the interpretation of Article 133 and provides much-needed clarity on the scope of appeals against the High Court’s decisions. This decision will have far-reaching implications for future cases, as it provides a standard framework for interpreting and applying Article 133 in all cases involving appeals against the High Court’s decisions.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of India’s ruling in the case of Garikapatti Veeraya v N. Subbiah Choudhury, handed down in 1957, is a significant milestone in the legal history of India. This ruling provided valuable insights into the interpretation of Article 133 of the Indian Constitution, which applies to all appeals against judgments, decrees, and final orders of the High Courts in India, irrespective of when the proceedings were initiated in civil cases. As a result, this case established a uniform and unambiguous legal framework, ensuring fair and equitable treatment for all litigants.

The Garikapatti Veeraya case underscores the importance of having a clear and consistent legal system that provides clarity and consistency in the interpretation and application of the law. This landmark decision has far-reaching implications for future cases, emphasizing the need for uniformity and consistency in legal rulings. The Court’s decision, in this case, serves as a guiding light for Indian courts and legal practitioners, helping to establish a clear and uniform legal framework for the entire nation. Overall, the Garikapatti Veeraya case is a crucial milestone in India’s legal history, representing a significant step forward in ensuring the fair and equitable treatment of all litigants.

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Endnotes:

1. INDIA CONST. art. 133.
2. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, § 109.
3. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, § 100.
4. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, § 2(2).
5. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, § 2(14).
6. INDIA CONST. art 135.
7. Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving, (1905) A.C. 369.
8. INDIA CONST. art. 136.

This case is analysed by Sohini Chakraborty, a first-year law student at RGNUL Patiala.

-Report by Sava Vishnu Vardhan

In the case of Nagarathinam V. State Through The Inspector Of Police | Criminal Appeal No. 1389 Of 2023, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India overturned the order of the State of Tamil Nadu rejecting the request for the Appellant’s premature release in the case of murder. 

FACTS OF THE CASE: 

Due to repeated threats from her spouse, Suresh, the mother, the appellant, chose to kill herself along with her children. She purchased pesticides intended for plants and, in accordance with her determination to pursue this line of action, she administered poison to her two children, Ramar and Laxmanan, who are identical twins. Then, the appellant’s niece pushed the pesticide down when she put it in a tumbler to drink it herself. Unfortunately, the two kids were pronounced dead when they got to the hospital. The appellant’s niece forced it down just as she was going to eat it herself.

Upon conviction of the appellant under Sections 302 and 309 of the IPC, Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Dindigul sentenced her to life in jail.

Following a trial, the appellant was found guilty of violating Sections 302 and 309 of the IPC by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Dindigul by Judgement and Order in Sessions Case No. 92 of 2004 dated 10.01.2005 and sentenced to life in jail. The Appellant requested an early release after serving nearly 20 years in jail. However, in light of the heinous and savage character of the offence (s) perpetrated by her, the State of Tamil Nadu rejected the State Level Committee’s proposal in G.O. (D) No. 1127, dated 24.09.2019.

APPELLANT‘S CONTENTIONS: 

Even if it is considered that the appellant attempted to poison herself and her children in order to end their lives, learned senior counsel for the appellant argued that this was only possible as a result of an unexpected provocation. Comes under IPC Section 300’s Exception 1. In addition, the fact that the appellant committed family suicide alongside her two boys is an extenuating circumstance protected by Section 300 of the IPC’s Exception 1. Additionally, if the mother had survived or managed to flee while the children perished, it would be illegal under Section 304 Part I of the IPC. In this regard, the Madras High Court’s learned Division Benches’ rulings in Guruswami Pillai v. State, 1991 (1) MWN (Cr.) 153 and Suyambukkani v. State, 1989 SCC OnLine Mad 481 were cited.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS: 

It was strongly maintained by knowledgeable counsel for the lone Respondent-State opposing the petitions that the act(s) perpetrated by the Appellant were cruel and violent as young children were given poison and put to death, hence it was only fair that the State had rejected the Appellant’s early release. It was argued that the High Court maintained the conviction under Section 302 of the IPC since both the Trial Court and the High Court carefully considered every aspect of the 6 issues.

JUDGEMENT:

The Judgement was delivered by Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J. the hon’ble Supreme Courtdetermined that the scenarios presented by the appellant are not protected by the exceptions listed under Section 300 of the IPC given the facts and circumstances of the current instance. Even more so when the people who were fed the pesticide administered by the appellant and perished from it did not provide their consent. In Guruswami Pillai v. State of Madras, the father attempted suicide as well as killing his little daughter by slicing her throat with a knife. It was revealed during the trial that the father and daughter had decided to take their own lives together. Thus, the High Court in that case determined that it was prudent to provide a benefit by converting the conviction from Section 302, IPC to one under Section 304 Part I, IPC. This was done in light of the background information, as well as the parties’ mental and social conditions, financial situation, and the surrounding circumstances. The appellant has already endured the brutal hand of fate, according to the supreme court. The Court further pointed out that it can’t only be said that the act was “cruel and brutal” because the appellant tried to kill herself but was saved just in time by her niece. She had already served nearly 20 years in prison, to add to it. This prompted the Bench to overturn the government injunction and order her release.

The order of the State of Tamil Nadu, as stated in G.O. (D) No. 1127 dated 24.09.2019, issued by the Home (Prison-IV) Department and signed by the Additional Chief Secretary to Government, rejecting the request for the Appellant’s early release is reversed for the aforementioned reasons.

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-Report by Gopal Kumar

This case is related to Judge’s power to put questions or order production to discover or obtain proper proof of relevant fact under section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act. 

FACTS

In this case, the appellant-accused along with the other co-accused were charged with kidnapping and murder of a person in the year 2000. The Trial Court convicted both the accused persons for offences under Section 302, Section 364, Section 392, Section 394, Section 201 and Section 34 of IPC and awarded a life sentence under Section 302 IPC, and the remaining accused was convictedlesser sentence, vide order dated July 11, 2003. Further, the appellant filed the case to   The Punjab and Haryana High Court which dismissed the file and upheld the conviction and sentence of the Trial Court vide order dated May 31, 2017. Hence, the appellant-accused filed the appeal before the Supreme Court.

In this case, the apex court found that the case of the prosecution is entirely based on circumstantial evidence and the ‘evidence’ of last seen and the “discoveries” made from the information given by the appellant.

The Court further observed that the case of the prosecution rests on two circumstantial pieces of evidence

1. The disclosure is given in police custody and the discovery is on its basis.

2. The evidence of last seen in the form of PW-10 (the neighbour of the complainant).

The court rightly points out that in the case of circumstantial evidence motive plays a significant role. The prosecution case is that the two accused killed the deceased only to steal his tractor. The prosecution case is that the deceased was kidnapped and murdered by the two accused, for his tractor which they had robbed from the deceased, after putting him to death. The Court pointed out that the facts that led to certain discoveries were already known to the police in the earlier discovery made by the co-accused. The Court further noted that the discoveries which were made on the pointing out of co-accused cannot be read against the present appellant.

According to section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act “If the disclosure has been made by the accused to the police while he was in their custody and such a disclosure leads to the discovery of a fact then that discovery is liable to be read as evidence against the accused. A fact discovered in a piece of information supplied by the accused in his disclosure statement is a relevant fact and that is only admissible in evidence if something new is discovered or recovered from the accused which was not within the knowledge of the police before recording the disclosure statement of the accused.

On the evidence of ‘last seen’ the Court noted:

“In this case, even if we take the time between the last seen and the approximate time of death as per the postmortem, which would go beyond 48 hours preceding the time of post-mortem the time of death can be stretched to the morning of May 9, 2000, which still begs an explanation from the prosecution as to the time gap, as the deceased was last seen with the two accused on 08.05.2000 at 7:00 P.M.” The Court further noted that the evidence of last seen itself is on a weak footing, considering the long gap of time between last seen by PW-10 and the time of death of the deceased, Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 would not be applicable to facts and the circumstances of the present case. When a person does an act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, the burden of proving that intention is upon him.

The court said “In order to establish a charge of guilt on the accused, the chain of evidence must be completed and the chain must point out to one and only one conclusion, which is that it is only the accused who have committed the crime and none else. 

RATIO DECIDENDI

The Court held that the evidence placed by the prosecution, in this case, does not pass muster the standard required in a case of circumstantial evidence.

JUDGEMENT

The judgement given by the division bench of Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia and Justice Sanjay Kumar noted:

In the present case, the prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence of last seen only leads up to a point and no further. It fails to link it further to make a complete chain. All we have here is the evidence of last seen, which as we have seen loses much of its weight under the circumstances of the case, due to the long duration of time between last seen and the possible time of death. The Court set aside the conviction of a murder accused on the ground that the evidence last seen on which the conviction was based, failed to make a complete chain of circumstantial evidence. 

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-Report by Arunima Jain

The Supreme Court on Monday, in the case of Essemm Logistics v. Darcl Logistics Limited& Anr., delved into the meaning and extent of Section 16 of the Carriers by Road Act, 2007read with the Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). According to the court, no notice is required under Section 16 of the new Act for instituting any suit or legal proceedings, much less a counter-claim against the common carrier for recovering any loss other than the loss of or damage to the consignment.

FACTS

In the matter at hand, the appellant is a high-end carrier providing service, governed by theCarrier by Road Act, 2007. The first respondent had originally instituted a suit against theappellant for the acquisition of Rs.4,09,53,847/- with 18% interest until its realization,because the current appellant had failed to make payments due on 530 bills raised between November 14, 2011, and January 31, 2012. Accordingly, the first defendant/current appellant had filed a counterclaim of Rs. 13,03,00,000/- with 24% interest on the said amount till realization. This was majorly on three grounds:- Loss of business opportunity due to the diversification of cargo;- Loss of reputation;- Loss on account of idling of men, machines & overheads.

The present first respondent sought to dismiss the counterclaim of the first defendant on thegrounds that it was preferred without issuing the necessary notice, as mistakenly intended bySection 10 of the Carriers Act, 1865, but in fact by Section 16 of the new Act. The Court ofFirst Instance dismissed the plaint for failure to issue mandatory notice prior to thepresentation of the counter-claim, and the High Court upheld that decision. Accordingly, thefirst defendant has filed this appeal in the Supreme Court to allow the plea for a counterclaim.

JUDGEMENT

Upon giving due regard to the facts and law in the above-mentioned case, it is contended bythe Hon’ble Court that a simple reading of Section 16 of the new Carriage by Road Actindicates that it is only relevant in the event of a suit or legal procedure being institutedagainst a common carrier for any loss or damage to the consignment. The provision is inapplicable to any other type of loss or any suit or legal procedures brought to recover damages for loss of a different sort. In the court’s opinion, there was no violation of Section 16 and it was observed that the first courts have erred in their judgement by rejecting thecounterclaim under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC as barred by Section 16 of the new Act. Hence, the impugned judgement and order have been repealed and the current appeal is allowed. The Court of first instance is directed to further allow the counterclaim.

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-Report by Moksh Kapoor

The appellant’s contention was set aside by the Supreme Court in the case of RAJIV KUMAR JINDAL AND OTHERS VERSUS BCI STAFF COLONY RESIDENTIAL WELFARE ASSOCIATION AND OTHER. Decided on 27-04-2023.

FACTS

BCI was deemed a sick company, and assets of BCI were disposed of in accordance with the directions of the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction. (BIFR) commenced the procedure of inviting sealed cover proposals for the sale of assets of the captioned unit under Section 20(4) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act 1985”) through IDBI – the Operating Agency. In a public notice dated May 24, 2004, offers were invited for various blocks, with the interested parties being asked to deposit earnest money of Rs.6 lakhs for Block IV and submit their tenders in a sealed cover within 30 days of the date of the 3 advertisements, and for further information, the interested parties may contact Mr. P.M. Nair, DGM, IDBI, Mumbai, the office of the BIFR’s Assets Sale Committee, and the agency reserved the right to accept or reject any bid without assigning any reason. In accordance with Section 21(c) of the Act, 1985, the Operating Agency was required to evaluate the realisable value of the property from the approved valuer and then notify the reserve price in the auction notice, which was not done, and the solitary bid submitted by the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 10128 of 2011 of Rs.2,84,00,000/- on 22nd June 2004 was accepted by the authority. The appellants were directed to provide a bank guarantee for a bid value of Rs.2,84,00,000/- for a term of one year by August 27, 2004, and to deposit payment in instalments. The appellants were hesitant to provide the bank guarantee of Rs.2,84,00,000/ from the start, but they allegedly showed their willingness to pay the value of the assets in accordance with the bid within six months. However, the appellants did not submit a bank guarantee of Rs.2,84,00,000/- or deposit a penny after the ASC approved the proposal by communication dated August 12, 2004. Because the appellants (in this case) are unwilling to follow the ASC rules, the Bench declined to accept the proposal.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION 

The advertisement was published by the IDBI (Operating Agency), but the ASC guidelines were not attached, and the parties were not informed. They are required to furnish a bank guarantee as security for the bid amount, and requiring the appellants to act on the guidelines and furnish a bank guarantee at the stage of bid acceptance was not justified, as determined by the AAIFR in its order dated 1st April 2005, and which has not been properly appreciated by the High Court. Appellants paid the entire sale consideration on June 3rd and 7th, 2005, in accordance with the tripartite Memorandum of Understanding. The High Court made a manifest error in failing to consider that once the auction sale is confirmed, objections to the said auction can only be entertained if there are material irregularities and fraud appellants had scrupulously adhered to the conditions of the ASC and were ready to pay the entire saleconsideration, and until September 2004, the appellants were never informed that a bank guarantee equal to the bid sum would be required. The appellants herein made over the bid sum of Rs.2,84,00,000/- on 3rd and 7th June 2005, immediately after their appeal was approved by the AAIFR, and hence there was no breach of any terms and circumstances of the sale of assets.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

The appellants submitted an offer of Rs.3 crores, which was more than their bid in Civil Appeal No.10128 of 2011, and they were successfully residing for a sufficiently long time over the property in question put up for auction, at the very least they seek the Court’s indulgence that their offer 2 (2018) 8 SCC 243 10 be accepted and the authorities be directed to execute the sale certificate in their favour the employees of the company in liquidation have not participated in the proceedings but their dues are still outstanding and could not have been made over in the absence of funds available. Upholding the Division Bench of the High Court’s decision, the BIFR or the Official Liquidator may be summoned to launch a new bidding procedure to maximise the value of the property that may provide some comfort to the staff whose dues have been outstanding for a long time and they have a superior claim over the company’s financial creditors in a liquidation.

JUDGEMENT

Undisputedly, the appellants (auction bidder) have not paid the selling consideration in accordance with clause (h) of the rules, nor have they provided the bank guarantee within 15 days of the acceptance of the offer bid in accordance with the guidelines’ clause (i). When the case was heard by the BIFR, the Bench noted that the appellants, M/s Rajiv Kumar Jindal and others, were the lone bidder for Block IV of the Rajpura Unit and had not followed the ASC criteria. Taking both facts into account; (i) the appellant being the lone bidder; and (ii) ASC guidelines not being followed, the appellants’ bid was not confirmed, However, when the appellants filed an appeal, the AAIFR ignored the fact that the ASC’s standards were not followed and the appellant was wrongfully convicted, The single bidder, because there was no competition bidding, which is usually important to ensure that the property’s worth is maximised. The Tripartite MOU was executed with no substance because the procedure initiated by the Operating Agency in the first instance was defective from the start, and prior to the initiation of the 20 auction proceedings, neither the value of the property was assessed through the approved valuer nor the reserve price was notified in the auction notice dated May 24, 2004, The appellants’ money paid in Civil Appeal No. 10128 of 2011 shall be refunded in accordance with the impugned High Court ruling dated February 5th, 2010. Simultaneously, the official liquidator may use all reasonable means to obtain the highest possible value for the property in order to achieve the purpose of public auction.

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-Report by Sejal Jethva

The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others v. Rachna Hills and Others this instance, Section 16-FF of the Act and Regulation 17 of the Regulations outlines the process for choosing and appointing heads of institutions and teachers at minority institutions. Although the specific selection process is outlined in Regulation 17, Section 16-FF, subsection (3) of the Act requires that the District Inspector of Schools provide his or her approval before appointing a teacher.

FACTS

Two minority institutions took the lead in the teacher selection process and submitted their requests for DIOS clearance. The Government changed Regulation 17 to include a new selection process before the required permission was given. In order to ensure that the proposal complied with the new method, the DIOS returned it. By submitting writ petitions in accordance with Article 226 of the Constitution, the institutions contested the DIOS’s decision forcing the Management to abide by the new Rules.

According to the decisions challenged before us, the High Court determined that the selection process was complete and the suggested candidates had a vested right to be appointed after Management sent the names to the DIOS for approval. The High Court also made reference to and relied on the rule that vacancies that occur before rules are amended must be regulated by the rules in effect at the time of the occurrence of the vacancy. We are hearing an appeal from the State of U.P.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION

We have maintained that the selection process doesn’t end until the DIOS has given its required clearance. A considered appointment has no place, according to our analysis of the legislative framework and the supporting laws. Additionally, we have made it clear that in light of recent decisions by this Court, the concept used by the High Court in order to apply outdated standards to previous vacancies is neither appropriate to the circumstances of the current cases nor sound legal precedent.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

The Respondent-candidates appealed the DIOS’s judgment in question by submitting a writ petition to Allahabad’s High Court of Judicature4. The judgment was overturned and the DIOS was instructed to rethink it by the learned Single Judge in an order dated 07.05.2018 on the grounds that the modified Regulations would not apply because the selection procedure had reached its conclusion.

JUDGMENT

1. In order to evaluate the Respondents’ claims that individuals whose names are submitted to the Management for approval by the DIOS acquire a vested right to be appointed as Teachers, it is important to look at Section 16-FF.

2. Respondents claim that in accordance with Regulation 1815, suggested candidates should be presumed to have been appointed if the DIOS fails to approve them within 15 days following the Management’s proposal.

3. The Division Bench and the High Court’s Single Judge accepted the selected candidates’ argument that the 19 Rules and Regulations in effect at the time the vacancies arose and not the Regulations that would later be amended could only be used to fill the vacancies for the post of a teacher.

4. In light of the law’s unambiguous formulation, we have no qualms about rejecting the learned counsels for the respondents’ argument that the vacancies that existed before the alteration to Regulation 17 of Chapter II must be regulated by unaltered norms.

5. Civil Appeal No. 1882 of 2023, Civil Appeal No. 1883 of 2023, and Civil Appeal No. 1884 of 2023 are all accepted for the reasons mentioned above. As a result, the decisions rendered by the High Court of Judicature in Allahabad on January 16, 2019, January 16, 2019, and January 18, 2019, in the cases of Special Appeal Defective No. 42 of 2019 and Writ Appeal No. 27341 of 2018 and Special Appeal Defective No. 38 of 2019, respectively, are annulled.

6. No cost-related order.

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