Tag: #Supremecourtjudgment

Citation

1979 AIR 621, 1979 SCR (2) 641

Date of Judgment

12/12/1978

Court

Supreme Court of India

Bench

• Justice P.N. Bhagwati
• Justice V.D. Tulzapulkar

Introduction

According to the Promissory Estoppel doctrine, the promisor will refrain from breaking the promise if it would be unfair for him to do so whenever an unambiguous promise is made with the intent to establish a legal relationship or affect one that will arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the other party and is in fact acted on. This is the main referred law in this present case. If parties who had already agreed to clear-cut terms involving specific legal outcomes later engage in negotiation, it may be assumed that Promissory Estoppel only applies to situations in which the parties are already bound by a legal or contractual relationship and one of them promises the other that strict legal rights under the contract won’t be enforced. However, the court found that the theory of promissory estoppel, even as it was originally stated by Lord Denning in the High Trees case, did not contain any such limitation, and thus it cannot apply in the current case, Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills.

Background of the Case

The appealing party in this instance was a limited sugar production company. His main line of work was producing and selling sugars. On October 10th, 1968, news broke that the respondent (In this case- The state of Uttar Pradesh) had decided to exempt all new modern units in the State of Uttar Pradesh from the Tax charges for a period of three years under Section 4-A of the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948. On October 11th, 1968, the appealing party spoke with the Director of Industries, stating that the party sought confirmation of the exemption and wished to establish a factory to produce vanaspati in light of the business charge occasion given by the administration. The appointment was confirmed by the director of industries. The Chief Secretary of the Government of Uttar Pradesh made an affirmation with a similar effect too.

The appealing party went ahead and built up the processing plant after receiving these certifications. The Uttar Pradesh State government reexamined the issue of exclusion in May 1969 and suggested the litigant attend a gathering. The representative of the appealing party testified at the meeting that the plaintiff had continued constructing the manufacturing facility on the affirmation and assurance of the respondent (the legislature of Uttar Pradesh). He took out a sizable loan and began to pay it back under the impression that the government had exempted him from paying taxes. But after some time, the government reconsidered its tax exemption strategy. It requested the petitioner attend a meeting discussing this matter and called for one to be held. To attend the meeting, the petitioner dispatched a representative. In any case, the State Government of Uttar Pradesh made the strategic decision on January 20th, 1970, to grant a small reduction in the deals charge to new vanaspati units that began operations by September 30th, 1970. Once again, however, the State govt. went back even on this promise denying any concession to be given. Plaintiff sued the government on account of promissory estoppel.

Issues Raised

The issues raised in this case are-

1. Whether the plaintiff’s acceptance of a partial exemption rendered his entitlement to have a cause of action?
2. Whether the plaintiff has a claim based on promissory estoppel?
3. Is it possible to take such action against the government when it is functioning in such capacities as government, sovereign, or administrative?
4. Given that the plaintiff did not experience any harm, would the theory of Promissory Estoppel apply in the current situation?

Contentions of Parties

Arguments of Petitioner- The main defence put forth on behalf of the appellant was that the respondent had made a categorical assurance on behalf of the State Government that the appellant would be exempt from payment of sales tax for a period of three years from the date of commencement of production. This assurance was made knowing or intending that the appellant would act on it, and in fact, the appellant did act in reliance on it and the State Government changed its position. The appellant argued that since waiver was a factual issue that needed to be pled and since it wasn’t addressed in the affidavit submitted by the State Government in opposition to the writ petition, the State Government was ineligible to rely on the waiver argument. It was claimed by the appellant that even if the waiver defence was allowed to be raised, despite the fact that it had no mention in the pleadings, no waiver had been established because there was no evidence to support the circumstances under which it had sent the letter. It was also impossible to claim that the appellant, with full knowledge of its right to claim complete exemption from payment of sales tax, had sent the letter.

Arguments from Respondent side- On the other hand, the State Government vigorously advanced the waiver argument, arguing that by addressing the letter dated June 25, 1970, the appellant had expressly forfeited its entitlement to full exemption from payment of sales tax. The State Government further argued that, even in the event of a waiver, the appellant would not be permitted to enforce the assurance provided by the fourth respondent because the State Government was not a party to the assurance, and that, in addition, in the absence of notification under section 4A, the State Government could not be prevented from enforcing the appellant’s obligation to pay sales tax under the terms of the Act. The State Government argued that there could not be a promissory estoppel against the State Government in order to prevent it from developing and carrying out its policies in the public interest. These were essentially the opposing arguments put out on behalf of the parties, and we will now analyse them.

Judgement

Though the division bench of the High Court rejected the plea for seeking promissory Estoppel against the respondents, the honourable Supreme Court held that-

1. The decision of the High Court of not granting Promissory Estoppel on the ground that the petitioner has waived that right and so can not have his course of action was wrong.
2. The waiver is a factual issue that needs to be adequately argued and proven. No plea of waiver may be raised unless it is pleaded and the facts supporting it are set forth in the pleadings.
3. Waiver is the act of giving up a right; it can be expressed or inferred from behaviour, but it must be “an intentional act with knowledge” in order to be considered valid. There can be no waiver unless the individual who is supposed to have done so is fully aware of his rights and intentionally gives them up while doing so.
4. ‘Promissory estoppel’ is a legal theory that was developed by equity to prevent injustice when a promise is made by someone who knows that it will be carried out and who is the person to whom it is made and in fact it is so. It is unfair to permit the party making the promise to break it after it has been acted upon. Despite being known as promissory estoppel, this legal doctrine has nothing to do with contracts or estoppel. The interposition of equity, which has always acted in accordance with form to lessen the burdens of strict law, serves as the foundation of the concept.
5. The true meaning of promissory estoppel is that when one party makes a clear and unambiguous promise to another party through words or conduct that is intended to forge a future legal relationship, knowing or intending that the other party will act on the promise, and that the other party actually does act on the promise, the promise will be enforceable against the party who made it and he will be bound by it whether there is a pre-existing relationship between those parties or not. In a situation when justice and fairness call for it, equity will prevent a person from insisting on stringent legal rights even when they originate from his own title deeds or from legislation rather than under any contract.
6. The same limiting estoppel in the strict meaning of the word cannot prevent the notion of promissory estoppel. It is an equitable concept that the Courts developed for the purpose of upholding justice, thus there is no reason why it should only be applied sparingly as a form of defence or used as a shield rather than a sword to establish a claim. It might serve as the impetus for legal action.
7. The Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the request of the promisee even though there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required when the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and the promisee, acting in reliance on it, changes his position.
8. The doctrine of promissory estoppel must give way when equity demands it since it is an equitable doctrine. The Court would not raise equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against the Government if the Government could demonstrate that, given the facts as they have developed, it would be unfair to hold it to the promise it made.
9. The moral standards of the society must be in accordance with the law for it to be legitimate and win social approval. Closing the gap between morality and law and achieving as close to a match as feasible between the two should be the constant goal of legislatures and courts. A key judicial advancement in that direction is the promissory estopped concept.
10. The distinction between a private person and a public body cannot be made in terms of the promissory estoppel theory.  This idea also applies to a government entity like a city council. This approach, however, cannot be used to circumvent a legal responsibility or liability. It cannot be used to force the government or even a private person to carry out an unlawful act. Additionally, promissory estoppel cannot be used to prevent the exercise of legislative power. By using the promissory estoppel concept, the Legislature can never be prevented from doing its legislative duties.

Conclusion

The case turned out to be very important in other cases. The court attempted to define promissory estoppels in this instance. This case did a good job of demonstrating how promissory estoppel could be a defence. However, it must be used with the doctrine of consideration if it is to be used as a weapon. This case demonstrated how important it is for society to stop fraud and injustice. This certificate appeal brings up a significant issue in the area of public law. Although it is a relatively new doctrine, it has the potential to be so prolific and packed with development opportunities that traditional attorneys are concerned it could upend established doctrines, which are viewed almost reverently and have held the line for decades.

This article is authored by Dibyojit Mukherjee, a student at the Institute of Law, Nirma University.

RELEVANT POST:

Doctrine of Estoppel

Case Number

Civil Appeal No. 230 of 1977.

Equivalent Citation

1957 AIR 540

Bench

The Supreme Court of India

Decided On

1st February 1957

Relevant Acts / Sections

The sections that are relevant in the case of Garikapatti Veeraya v N. Subbiah Choudhury are:

• Article 133 of the Constitution of India¹, deals with the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the appeals that can be filed before it.
• Order XLV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, which provides the procedure for filing Special Leave Petitions before the Supreme Court.
• Section 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908², allows for appeals to the Supreme Court in civil cases if certain conditions are fulfilled.
• Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908³, lays down the grounds on which a second appeal can be filed before a High Court.
• Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908⁴, which defines a “decree” is the official statement of a judgment that definitively settles the rights of the parties concerning one or more of the contested issues.
• According to Section 2(14) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908⁵, a “judgment” is defined as the pronouncement made by a judge based on a decree or order.

Brief Facts and Procedural History

OVERVIEW

This legal case concerns an application for special leave to appeal, which arises from a previous lawsuit that was filed on April 22, 1949, and had a value of Rs. 11,400. On February 10, 1955, the high court overruled the decision of the trial court, which had earlier dismissed the suit. However, when the applicant sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, the high court refused the application, arguing that the value of the lawsuit did not meet the minimum requirement of Rs. 20,000.

The applicant contended that they had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court, which was the highest court in the land at the time the suit was instituted, and that this right of appeal had been transferred to the Supreme Court under Article 135 of the Constitution⁶. The applicant argued that they were therefore entitled to appeal to the Supreme Court as a matter of right.

The court held, with Chief Justice Das and Justices Bhagwati, B. P. Sinha, and S. K. Das concurring and Justice Venkatarama Ayyar dissenting, that the applicant’s contention was well-founded. 

The court held that the right to appeal was a significant right that could be utilized only in situations where the verdict was unfavourable. However, it stated that this right was subject to the laws applicable at the commencement of the legal action and included all subsequent appeals from one court to another, effectively forming a single proceeding. The court also held that such a right could be taken away only by a subsequent enactment either expressly or by necessary intendment.

The court cited the case of Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. v. Irving (1905) A.C. 369⁷ and held that the vested right of appeal was a matter contemplated by Article 135 of the Constitution. The court ruled that Article 135 could not be limited to cases where the right of appeal had actually arisen in a concrete form and that the appeal was entertainable by the Supreme Court.

The court also held that Article 133 of the Constitution had no application to such cases. It was not intended to have a retrospective operation so as to take away this vested right, nor did it do so either in express terms or by necessary intendment. To summarize, the court ruled that the applicant had an inherent right to appeal to the Federal Court, and under Article 135 of the Constitution, he had the right to appeal to the Supreme Court. The court also held that Article 133 of the Constitution did not apply to such cases. Furthermore, the appellant’s vested right of appeal acquired under the old law fell under the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

Appellant’s Argument: Acquisition of Vested Right to Appeal to the Federal Court

The appellant in this case argued that he had a vested right to appeal to the Federal Court from the time he filed the suit on April 22, 1949. He contended that the Indian Independence Act of 1947 expanded the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to allow it to hear appeals that previously went to the Privy Council. 

As per the Act, starting from the appointed day, i.e., February 1, 1948, any decision falling under the purview of the Act could be appealed to the Federal Court. The appellant argued that he was entitled to appeal to the Supreme Court as of right under Article 135 of the Constitution, and Article 133 of the Constitution did not apply to cases like his.

Respondent’s Argument: Inapplicability of Article 135 and Refusal of Special Leave

The respondent argued that the appellant’s reliance on Article 135 of the Constitution was misplaced, as Article 133 was the relevant provision. They claimed that there was no vested right to appeal to the Federal Court immediately before the Constitution came into effect, and therefore, Article 133 applied. The respondent contended that since the jurisdiction to hear appeals to the Federal Court ceased to exist, the appellant had no right to appeal to the Supreme Court. Consequently, they maintained that the application for special leave to appeal should be dismissed.

Issues before the Court

• Should the petition for special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution⁸ be granted or not, in relation to the judgment and decree dated March 4, 1955, of the Andhra High Court?

In this particular case, the main issue revolved around the petitioner’s entitlement to appeal to the Supreme Court. The petitioner claimed that he had a vested right to appeal to the Federal Court, which was replaced by the Supreme Court. This right, according to the petitioner, was acquired at the time of the suit’s institution, which occurred before the Constitution came into force. In contrast, the respondent argued that the case fell under the jurisdiction of Article 133 of the Constitution, and there was no vested right to appeal to the Federal Court. As per the respondent’s argument, the petitioner had no right to appeal since the Constitution had extinguished this right.

Therefore, the court was required to determine whether the petitioner had a valid claim to appeal under the previous law and whether Article 135 or Article 133 of the Constitution was applicable to the case. Ultimately, the correct interpretation of these articles was key to the final decision, and whether the petitioner’s right to appeal had been preserved despite the constitutional changes.

Decision of the Court

After considering the opinions of several courts, the final decision was reached in this case. The majority of the courts agreed that the appellant should be granted Special Leave to Appeal to the Court on usual terms. In its judgment, the Court clarified the interpretation of Article 133 and stated that it applies to all appeals against judgments, decrees, and final orders of the High Courts in India, regardless of whether the proceedings were initiated before or after the Constitution’s commencement in civil proceedings.

The Court’s decision provides a clear and consistent legal framework for all appeals against the High Courts’ judgments. This interpretation ensures that all appeals are treated uniformly, irrespective of the time the proceedings were instituted. It also provides clarity to litigants seeking to appeal a decision, as they can now have a clear understanding of the legal provisions applicable to their case.

The Court’s ruling is an essential milestone in Indian legal history, as it resolves the ambiguity surrounding the interpretation of Article 133 and provides much-needed clarity on the scope of appeals against the High Court’s decisions. This decision will have far-reaching implications for future cases, as it provides a standard framework for interpreting and applying Article 133 in all cases involving appeals against the High Court’s decisions.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of India’s ruling in the case of Garikapatti Veeraya v N. Subbiah Choudhury, handed down in 1957, is a significant milestone in the legal history of India. This ruling provided valuable insights into the interpretation of Article 133 of the Indian Constitution, which applies to all appeals against judgments, decrees, and final orders of the High Courts in India, irrespective of when the proceedings were initiated in civil cases. As a result, this case established a uniform and unambiguous legal framework, ensuring fair and equitable treatment for all litigants.

The Garikapatti Veeraya case underscores the importance of having a clear and consistent legal system that provides clarity and consistency in the interpretation and application of the law. This landmark decision has far-reaching implications for future cases, emphasizing the need for uniformity and consistency in legal rulings. The Court’s decision, in this case, serves as a guiding light for Indian courts and legal practitioners, helping to establish a clear and uniform legal framework for the entire nation. Overall, the Garikapatti Veeraya case is a crucial milestone in India’s legal history, representing a significant step forward in ensuring the fair and equitable treatment of all litigants.

---

Endnotes:

1. INDIA CONST. art. 133.
2. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, § 109.
3. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, § 100.
4. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, § 2(2).
5. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, § 2(14).
6. INDIA CONST. art 135.
7. Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving, (1905) A.C. 369.
8. INDIA CONST. art. 136.

This case is analysed by Sohini Chakraborty, a first-year law student at RGNUL Patiala.

Year

1950

Citation

AIR 1950 SC 27

Court

The Supreme Court of India

Bench

Harilal Kania (C.J.), Justice M. Patanjali Sastri, Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, Justice B.K. Mukherjee and Justice Sudhi Rajan Das, Justice Fazal Ali Saiyid.

Introduction

A.K. Gopalan was the political opponent of the government. He filed the writ petition of habeas corpus. Habeas Corpus which means you may have the body is a writ that institutes the court to determine whether a criminal defendant has been lawfully imprisoned or not. A.K. Gopalan filed this writ petition challenging Article 19(1) (d)[1] which is the right to freedom of movement and article 21[2] which states the right to life and personal liberty. He filed this writ petition against the detention in pursuance of an order of detention made under the Prevention Detention Act, of 1950[3].

Prevention Detention Act detains the person without giving any valid reason and detention is being done because that detention is important. He challenged the validity of the order given by the court in pursuance of the Prevention Dentition Act to be “Mala Fide”.

Facts of the case

Since December 1947 A.K. Gopalan was detained several times illegally and even after the order of the court which makes him free he was kept under detention by the government under the Prevention Detention Act, of 1950. So, he filed a writ petition under article 32 for seeking the writ of habeas corpus of The Indian Constitution. He challenged the legality of order by the government as it opposes some of the articles of The Indian Constitution. He further argued that Sections 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 of the Prevention Detention Act, 1950 violate Articles 13, 19, and 21 of the Indian Constitution. But majorly he asked for this writ on the ground that the Preventive Detention Act[4] curtails his personal liberty under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. He contended that the law under Article 21 is not just the enacted law but it also includes the Principle of Natural Justice as well as some others laws associated with it that deprives the individual’s personal life and liberty. 

Petitioner contention

M.K. Nambiar appeared as a petitioner’s council. Some of the arguments put forward by the petitioner’s side were –

• The first and foremost argument was about the legality and validity of the provision of the Preventive Detention Act, of 1950 which they believed had violated Articles 13, 19, 21, and 22.
• We have article 19(1) (d) of the Indian Constitution which states the freedom to move freely within the territory of India but in this case, the State Government of Madras restricted this right by the detention of A.K. Gopala even after the decision by the court which made him free.
• The provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, of 1950 were against article 19 and challenged the statute’s failure as the petitioner’s freedom of speech and expression was revoked.
• Article 21 is in the Right to Life and personal liberty but after the prolonged detention, it seems to have no importance of Article 21 for the petitioner.
• The detention order was also arbitrary as it violates article 22. Article 22 deals with protection against arrest and detention in certain cases.
• Section 14 of the Preventive Detention Act, of 1950 violates the fundamental right under article 13 of the Indian Constitution

Respondent’s Contention

Advocate K. Rajah Ajyar (Advocate General of Madras), and M.C. Setalvad (Attorney General of India) appeared as respondent’s council 

• The respondent said that Articles 19 and 21 should not be read together as it depends on the perspective and the nature of the case in which context both the articles should be read together.
• Detention that is being done is not arbitrary, according to Article 22 which states protection against arrest and detention in certain cases.
• The legal procedure that is followed, everything is as per the constitution of India. 
• Detention does not violate any of the rights of the petitioner i.e. of articles 12, 19, 21, and 22.
• The Prevention Detention Act is completely legal and not arbitrary.
• There is no point in filing a writ petition of habeas corpus under article 32 of the Indian Constitution.

Issues raised in the case

• The Prevention Detention Act, of 1950 does violate the prevailing articles 19 and 21.
• Article 19 – Protection of certain rights regarding, speech and expression, assembly, association, residence, and profession. Article 21 – Protection of life and personal liberty is there any kind of relation between these two, and can they be read together? This was one of the major issues as it could turn out to be the deciding factor.
• Due process is a requirement that legal matters are resolved according to the established rules and principles and everyone should be treated fairly. So the issue raised was whether the procedure established by law under Article 21 is the same as that of due process of law.

Judgment

This case is a landmark case in constitutional law and is popularly known as the Prevention Detention case. After extensive discussion and wide research, the bench of judges came to the last point of the case where they were expected to give the judgment on this particular case. The court rejected the argument that Article 19 and Article 21 of the Indian Constitution are being violated because of the Prevention Detention Act, of 1950. The next particular topic on the discussion was being done was that whether the Prevention Detention Act, 1950 is ultra-vires or not, however in this particular question section 14 of the act was declared as the ultra-vires as it violates the rights guaranteed by Article 22(5) of the Indian Constitution. The court also said that being ultra-vires of section 14 of the act does not affect the validity of the whole act. The next question was whether article 19 and article 21 should be read together and if there is any kind of relationship between both articles. The court rejected this argument and said that both article is distinct and must not be read together.

The judgment of this case was given by the 6 judge’s constitutional bench in a ratio of 5:1. The decision of Justice Fazal Ali was opposite to the decision given by the other judges and his decision can be regarded as the dissenting opinion. The court said that personal liberty only means the freedom of the physical body and nothing beyond that. In the nutshell, we can say that the Supreme Court rejected the petition filed by A.K. Gopalan and said that the Prevention Detention Act, 1950 does not violate article 19(1) (d) and article 21 of the Indian Constitution.

• Dissenting opinion by Justice Fazal Ali

In this case, the dissenting opinion was given by Justice Fazal Ali; he observed that preventive detention violates the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the constitution. According to him, the Constitution recognized that personal liberty and preventive detention are arbitrary and could be misused by the government to suppress political dissent. He further argued that personal liberty was a fundamental right and could only be curtailed in accordance with the law and that the Preventive Detention Act, of 1950, did not satisfy this requirement.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Fazal Ali noted that the right to personal liberty is one of the essential parts of the freedom and dignity of the individual, and it is necessary to protect this right from arbitrary interference by the state. He said preventive detention violates this right hence it is unconstitutional.

Therefore, in the case of A.K. Gopalan vs. The State of Madras, Justice Fazal Ali highlights a commitment to a person’s rights and restricting the power of the state to interfere with personal liberty.

• Protection of Personal Liberty

The Article 21 of our Indian constitution reads “No person shall be deprived of his personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law”[5]. The word “person” that is being used in this article signifies that this Article is applicable to the citizen as well as non-citizens as everyone is entitled to personal liberty. The Article further states that this liberty cannot be taken away unless there is a procedure established by law has been followed. Concerning the fact regarding personal liberty the difference between “Due process of law” which means the process must be fair and reasonable and “procedure established by law” which means the procedure should take place in a way that the parliament has signified, was taken into consideration. However, in the judgment of this case the meaning of Article 21 was taken in a narrow sense i.e. in this case the meaning of personal liberty was taken as personal liberty is just protection of body parts and the state cannot harm the individual’s body part. Also, it was held that there is no link between Articles 14, 19, and Article 21.

After 30 years in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India[6], personal liberty was interpreted in a different sense i.e. in a wider sense. The court took the wider view of Article 21. It was held that there is a connection between Articles 19 and 21. It was also held that there is no difference between personal liberty and liberty. In personal liberty, every other liberty has been included. Therefore the concept of personal liberty was taken into consideration in a different sense before and after the case of A.K Gopalan v. State of Madras[7] thereby leading to the rejuvenation of a new concept of personal liberty in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India[8].

• Co-relation of Article 14, 19, and Article 21 before and after the case

Articles 14, 19, and Article 21 are the basic and vital Articles of the constitution, and the connection between both them is to be taken into consideration for the better interpretation of these Articles. Article 14, 19, and Article 21 are connected with each other as there forms the bedrock of the Fundamental Right guaranteed to every citizen of India. Before the case of A.K Gopalan (1950), these articles used to be taken into consideration as a separate and distinct identity. Article 14 ensures equality before the law and equal protection of the law. Article 19 guarantees six freedom to the citizens of India these freedoms are – Freedom of speech and expression, Freedom to assemble peacefully, Freedom to form associations and unions, Freedom to move freely throughout the territory of India, Freedom to reside and settle in any part of the country and the last is the freedom to practice any profession, occupation, trade or business. Article 21 guarantees the right to life and personal liberty to every citizen.

In the case of A.K Gopalan, the Supreme Court of India held that the right to personal liberty under Article 21 is limited to procedural aspects. This means the government can deprive an individual of their personal liberty as long as the procedure for doing so was legal. This decision in the case of A.K Gopalan was criticized by many as an individual could be detained infinitely without facing any trial until the procedure allows doing that.

However, in the subsequent cases, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of Article 21 to include substantive rights as well such as a free trial, the right to privacy, and the right to education, etc. under this Article. This inculcation of substantive rights in the purview of this Article 21 gives the interconnection of Articles 14, 19, and Article 21.

Conclusion

In the case of A.K. Gopalan vs. The State of Madras, the court restricted the meaning of Article 19 and Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. However, after several years in the case of Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, the court overruled this judgment and said that the opinion of Justice Fazal Ali was correct. The court further said that the scope of Article 21 and Article 19 has a wider view. From the above analysis of the case, we can conclude to the fact that the Right to life and personal liberty is not only recognized under the Indian Constitution but also intentionally recognized on the basis of the principles of natural justice. The case of A.K Gopalan is one of the most important cases of Independent India as in this case the question pertaining to Article 21 was raised for the first time after the Independence of India. However, the court took Article 21 in a narrow sense and makes it in accordance with the procedure established by the law. Almost after 30 years this decision was overruled and lastly, Article 21 was taken into a broader sense. Lastly, the court widen the view of Article 21 and said that the procedure established by the law must be just, fair, and reasonable. Therefore, from the above discussion, we can say that the case of A.K. Gopalan vs. The State of Madras (1950), was a landmark case in the Indian Constitution.

---

Endnotes

1. INDIA CONST. art. 19(1) (d)
2. INDIA CONST. art. 21
3. Prevention Detention Act, 1950, Act No. 4 of 1950
4. Ibid
5. INDIA CONST. art. 21
6. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597
7. A.K Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27
8. Supra note vii

This case analysis is authored by Prashant Prasad, a second-year law student from University Law College.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reiterated that all the provisions of a statute have to be read harmoniously. The Special Leave Petition was filed before the Supreme Court challenging the interlocutory orders of the Odisha High Court.

Construction work is being carried out near the Puri Jagannath Temple. The contentions of the petitioner were that subsection (4) of section 20A of the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act(AMASR Act), 1958 clearly states that no permission can be given for carrying out any public work in the prohibited area(area within a radius of 100 meters from the protected monument) after the President has given assent to amendments to the AMSAR act. Therefore, construction in the prohibited area of the temple is illegal. Further, the NMA(National Monuments Authority) is not authorized to give permission for the work.

The respondents argued that the permission for the work which has been given by the NMA(National Monuments Authority) is valid as it is a competent authority as per section 2(da) of the AMASR Act. Further Section 2(dc) of the Act excludes the construction of toilets, drainages, etc. from the definition of ” Construction”.

The respondents also contended that the Hon’ble Supreme Court itself had ordered the construction of separate toilets for men and women in the case of Mrinalini Padhi vs. Union of India and Others. The Court had observed that inconvenience was being caused to the devotees who came to visit the temple in large numbers. This will further help in making the city of Puri a world heritage city. The ASI was also directed to cooperate for the same. Therefore the nature of construction is according to the directions of the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court accepted the submissions of the respondents. It further held that as far as the provisions of the AMSAR Act are concerned, the provisions of the statute have to be read harmoniously. It observed that:

“ …………..40. It is a settled principle of law that all the provisions in the statute have to be read harmoniously. It is presumed that each and every provision has been brought by the legislature into the statute book with some purpose. A particular provision cannot be read in isolation and has to be read in context to each other. An attempt has to be made to reconcile all the provisions of the statute together, unless it is impossible.

41. At first blush, the arguments of the appellants on the basis of sub­section (4) of Section 20A of the said Act may
appear to be attractive. But when sub­section (4) of Section 20A of the said Act is read in harmony with clause (dc) of
Section 2 and the provisions of Sections 20C and 20D of the said Act, we find that the submission that no construction at all can be made in the prohibited area or the regulated area would be unsustainable.”

The Court held that such construction is necessary for the public interest. It also made a remark that these days Public Interest Litigations are either Publicity Interest Litigations or Personal Interest Litigations and filing of such PILs should be avoided to save judicial time.

Case: ARDHENDU KUMAR DAS vs. THE STATE OF ODISHA AND ORS.

In a recent judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India acquitted the accused in an alleged case of honor killing.

The accused was convicted of the offence of murdering a girl and a boy who were having an affair but belonged to a different caste. The couple went missing on 2^nd December 1994 and after 10 days, on the 11^th of December, their bodies were found hanging on a cashew tree in a decomposed state. The girl belonged to the Kumhar caste whereas the boy belonged to the Siddar (Gaur) caste. The girl’s father and uncle (the accused) had a problem with that.

Charges were framed under section 302 read with section 32 of the IPC. Separate charges were framed under section 201 read with section 34 of the IPC and under section 3(2)(v) of the Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities), Act, 1989. The sessions court convicted all the accused of the said offences however, acquitted them of the offence under section 3 (2)(v). The Hon’ble High Court of Chattisgarh upheld the conviction of the appellant and acquitted the rest of the offence under section 302 read with section 32 of the IPC, however, convicted them under section 201 read with section 34 of the IPC.

It was held that the evidence submitted by the Prosecution was insufficient to constitute a chain of circumstances pointing ultimately toward the guilt of the accused. Therefore, the appellant was acquitted.

Firstly, the lower courts had not given enough importance to the post-mortem report and the statement of the doctor who had said that the “nature of the death was suicidal”.

Secondly, the extra-judicial confession of one of the accused was considered a piece of weak evidence. The court after relying on a number of cases observed:

“…. However, this court has consistently held that an extra judicial confession is a weak kind of evidence and unless it inspires confidence or is fully corroborated by some other evidence of clinching nature, ordinarily conviction for the offence of murder should not be made only on the evidence of extra judicial confession.”

Lastly, the “theory of last seen together” was also rejected. There were a lot of loopholes in the theory that the accused was seen last with the deceased. The Supreme Court relied on a number of judgments and concluded that the time gap should be reasonable between seeing the accused and deceased together and the death of the deceased. Therefore the entire hypothesis does not conclude the guilt of the accused.

What seemed like a case of honor killing turned out to be a matter of suicide. As there was no further evidence, the accused was acquitted.

case: Chandrapal vs state of Chattisgarh

This article talks about Section 13(B) and the effects of the cooling period being waived off and various cases to understand this better.

INTRODUCTION 

Marriage is considered one of the essential sacraments for all Hindus. None other than the Hindus have endeavored to Idealize the institution of marriage. Due to this a divorced person was stigmatized and hindered in the Hindu Society but over the years as our nation developed and Hindu Marriage Act came into force eventually the divorce aspects also found their own place in the act. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 under Section 13 (B) states that a petition for mutual consent divorce is presented by the parties with the following averments: –

1. That both the spouses are living separately for a period of one year,
2. The Spouses have not been able to live together,
3. Both the spouses have been living separately by consent.

In recent years Supreme Court has given a new perspective to the cooling period in mutual and consented divorce. The court held that this clause of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955 which allows a cooling-off period of six months is not compulsory but just directory to the courts. According to this, the courts in which the divorce proceedings are ongoing under extraordinary cases have the right to suspend this time if other conditions are met, including the fact that the spouses have been piecemeal for a period of more than18 months, that all comforting and concession attempts to reunite the parties have collapsed and the parties have truly resolved their controversies, indeed in regard to alimony.

MEANING OF THE TERM ‘COOLING-OFF PERIOD’?

Under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 a married couple can get a divorce on the grounds of mutual consent through filing a petition to the court. It’s a straightforward method to dissolve the marriage where both the parties peacefully agree to the separation. According to Section 13 (b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for a statutory interregnum understanding, a cooling period of six months between the first and the last motion for divorce by mutual consent so as the possibility of cohabitation and settlement could be explored. This period of 6 months is called the cooling-off period.

APPLICABILITY OF COOLING PERIOD IN CASES OF DIVORCE

The expenses are the clearest preferred position of consensual divorce. Consensual divorce that stays uncontested is sort of often the foremost economical method of dissolving the wedding. The minimal effort of the cooling period isn’t, be that because it may, but it’s the littlest bit of leeway in consensual divorce. In the event that the degree of contention between the 2 partners stays low, a consensual divorce offers an approach to stay it that way. It is extremely private and progressively helpful and is helpful to keep a greater amount of your advantages in all of your personal assets and not on the hands of the law, and other required things within the procedure of the dissolution of marriage. Separation by mutual consent expels superfluous squabbles and saves a lot of time and money. With the expanding number of uses being applied for a separation, a consensual divorce is the best alternative. Uncontested separation offers to break away life partners the chance to finish their marriage discreetly and with dignity.

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES IT CAN BE WAIVED OFF?

In Abhay Chauhan v. Rachna Singh, 2006 both the parties were 30 years old, well educated, and mature and the marriage of the parties was solemnized four years ago and there was absolutely no possibility of reconciliation. The Delhi High Court in such a case held that the cooling period of 6 months can be exempted in certain cases but this controversy is still continuing. High Courts are overwhelmingly waiving this period by calling it directory rather than mandatory provision but some high courts beg to differ.

In an important judgment of Amardeep Singh vs Harveen Kaur on 12th September 2017, the Supreme Court held that this cooling period of 6 months can be waived in cases of mutual consent. Section 13B (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act deals with the petitions sustainability therefore it cannot be abolished and Section 13B (2) in spite of being administrative should be repealed after the details of every situation as they may vary from each other, wherever the little possibility of reconciliation is seen.

In the Avneesh Sood vs. Tithi Sood case and in the Shikha Bhatia case vs Gaurav Bhatia & Ors case, the courts held that a spouse who undertakes to comply with the consent given in the first motion for the dissolution of marriage under Section 13B (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act and for filing a second motion he/she would not be allowed to withdraw such an undertaking subject to an agreement reached between both the spouses.

Rajiv Chhikara vs. Sandhya Mathu, the Delhi High Court held that retracting from mediation would be considered as mental cruelty. The Court also noted in the case that the partner had lived apart since 2009 and that their relationship was now beyond repair. Therefore, under these circumstances, one partner demands that the marital bond be maintained and the same would be as putting the partner in extreme mental cruelty.

In Suman v. Surendra Kumar, the High Court of Rajasthan addressed this question for the purpose of the cooling period whose purpose is to give both the partner time and opportunity to reflect on their decision. The partners or one of them may have second thoughts in this cooling period and may change their minds about the dissolution of marriage.

However, the court always takes into consideration the following aspect before waving off the cooling period:

1. The statutory cooling period of 6 months as given under Section 13B (2) and the period of one year as specified under Section 13B (1) is already over before the commencement of the first movement of the divorce case.
2. If the parties have already dealt with their differences and have come to terms in matters such as alimony, custody of their child, and all other disputes between them then the waiting period only increases their agony and there is no point of it.
3. That all means of conciliation/mediation and efforts made in terms of Section 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955 and Order XXXII A Rule of Code of Civil Procedure have failed to reunite and save the marriage, and no hope is left for saving the marriage.

Thus, the Supreme Court has given family courts the discretion to determine whether to waive the six-month cooling-off period or not. The Court also held that the application for a waiver of the cooling period can be made as early as one week after the divorce petition had been filed in the court.

SOME OTHER IMPORTANT CASES UNDER SECTION 13 (B)

In the Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the phrase ‘living separately’ refers to not living as husband and wife. It has no reference to where the spouses live. It is possible that the partners may are living under the same roof and still may not live as husbands and wives. The partners don’t wish to fulfill marital obligations. The Supreme Court of India had ruled that mutual consent is a sine qua non I.e an essential condition for passing a decree of divorce and the said agreement must be binding and subsist until a final decree of divorce has been issued.

In Hirabai Bharucha vs. Pirojshah Bharucha, the High Court held that the courts are obliged to make every effort to maintain the institution of marriage. That is an arrangement between the partners specifying the terms of settlement runs counter to public policy, they should be regarded as void ab initio and it is unenforceable and, in such cases, it cannot be recourse to contempt proceedings.

The court ruled that where a solicitation is submitted for divorce through common concurrence under Section 13B of the Act, the Court will move that the concurrence granted by the mates persists until the date of the allocation of the divorce decree. And if one mate freely withdraws its support, in view of the provision of Section 13B of the Act, the Court doesn’t have the power to grant a divorce decree by collective concurrence.

CONCLUSION

Consensual divorce refers to that stage where both the partners dissolve their marriage by mutual consent. Divorce is an equally important part of society as marriage. As we all know that all marriages are not perfect and cannot be sustained or continued, ending such marriage is the best possible damage control that can be done for both spouses. Divorce by Mutual-consent is one of the recent addition to the Indian jurisprudence of divorce and is fairly integral. Earlier, Indian couples resorted to the very time-consuming and expensive method of ground-based litigation, which did no good to the parties but rather induced animosity between them and involved many maligning.

Reference: 

1. https://nrilegalconsultants.in/waiving-off-period-of-6-months-cooling-off-period in-case-of-a-mutual-divorce/ 
2. https://www.latestlaws.com/latest-news/couple-gets-divorce-without-6-month cooling-off-period/ 
3. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/sc-sanctions-divorce-to-couple-without six-months-cooling-off-period/article25237873.ece 
4. https://health.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/industry/future-of-artificial intelligence-in-healthcare-in-india/56174804

This article is written by Tanya Arya, a second-year law student at Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies.

Bench

By Hon’ble Justice Mr. Deepak Gupta and By Hon’ble Justice Mr. Aniruddha Bose

Advocates

Pritha Srikumar, Arunima Kedia (Appellant Side) & B.V. Balaram Das, Hrishikesh Baruah (Respondent’s Side)

Cases Referred

Dr. Subhramanium Swamy And Ors vs Raju through the Member Juvenile Justice [, SC (2014) 8 SCC 390]

Factual Observations

• A juvenile ‘X’, aged 16 to 18, is accused of committing an offense punishable under section 304 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)¹, which carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment or up to ten years in prison and a fine in the first part and up to ten years in prison and a fine in the second part.
• The deceased in the car accident was the appellant’s brother. The Juvenile was between the ages of 16 and 18 at the time of the incident. The appeal to the Children’s Court was similarly turned down. Following that, the juvenile ‘X’ sought the High Court of Delhi through his mother, who ruled that because no minimum term had been set for the offense in question, it did not fall under the purview of section 2 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015. The deceased’s sister has now filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.
• Heinous, petty, and serious transgressions are defined in sections 2(33), 2(45), and 2(54). In the IPC or any other legislation in force, heinous offenses are those for which the sentence imposed is a minimum of 7 years in prison or more.
• Siddharth Luthra, counsel for the appellant, pointed out to the Court that the Juvenile Justice Act has left out the fourth category of offenses for which the minimum sentence is less than 7 years, or for which no minimum sentence is prescribed but the maximum sentence can be more than 7 years, including homicide not amounting to murder (offense of present case). He persuaded the Court to remove the word “minimum” from the definition of heinous crimes, allowing all crimes to be categorized as “heinous crimes” with the exception of minor and serious offenses.
• Furthermore, he argued that leaving out the fourth category of charges would result in absurdity, which could not have been the legislature’s objective.
• Mukul Rohtagi, a skilled senior attorney for the Juvenile, contended that the Court could not amend the law. He stated that the Court could not interpret the legislature’s meaning since a category of offenses was left out and that the Court could not interfere to close the gap in the Act.

Issues Raised

1. What does Section 2(33) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 mean and how is it interpreted?
2. What is the uncertainty created by the word “minimum” in the Statute, and how is it interpreted?
3. How can a juvenile be treated under a category of an offense that is not defined in the statute but that the appellant argues should be included as an offense?

Contentions

APPELLANT

• The appellant claimed that there was one type of crime that was not addressed in the Act of 2015, claiming that heinous crimes are those that carry a “minimum” sentence of seven years or more.
• The unincluded category, it was said, would introduce absurdity, which the Legislature did not intend. The argument was that the Act had a gap in it that generated ambiguity and, as a result, did not specify anything.
• It was also claimed that the word “includes” was used in the definition of “heinous offenses”² implying that the definition is inclusive and encompasses things not mentioned in the definition.

RESPONDENT

• The appearing counsel argued that the Court was not in a position to rewrite the legislation and that the Court could not deduce the Legislature’s intent only based on an unincluded category of offenses.
• Even if the court had to fill the gap in the Act, it was claimed that this was not practicable in this case.

Difference of Opinion B/W Lower Court and SC

The crucial question before the court was whether the youngster should be tried as an adult or not. In this case, the child was over the age of 16 but under the age of 18 when he committed the offense.

Juvenile Justice Board– Because the youngster committed an offense under the definition of a ‘serious’ offense, the Juvenile Justice Board ordered that he be punished as an adult. The mother of the kid then petitions the High Court because the sentence for the offense was not passed under Section 2 (33) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.

High Court– High Court stated that if a kid has committed any heinous offense such as rape or murder, which is punished for more than 7 years, a punishment similar to that given to an adult can be imposed. The order was found to be inconsistent, prompting an appeal to the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court– It was determined that this Act does not apply to the fourth category of offenses, which are penalized for more than seven years but do not include a minimum sentence or a sentence of fewer than seven years. As a result, under the context of this Act, this is referred to as a “serious offense”. This type of issue is to be dealt with according to this procedure unless the Parliament itself deals with it.

Judgment of SC

Luthra’s submission reasoned that it was not the Court’s responsibility to fill in the gaps and fix them. The Court stated that if the legislature’s purpose was clear, it might add or remove terms from the Act. However, in cases where the legislature’s intent is uncertain, the Court cannot add or remove words to provide meaning that the Court deems fit into the scheme of things. The Court was interpreting a statute, which had to be construed following its wording and intent.

The Court dismissed the appeal by resolving the issue and ruling that an offense that does not carry a minimum penalty of seven years cannot be considered terrible. The Act, however, does not address the fourth category of offenses, namely, offenses where the maximum sentence is more than seven years in prison but no minimum sentence or a minimum sentence of fewer than seven years is provided, shall be treated as ‘serious offenses’³ within the meaning of the Act and dealt with accordingly until Parliament takes a call on the matter.

Unless the Parliament acts with it, this type of matter must be dealt with using this approach. It was decided that the Legislature’s objective does not have to be the same as the judge believes it should be. When the statute’s wording is obvious but the Legislature’s intent is ambiguous, the Court cannot add or remove terms from the statute to give it a meaning that the Court believes fits into the scheme of things. However, if the Legislature’s aim is obvious, the Court can see behind the statute’s inartistic or clunky wording and determine the problem that must be handled under the code’s objectives. The court also ordered the High Court to remove the child’s name from the Child in Conflict with the Law registry. As a result, the case was resolved in favor of the child.

Ratio Decidendi:

The rationale or the ratio decidendi is one of the crucial aspects in analyzing the mindset behind a judgment. According to Section 14 of The Children Act, 1960, If the child offender has committed a heinous crime, the Juvenile Justice Board must conduct a preliminary examination to determine the child’s mental and physical capacity to commit the crime, as well as the child’s ability to comprehend the consequences of the crime and the circumstances in which the crime was allegedly committed. The Board has the authority to enlist the assistance of experienced psychologists, psychosocial workers, or other field experts. The statement makes it clear that the preliminary assessment will not focus on the trial’s merits or the child’s allegations.

Further, under section 15 of The Children Act, 1960 –
(1) There is a need to try the child as an adult under the provisions of the Code of Criminal The procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), and pass appropriate orders after trial, subject to the provisions of this section and section 21, taking into account the child’s special needs, the tenets of a fair trial, and maintaining a child-friendly environment;
(2) There is no requirement for the child to be tried as an adult, and the Board may conduct an inquiry and issue appropriate directions in accordance with section 18. (2) In the case of a child in conflict with the law, the Children’s Court shall ensure that the final order includes an individual care plan for the child’s rehabilitation, including follow-up by the probation officer, the District Child Protection Unit, or a social worker.

In Dr. Subhramanium Swamy And Ors vs Raju through the Member Juvenile Justice…, on 28 March 2014⁴, only one of the five people was not sentenced to death by the session court on March 28, 2014, according to the Member Juvenile Justice… In their appeal, the petitioners demanded that the juvenile be prosecuted and punished alongside the other four defendants. The first appeal, which was dismissed by the Delhi High Court, was filed. Another appeal was filed with the Supreme Court, but it was dismissed. As a result, Dr. Subhramanian Swamy’s application was denied by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the court dismissed the victim’s parents’ writ suit.

Concluding Observations:

After analyzing the situation in the instant case, while acknowledging that the court cannot legislate, the reasoning of the bench that if it did not address the issue, the Boards would have no guidance on how to deal with children who have committed fourth-category offenses is concluded to be to the point. The court stated, “Since two viewpoints are feasible, we would prefer to choose the one that is in favor of children.” The bench, therefore, invoked its authority under Article 142 of the Constitution to order that, as of the date the 2015 Act took effect, all children who committed fourth-category offenses to be treated in the same way as children who committed serious offenses. Still, there is a need to make some serious amendments in the BOOKS OF JUSTICE.

We all know the maxim ‘Salum Populi Suprema Lex’ which means ‘the welfare of the society is the supreme law’, but unfortunately the court failed to apply the same in the recent case. I believe that sending the accused to a reform center will not affect him because his parents, who were aware of his repeated infractions, did nothing to stop him and may be able to “buy the system completely.” I personally feel that these verdicts by the Apex Court only encourage teenagers to become criminals and nothing else. A perfect example of the same is NIRBHAYA CASE.

References:

1. Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder
2. Defined in Section 2(33) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
3. Defined in Section 2(54) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
4. Dr. Subhramanium Swamy And Ors vs Raju through the Member Juvenile Justice, SC (2014) 8 SCC 390.

Analysis by Hemant Bohra student at School of Law, Lovely Professional University, Punjab.