Tag: #Article19

S.no	Contents
1.	Introduction
2.	Safeguard Of Liberty
3.	Essential elements in Safeguards of Liberty
4.	Safeguards the protected liberty of Indian citizens
5.	Right in Safeguard of Liberty
6.	Landmark Judgment
7.	Conclusion

“Without freedom of thought, there can be no such thing as wisdom – and no such thing as public liberty without freedom of speech”

By Benjamin Franklin

Introduction

Safeguards of Liberty in India was to protect people who are suffering and aged 16 or above 16 and also who needed it. Liberty Protection Safeguards(LPS) care for those people and treated their mental capacity with the proper agreement. In India basic right of the human being is liberty, the right to live life without fall of dignity. 

Every Individual who could have a Liberty Protection Safeguards authorization incorporate those with dementia, mental imbalance, and learning handicaps who come up short on the pertinent limit.

The Liberty Protection Safeguards were presented in the Mental capacity (amendment) Act 2019 and will supplant the Hardship of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS) framework. The Liberty Protection Safeguards will convey further developed results for individuals who are or who should be denied their liberty. The Liberty Protection Safeguards have been intended to put the privileges and wishes of those individuals at the focal point of all dynamics on the hardship of liberty.

The liberty protection safeguards are wanted to come into force in April 2022.[1]

Safeguard Of Liberty

Liberty is the most valuable thing for an individual and viable advances are required for its safeguards. From days of yore, there is a tussle between the state’s power and individuals’ liberties. An individual appreciates more freedoms assuming that the power of the state is abridged. Liberty can’t exist in a domineering state. Prof. Laski calls attention to specific strides for protecting freedom. “Opportunity, right off the bat, won’t be accomplished for the mass of men clear under unique certifications” and it can’t “exist in that frame of mind of honor”. Besides, “extraordinary honor is incongruent with opportunity”. Thirdly, “liberty can’t be acknowledged in that frame of mind in which the privileges of some rely on the joys of others”. Fourthly, “What is the state’s fundamental duty for safeguards liberty”.

Essential elements in Safeguards of Liberty

• The democratic form of Government

Democracy system is a type of govern­ment where everyone has an offer in the organization. Just democrat; states can give an amiable environment to the turn of events: human character. It is helpful for the full pleasure in liberty.

The Foundation of a majority rule framework is a fundamental shield of freedom. Both liberty and a democratic rules system are valuable to each other. We can’t imagine a majority rules government without the presence of common, financial, political, and individual freedom. Moreover, without even a trace of the right to opportunity, there can be no genuine majority rules government. Liberty is more secure and safer in the Majority rules system than in some other type of government. Popularity-based government is the public authority of individuals though in different types of government (like Outright Government and Fascism) all powers are focused and brought together under the control of one individual or a gathering of people. The individual in power or a gathering of people in power can’t endure his or their analysis. The nature of A majority rules system inverse gatherings is given due regard in Majority rules government. The contrary gatherings structure the public authority after the disappointment of the decision party. Analysis of the public authority is invited in Majority rule government.

• Fundamental Rights

There should be a reasonable and unambiguous rundown of essential fundamental rights in the Constitution. Individuals should be con­versant with their freedoms and the public authority should know about the limita­tion of abilities. These freedoms are justiciable and any demonstration that contradicts the arrangements of the Constitution can be announced ultra vires.

One of the vital strategies for safeguarding liberty is to consolidate a sanction of central privileges and opportunities in the constitution of the State. Alongside it, legal insurance ought to be given privileges. They safeguard our freedom to an exceptionally extraordinary degree. These basic freedoms likewise restrict the power of the state. In the presence of crucial freedoms, the state can’t meddle in that frame of mind of individual life. Without a trace of key freedoms freedom of the individual is never out of risk and without freedom improvement of human character is preposterous.

• Separation of Power

The powers of the public authority ought to be isolated among the chief, law-making body, and legal executive. This will help in forestalling any organ of the public authority. To turn out to be outright. Each organ of the public authority. Will work in its system. As indicated by popular French Researcher Montesquieu, detachment of abilities is a fundamental condition for pleasure in the freedom and the nations where there is the partition of abilities, individuals appreciate more freedom. This interaction is finished through the utilization of balanced governance. Lord  Acton believes that “Power taints an; outright power undermines totally.” Power has an internal pattern for abuse and power ought to go about as a check to drive.

• Responsible Government

An administration framed by the representa­tives of individuals will undoubtedly be capable. Any error concerning the public authority will sound its mark of the end and the resistance will exploit it. A bi-party framework with solid resistance will guarantee essential safeguards for liberty.

• Love for Liberty

For the security of freedom, individuals ought to have limitless love for freedom. On the off chance that it is thus, individuals might never want to lose their freedom and will be ready to make each penance for its insurance. During the opportunity battle, lakhs of Indians made penances of their lives as they went to gallows and prisons for the fulfilment of opportunity for their homeland.

• Rule of law

The idea of Law and order implies all people are equivalent under the watchful eye of law and regulation. This law and Regulation see no difference between the rich and poor, the high and low.

The rule of law is laid out in Britain, the U.S.A. also, and India. The idea of Law and order implies that all individuals are equivalent under the steady gaze of regulation. Regulation makes no separation between rich and poor, the high the low. All individuals ought to be under similar regulations and limited by similar sorts of commitments. Nobody ought to be above regulation. No honours will be given to an individual having a place with a specific class nor will there be any arrangement for insusceptibility. No individual will be rebuffed or saved in care for quite a while until and except if his wrongdoing is demonstrated.

• Constitution

Just the constitution limits the power of the state. It sets out specific obstructions and these hindrances are not to be crossed by the state while utilizing its power. For the most part, the constitution is acknowledged as the incomparable law of the nation, and if any organ of the public authority disregards any arrangement of the const., that act is pronounced unlawful by the courts. In brief, every organ of the public authority. Will undoubtedly work inside the structure of the constitution and this way the constitution safeguards the liberties of individuals.

• Independent Judiciary

There should be a free and fair judiciary for the assurance and conservation and individual liberty. The judiciary should be free of chief and authoritative control.

The autonomous, strong, and fair-minded legal executive is the greatest defender of freedom. Thus, arrangements ought to be made to keep the legal executive free. Assuming that the Legal executive is subordinate to the Leader or on the other hand on the off chance that it isn’t liberated from the impact of the Chief, it can not grant equity nor can it safeguard the major freedoms of man. In socialist nations or in nations that have Fascism, basic privileges are given to individuals, yet the Legal executive isn’t liberated from the impact of the Chief. In such nations, the safeguards and security of central privileges, constitution, and freedom aren’t exactly imaginable and freedom becomes simply a joke. Here, just keen and fair-minded people ought to be delegated as judges. They ought to be paid significant compensation and adequate annuity after retirement. Their residency ought to be long.

Safeguards the protected liberty of Indian citizens

• Right to life and individual freedom

 Article 21[2] gives that no individual will be denied his life or individual freedom besides as per technique laid out by regulation.

• Habeas Corpus

Habeas Corpus is a writ that is accustomed to bringing an individual who has been kept or detained under the watchful eye of a court. This writ is utilized to safeguard the liberty of a person.

• Legal Review

 Legal Survey is the force of the legal executive to survey the activities of the leader and authoritative parts of government. This power is utilized to guarantee that the public authority doesn’t abuse the central privileges of residents.

• Partition of power

Division of Abilities is a successful protection for individual freedom. The blend of a chief, administrative or legal powers in a similar individual or set of people could bring about the maltreatment of abilities and loss of individual freedom.

• Right to constitutional remedies

The Constitution accommodates different cures, for example, writs, orders, and headings that can be utilized by residents to authorize their central freedoms.

• Freedom of speech and expression

The right to speak freely of discourse and articulation is a principal right ensured by the Constitution of India. It permits residents to offer their viewpoints unreservedly unafraid of oversight or discipline.

• Right to information

 The Right to Information Act, of 2005[3] accommodates admittance to data held by open specialists. This right permits residents to consider public specialists responsible and guarantees straightforwardness in administration.

Right in Safeguard of Liberty

Article 5[4] says that safeguards are for anyone who is being arrested or detained. It is for all the people who suffer and those who are detained those people are sent to judge. Detention can be challenged if it is lawful. Victims get compensation for unlawful detention.

Some Restriction

A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras[5] it was contended that the ‘procedure established by law’ implied equivalent to ‘due process of law’. Both the terms are equivalent and similar security is being given in both nations with a distinction that ‘due process of law’ covers considerable and procedural regulation yet ‘methodology laid out by regulation’ covers just procedural law.

In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India[6], Chandrachud J. said that the system must be simple, fair and sensible, not whimsical, abusive, or erratic and Krishna Iyer J. said that the ‘law’ signifies sensible regulation and no established piece.

Landmark Judgment

This idea originally came up on account of A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras[7]. In this situation, the solicitor was confined under Preventive Detainment Act. He tested this in the court that it be violative of his right to opportunity of development, which is the quintessence of individual freedom under Article 21[8]. The Supreme Court gave the significance of individual freedom in an extremely tight sense. It said that individual freedom incorporates just the actual opportunity of the body like independence from capture or unjust repression. It likewise said that the term ‘law’ is the state-made regulation as it were. The High Court held that Article 19[9] has no association and relevance to Article 21.

On account of Satwant Singh Sahney v. Identification Officer[10], the option to travel abroad is remembered as ‘personal liberty’ and no individual can be denied his entitlement to go besides according to the technique laid out by regulation. Refusal to give the identification of the individual with practically no reasons allotted for it adds up to an unapproved hardship of individual freedom as given under Article 21.

There was another instance of the State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Pandurang[11]. In this situation, it was seen that the detainee does not stop being an individual not having key privileges. The right to compose a book and get it distributed by a detenu is his major right and its forswearing without the power of regulation disregarded Article 21.

Conclusion

Every one of the previously mentioned focuses addresses the manners by which we can defend a singular’s liberty. These are just conceivable when every single individual no matter what their situation in the general public no matter what their positions no matter what component can make discrimination attempts to guarantee that freedom as a guideline or element pervasive in the general public isn’t compromised. Freedom is an essential element that guarantees that the Majority rule government in space wins. On the off chance that it falls flat, that Democracy is no Democracy and acts as a joke to freedom all in all.

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Endnotes:

1. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/liberty-protection-safeguards-factsheets/liberty-protection-safeguards-what-they-are
2. Constitution of India, Article 21
3. Right to Information Act, of 2005, https://rti.gov.in/rti-act.pdf
4. Constitution of India, Article 5
5. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27
6. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597
7. ibid 5
8. ibid 2
9. Constitution of India, Article 19
10. Satwant Singh Sawhney vs D. Ramarathnam, Assistant Passport Officer, 1967 AIR 1836, 1967 SCR (2) 525
11. State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Pandurang, 1966 AIR 424, 1966 SCR (1) 702

This article is authored by Pranita Dhara, a student of Lloyd Law College.

S.no	Contents
1.	Introduction
2.	Constant Turbulence Between Article 13 and Article 368
3.	The Parliament’s Comeback
4.	The Conflict Between the Judiciary and Former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi: 39th Amendment
5.	The Contextual Constitution
6.	Conclusion

The Preamble, which is incorporated into the basic structure of the Constitution, demonstrates the relevance of Article 368[1] even to the present day. Recent amendments to the Constitution concerning fundamental rights are made by Parliament. The Constitution, including its fundamental rights, was initially drafted in response to the socio-political requirements deemed necessary at the time. These requirements may not be sufficient or appropriate for the rapidly expanding socio-economic, technological, and legal climate of today. As a result, it is always necessary to amend the Constitution. 

For instance, the 86th Amendment to the Constitution in 2002 made the right to education a fundamental right. In a similar vein, Articles 19(f) and 31 of the Constitution were struck down by the 44th Amendment in 1978, rendering the right to property non-essential. The extent of Article 368’s authority to modify fundamental rights has been interpreted by higher  Indian courts. 

In Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan[2], for instance, the dissenting opinion stated that Article  368 did not grant the Parliament absolute powers and could not be used indiscriminately to usurp citizens’ fundamental rights. Even though there is a lot of literature on how to look at  Article 368 from the point of view of changing the basic structure as a whole, very few recent cases have focused on specifically changing fundamental rights from a legal point of view.  Therefore, I as an author want to fill that knowledge gap. 

From Shankari Prasad v. Union of India[3] in the First Constitutional Amendment Act of 1951 to Waman Rao v. Union of India[4], I will aim to trace the path. I will sincerely put efforts into determining the reasoning behind the bench’s various decisions challenging or upholding certain Parliamentary amendments to fundamental rights, as well as include their own opinion on the subject in the analysis section. I will be using doctrinal methods for in-depth research, also I will address the principles of the law and the constitution, as well as provide a sociopolitical context for the decisions made. 

Introduction

The basic structure of the Indian Constitution includes the fundamental or essential elements that run throughout the document or serve as its foundation. It joins significant arrangements of our Constitution, without the ground standards is outlandish. 

Because of its goal of achieving equity, for instance, the 2019 Constitution (One Hundred and  Third Amendment) Act, which makes reservations for economically disadvantaged groups,  has implications for Article 14 of the Constitution, which is the first fundamental right.

Additionally, on February 4, 2022, the Rajya Sabha debated K.J. Alphons, a BJP Kerala MP,’s proposal to amend the Preamble of the Constitution with a private member’s bill. This was gone against by the RJD MP Manoj Jha and MDMK MP Vaiko in December 2021, on the grounds of abusing the standard in the Kesavananda judgment which was that law and order are essential for the fundamental construction of the Indian Constitution. 

As a result, Parliament would be unable to alter any aspect of the Constitution’s fundamental structure. Fundamental rights are included in the Constitution’s fundamental structure in Part III. According to A.V. Dicey, a nation is said to adhere to the rule of law only if it upholds citizens’ liberties. Article 368 of the Constitution both grants and restricts Parliament’s powers to amend specific sections of the Constitution. 

Constant Turbulence Between Article 13 and Article 368

First Constitutional  Amendment According to Article 13 of the Indian Constitution[5], the Parliament cannot enact laws that restrict, infringe, or violate the fundamental rights outlined in Part III. In contrast,  Parliament is empowered to amend specific sections of the Constitution by Article 368. There is still no answer to the question of whether the two articles can coexist harmoniously. 

The fundamental rights, Preamble, basic structure, and other elements necessary to regulate the three organs of governance and the Indian people are all encapsulated in the Constitution,  according to many. The amount of power Parliament has under Article 368 to amend the  Indian Constitution is symbolized by the scissors used to cut or change the cloth into something else. 

The Constitution only contained seven fundamental rights when the 1st Constitutional  Amendment Act of 1951 was enacted, including the right to property under Articles 31A and  31B[6], which was later eliminated by the 44th Constitutional Amendment. 

The introduction of this right at the time of independence was motivated by two reasons: first and foremost, to boost agricultural production; secondly, to provide farmers, cultivators, and the rural population, who were oppressed by the pre-independence zamindari system, with opportunities, land, and job security. 

They used socialist-welfarist methods and set limits on how much land a person could own to prevent too much land and power from being concentrated in a few hands; a term that is comparable to constitutionalism. In addition, the State was permitted to legally seize someone’s property instead of providing compensation for rehabilitation following displacement. 

A revolutionary policy of the Indian National Congress later led to the establishment of such an exploitative structure to close the gap between the widespread inequality in land ownership. Further changes were set up by the ideological group through the Agrarian Changes Council with Administrator J.C. Kumarappa, overcoming the need to keep the right to property as a key right in a free India.

The 9th Schedule and reasonable restrictions stipulated in Article 19(1)(g)[7] were also included in the First Amendment Act, making it possible for the government to completely or partially acquire the person of any individual. Many citizens were dissatisfied with this Act because it reduced the scope of the most important aspect of the Constitution—the fundamental rights— and gave the Centre too much power to interfere with their lives. 

They filed a case against this Amendment Act in the Supreme Court of India because the Parliament did not have the authority to change fundamental rights. This case became known as Shankari Prasad v. Union of India[8], which was a landmark decision. 

The Supreme Court held that Article 368 allowed Parliament to amend any of the fundamental rights through Constitutional Amendments and that the changes made by the first Constitutional Amendment stand. This proportion smothered the fight for control between the lawmaking body and the legal executive since they explained that Article 13  simply applied to common privileges and not Protected Revisions. 

Numerous state governments incorporated their respective Land Reforms Acts into the 9th Schedule of the Constitution as a result of this decision. This had a significant impact because, normally, any law that violates fundamental rights would be invalidated; however,  by including it in the 9th Schedule, the laws would not be invalidated regardless of whether they violate fundamental rights. 

In Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan[9], this provision of the 17th Constitutional Amendment was challenged. With a 3:2 vote, the five-judge bench decided that the 17th Constitutional Amendment Act does not fall under Article 13. Chief Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar looked into the deeper intentions of the people who wrote the Constitution and concluded that they didn’t want to protect fundamental rights completely because they didn’t put in place a clause that said fundamental rights couldn’t be changed. As a result, both Shankari and Sajjan appeared to favour Article 368 over Article 13. 

The disagreeing assessment given by Equity M. Hidayatullah and Equity J. R. Mudholkar set forward the inquiry with regards to whether changing an essential element of the Constitution would be considered as a revision or as a revamping, and thus, whether the ability to roll out this improvement was presented by Article 368. 

This reexamining of the composers’ aim drove the Court to allude the case to a bigger seat,  forming it into the Golaknath v. State of Punjab[10], which tested the Sajjan choice. By the majority’s decision in Sajjan, the 11-judge bench ruled that the parliamentary powers granted by Article 368 were not absolute and that the Parliament cannot curtail fundamental rights because they are included in Part III, giving them a transcendental status outside of the  Parliament’s purview. In addition, it stated that any amendment violating a fundamental right granted by Part III is unconstitutional, restricting the Parliament’s authority and requiring a  judicial review. 

Golaknath, in contrast to Shankari and Sajjan, prioritized Article 13 over Article 368 because the Supreme Court ruled that Parliament can enact a Constitutional Amendment. This decision by a larger bench of the Supreme Court effectively overturned its previous two decisions and sided with those who opposed amending fundamental rights. 

The Parliament’s Comeback

The 24th Constitutional Amendment, which removed the right to property as a fundamental right that had been included in the 1st Constitutional  Amendment, was challenged in the courts shortly after Golaknath by a large number of cases brought by the general public. The Supreme Court had to clarify that Golaknath would apply retroactively to previous amendments to prevent all of this chaos. 

The Golaknath case narrowed the scope of Parliament’s powers, while the first constitutional amendment restricted the scope of fundamental rights. The decision to enact the 24th Constitutional Amendment, which effectively added a fourth sub-clause to both Articles 13 and 368, was made by Parliament to expand its power to amend. 

The 24th Amendment stated in Article 368(4) that if Parliament enacts another Constitutional  Amendment, it will not apply to Article 13, whereas Article 13(4) stated the opposite to reverse the Golaknath decision. As a result, following the passage of the 24th Amendment  Act, the position was that Parliament could alter any section of the Constitution, including fundamental rights. 

Following the 24th amendment, additional constitutional amendments were enacted to repeal previous amendments that restricted citizens’ rights. The 29th Amendment introduced land reforms, while the 25th Amendment restricted property rights. In 1947, the Privy Purse, a  payment made to ruling families to give up their powers and merge their princely states, was made obsolete by the 26th Constitutional Amendment. In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala[11] and Golaknath’s position as well, the 24th, 25th, 26th, and 29th Constitutional Amendments were challenged. 

The Supreme Court made it clear that Parliament has the full power to change fundamental rights even before the 24th and 26th Amendments to the Constitution. The 24th Constitutional Amendment, which clarified parliamentary powers, was also upheld by the  Court. In this instance, the issue of how much power the Parliament has over the applicability of fundamental rights came up once more. The Court decided to take a balanced approach in support of a harmonious interpretation, which is referred to as the basic structure doctrine. It did not investigate whether Article 13 or Article 368 is more powerful. 

The Conflict Between the Judiciary and Former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi: 39th Amendment

On the twelfth of June 1975, Allahabad High Court set out a verifiable choice wherein they suppressed the discretionary triumph of Indira Gandhi’s administration, referring to proof of constituent misrepresentation. They also decided that no one in her cabinet could hold an election office position for six years as punishment. 

After that, Indira Gandhi appealed to the Supreme Court. Just one day before the hearing, she enacted the 39th Constitutional Amendment Act and declared a national emergency on the grounds of internal unrest.

The 39th CAA resulted in the addition of Article 329A and the elimination of Article 71. The dispute over the election was still before the Court at this point. According to Article 329A,  an independent body would handle all electoral disputes involving the Speaker of the Lok  Sabha, the Prime Minister (at the time, Indira Gandhi), the President, or the Vice President. 

Because of the death of this CAA, the forthcoming legal dispute against her could as of now not be active. As a result, the 39th CAA’s goal was clear: to allow Indira Gandhi to continue serving as India’s Prime Minister without interference. The constituent outcomes incidentally showed that Janata Dal Party won the political decision overwhelmingly, making Morarji  Desai the new State head. 

As a result, Indira Gandhi was forced to resign from her position reluctantly. The ruling party then decided to remove Article 329A, which was found to be unconstitutional in the case of  Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain[12], applying the principles of the Kesavananda case, to undo everything the previous government had done wrong, including the 39th CAA and the unsolicited national emergency. Article 71 was likewise brought back, which offered back the powers to attempt constituent questions to the High Court. 

The Contextual Constitution

After the emergency period under Indira Gandhi’s rule in  1975, the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution made a significant number of changes to prevent similar power abuses from occurring again. It underwent two significant modifications: To begin, it added sub-clause 4 to Article 31C, which discusses property rights; Second, it added paragraphs 4 and 5 to Article 368. 

Article 368(4) stated that Parliament can amend, alter, or remove any fundamental rights under Part III and cannot be subjected to judicial review like Article 31C(4). On the other hand, Article 31C(4) stated that any law could be put in Part IV under the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP), even if it violates fundamental rights under Part III. This made it immune to even someone challenging it before the courts. 

As a result, Parliament can add or change any provision in Parts III and IV. The Parliament was granted absolute amending powers by Article 368 (5). Since the legal powers were diminished and the decent methodology in Keshavananda, the 42nd Established Alteration was tested in Minerva Mills v. Union of India and Ors[13]. 

Conclusion

The petitioners in Minerva owned the Bombay Minerva Mills company, which the government occupied under the guise of nationalization. In this case, the Supreme Court  ruled that the 42nd Amendment and all of its amendments were unconstitutional because of  the following three fundamental characteristics: 

First, judicial review, in which rights granted by courts of law are regarded as fundamental  features and cannot be suppressed through an amendment by Parliament; 

Second, Parliament’s limited amending power, which means that Parliament cannot use its limited amending power to expand its capabilities; Thirdly, the balance between Parts III and IV must be maintained so that DPSPs and fundamental rights do not conflict.

All the Established Alteration Acts after the Kesavananda essential regulation case were tested in Waman Rao v. Union of India[14], where the most relevant issue that emerged under the watchful eye of the court was regardless of whether these alterations sabotaged the fundamental construction. 

The Court provided an odd solution to this question by stating that the Kesavananda-based basic structure test will be applied in future amendments and laws. As a result, the Court made it clear that any amendment to the Constitution made after April 24, 1973, can be challenged if it does not adhere to the basic structure doctrine. 

As a result, this case reaffirmed the significance of the Kesavananda rule by allowing  Parliament to alter a portion of the fabric—representing the Constitution—but not the entire fabric. Even though Parliament had the power to change any part of the Constitution,  including the Fundamental Rights, this did not mean that the Constitution’s fundamental structure could be changed even by a Constitutional Amendment. This shows how strong the  Constitution still is in the social and political context of today. 

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Endnotes

1. The Indian Constitution, Article 368
2. Sajjan Singh v. State Of Rajasthan, 1965 AIR 845, 1965 SCR (1) 933
3. Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, AIR. 1951 SC 458
4. Waman Rao v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 362
5. The Indian Constitution, Article 13
6. The Indian Constitution, Article 31(A) and Article 31(B)
7. The Indian Constitution, Article 19(1)(g)
8. Ibid 3
9. Ibid 2
10. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR. 1967, SC 1643
11. Kesavanand Bharti v. State of Kerala, AIR. 1973 SC 1461
12. Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 S.C. 2299
13. Minerva Mill Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC, 625
14. Ibid 4

This article is written by Shaurya Sharma, a third-year law student from Fairfield Institute of Technology and Management.

S.no	Contents
1.	Facts of the Case
2.	Issues of the case
3.	Rationale
4.	Judgment
5.	Generalis Specialibus Non-Derogant

Year

1958

Case No.

122 of 1958

Equivalent Citation

1959 AIR 396

Date of Judgment

12/12/1958

Court

The Supreme Court of India

Bench

Chief Justice Sudhi Ranjan Das, Justice Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Justice K. Subbarao, Justice K.N. Wanchoo.

Introduction

Certain privileges are being provided to the parliament collectively as well as individually so that they can effectively discharge their functions without any kind of hesitation. Article 105[1] deals with the power and privileges of the house of parliament whereas Article 194[2] deals with the power and privileges of the house of Legislators. The case of Pandit M.S.M. Sharma v. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha and Others[3] not only deals with the conflict between the legislator and the court but also between the legislator and a citizen. In the Judgment part of this case, it was held by the court of law that the legislative assembly does have the power to regulate the publication of debate and other proceedings. However, this act might curtail an individual’s Fundamental Rights i.e. Right to Freedom of Speech[4], in this case, analysis, we will critically analyze why the court has given such implications and what is the validity of such implications.

Facts of the Case

In the case, the petitioner M.S.M. Sharma was a journalist at the “Searchlight” which was an English Newspaper operated in Patna, Bihar. On May 30, 1957, one of the members of the Bihar Legislative assembly whose name was, Maheshwar Prasad Narayan Sinha delivered a speech in Bihar Legislative Assembly in his speech he made some statements regarding Mahesh Prasad Singh that he was the one who guided the Chief Minister in the selection process of the other ministers and he also cited certain instances of favouritism. Further, it was alleged by Maheshwar Prasad Narayan Sinha in his speech that ministers were not given the proper ministries to which they were entitled and for which the conventional process should have been followed for the appointment. Many other instances regarding corruption were mentioned by him in the speech, he took the example of the District Judge who was only transferred from one place to another but was not discharged as per the advice of the Chief Justice of the High Court, Bihar. Further many other instances were discussed by him which were regarding the corruption and criticism of the prevailing government.

The Speaker of the assembly held that the part of the speech made by Maheshwar Prasad Narayan Sinha was objectional and directed it to be expunged. However, no specific directions were given to the Press, the speaker meant by saying this that the publication of the part of the speech which criticized the government must not be made.
On May 31, 1957, the part of the speech that was expunged by the speaker and was directed by him that publication of these parts must not be done, was published by the newspaper “Searchlight”. On 10th June 1957 Nawal Kishore Sinha, a member of the state legislative assembly questioned the same in the assembly. The matter was soon transferred to the Privilege Committee. After the evaluation of the entire facts for almost after more than a year on 18th August 1958 M.S.M. Sharma was summoned before the Privilege Committee and was asked to reply as to why an action against him must not be taken as he has done the breach of subsisting privileges. Further, the proceeding regarding the breach of privilege was initiated against the editor. M.S.M. Sharma moved to the court under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution for quashing the said proceeding and he raised the question was whether the said privilege under Article 194 was subject to the Fundamental Right under Article 19(1)(a)[5].

Issues of the case

1. Does the legislative assembly have a power under Article 194(3) of the Indian Constitution to prohibit the publication of the statement which is being done publicly in the house?
2. Do the legislative assembly privileges under Article 194 of the Indian Constitution prevail over the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Indian Constitution specifically Freedom of Speech and Expression?[6]

Rationale

Arguments from the Petitioner’s side:

• The notice issued by the committee and the proceeding initiated by them violates his fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution as well as it violates his personal life and liberty assured under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.
• They further argued that as the petitioner of the newspaper petitioner is entitled to Freedom of the Press.
• The notice which was issued by the privilege committee was invalid as the Chief Minister of Bihar was the chairman of the Privilege Committee.

Arguments from the Respondent’s side:

• The respondent relied on the Article 194 of the Indian Constitution.
• They argued that the state legislative assembly can exercise similar powers, privileges, and immunities as the British House of Commons, where the proceedings of the assembly cannot be published.
• They further argued that the part of the speech which was directed to be expunged cannot be published by anyone under any circumstances as it was expressly prohibited.
• If a such publication is being made which was being prohibited then such publication is a breach of the privileges of the Assembly.

Judgment

The court of law held that in accordance with Article 194(3) of the Indian Constitution, the state legislative assembly of Bihar does have the same immunities, privileges and power as the British House of Commons. It was said that since Bihar legislative assembly did not have passed any law concerning the power, privileges, and immunities of the legislative assembly and hence legislative assembly of Bihar will enjoy similar power privileges, privileges, and immunities as that of the British House of Commons. In the British House of Commons, there is a framed order that no member shall give a copy or publish any kind of stuff that has happened during the preceding of the House i.e. no publication of the statement must be made that has taken place in the House. Therefore while dealing with the issue of publication regarding the proceeding of parliament or the legislative assembly the law and order of the British House of Commons should be taken into the consideration.

The petitioner said that Article 194(3) is curtailing his Fundamental Rights under Article 19(1) (a) the court has interpreted this question of has concluded that the legislative privilege under Article 194(3) does not abridge the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Indian Constitution under Article 19(1) (a) and explanation regarding the same was given. The court of law said that in (1) it is being mentioned that “subject to the provisions of the constitution” whereas in clauses (2) to (4) it has not been stated as subject to. Therefore it can be assumed that Constitutional makers did not intend that that clause should be subject to the provisions of the Indian constitution and hence Article 194(3) does not breach the Fundamental Rights which are guaranteed by the Indian Constitution. Further, the court of law stated that if any provision of the Indian Constitution takes away or abridges the Fundamental Right then in that case it is a violation of Article 13 and the provision that violates the Fundamental Right must be void. But, since Article 194(3) is perfectly valid it can be inferred that it does not violate Article 13 of the Indian Constitution.

However in this case the dissenting opinion was given by Justice Subbarao he quotes the case of Gunupati Keshavram Reddy v. Nafisul Hasan[7] and said that Article 194(3) is subjected to Part III i.e. Articles 12 to 35 which deals with Fundamental Rights.

Generalis Specialibus Non-Derogant

The meaning of above stated legal maxim is – where there is a special right, general rights will not be applicable. From the above discussion, we can infer that the Parliamentary Privileges or the State Legislative Privileges are special rights, and in case the Fundamental Rights are the General Rights. In the case of Pandit M.S.M. Sharma v. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha and Others[8], this was one of the key areas where consideration could have been taken and to a certain extent, it was taken. Therefore, the general principles or general rules won’t be applicable in cases where there is a special right. The same was with the condition of Article 194(3) these are the special rights that are being given to the parliament for their effective and efficient working so that they can effectively discharge their functions. And the Fundamental Rights given under 19(1) (a) is the general right that is not applicable in the circumstances in which there is a special privileges/rights and the fines example of the situation is the case of Pandit M.S.M. Sharma v. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha and Others[9].

In the case of Azad Transport Co. v. State of Bihar it was considered that the VAT is a special provision and rules in CrPC are considered to be general.

Conclusion

From the above discussion and the analysis of facts, issues, and the judgment of the case it can be said that the court in its majority decision tries to establish the harmonious construction between the prevailing Fundamental Rights and the privileges given to the parliament and the state legislature. The significance judgment of this case is of paramount importance as it serves as the judicial precedent after this particular case. After the decision was delivered by the court, the assembly was prorogued several times and the privilege committee was reconstructed which issued a fresh notice of petition in the court of law against M.S.M. Sharma. As a result, M.S.M. Sharma moved to the court seeking to reopen the same issue. The court held that the principle of res judicata is applicable in this particular case and held that the matter is already decided which is binding on the petitioner.

However, one question remained open in this case and that was whether Article 21 is being affected because of the privileges given to the parliament or state legislative. The question regarding the subjection of Article 19(1) (a) was solved by the court of law i.e. Article 19(1) (a) is not subject to the privileges. But the court of law failed in this case to answer the question relating to Article 21, whether it overrides the privileges or not.

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Endnotes

1. INDIA CONST, art. 105
2. INDIA CONST, art. 194
3. Pandit M.S.M. Sharma v. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha and Others, 1959 AIR 396
4. INDIA CONST, art. 19(1)(a)
5. Supra note iv
6. Ibid
7. Gunupati Keshavram Reddy v. Nafisul Hasan, AIR 1954 SC 636
8. Supra note iii
9. Ibid

This case analysis is authored by Prashant Prasad, a second-year law student from University Law College.

Year

1950

Citation

AIR 1950 SC 27

Court

The Supreme Court of India

Bench

Harilal Kania (C.J.), Justice M. Patanjali Sastri, Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, Justice B.K. Mukherjee and Justice Sudhi Rajan Das, Justice Fazal Ali Saiyid.

Introduction

A.K. Gopalan was the political opponent of the government. He filed the writ petition of habeas corpus. Habeas Corpus which means you may have the body is a writ that institutes the court to determine whether a criminal defendant has been lawfully imprisoned or not. A.K. Gopalan filed this writ petition challenging Article 19(1) (d)[1] which is the right to freedom of movement and article 21[2] which states the right to life and personal liberty. He filed this writ petition against the detention in pursuance of an order of detention made under the Prevention Detention Act, of 1950[3].

Prevention Detention Act detains the person without giving any valid reason and detention is being done because that detention is important. He challenged the validity of the order given by the court in pursuance of the Prevention Dentition Act to be “Mala Fide”.

Facts of the case

Since December 1947 A.K. Gopalan was detained several times illegally and even after the order of the court which makes him free he was kept under detention by the government under the Prevention Detention Act, of 1950. So, he filed a writ petition under article 32 for seeking the writ of habeas corpus of The Indian Constitution. He challenged the legality of order by the government as it opposes some of the articles of The Indian Constitution. He further argued that Sections 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 of the Prevention Detention Act, 1950 violate Articles 13, 19, and 21 of the Indian Constitution. But majorly he asked for this writ on the ground that the Preventive Detention Act[4] curtails his personal liberty under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. He contended that the law under Article 21 is not just the enacted law but it also includes the Principle of Natural Justice as well as some others laws associated with it that deprives the individual’s personal life and liberty. 

Petitioner contention

M.K. Nambiar appeared as a petitioner’s council. Some of the arguments put forward by the petitioner’s side were –

• The first and foremost argument was about the legality and validity of the provision of the Preventive Detention Act, of 1950 which they believed had violated Articles 13, 19, 21, and 22.
• We have article 19(1) (d) of the Indian Constitution which states the freedom to move freely within the territory of India but in this case, the State Government of Madras restricted this right by the detention of A.K. Gopala even after the decision by the court which made him free.
• The provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, of 1950 were against article 19 and challenged the statute’s failure as the petitioner’s freedom of speech and expression was revoked.
• Article 21 is in the Right to Life and personal liberty but after the prolonged detention, it seems to have no importance of Article 21 for the petitioner.
• The detention order was also arbitrary as it violates article 22. Article 22 deals with protection against arrest and detention in certain cases.
• Section 14 of the Preventive Detention Act, of 1950 violates the fundamental right under article 13 of the Indian Constitution

Respondent’s Contention

Advocate K. Rajah Ajyar (Advocate General of Madras), and M.C. Setalvad (Attorney General of India) appeared as respondent’s council 

• The respondent said that Articles 19 and 21 should not be read together as it depends on the perspective and the nature of the case in which context both the articles should be read together.
• Detention that is being done is not arbitrary, according to Article 22 which states protection against arrest and detention in certain cases.
• The legal procedure that is followed, everything is as per the constitution of India. 
• Detention does not violate any of the rights of the petitioner i.e. of articles 12, 19, 21, and 22.
• The Prevention Detention Act is completely legal and not arbitrary.
• There is no point in filing a writ petition of habeas corpus under article 32 of the Indian Constitution.

Issues raised in the case

• The Prevention Detention Act, of 1950 does violate the prevailing articles 19 and 21.
• Article 19 – Protection of certain rights regarding, speech and expression, assembly, association, residence, and profession. Article 21 – Protection of life and personal liberty is there any kind of relation between these two, and can they be read together? This was one of the major issues as it could turn out to be the deciding factor.
• Due process is a requirement that legal matters are resolved according to the established rules and principles and everyone should be treated fairly. So the issue raised was whether the procedure established by law under Article 21 is the same as that of due process of law.

Judgment

This case is a landmark case in constitutional law and is popularly known as the Prevention Detention case. After extensive discussion and wide research, the bench of judges came to the last point of the case where they were expected to give the judgment on this particular case. The court rejected the argument that Article 19 and Article 21 of the Indian Constitution are being violated because of the Prevention Detention Act, of 1950. The next particular topic on the discussion was being done was that whether the Prevention Detention Act, 1950 is ultra-vires or not, however in this particular question section 14 of the act was declared as the ultra-vires as it violates the rights guaranteed by Article 22(5) of the Indian Constitution. The court also said that being ultra-vires of section 14 of the act does not affect the validity of the whole act. The next question was whether article 19 and article 21 should be read together and if there is any kind of relationship between both articles. The court rejected this argument and said that both article is distinct and must not be read together.

The judgment of this case was given by the 6 judge’s constitutional bench in a ratio of 5:1. The decision of Justice Fazal Ali was opposite to the decision given by the other judges and his decision can be regarded as the dissenting opinion. The court said that personal liberty only means the freedom of the physical body and nothing beyond that. In the nutshell, we can say that the Supreme Court rejected the petition filed by A.K. Gopalan and said that the Prevention Detention Act, 1950 does not violate article 19(1) (d) and article 21 of the Indian Constitution.

• Dissenting opinion by Justice Fazal Ali

In this case, the dissenting opinion was given by Justice Fazal Ali; he observed that preventive detention violates the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the constitution. According to him, the Constitution recognized that personal liberty and preventive detention are arbitrary and could be misused by the government to suppress political dissent. He further argued that personal liberty was a fundamental right and could only be curtailed in accordance with the law and that the Preventive Detention Act, of 1950, did not satisfy this requirement.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Fazal Ali noted that the right to personal liberty is one of the essential parts of the freedom and dignity of the individual, and it is necessary to protect this right from arbitrary interference by the state. He said preventive detention violates this right hence it is unconstitutional.

Therefore, in the case of A.K. Gopalan vs. The State of Madras, Justice Fazal Ali highlights a commitment to a person’s rights and restricting the power of the state to interfere with personal liberty.

• Protection of Personal Liberty

The Article 21 of our Indian constitution reads “No person shall be deprived of his personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law”[5]. The word “person” that is being used in this article signifies that this Article is applicable to the citizen as well as non-citizens as everyone is entitled to personal liberty. The Article further states that this liberty cannot be taken away unless there is a procedure established by law has been followed. Concerning the fact regarding personal liberty the difference between “Due process of law” which means the process must be fair and reasonable and “procedure established by law” which means the procedure should take place in a way that the parliament has signified, was taken into consideration. However, in the judgment of this case the meaning of Article 21 was taken in a narrow sense i.e. in this case the meaning of personal liberty was taken as personal liberty is just protection of body parts and the state cannot harm the individual’s body part. Also, it was held that there is no link between Articles 14, 19, and Article 21.

After 30 years in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India[6], personal liberty was interpreted in a different sense i.e. in a wider sense. The court took the wider view of Article 21. It was held that there is a connection between Articles 19 and 21. It was also held that there is no difference between personal liberty and liberty. In personal liberty, every other liberty has been included. Therefore the concept of personal liberty was taken into consideration in a different sense before and after the case of A.K Gopalan v. State of Madras[7] thereby leading to the rejuvenation of a new concept of personal liberty in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India[8].

• Co-relation of Article 14, 19, and Article 21 before and after the case

Articles 14, 19, and Article 21 are the basic and vital Articles of the constitution, and the connection between both them is to be taken into consideration for the better interpretation of these Articles. Article 14, 19, and Article 21 are connected with each other as there forms the bedrock of the Fundamental Right guaranteed to every citizen of India. Before the case of A.K Gopalan (1950), these articles used to be taken into consideration as a separate and distinct identity. Article 14 ensures equality before the law and equal protection of the law. Article 19 guarantees six freedom to the citizens of India these freedoms are – Freedom of speech and expression, Freedom to assemble peacefully, Freedom to form associations and unions, Freedom to move freely throughout the territory of India, Freedom to reside and settle in any part of the country and the last is the freedom to practice any profession, occupation, trade or business. Article 21 guarantees the right to life and personal liberty to every citizen.

In the case of A.K Gopalan, the Supreme Court of India held that the right to personal liberty under Article 21 is limited to procedural aspects. This means the government can deprive an individual of their personal liberty as long as the procedure for doing so was legal. This decision in the case of A.K Gopalan was criticized by many as an individual could be detained infinitely without facing any trial until the procedure allows doing that.

However, in the subsequent cases, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of Article 21 to include substantive rights as well such as a free trial, the right to privacy, and the right to education, etc. under this Article. This inculcation of substantive rights in the purview of this Article 21 gives the interconnection of Articles 14, 19, and Article 21.

Conclusion

In the case of A.K. Gopalan vs. The State of Madras, the court restricted the meaning of Article 19 and Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. However, after several years in the case of Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, the court overruled this judgment and said that the opinion of Justice Fazal Ali was correct. The court further said that the scope of Article 21 and Article 19 has a wider view. From the above analysis of the case, we can conclude to the fact that the Right to life and personal liberty is not only recognized under the Indian Constitution but also intentionally recognized on the basis of the principles of natural justice. The case of A.K Gopalan is one of the most important cases of Independent India as in this case the question pertaining to Article 21 was raised for the first time after the Independence of India. However, the court took Article 21 in a narrow sense and makes it in accordance with the procedure established by the law. Almost after 30 years this decision was overruled and lastly, Article 21 was taken into a broader sense. Lastly, the court widen the view of Article 21 and said that the procedure established by the law must be just, fair, and reasonable. Therefore, from the above discussion, we can say that the case of A.K. Gopalan vs. The State of Madras (1950), was a landmark case in the Indian Constitution.

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Endnotes

1. INDIA CONST. art. 19(1) (d)
2. INDIA CONST. art. 21
3. Prevention Detention Act, 1950, Act No. 4 of 1950
4. Ibid
5. INDIA CONST. art. 21
6. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597
7. A.K Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27
8. Supra note vii

This case analysis is authored by Prashant Prasad, a second-year law student from University Law College.

Divorce, further referred to here as dissolution of marriage is the process of ending a marriage. The reasons for divorce can vary from irreconcilable differences to infidelity, and the process typically involves legal proceedings to divide assets and determine custody arrangements for any children involved. It pertains to the revocation or restructuring of the constitutionally protected duties and responsibilities of marriage, thereby dissolving this same relationship of matrimony between a married couple under the laws of the specific country or state. Gender justice refers to eliminating the disparities between men and women that are reproduced and produced in the family, market, community, and state.

To address the injustice and discrimination against women and the poor, we must address all of these issues. Gender justice plays a crucial role in divorce proceedings to ensure that both parties are treated fairly and equitably, especially in cases where women and children are often at a disadvantage. It is important to recognise the intersectionality of gender, class, and race in divorce cases to promote a more just and inclusive legal system. Therefore, it is important to consider gender justice when dealing with divorce cases, as women and children are often disproportionately affected by the legal and financial consequences of divorce. Efforts to promote gender equality and address systemic inequalities can help mitigate these negative impacts.

Gender justice is a global movement to achieve equal rights, freedom, and justice, but women still face discrimination, violence, poverty, and limited access to education and healthcare. It is important to continue the fight for gender justice and promote women’s rights worldwide. Achieving gender justice requires a comprehensive approach that involves changing social norms, policies, and institutions to ensure that women and men have equal opportunities and resources. This can be achieved through initiatives such as education and awareness campaigns, legal reforms, and the empowerment of women in leadership positions. By working towards gender justice, we can create a more equitable and just society for all. This requires the active participation of individuals, communities, governments, and international organisations.

Divorce under Muslim law 

Well before the Solubilization of the Muslim Marriage Act of 1939, Muslim women had almost no legitimate right to ask their spouses for separation. This highlights the need for continued efforts towards gender justice, particularly in the context of religious and cultural practices that may perpetuate inequality. Such efforts must be inclusive and involve a range of stakeholders to ensure lasting change. This highlights the need for reform in traditional religious laws and practices that discriminate against women and perpetuate gender inequality. It is crucial to promote legal and social frameworks that protect women’s rights and empower them to make independent decisions about their lives. The Solubilization of the Muslim Marriage Act of 1939 was a significant step towards granting Muslim women the right to seek divorce. However, there is still a long way to go in terms of ensuring gender equality and justice within the Muslim community. Efforts must be made to challenge patriarchal norms and promote education and awareness among both men and women. This will help to create a more inclusive and equitable society where women can fully participate and thrive. In addition, there is a need to address the issue of triple talaq, which allows Muslim men to divorce their wives by simply saying “talaq” three times. Triple talaq is a discriminatory practise that violates women’s rights and leaves them vulnerable to abandonment and destitution. It is crucial for Muslim leaders and policymakers to work towards abolishing this practise and implementing laws that protect women’s rights in marriage and divorce. This practise is not only discriminatory but also violates the fundamental rights of women. Reforms must be made to ensure that Muslim women have equal rights and protection under the law.

The Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act of 1939 developed nine grounds on which a Muslim woman could seek redress in court, namely:

1. that the husband’s whereabouts were uncertain for a duration of four years;
2. that the husband neglected or did not provide her monitoring for a duration of two years;
3. that the husband must have been incarcerated for a period of seven years or more; but rather
4. that the husband failed to act, without justifiable suspicion.
5. the husband has been mentally ill for two years, or
6. that she, having been given in marriage by her father or other guardians before the age of fifteen, repudiated the marriage before the age of eighteen.

The Act also gave Muslim women the right to divorce their husbands on certain grounds, such as cruelty, impotence, and adultery. However, the Act has been criticised for not going far enough to protect Muslim women’s rights in divorce cases.

 Gender injustice against women

Muslim personal law is seen as having even more gender inequality. As a result, Muslims deserve extraordinary justice. They are not left in charge of deciding how “justice,” “fairness,” and “equity” are attained. In a number of situations, God decrees what is “just” for human society, and humans are compelled to follow these decrees or stipulations from the divine.

This tactic is based on the idea that divine law is superior to laws made by humans and that upholding it will result in a society that is fair and just. This strategic approach, albeit having its detractors, every so often results in the oppression of minority populations within Muslim communities. God commanded humans to uphold justice and fairness on earth and made it a virtue that would ensure their happiness and peace in both this life and the next.

The path of injustice leads to the promised damnation. Justice is required in all aspects of life, including business transactions, politics, domestic relationships, legal administration, and intellectual and educational pursuits. It argues that it is evident that Islam places a high value on justice in all aspects of life. With the promise of reward for those who do and punishment for those who do not, Muslims are encouraged to strive for justice and fairness in their interpersonal and societal interactions.

This emphasis on justice stems from the conviction that all individuals have equal worth in God’s eyes, and it is each person’s duty to uphold this equality. Striving for justice is thus not only a moral obligation but also a means of achieving spiritual fulfilment and closeness to God.

The tense relations between Hindus and Muslims today have their roots in the Shah Bano episode. The Supreme Court’s decision awarding Shah Bano pitiful monthly alimony was overturned by the Rajiv Gandhi administration through an ordinance. 

Intentionally, this was done to protect Muslims’ ability to practise their religion freely. In reality, it amounted to violating the rights of women, who make up half of the Muslim population. It was obvious that the move was made to placate the vocal groups and clerics. This gave the BJP’s accusation of Muslim appeasement momentum and gave the long-dormant Hindutva movement new life. Many Native Americans started to believe the accusation of appeasement. It helped the BJP go from having two MPs in Parliament to having an absolute majority in 2014. The BJP’s strategy of portraying themselves as the protectors of Hindu interests and accusing their opponents of Muslim appeasement proved to be a successful political tactic, as it resonated with a significant portion of the Indian electorate. This allowed them to consolidate their power and implement their agenda, including controversial policies such as the Citizenship Amendment Act. The Citizenship Amendment Act has been criticised for being discriminatory against Muslims and has sparked protests across the country. However, the BJP remains popular among many Hindu nationalists, who see the party as a defender of their interests and values.

Only speaking out when they believed there was a “danger to Islam,” the Muslim leadership has historically been exclusively male and overtly religious. Islam khatre mein is a well-known rant from my generation. In their eyes, women who educate themselves, secure employment, and demand equal treatment pose a clear threat to their authority and status. For them, the equality of women leads to Islam, khatre mein he. They keep saying that Islam granted women’s rights 1400 years ago, but they never give the idea of making those rights a reality. They could not be credited with respect for people of other faiths or tolerance for Muslims who hold dissimilar beliefs. This mindset is not only harmful to women but also to the progress of society as a whole. It is important to challenge these beliefs and promote gender equality for a better future.

In India, a number of laws have been passed with the goal of reducing the gender pay gap and promoting women’s empowerment. Various rights for women in this regard are guaranteed by the Indian constitution. Part III of the Constitution, which deals with fundamental rights, and Part IV, which deals with directives and guiding principles of state policy, provide evidence of this. According to Article 14, everyone shall enjoy equal protection under the law and be treated equally in court. This means that no distinction between men and women should be made by courts or law enforcement organizations. The foundation upon which other laws are created and may be put into effect is the right to equality.

The goal of gender justice cannot be accomplished without the right to equality. The prohibition against discrimination is guaranteed by Article 15. The right to equality and, by extension, the right against discrimination are meant to address the widespread prejudice and bias against women. The special protection for women is discussed in Article 15(3). No matter a person’s sex, they have the right to equal opportunity in terms of public employment under Article 16.

This clause makes it easier for women to start taking part in elections and decision-making. The 74th Amendment, which established a reservation for women in panchayats, is significant to note in this context.

Article 19 guarantees freedom of speech and expression, the right to peacefully assemble without weapons, the right to form associations and unions, the right to move freely throughout the Indian subcontinent, the right to live and settle anywhere on the subcontinent, and the right to engage in any occupation or business. By granting the freedoms required to function in society, promotes the right to equality. Article 19 guarantees freedom of speech and expression, the right to peacefully assemble without weapons, the right to form associations and unions, the right to move freely throughout the Indian subcontinent, the right to live and establish oneself in any location, and the right to engage in any occupation or business. By granting the essential liberties required to participate in society, promotes the right to equality.

The right to life is guaranteed by Article 21, and this interpretation has been expanded to include the right to live with dignity. The right against exploitation is protected by Article 23. It forbids the trafficking of people. Part IV of the Constitution is made up of the State Policy Directive Principles.

Lacking a comprehensive democratic vision that would enable Muslims to meaningfully participate in our secular multifaith polity, the All-India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) and the Babri Masjid Action Committee failed to achieve their goals. Both bodies kept their discussions to questions of identity. The majority of these organisations’ leaders pretended to be “Muslim leaders,” speaking for the religion’s 12 crore or more adherents. The majority of them developed close ties with various political parties and benefited from their patronage. These connections were never more than personal, and worse, they never resulted in any collective benefits like promoting education or preventing riots for the whole community. Muslims’ poor economic and educational status serves as evidence of this.

The last 15 years have seen a historic shift in the way that women have publicly spoken out against patriarchal practices like instant triple talaq, polygamy, and halala. When everyday women joined the democratic fight against instant triple talaq and for justice within marriage and the family, it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the religious male leadership was rendered irrelevant. Additionally, women spearheaded the fight for social justice, communal harmony, and the repeal of unjust laws like the CAA-NRC. This shows that despite their disadvantaged economic and educational status, Muslim women have been able to mobilise and lead important social and political movements in their communities. Their activism challenges stereotypes about Muslim women and highlights the potential for empowerment even in the face of systemic oppression. 

Conclusion

Divorce is the process of ending a marriage. It involves legal proceedings to divide assets and determine custody arrangements for any children involved. Gender justice plays a crucial role in divorce proceedings to ensure that both parties are treated fairly and equitably, especially in cases where women and children are often at a disadvantage. It is important to recognise the intersectionality of gender, class, and race in divorce cases to promote a more just and inclusive legal system. Gender justice is a global movement to achieve equal rights, freedom, and justice, but women still face discrimination, violence, poverty, and limited access to education and healthcare. To address the injustice and discrimination against women and the poor, we must address all of these issues. Divorce under Muslim law highlights the need for reform in traditional religious laws and practices that discriminate against women and perpetuate gender inequality. The Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act of 1939 gave Muslim women the right to divorce their husbands on certain grounds, such as cruelty, impotence, and adultery. However, the Act has been criticised for not going far enough to protect Muslim women’s rights in divorce cases. Muslim personal law is seen as having even more gender inequality, and Muslims deserve extraordinary justice. Islam places a high value on justice in all aspects of life and encourages Muslims to strive for justice and fairness in their interpersonal and societal interactions. God commanded humans to uphold justice and fairness on earth and made it a virtue that would ensure their happiness and peace in both this life and the next.

The path of injustice leads to the promised damnation. The emphasis on justice stems from the conviction that all individuals have equal worth in God’s eyes, and it is each person’s duty to uphold this equality. The tense relations between Hindus and Muslims today have their roots in the Shah Bano episode, where the Supreme Court’s decision awarding Shah Bano pitiful monthly alimony was overturned by the Rajiv Gandhi administration. This gave the BJP’s accusation of Muslim appeasement momentum and gave the long-dormant Hindutva movement new life. It helped the BJP go from having two MPs in Parliament to having an absolute majority in 2014, as it resonated with a significant portion of the Indian electorate. The Muslim leadership has historically been exclusively male and overtly religious, leading to the view that women who educate themselves, secure employment, and demand equal treatment pose a threat to their authority and status. This mindset is harmful to women and society as a whole, and it is important to challenge these beliefs and promote equality. Muslim personal law is based on the idea that divine law is superior to laws made by humans and that upholding it will result in a fair and just society. The BJP’s strategy of portraying themselves as the protectors of Hindu interests and accusing their opponents of Muslim appeasement was a successful political tactic, allowing them to consolidate their power and implement controversial policies such as the Citizenship Amendment Act.

The Solubilization of the Muslim Marriage Act of 1939 was a significant step towards granting Muslim women the right to seek a divorce, but there is still a long way to go in ensuring gender equality and justice. Reform in traditional religious laws and practises are needed to protect women’s rights and empower them to make independent decisions. Additionally, there is a need to address the issue of triple talaq, which allows Muslim men to divorce their wives by saying “talaq” three times. Triple talaq is a discriminatory practise that violates women’s rights and leaves them vulnerable to abandonment and destitution. Reforms must be made to ensure Muslim women have equal rights and protection under the law, such as the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act of 1939. However, the Act has been criticised for not going far enough to protect Muslim women’s rights in divorce cases.

This article is written by Aehra Tayyaba Hussain, a student in her1st year at Symbiosis Law School Hyderabad, pursuing a B.A. LLB.

As the definition of the word says, defamation is hurt to a person’s reputation caused by a false statement. A man’s reputation is recognized as his property, and anyone who causes property damage is liable under the law; similarly, anyone who harms a person’s reputation is equally liable under the law. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, defamation means the offence of injuring a person’s character, fame, or reputation by false and malicious statements. The term includes both libel and slander. Defamation is a statement published that negatively affects a person’s reputation and tends to reduce his reputation among generally right-thinking members of society or to cause people to avoid or shun him.[1]

In English law, there is a distinction between the forms under the categories of criminal defamation and civil defamation. Under criminal law, libel is an offence. Slander is not an offence under criminal law. Slander is a crime when supported by evidence, unlike libel, which is a crime under civil law but not under criminal law.

In Indian law, both slander and libel are recognized as criminal offences under Section 499 of IPC and no distinction is maintained between them[2]. In the law of torts, libel is actionable per se and slander is actionable. It implies that there must be evidence of defamation in a suit for slander.

In the case of D.P. Choudhary v Kumari Manjulata, defamatory news about Manjulata, a 17-year-old girl from a prominent family, eloping with a neighbour was published in the daily newspaper “Dainik Navjyoti”. As a result, her reputation was damaged and she experienced great humiliation because this information was recklessly and falsely reported. The Court held that the words published were defamatory and actionable per se and thus she was entitled to damages of Rs. 10000 [3].

ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF DEFAMATION

1. The argument made or published must be defamatory.

The statement made or published must be defamatory i.e. which tends to lower the plaintiff’s reputation. Whether or whether a comment is defamatory will rely on how the general public, who are right-thinking people, are likely to interpret it.

In Arun Jaitley v Arvind Kejriwal,[4] the court held the statement by Arvind Kejriwal and his 5 other leaders to be defamatory.

In Ram Jethmalani v Subramanian Swamy,[5]the court determined that Dr Swamy was responsible for defaming Mr Jethmalani by alleging that Mr Jethmalani had accepted money from a prohibited organisation to defend the then-chief minister of Tamil Nadu in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case.

2. It must refer to the plaintiff.

In a defamation lawsuit, the plaintiff must show that the comment in question referred to him; whether or not the defendant intended to defame the plaintiff is irrelevant. The defendant shall be held accountable if the person to whom the statement was published may reasonably infer that the statement was addressed to him.

In the case of T V Ramasubha Iyer v A.M.A Mohindeen,[6] The court found the defendants guilty of publishing a statement that was not intended to disparage them. According to the statement, a specific person transporting Agarbattis goods to Ceylon was detained for smuggling. The plaintiff was also one of the people carrying on a similar business, and due to this statement, his reputation was also severely damaged.

3. The imputation must have been made with the intent to injure and with understanding or reason to believe it would harm the person’s credibility.

The essence of the offence of defamation is the harm caused to a person’s reputation. In Sunilakhya v H M Jadwet,[7] the Court stated that the intention to cause harm to the reputation of a person is the sine qua non of the offence of defamation.

In Wahid Ullah Ahrari v Emperor,[8] the appellant was responsible for publishing two articles in a paper called the “University Punch”, Aligarh which contained scandalous accusations against the girls of the Girls’ Intermediate College of Aligarh. For solace and enjoyment, it was claimed that the college’s female students frequented the broad Marris Road, green meadows, and canal banks. It was also claimed that the Meena Bazar Exhibition was held within the college’s grounds and that university students, professors, Muslim and non-Muslim members of the local gentry, as well as gay officers, visited the location after purchasing tickets to go shopping with the female students. The essence of the offence of defamation is the publication of imputation with the knowledge that it will harm the reputation of the person defamed, and as these articles do beyond question imply that the girls of the college are habitually guilty of the misbehaviour described in the articles, the inevitable effect on the reader must be to make him believe that it is habitual with the girls of college to behave in this way. Thus, the Appellate Court upheld the order of the Lower Court and held the appellant guilty of defamation.

4. The statement must be made public, meaning it must be shared with at least one person other than the applicant.

The publication of defamatory statements to someone other than the individual who has been defamed is crucial in holding someone accountable. Without it, no defamation case will be possible. If a third party reads a letter intended for the plaintiff incorrectly, the defendant will likely be held accountable. However, there will be a legal publication if the defamatory letter written to the plaintiff is likely to be read by others.

In the case of Mahendra Ram v Harnandan Prasad,[9] the plaintiff filed a suit for the realization of Rs. 500/- as damages for defamation of the plaintiff by the defendant. The plaintiff’s case is that he is a respectable man and a man of substantial means and is held in esteem and regard by the public. He lived in a rented house belonging to the defendant who mainly resided in Sultanpur. The defendant sent a registered notice in Urdu from Sultanpur to the plaintiff at Siwan. The plaintiff was not conversant with Urdu and, therefore, got the notice read over by one Kurban Ali in the presence of several other persons. The notice contained defamatory and false allegations against him. The defamatory statement lowered the plaintiff’s estimation of the public and harmed his reputation. The plaintiff’s inability to read Urdu, which required that he have the letter read to him by someone else, was not enough to hold the defendant directly or constructively liable for publishing. Because it was unproven that the defendant intended to harm the plaintiff’s reputation and that he was aware that the plaintiff did not speak Urdu, the court determined that the defendant was not responsible for any damages.

When a passage appears to be innocent prima facie, the complaint can demonstrate that it disparages him by pointing to the context and nature of the publication. Innuendo is the justification given for why a statement is considered defamatory.[10]

Innuendo is a way to speak negative sentences in a very sarcastic or ironic way, which may appear to be positive but is not.

Illustration: X asks Z, “Do you know who stole B’s watch?

Z in return pointed at C and said, “well you know, who can”. This is innuendo as it was sarcastically said by Z while pointing at C. Under Section 499, defaming any person by innuendo is a form of criminal defamation.

Intention to defame is not necessary- Though the person about whom the statement is made thinks it is defamatory, even if the person making the statement thinks it is not, there has been defamation. The fact that the defendants were unaware of the circumstances giving rise to the accusations of defamation despite the statements’ innocence is irrelevant.

In Morrison v. Rithie & Co.,[11] in good faith, the defendants falsely reported that the plaintiff had given birth to twins. The plaintiff had only recently been married. The defendants were held liable even though they were unaware of this fact.

In another case,[12] the plaintiff filed a suit seeking a declaration that the resolution passed by the defendants with regard to the management of the affairs of a school was illegal. The statement also insulated that there was a doubtful relationship between ‘K’ and the plaintiff. According to the Karnataka High Court, the plaintiff’s moral character was attacked by the statements because they implied that she had engaged in dishonourable conduct by engaging in dubious relationships and activities with another person.

REMEDIES TO DEFAMATION

Every infringement of rights gives rise to a remedy. The Latin maxim ubi jus ibi remedium enunciates this. There are three defences available to defamation. These are as follows:

1. Justification or Truth

Simply demonstrating the veracity of a claim is not a valid defence in criminal law, but it is so in civil law. In Alexander v. N.E. Rly,[13] the plaintiff had been found guilty of boarding a train out of Leeds without possessing a valid ticket. If he did not pay the fine, he was subject to a fine and a fourteen-day jail sentence. However, after the verdict, the defendant published a notice stating that the plaintiff had been found guilty and given a fine or three weeks in imprisonment in the event of default. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had lied by falsely reporting the punishment given to him.

In Radheshyam Tiwari v. Eknath,[14] the plaintiff, a block development officer, was the subject of several articles written by the defendant, a newspaper publisher, editor, and printer, alleging that the plaintiff had used unethical and corrupt tactics in a range of cases, including issuing false certificates, taking bribes, and accepting bribes. The defendant was found responsible for defamation because he could not prove that the information he published was truthful.

2. Fair Comment

The comment must be an opinion rather than an assertion of fact. The comment must be fair i.e., without malice. The matter commented upon must be of public interest. It is also essential that the facts commented upon must be either known to the audience addressed or the commentator should make it known along with his comment.

In R.K. Karnajia v. Thackersey,[15] the court held that if the defendant cannot establish the accuracy of a statement of facts published in a newspaper and makes significant accusations of dishonesty and corruption against the plaintiff, the defence of fair comment is predicated on those inaccurate facts, will also fail.

3. Privilege

Privilege confers exceptional status. When the law accepts that the plaintiff’s right to free expression surpasses his or her right against defamation, a defamatory statement uttered on such an occasion is not actionable. There are two categories of privileges.

1. Absolute privilege: In some instances, the individual speaking is given immunity, and no defamation action can be brought against him. It has three components.

• Parliamentary proceedings: Article 105(2) of the Indian Constitution grants parliamentarians immunity from prosecution if they talk freely during the parliamentary business.
• Judicial proceedings: Judges are protected under the Judicial Officers Protection Act of 1850. It also applies to attorneys, witnesses, and defendants in a lawsuit.

In T.G. Nair v. Melepurath Sankunni,[16] Whether a petition to the Executive Magistrate for the purpose of initiating legal proceedings under section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code and simultaneously sending a copy to the Sub-Inspector of Police for the purpose of taking executive action fell under the purview of the defence of absolute privilege arose. The plaintiff sued the defendant for defamation. The court held that the statements made by the defendant in the petition presented to the magistrate and in the copy thereof which he presented to the Sub-Inspector of Police are both privileged.

2. Qualified privilege: This privilege is also available, but it requires that the statement be made without malice, i.e., without a wrongful intention. It is further necessary that there must be an occasion for making the statement.

ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE 19: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION

Freedom of Speech and Expression is one of the most fundamental aspects of a democratic democracy because it allows citizens to participate fully and effectively in the country’s social and political activities. People can share their thoughts and political perspectives due to freedom of speech and expression. It eventually leads to societal and economic well-being.

In the State of West Bengal v Subodh Gopal Bose, the court determined that the State has a responsibility to protect itself against unlawful activities and, as a result, can enact laws to that end. Article 19(1)(a) establishes a limited privilege. There cannot be any liberty that is unrestricted in nature and unregulated in practice to confer an unrestricted right.[17]

In the case of S Rangarajan v Jagjivan Ram,[18] it was held that the Court should bear in mind that restriction should be founded on the principle of least invasiveness, i.e. the restriction should be imposed in a manner and that an individual has the right to a good reputation and should not be subjected to a defamatory circumstance.

Subramanian Swamy v Union of India[19]

Justice Dipak Mishra and Justice P.C. Pant of the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the country’s criminal defamation laws enshrined under Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code, saying that they do not interfere with the right to free expression. Several leaders and media houses suggested that it would limit freedom of expression. There is enough evidence to believe that the ruling is a blatant violation of free expression. Article 19 (2) of the Indian Constitution set reasonable limits on freedom of expression to prevent defamation. However, whether the provision covers criminal and civil defamation is unclear.

R Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu[20]

This case dealt with the constitutionality of civil defamation. The Supreme Court of India cited a historic US Supreme Court ruling in New York Times v. Sullivan [21]in this case, which stated that a government official on duty can only recover damages if the truth argument is false and there is a willful disregard for the truth. The court considered the relationship between free speech and civil defamation in this decision. In view of the court, Article 19(1) of the Constitution imposes an unfair restriction on common law defamation.

CONCLUSION

After evaluating all of the significant features of defamation, we observe that the essence of defamation is the injury to a person’s reputation, and he has a good argument against the defendants for this injury. Libel and slander are the two types of defamation. Under Indian law, both are considered criminal offences. Certain privilege exceptions to this rule can protect the defendant from criminal liability.

It signifies that the Indian Constitution has given citizens certain rights, which they should exercise in moderation so as not to infringe on the rights of others. Defamation provisions operate as a check on Article 19 of the Constitution to protect people’s reputations.

---

References

[1] Peel W.E. & Goudkamp J., Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort 360 (Sweet & Maxwell, 19th edn., 2014).
[2] Parvathi v. Mannar, (1884) ILR 8 Mad 175.
[3] AIR 1997 Raj 170.
[4] CS(OS) 236/2017.
[5] A.I.R. 2006 Delhi 300.
[6] A.I.R. 1972 Mad 398.
[7] A.I.R. 1968 Cal 266.
[8] A.I.R. 1935 All 743.
[9] A.I.R. 1958 Pat 445.
[10] PILLAI PSA & VIBHUTE K I, CRIMINAL LAW  1050 (LexisNexis, 14th ed. 2019).
[11] (1902) 4 F. 654.
[12] B.M. Thimmaiah v. T.M. Rukimini, A.I.R. 2013 Kar. 81.
[13] (1865) 6 B&S 340.
[14] A.I.R. 1985 Bom. 285.
[15] A.I.R. 1970 Bom. 424.
[16] A.I.R. 1971 Ker. 280.
[17] A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 92.
[18] (1989) S.C.C. 2 574.
[19] WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 184 OF 2014.
[20] A.I.R.1995 S.C. 264.
[21] 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

This article has been written by Nashrah Fatma, a third-year law student at the Faculty of Law, Jamia Millia Islamia.

Case Number

Transfer Case (civil) 92-95 of 2002

Equivalent Citation

2004 (2) Mh.L.J. 1090

Bench

• Chief Justice Vishweshwar Nath Khare
• Justice Brijesh Kumar
• Justice Arun Kumar

Decided On

April 8, 2004

Relevant Act/Section

• Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest (SARFAESI) Act, 2002
• Essential Services (Maintenance) Ordinance Repeal Act, 2001
• Transfer of Property Act, 1882

Brief Facts & Procedural History

Here, the constitutionality of SARFAESI was challenged, particularly Sections 13, 15, 17, and 34, on the grounds that they are arbitrary and unjustified.

The Industrial Development Bank of India (for short, ‘the IDBI’) issued a notice to Mardia Chemicals Ltd. on July 24, 2002, under Section 13 of the then-current Ordinance, requiring it to pay the amount of arrears indicated in the notice within 60 days, failing which the IDBI, as a secured creditor, would be entitled to enforce the security interest without the intervention of a court or Tribunal, using all or any of the measures contained in sub-section (4) of S The petitioner was also prohibited from selling, leasing, or otherwise transferring any of the secured assets.

Other financial institutions and banks issued similar notices to other parties who filed petitions in various High Courts under the terms of Section 13 of the Ordinance/Act. This was united with a number of other writ petitions filed in several High Courts contesting the constitutionality of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act of 2002.

The petitioners argued that the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act 1993 was sufficient to address the difficulty created by NPAs and that the current statute was unnecessary. It is debatable whether the Court should delve into the necessity of a statute while considering its constitutional legitimacy. “The Parliament and Legislatures composed as they are of the Representatives of the people are supposed to be cognizant of the requirements of the people and what is good or harmful for them,” the Supreme Court has previously decided.
The Court is unable to sit in judgment of their wisdom… A law passed by Parliament or a state legislature can be overturned for two reasons:

1. inadequacy of legislative authority
2. infringement of any constitutional rights¹

In BALCO Employees Union v Union of India², the Supreme Court has ruled that the right place for discussing policy issues is the legislature, not the courts.

In light of the Court’s previous pronouncements, it is evident that the question to be answered is whether the legislation is constitutional. Any discussion of whether a statute is required, particularly in light of another Act whose scope is not in question in this case, was superfluous. As a result, the Court declined to hear the case.

Many petitioners argued that the existing rights of private parties under a contract cannot be interfered with, particularly by putting one party in a more advantageous position than the other. In the present case, for example, in a matter of private contract between the borrower and the financing bank or institution, the borrowers’ rights have been curtailed and enforcement of secured assets has been provided without the intervention of the court, denying them the remedy available under the law by approaching the civil court.

The Appellants are vague on where they find the legal validity of their claim. The Honourable Supreme Court has pointed out that, unlike the US Constitution, there is no bar to prospective contract invalidation in India, and hence such a statute is completely constitutional.³

Indeed, the 44th amendment removed the right to property as a basic right from the Constitution, leaving it only as a constitutional right. Indeed, even while the right existed in part III, the courts ruled that absolute contract freedom, as defined by the idea of leissez faire, was no longer valid.⁴

The Appellants have also been unable to locate the rights under Art 19(1)(g) and Art 298. The Supreme Court has ruled that these articles are subject to reasonable constraints and that what is acceptable is to be interpreted in the public interest, regardless of how onerous the restrictions are on the individual’s interests.⁵

In light of these precedents, it’s difficult to identify where the appellants’ reasoning originates. The respondents’ counsels, on the other hand, have not taken a position on the Constitution’s freedom of contract or right to trade, but have pointed out that a similar argument has been raised in a different context, namely statutes providing relief to agricultural borrowers, and has been repeatedly rejected.

It has been contended that certain facts must be determined before the power u/s.13 can be used, such as whether the person to whom notice is given is liable to pay, the magnitude of the liability, and so on. Furthermore, issues such as the law of limitation and bar under consortium agreements, set-off/counterclaim claims, creditors defaults as bailees or failure to disburse credit on time, the changeability of penal interest or compound interest, non-appropriation of funds already paid, and so on and so forth must be resolved.

So, using case law that will be covered in the main project, it was claimed that a lis exists in such a case and that the ability to resolve a lis is a judicial or quasi-judicial power, not solely an administrative function. As a result, a suitable forum must be established to resolve all such disagreements at an early stage.⁶

The statutory provision becomes arbitrary, procedurally, and substantively unfair if such a forum is not established. This is a false argument based on facts. S.13 does not preclude the use of any judicial venue; it just states that a judicial remedy can be sought only after the secured creditor has used his powers under s.13 (4). This is entirely correct. Many legislations provide for the use of a forum after the aggrieved party has exhausted self-help options.

It was also pointed out that the provisions of s.13 generate some practical challenges that could lead to serious legal errors. Section 2(f) of the Act, for example, specifies that the meaning of the term “borrower” includes the guarantor. A guarantor is relieved of his commitment under Section 135 of the Contract Act in certain circumstances. Now, if a discharged guarantee receives a notification under Section 13(2) of the Act, he cannot approach the Court to show and establish that he is a discharged guarantor because Section 34 prohibits him from filing an action in the Civil Court. As a result, notice under Section 13(2) is unfavourable.⁷

These concerns have been addressed by Section 35 of the Securitization Act, which states that the Act’s provisions have precedence over all other laws. Finally, it was pointed out that under s.13 read with s.34, the borrower has no right to go to court before the lender employs the rights granted under s.13 (4), exposing him to arbitrary and potentially fraudulent lending practises. It was argued in defence of this section that because the asset cannot be sold for 60 days under Section 9 of the Rules, the borrower has the option of approaching the Tribunal within that time frame. The Court accepted the plaintiffs’ argument in part and added two riders to s.13. To begin with, it was held that the lender had an obligation to reveal the reasons for not accepting the objections or points expressed in response to the notice issued to them before taking action under Section 13 (4). Second, the Court made a comparison to an English mortgage, pointing out that enforcement proceedings under an English mortgage can be contested on the basis of fraud. This section is also subject to such provisions.⁸

Another point that the Court has overlooked is that a statute must be read in context and in pari materia as a standard rule of legislative construction. The present Act’s s.13 is pari materia with the State Financial Corporation Act of 1951’s s.29. Art 300A, 21, and 14 have all been challenged on the basis of this section’s constitutional vires, specifically that it provides no right of appeal. Though the matter was never heard by the Supreme Court, it was considered by a number of High Courts. The courts have consistently ruled that the Act itself reveals a clear aim and objective and that the power granted under s.29 is intended to carry out that policy, namely, the prompt collection of dues.⁹

Issues before the Court

• Is it possible to challenge the statute on the grounds that it was unnecessary to create it given the circumstances, especially when another statute was already in effect?
• Whether the terms or existing rights under a contract entered into by two private persons could be altered by provisions of law conferring one-sided powers in favour of one of the contracting parties?
• Whether or not Section 13 of the Act is unconstitutional?
• Whether the requirement that 75% of the amount owing to be paid before filing an appeal with the DRT is onerous and thus Section 17 of the Act unconstitutional?

Decision of the Court

In this case, the Supreme Court held that:

a) The Parliament’s superiority in deciding the need for legislation was emphasised.
b) The connection between the RDB Act and SARFAESI was rejected since the latter deals with the highly particular issue of nonperforming assets (NPAs) (among other differences such as the latter dealing only with secured creditors).
c) As a result, it is up to Parliament to decide whether or not legislation is required.
d) Section 13 was found to be constitutionally legitimate by the Court.
e) The secured creditor is only exercising his entitlement because the default that led to the sec 13 measure might be considered a “second default”—NPA + 60 days extra time to repay following notice.
f) Prior to the 2016 Amendment, Section 13 acknowledged the Right of Redemption in a sense. Rule 8 and 9 of the SI Rules stated that the bank must serve a notice confirming the sale of secured property and that the borrower may pay off the obligation and reclaim possession at any point prior to the actual sale
g) While the Supreme Court confirmed the constitutionality of the section, it pushed hard for borrowers to have the right to representation.
h) The Supreme Court determined Section 17(2) to be arbitrary, and ordered that the heading be altered from “appeal” to “application.”

Impact of the Judgement

1. Section 13 now states that the bank must evaluate all of a borrower’s representations and respond within seven days (which was later changed to 15 days).
2. Within section 17, the word “appeal” was replaced by “application,” despite the fact that the marginal header remained the same (wow). In 2016, the appeal was superseded by an application in the marginal heading.
3. DRTs now have jurisdiction over the rights of tenants in a security property. In such instances, the property is given to the person who files the application (if he meets the requirements).
4. Section 18 was also considerably amended. When filing an appeal with the DRAT, you must deposit 50% of the total cost, which can be lowered to 25%. DRT was likewise granted a similar waiver right under Section 17.

Citations:

1. State of Andhra Pradesh v McDowell, AIR 1996 SC 1627
2. AIR 2002 SC 350
3. Raghubir Dayal v Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 263
4. YA Marmade v Authority under Minimum Wages Act, (1972) 2 SCC 108
5. Krishan Kakkanth v Government of Kerala, (1997) 9 SCC 495
6. Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu & Ors1992 Suppl. (2) SCC p. 651 and Associated Cement Companies Ltd v. P.N. Sharma (1965(2) SCR p. 366 at pages 386-87).
7. Mafatlal Industries Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., 1997(5) SCC
8. Adams v. Scott, (1859) 7 WR (Eng.) 213 (Z49)
9. K Surendranathan v Kerala Financial Corporation AIR 1988 Ker 330

This case analysis is done by Arryan Mohanty, a 2nd Year Student student of Symbiosis Law School.

Introduction

Transgender¹ or the third sex denotes those people who cannot align themselves to their given respective biological genders with their inherent biological features. They are usually born as male or female but their innate perseverance of gender turns out to be different from their bodily features. Their self-proclaimed gender identity doesn’t match with their sex leading to the discrepancy in their gender orientation. Transgender, transsexual, and hijra are synonymous with each other and are used to denote them.

Since the dawn of human civilization, the existence of transgender people has been acknowledged but they have been devoid of subsequent approval from mainstream society. Even in this 21st century, such people are viewed as taboo and are subjected to persecution and a state of constant denial. Shame and stigma still continue to characterize such subjects in both public and private spheres thus engendering grave misconceptions. They are systematically denied equal rights in spheres of education, employment, marriage, divorce, inheritance, property, adoption, etc. The rudimentary reason for their denial of equal rights is ambiguity in recognition of their gender status as most of the civil rights especially succession, inheritance, marriage, and property rights are gender-specific and the policymaking in India has been always conceived primarily in respect of only two genders i.e. male and female, thereby preventing them from exercising their civil rights in their desired gender.

National Legal Services Authority vs Union of India

The Supreme Court in its landmark judgment of National Legal Services Authority vs Union of India² declared the transgenders as the third gender and endowed them with the right of self-identification of gender as female/ male / third gender. This self-perceived gender identity forms a very crucial part of one’s right to life under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. The two-judge bench affirmed their entitlement to the fundamental rights granted to them via the constitution of India. Any denial of their fundamental rights in the civil or criminal sphere owing to their third gender is discriminatory to them. The court held transgenders as socially and economically backward classes (OBC) who are entitled to reservation in educational institutions and public sector appointments.

Constitutional Rights

Article 14 of the Constitution of India states that the State shall not deny to “any person” equality before the law or the equal protection of the law within the territory of India. The phrase “any person” includes transgender too. And article 15 prohibits discrimination against any citizen on grounds of sex. Non-recognition of the identities of transgender/hijras leads to the systematic denial of the rights of equality and equal protection of the law. Article 19 (1) (a) of the Indian Constitution describes that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. It guarantees one of the most basic and fundamental human rights. Expression and alignment of one’s gender is hence an obvious derivative of article 19 (1)(a). Denial of the right to express one’s sexual identity through speech and choice of romantic/sexual partner would lead to violation of Article 19

The Transfer of Property Act 1882 and Miscellaneous rights

The Transfer of Property Act 1882³ and its subsequent amendments regulate the transfer of property. The phrase ‘transfer of property’ denotes a demonstration by which a person transfers or passes the property to at least one person, or himself, and at least one different person. It basically implies the transfer of property from one person to another. The term person consists of an individual, or body of individual or company, or association. Section 5 of the Act provides that transfer of property must take place between two or more persons who are living or it must take place inter vivos. The word “person” above forth holistically includes male, female and third gender. The other property-related laws such as The Hindu Disposition Of Property Act, 1916, The Indian Easements Act, 1882, etc include the word “person” to connote and include transgender within its sphere and do not per se disqualify them from legal transactions.

Inheritance Laws

The inheritance and succession laws lay down rules pertaining to the devolution of property on the death of an individual. The property is devolved on the basis of the relationship between the deceased and the inheritor. The succession laws in India are governed by the respective personal laws of the religious communities that chiefly recognize inheritors into the watertight compartments of the male and female genders. In order to claim property rights, transgenders are required to recognize themselves as male or female.

The Hindu Succession Act 1956⁴ which governs the inheritance of properties is completely silent pertaining to the rights of transgender. It explains who is Hindu and whom all comprise the inheritance schedule (such as son, daughter, spouse, etc.) within the said definition. The Act establishes a comprehensive and uniform system of inheritance. Ownership over the property is granted only to males and females thereby excluding the third gender. Such trans people are devoid of property rights and subject to extreme prejudice and vulnerability. They have to align their genders to respective categories of either male or female in order to claim property rights. So they have to establish their gender identity as per the one assigned to them at their birth certificate. Moreover, trans people are not entitled to the status of legal heir of their parent’s separate property nor coparcener in the Joint Hindu Family with their gender identity.

Similar to the line of succession rules of The Hindu Succession Act, the personal law of Muslims i.e. Shariat too follows similar rules pertaining to transgender property rights. Indian Succession Act, 1925 governs property inheritance of Christians. Notably, Section 44 of the act has included transgender and elucidates upon their inheritance of the ancestral property.

THE TRANSGENDER PERSONS (PROTECTION OF RIGHTS) ACT, 2019

THE TRANSGENDER PERSONS (PROTECTION OF RIGHTS) ACT, 2019⁵ has made a decent effort to protect the rights of transgender and promote their welfare by prohibiting discrimination on grounds of education, employment, healthcare, movement, access to goods and services, choice of occupation, etc. The act has sought to remove discrepancies in unfair treatment with regard to the right to reside, purchase, rent, or otherwise occupy any property. Section 4(2) of the Act provides the right to self-perceived gender identity. Section 5 of the Act provides that a transgender person could be perceived as third gender (transgender) by making an application to the District Magistrate for issuing a certificate of identity as a transgender person. But the act does not delineate anything about property rights thereby perpetuating lacunae in the system.

Evolving Sphere

Recently States such as Uttar Pradesh⁶, Uttarakhand, etc have sought to enforce progressive laws on property inheritance of transgender people. It has successfully passed an amendment to include transgender people in the UP Revenue code wherein they will be included in the inheritance nomenclature. The transgender people will now be recognized as members of a landowner’s family and will hold an equal right to inherit agricultural property.

Conclusion

The SC judgment in the NALSA case coupled with THE TRANSGENDER PERSONS ACT, 2019 has sought to create a level playing field by endowing trans people with the right to self-identification and creation of the label of the third gender. Transgenders cannot be denied the right to property per se as they have the absolute right to inherit family property unless disqualified by law. The State must strive to ensure equality of rights and promote the holistic development of the trans community as a whole.

References:

1. FAQs, https://transequality.org/issues/resources/frequently-asked-questions-about-transgender-people
2. WP (Civil) No 400 of 2012
3. https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/2338/1/A1882-04.pdf
4. https://www.ijlmh.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Inheritance-Rights-of-Transgender-A-Cry-of-Humanity.pdf
5. https://www.news18.com/news/buzz/why-transgender-people-still-have-to-go-through-hoops-to-get-married-or-inherit-property-in-india-2842545.html

This article is written by Riya Ganguly, 2 nd year BBA LLB student at Bharati Vidyapeeth New Law College, Pune.

INTRODUCTION

With the advent of social media and networking it is difficult to maintain privacy with the data available online. Data on the internet is flowing like water in the river. If the information of someone is available on the internet which the person has relevant context now or the reason for which it was there on the internet has been served is affecting the other person emotionally or making it difficult for another person to live peacefully. Then, it is a violation of article 21¹. This can be removed through the right to be forgotten which is provided under the right to privacy.

Right to forgotten means the deletion of the user’s personal information from the search engine, website, and many more. The European Union acquired the General Data Protection Bill [GDPR]² in the year 2018. Article 17 of this bill provides certain rights to the erasure of personal information and the certain rights include which are no longer necessary, consent has been withdrawn for particular information, and where there is legal obligation to erase. There are also some reasonable restrictions to some extent like in the area of public interest related to public health, or the data required in achieving historical, statistical, or scientific research.³

The right to be forgotten is to be followed in other countries also. In 2014, in Spain, the European court of justice managed a case Google Inc V Agencia Espanola De Proteccion De Datos in which a Spanish man whose name was Mario Costeja Gonzalez asked google to remove his information related to the auction for his unbridled home and the debt he had subsequently paid. Google was sued under the National High court which suggested a series of questions to the European court of justice. The court ruled the judgment in the favour of the Spanish man and asked google to delete the information.

In 2016, the first case of the right to be forgotten was heard by the Chinese court in Beijing in which they held that the residents don’t have the right to be forgotten. In this case, Ren Jiayu asked the Chinese web search tool Baidu to remove the search list that is related to Wuxi Taoshi’s previous business. Ren argued that the right of name and right of notoriety is reserved under Chinese law. Then the court ruled the judgment against Ren and said that he doesn’t have a right to be forgotten.

RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN UNDER THE PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION BILL

The right to privacy is our fundamental right under article 21 of the Indian constitution decided in the case of Justice K.S Puttaswamy Vs the Union of India⁴ in 2017. Data is a very sensitive thing that needs to be protected. The personal data protection bill⁵ was introduced in the Lok Sabha in 2019 with the objective to protect or conserve the data from getting into the wrong hands. This bill also includes the right to be forgotten under clause 20 of chapter V. it means that any person can ask the data fiduciary to remove or limit the data of the concerned person. The role of data fiduciary is to decide the means and the purpose of controlling the personal data it can be anyone an individual, entity, state, or cooperation. The data will be monitored by the Data protection authority and any removal of data has to be approved by the Data protecting authorities’ adjudicating officer. The officer has to see many aspects like the public interest in the concerned data, the extent of availability susceptibility, or the scope of divulgence before approving the removal of the data.

RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN VS THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION

“Right to be forgotten is the biggest threat to freedom of speech and expression in the coming decade”
-Jeffrey Rosen

The right to be forgotten is a much-needed statute nowadays to protect the individual interest against defamatory or derogatory statements. Freedom of speech and expression is our fundamental right under article 19⁶ of our Indian constitution and also contains reasonable restrictions under Article 19[2]⁷. Whereas the right to be forgotten can undermine the lusture of freedom of speech and expression. It can affect journalism it will be difficult for media to express their views freely and to wait for the decision of the adjudicating officer. If any person wishes to delete some information on the internet then it will favor the individual, not the society at large. This will also create a sense of feeling in the minds of the people that they are not free to express their views through articles, books, blogs, etc.

CASE LAWS

• Jorawar Singh Mundy Vs Union Of India and Ors⁸
  In this case, the petitioner was an American citizen who visited India in 2009. He got acquitted under the narcotics drugs and substance [NDPS] act, 1985. After two years trial court convicted him on April 30, 2011. On 29 January 2013 through the appeal of state, the Delhi high court then affirmed her acquittal. After returning to America petitioner realized that the Delhi high court’s judgment is available on the internet and this can be harmful to his reputation or while screening test done by the employer. He sent directions to Google India Private Ltd., Google LLC, Indian Kanoon, and vLex.in but the judgment was not deleted then he filled a writ petition before the Delhi High Court for the violation of Article 21. The Delhi high court directed the respondents to delete the judgment.
  
• Dharmaraj Bhanushankar Dave Vs State of Gujarat and ors⁹
  In this case, the petitioner filed a writ petitioner under Article 226 of the Indian constitution before the Gujarat High court for the violation of Article 21. The non-reportable judgment was published by the Indian kanoon on their site and the petitioner contended that google and Indian kanoon has no right to publish any non-reportable judgment. The court held that the judgment was part of the proceeding and that merely publishing judgment on online websites will not amount to be reported. So, it is not a violation of Article 21 and there is no legal rationale to remove the judgment.
  
• Subhranshu Rout Gugul Vs State of Odisha¹⁰
  In this rape case, the accused has created a fake id on Facebook and uploaded objectionable photos of the prosecutrix on the fake id. The police were failed to take any strict action against the accused. The pictures were taken with the consent of the prosecutrix at the time they were in a relationship but now they got separated. It was observed that consent does not mean to misuse the phots or outraging the modesty of the women. In this case, the right to be forgotten should be exercised. The court held that the photo should be removed to protect the privacy of the victim. Irrespective of ongoing criminal cases. The Odisha High Court further noted that the Indian Criminal Justice system is more of a sentence-oriented system, with little emphasis on compensating victims for their losses and suffering. Allowing such offensive photographs and videos to remain on a social networking platform without a woman’s agreement is an outrage to her modesty and, more crucially, her right to privacy.

CONCLUSION

Information in the public domain is like toothpaste. They can not completely be deleted if someone has taken a screenshot or screened the concerned content. the right to privacy is our fundamental right under article 21 of the Indian constitution which needs to be protected. The right to be forgotten is also included in the personal data protection bill, 2019 which is a great step towards the safety of data and the privacy of the individual. In case one person was acquitted under any criminal action but later on find to be innocent and the judgment is reported on many websites or search engines. It can be difficult for the employee to get a job as during the screening process this can destroy the reputation of the employee. The right to be forgotten can be a major relief and can ask for the removal of the judgment. Also in the case when a person with the intention of taking revenge or with the feeling of animosity posts or share any picture or video which is offensive or outrages the modesty of the victim through the right to be forgotten victim can make them deleted. It is been a debatable topic whether the right to be forgotten undermines the fundamental right the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19 which also contains reasonable restrictions under Article 19[2] of the Indian constitution. If a person asks to remove some content from the website or from the internet then it can also cause feelings among the people that they are not free to express their views and opinion through writing articles, blogs, etc and the removal of the concerned content can lead to being in the favor of the individual rather than the society at large. According to me, it requires judicial administration, and article 19[2] which provides reasonable restrictions should be amended and should include privacy in it.

References:

The Supreme Court of India emphasized in Satish Chandra Verma vs. Union of India that the freedom to go abroad, like marriage and family, is a genuine and vital human right. “The right to travel abroad is an important basic human right because it fosters an individual’s independent and self-determining creative character,” wrote a bench led by Justices L. Nageswara Rao and M.R. Shah, “not only by expanding his freedoms of action but also by expanding his scope of experience.

In this case, an IPS officer filed an appeal, from Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu. He claimed in his appeal that he was the subject of a departmental inquiry and that the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) had denied him permission to visit relatives overseas because of it. Despite the fact that Inspector General of Police Satish Chandra Verma was not facing any criminal charges, the Madras High Court upheld the Central Administrative Tribunal’s decision that he may not go abroad without first obtaining Vigilance clearance. The Supreme Court overruled the verdict of the High Court, citing Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India and Kent vs. Dulles, two landmark US Supreme Court cases (1958).

In its judgment in Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India, the bench stated that the right to travel abroad is a fundamental human right since it strengthens an individual’s independent and self-determining creative character by widening his job experience and giving him more freedom of action. The Supreme Court noted the ruling in the latter case, which stated that “freedom to go abroad is a fundamental human right with major societal relevance.” The Supreme Court said that the freedom to travel globally is a core human right that also relates to private life, such as marriage, family, and friendship.

Right to travel internationally

Article 19 of the Indian constitution guarantees the freedom to freely move beyond Indian territory; nevertheless, the right to go abroad is derived from Article 21’s right to life and personal liberty.

Liberal interpretations have given the phrase “life and liberty” huge meanings in this article. Life here refers to both one’s physical existence and one’s quality of life. Personal liberty, on the other hand, encompasses a wide variety of rights in addition to freedom from physical constraint or confinement.

The Supreme Court stated in Maneka Gandhi v. UOI that the term “personal liberty” as used in Article 21 has a very broad meaning and it encompasses a plethora of rights that include man’s personal liberty, some of which have been elevated to the status of separate fundamental rights and given additional protection under Article 19.

Article 21 defines the state’s negative duty, although it does not totally nullify restrictions or limitations if carried out in line with the “process” prescribed by law. An individual’s personal liberty and the rights that come with it, as well as the individual’s duties and obligations to the state and other citizens, must be balanced. Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam: The Supreme Court ruled in Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam that the “expression” of personal liberty includes freedom of movement and travel internationally. The necessity to hold a passport in order to
legitimately going overseas may raise the question of whether it is a barrier to an individual’s right to travel abroad, however, the Supreme Court found against this in the same case.

In a nutshell, the right to freely travel throughout India’s territory and the right to freely travel abroad both fall under the umbrella of “personal liberty,” although being provided under separate parts of the constitution. Specific limits on traveling overseas may apply, which must be followed in compliance with legal regulations. There are several fair restrictions on roaming freely throughout India.

Article 12 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights addresses the freedom to travel abroad in international law. It empowers anybody, including themselves, to exit any country. As a result, it enhances the basic freedom of foreign travel. However, the Covenant, like the Indian Constitution, places limitations on the right “as may be needed by law to protect national security, public order, health, or morality in the interests of others’ rights and freedoms,” and these restrictions are compatible with the Covenant’s other rights.

The United Nations Human Rights Committee, which oversees the Covenant’s implementation, has underlined that Article 12 covers both the freedom to leave for permanent emigration and the right to travel abroad. It also safeguards a person’s freedom to pick his or her own travel destination.

While the UN Human Rights Council asserts that the right to dwell in a country includes the right to get the necessary travel documents, the Supreme Court has a different view on the passport and travel document problem. In Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam, the Supreme Court argued that a passport is a political document with no absolute right to get one because it is up to the state to give or deny one. The government does not appear to need to assert someone it does not think acceptable because the document states the holder’s respectability.

When there is a dispute between national and international law, the Supreme Court stated in Gramophone Company of India vs. Virendra Pandey in 1984 that national law shall prevail.

The right to travel freely across the world has been recognized by the Supreme Court as a fundamental right. Following Article 21, it is suggested that a new article, namely Article 21A, be included with the words “A21. (2) Nothing in section (1) stops the State from implementing legislation that sets appropriate boundaries in the interests of India’s sovereignty and integrity, friendly relations with other states, and the general public.” An individual provision for the right to travel abroad might help to accelerate the implementation of this critical right, which is now underway.

Written by Muskan Patidar student at Kirit P. Mehta School of law (NMIMS), Mumbai.