Tag: #RighttoPrivacy

Equivalent Citation

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012, (2017) 10 SCC 1

Bench

Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, R. K. Agrawal, J. S. Khehar, S. A. Bobde, S. A. Nazeer, R. K. Agrawal, J. Chelameswar, A.M. Sapre JJ

Decided on

24th  August 2017

Relevant Act/ Section

Article 19,19(1)(a), 21 and 25

Brief Facts and Procedural History

The Government of India has launched a scheme called “Unique Identification for BPL Families.” For the initiative, a committee was also formed. The Committee suggested that a ‘Unique Identification Database’ be created for the project. The project will be divided into three phases, according to the decision. The Planning Commission of India then issued a notification on UIDAI in January 2009. (Unique Identification Authority of India). In the year 2010, the Planning Commission also approved the National Identification Authority of India Bill. The current case was filed by retired High Court Judge K.S. Puttaswamy, who is 91 years old, is against the Union of India, or the Government of India. The case was heard by a nine-judge Supreme Court bench that had been created specifically for the Constitution Bench. Following conflicting judgments from other Supreme Court benches, the special bench was constituted to assess whether the “right to privacy” was guaranteed as an independent basic right.

The case emphasized various concerns about the government’s Aadhaar program (a form of uniform biometrics-based identity card). In the near future, the government suggested that the above-mentioned plan become required for access to government services and benefits. Initially, the challenge was brought before a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court, claiming that the scheme invaded the “right to privacy” provided to Indian people by the Constitution. On account of the Union of India, the Attorney General disputed that the Indian Constitution does not give particular protections for the right to privacy. He based this on observations made at various times in the cases of M.P. Sharma vs. Satish Chandra (an eight-judge bench) and Kharak Singh vs. Uttar Pradesh (an eight-judge bench) (a five-judge bench). Following that, an eleven-judge panel determined that basic rights should not be regarded as separate, unrelated rights, upholding the dissenting opinion in the Kharak Singh case. This also acted as a precedent of following rulings by smaller benches of the Supreme Court which expressly recognized the right to privacy. Moreover, it was in this circumstance that a Constitution Bench was established, which found that a nine-judge bench should be established to assess whether the Constitution contained a fundamental right to privacy or not.

Finally, on August 24, 2017, the Supreme Court issued a landmark decision, declaring the right to privacy a Fundamental Right under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.

Issues before the Court

• Whether the ‘right to privacy’ is a basic part of the right to life and personal liberty provided under Article 21 and also a part of the freedoms provided by Part III of the Constitution,
• And whether the judgment was taken in M P Sharma v Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi was right in the face of law?
• And was the decision taken in Kharak Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh correct in a legal sense?

The decision of the Court

On August 24, 2017, a nine-judge panel of the Supreme Court of India issued a major decision upholding the basic right to privacy guaranteed by Article 21 of India’s constitution. The Supreme Court’s historic nine-judge bench unanimously agreed that Article 21 of the Constitution secured the right to privacy as an essential aspect of the right to life and personal liberty. Privacy is a distinct and independent basic right granted by Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, according to the Supreme Court, which relied on six separate judgments. The decision’s most crucial element conveyed a broad interpretation of the right to privacy. It was clarified that the right to privacy is a broad right that covers the body and mind, including judgments, choices, information, and freedom, rather than narrow protection against physical derivation or an invasion right under Article 21. Privacy was found to be a predominant, enforceable, and multifaceted right under Part III of the Constitution. Overall, the Court overturned the judgments in M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh because the latter found that the right to privacy was not a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, and the Court found that the judgment in M.P. Sharma was legitimate because the Indian Constitution did not contain any limitations to the laws on search and seizure comparable to the Fourth Amendment in the United States Constitution. Nevertheless, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment was not a comprehensive concept of security and that the absence of a comparable assurance in the Constitution didn’t imply that India lacked a distinctive right to protection by any stretch of the imagination– and thus, the decision in M.P. Sharma was overturned. Kharak Singh’s biased perspective on close-to-home freedom was also invalidated by the Supreme Court. This viewpoint was referred to as the “storehouse” approach obtained from A.K. Gopalan by Justice D.Y. Chandrachud. The Court stated that after Maneka Gandhi, this method of seeing fundamental rights in watertight containers was abandoned.

The Court stated that after Maneka Gandhi, this method of seeing fundamental rights in watertight containers was abandoned. The Court also pointed out that the majority conclusion in Kharak Singh was internally inconsistent, as there was no legal basis for striking down domiciliary visits and police monitoring on any grounds other than privacy – a right they referred to in theory yet ruled to be unconstitutional. The Court further stated that subsequent cases maintaining the right to privacy after Kharak Singh should be viewed in light of the principles set forth in the opinion. The court also considered whether the right to life, the right to personal liberty, and the right to liberty established in Part III of the Constitution protects the right to privacy in affirmative instances. The court decided that privacy “is not an exclusive concept.” It dismissed the Attorney General’s position that the right to privacy should be ceded in exchange for the state’s welfare rights. Overall, while ruling that the right to privacy is not self-contained, the decision also outlined a legal survey standard that should be applied when the state intrudes on a person’s privacy.

It was decided that the right to privacy could be limited where an intrusion met the three-fold requirement of legality, which assumes the existence of law; need, which is defined in terms of a reliable state point; and proportionality, which ensures a reasonable relationship between the objects and the methods used to achieve them. The fourth point of this criteria was added by Justice S.K Kaul, who demanded “procedural assurances against maltreatment of such obstacles. Chelameswar, on the other hand, feels that the “overriding national interest” threshold should be applied only to privacy claims that demand “close inspection.”

The court found that the fair, just, and reasonable criteria of Article 21 should be applied to additional privacy issues and that whether or not to apply the “national priority” standard depends on the facts. The court also stressed the importance of sexual orientation in terms of privacy. It also examined the negative and positive aspects of the right to privacy, namely, that the state is not only prohibited from interfering with this right but is also required to take reasonable steps to protect personal privacy. Information privacy is part of the right to privacy, according to the ruling. Despite the fact that the court recognized the need for a data protection law, it left the burden of enacting legislation to Parliament.

References

Justice K.S.Puttaswamy (Retired). vs Union of India and Ors., 2017. | LawFoyer

Written by Vidushi Joshi student at UPES, Dehradun.

Citation of the case

AIR 2018 SC 4321; W. P. (Crl.) No. 76 of 2016; D. No. 14961/2016.

Date of the case

6 September 2018

Petitioner

Navtej Singh Johar & Ors.

Respondent(s)

Union of India & Ors.

Bench/Judges

Dipak Misra, R. F. Nariman, D. Y. Chandrachud, and Indu Malhotra.

Statutes Involved

The Constitution of India, The Indian Penal Code.

Important Sections/Articles

Art. 14, 15, 19, 21, 25 of the Constitution of India, Right to Privacy under Fundamental Rights, S. 377 of the Indian Penal Code.

INTRODUCTION

Navtej Singh Johar V/s Union of India¹ was one of the most critical cases, which changed our Indian laws and conveyed us with a superior understanding of those laws. Right to Life under Art. 21 of The Indian Constitution isn’t just with regards to allowing an individual to live, yet permitting everybody to live they need to live, in any means not harming those of others. Neither The Indian Constitution discusses the Right to Equality on a separate premise. Each living being is to partake in those freedoms with practically no segregation or imbalance.

An individual’s Natural Identity is to be treated as fundamental. What an individual is brought into the world with is normal, the same way the character an individual is brought into the world with is regular and is to be regarded and acknowledged as opposed to being scorned or peered downward on. Crumbling or deterring an individual’s character and personality would be something like pounding the upsides of Privacy, Choice, Freedom of Speech, and different Expressions. For long, the transsexual local area has been peered downward on, to which once Radhakrishnan, J. expressed, Gender character alludes to every individual’s profoundly felt inside and individual experience of orientation, which could compare with the sex relegated upon entering the world, including the individual feeling of the body which might include an openly picked, adjustment of real appearance or capacities by clinical, careful, or different means and different articulations of orientation, including dress, discourse, and peculiarities. Orientation personality, along these lines, alludes to a singular’s self-distinguishing proof as a man, lady, transsexual, or other recognized class. Numerous strict bodies have gone against the Carnal intercourse against the Order of nature and some remember it as a demonstration disparaging the protected idea of Dignity. The Navtej Singh Johar V/s Union of India was the milestone case which prompted the struck down of S. 377 of The Indian Penal Code, as it expressed – Whoever deliberately has licentious inter­course against the request for nature with any man, lady or creature, will be rebuffed with 1[imprisonment for life], or with impris­onment of one or the other depiction for a term which might stretch out to a decade, and will likewise be responsible to fine.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

Writ Petition (Crl) No. 76 of 2016 was petitioned for proclaiming the right to sexuality, right to sexual independence, and right to the decision of a sexual accomplice to be essential for the right to life ensured under A. 21 of the Constitution of India and to pronounce S. 377 of the Indian Penal Code to be unlawful. Mr. Arvind Datar learned senior guidance showing up for the writ applicants presented that the two-Judge Bench in Suresh Kumar Koushal and another v. Naz Foundation had been directed by friendly ethical quality in light of majoritarian discernment while the issue, in reality, should have been bantered upon in the setting of sacred ethical quality. Likewise in a Nine-Judge Bench choice in K.S. Puttaswamy and another v. Association of India and Ors., have thought that sexual direction is a fundamental part of freedoms ensured under the Constitution which are not formed on majoritarian discernment. Mr. Arvind Datar expressed that he doesn’t expect to challenge the piece of S. 377 that connects with licentious intercourse with creatures, he limits consenting demonstrations between two grown-ups. The assent between two grown-ups must be the essential pre-condition. If not, the kids would become prey, and insurance of the youngsters in all circles must be monitored and ensured.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Navtej Singh Johar, an artist alongside Sunil Mehra a columnist, a culinary specialist Ritu Dalmia, hoteliers Keshav, Aman Nath, and a Businesswoman Ayesha Kapur, all in all, documented a writ request in the Supreme Court looking for a presentation of the right to sexuality, right to sexual independence and right to the decision of a sexual accomplice to be important for the right to life ensured under A. 21 of the Constitution of India and to pronounce S. 377 of the Indian Penal Code to be unlawful, as it was impeding the privileges of the LGBT people group. It was expressed that this segment not just abused A. 21 yet in addition A. 15, 19 alongside the Right to Privacy under the Fundamental Rights in The Indian Constitution. There had likewise been a few cases in the past like the Naz Foundation v. Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi² and Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation³, which were likewise kept in thought during this case.

ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether the rationale adopted in the Suresh Kaushal judgment was proper or not?
2. Whether S. 377 violates A. 14 and 15 of the constitution?
3. Whether S. 377 infringes the right to privacy under A. 21?
4. Whether S. 377 has a ‘chilling effect’ on A. 19 (1) (a) by criminalizing gender expression by the LGBT community?

CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER

• The Petitioner had lamented that the individuals from the LGBT people group were denied the right to life ensured by Art. 21 of the Constitution of India.
• The S. 377 of The Indian Penal Code conflicted with the A. 14, 15 of the Indian Constitution as they, as an individual were dealt with inconsistent to other people and segregated on the premise of sex of an individual’s sexual accomplice, and they, had to not to pick an accomplice of their enjoying.
• 19 of The Indian Constitution out of totally was the most cut off, as the local area was denied to communicate their sexual personality through discourse and decision of an accomplice of their enjoying.
• Right to protection under the Fundamental Duties was being impacted as they were evaded by society on finding their specific decision of living.
• It was encouraged to the statement of the S. 377 of The Indian Penal Code, illegal and perceiving the right to sexuality, right to sexual independence, and right to the decision of the sexual accomplice to be essential for A. 21 of the Indian Constitution.

CONTENTIONS BY THE RESPONDENTS

• The Union of India, taking a nonpartisan side passed on the make a difference to the Hon’ble Court by commenting “It left the topic of the sacred legitimacy of Section 377 to the insight of the Court”. Furthermore, found out if the law set down in Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation, is right or not.
• Shri K. Radhakrishnan, senior guidance, for the benefit of intervenor-NGO, Trust God Ministries contended, there is no private freedom to mishandle one’s organs and that the hostile demonstrations prohibited by S. 377 are submitted by manhandling the organs. Such demonstrations, according to the intervenor, are undignified and overly critical to the protected idea of nobility and on the off chance that any infraction is caused to the idea of poise, it would add up to established off-base and sacred shamelessness.
• The people enjoying unnatural sexual demonstrations which have been made culpable under S. 377 are more helpless and defenseless against contracting HIV/AIDS, additionally, the level of commonness of AIDS in gay people is a lot more prominent than heteros, and the right to protection may not be stretched out to empower individuals to enjoy unnatural offenses and in this way contact AIDS.
• Mr. Suresh Kumar Koushal, intervenor, by a composed accommodation contended in that that the contention of the candidates that consensual demonstrations of grown-ups in private have been decriminalized in many regions of the planet and, hence, it should be decriminalized in India.
• On the occasion consenting demonstrations between two same-sex grown-ups are barred from the ambit of S. 377, then, at that point, a wedded lady would be delivered remediless under the IPC against her bi-sexual spouse and his consenting male accomplice enjoying any sexual demonstrations.
• For the benefit of Raza Academy, the intervenor, through its learned direction Mr. R.R Kishore, it was contended that homosexuality is against the nature request and S. 377 properly precludes it.

JUDGMENT

1. S. 377 of The Indian Penal Code, to the extent that it applied to the consensual sexual direct between the grown-ups in private was announced Unconstitutional.
2. The choice in the Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation (1) was overruled.
3. Basic privileges are accessible to the LGBT people group even though they comprise a minority.
4. S. 377 is violative of A. 14 being entirely discretionary, unclear, and has an unlawful goal.
5. S. 377 punishes an individual in light of their sexual direction and is consequently oppressive under A. 15.
6. S. 377 ignores the right to life and freedom provided by A. 21 which includes all parts of the option to live with poise, the right to protection, and the right to independence and self-assurance concerning the coziest choices of an individual.

CONCLUSION

The judgment for the situation was notable as it struck down the S. 377 of The Indian Penal Code and it allowed them to the Homosexuals and every one of the individuals from the LGBT people group to unreservedly put themselves out there and to stroll with a head high in the general public. They don’t need to fear being evaded by society and their right to security being pulverized and pronounced as hoodlums because they communicated their friendship and affections for their sexual accomplice.

This judgment was an overjoy for each individual from the LGBT people group and different Heterosexuals. The choice was valued even abroad by different NGOs and gatherings named The Human Rights Watch, in this manner acquiring global acknowledgment. Different translations were made to clarify what laws said and that they are to cling to and everybody in the general public is to be dealt with similarly.

References

1. Navtej Singh Johar vs Union Of India Ministry Of Law And … on 8 January, 2018. indiankanoon.org.[Online] https://indiankanoon.org/doc/119980704/.
2. Naz Foundation v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi. en.wikipedia.org. [Online] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naz_Foundation_v._Govt._of_NCT_of_Delhi#:~:text=Naz%20Foundatio
   n%20v.%20Govt.%20of%20NCT%20of%20Delhi,violation%20of%20fundamental%20rights%20protected%20by%20India%27s%20Constitution..
3. Suresh Kumar Koushal and another v. Naz Foundation and Others. www.desikanoon.co.in. [Online] https://www.desikanoon.co.in/2014/02/suresh-kumar-koushal-anr-v-naz.html.

Written by Sara Agrawal student at Sinhgad Law College, Pune.

The Bombay High Court on Friday, ordered to remove certain content from the internet that was prima facie defamatory to the Actress. Shilpa Shetty on Thursday filed a defamation suit against several media organizations seeking an injunction against false, malicious, and defamatory content published by them. This came after the husband of the actress, Raj Kundra was arrested for his alleged involvement in a porn production case.

The court said imposing a blanket order on the media personnel against the alleged defamatory content would have a “chilling effect on the freedom of the press”. However, the court ordered one media house from Uttar Pradesh to take down a video that portrayed her as ‘duplicitous’ at a personal level, while two others removed their content themselves. The court while ordering the same said that this order shall not act as a gag except for the two or three instances mentioned above.

The court said news reports which are based on police information cannot be construed as defamation. The matter needs to be looked at closely, it cannot be said that all the statements made are defamatory or not.

Shetty has filed a 25 crore defamation suit against 29 media houses- print, electronic and social media to prevent them from circulating derogatory content which is an invasion of her privacy. The Court said, there has to be a certain level of balance between freedom of press and the right of privacy. It simply cannot be said that because a person is a celebrity, such person has forfeited his/her right to privacy.

One video uploaded on the Shudh Manoranjan channel portrayed Shetty on moral grounds commenting on her parenting to her minor children. This video was removed from the online platform and the court said that it shall remain so.

The court has sought responses from the defendants by August 18 and the next date of hearing is to be on September 20th.

-Report by VANESSA RODRIGUES