Citation

AIR 2018 SC 4321; WP (Crl.) No. 76 of 2018 D. No. 14961/2016

Decided

6th September 2018

Petitioners

Navtej Singh Johar, Ritu Dalmia, Ayesha Kapur, Aman Nath, Sunil Mehra.

Respondent

Ministry of Health, represented by Tushar Mehta.

Bench

CJI Dipak Misra, Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, and Justice Indu Malhotra.

Issues

Constitutionality of Section 377 of IPC.

Introduction

Personal laws play a dominant role within Indian Legal jurisprudence. Most current-day laws are based on the codifications made to the uncodified legal literature by the British during colonialization. This is especially evident from the Hindu Personal law concepts like the co-parcener system, succession, and inheritance, mentioning the contract law aspects in works like Vyavahara Mayukha and Criminal laws from the Smritis and Shrutis. India has witnessed a phased manner of liberalization of these ancient uncodified laws, stripping away the unconstitutional aspects of patriarchal society- such as the right to equality conferred to women in claiming property from their ancestors, by the 2005 amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, among many others. Post this phase marked a further liberalization movement for equal rights by the third gender category, i.e., the LGBTQIA+ (Lesbian, Gay, Binary, Transgendered, and Queer), which has finally reached a successful end by the landmark verdict pronounced by the honourable Supreme Court of India in the Navtej Singh Johar case. This article tries to give a view on whether the verdict can be considered an end goal to the journey of struggle by the LGBTQIA+ community or if anything is left ahead.

Historical Backdrop of Homosexuality in India

The concept of homosexuality is not new to India. Ancient texts in multiple instances show its presence through multiple instances¹. Matsya Purana describes the instance where lord Vishnu had to take up the form of a beautiful woman (Mohini) in order to destroy the then demon Mahishasur, which further coupled with this union with Lord Shiva giving birth to Lord Ayappa. Mahabharat’s Shikandi and Arjun turning into a homosexual person named Brihannala for one year of exile adds to the claim of the age-long presence of homosexuality in ancient India². Further extending to legal texts like Manusmriti­, Naradha Purana, Kautilya Arhtashastra, and Vatsyayana Kamasutra, among others, strictly criticize these homosexual acts and provide for stringent punishments- which thereby clearly seeped into the codified Indian Penal Code, 1860 by the inclusion of Section 377 in the form of penalizing Unnatural offenses. Research also shows that the British Buggery Act of 1553³ explicitly criminalized these sexual activities against the order of nature as illegal, which was ultimately reflected in the form of Section 377.

Judicial Precedents giving rise to Navtej Singh

The landmark nature of Navtej Singh is primarily due to the contrasting judicial opinions available by then. It all started 24 years back, in 1994, when an NGO named AIDS Bhedbhav Virodhi Abhiyan (ABVA) filed a petition before the Delhi High Court⁴ challenging the ban on the oversupply of condoms by the Tihar Jail Authorities- Kiran Bedi, the then IG of Tihar Jail’s decision on this front to discourage such unlawful and unnatural acts as a whole. Delhi High Court however had to dismiss the petition due to non-involvement by the petitioners, paving the way for the second case instituted on these grounds in Naz Foundation v. Govt of NCT of Delhi & Others⁵.

In 2001, Naz foundation, another NGO working on HIV AIDS eradication filed a PIL before the Delhi High Court upon the same grounds to strike down Section 377 due to the absence of any constitutional validity. However, the high Court dismissed the PIL in 2004 on the technical grounds of the absence of locus standi of the petitioners. A subsequent review petition was also dismissed in 2006. It was then that the matter went as an appeal to the apex court. Supreme court ordered for reinstatement of the issue before the Delhi Court and to deal with the issue on merits. The contentions of the petitioners were upheld by the High Court considering the violation of fundamental rights of equality, privacy, and dignity, international treatises (Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights), constitutional morality, and the recommendations made by the 142^nd Law Commission. The section, however, was kept intact to deal with cases of non-consensual activities.

This reasoning was challenged by a Delhi-based astrologer- Suresh Kumar Kaushal, before the Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition in 2009 in Suresh Kumar Kaushal and Ors v. Naz Foundation⁶. The Supreme Court, finally in 2013, overturned the Delhi High Court’s verdict, thereby re-criminalizing consensual homosexual acts. The main reasoning by the apex court was the absence of proving the unconstitutionality of section 377 beyond a reasonable doubt. According to the Court, Section 377 is gender-neutral, and it does not in any way violate any particular group’s fundamental rights. This was coupled with the further fact that the criminalization rate, over the 150 years, was a bare minimum of just 200 prosecutions- intending no ultra-vires or unconstitutional nature.

While this decision was widely criticized as a backward step, the apex court in the meanwhile has pronounced several landmark judgments beginning with National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India⁷, 2014, where transgender people were conferred officially as the “third gender,” providing them an equal pedestal in enjoying fundamental rights and the right to self and separate identity. In the nine-judge bench landmark judgment in Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. vs. Union of India and Ors⁸, declared the right to privacy as a fundamental right, implicit under Article 21 of the Constitution, thereby overturning the previous rulings in ADM Jabalpur v. S.S. Shukla⁹, M.P. Sharma and Others v. Satish Chandra and Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh¹⁰. This decision had a phenomenal bearing on the then ongoing skepticism of Section 377 and the rights of the LGBTQIA+ community as the judges, including D.Y. Chandrachud (accepted further by Chief Justice J.S. Khehar and Justices A. Abdul Nazeer and R.K. Agrawal) expressed explicit critiques to the observations made in SK Kaushal, such as the consideration of “minuscule minority” of prosecutions under Section 377- whose privacy of sexual orientation cannot, hence, be denied based on majoritarian view. All these formed a groundwork for inevitably decriminalizing Section 377 in Navtej Singh.This led to the filing of multiple curative petitions before the Supreme Court, which prompted the apex court to hear the issue afresh by a five-judge Constitutional bench- paving the way for the landmark ruling in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India.

Rise of Navtej Singh Johar- Important observations

This case began on Apr 27th, 2016, when five petitioners filed a new writ petition before the then CJI S.A. Bobde, challenging the constitutionality of Section 377 and the SK Kaushal verdict. The petitioners this time did not commit the mistake of filing through any NGO, thereby not losing any locus standi, which included dancer Navtej Singh Johar, journalist Sunil Mehra, chef Ritu Dalmia, hoteliers Aman Nath and Keshav Suri, and businesswoman Ayesha Kapur- who were all directly aggrieved by the criminalization of Section 377. This matter was posted to a five-judge constitutional bench headed by CJI Deepak Mishra before which the curative petitions from SK Kaushal were already pending. Finally, the issue was taken up as a joinder, with the hearings starting on Jan 17^th, 2018. The deliberate hearings and written submissions lasted for about nine months, ending with the final verdict on Sept 6th, 2018.

The arguments coming from the petitioners’ counsel primarily were based on drawing a nexus between section 377 and the infringement of Fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the constitution, based on the underlying premise of viewing section 377 as a Victorian and colonial view, which is redundant in the progressive society. The core idea is the basic fact that consensual homosexual union, shouldn’t be seen, and termed as unnatural by its very definition. Counters from the opposite counsel for respondent union government involved taking into account the overall effect of the decriminalization on other laws, especially on the very concept of marriage and the personal and matrimonial laws surrounding it- belonging to multiple religious communities such as the Hindu Marriage Act, Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, Special Marriage Act, and even succession laws in India, thereby further ruining the socioeconomic, political and cultural heritage of the nation. In countering the fundamental rights claims, the state relied on the already existing rights conferred to LGBT communities by the NALSA case¹¹, thereby arguing that these sort of bizarre claims by the petitioners is beyond public morality and a mere abuse of personal liberty.

Key takeaways from the judgment

It was finally, on Sept 6th, 2018, that the longstanding issue concluded with the five-judge bench of the Supreme Court unanimously re-iterated the Delhi High Court’s verdict in Naz Foundation, over-ruling Suresh Kumar Kaushal, thereby decriminalizing consensual sex between homosexual persons and concluding section 377 as violative of Articles 14, 19 (1)(a), and 21 of the Indian Constitution. The rationale behind the decision is primarily based on the ones held by Naz Foundation, including the following grounds:

• Failure of the litmus test on Fundamental Rights- The apex court reasoned section 377 as violative of Fundamental rights enshrined in the constitution on the following grounds:
  • The absence of consensual and non-consensual sex, as opposed to the presence of the same u/s 375, renders section 377 arbitrary and discriminatory against same-sex persons. The object of section 377 to protect children (under POCSO) and women (u/s 375 of IPC) lacks any reasonable nexus with the very classification of distinguishing between natural and un-natural intercourse, rendering 377 redundant and discriminatory- targeting only the LGBTQIA+ community. Hence, it violates the Right to Equality under Article 14.
  • Freedom of choice of a sexual partner under Article 19(1)(a), with the element of consent, is infringed by Section 377. Such private, consensual acts among homosexual persons do not in any way affect constitutional and public morality; hence there is no justification for imposing reasonable restrictions on this freedom of choice of the LGBTQIA+ community.
  • The full and free realization of one’s sexual identity is an essential facet of the right to life embedded under Article 21 of the constitution. The right to privacy extends to the right to protect sexual privacy. Section 377, by denying and restricting this right to determine one’s sexual orientation and partner, curtails the right to privacy of an individual.
• Violation of Yogyakarta Principles¹²– India, being a signatory to this intentional convention, binds the nations to affirm sexual orientation and gender identity as an integral part of human dignity. The preamble of this convention clearly defines sexual orientation as the “sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender or the same gender or more than one gender.” Section 377, thereby, clearly violates these principles, too.

From Navtej to the present- challenges persist

1.     Legal hurdles with other laws-

This issue of conferring equal sexual rights to homosexual groups is equally a matter of marriage and personal laws as much is an issue of constitutional law. Litigation in this area, starting from 1994’s petition by AIDS Bhedbhav Virodhi Abhiyan (ABVA) to this pertinent landmark Navtej Singh in 2018, only focused on the infringement of fundamental rights of the LGBTQIA+ community, making it a predominately constitutional law matter. This gives the landmark Navtej Johar judgment a limited application in the issues of homosexuality as a whole, especially due to the fact of ignoring personal law and family law matters.

The intact prevalence of heteronormative notions in all the matrimonial and personal laws in India is the major hurdle in this regard¹³. Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, providing for the grounds for solemnization of a marriage, is the basis for all the other provisions to chip in, only mentions the heterosexual identifications of bride and bridegroom, excluding individuals from the LGBTQIA+ community within the purview of Hindu marriage. The conditions of the Indian Majority Act inculcated u/s 4 of the Special Marriage Act- “21 years for male and 18 years for female”, thereby subjecting the third gender to discrimination. Along similar lines, sections 7 and 8 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act exclude third genders’ capacity to take a child in adoption¹⁴. Section 21 of the same act impliedly denies LGBTs from claiming maintenance by conferring this right only to heterosexuals. Especially when same-sex couples lack that ability to procreate, one of the options, apart from adoption, to confer a biological child is to go for surrogacy. However, section 2(h) of the Surrogacy Regulation Act 2021 restricts the definition of a couple to only a male and female, clearly taking away the natural rights of a homosexual couple. This line of heterosexual depiction also extends to Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Act 2021.

Four years post the landmark judgment widely hailed both nationally and internationally, where the right to sexual orientation has been recognized as an implicit part of the right to privacy which is further an essential facet of dignity, these heterosexual ideas, and beliefs, stereotypically based on the traditional notions of family system act as a hurdle to the actual exercising of sexual rights by LGBTQIA+ community.

2.     Judicial and governmental responses-

Considering the above-stated existence of improper application of LGBT rights due to the intact application of other laws in force, Judiciary has, from time to time, over four years, evolved a case-by-case conferring of real-time liberty to LGBTs for exercising their rights. Most famously, the Single judge bench of the Madras High Court in Arunkumar v. Inspector General of Registration (2019) has recognized marriage between a cis-gendered male and a transwoman as a valid marriage u/s 5 of the Hindu Marriage act. The judge, here, made applauding observations of expanding the said matrimonial rights and allowing queer people to gain access to artificial reproductive technologies, surrogacy, and perhaps, even finally adopt children¹⁵. The Court has clearly explained that the term ‘bride would comprise cis-gendered women, including transgender women and intersex individuals who identify themselves as a “woman.”  This reasoning follows from the long-settled case in Mahadeolal Kanodia v. The Administrator General of West Bengal (1960), where the Supreme Court observed that the strict grammatical interpretation giving rise to absurdity or inconsistency could be discarded to adopt an interpretation that will give effect to the purpose of the legislature¹⁶. High courts across the nation have also received multiple petitions challenging the various provisions of the Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Act, 2021 and the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021, in which the courts have affirmatively ordered the concerned governments to submit their views on the issue. Madras High Court’s judgment in S. Sushma v. Commissioner of Police¹⁷ rendered by Justice N Anand Venkatesh on a plea by a lesbian couple granted police protections from unlawful incarceration by the police engaged by their parents, has been widely hailed by activists and people connected with LGBTQIA + persons. The judgment also sought to prohibit attempts to “medically cure persons” associated with the community by creating mass awareness and sensitivity.

The response from the government, however, is not the same. Though the governmental response from the BJP-led ministers clearly applauded the inevitable decision in Navtej, their view, however, is restricted. Union Minister of Law and Justice Kiran Rejiju, in February 2021, remarked that “’legitimate State interest’ lay in limiting the institution of marriage to those of the opposite sex only to preserve ‘social morality. Hence, the government’s stance on the issue was clear: courts should refrain from legitimizing same-sex marriage.¹⁸” Even in Abhijeet Iyer Mitra v. Union of India (2021), the Centre has argued that a marriage under the Special Marriage Act is permissible only between a biological man and a biological woman. It is the “legitimate State interest” that limits the recognition of marriage only to persons of the opposite sex, as the concept of marriage is not solely relegated to the domain of privacy of an individual¹⁹.

3.     Issue of Same-Sex Marriage on the rise-

Another vital issue pertaining to the LGBT community- conferring legal recognition to same-sex marriage, is still unsettled by the Navtej judgment. Marriage, as opposed to the western tradition where it is considered a mere contract between the couples, whereas, in Indian jurisprudence, it is traditionally and at present recognized as a sacrosanct, legitimate union, authorizing the couples to share their positives and negatives in their lives with one another. This authorization also extends to procreation, sexual union, inheritance, and so on, which form a definite chain of legal aspects. For the third gender to enjoy the same legal rights arising from a valid marriage and also to societally erase the conception of the unnaturalness of same-sex relationships requires a sacrosanct bond of marriage.

Enormous litigation has become widespread before multiple High Courts, contending for conferring legal authorization to same-sex marriage in order to claim the rights conferred by Navtej Johar. Starting from the previously mentioned Madras High Court case in Arunkumar v. Inspector General of Registration²⁰, the court recognized marriage between a cis-gendered male and a transwoman as a valid marriage u/s 5 of the Hindu Marriage act. From the year 2020, writ petitions are pending before the Delhi High Court²¹ for altering the provisions of the Foreign Marriage Act, 1969, and the Special Marriage Act, 1954 to provide for registration/recognition of same-sex marriages²², they being secular legislations and the Supreme Court conferring LGBT rights in the above-said cases. A gay couple from Kerala also filed a writ petition in the same year, contending the same fact that the landmark decision of Navtej Singh would become meaningless in the absence of conferring equal access to the institution of marriage²³.

4.     Conferring Reservations- the road ahead-

The minuscule minority argument in reference to the LGBTQIA+ community continues to be heard from S.K. Kaushal till the Navtej Johar. Nevertheless, the fact in numerical is true that the third-gender community constitutes a minority population. This minuscule population, therefore, requires special reservations for their upliftment on equal footing with that of the dominant heterosexual society. This topic itself requires phenomenal research as the reservations for women are still unsettled in our country. Though the parliament of India has passed the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019, there is no mention of conferring reservations for these groups, especially when Article 16(4) of the Indian constitution clearly provides for this measure. Though the NALSA judgment provides for self-identification but does not mention the provisions regarding the mechanism to be drawn in this regard.

Expecting a step in this direction is obvious in the near future, which therefore requires how the implementation of these laws is to take place. The primary obstacle in this direction is to determine who the beneficiaries are, which usually requires the formation of boards consisting of medical practitioners, psychologists, bureaucrats, and social welfare activists for the issuance of identity cards. The result, however, with this approach is quite negatively evident from the increased bureaucratic influence, as seen with disabled persons’ identity card issuance. While some states like West Bengal have adopted the law for compulsory Sexual reassignment surgery in order to determine gender identity, this goes with a toss to the ruling in NALSA, which for not enabling such tests compulsory and is also opposed by the National Human Rights Commission, as infringing and putting at stake the LGBT’s human rights²⁴.

Further mentioning in this aspect involves the very form of reservations to be conferred, i.e., whether it needs to be a horizontal conferment of reservation on the basis of ‘gender identity under Article 15 of the constitution or to adopt a vertical reservation model wherein they will be categorized as a subset under the Socially and Educationally Backward Class (SEBC) category, under Article 16(4) of the constitution²⁵. Activists in this regard vigorously contest for the horizontal reservation over the vertical, as the clubbing down of LGBT persons under the banner of OBCs or SEBCs would curtail their self-identity as the third gender, and also when there is an express arrangement of providing for the gender-based reservations under Article 15. States like Karnataka have made a positive step in this regard by conferring 1% reservation for LGBTQIA+ people under the horizontal model for public sector jobs. While in Tamil Nādu, a vertical mode of reservation was conferred, wherein the third genders were placed under the Most Backward Classes (MBC), equivalent to the OBC category in other states²⁶.

5.     Protection of Transgenders Health-

The main issue of Navtej Johar involved the matter of consensual sex between two homosexuals or third genders, which is directly connected to the health of the LGBTQ community. However, the reality shows a clear sign of amplified discrimination against patients from this community, primarily due to the fact that the very practice and training of medical staff inculcates the idea that acts of lesbianism, homosexuality, etc., are the breeding grounds for other diseases like HIV AIDS, and therefore considered as unnatural. This, therefore, required proper sensitization and training facilities for the medical profession and also to include people from the same community in the medical field so they can better understand the problems of their own community.

High Courts in this regard have made due efforts to uphold the healthy life of LGBTs. Madras High Court in S. Sushma v. Commissioner of Police²⁷ case clearly emphasized mental as well as medical health support to LGBTs, caused due to the lack of knowledge on the part of the medical practitioners (a psychologist in that case), due to the prevalent queerphobia among the healthcare workers caused by the way MBBS course was designed in such a way. In Swati Bidhan Baruah v. State of Assam²⁸, a two-judge bench of the Guwahati High Court ordered the concerned government to take measures for the health and welfare of LGBTs.

Conclusion

This enormous research, over the 24 years of a legal battle by the LBTQIA+ community, shows the mixed response from the community- rendering this as a battle between traditional and conservative family-oriented approach to a more liberalized and modernized forward-looking and rights-centered approach, i.e., a battle of Naturalness v Unnaturalness, a battle of restrictions and autonomy-liberty. With this fact getting legal backing that homosexuality is natural, civil society demands protection of and equal treatment of the most vulnerable citizens. This aspect puts a further burden on the state to accommodate the feminist demands on the one hand and this emerging trend of the third gender on the other hand. This clears one straightforward inevitability of the reduced masculine majority trend in the public sphere- with an increased share of feminine and third genders coming into the public forum in multiple sectors, thereby representing every community’s view and accommodating every community’s needs. Indian laws are yet to witness radical changes for accommodating these issues, especially in the personal and matrimonial laws, which might also lead to a complete reading down of present laws and enacting more egalitarian ones, representing the liberties and privacies of all three genders.²⁹

References

1. Prabhash K Dutta, Homosexuality in ancient India: 10 instances, THE INDIA TODAY (July, 10, 2018, 18:40 IST), https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/10-instances-of-homosexuality-among-lgbts-in-ancient-india-1281446-2018-07-10
2. The same mythological tales were re-emphasized in Arunkumar v. Inspector General of Registration, 2019 SCC OnLine Mad 8779.
3. The Buggery Act, Parliament of England, 1553.
4. Geetanjali Mishra, Decriminalising homosexuality in India, RHM J, 2009, 21-22.
5. Naz Foundation v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2009 SCC OnLine Del 1762.
6. Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation (2014) 1 SCC 1.
7. National Legal Service Authorities v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438.
8. K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhar-5J.) v. Union of India, (2018) 1 SCC 809.
9. ADM, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, (1976) 2 SCC 521.
10. M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, 1954 SCR 1077.
11. Supra Note 7.
12. The Yogyakarta Principles, March 2007, https://translaw.clpr.org.in/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Yogyakarta-Principles.pdf.
13. Puneet Deshwal, Anadi Tiwari, Four years since the Supreme Court’s Navtej Johar verdict, matrimonial rights still remain in the closet, BAR AND BENCH (Sept 11th, 2022, 11:26 am), https://www.barandbench.com/columns/litigation-columns/four-years-since-the-supreme-courts-navtej-johar-verdict-matrimonial-rights-still-remain-in-the-closet?utm_source=izooto&utm_medium=push-notification.
14. A similar provision in Adoption Regulation, 2017, published on the official website of the Central Adoption Resource Authority (CARA), http://cara.nic.in/PDF/Regulation_english.pdf.
15. Arunkumar v. Inspector General of Registration, 2019 SCC OnLine Mad 8779.
16. Mahadeolal Kanodia v. Administrator-General of WB, (1960) 3 SCR 578.
17. S. Sushma v. Commissioner of Police, 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 2096.
18. Sofi Ahsan, Centre opposes same-sex marriage in Delhi HC, says not comparable with ‘Indian family unit concept,’ THE INDIAN EXPRESS (Feb 26th, 2021, 4:05:42 am), https://indianexpress.com/article/india/same-sex-marriages-legal-recognition-centre-7204303/.
19. Abhijeet Iyer Mitra v. Union of India, WP (C) No. 6371/2020 & CM Appl. No. 22554/2020.
20. Supra Note 15.
21. Supra Note 20.
22. Karan Tripathi, Marriage Equality For Same-Sex Couples: The Delhi HC Says This Is Not an Adversarial Petition, LIVE LAW (Oct 14th, 2020, 12:57 PM), https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/marriage-equality-for-same-sex-couples-the-delhi-hc-says-this-is-not-an-adversarial-petition-164444.
23. Live Law News Network, Gay Couple Moves Kerala HC For Recognition Of Homosexual Marriages Under Special Marriage Act, LIVE LAW (Jan 27th, 2020, 2:07 PM), https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/gay-couple-moves-kerala-hc-for-recognition-of-homosexual-marriages-under-special-marriage-act-152046
24. Shemin Joy, Introduce quota for LGBTQI+, bring law to prevent forced reassignment surgery: NHRC Core Group, DECCAN HERALD (Dec 14^th, 2020, 18:12 IST), https://www.deccanherald.com/national/introduce-quota-for-lgbtqi-bring-law-to-prevent-forced-reassignment-surgery-nhrc-core-group-927313.html
25. Reservation for Transgender persons in India, Centre For Law & Policy Research (Nov 11th, 2018), https://clpr.org.in/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Reservations-for-Transgender-Persons-Draft-Policy-Brief.pdf. 
26. Venkatesan V, Karnataka Becomes The First State To Reserve Jobs For Transgender Persons, THE WIRE (Jul 22^nd, 2021), https://thewire.in/lgbtqia/karnataka-first-state-reserve-jobs-transgender-persons.
27. Supra Note 18.
28. Swati Bidhan Baruah vs. The State of Assam and Ors. (06.09.2021 – GUHC) : MANU/GH/0523/2021.
29. Nayantara Ravichandran, Legal Recognition of Same-sex Relationships in India, vol 5 JILS, 95, 105-108 (2017).

This article is written by Mokshith Venkata Shiva Bhyri, a 2^nd-Year BA., LLB (Hons) student from the National Academy of Legal Studies and Applied Research (NALSAR), Hyderabad.

INTRODUCTION

On August 2, the Parliament passed the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2019. On August 8th, 2019, it was quickly approved by the President. The Amendment Act, which was passed by Parliament, resulted in a number of revisions to the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967. The primary modification was done to Section 35 of the Act. The most recent change to the law, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2019 (UAPA 2019), allows the Union Government to label individuals as terrorists without following due process. The UAPA is also referred to as the Anti-Terrorism Act. This amendment has received much criticism as it allowed the government to classify individuals as terrorists if the government suspects they are engaging in terrorism. When a person is so classified, their name is included in Schedule 4 of the statute. Prior to the amendment, only organizations could be classified as terrorist organizations. The current challenge to the 2019 Amendment Act is merely in its earliest stages, with the State yet to file its response. Nonetheless, due to the nature of the challenge and previous complaints of the legislation as excessive, the situation is poised to provide an excellent testing ground for the scope of the government’s discretion in anti-terror legislation.

The amendment resulted in sections 35 and 36 of Chapter VI of the Act being broadened – the term “terrorist” to include individuals. It also empowers the DG of the NIA to seize property derived from terrorist funds under Section 25 and personnel with the level of inspector and higher to investigate crimes under Section 43 of the UAPA. The Central Government also establishes a Review Committee to denote the individual who has been designated as a terrorist, effectively eliminating any institutional avenue for judicial review.

CHALLENGES TO THE AMENDMENT

The principal objections to the Amendment are based on Section 35, which, in addition to categorizing organizations as terrorist organizations, expanded the power to encompass the designation of individuals as terrorists. Two petitions were filed before the supreme court regarding the constitutional validity – Sajal Awasthi filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the Supreme Court against the UAPA, 2019, claiming that it is unconstitutional since it infringes basic fundamental rights. Another petition, filed by the Association for the Protection of Civil Rights (APCR), argued that the new Section 35 enables the Centre to classify an individual as a terrorist and include his individuality in Schedule 4 of the Act, whereas previously only organizations could be designated as terrorist organizations. The fundamental point of disagreement for both petitioners is that an individual can be classified as a terrorist with no judicial assessment and even before a lawsuit is filed, which is unreasonable. They claimed that the Amendment Act violated the rights to life (Article 21), free speech (Article 19), and equality guaranteed by the Constitution (Article 14). Opposers of the Amendment contend that it provides the executive arbitrary authority and infringes an individual’s right to due process, right to protest, and right to dignity. The Court marked these petitions, and on September 7, 2019, it sent notice to the Government. Sections 35 and 36, according to the petitioners, should be repealed and declared illegal. Based on the Awasthi lawsuit, the provision’s absence of defined standards for labelling someone a terrorist violates their right to equality. As a result, the clause is manifestly arbitrary. A law is clearly capricious and inconsistent with equality right if it is established without a proper guiding foundation and is exorbitant or disproportionate in character, according to the concept of obvious arbitrariness. Awasthi further claims that the amendment infringes the right to dissent, which is a component of free speech. They highlighted the judgements in Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras (1950) and Maqbool Fida Hussain v. Rajkumar Pandey (1950) to emphasize the importance of free expression and the accompanying freedom to disagree (2008). The grounds for the petition are as follows:

1. There is an absence of substantive and procedural fair trials – There is an absence of substantive and procedural fair trials. section 35 authorizes the government to label any individual as a terrorist under the Fourth Schedule of the UAPA. Without an elaborate process, the administration can proclaim and inform based on mere belief. There is no requirement for a fair hearing. The basis for declaring someone a terrorist is imprecise and ambiguous: would it be the filing of an FIR or a trial court conviction? While S. 36 allows an individual who has been designated as a terrorist to file an appeal with the government, its implementation is problematic. A person is not notified of the reason for his or her arrest. At the level of appeal, there isn’t any provision for an oral hearing. In the case of Puttaswamy v Union of India (2017), it was reaffirmed that only through due process of law could the right to life and personal liberty be restricted. Sections 35 and 36 violate the due process requirement.
2. The law is irrational and infringes on equality – The challenging part lacks safeguards against the considerable potential for discretionary power. While the method for designating an organization as a terrorist is robust, it is inappropriate for an individual. The handling of a person is disproportionate and inappropriate because there is no clear aim underlying the differentiation between an organization and an individual. This does not meet Article 14’s ‘reasonable classification’ criteria. Furthermore, the denial of a fair hearing violated the natural justice concept of audi alteram partem, or the fair hearing rule. Invoking the case of Union of India v Tulsiram Patel (1985), the petition claims that a violation of natural justice leads to arbitrariness and thus violates Article 14. The petition also mentioned People’s Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India (2004). The Court concluded that violating human rights in the fight against terrorism is counterproductive.
3. Indirect Infringement to Free Speech – According to Maqbool Fida Hussain v. Rajkumar Pandey, dissent is an essential component of the right to free expression under Article 19(1)(a) (2008). Under the pretence of banning terrorism, the challenged Sections are intended to restrict critical expression against the government. The change contradicts the international conventions approved by India. The Amendment specifically violates legal norms under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Counterterrorism.

CONCLUSION

The Amendment was already widely criticized since it gives the Union Government vast and indefinite authority to arrest anyone without following necessary procedures. The UAPA amendment empowers the government to violate a person’s basic rights to free speech, integrity, dissent, and reputation. The burden of evidence to counter the charges is on the individual, not just the state, and anyone can be branded a terrorist at the discretion of the government. Articles 14, 19(1)(a), and 21 of the Constitution are violated by the 2019 Act changes, and the legislature has no jurisdiction to take away a citizen’s fundamental rights because they are a fundamental component of the Constitution. Certain provisions of the recently amended UAPA, 2019, are irreconcilable with the legal structure of the country. To fight terrorism, this Act empowers the government to impose unofficial limitations on the right to free expression; yet these measures have unintended implications that limit the circulation of ideas within society. As a consequence of this law, countless journalists are placed on trial and required to withdraw their opinions on certain sensitive topics merely because the government considers that doing so will incite hatred, without giving any proof to support this claim. The most serious consequences can be witnessed in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. After Article 370 was repealed, the government gained control over the state. Many residents, especially reporters, are being tried under UAPA and are being denied the right to free expression guaranteed by Article 19(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, the Amendment contradicts the mandate of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The preceding arguments have demonstrated how the amendment jeopardizes its citizens’ fundamental rights and threatens the very existence of opposition. When such heinous legislation breaches and deprives citizens’ rights, it is the Supreme Court’s responsibility to intervene and re-establish faith in democracy. This Amendment shows the goal of laws enacted by colonial rule to stifle various liberation movements under the guise of maintaining public order.

CITATIONS

1. K.S. Puttaswamy and Anr. vs. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 (India).
2. Union Of India and Another vs Tulsiram Patel and Others, 1985 AIR 1416 (India).

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This article is written by Shraddha Vemula, a second-year B.B.A. LLB Student at Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad.

INTRODUCTION

India is a democratic country; therefore, the people of the country are its superheroes. The government, constitution, laws, and others, as such, all exist for the people and by the people. So, laws are meant for the citizens of the country, and they can be shaped by the people. In India, the law-making process is carried on by the central or union government for the whole country and by each state government for each state, as well as the local municipal councils and districts for their respective districts. The Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha are India’s two legislative houses, and for a law to be passed in India, it must pass through the two legislative houses of the parliament of India. A bill is used to present legislative proposals to either house of the Indian Parliament.

 A bill is a draught legislative proposal that, after being approved by both chambers of parliament and the president, becomes law. A law is not passed or enforced as such. It is first crafted as a bill by the legislative houses, and before it is enforced or passed, the bill must be passed or approved by both houses. A bill is a drafted legislative proposal that, after being approved by both chambers of parliament and the president, becomes law. After the bill has been drafted, it must be publicized in the newspapers and the people must be given a democratic opportunity to comment. The legislature must adopt a bill before it becomes a law, and in most situations, the administration must also approve it. A bill is referred to as an act of the legislature or a statute once it has been made into law. The President can assent, withhold assent, and send the measure back for consideration, and he can also sit on it if both houses of Congress concur. The bill then passes both houses if they agree. The president will then sign this agreed-upon bill into law, making it applicable throughout the country. 

DEMOCRATIZATION IN LAW-MAKING       

As a democratic country, there must be public participation in the law-making process. As a democratic country, there must not only be the right to franchise and elect their representative but the people must also participate in the law-making process. In the democratization of law-making, the central government must publish the details of the legislation. The drafted bill must contain the provisions, its impact on the environment and the lives of the affected people. The public must be given 30 days to comment. Comments are submitted to the parliamentary standing committee to amend the necessary provisions in the bill to make the bill people-friendly.

THE PRE-LEGISLATIVE CONSULTATION POLICY

The Pre-Legislative Consultation Policy was developed by the Central Government in 2014. This policy gives individuals like you and me the opportunity to participate in the drafting of laws before it is to made or enforced as law in our country. According to this policy, the government must give a chance to all the people of the country to participate in the process of law-making so that the law made by the government is for all. Since the law made by the government will be for the good of the public and since the people themselves are involved in the law-making process, the law made will not be violated on a large scale and will be followed by the majority of the population. This ideology of law-making is successfully achieved by the government publishing the proposals made by the legislative assembly to the general public to receive their feedback on any draught or proposed legislation for at least 30 days. Public consultation is the procedure where you inform the government of your opinions on how a policy might affect you.

These requests for comment must include the proposed legislation or at the very least information about it, such as its financial ramifications and effects on the environment, citizens’ lives and livelihoods, and their fundamental rights. The main objective of the Pre-Legislative Consultation Policy is to assist citizens in legitimate and expanding demands for more transparency from the government. This policy is considered to be the most effective tool for citizens to participate in the process of law-making in our country in a democratic manner.

It is important that laws be drafted in a democratic form. In the first place, we, the people, elect our representatives and they make the laws for us in parliament, and we the people play a crucial role in shaping those laws made by them. They also ensure that the final policy or law drafted is relevant and serves the people for whom it was drafted.

It is essential that we have policy tools like PLP in a nation like ours with such a wide range of interests so that all groups feel as though their opinions are given the proper respect and recognition. To make sure that the government receives useful suggestions from those whose lives will be impacted by its laws, consultation with the pertinent stakeholders is essential.

The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill of 2017, which forbids the practice of triple talaq, is a clear illustration of this. The appropriate organizations weren’t appropriately contacted before the measure was enacted. One of the many errors in the bill is that triple talaq was stated as a cognizable offence. Another alarming development is that the police were given the right to hold Muslim men without any judicial review or inquiry into whether the subject actually warranted detention. In essence, this meant that the rules were still in effect even though neither spouse had filed a formal complaint. Additionally, the government did not draught the measure after engaging with concerned representatives of civil society, such as advocates for women’s rights, defence attorneys, or even Muslims. In this case, the bill or the law passed by the legislative assembly would have been drafted more effectively if a pre-legislative consultative procedure had been used

The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Bill, 2016, which drastically curtailed the rights of transgender people as recognized in the seminal case of NALSA v. Union of India¹, serves as another illustration of how the government neglected to engage with concerned community members. The transgender community essentially rejected the Bill outright because they felt it was not in their best interests because it was not adequately discussed and consulted with during the bill’s development. In short, the Bill incorrectly lumps intersex people and transgender people together, seeing them as interchangeable, and it neglected to adequately address significant issues at the time, like the repeal of Section 377 of the IPC. It also did not respond to the Trans community’s widespread call for inclusive marital and inheritance rules. Another grievous omission was the failure to gender-neutralize offences in order to properly exclude members of the transgender community. In this instance, much more effective legislation could have been drafted if a pre-legislative consultative procedure had been used, in which the Trans community had been properly informed and consulted before the Bill was drafted.

Kerala has set an example for Pre Legislative Consultation Policy. In Kerala, the state ensures public participation to draft its police law. The draft bill was placed on the Kerala police website inviting feedback from the public at large. When the draft bill was introduced in the house at that time there was a district-level town hall meeting. A select Committee was set up and amendments were made which included people-friendly provisions. And Kerala Police Act was passed.

CONCLUSION

There will be effective law-making only when the public also participates in the law-making process. The Second Administrative Reforms Commission has emphasized that public participation in law-making is vital for the functioning of the law-making process. The policy-making and law-making process should be available in regional language also so that the people would understand the law and suggest some changes in the law.  Public comment is essential and necessary changes should also be made by the legislature. Our country should develop a social audit legislation wherein there must be a legal obligation on policymakers to consult the public.  

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CITATIONS

1. SC Writ Petition (Civil) No. 400 of 2012

This article is written by Sree Lekshmi B J; third year law student from Sastra University, Thanjavur.

Introduction

A company is an artificial person that exists to serve a purpose, but some circumstances could cause it to fail. When a company fails, it could potentially eliminate jobs for everyone connected to it and have a detrimental effect on the nation’s economy.

Every effort is made to prevent this from happening, but when it couldn’t be helped and an organization is about to enter into insolvency proceedings, the transactions and agreements made by the organization prior to the start of those proceedings are assessed, and those that are found to be detrimental to the organization and those connected to it or that violate the interests of the debtor or the creditor are deemed null and void. Avoidance of pre-bankruptcy procedures is the name of the process.

The laws governing insolvency and bankruptcy have figured out how to strike a balance between the rights of the debtor and the creditor. The debtor cannot be forced to sell off assets like shares of stock, real estate, or other assets, or to sign a contract that goes against his rights or interests in any way by creditors of the entity with the authority to collect debts from the debtor’s estate. The activities taken and agreements made in this regard are avoidable and preventable in order to safeguard the interests of the debtors, and as a result, are referred to as avoidable transactions.

The protection of debtors’ assets, their maximization as a value, and the availability of credit in place of those assets continue to be the goals of avoidable transactions. Ultimately, improving the company’s financial situation and streamlining the resolution procedure will result in a fair allocation of the assets.

Prior to the start of the insolvency proceedings, the two parties may enter into contracts involving simple assets like shares, buildings, or land or more complex agreements like those involving a franchise, taking over construction projects, etc. Given its prominence and value as one of a company’s most precious assets, the land would be a target for any creditor who set out to pay off their debts to the debtor while ignoring other creditors. Land contracts between a creditor and a debtor should be avoided in addition to all other contracts.

The UNCITRAL model, in accordance with part 2 of its legislative guide, calls for the avoidance of specific transactions on the part of the debtor in order to guarantee the treatment of all creditors equally and protect the rights of the debtors and prevent them from being coerced by creditors into entering into a contract for the transfer of any asset at a value that is less than its true value.

Avoiding favoritism on the part of the debtor is another way to look at the situation. The debtor can prefer one creditor over another and get into an agreement with him on the transfer of an asset as soon as they learn that bankruptcy procedures will soon begin.

To ensure the preservation of the rights of all parties involved, these transactions that were made before the start of the insolvency procedures are canceled or declared to be ineffective. There are differences between the rules of different countries, even though different jurisdictions have based their insolvency laws on the UNCITRAL model.

Under sections 43 to 51 of the 2016 Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, transactions that can be avoided, commonly known as vulnerable transactions, are addressed.

Under the IBC, the following transactions can be avoided:

1. Preferential Transaction
2. Undervalued Transaction
3. Extortionate Credit Transaction

According to section 46 of the 2016 IBC, the debtor must avoid the aforementioned transactions throughout the relevant period, which is two years in the case of a related party and one year in all other cases before the insolvency beginning date.

Model and Avoidance Procedures for UNCITRAL

The UNCITRAL Model Law is intended to help States give their insolvency laws a contemporary legal foundation so that they can deal with cross-border insolvency processes involving debtors who are in serious financial difficulty or insolvency more efficiently¹. The legislative guide is composed of four parts on insolvency legislation, covering the objectives, structural issues, mechanisms for resolving the debtor’s financial difficulties, the start, termination, and avoidance of proceedings, as well as other similar provisions that call for detailed consideration.

In the legislative guide’s part 2 on debtor rights, it is stated that it is preferable for the right to keep those excluded assets to be made clear in the insolvency law when a debtor is a natural person and that certain assets are typically excluded from the insolvency estate to allow the debtor to preserve its rights and those of its family².

Avoidance proceedings are likewise covered by recommendations 87 to 99 in the same section of the legislative handbook. The avoidance proceedings are based on a general principle of insolvency law that gives priority to the collective goal and overall maximization of the value of the assets and credit availability to facilitate equal treatment for all the creditors and the debtor’s rights rather than providing individual remedies to the creditors who could claim the assets by entering into a contract with the debtor before the commencement of the insolvency proceedings.

“Provisions dealing with avoidance powers are designed to support these collective goals, ensuring that creditors receive a fair allocation of an insolvent debtor’s assets consistent with established priorities and preserving the integrity of the insolvency estate,” reads a statement about this in the guide.

The UNCITRAL model also stipulates a few avoidance criteria. There are several factors, including the normal course of business, defenses, and both subjective and objective criteria. The state may choose any of the criteria as long as the overall goal—to strike a balance between the interests of the individual and the estate—remains the same.

Criteria

1. Objective Criteria: The focus is on measurable issues, such as whether the transaction occurred during the questionable time frame and whether it demonstrated any of the several broad legal requirements.
2. Subjective Criteria: The subjective approach is more case-specific, and the issues that might come up include whether there was a desire to conceal assets from creditors and when the debtor became insolvent—whether that occurred during or after the transaction.
3. Combination of the two: The majority of states’ insolvency laws are more subjective in nature, but they also provide a deadline by which the transaction must have been completed. For instance, in India, the applicable period is two years for a related party and one year for any other creditor.
4. Ordinary Course of Business: There is a distinction made between what might be seen as a routine or ordinary business transaction and what is extraordinary and ought to be avoided as part of an avoidable transaction. Along with conventions and standard business practices, the debtor’s prior actions may have an impact here.

The states are allowed to use either of the criteria as a starting point when deciding how to handle the aforementioned unnecessary transactions.

Avoidance tactics used worldwide

Different jurisdictions follow different sets of avoiding powers; by classifying them broadly, we can conclude that there are single sets and double sets of avoiding powers. Civil law countries like France and Spain are followers of a single set of avoiding powers, whereas common law countries follow a double set of avoiding powers. As previously stated, the UNCITRAL model is merely providing a guide to the states to formulate proper avoidance actions.

• American Viewpoint: A technique to invalidate perfectly legal transactions because they were made before the start of insolvency proceedings is the use of clawback actions or avoidance powers. The usual justification for invalidating such a deal is that the creditors who would be getting the firm’s assets but losing all control over them once the formal processes started would try to seize control of them beforehand by manipulation or other unethical ways. The transactions made before the bankruptcy proceedings, as was already indicated, are detrimental to the firm’s assets worthwhile also violating the rights of the debtor and other creditors. The goal of American bankruptcy law is to give creditors the most advantage possible.
• Automatic Stay: A fundamental tenet of the American insolvency regime is the automatic stay. When insolvency procedures begin, the rules of the automatic stay described in Section 362 of the bankruptcy code take effect. Any creditor would not be able to seize any assets or property from the debtor as a result of the stay. By allowing the creditors to pursue their recovery options, this approach benefits them. However, there are some exceptions to the automatic stay, and the court can change it if there is a good basis to do so. Creditors are protected by the automatic stay because it prevents the value of the debtor’s property from declining and guarantees that it is distributed fairly.
• Absolute Priority Rule: Another important tenet of the US insolvency process is the Absolute Priority Rule. This rule is based on fairness and equity because it requires that creditors who have investments be paid in priority to other creditors who have smaller investments. Because equity holders have the lowest priority, they will be paid last and secured creditors will be paid first. However, this rule can be circumvented by voting of senior members; if votes of senior members are obtained, payment of junior class or unsecured creditors can be possible.
• Avoidance action: The bankruptcy law in the US outlines several techniques that let debtors avoid the pre-bankruptcy transfer of assets. Due to the possibility of bias on the part of creditors, this affords debtors the right to raise the worth of their bankruptcy estate and prevent its decline before filing for bankruptcy.

• Australian Viewpoint: The clauses specified in the Bankruptcy Act, 1924-1946 deal with the transfer of property under Australian law at the time of bankruptcy. It is addressed in Section 95 of the Act, which states that if the debtor declares bankruptcy on a bankruptcy petition filed within six months, any transfer of property, payment, or obligation made in favor of any creditor or person acting in the creditor’s behalf and a creditor a preference, precedence, or other benefits over other creditors, shall be null and void. The Downs Distributing Co. Pty. Ltd. V. Associated Blue Star Stores Pty. Ltd. In the end, the court’s conclusion was influenced by the bankruptcy act’s Ltd provision.
• Indian Viewpoint: The common law nations influence the avoidance powers of the insolvency and bankruptcy code, which is a relatively young piece of legislation. Contracts for the transfer of assets or property may be the subject of avoidance procedures, which are covered under Sections 43 to 51.

Any contract involving the transfer of any asset or property may be avoided, and the parties may declare any contracts they have entered into to be null and void. Land contracts are no exception; the Jaypee Infratech Limited v. Axis Bank Limited case is the ideal illustration of how to prevent a transaction based on the transfer of real property.

In this instance, the holding company of Jaypee Infratech Limited, Jaiprakash Associates Limited (JIL), established the aforementioned subsidiary as a special purpose vehicle for the construction of an expressway and entered into a contract with the Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority. Loans were obtained for this purpose from several banks jointly, and the land and 51 percent of JIL’s stock were mortgaged.

Later, when an IDBI bank petition was filed about it, some of JIL’s lenders declared it to be a non-performing asset, and the NCLT issued an order under section 7 of the IBC, 2016 to start the insolvency procedures. The corporate debtor engaged in transactions that resulted in an obligation on its immovable property, and those transactions were alleged to have been preferential, undervalued, and fraudulent in the application submitted by the designated IRP.

The request was reviewed and approved. The creditors filed an appeal to invalidate the NCLT orders.

The issues, therefore, faced by the supreme court were as follows:

1. Whether the transactions entered into by the debtor undervalued, preferential and fraudulent?

2. Whether the respondents were financial creditors given the fact that the property was mortgaged to them?

The land was mortgaged, according to the NCLT, to mislead the lenders. The debtor was already in financial trouble at the time the transactions were made, and the creditors were aware of the debtor’s predicament at the time the mortgage contract was signed. Because the debtor’s only goal was to make money, the adjudicating authority believed that the debtor was attempting to conduct a fraudulent transaction during the twilight period and did not meet the definition of an ordinary course of business.

The appellate authority, on the other hand, determined that the mortgage was made in the normal course of business and therefore section 43(2) was not invoked. Additionally, the transactions were not preferential nor undervalued, and the adjudicating authority cannot issue any directives in this regard.

The apex court determined that the debtors had engaged in a preferential transaction in terms of preference. The supreme court upheld NCLT’s ruling and declared that section 43³ applied to the current situation. A translation must pass the three-fold criteria to qualify as a preferential transaction under this clause, i.e. observing Sections 43(4) and 43(2) criteria, and not violating any of the Section 43 exceptions (3).

The transactions in which the corporate debtor shall be judged to have been granted a preference are discussed in subsection 2 section 43. The clause expressly mentions a corporate debtor transferring property or an interest in that property to a creditor in exchange for payment of financial or operational debt. The clause intends to invalidate any transactions involving the transfer of property in which a corporate debtor granted precedence. hence include transactions relating to land within its purview.

The Goodwill Theaters v. Sunteck Realty, in which it was questioned whether the developer who had been granted development rights by the landowner should be classified as an operational creditor, adopted a different strategy and determined that because the transfer of development rights did not amount to the supply of goods or services, the developer would not be classified as an operational creditor.

The aforementioned transactions specified in subsection 3 will not be regarded as preferential transactions if the transfer is carried out in the ordinary course of business and is establishing a security interest in the property.

Undervalued transactions are another sort of transaction that can be prevented thanks to section 45 of the code. The IRP believed that the transactions in the aforementioned matter of Jaypee Infratech were not only preferential but also undervalued; nonetheless, it was finally decided that the transaction was undervalued. A deal is considered undervalued if the corporate debtor pays less than the asset’s true value.

The aforementioned situation is another illustration of a transaction that may be avoided because it is cheating the creditors. The IBC’s Section 49 addresses the prohibition against deceiving the creditor. This clause would apply if the corporate debtor had purposefully entered into a transaction at a discount.

Last but not least, the IBC allows for exorbitant credit transactions, another category of unnecessary transactions. In Section 50, extortionate transactions are discussed. A transaction is deemed exorbitant if it is unfavorable to the corporate debtor and is made at a time when the debtor is at its most vulnerable. It’s possible that the contract was either blindly signed by the debtor without reading it or that it was purposefully drafted in the creditor’s favor so that the debtor would sign it while at a vulnerable moment.

Conclusion

We have determined that some transactions are avoidable and, as a result, ruled void if there is a conflict between the interests of the debtor and any other creditors, including the firm. Regarding the laws governing such proceedings, diverse perspectives have been adopted by jurisdictions around the world. However, it is important to make very thorough judgments about the deals and agreements made.

They might be produced as part of routine company operations. Land contracts, in particular, the land being one of the most important assets of any business could become an easy target by the creditors who desire to injure the debtor by taking it away at a reduced price, at the same time the debtor could also engage in a land transaction with ill will. To protect the interests of all parties involved, the avoidance procedures must therefore be thoroughly assessed and finally dismissed.

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References

1. UNCITRAL Model on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997) available at https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/insolvency/modellaw/cross-border_insolvency
2. UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law Part 2 https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/05-80722_ebook.pdf Page 167 Point 20.
3. (1) Where the liquidator or the resolution professional, as the case may be, is of the opinion that the corporate debtor has at a relevant time given a preference in such transactions and in such manner as laid down in sub-section (2) to any persons as referred to in sub-section (4), he shall apply to the Adjudicating Authority for avoidance of preferential transactions and for, one or more of the orders referred to in section 44.

This article is written by Bhagyashri Neware, LLM student from Maharashtra National Law University, Aurangabad.

Background

The Constitution has been modified multiple times in order to keep up with societal changes. The Constitution was written to build an equitable society in which social, economic, and political justice are preserved, as well as equality of position and opportunity for all. Amendments to the Constitution are also made with the same goal and intent in mind. According to India’s legal history, anytime the Supreme Court issued a ruling on reservations, the Parliament would either reject or restrain the uncomfortable judicial declaration by amending the Constitution. One such example is the ratification of the Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019, which aimed to grant reservations to economically disadvantaged parts of society.

The Constitution Amendment Act of 2019 amended Articles 15 and 16 of the Indian Constitution. These two clauses provide the foundation of reservation in sectors like education and government employment. The legislation enabled the state to grant a maximum of 10% reserve for “economically weaker parts” of society by inserting two additional articles into Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution. As a consequence, the total number of reservations over and above the existing programme has risen to 59.50 percent.

Need for the 103rd Amendment

1. This specific amendment will deal with a problem that is prevalent in India, which is the upper caste pupils who were unable to attend public employment and further education owing to improper family financial structure.
2. Also, many of the upper caste residents live in poverty and starvation.
3. The higher caste poor will be able to receive the same level of quota as OBC thanks to this adjustment to the reservation policy.
4. The upper caste used to despise people who entered the country through reservations, but this amendment will help to end that practice.

What were the Amendments and the Additions?

1. The Amendment added clauses 15(6) and 16(6) to the corresponding provisions of Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution, respectively.
2. The amendment gave the state the power to pass legislation aimed at “advancing any economically disadvantaged portion of citizens other than the classes indicated (in the preceding provisions).”
3. Article 15(6)(b) specifically mentions “admission to educational institutions including private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State, other than the minority educational institutions referred to in clause (1) of article 30. Article 15(6)(a) discusses allowing the enactment of special provisions of any kind.
4. EWS reservations are required per Article 16.6 in situations involving “appointments or postings.
5. The Act specifies a 10% cap on this reserve as its maximum.

The requirement for amending Constitutional clauses

For social and economic advancement, the Constitution is modified. In the case of Keshavanada Bharati v. The State of Kerala (1973), it was noted that the people would turn to extra-constitutional tactics, such as a revolution, to modify the Constitution if no provisions were created for its amendment. Politicians have characterized the federal constitution as stiff because of the way amendments are made in federations. The American Constitution’s amending process is exceedingly challenging. The federal Constitution is frequently criticized for being overly conservative and for being too difficult to change.

The Indian Constitution was therefore drafted in a way that would allow it to adjust to the shifting needs and circumstances of an expanding people in order to avoid becoming inflexible. However, the framers did not want to make the Constitution overly pliable since it would have allowed the ruling party to play to its whims and fancies. The Constitution may be changed since it is neither too strict nor too flexible. According to Willis, there would always be a risk of revolution if no provisions for the amendment were made to the United States Constitutional Law. The risk of taking action that is too quickly would always exist if the technique of the modification were too simple. Our political institutions would be at risk of being overthrown in any scenario.

Therefore, the goal behind altering the Constitution under Article 368 was to bring about societal transformation. The Constitution’s amendment process functions as a safety valve designed to maintain the document’s provisions and to allow for amendments if needed. The risk of having a non-amendable Constitution and the risk of a Constitution that is too easily amendable have therefore been balanced by the constitution-makers.

The challenge to the Constitution’s validity

The Constitution’s “Identity” is formed by certain structural concepts, which include federalism, equality, freedom, secularism, independence of the judiciary, power of judicial review, democratic form of government, republican form of government, and others. The basic structural theory established this, thus it cannot be changed without destroying the constitution’s unique character. The Supreme Court ruled in the precedent-setting case of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala that the Parliament’s ability to amend the Constitution under Article 368 is not absolute and that even a Constitutional amendment can be invalidated if it has the result of destroying or repealing the “basic structure” of the Constitution.

A government office memo from the P.V. Narasimha Rao administration in September 1991 set aside 10% of positions for “other economically deprived categories.” In Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, the Supreme Court overturned this judgment. The court examined the legality of the quotas in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India and Ors., carefully analyzing the idea of backwardness. As per, Dr. BR Ambedkar, the classes of people for whom reservations were to be introduced are those “communities who have not had thus far representation in the State.” Indra Sawhney, where it was believed that the Constitution allowed for “appropriate representation” rather than “proportionate representation,” explains one of the reasons why the quota limit was set at 50%.

The following is a list of some of the crucial decisions made in the Indra Sawhney case regarding reservations:

• It upheld the 27% OBC reservation with the condition that the “creamy layer” excluded.
• It declared that a backward class of citizens cannot be established solely and exclusively with regard to economic backward criteria and nullified the 10% quota for economically backward portions.
• It was decided that the reservations made for backlog or carried-forward vacancies were valid; should not exceed 50% of the annual appointments
• It was decided that reservations may only be issued for a service or category if the State was satisfied that the representation of people from the underprivileged class was insufficient.

Does the action contradict the Constitution’s basic structure doctrine?

Youth for Equality, a non-profit organization, filed a Public Interest Litigation with the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, alleging that the legislation’s decision to grant a ten percent reservation to students from economically disadvantaged groups in public and private educational institutions violates the fundamental principles of the Constitution and supersedes earlier rulings.

The question that emerges initially is that can the basic rights be amended? This can be explained by the 1951 case of Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, in which the constitutionality of the First Amendment Act of 1951, which included Articles 31 A and 31 B, was contested. The argument against the Amendment was that it violates the rights granted by Part III, which is prohibited under Article 13(2) and is therefore invalid. It was argued that because Parliament is included in the definition of “state” in Article 12, the term “Law” in Article 13(2) must also refer to a constitutional amendment.

The next issue is whether the Constitution’s fundamental principles are violated by the Act. The solution may be found by first defining the idea of the fundamental structure before concluding. Although the courts have made various rulings in this regard, they have not defined the idea of the Constitution’s fundamental structure. The idea was debated in the well-known Kesavananda Bharati Case, in which the petitioners actually contested the legitimacy and scope of Article 368, arguing that it lacked any restrictions and so ran counter to the fundamental principles of the constitution.

Critical evaluation

The Indian Constitution establishes an “equality code” to address historical injustices and the obvious inequality in higher education and state jobs. Everyone is guaranteed equal protection under the law and equality before the law under Article 14.

In M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, the Supreme Court declared that the reservation should not exceed 50% and overturned the 68% restriction imposed by Article 15 (4) on admissions to medical and engineering institutes in the (then) State of Mysore. According to the rationale behind the “50% ceiling” for reservations in the M.R. Balaji case, the exception cannot supersede the rule. There is nothing to prevent the State from exceeding the “50% ceiling” for reservations if Article 16(4) does not constitute an exception to Article 16(1), provided that the total population of the underrepresented classes is not itself less than 50%. In India, nevertheless, this is not the case.

However, the Supreme Court determined in State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas that Article 16(1), which is a component of the equality theory, allows for the reasonable classification of all people who are in a comparable situation with regard to a statute identical to Article 14[11]. In other words, even without Article 16(4) of the Indian Constitution, Article 16(1) itself enables reserves and preferential treatment.

In other words, even without Article 16(4) of the Indian Constitution, Article 16(1) itself enables reserves and preferential treatment. Article 16(4) only seeks to make explicit what is already implicit in Article 16 and does not seek to be an exception to Article 16(1). (1). The alternative argument, on the other hand, contends that Articles 15(4) and 16(4), which allow for racial and ethnic minorities in public employment and education, are “exceptions” to Articles 15(1) and 16(1)’s provisions for equality and non-discrimination, and that therefore, exceeding the “50 per ceiling” constitutes reverse discrimination. Indra Sawhney’s decision by the Supreme Court, in essence, constitutes a compromise between M.R. N.M. and Balaji Thomas. It established a compromise between nominal equality and substantive equality by reinstating the “50% ceiling” norm.

Conclusion

The Constitution has been amended and introduced in order to stay up with societal advancements. In order to assure economic upliftment for the populace and to offer benefits to those who experience unemployment and are unable to pay for their school costs, the Constitutional Amendment Act, 2019 has also been proposed and passed. The other fundamental rights and other Constitutional provisions are not in any manner at odds with the Act. It may be said that by revising the Act, the government has given all people equal rights and benefits in terms of economic advancement and has in reality acceded to the Constitution of India’s requirements.

---

Citations

1. The Gazette of India.
2. Indian Constitution, art. 15.
3. Indian Constitution, art. 16.
4. Kesavananda Bharati vs State Of Kerala And Anr , 1973.
5. The Constitution of the United States: A Transcription | National Archives. (2015, November 4). National Archives. https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript
6. Indian Constitution, art. 368.
7. Indra Sawhney Etc. vs Union Of India And Others, Etc., 1992.
8. Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo vs Union Of India And State Of Bihar, 1951.
9. M. R. Balaji And Others vs State Of Mysore, 1962.
10. State Of Kerala & Anr vs N. M. Thomas & Ors, 1975.

This article is written by Puneet Kaur, a second-year student.

INTRODUCTION

Association refers to a group of people or entities that come together to form a group to achieve a particular objective over a period of time. A person cannot evolve if he is isolated from the rest of his community. To survive in society, people are required to have the company of others with whom they can communicate. Hence, people are compelled by the need to co-exist and create connections with one another. Participation in various organizations and groups assists a person in staying in touch and being educated about the current happenings in society. In a constitutional democracy, the liberty to assemble and the freedom of association are central tenets of citizens’ lives. These liberties empower citizens to organize for the pursuit of communal goals and to connect with one another. It also gives them the right to protest, as a result, they are among the rights and liberties that are limited by any State.

Article 19(1)(c) of the Indian Constitution empowers all citizens to form organizations, unions, or cooperative societies. However, under Article 19, clause (4), the state can implement restrictions on this freedom in the interests of public order, morals, and the sovereignty and integrity of the nation. Until recently, most Western nations not only prohibited union activity but it was also considered as being an anti-social and anti-state issue in many countries. After World War I, the State took cognizance of the matter and was compelled to take significant efforts to guarantee the working class’s fundamental rights through labour and industrial legislation. Asserting upon such rights as fundamental and upholding them within a Constitution was a much more daring step. Recognizing the contemporary trends, India’s Constitution has declared the right of workers to organize unions a fundamental right.

SIGNIFICANCE OF FREEDOM TO FORM ASSOCIATIONS           

These organizations ensure that everyone has the right to organize and join unions, whether informally or formally. It is the enabling right, at the foundation of rule of law and democracy, to allow non-state entities to participate effectively in economic and social policy. It guarantees that both employees and employers are represented, which is vital for the smooth running of both labour markets and a country’s overall governance. These organizations encourage people to express their opinions and help them get to know others. They also aid their members in developing an identity and achieving a reputable standing by improving an individual’s understanding and instilling vital ideals in them.

In the case of State of Madras v. V.G. Rao, the Supreme Court held that the freedom to form groups or unions has a broad and diversified scope for its practice, and its restriction is loaded with varied consequences arising from religious, political, and economic sectors. The apex court also stated that the government has the authority to impose restrictions on such rights without allowing their factual and legal aspects to be duly tested during a judicial inquiry is a robust element that must be considered while assessing the legality of the constraints put on the exercise of the right under Article 19(1)(c).

The legitimacy of the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Act, 1962, was questioned in the case of Damayanti v. Union of India as a violation of Article 19(1)(c). The petitioner belonged to an organization whose composition was altered due to the Act by bringing in new members. The members who willingly founded the association now were obligated to operate in the association with several other members over whose admittance they had no influence. The Supreme Court ruled that the Act infringed the rights of the people to join an organization, as granted by Art 19(1)(c). The right to create an association, necessarily entails that the person founding the group likewise has the right to continue to be affiliated with only those who willingly admit themselves to the association, the court stated.

Any legislation that introduces members into a voluntary association without allowing the members to keep them out, or any law that strips away the affiliation of those who have willingly joined it, shall be a law that violates the freedom to create an association. The Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Act does more than only control the management of the original society’s business; it also changes the constitution of the association itself. As a result, the Act breaches the freedom of the society’s founding members to form an organization, as granted by Article 19(1)(c). As a result, the Act breaches the freedom of the society’s founding members to form an organization, as granted by Article 19(1)(c).

Right to form Associations for Defence Personnel:

In the case of Ous Kutilingal Achudan Nair v. Union of India, a crucial question emerged as to whether civilian personnel classified as non-combatants, such as chefs, barbers, mechanics, tailors, etc, attached to Defence Establishments had the right to form or join organizations or unions. The appellants were affiliates of city employee unions in several facilities of the Defence Establishment, and their unions were ruled illegal by the Commandment. They claimed that the action infringed their basic freedom to form or join associations or unions under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution. They maintained that, while members of the unions were attached to the Defence Establishments, their employment conditions were governed by the Civil Service Rules, and so they could not be referred to as “members of the Armed Forces” under Art 33 of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court rejected the appellants’ arguments and held that civilian workers of Defence Establishments fit the character of members of the Armed Forces under Article 33 and, as such, were not allowed to organize trade unions. It is their responsibility to follow or accompany Armed Personnel on active duty, in camp, or on the march. Even though they are non-combatants and are subject to Civil Service Rules in some areas, they are essential to the Armed Forces. As a result, the Central Government has the authority under the Army Act to impose laws restricting or curbing their basic right under Article 19(1)(c).

Right to form Associations while in Government or Civil Services:

In the case of G.K. Ghosh v. E.X. Josef, Rule 4-B of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955, states that a government servant must not join or continue to be a member of the Association of State Employees as soon as the recognition granted to such association is withdrawn, or if the association is formed, no recognition is granted within six months. The Supreme Court held that making the requirement of recognition of the association a right would be futile and illusory and that imposing such a requirement on the right of the association will have no bearing on the public order of the State.

REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS

As with any other fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 19, the right to associate is not absolute and may be limited to the public good. Article 19(4) specifically authorizes the State to adopt legislation that limits, abridges, or eliminates any or all the rights granted by Article 19(1)(c). Clause (4) allows the state to impose reasonable limits on the freedom to organize groups in the best interest of India’s sovereignty and integrity, civil security, and morality.

Grounds for the restrictions imposed-

• Threat to Sovereignty and/or Integrity of India; To protect the country’s sovereignty, the right to form associations can be curtailed if it jeopardizes the country’s unity.
• Threat to Public Order; To ensure the safety, public peace, order, and tranquillity of the country, the right to establish an association can be curtailed.
• Threat to Morality; This freedom may be limited when an association’s or individual’s conduct includes indecency, obscenity, or immorality.

Following are the elements of the restrictions that can be imposed-

• Only a legislative authority can impose such restrictions.
• Reasonable restrictions are required to be included.
• A judicial authority like a Judge has the authority to check for the legality of any or all the restrictions imposed upon by any such acts of the legislative authority on the following grounds; 1) Whether the restrictions are reasonably imposed or afforded by the people. 2) Whether the restrictions are being imposed for the purposes mentioned in the article.

In the case of P. Balakotaih v. Union of India, the appellant’s services were discontinued under Railway Service Rules because he was a communist party member and a trade unionist. The appellant asserted that his dismissal from service amounted to a deprivation of his freedom to organize an association. The appellant had a basic right to form or join an association or union, however, he had no fundamental right to continue working for the government. As a result, it was determined that the order discontinuing his employment did not violate Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution since it did not preclude him from being a member of the Communist Party as a trade unionist.

In the case of Hazi Mohammad Ibrahim v. District School Board Malda, it was seen that a limitation requiring a teacher to obtain prior authorization to engage in political activity is a reasonable restriction. It attempted to prohibit teachers from being active in political institutions since it may influence their opinions on specific themes which may impede pupils’ overall education.

In the case of S. Ramkrishnaiah v. President District Board, Nellore, a government order compelling municipal teachers not to join unions other than those officially sanctioned was held to be administrative censorship on the freedom to form or join association and union and was hence unlawful.

CONCLUSION

We can hence infer that such associations, clubs, groups, and other organizations do play an important part in an individual’s life. They also play a significant role in shaping his perception and convincing him to have a larger perspective on everything that happens in society. The Constitution ensures that no citizen dwelling within the nation’s territorial boundaries is denied the right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c). At the same time, citizens must guarantee that peace, discipline, and order remain in society throughout the founding of an organization and during their membership term. It is also vital that the establishment, participation, and even survival of such organizations do not operate as a roadblock or an impediment to the country’s advancement and development. If people participating in them have a bad or comparable goal or purpose, the democratic system would become imbalanced. It is in such cases that the state will step in to protect the welfare and well-being of the country’s population. These groups should help everyone be united, and enjoy this constitutionally granted liberty to its advantage for achieving the greater good.

REFERENCES

1. State of Madras v. V.G. Rao, 1952 AIR 196
2. Damayanti Naranga v. Union of India, 1971 AIR 966
3. Ous Kutilingal Achudan Nair v. Union of India, 1976 AIR 1179
4. G.K. Ghosh v. E.X. Josef, 1963 AIR 812
5. P. Balakotaih v. Union of India, 1958 AIR 232
6. Hazi Mohammad Ibrahim v. District School Board Malda, AIR 1958 Cal 401
7. S. Ramkrishnaiah v. President District Board, Nellore, AIR 1952 Mad 253

This article is written by Namay Khanna, a 3^rd year BBA LLB (Hons.) student at Symbiosis Law School, Pune.

Introduction

The Constitution of the Republic of India is the largest in the world. It describes India as a Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, which has a parliamentary system of governance. The Indian Constitution was adopted on the 26^th Day of November 1949 and was officially enforced from 26^th January 1950. It took 2 years, 11 months, and 18 days for the constituent assembly to write the constitution. The Indian Constitution is a living document and is the supreme source and authority of law in India, but since its creation, the Constitution has been amended multiple times. Beginning with 395 Articles and 8 Schedules, it presently remains stands at 450 Articles and 12 Schedules resulting from 105 amendments. The 1^st Amendment to the Constitution was made in 1951, whereas the most recent, 105^th Amendment, was made in 2021.

Both rigid and flexible, the Indian Constitution is virtually amendable but difficult to change. The Indian Constitution stipulates that the government may amend the constitution as per Article 368. There are two distinct kinds of amending procedures: rigid and flexible. It is highly challenging to modify the Constitution under the rigid system. The U.S., Canadian, and Australian Constitutions are listed under the rigid system, whereas, the flexible approach is how the Constitution can be amended. A provision must be made in any of the houses in accordance with Article 368 of the Indian Constitution, and it must later be approved by a simple majority or a substantial majority. The resolution will be sent to the president seeking approval if a vote passes it.

Three unique amendment techniques, which blend flexibility and rigidity, are included in the Indian Constitution.

• Simple majority approval; is required to amend some sections, which is akin to adopting a regular law. For instance, adding new states, changing the boundaries of states, changing citizenship requirements, etc.
• The special majority’s amendment; According to Article 249, a majority of two-thirds of members is necessary for a vote. A special majority is needed to adopt Rajya Sabha resolutions that are intended to become laws for the State list.
• Special majority and ratification by at least half of the State Legislatures; the articles, such as those governing the election of the President, the subjects included in the Seventh Schedule, the relationship between the Centre and the States, etc., may be amended.

The Supreme Court held in the 1973 case of Kesavanand Bharati v. State of Kerala that the Parliament could not alter essential clauses that make up the fundamental structure of the constitution. Ideologies of the constitution that are necessary for its existence. Free and fair elections, the federal form of the country, judicial oversight, separation of powers, and so on. It indicates that the Constitution’s fundamental legal principles and founding principles serve as its cornerstone.

Important Amendments to the Indian Constitution

1. The First Constitutional (Amendment) Act, 1951 – On June 18, 1951, India’s first constitutional amendment came into effect. All subsequent constitutional amendments followed the model set by this one. The ninth schedule Articles 31A and 31B, and numerous other articles were changed or added because of the first amendment Act. The following Articles were modified by it: 15, 19, 85, 87, 174, 176, 341, 342, 372, and 376. The Acts that make up the ninth schedule are shielded from judicial review. This means that neither the acts nor their legality may be said to violate fundamental rights as the judiciary’s review of parliamentary actions was not effective for the acts as per the ninth schedule, this made it simpler and more straightforward for the government to carry out its objectives through the legislative process of the parliament. They did not need to be concerned about the judiciary disagreeing as a result. Indian people are free to engage in any type of trade or company they choose under Article 19(g). The amendment stated that the nationalization of any trade or enterprise by the state is permitted if it complies with the following requirements and is in the interests of public order, friendly relations with other countries, and state security, the provocation to execute an offence, defamation, and court contempt.
2. The Fourth Constitutional (Amendment) Act, 1955 – The first constitutional amendment and the fourth amendment both address issues concerning property, land acquisition, and zamindari eradication laws. The judiciary fairly maintained the Zamindari abolition legislation and accepted them. Article 31 was amended significantly by the Fourth Amendment, which also added Article 31A. Clause (1) of Article 31A was replaced, and Article 31A (2)(b) was changed to include the terms “raiyats” and “under raiyats” in the group of people whose “rights” in an estate were no longer covered by Articles 14, 19(1)(f), and 31. Additionally, the ninth schedule was changed to include additional performances. Trade and commerce are free according to Article 301. Is a law that establishes a governmental monopoly in breach of Article 301. The Supreme Court’s ruling explains that law empowering state monopoly needs to be proven to be established in the public’s best interests and indicates that it comes under the classification of reasonable restrictions under articles 301 and 304(b), respectively. This was raised in the case of Saghir Ahmed v. the State of U.P., but it was not addressed at the time. However, an amendment to Article 305 clarifies it now.
3. The Seventh Constitutional (Amendment) Act, 1956 – The first schedule, which included the geographical area and boundaries of all the states and union territories, underwent alterations because of the reorganization plan. Articles 258A, 290A, 298, 350A, 350B, 371, 372A, and 378A were included as part of India’s seventh constitutional amendment. Additionally, it changed the constitution’s schedules 1, 2, 4, and 7, as well as Section 8. The fourth schedule, which outlines how members in the Council of States are distributed, has undergone a major revision. This was because the seat counts were based on a 1941 census. The population and demographics of India had undergone a major change, necessitating an alteration in the number of seats for each state. The constitution was amended to add a new Article 258A. In contrast to Article 258(1), which grants state governments the authority to delegate union functions, the Article defined the states’ ability to do so. The distribution of seats among the states and their regions has been altered by amending Article 81. Alterations are made after every census. Additionally, after every census, each state would be divided into territorial constituencies. Based on the 13th edition of V.N. Shukla’s Constitution of India, there was a gap that required the application of Article 258A. This gap was discovered when a state’s implementation of some of its developmental projects ran into a practical problem. The addition of Article 258A filled (fixed) this gap. The seventh amendment made significant modifications to the makeup of legislative bodies and councils. The same calculation as before was to be used, i.e., one seat per million for the initial five million; and one extra seat for every additional two million. As a result, the seat count is updated in accordance with the findings of the most recent census, but the calculation method is unchanged. Due to problems in states with a low population, the strength was increased from one-fourth to one-third. The 1/4th rule was effective for states with high populations, like Uttar Pradesh, but not for those with smaller populations.
4. The Thirty-Eight Constitutional (Amendment) Act, 1975 – According to Article 123, the President may issue ordinances when neither chamber of parliament is in session. However, the President may only do this if he or she is convinced that doing so is absolutely required in the specific situation. As a result, the Constitution has granted the following powers: to the Governor under Article 239B, to the administrator. Articles 123, 213, and 239B have readable language. Since satisfaction is an ambiguous concept, it cannot be quantified. It is inherently arbitrary. According to the amendment, since “satisfaction” is a relative concept, an ordinance should pass if the president is satisfied with it. When the parliament’s two houses are not in session and a crisis arises, an ordinance is passed. There is no time to confer with others or consider the problem in such circumstances. The approval of the president ought to be the sole criterion for action, which must be implemented quickly. After the cases A.K. Roy, etc. vs. Union of India and Anr. and T. Venkata Reddy, etc. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, the following was decided. The president’s satisfaction is not exempt from judicial review, but it also cannot be dismissed as simply political or cast in doubt just because of a political issue. On the grounds of motivation or lack of application of mind, the ordinance cannot be contested. The authority to enact an ordinance is a legislative authority, not an executive power. If the President’s intentions are being questioned, an ordinance may be called into doubt. When the President acts dishonestly, it may be contested.
5. The One Hundred First Constitutional (Amendment) Act, 2016 –Article 256A, was added to the constitution with the 101st amendment. “(1) Notwithstanding anything stated in articles 246 and 254, Parliament, and according to clause (2), the Legislature of each and every State, having jurisdiction to adopt legislation with regard to goods and services tax levied by the Union or by such State,” the constitution reads. Where the provision of products, services, or both occur during interstate trade or commerce, Parliament alone has the authority to enact laws relating to the goods and services tax. All the states and the center have the same authority to enact laws governing goods and services. Trades conducted within a state are subject to both state and federal regulations. According to Section 269A, “(1) The Government of India shall levy and collect the Goods and Services Tax on goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, and such tax shall be appropriated between the Union and the States in the manner might well be produced by Parliament by law on the suggestions of the Goods and Services Tax Council.” The following prerequisites must be met for the provision, regarding the clause, the provision of products or services, or both, for interstate trade or commerce is defined as the importation of such goods or services into India. According to the clause, the sum allotted to a state is not included in the Consolidated Fund of India. If a tax amount is imposed under subsection (1) and collected to satisfy a tax obligation imposed by the state, it will not be included in the Consolidated Fund of India. When a tax is collected that was imposed by a state under Article 246A and utilized to fulfill clause (1), the tax amount collected will not be included in the State’s Consolidated Fund. Through the creation of laws, the Parliament is empowered to determine where interstate commerce in the form of the delivery of commodities, services, or both will occur. The purpose of the 101st Amendment was to create a consistent national tax system. It grants the center and the states simultaneous taxing authority. Added to that are the union territories. With the legislature in session, this authority allows for the passage of laws relating to the tax imposed on goods and services. All domestic deals involving the flow of goods and services would be subject to this goods and services tax.

Scope for Improvement in the Constitution

1. Transparency in Appointment of Judges- Judges in India choose other judges. The remaining judges and HC judges are appointed by the SC collegium, which consists of the Chief Justice and the four senior-most judges. The public is unaware of the reasons why one judge was nominated and another was not since this is done in an opaque manner. To ensure accountability and openness, the Judges should be appointed by a completely independent authority. On this point, the judiciary serves as a check on the legislative and executive branches’ powers, but there is minimal to no control over the judiciary itself.
2. Term Limits on Public Offices- Important constitutional positions including the Prime Minister, President, Chief Minister, Governor, and even Members of Parliament, Legislative Assemblies, all the way down to members of panchayats should have a set number of terms or tenures. No one should be permitted to occupy any elected public office for longer than 3 terms if not 2. Staying for longer durations in a position of power can be misused for personal gains, as we have seen in countries like Russia and China where their head of state misused their powers to remain in power for even longer durations.

References

1. Kesavanand Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225.
2. Saghir Ahmed v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, 1954 AIR 728.
3. A.K. Roy, etc. v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 710.
4. T. Venkata Reddy, etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1985 AIR 724.

This article is written by Namay Khanna, a 3^rd year BBA LLB (Hons.) student at Symbiosis Law School, Pune.

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Abstract

The pay gap is an issue for our country because it prohibits the country to become a superpower
in economic areas. This article prescribes the “Equal pay for equal work” and Constitutional and
Labor legislation concepts in Acts like the Equal Remuneration Act, Contract Labor, and
Factories Act, etc. The Directive Principle of State Policy defined under Part IV of the
Constitution has provision for equal pay for equal work. It also states where can be discriminated
against or not in payment. 

Introduction

Equal pay for equal work means an equal payment to someone who has been employed in the
same place and does the same work. Even the temporary worker who has done the same work in
the same shift should get equal payment in comparison to the permanent worker.
Constitutional provisions

Article 14 – Equality before the law means every person is equal in the eyes of Law there should
not be discrimination. Everyone has equal rights and opportunities . 
Article 15(1) – Prohibition of discrimination against citizens of India on grounds of caste or sex
which means no one can be distinguished and unfavorable to the person. This means the
employer will get equal payment from an employer either from a different caste or a woman .
Article 15(3) – It is the exception of Article 15 clauses 1 and 2. The state can make laws for
women and children to improve the situations of women and children . 
Article 16 – Equal opportunity in public employment .
Article 39 – It is defined that the State should direct the policies for equal remuneration to both
men and women. This means if both the parties are doing equal work then they should be paid
equally without any discrimination. If the people are in the same post or either different place
then he should get equal payment.
Article 42 – The state should ensure and make provision for the workplace should be a humane
condition for women and make provision for maternity relief . 
Article 51(A) (e) – To abolish the practices against women’s dignity .

The term equal also includes allowances benefits and promotions. The directive principles are
not enforceable by law. The state must make legislation for the prohibition of discrimination in
payment. Also, it is a fundamental right under Articles 14, 15 and 16. Various judgments have
been decided through fundamental rights.  Equal pay for equal work was first acknowledged in
the case Kishori Mohanlal Bakshi v. Union of India , in which the Supreme Court held that the
court cannot enforce the court of law. In 1987, in the case, Mackinnon Mackenzie & Company

Limited v. Audrey D coastal & others , the woman who was a stenographer was discriminated
against based on sex she paid less than men. The court held that it is discrimination against
women. When both men and women are doing the same work in the same circumstances they
should be paid equally.
Randhir Singh v. Union of India , in this case, the court held that the equality for equal work is
mentioned in directive principles and directive states and not under the fundamental right but is
considered a Constitutional goal. The court can enforce constitutional remedies prescribed under
Article 32.
State of Punjab and Ors v. Jagjit Singh and Ors , in this case, the court held that the workers
who are doing temporary work, ad hoc and daily wages should get equal payment which is given
to the permanent worker. To refuse the equal payment is oppressive, coercive and exploitative
behavior with them.

Statute related to equal pay for equal work

Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923

• Those workers accidentally injured during work should be compensated by companies.
• Because of differences in negotiating power, women may be exploited.

Minimum Wages Act, 1948

• The state has fixed minimum wages in the territory. This means an employer cannot give less than the fixed wages.
• Workers are poorly organized & have less negotiating power in India. Because in India there is also the problem of employment so the workers are accepting the money without negotiation.

Factories Act, 1948

• The object of this Act is to improve the conditions of laborers in factories and industries.

Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970

The object was to make this Act that there should be a separate provision for utilities and fix
working hours for the women.

Equal Remuneration Act, 1976

In 1975, this was passed as equal remuneration Ordinance, 1975 and further converted into an
Act, the Equal remuneration Act, 1976. Women were not getting equal payments and working
conditions according to them. The Act made for improvement of the women condition in
remuneration. The provision of the Act is against discrimination in the recruitment and
promotion of men and women. When this Act was enacted, they considered the physical & social
burden a woman faces or the condition of the women during their pregnancy time.

In the case, Dharwad District P.W.D. Literate Daily Wage Employees Association and
others v. State of Karnataka and others. the court in this case held that Sec. 5 of the equal remuneration Act states that there shall be no discrimination against women in their appointment,
recruitment, and promotion. It means if both men and women are working in the same condition
then women should not be discriminated on these. The employer should maintain a register or
documents to avoid unjust practices. 

Code on Wages Act, 2019 

This Act considered equal pay for equal work for all genders. Under Sec.16 of this Act has given
the power to the employer that they can fix wages based on monthly, daily, or weekly but not
more than a month.

Exceptions of equal pay for equal work

This is mentioned in our Constitution in Directive Principles and Directive States. However, it is
not an absolute right. Exceptions are not mentioned but they came from the cases.

In the case F.A.I.C and C.E.S v. Union of India 13 , the court held that employers can fix
different pay scales for employees who have a similar post and work but there is a difference
between responsibility, reliability, and confidentiality.  Equal payment depends on the work that
has been done and not the volume of work.

International Perspective 

The problem related to equal remuneration is not only limited to India but is worldwide. This has
been discussed at various conventions. The Equal Remuneration Convention, 1952 states that
there should not be discrimination against equal remuneration.
The International Labour Organization (ILO) has stated that it doesn’t matter if the labor is male
or female if they are doing equal work with equal capacity, there is no requirement of the gender
pay gap. 

Gender pay gap

This means the difference between the earnings of men and women who are involved in the same
work. India ranks the last 10 in female participation. Female participation is a very low rate in
rural areas compared to urban areas. Women are not educated. This is also the reason. 

Conclusion 

In India, we have many statutes which talk about how everyone should get equal pay for equal
work. But the inequality in recruitment still exists. Court has decided in many cases that it is the
right of the employees to get equal payment. Government should organize a campaign for
awareness towards equal recruitment to labour. 

Every individual should be equally paid there should not be discrimination but employers can
discriminate based on responsibility and volume of work done by employees.

This article is written by Prachi Yadav, a 2 nd Year student from Mody University of Science and
Technology, Laxmangarh, Rajasthan.

This article is written by Mohit Bhardwaj. A 2nd year Law student, currently pursuing BBA-LL.B(Hons.) from Unitedworld School of Law, Karnavati University. The objective of this article is to describe The Doctrine of Territorial Nexus which is covered from Article 245 to Article 255 of The Constitution of India.

INTRODUCTION

Article 245, clause 1 of the constitution of India states that, ‘Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India, and the Legislature of a State may make laws for the whole or any part of the State.

Clause 2, states that, ‘No law made by Parliament be held invalid on the ground that it has an extra-territorial operation.’.

The above-mentioned statement implies that State law cannot have extra-territorial jurisdiction. Thus, the Doctrine of Territorial Nexus originates from the Apex Court’s interpretation of this particular provision in context with the extra-territorial operation of a law made by the state government in India.

Explanation: The Doctrine of Territorial Nexus states, that laws that are made by a particular State Legislature are only applicable in that particular State and not outside the territorial boundary of that State, except in scenarios where there is a sufficient nexus between that State and the object. The significance of this can be determined by the Supreme Court’s observation wherein it has stated that ‘Territorial nexus doctrine, thus, plays an important part in the assessment of tax. Tax is imposed on one transaction where the operations which can produce to income may happen partly in one territory and partly in another. The question which might fall for consideration is on whether the income that arises out of the said transaction would be required to be apportioned to each of the territories or not.

Income arising out of operation in more than one jurisdiction would have territorial nexus with each of the jurisdiction on an actual basis. If that be so, it may not be correct to contend that the entire income “accrues or arises” in each of the jurisdiction.”

Judicial Pronouncements

A.H. Wadia vs Income Tax Commissioner, Bombay, 1947

 The Apex Court held, that in the case of a sovereign Legislature question of extraterritoriality of enactment can never be raised in the municipal court as a ground for challenging its validity. Further, the Court stated that legislation may offend the rules of international law, and there are chances that they may not be recognised by foreign courts also, or there might be practical obstacles in enforcing them, but these questions are of policy and domestic tribunals should not be concerned and affected by them. 

GVK Industries Limited vs. Income Tax Officer, 2011

In this case, it was questioned as to whether the Parliament is authorized to enact laws in respect of extra-territorial aspects or in causes that have no nexus with India, and furthermore, if such laws are bereft of any benefit to India?

The Supreme Court held that ‘The clue of the answer to this question also lies in the word for used in article 245(1). The Court derived the responsibility of the Parliament with the help of the word for used in article 245(1) and stated that Parliament of India is to act as the Parliament of India and of no other territory, nation or people.’ The Court derived two related limitations in this regard, which are as follows:

• The Parliament may only apply its power for the benefit of the Country as per the necessity and the laws framed by the Parliament may strengthen the welfare of the people in other territories too but the benefit to or of India will remain the central and primary purpose.
• It is also stated that the laws enacted by the Parliament with respect to extra-territorial aspects or causes that do not have any, or maybe expected to not have nexus with India, defy the first condition. The Constitutional Bench headed by Sudershan Reddy J, denied the answer of question logically and stated that the Legislature’s powers to frame laws pursuant to clause (1) of Article 245 might not reach to those extra-territorial aspects or causes that have not any impact on or nexus with India.

State of Bombay vs RMDC

Facts of the case: The respondent was not residing in Bombay (Mumbai) but he conducted competitions with prize money through a newspaper printed and published from Bangalore (Bengaluru) having a wide circulation in Bombay.

All the necessary activities like filling up of the forms, entry fees etc. for the competition took place in Bombay.

The State Government sought to levy a tax on the respondent for carrying on business in the State.

Issue: The question for decision before the Supreme Court was if the respondent, the organizer of the competition, who was outside the state of Bombay, could be validly taxed under the Act.

Judgment: The Supreme Court held that as most of the activities which the competitor is ordinarily expected to undertake took place in Bombay. Thus, it was sufficient to show that there was an existence of territorial nexus and based on this the State Government had the authority to levy a tax on the respondent. 

State of Bihar vs Charusila Dasi:

Facts of the case- The Bihar legislature enacted the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act,1950, for the protection and preservation of properties pertaining to the Hindu religious trusts. The Act was made applicable to all trusts any part of which was situated in the state of Bihar.

The Respondent created a trust deed of the properties of several houses and land in Bihar and Calcutta. The trust is situated in Bihar.

The issue-the main question for decision was whether the Act applies to trust properties which are situated outside the state of Bihar. Can the legislature of Bihar make a law with respect to such a trust situated in Bihar and other properties appertaining to such trust which is situated outside Bihar?

Judgement: The Supreme Court after applying the doctrine of territorial nexus stated that the Act had the scope of affecting the trust property situated outside Bihar, but appertaining to a trust situated in Bihar where the trustees functioned. It further stated that the Act aims to provide for the better administration of Hindu religious trusts in the state of Bihar. Therefore, the trust is situated in Bihar, enables the State to exercise its legislative power over it and also over its trustees or their servants and agents who must be in Bihar to administer the trust.

Conclusion 

By the above interpretation and cases, we can conclude that the Doctrine Territorial Nexus does not debar a State law from having an extra-territorial jurisdiction. It simply lays down that if a State wants to extend its laws beyond its boundary then it will have to satisfy the Court that there is a sufficient nexus between the subject matter concerned and the state making the law.