INTRODUCTION

In India, the online gaming market has exploded in recent years, raising concerns about its legality and the need for regulation. The legality of numerous games, including Rummy, online poker, and fantasy games like Dream 11, has been in question. Moreover, playing real-money games comes with a lot of psychological and financial risks. Numerous states and courts have made vain attempts to control the gaming industry. Understanding and creating appropriate regulations is crucial to establishing some order in the gaming industry.

Large Indian gaming enterprises now face a hefty financial burden because there is no unified national gambling regulation. One of India’s fastest-growing businesses would get a great boost from the creation of a harmonious national gaming industry with clear actionable guidelines. 

On April 1, 2022, the Online Gambling (Regulation) Bill, 2022 (the “Bill”) was introduced in the Lok Sabha to create an efficient regulatory framework for the online gaming business to stop fraud and abuse. The Bill proposes the establishment of a regulatory body to oversee the online gaming business, acknowledging the impacts of online gaming’s addictive qualities and the sector’s significant national influence.

ASPECTS OF THE ACT

With the help of the Bill, an Online Gaming Commission (referred to as “the Commission”) will be created, and a licensing system will be put in place that would require licenses from the Commission to provide and run gaming enterprises in India. According to the Bill, it is now illegal to sell and run gaming companies without a license. There is also a bond requirement. Anyone found to have participated in gaming on an unlicensed website will also be subject to legal repercussions under the Bill.

The Commission will have the authority to keep an eye on the operation of websites that offer online gaming and to take action to stop illegal online gaming. Additionally, the Commission will create rules and regulations governing the license and permit requirements, authorization for players to use gaming websites, requirements for providing gaming services, terms for player credit facilities, fines or penalties, and any other matter it may deem appropriate.

The Bill’s highlights

Any game played on an electronic device, such as a personal computer, a mobile phone, a tablet, or another device, is considered “online gaming” under the Bill. It is clear that the Bill seeks to regulate all games played on these electronic devices because the term does not distinguish between “game of skill” and “game of chance.”

The bill calls for the establishment of an oversight body called the Online Gaming Commission (OGC), which will have five members appointed by the central government and include at least one expert in each of the fields of law, cyber technology, and law enforcement. The OGC will have the authority to, among other things, supervise the operations of online gaming websites, produce periodic or one-time reports on related subjects, recommend appropriate steps to control and stop illegal online gaming, grant, suspend, and revoke licenses for such websites, and set fees for license applications and renewals of such websites.

Playing online games without a website and a non-transferable, non-assignable license would be prohibited under the proposed legislation. Without the appropriate license, operating an online gaming server or website is punishable by up to three years in prison and a fine. Six years will pass before the license expires.

If the licensee violates any of the license’s terms or Bill’s provisions, the license that is proposed to be issued under the Bill may be suspended or revoked. The Bill does not, however, apply to anyone who offers backend services in India, such as hosting and upkeep for any international gaming website based outside of India.

QUESTIONS ABOUT THE BILL

Although the Bill seeks to regulate online gaming in India through numerous checks and balances, it currently suffers from several drawbacks:

  1. The difference between “games of skill” and “games of chance” is absent from the Bill. Furthermore, it is unclear from the Bill if its rules exclusively apply to for-real-money games or also apply to games played for free.
  2. Although this Bill intends to be the primary piece of law controlling gaming in India, it will eventually be subject to court review because, according to the Indian Constitution, neither gaming nor gambling are federal topics and may only be regulated by state governments.
  3. The conflict between the present licensing system and the state gaming laws of Meghalaya, Nagaland, and Sikkim is not addressed by the Bill.
  4. The Know Your Customer (KYC) standards, customer complaint procedures, advertising and marketing regulations, user data protection, responsible gambling rules, and other issues have not been addressed by the bill.

Games of chance versus games of skill

The Constitution’s seventh schedule, List II (state list), section 34, is titled “Betting and Gambling.” the states alone have the authority to enact laws governing “games of chance.” Contrary to “games of chance,” “games of skill” are protected by Article 19 (1) (g) of the constitution.

Games of skill are not considered gambling under the gambling regulations of several states. There are several uncertainties when attempting to distinguish between a “game of chance” and a “game of skill.” In the absence of legislation defining a “game of skill,” courts have occasionally established definitions for the term.

RMDC v. State of Bombay and KR Lakshmanan v. State of Tamil Nadu

The supreme court ruled in RMDC v. State of Bombay and KR Lakshmanan v. State of Tamil Nadu that a game of skill is one in which the element of talent outweighs the element of chance. A game can be categorized as a game of skill or chance depending on the facts and circumstances of each case, the court ruled in Manoranjitham Manamyil Mandram v. State of Tamil Nadu.

The Kerala High Court ruled that playing for stakes or not is not a factor in assessing whether a game is one of skill or chance when it dismissed a notification that sought to outlaw online Rummy when played for money. “Players have the right to support themselves with their talents.”

Online skill-based gaming is legal.

Using their jurisdiction under Entry 26 of List II, the states of Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala made changes to outlaw all types of internet gaming, including skill-based games, in their respective states. They cited an increase in cases of youth suicide, gaming addiction, and financial loss.

States are outlawing online gaming for the reasons listed below:

  1. Online games are prone to addiction, and if played for money, they can cause users to commit suicide.
  2. instances of children committing murder and crimes to make up for losses from online gaming
  3. Websites can manipulate online gaming.

Because they violate the basic right to engage in commerce, business, and occupation, these changes have been brought up in court as being unconstitutional.

As a result, the rules outlawing skill-based gaming have all been overturned by the Madras High Court, Kerala High Court, and Karnataka High Court. Although governments have the sole authority to enact laws governing skill-based gambling, courts have cited the following as key justifications: 

  1. A complete prohibition on skill gaming is arbitrary, unlawful, and in violation of Article 19 (1). (g).
  2. Additionally, both Article 19 (1) (a) and Article 21 mention participating in games and sports of skill.
  3. Such a ban is out of proportion to the goal that governments are trying to accomplish.
  4. There are no scientific studies or data about the negative effects of real-money gambling supplied by the states to support complete prohibition.
  5. The stakes in the game do not affect a player’s ability to use their skills to their advantage and support themselves financially.

India needs to regulate internet gaming

There are no regulatory frameworks in place for India’s online gaming sector. There is uncertainty over tax rates and revenue collection in the lack of any comprehensive legislation. Currently, several states have rules governing online gambling inside their borders, but due to the industry’s rapid expansion, there is a need for federal legislation that would apply to the entire nation. An effective regulatory system would also promote economic growth and other advantages.

The Online Gaming (Regulation) Bill 2022 has been introduced in Parliament to address the issues and guarantee the expansion of the online gaming sector. According to Article 249 of the Constitution, the Center may pass laws on state subjects provided they are in the “national interest.” This legislation aims to establish a central body for regulating and supervising internet gaming in India.

The 2022 ONLINE GAMING (REGULATION) BILL

A private member’s bill titled Online Gaming (Regulation) Bill, 2022 was presented in Lok Sabha.

While preserving the integrity of online gaming, the measure aims to establish a regulated framework for it.

Online gaming is defined as games played on any electronic device in Section 2(e) of the bill. A central government-created “online gaming commission” would be established under the proposed legislation as an oversight body to develop guidelines for online gaming, including licensing requirements and reporting requirements. Playing without a license is a crime that carries a fine. Any license requirement that is broken will result in license revocation.

The Know Your Consumer (KYC) requirement, the grievance redressal system, data protection or privacy, and one of the key reasons for bringing forth such a bill, mental health issues including addiction and depression, are not addressed in the bill.

The current regulations also have a lot of problems. The distinction between “game of chance” and “game of skill” is not mentioned in the definition of online gaming, which is essential given the conflicts that have arisen in the past as a result of this lack of demarcation. Furthermore, real-money gaming needs to be regulated due to its rising popularity and potential for an increase in unlawful transactions, but the bill does not offer any precise guidelines in this regard.

There is a lack of a thorough licensing structure with precise rules. Although the bill represents a big step, it does not effectively address the problems related to online gambling. The bill must be clearer and more open.

CURRENT SCENARIO

Currently, the majority of businesses that offer real money games are supervised by charters given by the All India Gaming Federation (“AIGF”) and the Federation of Indian Fantasy Sports (“FIFS”), two self-regulatory organizations created to oversee online gaming in India. The lack of enabling national legislation is felt deeply even though these charters help to streamline the conduct and governance of online gambling platforms.

CONCLUSION

Since the start of the epidemic, online gaming has grown in popularity and involvement, especially among young people. While it has been good for the economy, there are societal, psychological, and legal ramifications for online gaming in India. The internet gaming sector is in a “grey area” because there aren’t clear distinctions and rules.

For a long time now, courts have dealt with these ambiguities. The country needs a well-regulated gaming industry if it is to fully realize its enormous economic potential. The recently proposed bill does not seem to be sufficient; the only way to guarantee everyone’s safety and privacy in one of India’s fastest-growing businesses is through a thorough legal system.


References:

  1. India’s Online Gaming Bill: Regressive Regulation – JURIST – Commentary – Legal News & Commentary [Online][Cited: 3 September 2022] https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2022/05/nishka-kapoor-online-gaming-bill-india/

This article is written by Kanika Arora from Delhi Metropolitan Education (Affiliated to GGSIPU).

-Report by Zainab Khan

A bench consisting of SC judges of Justice U.U.Lalit, Justice Ravindra Bhat, Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia hearing a civil appeal in the case of the University of Kerala and ors. Etc. Vs Merlin J.N and anr.etc.etc held that regulations passed by UGC’s have a retrospective effect on the appointment of university Lecturers, which gives them exemption from the compulsory qualification of NET.

FACT

Appellant had qualified M.Phil in the year 2000 and completed his Ph.D. in 2006. He was appointed as a lecturer of sociology at the University of Kerala on 4.08.2012. The university provides him exemption from compulsory NET qualification while selecting him. The respondent who was ranked 2 nd in the selection process in the same category, filed a writ petition before the Kerala High court alleging that the appellant’s appointment was not in accordance with UGC, REGULATION 2009.

The HC court ruled on 1.02.2017 that the appellant was not qualified to hold the post of Lecturer, the court relied on the judgments of Suseela Vs. University Grants Commission and Dr. D Radhakrishnan Pillai Vs. The Travancore Devaswom Board.

APPELLANT CONTENTION

The counsel for the appellant argues that his appointment was made as per the law, as university has adopted the UGC regulations, 2009 on 23.11.2013 which is after the appointment of the appellant. The counsel further argues that the resolution passed by UGC in its 471 meeting on 12.08.2010 that Ph.D regulation 2004 and UGC regulation
2009 were of prospective nature.Hence appellant’s appointment should be declared as valid.

RESPONDENT CONTENTION

Counsel for respondent argues that respondent is more capable than appellant as she had qualified for her NET exam in 1998 and done Ph.D. later and since then she is working in Kerala university as a teacher. The counsel further argues that the UGC resolution on 12.08.2010 is contrary to UGC regulation 2010 and the central Government also disagrees with this resolution.

Counsel argues that the appellant should not take benefit of ph.d regulation 2009 and UGC regulation 2016 , as these have prospective effect and he has completed his ph.d before both regulations.

Key highlights of UGC amendments –

  • UGC regulation 2000 states NET as an essential condition for appointment as a lecturer in any university. But it exempted candidates who acquired M.Phil or submitted a Ph.D. by 31.12.1993 from NET.
  • UGC regulation amendment 2002 gives exemption to candidates from NET who acquired their M.Phil by 31.03.1993 or submitted Ph.D. by 31.12.2002.
  • UGC regulation amendment 2009, it rules the minimum condition for appointment of the lecturer as NET but exempted those who acquired their Ph.D. in accordance with Ph.D. regulation 2009.
  • UGC regulation amendment 2016, provides candidates having a Ph.D. degree before 11.07.2009 also considered to be appointed as lecturers.

JUDGEMENT

The Hon’ble court has observed how UGC is protecting the candidate and learned teachers by giving them exemption from compulsory NET as much possible as it can.

The court ruled that UGC regulation 2016 is retrospective in nature. The court relied on the judgment of Rafiquennessa v. Lal Bahadur Chetri (dead) through his representative and ors.

The Hon’ble court quashed the earlier orders of the Kerala High court and upheld the appellant’s appointment as valid as per UGC regulation 2016.

A webinar is being organized by King’s College, London where Hon’ble Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, Supreme Court of India will be speaking about the role of courts in a democracy.

ABOUT

Hon’ble Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, from India’s Supreme Court, will be speaking about the role of courts in democracy, with a particular focus on India and the UK. This lecture is hosted by the King’s India Institute, The Dickson Poon School of Law, and the Principal’s Office, King’s College London, in partnership with the Jindal Global Law School, O.P. Jindal Global University, India.

GENERAL DETAILS

JUNE 20, 2022

REGISTRATION

Online participants can join via zoom, please register with the link below.

LOCATION

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KING’S BUILDING, STRAND CAMPUS, LONDON

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Case Number

Transfer Case (civil) 92-95 of 2002

Equivalent Citation

2004 (2) Mh.L.J. 1090

Bench

  • Chief Justice Vishweshwar Nath Khare
  • Justice Brijesh Kumar
  • Justice Arun Kumar

Decided On

April 8, 2004

Relevant Act/Section

  • Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest (SARFAESI) Act, 2002
  • Essential Services (Maintenance) Ordinance Repeal Act, 2001
  • Transfer of Property Act, 1882

Brief Facts & Procedural History

Here, the constitutionality of SARFAESI was challenged, particularly Sections 13, 15, 17, and 34, on the grounds that they are arbitrary and unjustified.

The Industrial Development Bank of India (for short, ‘the IDBI’) issued a notice to Mardia Chemicals Ltd. on July 24, 2002, under Section 13 of the then-current Ordinance, requiring it to pay the amount of arrears indicated in the notice within 60 days, failing which the IDBI, as a secured creditor, would be entitled to enforce the security interest without the intervention of a court or Tribunal, using all or any of the measures contained in sub-section (4) of S The petitioner was also prohibited from selling, leasing, or otherwise transferring any of the secured assets.

Other financial institutions and banks issued similar notices to other parties who filed petitions in various High Courts under the terms of Section 13 of the Ordinance/Act. This was united with a number of other writ petitions filed in several High Courts contesting the constitutionality of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act of 2002.

The petitioners argued that the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act 1993 was sufficient to address the difficulty created by NPAs and that the current statute was unnecessary. It is debatable whether the Court should delve into the necessity of a statute while considering its constitutional legitimacy. “The Parliament and Legislatures composed as they are of the Representatives of the people are supposed to be cognizant of the requirements of the people and what is good or harmful for them,” the Supreme Court has previously decided.
The Court is unable to sit in judgment of their wisdom… A law passed by Parliament or a state legislature can be overturned for two reasons:

  1. inadequacy of legislative authority
  2. infringement of any constitutional rights1

In BALCO Employees Union v Union of India2, the Supreme Court has ruled that the right place for discussing policy issues is the legislature, not the courts.

In light of the Court’s previous pronouncements, it is evident that the question to be answered is whether the legislation is constitutional. Any discussion of whether a statute is required, particularly in light of another Act whose scope is not in question in this case, was superfluous. As a result, the Court declined to hear the case.

Many petitioners argued that the existing rights of private parties under a contract cannot be interfered with, particularly by putting one party in a more advantageous position than the other. In the present case, for example, in a matter of private contract between the borrower and the financing bank or institution, the borrowers’ rights have been curtailed and enforcement of secured assets has been provided without the intervention of the court, denying them the remedy available under the law by approaching the civil court.

The Appellants are vague on where they find the legal validity of their claim. The Honourable Supreme Court has pointed out that, unlike the US Constitution, there is no bar to prospective contract invalidation in India, and hence such a statute is completely constitutional.3

Indeed, the 44th amendment removed the right to property as a basic right from the Constitution, leaving it only as a constitutional right. Indeed, even while the right existed in part III, the courts ruled that absolute contract freedom, as defined by the idea of leissez faire, was no longer valid.4

The Appellants have also been unable to locate the rights under Art 19(1)(g) and Art 298. The Supreme Court has ruled that these articles are subject to reasonable constraints and that what is acceptable is to be interpreted in the public interest, regardless of how onerous the restrictions are on the individual’s interests.5

In light of these precedents, it’s difficult to identify where the appellants’ reasoning originates. The respondents’ counsels, on the other hand, have not taken a position on the Constitution’s freedom of contract or right to trade, but have pointed out that a similar argument has been raised in a different context, namely statutes providing relief to agricultural borrowers, and has been repeatedly rejected.

It has been contended that certain facts must be determined before the power u/s.13 can be used, such as whether the person to whom notice is given is liable to pay, the magnitude of the liability, and so on. Furthermore, issues such as the law of limitation and bar under consortium agreements, set-off/counterclaim claims, creditors defaults as bailees or failure to disburse credit on time, the changeability of penal interest or compound interest, non-appropriation of funds already paid, and so on and so forth must be resolved.

So, using case law that will be covered in the main project, it was claimed that a lis exists in such a case and that the ability to resolve a lis is a judicial or quasi-judicial power, not solely an administrative function. As a result, a suitable forum must be established to resolve all such disagreements at an early stage.6

The statutory provision becomes arbitrary, procedurally, and substantively unfair if such a forum is not established. This is a false argument based on facts. S.13 does not preclude the use of any judicial venue; it just states that a judicial remedy can be sought only after the secured creditor has used his powers under s.13 (4). This is entirely correct. Many legislations provide for the use of a forum after the aggrieved party has exhausted self-help options.

It was also pointed out that the provisions of s.13 generate some practical challenges that could lead to serious legal errors. Section 2(f) of the Act, for example, specifies that the meaning of the term “borrower” includes the guarantor. A guarantor is relieved of his commitment under Section 135 of the Contract Act in certain circumstances. Now, if a discharged guarantee receives a notification under Section 13(2) of the Act, he cannot approach the Court to show and establish that he is a discharged guarantor because Section 34 prohibits him from filing an action in the Civil Court. As a result, notice under Section 13(2) is unfavourable.7

These concerns have been addressed by Section 35 of the Securitization Act, which states that the Act’s provisions have precedence over all other laws. Finally, it was pointed out that under s.13 read with s.34, the borrower has no right to go to court before the lender employs the rights granted under s.13 (4), exposing him to arbitrary and potentially fraudulent lending practises. It was argued in defence of this section that because the asset cannot be sold for 60 days under Section 9 of the Rules, the borrower has the option of approaching the Tribunal within that time frame. The Court accepted the plaintiffs’ argument in part and added two riders to s.13. To begin with, it was held that the lender had an obligation to reveal the reasons for not accepting the objections or points expressed in response to the notice issued to them before taking action under Section 13 (4). Second, the Court made a comparison to an English mortgage, pointing out that enforcement proceedings under an English mortgage can be contested on the basis of fraud. This section is also subject to such provisions.8

Another point that the Court has overlooked is that a statute must be read in context and in pari materia as a standard rule of legislative construction. The present Act’s s.13 is pari materia with the State Financial Corporation Act of 1951’s s.29. Art 300A, 21, and 14 have all been challenged on the basis of this section’s constitutional vires, specifically that it provides no right of appeal. Though the matter was never heard by the Supreme Court, it was considered by a number of High Courts. The courts have consistently ruled that the Act itself reveals a clear aim and objective and that the power granted under s.29 is intended to carry out that policy, namely, the prompt collection of dues.9

Issues before the Court

  • Is it possible to challenge the statute on the grounds that it was unnecessary to create it given the circumstances, especially when another statute was already in effect?
  • Whether the terms or existing rights under a contract entered into by two private persons could be altered by provisions of law conferring one-sided powers in favour of one of the contracting parties?
  • Whether or not Section 13 of the Act is unconstitutional?
  • Whether the requirement that 75% of the amount owing to be paid before filing an appeal with the DRT is onerous and thus Section 17 of the Act unconstitutional?

Decision of the Court

In this case, the Supreme Court held that:

a) The Parliament’s superiority in deciding the need for legislation was emphasised.
b) The connection between the RDB Act and SARFAESI was rejected since the latter deals with the highly particular issue of nonperforming assets (NPAs) (among other differences such as the latter dealing only with secured creditors).
c) As a result, it is up to Parliament to decide whether or not legislation is required.
d) Section 13 was found to be constitutionally legitimate by the Court.
e) The secured creditor is only exercising his entitlement because the default that led to the sec 13 measure might be considered a “second default”—NPA + 60 days extra time to repay following notice.
f) Prior to the 2016 Amendment, Section 13 acknowledged the Right of Redemption in a sense. Rule 8 and 9 of the SI Rules stated that the bank must serve a notice confirming the sale of secured property and that the borrower may pay off the obligation and reclaim possession at any point prior to the actual sale
g) While the Supreme Court confirmed the constitutionality of the section, it pushed hard for borrowers to have the right to representation.
h) The Supreme Court determined Section 17(2) to be arbitrary, and ordered that the heading be altered from “appeal” to “application.”

Impact of the Judgement

  1. Section 13 now states that the bank must evaluate all of a borrower’s representations and respond within seven days (which was later changed to 15 days).
  2. Within section 17, the word “appeal” was replaced by “application,” despite the fact that the marginal header remained the same (wow). In 2016, the appeal was superseded by an application in the marginal heading.
  3. DRTs now have jurisdiction over the rights of tenants in a security property. In such instances, the property is given to the person who files the application (if he meets the requirements).
  4. Section 18 was also considerably amended. When filing an appeal with the DRAT, you must deposit 50% of the total cost, which can be lowered to 25%. DRT was likewise granted a similar waiver right under Section 17.

Citations:

  1. State of Andhra Pradesh v McDowell, AIR 1996 SC 1627
  2. AIR 2002 SC 350
  3. Raghubir Dayal v Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 263
  4. YA Marmade v Authority under Minimum Wages Act, (1972) 2 SCC 108
  5. Krishan Kakkanth v Government of Kerala, (1997) 9 SCC 495
  6. Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu & Ors1992 Suppl. (2) SCC p. 651 and Associated Cement Companies Ltd v. P.N. Sharma (1965(2) SCR p. 366 at pages 386-87).
  7. Mafatlal Industries Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., 1997(5) SCC
  8. Adams v. Scott, (1859) 7 WR (Eng.) 213 (Z49)
  9. K Surendranathan v Kerala Financial Corporation AIR 1988 Ker 330

This case analysis is done by Arryan Mohanty, a 2nd Year Student student of Symbiosis Law School.

Abstract

Every person’s life revolves around the concept of justice. Courts have been established in every country for the purpose of regulating justice. The courts are held in high regard as the guardians of the rule of law. This element of the courts contributes to the development of a trusting connection between the general public and the courts. When this relationship is harmed by unlawful influence in the courts, a miscarriage of justice occurs. A miscarriage of justice is the responsibility of the courts. The Supreme Court of India, the country’s highest court of appeal, declared that the rule of law is in place. As the ultimate bidder to justice, it is the apex court that gets to decide what is right and what is wrong. When the top court commits a miscarriage of justice, the entire country is thrown into chaos, and the public loses faith in the country’s judiciary.

The comment of Justice A.S. Anand, former Chief Justice of India and Chairman of the National Human Rights Commission, that the acquittal decision in the Best Bakery trial by a fast-track court was a “miscarriage of justice,” is not limited to that case, but can be applied to the entire mechanism of so-called fast-track courts as envisaged by the previous NDA government and now scrapped by the current UPA administration. The state did very little to return justice to its proper ‘quick’ track, and it is impossible for the average person to appreciate the question of when he will receive final justice in criminal or civil litigation.

Introduction

The decision to close the fast-track courts by the end of April, a year earlier than the five-year deadline, by starving them of funds because the Twelfth Finance Commission did not recommend any allocations, will put an end to the experiment without finding a viable replacement or doing anything to resolve pending cases.

The subject of the nation’s justice system’s very existence arises. Delivering justice is a challenging task since it must not only be done, but it must also appear to be done. This means that the court’s role does not end once the judgment is rendered, which offers justice to the parties in the case, but also after the court ensures that the judgment is applied. In recent days, there have been several cases of miscarriage of justice that have impacted not only the people engaged in the case but also the general public. Many people are confused about who is to blame for a miscarriage of justice: the courts or the judges who give the verdict. In either case, the integrity of the court system as a whole is jeopardized.

As a result, the court system has developed a number of strategies in order to limit the rising number of miscarriages in the delivery of justice and to carry out its mission efficiently and without hindrances. They can be successful at times and also fail at other times. As a result, the judiciary must keep a close eye on itself in order to avoid miscarriages of justice.

Miscarriage of Justice Explained

Justice can be defined as justness or righteousness, whereas miscarriage denotes failure. As a result, a miscarriage of justice denotes a failure to declare what is right and just. A miscarriage of justice happens when an innocent person is found guilty, allowing the true perpetrator to flee the scene. The criminal justice system is meant to be set up in such a way that it punishes those who are found guilty as well as acquits those who are found not guilty. If any of these ingredients are missing, a miscarriage of justice will very certainly result. True, the criminal justice system cannot ensure the punishment of the wicked or the acquittal of the innocent, but it may certainly attempt. Even after being exonerated of the erroneous prosecution, it is difficult for an innocent individual to lead a normal life after being tried as a criminal. As a result, it is the responsibility of the state to guarantee that the person has a normal existence.

Under Article 14(6) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, read with General Comment 32 of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany have already adopted the same remedial method in which the State regulates statutory responsibilities by providing compensation to victims of wrongful prosecution. The High Court of Delhi emphasized the rehabilitation of victims of unfair prosecution in the case of Babloo Chauhan v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi1, in order to assist them to lead a normal life following their acquittal. The court stressed the creation of a legal framework that would govern the formation of a committee to care for these innocent victims. Miscarriage of justice results in wrongful prosecution and humiliation of the innocent party. Miscarriage of justice can occur not only in the courts but also in the hands of investigating officials on the ground. Innocent people are also affected. Taking note of these factors, the Supreme Court issued a historic decision in 2016 in the case of Rudul Sah v. the State of Bihar2, declaring that innocent people who have been subjected to shoddy investigation and unfair prosecution shall be compensated by the state in question. A miscarriage of justice can be caused by a hasty decision on the part of the court in certain cases to clear out pending judgments, plea bargaining, which involves providing an incentive to the judge hearing the case in order to declare the innocent as guilty, bias in the investigation procedure by the officials, evidence gathered by the police associated with the offense is frequently destroyed, and judicial misconduct on the part of the judge. As a result, a miscarriage of justice is an unwelcome activity carried out by the judiciary or investigating officials that, to a considerable extent, violates human rights.3

Alarming Rate of Pendency

The amount of unresolved cases is upsetting. As indicated by data accessible on July 5, 2000, there were 21,600 cases forthcoming under the steady gaze of the Supreme Court, contrasted with 1.05 lakhs 10 years earlier. In the High Courts, there are presently 34 lakhs of forthcoming cases, contrasted with 19 lakhs a decade prior. The Supreme Court has 645 cases progressing for over a decade, while the High Courts have 5,00,085. The inability to fill judge vacancies sooner rather than later is one of the reasons for the huge expansion in the number of forthcoming cases in High Courts. There are presently around 100 such vacancies. The quantity of cases anticipating preliminary in the country’s 12,378 locale and subordinate courts is assessed to be in large numbers. 1,500 of the 12,205 judge and justice positions in these courts are vacant.

Fundamental Rights of Speedy Trial

The fundamental right to a speedy trial has become a daily farce due to the delays, lack of accountability, and half-baked ideas. “A timely trial is essential to criminal justice, and there can be no doubt that the delay in trial by itself constitutes a denial of justice,” the Supreme Court stated.4 “There can be no question that rapid trial — and by speedy trial, we mean a properly expedited trial — is an integral and vital aspect of the fundamental right to life and liberty contained in Art 21,” it continued in another case. It is a vital responsibility.5 Even if Art. 21 is not enforced, the demand for quick justice is unavoidable under the Constitution. According to the preamble of the Constitution, the state is required to guarantee social, economic, and political justice to all of its citizens.6 The state should strive for a social order in which justice is represented in all aspects of national life, according to the Directive Principles of State Policy. “The State shall ensure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice; to ensure that no person is denied access to justice because of economic or other disadvantages,” it continues.7 The Supreme Court has held that “social justice would include ‘legal justice,’ which means that the system of administration of justice must provide a cheap, expeditious, and effective instrument for realizing justice by all sections of the people, regardless of their social or economic position or financial resources” in interpreting this provision.8

Need for a fair Judge-Population Ratio

The way public authority has would not take on a suggestion by the Law Commission of India to upgrade the judge-to-populace proportion. As indicated by the 120th Law Commission Report, “In the event that official portrayal can be determined in light of populace, as recently expressed, and other state administration, police, and different administrations can be arranged similarly, there is not a great explanation for why a similar standard can’t be applied to legal administrations. While the populace is a segment unit, it is additionally a vote-based unit, it should be recognized transparently. At the end of the day, we’re discussing residents who have popularity-based privileges, for example, the option to admittance to equity, which the state is committed to giving “. While proposing a fivefold expansion in legal strength at all levels of the Indian legal executive (from 10.5 to 50 judges for every million of the populace), the 120th Law Commission additionally noticed that India’s judge-populace proportion could not hope to compare to a few different nations. Rather than spending Rs 4750 crore to redesign the current legal executive by expanding the judge-populace proportion, the NDA government has proposed a 502-crore quick track court project for a five-year term, which is a specially appointed, silly endeavor to deal with a huge issue of confusing pendency.

The arrangement required the foundation of 1750 quick track courts, five in each locale, to speed up the goal of forthcoming lawbreaker cases. The idea is sound since it tackles the issue of undertrials grieving in jail for a really long time and turning into a monetary weight on the public authority. An amount of Rs. 502.90 crores was endorsed as an exceptional issue and upgradation award for the legal organization for a long time, till 2005, under the Fast Track Court Scheme. There are at present 1.8 lakh undertrials in bars, with the public authority paying around Rs. 361 crores each year on their upkeep at a pace of Rs. 55 for each individual, consistently in jail. As indicated by the sources, “just about two crore cases were anticipated to be settled by 2005,” bringing about tremendous reserve funds in prison uses while likewise settling a “genuine basic liberties worry.” “No less than five such courts work with full government help with each locale the nation over,” said Mr. Arun Jaitley, then, at that point Minister of Law (2000-2002, 2003-2004). The system, which would likewise deal with undertrial cases, was financially savvy since it would cost an expected Rs. 100 crores each year, contrasted with the Rs. 360 crores spent by states every year on undertrials upkeep. The Center set out just Rs 100 crore each year for this reason, with the assumption that all forthcoming detainee cases would be settled in something like a time of the most optimized plan of attack courts’ foundation. It is obscure whether the undertaking will be finished in something like four years. As per Union Law Minister H R Bhardwaj (2004-2009), the most optimized plan of attack courts could resolve 3.8 lakh of the 8 lakh cases allotted to them in four years. The middle would not give them Rs 100 for the undertaking’s fifth and last year, compelling them to close down the nation over.

Initial Setback

At the point when it was first presented, the allies were irritated, truth be told. The arrangement was tested by the Andhra Pradesh Bar Council as unlawful and incapable of giving quick equity. The AP High Court requested a stay on the activity of quick track courts after the appeal was acknowledged. The bar chamber’s reactions to the most optimized plan of attack courts are legalistic in the most terrible feeling of the world. For instance, it scrutinizes the Finance Commission’s affirmation that the expense of undertrials (assessed at Rs 20,000 for each individual each year) will diminish as quick track courts speed up the goal of their cases. The bar board asserted, rather grandiosely, that a court’s only intention is to administer equity, not to diminish prison spending.

It likewise goes against the directing officials being named on a two-year agreement from among resigned judges. The bar committee contended that the most optimized plan of attack courts’ authoritative judges will be less responsible than the customary courts’ long-lasting judges. The AP High Court deferred the plan’s execution since it seemed to have major legitimate and sacred flaws. The Union government pursued the High Court’s choice to the Supreme Court in a Special Leave Petition (SLP). As indicated by the SLP, the High Court made a lawful blunder by really giving the writ request through an ex-parte request in light of a simple at first sight assessment of the legitimacy of laying out quick track courts without articulating the grounds. The High Court’s structure was deferred on May 2 by a Supreme Court seat comprising Justice B.N. Kirpal and Justice Ruma Pal. Afterward, while hearing a case on the situation with undertrials in different States, one more Supreme Court Bench, drove by Chief Justice of India (CJI) Justice A.S. Anand, Justice R.C. Lahoti, and Justice Doraiswamy Raju, communicated lament that the plan of quick track courts, notwithstanding its significance, was not brought to the CJI’s consideration before the public authority made a declaration in such manner. The judges called attention to that the assets given to state legislatures to layout quick track courts ought to have been put in the possession of the Chief Justices of the High Courts for appropriate use.

“On the off chance that you fabricate structures first, pick judges,” the Bench noticed, “the most optimized plan of attack courts will turn out to be incredibly sluggish.” The Court inferred that the course of action would have worked better assuming the Chief Justices of the High Courts included picked the cases and areas that the most optimized plan of attack courts ought to attempt. The Bench additionally considered how previous District Judges could be enlisted as managing officials and who might be responsible for them. Its basic comments have caused frustration, as Law Ministry authorities keep up with that the plan’s draft was conveyed to all states and Chief Justices of every single High Court, and that it was just executed after intensive interviews with the legal executive at all levels. As per these sources, just the Chief Justices of the High Courts would allow judges to quick-track courts. In reply to a TV interview, H R Bharadwaj demonstrated that by March 2004, 1400 such courts were working, with 8 lakh cases going over to them, with 3.8 lakh cases getting a decision. Notwithstanding, he asserts that the strike rate is excessively low and that the explanation for this is that the most optimized plan of attack courts are dealt with by judges who come up short on energy for equity. “More youthful blood ought to be allowed an opportunity as opposed to resigning judges; they can acquire advancements and have a future,” Bharadwaj commented. He additionally expressed that he will start filling vacancies in different courts in the nation in the following three weeks.

Impact

The media claimed in 2002, while the courts were still getting up to speed, that the plan was beginning to have, “It had a positive influence on crime, since the number of heinous crimes had decreased, notably in Rajasthan and Maharashtra. Uttar Pradesh and Bihar had also suffered the effects.” The Parliamentary Standing Committee, which includes members from all political parties and is chaired by an opposition member, expressed pleasure in May 2003 and asked the government to do more.9

Lack of Accountability

Ad hoc Judges would be appointed for a two-year term from among retired sessions or additional sessions Judges, members of the Bar, and judicial employees who would be elevated on an ad hoc basis under the fast-track court program. The High Courts will be in charge of appointing judges. The Centre has urged state governments to use a particular drive to fill any vacancies that may arise as a result of ad hoc promotions. They did not anticipate the issue of presiding officers’ lack of accountability as a result of the provision of a short tenure in office after retirement.

There are serious concerns that litigants with clout at the district level could use the plan to their advantage to advocate for the fast disposition of causes they care about, which could lead to a miscarriage of justice. The model does not allow for the infusion of new and youthful judicial talent, which is plentiful. There were no fundamental changes in the legal system as a result of the fast-track courts program. There has been no new procedure code established. Retired judges, who have served in the past but have no plans for the future, are dispensing justice at a breakneck pace. It’s worth noting that these gentlemen never performed at even half their normal speed in their regular jobs. This is due to two factors. One, because they were vulnerable to disciplinary hearings during their ordinary jobs, the judges were cautious. A person who has already retired and is serving on a short end-of-career tenure is not subject to disciplinary action. This is compounded by the Indian legal system’s complete lack of judicial accountability. Two, some judges see this term assignment as their last chance to make some money while the sun is shining. As a result, there was a greater emphasis on speedy wheeling-dealing and the disposal of the greatest number of cases possible.

Is it permissible to follow the easy way of acquitting the accused because of a mechanical adherence to the idea that “hundreds of criminals may escape, but one single innocent must not be punished”? Though it is a commonly accepted principle that no innocent person should be punished, courts are obliged to be sensitive and cautious in order to ensure that no criminal escapes. In such circumstances, the criminal justice system’s sustainability is put to the test. Otherwise, criminal activity will continue uninterrupted.

Worst Example of Fast-Track Injustice: Best Bakery

At its Special Leave Petition (SLP) in the Supreme Court, the National Human Rights Commission challenged the judgment of the Fast Track Court of H.U. Mahida acquitting all 21 accused in the Best Bakery case, which involved the murder of 14 Muslims in communal riots in Vadodara on March 1, 2002. The NHRC claimed in its petition to the Supreme Court that even as one witness after another, including the main eyewitnesses, became hostile, Judge Mahida made no attempt to figure out why this was happening. The NHRC objected strongly, citing documents, that there was no adequate cross-examination of Zahira Sheik and Lal Mohammad, who contradicted their earlier written statements. “Instead of attempting to bolster the prosecution case, it appears that steps to the contrary were done,” according to the NHRC appeal. The NHRC also noted how the trial was reduced to a farce by excluding a full cross-examination of the investigating officer, who testified on June 21. The Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 1, Vadodara, completed the examination and recording of all 21 accused people’s statements under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) on the same day and proceeded to hear arguments in part. The Fast Track Court, as its name suggests, handed down its decision on June 27.10

On February 20, the trial began. Was the trial court completely powerless in the face of a dearth of evidence? Apparently, the trial court believed it lacked the authority and jurisdiction to determine who was the genuine criminal if the accused were not guilty, or to compel restitution from the government to the victim. In his ruling, Judge Mahida stated, “The court of justice is not a court of justice in the true sense, rather it is a court of evidence.” “The prosecution was required to petition to the court to have the trial conducted in camera under Section 9 (6) of the CrPC when one witness after another was observed by the court to be resiling from the earlier statement made. Even if the prosecution did not do so, the court had the authority to request that the trial be held in private “The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) drew attention to this. The trial court can postpone the trial under Section 309 of the CrPC for reasons that must be stated in writing in order to guarantee that a safe environment is provided for witnesses to depose without fear. It is also conceivable to recall and re-examine any person previously examined under Section 311, particularly if his or her testimony appears to be critical to the case’s just conclusion. The Fast Track Court did not use these powers and instead chose to acquit everyone. On August 8, the Supreme Court Bench appeared to concur with the NHRC’s petition in broad terms. It ordered the Centre and the Gujarat government to produce a report within two weeks detailing any plans to reform the criminal justice system.11

Recent instances of miscarriage of justice

The case of Parsa Kente Collieries Ltd v. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited, in which leave was eventually granted, was decided in haste and without much deliberation by the Supreme Court. According to the notification dated May 9th, 2018, the matter was meant to be heard by the summer vacation bench of the court, but it was instead taken up by a different bench. The case was put on hold since the court couldn’t reach a decision owing to a lack of evidence. In addition, the court took up the matter on May 21st on its own, hearing an argument from one of the parties involved. The judgment date was given the very following day.

The decision was made without informing the attorneys engaged in the case. The court’s action appeared to be ambiguous because the subject was not urgent enough to be dealt with before the deadline. As a result, this ruling was seen to be a miscarriage of justice because there was no necessity involved and the court made its decision in haste in order to clear out the pending cases. M/s Adani Power (Mundra) Ltd v. Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission and Ors was a case similar to this one in which the court acted similarly. In this case, too, the court’s decision was based on a new date chosen by itself rather than the previously specified dates. This clearly demonstrates that the court was biased in favor of one of the parties in the case. Both of these cases involved Adani Business Groups, and because the verdicts were in their favor, the business group profited by crores of rupees. Both rulings were rendered in an unreasonable and rushed way, which is contrary to the court’s regulations.

It’s possible that the court reached a decision as it saw fit, but the process by which the cases were handled, both of which were affiliated with a huge business company, was not fair. Another case in which the court committed a miscarriage of justice was Zulfikar Nasir & Ors v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors, often known as the Hashimpura massacre. The Hashimpura massacre occurred during the Rajiv Gandhi government’s reign of terror in India. The massacre resulted in the deaths of approximately 45 Muslim men who were being transported by a Provincial Armed Constabulary truck. Those men were wrongfully detained and held in detention for an indefinite period of time. As a result, the actions of the members of the Provincial Armed Constabulary were manifestly illegal. The killings occurred while the Muslim men were being held in jail. Because neither the men who were taken away nor their dead corpses were ever returned to their families, the High Court made it plain that the victims’ families had the right to know the reason and the truth as part of their access to justice. In a 2015 verdict, twenty years after the occurrence, the court acquitted all of the accused males on the basis of a lack of transparent evidence. The court’s decision has sparked a number of questions and debates about the country’s justice delivery system. After the matter had been neglected in the High Court of Uttar Pradesh for so long, such a move by the Supreme Court was a clear indication of a miscarriage of justice. The compensation which was decided by the Uttar Pradesh government to be provided to the families of the victims of the massacre was not put into effect as well. Many legal experts simply labeled this as genocide, and the court’s inaction on the topic was not welcome.

The court may have reached a rational judgment, but it should have also devised some means of obtaining justice for the victims’ families and should not have delayed the case for so long. Because jihadists are responsible for a large number of terrorist activities, many innocent Muslims have been exposed to abuse and harassment as a result of investigative officials declaring them guilty. The court had recognized the police officials’ miscarriage of justice in a case from 1996, in which the officials had arrested a few Muslim males and accused them of being responsible for an explosion at New Delhi’s Lajpat Nagar Market. These guys were cleared of the same charges in a 2012 ruling. If the court had not reviewed the police investigation, this case would have been considered a terrible miscarriage of justice. Following the 2011 attack, a new investigative team was developed in order to avoid future mismanagement and carelessness when conducting investigations. This episode, which occurred after the formation of the new time, exemplifies how officials’ carelessness and stupidity caused innocent individuals to suffer as a result of the improper prosecution of a case in which they were not even involved.

This case also highlights the Supreme Court’s role in the case, which is to keep a check on the activities of the police officers involved. Along with the courts, the government bears the duty of policing officials’ carelessness. The fact that the cases are being handled in his state must be made known to the state governments. Strict actions must be taken to ensure that authorities work diligently and with care. Taking a cue from Indian cases, the insights of a miscarriage of justice are nothing new in international situations. The United States of America has long struggled with racial issues, so the Florida bench’s decision in the case of Florida v. George Zimmerman, which involved the assassination of Trayvon Martin, an African-American teenager, by George Zimmerman, an American, was not a welcome one, as it exacerbated the society’s long-standing racial divide and was thus declared a miscarriage of justice. In this instance, the defendant was hurt as a result of the plaintiff’s murder and thus claimed self-defense. As a result, he was cleared of the murder allegations leveled against him. Several civil rights activists were opposed to the verdict, which was deemed to be discriminatory.

The court’s decision may not be incorrect, but the fact that a youngster was slain without cause should have been causing alarm. These examples show when a case has reached a court and has been heard by that court. There are a number of different situations that lead to a miscarriage of justice even before the case reaches the courts. The rape instances stand out among them. Several times, the victim of a rape case has been forced to withdraw their petition from the court due to pressure from society, the families involved, and political considerations. This implies a terrible miscarriage of justice by the courts due to the lack of support it is meant to provide to the victims and the inability to withdraw the claims that are pending. The oppression of African-Americans by whites has been a long-running social fight. The courts exist to promote equality and to eliminate any disparities that may arise. The Florida Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Florida v. George Zimmerman served to accentuate the social divides that previously existed. It is usually preferable for the courts to end a case with a conclusion based on grounds and clarity, as the absence of these factors leads to injustice.

Rape cases are a serious societal issue, and it is not difficult to press charges in such circumstances because there are statutes dedicated solely to rape. According to police officials, even after a successful investigation, the case is delayed due to a lack of judicial participation in such instances. Following that, the nation was made aware of the delays in the court’s decision-making ability through the case of Mukesh & Anr v. State for NCT of Delhi & Ors, also known as the Nirbhaya case. After nine years of litigation, the victim achieved justice when the rapists were sentenced to death by the court. However, not all rape cases have the same resources and support as Nirbhaya’s. This is a reflection of the court system’s flaws, which result in a miscarriage of justice. The events described above occurred within the last five to ten years. They were chosen because they reflect the direction in which the country and the world as a whole are heading. When the courts have gone to the aid of the victim to prevent injustice, they have also stayed silent or absent when justice has been denied.12

Why not the system is strengthened?

Poor litigants will continue to suffer unless systematic reforms are implemented to eliminate delays. Even within the current system, there is no reason why formal court processes should not be developed to expedite the hearing of urgent matters rather than leaving it to chance or using fast-track courts. Decisions on requests for early hearings are often made without regard for the consequences of any delay for poor litigants under the current system. Fast-track courts are unlikely to make a difference to the massive backlog of cases if there isn’t a rational and sensible system in place to support the rapid disposition of cases.

There is a need for studies that assess the quality of decisions rendered and the level of public confidence in the judicial system on a regular basis by the Law Commission, the National Human Rights Commission, law schools, and the nation as a whole. The fast-track court plan was a temporary fix that appears to have worked on the surface, as the backlog of cases has likely decreased and cases are being resolved more quickly. On the other side, it has caused major problems by resulting in a massive ‘miscarriage of justice’ in thousands of instances, eroding the judiciary’s credibility. On a legitimate mission, the entire legal system should be run on a fast track.

Ways to avoid a miscarriage of justice

No court wants to issue a decision that could result in a miscarriage of justice. It is not only the courts that are responsible for delivering an unjust verdict, but also the investigating officers who arrive before the case reaches the courts. Miscarriage of justice, if it occurs, should be prevented in order to ensure that the courts provide justice in a clear, affordable, and consistent manner. Below are some suggestions about how to go about doing so.

Special Courts

When courts are inundated with cases, they issue hasty decisions in an attempt to reduce the number of pending cases, which leads to miscarriage of justice. By their very nature, decisions made in haste are destined to be unjustified. To avoid this, special courts have been recommended and are being built up to handle a few cases and give justice quickly and without any loopholes. It has been suggested that special courts be established in each area to prevent unjust prosecutions from being carried out. The harmed person can file a claim alleging that he or she was wrongly prosecuted. The claimant bears the burden of proof for the unjust prosecution.

The special courts provide an efficient system for filing cases, payment options for clearing fees, a list of timetables for case disposition, the time limit for filing an application, and so on. For ordinary folks, this has made the court system easier, faster, and smoother. This is one technique to ensure that judges’ actions are monitored and that miscarriages are avoided. The special courts are required to send notice of the appeals hearing to the parties concerned in the case after receiving a claim.

The special court will provide an award for damages, whether monetary or non-monetary, to any party in the case after hearing the case and hearing both sides’ appeals. This simplifies the entire legal process for both the parties and the courts. The court must consider a few issues before awarding compensation to the victim, which is given below:

  • A brief financial history
  • Emotional harm to the aggrieved person
  • Damages to the aggrieved party’s health, and so forth.

Human Rights

Human rights are fundamental rights that are granted to all citizens, regardless of their background. Human rights include the right to a fair trial, the right to freedom of speech and expression, and the right to liberty, all of which might be considered essential aspects in preventing a miscarriage of justice. The right to a fair trial is guaranteed under Article 6 of the Human Rights Convention, which states that everyone is presumed innocent until proven guilty. Article 5 of the Human Rights Convention guarantees liberty.

The phrase “liberty” refers to the fact that a person will be prosecuted according to the method laid out, and that the person imprisoned must be aware of the reasons for his detention. The guarantee of access to justice within a certain time frame is accompanied by liberty. The right to freedom of expression is addressed in Article 10 of the Human Rights Convention. This freedom allows an individual to connect with others who can help him get out of trials or provide a larger platform to demand justice, such as the media.

The special courts provide an efficient system for filing cases, payment options for clearing fees, a list of timetables for case disposition, the time limit for filing an application, and so on. For ordinary folks, this has made the court system easier, faster, and smoother. This is one technique to ensure that judges’ actions are monitored and that miscarriages are avoided. The special courts are required to send notice of the appeals hearing to the parties concerned in the case after receiving a claim.

Principles of Natural Justice

Natural justice principles have served as an important check on the possibility of a miscarriage of justice. In a similar way to human rights, the Indian Constitution includes natural justice principles in some of its sections to protect public rights. When there is a miscarriage of justice, it is the general public who suffers the most. Natural justice principles underpin all other statutes in place, hence they must be kept in mind for the Constitution to work effectively, as their violation amounts to the arbitrary exercise of power.13

Curative Petition

Curative petitions are those that serve as the last constitutional alternative for redressing grievances that have arisen in the court after the review plea has been exhausted. The Supreme Court adopted a curative petition for the first time in the matter of Rupa Ashok Hurra V. Ashok Hurra and Anr, in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice from occurring. In this case, the court stated that curative petitions can only be filed if the petitioner can show that the principles of natural justice have been violated.

In addition, the petition has the burden of establishing that the court was unaware of the presence of a curative petition at the time of the judgment. Although curative petitions are viewed with suspicion in unusual circumstances that are witnessed in open court proceedings, they are one of the tools for preventing miscarriages of justice and placing limits on the use of the courts’ power. In plain terms, a curative petition is a second review by the courts of its own judgments that have previously been issued. Article 137 of the Indian Constitution gives the Supreme Court the power to reconsider its decisions after they have been declared obligatory. The party that has been wronged has a legal right to make an appeal to the court for a second time to have its judgment reviewed, which must be done according to the court’s regulations.

Judicial review

Judicial review is a judicial power that allows the courts to check the constitutionality of the legislature’s and executive branches’ responsibilities. True, miscarriage of justice does not always arise as a result of court orders, but it can also emerge from the influence of the legislature and executive branches of government. Several cases have occurred that demonstrate how the executive’s influence and statutes enacted by legislatures might leave the judiciary unsure of what verdict to issue. To be on the safe side, courts frequently fail to pursue the road of justice, resulting in a miscarriage of justice. To avoid this, the courts can control the power of judicial review to keep a check on the other branches of government, and rather than being influenced individually, the three branches of government can work together to avoid a situation that could result in a miscarriage of justice.14

Conclusion

Miscarriage of justice is not a welcome development because it violates human rights. For the judiciary, a miscarriage of justice raises a lot of questions. The judiciary’s goal is to correct injustice. Because it leads to unfairness on the side of the parties concerned in the case, a miscarriage of justice negates the judiciary’s goal. The judiciary is well aware of the duties and responsibilities it bears to the nation’s residents. As a result, there is no need to instruct the courts. The judiciary, for its part, has already taken a number of steps to address the miscarriage of justice.

The judiciary should use more of these types of corrective procedures in order to successfully carry out the application of law and protect the innocent by administering justice. It is important to remember that the courts have served as a guiding light in countless cases, providing justice to both parties involved. Default does occur from time to time, but this is because of the confidence that courts have built with the public through time. The remedies and instruments established by the courts to provide safeguards will serve to maintain the judiciary’s independence and, as a result, allow it to function effectively.

References:

  1. 247 (2018) DLT 31
  2. 1983 AIR 1086
  3. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/may/09/miscarriage-of-justice-victims-uk-supreme-court
  4. Hussainara Khatoon V. State of Bihar AIR 1979 SC 1364
  5. Maneka Gandhi V. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597
  6. Constitution of India, 1949, art.38(1)
  7. Constitution of India, 1949, art.39(A)
  8. Babu V. Raghunathji AIR 1976 SC 1734
  9. https://eachother.org.uk/5-shocking-miscarriages-justice-prisoners-need-human-rights/
  10. https://www.news18.com/news/india/miscarriage-of-justice-delhi-hc-acquits-man-of-raping-daughter-10-months-after-his-death-1978487.html
  11. Dr. Madabhushi Sridhar, Miscarriage of Fast Track Justice, Legal Service India http://www.legalservicesindia.com/articles/misoj.htm
  12. Oishika Banerji, Recent instances of miscarriage of justice, iPleaders https://blog.ipleaders.in/recent-instances-miscarriage-justice/
  13. Laskit, Concept of Natural Justice, Legal Service India https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-1549-concept-of-natural-justice.html
  14. https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2018/09/08/wrongful-prosecution-miscarriage-of-justice-legal-remedies-law-commission-of-india-report-no-277/

This article is written by Arryan Mohanty, a student of Symbiosis Law School.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most unprecedented crisis ever in modern human history unfettered its wings in the form of a virus transmission namely Covid-19. The pandemic shook all spheres of life ranging from regular personal issues to the most intriguing aspect of our life. The Legal field was no exception to this havoc and it too bore the brunt of the pandemic. It compelled the justice delivery system to turn its recourse from traditional instruments of justice delivery to modern ones. In order to cope with the complicated demand system and ensure speedy and accessible delivery of justice, the virtual courts evolved to the fullest. It would be necessary to observe that even though they were present before the pandemic, covid-19 caused their application. Even after the retrieval of the pandemic, the ever arching presence of technology-assisted tools such as video conferencing and virtual courts are like to stay long after given their immense benefits of time-saving, speedy trials, social distancing norms, and technical benefits. However, as we know everything comes at a cost, this becomes more relevant in this case where the queen card is technology.1

TECHNOLOGICAL CONUNDRUM

Starting from the very conception, nearly all the aspects in this technology-driven process suffer from myriad glitches. In the present scenario of virtual proceedings, only lawyers and their respective clients can view the same. The general public is barred from participating in the process. This completely goes against the notion of open courts and access to justice because these ultimately erode the rule of law as the very credibility and transparency depend on the open and fair judicial trials. Moreover, poor audio-video quality, manipulation of testimonials and evidence, power backup and connectivity issues, irregular code of conduct by the stakeholders, difficulty posed in cross-examination of witnesses, and multiple other issues that have crept into the system have further accentuated the discrepancies and complications of the ongoing virtual process.

The words of Adv. Dushyant Dave who quoted, “Performance of virtual courts through the medium of video conferencing has been not only far from satisfactory, but utterly disappointing.” presents a stark contrast as to actual requirements of setting up the requisite infrastructure and the ground reality.

One of the pertinent questions that arise is how to retain the public trust and confidence in the ongoing convoluted circumstances when the very concept of open courts and access to justice have been endangered by the advent and ramifications of covid-19? One of the notable answers to this question could be the live streaming of cases in matters of constitutional and national public interest which had been laid down in the case of Swapnil Tripathi vs Supreme Court Of India2. The case lays down the groundwork required for setting up virtual courts, thus, paving way for the establishment of online norms and infra for live streaming.

BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE

In 2017, Swapnil Tripathi, a law student, filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the constitution and was joined by 3 others, seeking declaration for the live streaming of the cases of constitutional importance and affecting the public at large in a manner that is accessible for public viewing. It further sought guidelines for laying down criteria for determining the cases that qualify for live streaming and also chalking out the list of exceptional cases. In order to buttress his case, the petitioner relied on the case of Naresh Shridhar Mirjkar v. the State of Maharashtra3 wherein the court emphasized the efficacy of open trials for upholding the legitimacy, effectiveness of the courts, and enhancement of public confidence and support.

ISSUES RAISED

Whether there should be live dissemination of the cases with aid of ICT( information and communication technology) and, if they are to be introduced in India, then under what conditions?

DECISION

The decision was delivered by a 3 judge bench of the Supreme Court of India wherein Justice Khanwilkar delivered the majority judgment on behalf of himself and CJI Dipak Misra. Justice D.Y Chandrachud gave a different concurring judgment. The bench ruled that the cases of the constitutional and national importance of public matter should be live-streamed in a manner consistent with the guidelines as prescribed by the honorable Supreme Court of India.

HELD

The Judgement is held to be significant, for it opens the door that provides open access to justice, public information and ensures transparency of the judicial process. The judgment has opened the application of live stream even to the most bottom tiers of judicial institutions i.e. lower courts thereby enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the entire judicial ecosystem. The court held that the right to view the live broadcast of the above-mentioned cases flowed from the right to access to justice which is derived from Article 21 Right to life and liberty thereby underlining the concept of open courts. However, this right is not absolute and is subject to the provisions of model guidelines framed for this purpose. The SC shall hold the broadcast and archive rights exclusively. The court concluded that live streaming of cases would uphold the constitution values, infuse public confidence into the judicial machinery, and uphold the values of democracy and integrity. However, there is a compelling need to balance the administration of justice and the virtues of privacy and dignity of the stakeholders involved. The other benefits involve:

  1. It would infuse radical immediacy of the court proceedings and espouse public awareness regarding matters of national importance.
  2. It would reduce public reliance upon second-hand narratives and ensure the credibility of the system.
  3. It would literally eliminate the space and the time constraints by removing physical barriers and decongesting the courtrooms, thereby, greatly aiding in keeping infections at bay.
  4. It would drastically enhance the accountability and credibility of the judicial process, thus, promoting democracy.

CONCLUSION

While allowing such streaming, the majesty, integrity, and decorum of the courts as well as of the stakeholders involved, should not be compromised. Given in this unprecedented crisis of covid19 and the post covid world, live streams would be an imperative tool for the purpose of serving justice and fulfilling the notion of open courts thereby promoting technological prowess.

References:

  1. https://lawtimesjournal.in/swapnil-tripathi-vs-supreme-court-of-india/
  2. (2018) 10 SCC 628
  3. 1966 3 S.C.R 744

This article is written by Riya Ganguly, 2nd year BBA LLB student at Bharati Vidyapeeth New Law College, Pune.

Introduction

One of the primary players in India’s journey to prevailing in quick structure its economy has been the banking sector. Since our present legal framework for business exchanges has not stayed aware of developing strategic policies and monetary sector changes. This outcome in an extended recuperation of defaulted advances and an expansion in the number of nonperforming resources held by banks and monetary organizations. The Central Government laid out the first and second Narasimham Committees, as well as the Andhyarujina Committee, to look at banking sector changes. These committees surveyed the need for changes in the legal framework in these sectors. These committees, among others, have proposed new regulations for securitization that would permit banks and monetary organizations to take care of protections and sell them without the requirement for judicial activity.1

In light of these suggestions, the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act (SARFAESI) were passed by the Parliament on December 17, 2002. The motivation behind this act is to permit banks and financial organizations to expeditiously recover cash progress. The Act licenses banks and financial organizations to sell sold property to recover outstanding obligations that poor person been paid for quite a long time in spite of various updates. Non-performing assets (“NPA”) in the records of banks and financial foundations must be dealt with in much the same way. The property being referred to could be a private or business property that has been sold with a bank or financial establishment as security for the assets progressed. Before the execution of the SARFAESI Act, distressed parties, like banks or financial establishments, would record a common recuperation claim in common court, and the interaction would delay for quite a long time in light of the fact that the common suit was battled by the two sides. Considering this, the law-making body chose to enact regulation that would permit such nonperforming assets (NPAs) to be quickly settled, permitting the bank to reinvest the recuperated reserves. Banks and financial foundations will save time by not recording a claim in common court, which would regularly be an extensive strategy.2 Unstable advances, credits under $100,000, and obligations that are under 20% of the underlying guideline are excluded from the resolution. This regulation allowed the arrangement of resource reconstruction organizations (ARCs) and the offer of non-performing assets by banks to ARCs. Without the assent of a court, banks are approved to take responsibility for the property and sell it.

Objective and Applicability

It’s a legal framework that governs securitization transactions. Security interests can be implemented without the support of a court. The Act encourages banks and financial institutions to manage their assets to successfully deal with NPAs, asset reconstruction, and asset securitization organizations are being established. This Act empowers banks and financial institutions to seize hypothecated or mortgaged assets to recover nonperforming assets (NPAs). Without the participation of the court, the SARFAESI Act enables the following recovery channels for NPAs: securitization, asset reconstruction, and security enforcement.

The following topics are covered under the Act:

  • The Reserve Bank of India regulates and registers Asset Reconstruction Companies (ARCs). Facilitating the securitization of banks’ and financial institutions’ financial assets, with or without the use of underlying securities.
  • The ARC supports the consistent transferability of financial assets by issuing bonds, debentures, or any other instrument as a debenture to buy financial assets from financial organizations and banks.
  • By entrusting the Asset Reconstruction Companies with the task of raising cash through the sale of security receipts to eligible buyers, the Asset Reconstruction Companies will be able to obtain funds.
  • Facilitating the reconstruction of financial assets obtained when exercising securities enforcement authorities, management change powers, or other powers intended to be placed on banks and financial organizations.
  • The borrower’s account is classified as a non-performing asset following the Reserve Bank of India’s instructions or guidelines released from time to time.
  • In this case, the officials authorized shall exercise the rights of a secured creditor in line with the Central Government’s laws.
  • An appeal to the relevant Debts Recovery Tribunal and a second appeal to the Appellate Debts Recovery Tribunal against any bank or financial institution’s activity.
  • The Central Government may establish or compel the establishment of a Central Registry to register securitization, asset reconstruction, and security interest formation transactions.
  • Applicability of the proposed legislation to banks and financial institutions initially, with the Central Government empowered to expand the proposed legislation’s application to non-banking financial enterprises and other organizations.
  • The proposed regulation does not apply to security interests in agricultural lands, loans under one lakh rupees, or circumstances where the borrower repays 80% of the loan.

Asset Reconstruction

Asset Construction is covered by RBI regulations and legislative provisions under the SARFAESI Act, 2002. It consists of the following:

  • The fundamental definition of “asset reconstruction” is the process of transforming nonperforming assets (NPAs) into performing assets.
  • It all starts with a specialist Asset Reconstruction Company purchasing defective assets, including hypothecated assets, and financing them by issuing Bonds, Securities, and cash.
  • The Asset Reconstruction Company takes over or changes the management of the borrower’s business, sells or leases a part or all of the borrower’s firm, and reschedules the borrower’s debt payments using this approach.

Working of Security Enforcement

The SARFAESI Act gives banks and financial institutions the authority to enforce their securities. The procedure begins with the Debtor being given a 60-day notice period to pay the owing amount. If the outstanding dues are not paid within the required term, the Banks and FI’s have the authority to enforce their SECURITY INTEREST by taking the following steps:

  • Banks and financial institutions have the legal right to take ownership of the secured property.
  • Banks and financial institutions have the option of selling or leasing such property or assigning the right to security.
  • Appointment of a “Manager” to oversee the aforementioned security.

It can approach the borrower’s debtors for payment of the borrower’s debts.

Landmark Cases

M/S Transcore vs Union of India & Anr3
The appellant is M/s Transco, while the respondent is Union of India and Anr. This case is of general interest since it brings up a public approach issue about whether the principal stipulation to Section 19(1) of the DRT Act, 1993 (added by the Amending Act No.30 of 2004) is a condition that should be met prior to utilizing the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. The respondent (Indian Overseas Bank) recorded activity with the DRT in Chennai for the recuperation of duty from the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 3228 of 2006. In 2005, the Respondent gave a Possession Notice to the appellant under segment 13(4) of the Act, expecting him to reimburse his duty of Rs. 4.15 crores (around) in addition to premium inside sixty days, and expressing that the appellant had neglected to do as such and that the bank had claimed the undaunted properties recorded in the timetable to the Notice, which was then sold. In any case, a common allure has been recorded, and the sale deal has been deferred.

In this case, the Supreme Court reasoned that pulling out a case forthcoming before the DRT is definitely not essential for utilizing the SARFEASI Act. This choice has settled the lawful issue encompassing the send-off of simultaneous procedures under the SARFAESI Act. The allure/I.A. made by the appellant in this Court is excused, yet the allure/I.A. is presented by the banks/FIs. is allowed with no expense’s choice. Besides, the choice in the Transcore case permitted banks and monetary foundations to start systems under both the SARAESI Act and the DRT Act simultaneously. The court likewise held that segment 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act is a notification of interest expecting activity to be directed inside the time expressed and not a simple show-cause notice. At the point when a notice is given to the indebted person it is adequately evident, that borrower has neglected to put in his time and his record is classed as NPA. The obligation is distinguished and the record is delegated a nonperforming resource (NPA) under RBI rules. Prior to the bank/FI can summon Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, the requirements of Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act should be met. Following the culmination of Section 13(2) conditions, the bank or FI would be qualified to assume responsibility for the borrower’s gotten resources or make different moves. For this situation, the possibility of the political race doesn’t matter in light of the fact that the Act is a beneficial solution for the DRT Act. They are joined to frame a solitary cure; henceforth the possibility of the political race doesn’t have any significant bearing. The SARFAESI Act gives an additional cure that isn’t in a struggle with DRT. The SARFAESI Act was intended to safeguard the bank/premium FI’s in monetary resources that it claims because of an agreement or the use of customary regulation standards. Segment 13 of the SARFAESI Act intends to recuperate reserves utilizing a non-adjudicatory way. Under the SARFAESI Act, a got resource is one in which the borrower makes revenue for the bank/FI and the SARFAESI is determined exclusively on that premise. The reason for adding the stipulation to Section 19(1) of the DRT Act is to bring the arrangements of the DRT Act, the SARFAESI Act, and Order XXIII CPC into the arrangement.4

Mardia Chemicals Ltd. vs Union of India5
Here, the protected authenticity of SARFAESI was addressed, especially Sections 13, 15, 17, and 34, on the grounds that they are erratic and outlandish. Whenever the Act became real, IDBI Bank gave a notification to Mardia. Mardia defaulted-spoke to the court, where a progression of comparable petitions was assembled and tended to as a solitary case. The appellant battled that section 13 of the SARFAESI Act gives full freedoms to banks and monetary establishments while overlooking the privileges of defaulters. Likewise, borrower interest was not thought about by any means in Section 13. Besides, the borrowers had no right of direction or response to an adjudicatory technique. Section 17(2) of the Act expressed that the defaulter should store 75% of the sum to like and allure the sum was inordinate and subsequently restricted admittance to the legal plan of action of allure maybe a suggested bar had been made/to this, respondent battled that few different regulations accommodated such preconditions/Pet contended that those were for the claim and not for the use of first occurrence/respondent attempted to invalidate that by expressing that The strategy for assuming control over the business and the board of an element, especially a firm, was canvassed in Section 15 of the 15. The appellant likewise fought that section 34 was indistinguishable from Section 34 of the RDB Act, which announced that DRTs have selective locale, i.e., no respectful court will give any request or order against a bank practicing privileges under the Act. SARFAESI was pointless on the grounds that there was at that point a regulation managing this subject issue, and a few regulations were not expected to deal with a similar topic. It was additionally brought up that the most inconvenient obligation section somewhere in the range of 25,000 and 1 lakh dollars-didn’t require separate regulations.

For this situation, the Supreme Court held that the Parliament’s prevalence in concluding the requirement for regulation is underlined. The association between the RDB Act and SARFAESI was dismissed since the last option manages the exceptionally specific issue of nonperforming resources (NPAs) (among different contrasts, for example, the last option managing got leasers). Accordingly, it really depends on Parliament to conclude regardless of whether regulation is required. Section 13 was viewed as intrinsically authentic by the Court. The got bank is just practicing his privilege on the grounds that the default that prompted the sec 13 measure may be viewed as a “second default”- NPA + 60 days additional chance to reimburse following notification. Prior to the 2016 Amendment, Section 13 recognized the Right of Redemption it might be said. Rule 8 and 9 of the SI Rules expressed that the bank should serve a notification affirming the offer of gotten property and that the borrower might take care of the commitment and recover ownership any time before the genuine deal. While the Supreme Court affirmed the section’s legality, it pushed it difficult for borrowers to reserve the privilege to the portrayal. The Supreme Court decided Section 17(2) to be inconsistent and requested that the heading be modified from “claim” to “application.”6

Pandurang Ganpati Chaugale v. Vishwasrao Patil Murgud Sahakari Bank Ltd7
“‘Banking’ relating to cooperatives can be included within the purview of Entry 45 of List I, and it cannot be said to be over inclusion to cover provisions of recovery by cooperative banks in the SARFAESI Act,” a five-judge bench of Justices Arun Mishra, Indira Banerjee, Vineet Saran, MR Shah, and Aniruddha Bose, has held in this case. The ruling of the Court came in a reference made in light of contradictory decisions in Greater Bombay Coop. Bank Ltd. v. United Yarn Tex (P) Ltd.8, Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India9, T. Velayudhan Achari v. Union of India10, and Union of India v. Delhi High Court Bar Association11.

The seat held that the whole situation and banking action of helpful banks is represented by a regulation authorized under Entry 45 of List I, i.e., the BR Act, 1949, and the RBI Act ordered under Entry 38 of List I, saying that “recuperation of duty would be a fundamental capacity of any banking foundation, and the Parliament can sanction a regulation under Entry 45 of List I as the action of banking done by agreeable banks is inside the domain of Entry 45 of List I.” Obviously, under Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, Parliament has the position to endorse the solution for recuperation.” The Court likewise clarified that the principal part of the matter of the agreeable bank connecting with banking was covered by the BR Act, 1949, and the Reserve Bank of India Act, such regulations are connected with Entries 45 and 38 of List I of the Seventh Schedule. The parts of ‘joining, regulation and twisting up’ are covered by Entry 32 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. “As we would see it, such bankers’ banking movement is covered by Entry 45 of List I, which considers the Doctrine of Pith and Substance, as well as the passability of accidental infringement on the field held for the State.” The court reasoned that disturbing ‘banking,’ the regulation connecting with Entry 45 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India administers cooperative banks enrolled under State regulation and multi-State level cooperative social orders enlisted under the Multi-State Cooperative Societies Act, 2002 (MSCS Act, 2002). The cooperative banks run by cooperative social orders enrolled under State regulation for ‘joining, regulation, and ending up,’ specifically, to issues that are outside the domain of Entry 45 of List I of the Constitution of India, are administered by the said regulation connected with Entry 32 of List II of the Constitution of India. The significance of ‘Banking Company’ is characterized under Section 5(c) read with Section 56(a) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, which is a regulation associated with Entry 45 of List I. It manages the ‘banking’ part of co-employable social orders’ banks. The Banking Regulation Act, 1949, and some other regulation appropriate to helpful banks interesting in ‘Banking’ in Entry 45 of List I, and the RBI Act appealing to Entry 38 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, deny agreeable banks from participating in any movement except if they conform to the arrangements of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, and some other regulation relevant to such banks engaging to ‘Banking’ in Entry 45 of List I. Under section 2(1)(c) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, state-contracted helpful banks and multi-state agreeable banks are alluded to as “banks.” The recuperation component laid out under section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, regulation connected with Entry 45 List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India is pertinent on the grounds that recuperation is a significant part of banking.12

Amendment to the SARFAESI Act

The Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debts Laws and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment) Bill, 2016, was introduced in Parliament to amend four laws: the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI), the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (RDDBFI), the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, and the Depositories Act, 1996. When secured creditor defaults on a loan, the SARFAESI Act permits secured creditors to seize the collateral used to finance the transaction. This procedure is carried out with the help of the District Magistrate and does not necessitate the involvement of courts or tribunals. The District Magistrate must finish this process within 30 days, according to the Bill. Furthermore, the Bill authorizes the District Magistrate to assist banks in assuming management of a company if it is unable to repay loans. This will be done if the banks convert their outstanding loans into equity shares and hold a 51 percent or greater ownership in the company as a result.

The Act establishes a single registry to keep track of secured asset transactions. The bill establishes a consolidated database that will allow property records from diverse registration systems to be integrated into one central registry. This contains registrations made under the Companies Act of 2013, the Registration Act of 1908, and the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988. Secured creditors will not be able to take possession of collateral unless it is registered with the central registration, according to the bill. Furthermore, after the registration of a security interest, these creditors will have priority over others in the repayment of their debts.13

Conclusion

With the recent judgment made by the Supreme Court of India, all state and multi-state cooperative banks will now be subject to the SARFAESI Act of 2002. Banks can now sell and seize defaulters’ properties to recover their debts, because of the Supreme Court’s crucial decision. The court bench also recognized a 2003 notification that cooperative banks are covered by the SARFAESI Act and are entitled to seek redress. Cooperative banks had to go to court to recover their dues before this notification was written. The Supreme Court went on to say that this decision was made to eliminate delays in collecting dues because cooperative banks are required to resort to civil courts under the Cooperative Societies Act to do so. The court also held that co-operative banks that engage in banking activities are subject to Sections 5 (c) and 56 (a) of the Banking Regulation Act of 1949, which are laws related to List I Entry 45. (Union List).14 After the judgment made by the Court regarding this issue, experts hope that it would bring the much-needed reforms in the cooperative banks sector, which has been subjected to bankruptcy and corruption. They also believe that it would bring large-scale implications.

References:

  1. SARFAESI ACT, 2002- Applicability, Objectives, Process, Documentation, cleartax.in https://cleartax.in/s/sarfaesi-act-2002 
  2. An overview of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI), Arun Bapat, iPleaders https://blog.ipleaders.in/overview-securitisation-reconstruction-financial-assets-enforcement-security-interest-act/
  3. 2006(5) CTC 753(SC)
  4. M/S Transcore vs Union of India & Anr, Darshika Rughani, Pro Bono India https://probono-india.in/research-paper-detail.php?id=415 
  5. Case No.: Transfer Case (civil) 92-95 of 2002
  6. Constitutional Validity of SARFAESI Act of 2002 tested under ‘Mardia Chemicals vs. UOI’, Shubham Phophalia, taxguru  https://taxguru.in/finance/constitutional-validity-sarfaesi-act-2002-tested-mardia-chemicals-vs-uoi.html
  7. 2020 SC 431
  8. (2007) 6 SCC 236
  9. (1993) 2 SCC 582
  10. (1983) 4 SCC 166
  11. (2007) 6 SCC 236
  12. SARFAESI Act applicable to Cooperative Banks: Constitution Bench, Prachi Bharadwaj, SCC Online https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2020/05/05/sarfaesi-act-applicable-to-cooperative-banks-constitution-bench/ 
  13. The Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debts Laws and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment) Bill, 2016, PRS India https://prsindia.org/billtrack/the-enforcement-of-security-interest-and-recovery-of-debts-laws-and-miscellaneous-provisions-amendment-bill-2016#:~:text=Amendments%20to%20the%20SARFAESI%20Act,intervention%20of%20courts%20or%20tribunals.
  14. What is SARFAESI Act? Jagran Josh https://www.jagranjosh.com/general-knowledge/sarfaesi-act-1588850144-1

This article is written by Arryan Mohanty, a student of Symbiosis Law School.

INTRODUCTION

The word ‘federalism’ is derived from the Latin word ‘foedus’ which means ‘covenant or treaty. Federalism refers to the distribution of powers between the state and the central government. Three lists are provided by the seventh schedule of our Indian constitution and the three lists are union lists, state lists, and the concurrent list. The central government deals with the issues mentioned under the union list such as defense, trade and commerce, citizenship, insurance, banking, highways, railways, higher education, navigation and shipping, and many more. The state government deals with the issue given under the state lists such as agriculture, pilgrimages within India, prisons, state court fees, public health and sanitation, and the last list is a concurrent list which consists of issues on which both the central government and the state government can exercise jurisdiction such as contempt of court, evidence, protection of wild animals and bird, labor welfare, stamp duties, food, administration of justice, etc. if there is a conflict between the central government and the state government then, the decision of the central government will supersede the decision of the state government.

PRINCIPLES OF FEDERALISM

SEPARATION OF POWERS
The power is divided into three branches: legislative, executive, and judiciary. These three organs of the government are independent of each other. These branches are well-known examples of the tripartite system in the united states. The main purpose of this separation of power is to prevent the concentration of power and autocracy.

CHECKS AND BALANCES
Checks and balances are important to prevent the concentration of power and violation of the separation of power. It is required for the proper functioning of the three organs of the government. Some of the examples of checks and balances are judicial review, basic doctrine structure of the Indian constitution, etc.

KEY FEATURES OF THE FEDERALISM UNDER THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION

DIVISION OF POWER
Division of power is the essential feature of federalism so that the power is not concentrated in the hands of the central government. In this, the power flows from the central government to the state government and the local government i.e panchayat.

SUPREMACY OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION
Supremacy of the Indian constitution means that the powers of the executive, judiciary, and the legislative are mentioned in the Indian constitution and they are bound by the constitution hence, no one is above the constitution. This feature gives strength to the basic structure doctrine of the Indian constitution which was given by the Keshvananda Bharti vs the State of Kerala1.

WRITTEN CONSTITUTION
A written constitution is necessary to constitute a country as a federal nation. As it is difficult to distribute the powers orally among the center and the state government. Written constitution helps to maintain the supremacy of the Indian constitution and provides clarity.

RIGID CONSTITUTION
It is important to have rigidity in the constitution to maintain the supremacy of the constitution.

JUDICIARY
There can be a dispute between the center and the state and the judiciary provides the proper mechanism to solve the dispute between them and the decision of the judiciary is binding upon all of them.

  • ARTICLE 131
    According to this article, the supreme court has original jurisdiction to hear the disputes between the center and the state, two or more states, etc.2
  • ARTICLE 262
    This article focuses on the issue of water and valley disputes between states. This parliament Is allowed to make laws on the distribution of water or control of river valleys and can even bar the supreme court to hear disputes related to water or valley disputes.3
  • ARTICLE 263
    Article 263 is based on the issue of the “establishment of the inter-state council”. In this article, the president can ask to establish a council on the charge of interest of the public or to resolve disputes between them. The duty of these councils is to advise and inquire the states if a dispute arises between them, make a recommendation for the better functioning of the policy, and discuss the subjects which are common to both the state and the union.4

BICAMERAL LEGISLATION
Like Canada, India has also bicameral legislation. India also has two houses upper house [Rajya Sabha] and the Lower house [Lok Sabha] and a bill have to be passed by both the houses of the parliament. In India even states also have bicameral legislation such states are Karnataka, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Telangana, and Andhra Pradesh. They have an upper house [Vidhan sabha] and a lower house [Vidhan Parsihad].

QUASI FEDERALISM

Quasi federalism means a form of government that has features of both the federal government and the unitary government. For example India and Canada. But the major control and authority lie with the central government. India is a quasi-federal country in which the states have the power to make laws under list 2 of the seventh schedule of the Indian constitution and the central government has jurisdiction on the matters mentioned in the first list of the seventh schedule of the Indian constitution. The state government and the central government both have the powers to make laws on the matter listed under the third list of the seventh schedule of the Indian constitution. If the dispute arises between the center and the state then the opinion of the central government will prevail.

In India, emergencies can be imposed under articles 352, 356, and 360 of the Indian constitution. During an emergency center government retains all the power and the state government has no autonomy during an emergency. This way federalism loses its luster.

ISSUES AND CHALLENGES FACED BY THE INDIAN FEDERALISM

REGIONALISM
As center focuses more on bigger states than the smaller states and states work according to the democratic system. Then, the conflict can arise between them and they demand to be separated from the union.

ABSENCE OF FISCAL FREEDOM
Fiscal freedom basically means the distribution of financial and tax-related power between the center and the state government. It is necessary for the development of the nation. Though the main power lies in the hands of the center and also they have a finance commission whose work is to decide the state’s share in the center’s revenue.

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
Governor is the head of the state and is appointed by the president of India under Article 155 of the Indian constitution. The decision of the president can overrule the decision of the governors appointed by the president.

INTEGRATED SERVICES
India has integrated services of the judiciary, audits, elections, and many more. The judiciary system of India consists of the supreme, the high court at the state level, and district courts. Supreme courts decisions are bound on the high court and the high court doesn’t have jurisdiction to entertain cases related to disputes between the states. The process of election is the same at both the center and the state level. At the center, it is conducted by the election commission and at the state level it is conducted by the chief electoral officer [CEO] but they are under the supervision of the election commission.

DIFFERENT RELIGION
India is a diverse country and has people who belong to many religions but India is a secular state and the word secular was added in the preamble under the 42nd amendment act which means India will not have any religion or will not promote any religion. This can lead to a conflict between the two religions and then makes federalism weak.

CASE LAWS

MANEKA GANDHI VS UNION OF INDIA
In the year 1978, the verdict passed under this law is that any law made by the legislature is considered to be ultra vires if it violates or infringes any of the fundamental rights. The fundamental rights can only be changed by the constitution, hence this is a check on both the executive branch and the parliament and the state legislatures. During times of emergency article 19 of the Indian constitution is taken away as during the times of emergency our country follows a unitary government. Therefore India is a quasi-federal country.5

STATE OF WEST BENGAL VS UNION OF INDIA
The exercise of sovereign rights by Indian states was the central issue in this case. The Parliament’s legislative competence to implement a statute requiring the Union to acquire land and other properties vested in or owned by the state, as well as the sovereign authority of states as separate entities, were also investigated. The Supreme Court of India ruled that the Indian Constitution did not contain an absolute federalism provision.6

Article 13 of the Indian Constitution will therefore become a non-issue, and it may be overlooked because even regular legislation will be exempt from judicial examination because they were passed on the strength of a constitutional amendment that is not subject to challenge.7

CONCLUSION

Federalism is the distribution of power from the central government to the state government and the local government. The main objective of this is to prevent autocracy. India is quasi federalism country which means it has the features of federalism but the main authority lies with the central government. No doubt there is a lack of balance between the center and the state government.

References:

  1. Kesavananada Bharti vs state of Kerala, [1973 SC 1461]
  2. Constitution of India, 1950 Art 131
  3. Constitution of India, 1950 Art 262
  4. Constitution of India, 1950, Art 263
  5. Maneka Gandhi Vs Union of India, [AIR 567, 1978 SCR[2] 621]
  6. State of West Bengal vs union of India, [AIR 1987 Cal 226]
  7. Constitution of India, 1950 Art 13

This article is written by Prerna Pahwa, a student of Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies, New Delhi.

Equivalent Citation

[1992 SCR (1) 686, 1992 SCC Supl. (2) 651]

Bench

By Hon’ble Justice Sharma, L.M.,
By Hon’ble Justice Venkatachalliah, M.N.,
By Hon’ble Justice Verma, Jagdish Saran,
By Hon’ble Justice Reddy, K. Jayachandra and
By Hon’ble Justice Agrawal, S.C

Date of Judgment

February 18, 1992

Provisions Involved

Articles 102(2), Article 122(1), Article212(1), Article 368 of Constitution of India

Introduction

A constitution is a written document that contains rules, laws, and regulations for the government of a country. The Indian Constitution is regarded as the country’s supreme or “grundnorm” law. Its preamble speaks of people’s sovereignty, democratic polity, justice, liberty, equality, and brotherhood, all of which ensure the individual’s dignity as well as the nation’s unity and integrity. The Preamble is based on Nehru’s beliefs, which constituted the foundation for the constitution’s construction After the constitution was created, it didn’t take long for political insiders to convince Indian framers. Following Nehru’s death, India experienced a decline in political morals and an unpleasant increase in political corruption. The disorderly floor-crossing was a blow to the electoral system and weakened the government’s three organs. Parliament passed the Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act in early 1985, making defections illegal.

Factual Observations

The constitutional legitimacy of the Tenth Schedule established by the Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act, 1985, was challenged in the case of Kihota Hollohon v. Zachilhu and Ors. Writ Petitions, Transfer Petitions, Civil Appeals, Special Leave Petitions, and other proceedings presenting common questions were all heard jointly, bringing the petitioners together. The Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act substituted the tenth schedule for four articles of the Constitution, namely 101(3)(a), 102(2), 190(3)(a), and 191(2). In a 3:2 judgment in the case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld the constitutional legitimacy of the Anti-Defection Law. Justices M.N. Venkatachaliah, K.J. Reddy, and S.C. Agrawal made up the majority, while Justices L.M. Sharma and J.S. Verma made up the minority. Simultaneously, the Supreme Court ruled that the speaker’s directives under the law barring an MLA from serving because of defection are subject to judicial review.

Issues Raised

  1. Whether the changes made by the 52nd amendment are legally acceptable?
  2. Whether the additions made by the 52nd amendment have constitutional validity?

Applicability of Doctrine of Severability

As stated in the definition itself, the doctrine of severability can be applied to a composite amendment that contains amendments that do not require ratification by States as well as amendments that do require such ratification, and the amendment can be upheld in respect of the amendments that do not require ratification and are within the competence of Parliament alone by applying the doctrine of severability. Only the revisions to the proviso’s provisions that require approval must be struck down or declared illegal. The severability test asks the Court to determine whether the legislature would have adopted the legislation at all if the severed element was not a part of it, and if what remains after severance can stand alone and is functional.

The doctrine of severability applies when a piece of otherwise lawful legislation contains a provision that is invalid due to a lack of legislative competence, and the invalid section is severable, leaving the remaining valid provisions intact. This theory does not apply where legislation is invalidly enacted because of non-compliance with a mandatory legislative procedure, such as the mandatory special procedure for exercising constituent power. The theory does not apply to legislation that has not yet been enacted. Even if it may be feasible to keep a stillborn alive by surgical skillfully removing a congenitally faulty portion, it is not possible to infuse life into a stillborn referred in The Bribery Commissioner v. Pedrick Ranasinghe1.

Laws/Provisions Involved

Schedule 10
The first paragraph begins with definitions, the second with disqualifications, the third with divisions within the party (now deleted by the 2003 amendment to the constitution), the fourth with a few disqualifications that do not apply just in mergers, and the fifth with some exemptions. The sixth and seventh paragraphs state who will resolve disputes and restrict courts from hearing concerns about a member’s disqualification, and finally, the last paragraph allows a speaker to make rules for a House to give effect to the provisions of the Schedule.

Most of these provisions are subject to adjudication and interpretation by the courts of the land. Paragraph 2, which outlines a member’s disqualifications, is perhaps the one provision that has been scrutinized by the courts.

Ratio Decidendi

People’s lifestyles shape the law’s profile, not the other way around. A finality clause is not a magical legislative incantation that prevents Judicial Review from proceeding. A decision’s statutory finality assumes and is dependent on its adherence to the law. The scope of judicial review under Articles 136, 226, and 227 of the Constitution in relation to an order made by the Speaker/Chairman under would be limited to jurisdictional errors, such as infirmities based on constitutional mandate violations, mala fides, non-compliance with natural justice rules, and perversity. The courts follow the notion that, notwithstanding a finality provision, it is open to the court to determine whether the action of the challenged authority is ultra vires the powers conferred on it. An action can be ultra vires if it is carried out in violation of a mandatory provision of the law granting the authority the ability to do so. If the authority’s powers are vitiated by mala fides or a colorable use of power based on extraneous and irrelevant considerations, it will be supra vires.

Case Law Referred

Eight sections of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 were found illegal by the court in State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara2 on the grounds that they were in violation of certain constitutional provisions and essential freedoms. The Supreme Court ruled that the sections of the law that were declared unconstitutional were valid because they were not inextricably linked with the remainder of the Act, they were severable from the rest of it. It was one thing to say that the Legislature would not have enacted the Act, but it was another to say that the Legislature would not have enacted it. It would be impossible to pass the Act without adding the elements that were judged to be illegal.

Likewise, the Supreme Court stated in A.K. Gopalan v. the State of Madras3 that if a law is unconstitutional, just the part that is unconstitutional will be declared void, not the entire law, and every effort should be made to save as much of it as possible. If the invalid part’s omission has no effect on the character or structure of the document, it will be considered a severable legislative object.

Judgment

The minority judges held that the Constitution was violated because the Constitutional scheme for deciding on questions of disqualification of members after being duly elected contemplates adjudication of such disputes by an independent authority outside the House, namely the President or Governor, in accordance with the opinion of the committee, all of whom are high Constitutional functionaries.

The Election Commission came to the same conclusion as the minority judges in this instance. It issued suggestions in 1977, recommending that disqualification for defection be referred to the Election Commission for an opinion to be given to the President or Governor, because the matter might potentially be, and as with other disqualifications alluded to in Articles 102 and 191 of the constitution, the President or the Governor will act on the Election Commission’s recommendation.

As a result, it was determined that paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule did not create a non-justiciable territory. The Speaker/power Chairman’s to resolve disagreements could be considered judicial. The ‘finality clause,’ which prepared the way for the majority to prevail in the verdict, is an important construction.

Own Analysis/Opinion

The Anti-Defection Law was enacted to counteract the “evil of political defections.” However, the phrase “voluntarily giving up membership in a political party” must be defined more clearly. The President/Governor should make agreements under the Tenth Schedule based on the Election Commission’s binding advice. Disqualification should be limited to situations in which a member voluntarily resigns from his political party, abstains from voting, or votes against the party whip in a confidence/non-confidence vote.

The law that has prevented individual defections must now be used to prevent mass defections. It’s also necessary to challenge the speaker’s function. For his tenure, the speaker is reliant on the support of the legislature’s majority. As a result, he does not meet the criteria for an ‘individual adjudicatory body.’ It is not practical to repeal the Anti-defection law completely, but the long-term solution is to keep a check on political culture, and legislators who act in contempt or with mala fide intent should be voted out in subsequent elections, as the ultimate agency in the world’s largest democracy rests with the Indian people. That’s why the doctrine of severability has made it easy to combat with kind of issues and help in avoiding any kind of misuse of arbitrary powers.

The president of the parliament, and the governor of the state legislature, may report the subject to the Election Commission under Articles 102 and 192, respectively. This appears to be the only way to avoid the speakers’ political biases in their judgments. If the government wishes to keep the current arrangement, the Supreme Court will have to exercise far more judicial review power over the Speaker’s decision under the Anti-defection law than the Supreme Court is willing to do now under the Kihota Hollohon case.

Concluding Observations

After analyzing the situation in the instant case, it can be concluded that the concerns of construction and severability are distinct because, where more than one reasonable interpretation is available, one upholding the legitimacy of the legislation and the other invalidating it, the former would be accepted, and in the situation that both are possible, the former would be accepted.

If this isn’t practicable, the court has no choice but to decide whether the entire statute should be repealed, stricken down, or the excellent and bad elements can be separated. Also, the Separation of valid and invalid provisions of a statute is not determined by whether the law is enacted in the same section or in distinct parts; what matters is the substance of the matter, which must be determined through a thorough examination of the Act as a whole, as well as the enactment of the applicable provisions. Despite its relative obscurity, the philosophy has far-reaching implications. On the one hand, rejecting entire legislation for one erroneous provision is the most invasive remedy; on the other hand, the Supreme Court is hesitant about amending statutes by removing portions of them. Prior to the passage of the Tenth Schedule, there was no such thing as a “political party” under the Constitution, but their existence is now acknowledged under the Anti-defection Act.

Citations:

  1. [1965] AC 172
  2. AIR 1951 SC 318.
  3. AIR 1950 SC 27.

Analysis by Hemant Bohra student at School of Law, Lovely Professional University, Punjab.

INTRODUCTION

“The Indian constitution is first and foremost a social document, and it is aided by its Parts III and IV (Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy, respectively) acting together as its chief instruments and conscience in realizing the goals set by it for all people.” The constitution was purposefully written in broad strokes (rather than ambiguous language) to ensure its flexibility. Constitutions are divided into two types: rigid and flexible. A constitution’s rigidity or flexibility is determined by the nature of the amendment. Anytime the ordinary laws and constitutional laws are amended separately, the constitution is rigid. In a flexible constitution, however, the two of them; ordinary laws and constitutional laws can be amended in an identical manner. The Indian Constitution is neither too rigid nor too flexible; rather, it is a hybrid of the two.

THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION

The Indian Constitution attempts to strike a balance between rigor and flexibility. A special majority of the Parliament, referring to the two-thirds majority of the members of each house i.e.; Rajya Sabha and Lok Sabha present and voting, the majority as well (which should be greater than 50%) of the total membership of each House, can change certain statutes.

Other clauses can be changed with a two-thirds majority in the Parliament and if there is ratification by half of the states. At the same time, there are certain provisions of the Constitution that can be modified in the ordinary legislative process by a simple majority of Parliament. The constitution’s flexibility is enhanced by provisions that allow the parliament to give an addition to the constitution’s provisions with legislation.

The basic structure concept was established in the Kesavananda Bharti case, which has unquestionably strengthened the constitution’s rigor. In fact, if the topic of Basic Structure arises, the Constitution of India is “completely rigorous” according to the Supreme Court. It clarifies that Parliament’s ability to amend the Constitution cannot be used to change, distort, or undermine the Constitution’s core characteristics and principles in any way.

The illustration of India’s constitutional nature has been outlined in this case, which allows for the Parliament to allow changes according to the ever-changing contexts, weighing the importance of such amendments. The Kesavananda case ruling was a thought-provoking, one-of-a-kind, and high-order decision. This 69-day case was meticulously examined, considering every possible outcome of the decision. After a thorough examination of the matter, it was clear that this ruling was required; otherwise, any political party with a two-thirds majority in parliament might propose any alteration that would jeopardize the constitution’s basic structure. Following the implementation of this ruling, the Judiciary, as mandated by the Constitution, is the last arbitrator in determining whether constitutional provisions have been violated. This case overruled Golaknath’s and opened the path for Parliament to fulfill its duty to construct an egalitarian society and welfare state in accordance with the Constitution’s Basic Structure.

This well-known case resulted in the creation of the basic structural theory, which went down in history as saving our constitution and restoring faith in the court, as well as saving the democracy of our country, for which the freedom fighters in the past gave their lives. As a result, the Kesavananda Bharati case has and will continue to have a place in our nation’s constitutional history.

RECENT AMENDMENTS MADE IN THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION

103TH CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ACT,2019
The Constitution (103rd Amendment) Act made in 2019 has altered two fundamental rights in the Indian Constitution, namely Article 15 and Article 16. These two clauses form the foundation of reservation in the realms of education and government employment. The state now has the power to establish a maximum of 10% quota for “economically vulnerable sectors” of citizens by adding two new paragraphs to Articles 15 and 16 of the Indian constitution. As a result, the total bookings over and above the existing program have increased to 59.50 percent.

Discrimination on the basis of race, caste, sex, religion, or place of birth is prohibited by Article 15 of the Indian Constitution. The amendment attempts to offer reservation to individuals who do not fall under 15(5) and 15 (4) (essentially, SCs, STs, and OBCs), i.e. economically disadvantaged sections so that they can be admitted to educational institutions other than the educational institutions for the minority mentioned in clause (1) of Article 30.

Discrimination in government employment is prohibited by Article 16 of the Indian Constitution. With the amendment, Article 16 (6) is inserted to enable reservations in government positions for people from economically disadvantaged groups. The “economic weakness” will now be determined based on “family income” and other “economic disadvantage factors.”

The Rs. 8 lakh income limit and asset restrictions to determine economic backwardness are the same as the bar set for determining the ‘creamy layer’ for OBC. This effectively eliminates the distinction between the “EWS other than SC, ST, and OBC-NCL” and the OBC-NCL under the 103rd Amendment. This would result in unequal being treated equally.

The Supreme Court has regularly held that overall reservations should not exceed 50% in order to be reasonable and to not jeopardize the basic right to equality. This ’50 percent ceiling’ however, has been effectively violated by the most recent Constitutional change.

Certain structural concepts, such as democratic government, republican government, secularism federalism, judiciary independence, freedom, equality, judicial review power, and so on, form the core or essence of the Constitution and give it a distinct ‘Identity’. This is dictated by the idea of basic structure, and it cannot be changed since it would jeopardize the constitution’s uniqueness.

The Supreme Court ruled in the landmark case of Kesavananda Bharati v. the State of Kerala that the Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 is not absolute and that even a constitutional amendment can be taken down if there are chances of it abrogating or destroying the Constitution’s “basic structure.” In September 1991, the then-P.V. Narasimha Rao government issued an Office Memorandum reserving ten percent of postings for ‘other economically deprived categories.’ The Supreme Court overturned this verdict in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India. The court in Indra Sawhney v. Union Of India and Ors. examined the constitutionality of the quotas in-depth, delving into the idea of backwardness. The reservation was made for a category of citizens who, according to Dr. BR Ambedkar, are those “groups which have not had so far representation in the State.” Indra Sawhney explains one of the reasons behind the 50 percent quota limit, stating that the Constitution allows for “appropriate representation” rather than “proportionate representation.”

The following are some of the key decisions made in the Indra Sawhney case regarding reservation:
• It supported the OBC reserve of 27%, with the exception of the “creamy layer.”
• It overturned the ten percent reservation for economically disadvantaged people, ruling that a backward category of citizens shall not be defined only on the basis of economic factors.
• It ruled that reservations for brought-forward or piled-up reserved vacancies should not exceed 50% of all appointments each year.
• It ruled that reservations can only be made in service or category if the State is satisfied that the representation of the backward class of citizens is insufficient.

In M. Nagaraj v. Union of India & Ors, the Hon’ble Court upheld the constitutional validity of Article 16 (4A) and the proviso to Article 335 and emphasized that the 50 percent ceiling, the concept of creamy layer, and compelling reasons such as overall administrative efficiency, backwardness, the inadequacy of representation, and are some of the constitutional requirements without which the point of equality for opportunities in Article 16 would be lost. Excessiveness in any form of reservation or evaluation, it has also been suggested, would result in a violation of this constitutional requirement. Because of this, the 50 percent reservation bar has been embedded into the fundamental structure of the Constitution’s code of equality.

The Supreme Court ruled in State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas that Article 16(1), as a component of the notion of equality, allows justifiable categorization of all citizens who are in a similar situation with respect to the law. In other words, even if Article 16(4) of the Indian constitution is not there, Article 16(1) enables reserves and special treatment. Article 16(4) is not be made an exception to Article 16(1); rather, it aims to express what is already inherent in Article 16. (1).

Indra Sawhney provides a midway ground between N.M. Thomas and M.R. Balaji, according to the Supreme Court’s decision. It found a compromise between substantive equality and nominal equality by retaining the ‘50% ceiling’ criterion.

104th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2020
This Act abolished Anglo-Indian reservations in the Lok Sabha and state legislatures while extending reserves for SCs and STs for up to ten years. On December 9, 2019, Minister of Law and Justice Ravi Shankar Prasad introduced this bill for amendment in the Lok Sabha. The bill intended to modify Article 334 of the Constitution. On December 10, 2019, the Lok Sabha passed the Bill with 355 votes in favor and there were 0 votes against it. On December 12, 2019, the bill was introduced in the Rajya Sabha, where it gained 163 votes in favor and there were 0 votes against it. President Ram Nath Kovind of India gave his assent to the law on January 21, 2020, and it was published in the Indian Gazette the same day. On January 25, 2020, the amendment took effect.

Aside from the fact that the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes have shown some significant progress for the last 70 years, the reasons that played a part in the Constituent Assembly’s decision to make provisions for the aforementioned reservation of seats still exist, according to Minister of Law and Justice Ravishankar Prasad. Due to this, an amendment to the Constitution was needed in order to keep the Constitution’s inclusive nature as intended by the founding fathers.

The Ministry of Law and Justice further stated that the issue of the extension of Anglo-Indian reservation in the Legislative Assembly had not yet been raised. However, he stated that the matter of terminating the reservation will be addressed by the center at a later date and that the subject matter has not been completely resolved.

The reservation seats for the Anglo Indians were not extended as it was for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, which was one of the main criticisms of the amendment. The objective and reason for such an Amendment, provide justification for such enactment. The 104th Constitutional Amendment’s declaration of goal and reason explains the enlargement of the SC and ST reservations but it does not explain why the Anglo-Indian reservation seats were not extended or increased.

In Prashar v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas (1963), the Supreme Court decided that the statement of purposes and reasons for adopting a piece of law cannot be used to interpret the statute if the language used is plain enough. The declaration of objects and reasons, on the other hand, can be utilized to figure out what led to the law and what the problem was being solved through the legislation.

Parliamentarians have considered the interpretation of extending for SCs and STs with the goal of the founding authors of the Constitution. However, when it came to Anglo-Indians, the approach was not in the spirit of the founding fathers, but rather based on numerical data from the 2011 Census, rather than the report on the Anglo-Indian Community given by the 2013 Ministry of Minority Affairs. Anglo-Indians face challenges such as loss of culture, unemployment, identity crisis, educational backwardness, and a lack of acceptable housing amenities, according to a 2013 Ministry of Minority Affairs fact-finding report.

105th CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ACT, 2021
On August 9, 2021, the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment introduced the 127th Amendment Bill of the Constitution, which was later approved as the 105th Constitution (Amendment) Act. both the Houses of the legislature passed the act unanimously without delay on subsequent days. The major goal of enacting this Act was to bring back the states’ ability to identify their own state’s backward classes.

SEBC and OBC
In India, the Centre creates a separate list that recognizes the Other Backward Classes (OBC). Similarly, each State determines which classes are classified as Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) of that state. Articles 15(4), 15(5), and 16 of the Indian Constitution have established these lists which are essential for the framework of reservation and quotas.

The Constitution (102nd Amendment) Act of 2018 was enacted to address the Central List of Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBCs). Independent lists of the backward classes have been maintained by the Central Government and the State Governments since 1993. However, the Constitution (102nd Amendment) Act of 2018 raised the question of whether it mandated a single Central List of SEBCs detailing the SEBCs for each State, removing the State’s ability to establish and maintain its own State List of SEBCs. Furthermore, because authority has already been given to the Central government to issue lists, including Central in the then-amended Article 342A was redundant.

A contentious piece of legislation- which is The Maharashtra State Reservation for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) Act, 2018, was considered unconstitutional until the Supreme Court pronounced it illegal in Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. Chief Minister (2021).

Several writ petitions challenging the constitutional legality of the reservation act have been filed in the Bombay High Court. The petitioner’s primary points of contention were as follows:

The Act is unlawful because it exceeds the 50% ceiling established on a reservation in any state according to the Indra Sawhney v. Union of India decision (1992).

The Act establishes reservations based on the Justice Gaikwad Commission’s findings, which purportedly lacks trustworthy, scientific, and appropriate facts to prove either Marathas’ backwardness or the extraordinary circumstances that justify raising reservations in Maharashtra.

The Act establishes reservations based on the Justice Gaikwad Commission’s findings, which purportedly lacks trustworthy, scientific, and appropriate facts to prove either Marathas’ backwardness or the extraordinary circumstances that justify raising reservations in Maharashtra.

The state government had passed the Act without complying with the 102nd Constitution (Amendment) Act’s procedural provisions.

The respondent- The Maharashtra State Government, argued that special circumstances, such as an increase in the incidence of suicides among Maratha families due to social and economic issues, justified the Act.

The Bombay High Court upheld the reservation for the Marathas but requested the state administration to cut it to 12-13 percent — the level proposed by the State Backward Class Commission, as opposed to the 16 percent given by the Act. The rationale was that, as the Maharashtrian government demonstrated, the Supreme Court-imposed ceiling on the total percentage of seats might be exceeded in extraordinary situations.

The Supreme Court accepted an appeal from the Bombay High Court’s verdict for the Maharashtra state government on July 12, 2019. The bench overturned the High Court verdict and declared the SEBC Act unconstitutional since there were no special circumstances that allowed for the violation of the 50% reservation mark. This was the unanimous decision of the Bench.

Meanwhile, the majority of the Bench, with two exceptions, believes that the 102nd Amendment deprives the state of the ability to identify backward classes. According to the ruling, only the President can issue a list that points out the economically disadvantaged, which Parliament can then change. In this regard, states merely have a recommending power. On this point, Justices Bhushan and Nazeer dissented, believing that Parliament did not have any intention to withdraw the States’ identification authority.

CONCLUSION

The Indian Constitution is a fusion of the United States’ basic law doctrine and the United Kingdom’s unwritten constitution’s theory of Parliamentary sovereignty. In other words, the Constitution is very stiff that Parliament, the supreme law-making body, cannot modify it. India picked a medium ground between the formality of the United States Constitution and the flexibility of the United Kingdom’s unwritten customs in order to allow the new nation to grow smoothly.

These Constitutional Amendments are significant because it reflects our society’s growing need for development and advancement, particularly among those who need it the most due to their backwardness. The fact that many communities require the presentation of the OBC category for reasons other than political power is linked to the belief that many of them have a lot of room for development in India. The severe caste system has yet to be dismantled, and this bleak reality requires further reflection and policy creativity. Another problem raised by this Amendment is how will the responsibilities be carried out by the states, as states will now be driven by local politics to include newer communities in their OBC lists.

As a result of the Constitution Amendment Bill, the standard operating procedures of the OBC, the scheduled castes, and tribes reserve have been clarified, ensuring empowerment and representation for communities that are frequently left out of inclusive development debate. Its goal is to empower people from underdeveloped communities by improving their social status via quality education and job opportunities, paving the road for inclusive development.

Written by Tingjin Marak, a student at Ajeenkya DY Patil University, Pune.