Tag: #recentjudgement

-Report by Shweta Sabuji

The recent case of PANCHAM LAL PANDEY versus NEERAJ KUMAR MISHRA & ORS., talks about the Uttar Pradesh High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971 and how section 9, read along with section 10 of the act comes into being.

FACTS: 

Tripathi Ramroop Sanskrit Vidyalaya, located in Jogapur, Kaushambi, Uttar Pradesh, is an established school that provides Sanskrit education from Class I to XII, or what is also known as Uttar Madhyama. The school was granted permanent recognition on February 22, 1999. The Government of Uttar Pradesh has decided to include Sanskrit Vidyalayas and Mahavidyalayas on its Grant-in-Aid List, and has laid out specific criteria for institutions to be included in this list in a G.O. dated February 7, 2014. The State Government has notified a list of institutions that have been included in the Grant-in-Aid List, including Tripathi Ramroop Sanskrit Vidyalaya which is listed as Serial No.47. In relation to the aforementioned institution, the State Government approved five positions for salary payment from the State Exchequer, one for the Headmaster and four for the

Assistant professors. In a circular dated 01.01.2016, the Principal Secretary of the Government of Uttar Pradesh approved the payment of salaries to all instructors at institutions receiving Grant-in-Aid who were actively employed previous to the institution’s inclusion on the Grant-in-Aid list. A different circular, dated 18.03.2016, outlined how the reserve policy should be applied. One of the professors, Satya Prakash Shukla, filed Writ Petition No. 29784 of 2016 before the Lucknow bench of the Allahabad High Court since the aforementioned Circulars were having an impact on some of the teachers.

On the grounds that the Joint Secretary of the Department of Secondary Education had stated that “the payment of salary to the teachers shall be made on the basis of seniority of teachers as disclosed in the Manager’s Return,” the aforementioned Writ Petition was granted by order dated December 21, 2016. Unfortunately, by order dated March 28, 2017, the Director of Secondary Education divided the positions of Assistant Teachers, disregarding the Joint Secretary’s testimony before the High Court, and ordered that Neeraj Kumar Mishra, who was nearly five years younger than Pancham Lal Pandey, be paid a salary. In light of this, the aforementioned Pancham Lal Pandey chose

As a result, the aforementioned Pancham Lal Pandey filed Writ Petition No. 19709 of 2017 to contest the Director of Secondary Education’s order from March 28, 2017. Following a hearing with the parties, the aforementioned writ petition was granted by decision and order dated 15.04.2019, nullifying the order dated 28.03.2017 and directing the authorities to declare Pancham Lal Pandey entitled to payment of salary from the State Exchequer.

PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTION: 

The argument made by the knowledgeable attorney representing the appellant in this case, Pancham Lal Pandey, in challenging the aforementioned order is that the Review Application was not maintainable because Neeraj Kumar Mishra’s Special Appeal was dismissed with no apparent error on the face of the record, and that the review was approved without taking his objections to the maintainability of the application into account.

DEFENDANT’S CONTENTION: 

On the other side, Mr. V.K. Shukla, learned Senior Counsel defended the order on the grounds that the learned Single Judge had made a clear legal error in granting the writ petition and that if the order is left in place, it will continue criminal activity, which is against the law. In light of Section 9 read with Section 10 of the Uttar Pradesh High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971, the institution is not permitted to create any new post of a teacher or any employee without the prior approval of the Director, so the review petition was properly allowed because there was an apparent error in the order of the Division Bench dismissing the Special Appeal.

JUDGEMENT: 

The Joint Secretary of the Department of Secondary Education stated that teachers’ salaries would be paid based on seniority, therefore the question of teaching was irrelevant. In light of this declaration, the Single Judge granted the writ petition. The institution’s decision to divide the authorized Assistant Teacher positions into subject-based groups is purely an internal decision that imposes no additional burden on the State. Since the school was placed on the Grant-in-Aid list with a Headmaster and four Assistant Teachers in order of seniority, allowing just five people to earn compensation from government funds is legal. The Court did not establish a new position for an assistant teacher at the institution. Because of this, the Writ Court correctly granted the writ petition, and the Division Bench did nothing wrong by rejecting the Special Appeal. We believe that, given the facts and circumstances of the case, the contested ruling, dated February 5, 2021, enabling the review, is illegal and must be reversed.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3jZEE97

–Report by Saloni Agarwal

The Delhi High Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs M/S Sweka PowerTechEngineers Pvt. Ltd settled the dispute between them by awarding the rightfully demanded claims of the respondent.

Facts:

The Municipal Corporation of Delhi hired Sweka PowerTech Engineers Pvt Ltd for providing street lights and ancillary work in different areas of the Karol Bagh Zone. The work ordered was to be completed within six months. There was a delay in the work and until the deadline, only 41% of the work was done. The PowerTech company had also taken money for the completion of the work but the work was pending. The work was assumed to be related to Common Wealth Games and the delay caused a huge loss to the Corporation. The work was supposed to be completed by 15.01.2011. The work order had lost its worth due to delay as time was an important factor in the case. The main ground of the case was the Common Wealth Games but the game ended much before the completion date of work.

Appellant’s Contention:

The plaintiff claimed that it incurred a huge loss due to the delay in work and not even a single street was illuminated. The appellant also said that the respondent had claimed payment falsely which is wrong. It also claimed that it had the right to have a check on the working of the respondent according to the order. Due to a delay in work, the appellant was forced to cancel the contract as it could not ensure more loss. It was said that because of the respondent, it became necessary to file an arbitration case and incur its cost.

Respondent’s Contention:

The respondent claimed the amount fixed for completion of work along with interest and to return the security money which was deducted. It also asked for the loss amount due to the reduction of the work and cost of arbitration. The respondent’s claim that the work was not related to the Commonwealth Games was upheld. The claim of the amount by the respondent was not arbitrary and was according to the contract.

Judgement:

The High Court said that the Arbitrator’s findings were challenged because of advancement in evidence and no actual fault was there. The court awarded the respondent the claimed amount for the completion of work as the calculation was done with reasoning. The court agreed with the Arbitrator’s decision to refund the security amount. The court also asked to pay for the arbitration cost incurred by the respondent.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3K9VFIo

–Report by Umang Kanwat

According to the legal dictionary, an appeal memorandum explains the grounds on which it is desired and why a court hearing has been requested. When the parties to the proceedings are unhappy with the orders or decisions made by the tribunal, they may appeal to the national company law appellate tribunal. This is mentioned in Section 421 of the 2013 Companies Act. The present case of Regal Machine Tools Private … vs Mrs Kaushy Lal & Ors revolves around the same.

FACTS:

M/s. Regal Enterprises, a sole proprietorship business owned by Mr S.M. Mohan Lal, received a one-acre parcel of land bearing Plot No. 39, Bommasandra Industrial Area, Attibele, Hobli, Ankal Taluk, Bangalore, measuring 3948 square metres in exchange for paying a portion of the consideration. The aforementioned allotment was initially given on a “lease basis” for a period of 11 years, and after that, a Sale Deed was to be executed subject to the satisfaction of further requirements. The Balance Payment was to be made after 11 years, it is further noted.

In order to convert the company from a sole “Proprietorship Concern” to a “Private Limited Company” with the name and designation of “M/s. Regal Machine Tools Private Limited,” Mr S.M. Mohanlal had to hold 51% of the company’s “Shares” until the end of the 11-year lease period. This request was granted by KIADB. It is alleged that the Appellants had asked KIADB to execute the Sale Deed and that KIADB had informed them that the Sale Deed would only be done if the Original Allottee, Mr SM Mohanlal, maintained a 51% shareholding, but the Appellants received no answer to their request.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS:

The Appellant’s learned counsel claimed that the Respondents made the offer to buy 2,243 “Equity Shares” for Rs. 53,83,200/-, and the abovementioned consideration amount was given to the appellant by check as part of an MoU on July 1, 2011, but it was never presented and was given back to the respondent. Therefore, no deal has ever been reached to buy 2,243 “Equity Shares.”

RESPONDANT’S CONTENTIONS:

The Supplementary Agreement that the Appellant had recorded, according to the Respondents, was never ever signed. The Schedule Property was assigned for the purpose of constructing and operating an industrial unit for a period of 11 years, failing which the Sale Deed could not be performed in their favour. This is also important to note. A review of the documentation shows that there is no documentary proof that any transfer of shares was made with the approval of the Respondent or the legal heirs of Late Shri S.M. Mohan Lal, as shown by the pertinent Minutes of the Board Meeting or any other key documents.

JUDGEMENT:

The basic goal of the Memorandum of Understanding, it was stated, was for KIADB to allot land in the company’s name and for a check to be written in exchange for shares to be issued, but the same was subject to conditions. No transaction by the Company may be engaged in that would effectively reduce the Shareholding of the Respondents below 51% without the consent of the Respondents, who currently own 51% of the shares.

The Tribunal was of the sincere opinion that the Appellants had violated the Company’s Articles of Association and had not come before the Tribunal with clean hands. This is worth repeating. The well-reasoned order of the National Company Law Tribunal is dismissed as a result because the Tribunal finds no illegality or flaw in it, and the costs of the court are borne by each side separately.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3lr2mv9

–Report by Arun Bhattacharya

The honourable Supreme Court of India in HAJI ABDUL GANI KHAN & ANR. V UNION OF INDIA & ORS. on Monday 13th of January, 2023 observed that “A Constitutional Court cannot casually interfere with legislation made by a competent Legislature” while dismissing the writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

FACTS

The legality of the action of forming a Delimitation Commission for the rearrangement of constituencies in the Union territories of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh was challenged.
On 5th of August, 2019 a Presidential Order was issued under the powers provided in clause (1) of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution with the objective of application of the Constitution along with its amendments in the state of Jammu & Kashmir. Application of all provisions of Article 370 was discontinued by a subsequent Presidential declaration.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION

The petitioners’ primary objection was to the increased number of Assembly seats and the subsequent challenge was that the constitution of the Delimitation Commission was in complete violation of the order passed by the Election Commission of India in 2008 (Delimitation of Parliamentary and Assembly Constituencies Order,2008). The petitioners mainly relied on Article 170 of the Indian Constitution which restrained any rearrangement of assembly seats before the first census after the year 2026. Certain other violations by Articles 330,332, 82 and 83 have also contended which may be read in the original judgment but the essential focus was on the violation of the jurisdiction of the Election Commission of India due to the noncompliance with the order of 2008. Further, sections 59 to 63 were also challenged on the ground of contradiction.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

The Union of India represented by the learned Solicitor General highlighted the delay since the delimitation order had already been passed and the said order of the Delimitation Commission was operative from 20th March 2022 and that such an order by a Delimitation commission stands beyond the purview of court’s review jurisdiction according to Section 10 (2). The validity of sections 60 and 62 was highlighted because the Election Commission had already notified the Government of India of the non-necessity of its interference with the rearrangement of constituencies since the same had already been directed to the Delimitation Commission by a letter proving the sections’ non-contradictory nature.

COURT’S CONSIDERATION

The honourable Supreme Court observed a lack of specificity of allegations and since the grounds on which the said Act’s constitutionality may be verified is not mentioned, it fell short of gaining an in-depth reply from the respondent as well as it did not provide the honourable court with enough room for a constitutionality check. The honourable court denied the validity check of the J&K Reorganisation Act and the Presidential Order of 2019 since they were not at all challenged by the petitioners. The Supreme Court observed the legislative action of constituting the Delimitation Commission in compliance with Articles 3, 4 and 239A and pointed out that the argument on Article 170 does not stand since it dealt with the Legislature of a State and not a Union territory. Applying similar legal analogies the sections 60 and 62 of the J&K Reorganisation Act, the apex court completely refuted the question of legality raised about the exercise of delimitation conducted by the Delimitation Commission.
On the question of the legality of the Order of 6th March 2020 the apex court weighed on the fact that statutory interpretation must be by the legislative intent and that a practical approach must be adopted to “make it workable”.

JUDGMENT

Considering all other legal points and dogmas the apex court stated that the petition lacked merits and that it was a ‘vague attempt’ to portray the exercise of delimitation as an illegal affair. Pointing out the non-bearing of this judgment’s observations on other matters which are subject to judicial scrutiny, the court intentionally refrained from weighing on the validity of the exercise of Parliamentary powers and dismissed this petition.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3Kd0twu

–Report by Shweta Sabuji

The State of Haryana has filed the current appeals because it feels wronged and unsatisfied by the impugned common judgment and order dated 18.10.2019 issued by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Chandigarh, which increased the amount of compensation for the lands acquired at Rs. 2,98,54,720/- per acre with all other statutory benefits and allowed the said first appeals in part preferred by the original land owners. 

FACTS:

Under the terms of the Property Acquisition Act of 1894, a substantial portion of land in the village of Kherki, Majra, measuring roughly 58 acres, was purchased for public use. The awards were made public by the land acquisition officer. The original landowners requested that references be made under Section 18 of the Act of 1894. The reference court increased the compensation for the notification dated 13.01.2010 from Rs. 60 lakhs per acre as awarded by the land acquisition officer to Rs. 1,56,24,000/per acre. The State’s appeals against the decision and award rendered by the reference court, which set the compensation at Rs. 1,56,24,000, were ultimately dismissed.

But by the impugned judgment and order, which considered the compensation amount increased by the High Court and modified by this Court to Rs. 2,38,00,000/per acre concerning the lands acquired in January 2008 and granted a 12% cumulative increase, the High Court has partially allowed the appeals raised by the landowners and determined and awarded the compensation at Rs. 2,98,54,720. The State of Haryana has filed the current appeals because it is unhappy with the impugned decision and order made by the High Court that determined and awarded compensation for the lands acquired via a notification dated 13.01.2010 at Rs. 2,98,54,720 per acre.

PLAINTIFF CONTENTION:

While calculating the compensation at Rs. 2,98,54,720/- per acre for the lands acquired via a notification dated 13.01.2010, Shri Nikhil Goel, learned AAG, appearing on behalf of the State, has vehemently argued that the High Court materially erred by considering and/or relying upon the judgment of this Court [State of Haryana vs. Ram Chander (2017 SCC Online SC 1869)]concerning the lands acquired.

It is argued that this Court clearly said in the decision and order it issued that the compensation figure of Rs. 2,38,00,000 per acre established by the judgment shall not be regarded as precedent in any other case. Considering this, it is argued that the High Court committed a grave error by considering the sum awarded by this Court in the decision and order given at a value of Rs. 2,38,00,000.

Furthermore, it is argued that prices for the lands were artificially raised because, concerning the community specifically, lands started to be acquired starting in 2008. Therefore, it is claimed, the High Court erred significantly by increasing the award price of Rs. 2,38,00,000 per acre by 12% for the notification of 25.01.2008.

DEFENDANT’S CONTENTION:

The learned attorney representing the landowners has argued that after the State’s appeals were rejected and the impugned common judgment and order were issued in the landowners’ appeals, the State is no longer permitted to contest the impugned common judgment and order issued by the High Court.

Further, it is argued that there was a price increase even after considering the sale instances that were provided on record from 09.03.2007 to 31.03.2008; as a result, the High Court did not mistake in approving the 12% increase on Rs. 2,38,00/- per acre. It is argued that, as of this point, no conclusive evidence nor a sale instance to the opposite has been recorded by the acquiring authority, demonstrating a decline in market value between 2008 and 2010.

JUDGMENT:

This Court made it clear in the judgment and order that it should not be regarded as a precedent. It must be observed, however, that even on the merits, this Court considered and approved the sale cases presented on behalf of the landowners between 2007 and 2008. Because the compensation amount of Rs. 2,38,00,000/- per acre for the land acquired through a notification issued on January 25, 2008,can be considered the base and the time interval between the 2008 notification and the 2010 notification, a suitable enhancement of 8% to 15% is given, which is held in the case of [Pehlad Ram Vs. HUDA; (2014) 14 SCC 778]

It will not be safe or wise to grant the cumulative increase of 12% nonetheless, especially because the purchase processes in the current case were just started in January 2008 concerning the exact hamlet. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, as well as the sale cases that have been presented on the record, we believe that accepting a 10% increase above the original amount of Rs. 2,38,00,000 can be considered just compensation and may further the interests of justice. The market value of the land in question for the lands acquired via a notification dated 13.01.2010 will be Rs. 2,87,98,000/- per acre considering this situation. The current appeals are partially granted to the degree, and it is decided that the original landowners are entitled to compensation at a rate of Rs. 2,87,98,000 per acre together with any additional legal advantages that may be provided by the Land Acquisition Act, of 1894.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3RXb5S4

–Report by Tannu Dahiya

Bombay High Court on Monday i.e. 13th February 2023, granted relief to the petitioner in M/s. Lifeline Medical & General Stores Chemist and Drugs v. Assistant Municipal Commissioner Food & Drugs Administration & Licensing Authority, Maharashtra State.

Facts:

The petitioner being a chemist carries a business of General Stores of Chemist and Drugs (Medial Store/Shop) for the last 17 years and has a valid licence for the same which is renewed from time to time. On 8th June 2018, the Drug inspector of Raigar visited the shop for an inspection. An inspection report was prepared after which a show cause notice was issued in July under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and Rules, 1945, alleging the petitioner has violated Rules 65(2), 65(3)(1), 65(6), 65(4)(i), 65(4)(3), 65(4)(4), 65(4)(4)(ii) of the said Act. The petitioner filed for a reply but his licence was cancelled on the last date of the month. Filed an appeal before the appellate authority which had put a stay on the order. But on 26.02.2022, the appeal was partly allowed and the licence was suspended for 90 days. And hence the present appeal was filed.

Petitioner’s contentions:

Mr Kumbhar, learned counsel, stated that the orders passed by the authority are against the principles of natural justice. The provisions and exceptions of the said Act have not been considered by the respondent before passing the orders. The Petitioner has been carrying the business for the past 17 years with a valid licence and no allegations have been on record against him. Also, a reply was filed for the show cause notice and it was clearly stated that no such violations will happen in future. The petition against the order passed in 2022 is still pending before the authority and the petitioner has been suffering because of the suspension since January 2023.

Respondent’s contentions:

Mr Sawant, who learned AGP for the state, claimed that the petitioner has been carrying his business for the past 17 years without blemish and a valid licence which has been renewed from time to time. But the report made by the Inspector shows that certain drugs were sold with valid bills when the owner, Pharmacist Mr Mustafa Hanif Sirkot was not present. It was also alleged that the bills of the same were not shown to the inspector. Two day time was given to produce the bill before the authority resulting in there being some discrepancy found in the dates of the bills. The show cause notice was issued in violation of section 18(c) of the said Act and the petitioner was asked to reply within 5 days.

The reply stated that the said drugs were sold in presence of the owner, Mr Mustafa, the discrepancy found in the hills was due to the inadvertent mistake of Mr Mustafa, who by mistake forgot to mention a few dates. The copies of bills of all the informed drugs have been submitted to the Assistant Commissioner. The order of 2018 was passed after due consideration of the facts. The reason for selling drugs without a prescription was that they could be sold at high rates and could also lead to adulteration and the sale of fake drugs. Thus in violation of rule 65 and liable under the provisions of Rule 66(1) and 67(h)(1), the petitioner’s licence was cancelled.

Judgement :

The learned counsel for the petitioner pleaded that the penalty imposed by the impugned order is without any reason harsh. The petitioner has been without any livelihood since 9th January 2023. He has also expressed an unconditional apology for the discrepancy found in the hills of the drugs. He has also given an undertaking to the court that no such mistake or violation shall take place in future. This undertaking has been accepted by the court and the appeal filed by him is allowed stating that he must abide by all the rules and follow all the provisions in respect of the conduct of his business. Hence the impugned order of 2018 and the show cause notice stands quashed.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3Io2K6X

–Report by Sneha Sakshi

In Writ Petition (C) No. 740 of 1986, the initial question is whether a Constitution Bench of this Court should re-examine the position it took in Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay. The Bombay Protection of Excommunication Act, 1949 (also known as “the Excommunication Act”) was being challenged as being unconstitutional.

FACTS

On the grounds that it violates the fundamental rights protected by Articles 25 and 26 of the Indian Constitution, Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb challenged the Excommunication Act. Excommunication, according to the Constitution Bench, is an essential component of the Dawoodi Bohra community’s management, and interfering with this prerogative constitutes interfering with the community’s freedom to manage its own affairs in issues of religion. As a result, the Act is null and void and violates Article 26(b) of the Constitution.

No excommunication of a member of any community shall be valid or have any effect, according to Section 3 of the Act. Excommunication is defined in Section 2 of the Act as the removal of a person from any society in which he or she is a member, depriving that person of rights and privileges that are legally attainable through a civil lawsuit.

CONTENTIONS OF PETITIONER:

➢ After taking into account the ruling of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sardar Syedna, the Central Board of the Dawoodi Bohra Community petitioned for the issuance of a writ of mandamus ordering the State Government to implement the Ex-communication Act’s provisions. 

➢ A Division Bench ordered that the case be placed before a Bench of seven Judges after issuing “Rule Nisi” in the petition on August 25, 1986.

CONTENTIONS OF RESPONDENT:

➢ Syedna Mufaddal (53rd Daial Mutlaq) submitted a request for a directive requesting that the petition be listed before a Division Bench. ➢ A Constitution Bench received the writ petition. 

➢ The application submitted by the second respondent was partially approved by the Constitution Bench by judgement and order dated December 17, 2004.

JUDGMENT

The petitioners’ knowledgeable senior lawyer, Shri Siddharth Bhatnagar, contended that the Dawoodi Bohra community’s practise of Baraat/ex-communication falls under the definition of “matters of religion” as stated in clause (b) of Article 26 of the Indian Constitution. Additionally, he claimed that even if the Ex-communication Act were to be repealed, it would still be necessary to determine whether the practise of ex-communication is regarded as a matter of religion because the 2nd Respondent, Syedna Mufaddal, serves as both the religious Head and the Trustee of the community property. Finally, he claimed that morality affects the rights protected by Article 26 and that this Court’s decisions have helped to clarify what morality is.

The case Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors. v. Sabrimala Temple, concluded that the excommunication practise in the Dawoodi Bohra community violates Articles 17, 19, 21, and 25 of the Indian Constitution and cannot, therefore, be protected by Article 26 of the Constitution.

In the Sardar Syedna case, the Constitution Bench did not attempt to strike a balance between the rights under Article 26(b) and other rights under Part III, particularly Article 21.

The Sabrimala Temple Review ­a bench of nine judges is debating this matter in large part. Additionally, as the practise of excommunication is subject to morality, it is important to determine if Article 26(protection)’s of it may be put to the test. To do this, it is important to use the concept of constitutional morality as a yardstick. This is an urgent, crucial problem. The abovementioned judgement may need to be reviewed by a larger Bench on these two key grounds.

In light of the situation, it is believed that the current writ petition merits being included in the Review Petition (Civil) No.3358 of 2018 that is currently being heard by a bench of nine honourable judges. As a result, it is directed that the Registry ask the Honorable Chief Justice for the necessary instructions in this regard.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3Iitbuz

–Report by Sanya Luthra

The case Keshaw sanyasi gawo shewasharam vs Govt of NCT, New Delhi and Anr was filed by the petitioner as the result of a public notice issued by the Welfares Department which directs the petitioner to empty the slum area in which he is running a Gaushala for 15 years.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The petitioner-Keshaw Sanyasi Gawo Shewasharam is running a Gaushala or a cow shelter for 15 years and it is a registered trust according to him and then on 23rd Jan an eviction notice is being issued by the Public Welfare Department where they are asking to empty the slum area where the cow shelter is situated within fifteen days of the notice.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:

It was said by the petitioner that he is running the cow shelter for 15 years, electricity is installed by him and even an Aadhar card has been issued concerning the said premises only. As he is staying there for 15 years he demands the legal right for the same, also he mentions that impugned notices have been issued without any show cause notice or without providing any hearing to the petitioner.

DEFENDANT’S CONTENTIONS:

It was said by the defendant that the petitioner Jhuggi doesn’t comes under the notified clusters which are 675 and 82 in number and they also rely on the court’s order to demolish the jhuggi and now they are of opinion that unless the jhuggi clusters are not duly notified, stay on demolition would not be feasible.

JUDGMENT:

The court held that the petitioner cannot be granted relief and also said that the clusters that are not identified by the DUSIB would not be open for rehabilitation also asked the respondent to give an alternate place to the petitioner within a week and to also give some time to the petitioner to shift to another place while cows to be moved to alternate cow shelter.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3K2jv8P

–Report by Umang Kanwat

In the present case of Vibhuti Shankar Pandey v The State Of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., the Supreme Court discusses the degree to which the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court’s prior order can be interfered with.

FACTS:

The appellant, who felt wronged by an order the Madhya Pradesh High Court’s Division Bench had overturned, led this appeal. The order from the learned Single Judge dated which had awarded the present appellant the advantage of regularisation.

The appellant claims that he was hired in 1980 as a Supervisor under a project of the State Water Resources Department of Madhya Pradesh, on a daily rate basis. The appellant asked for the position of supervisor/timekeeper to be regularized. The applicant lacked the matriculation with mathematics requirement that was the minimal requirement for the position in question. The government eased these requirements via a circular, and the appellant requested his regularisation in the position of Supervisor/Time Keeper because he was competent for the position and had previously worked for a daily rate.

According to an order from the Chief Engineer for the Rani Avanti Bai Lodhi Sagar Project, the claim of the appellant for regularisation was denied for the following reasons: even though the appellant does not lack the necessary matriculation with mathematics credentials to be regularised, the appellant has never been appointed to a position. Furthermore, the appropriate authority never appointed him because there were no open positions at the time for regularisation.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS:

The appellant based his claim for regularisation on the fact that individuals who were daily wagers but less senior to him were regularised in 1990 or earlier. While granting the writ petition, the learned Single Judge provided instructions for regularising the appellant as of the date his juniors were regularized.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:

The State Government appealed against the petitioner’s order in the current case to a Division Bench, which upheld the State Government’s appeal. The Division Bench correctly concluded that the learned Single Judge had not adhered to the legal standard established by this Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Umadevi and Ors., as the initial appointment had to be made by the appropriate party, and the daily rated employee had to be employed in a sanctioned position. These two requirements were categorically absent in the case of the current petitioner. So, in the respondent’s opinion, the Division Bench of the High Court was correct to allow the appeal.

Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Umadevi and Ors
The court held that precise position in this case, the issue of regularising the services of such employees may need to be evaluated on an individual basis in this particular situation. When temporary workers or daily wage earners ll vacant sanctioned positions that need to be filled, the Union of India, the State Governments, and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularise their services as a one-time measure. These individuals were irregularly appointed and have worked for at least ten years in those positions without the benet of court or tribunal orders.

JUDGEMENT:

According to the law established by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Uma Devi, the court in the current instance determined that the appellant had no grounds for regularisation. Therefore, there is no justification for the court to intervene with the Madhya Pradesh High Court Division Bench’s decision. As a result, the appeal was ultimately denied.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3XpT6EO

-Report by Saloni Agarwal

The Supreme Court of India recently in the case of Gas Authority of India Limited v Indian Petrochemicals Corp. Ltd. & Ors concluded the dispute between parties relating to the contract signed for natural gas supply. The case was in favour of IPCL as its claim was just.

Facts:

The Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas provided a letter for the allocation of a Natural Gas Pipeline to IPCL. The contract was to be signed with GAIL and the pipeline would be from Hazira to the Gandhar unit carrying semi-rich gas. IPCL was asked to lay down the plant and a pipeline of its own which would be used to transport the gas. GAIL claimed that it was being charged with transportation costs. The clauses of the contract were clear that the buyer has to bear all the charges of transportation for himself and the seller. The main point of argument is the transportation cost dispute.

Appellant’s Contention:

IPCL claimed that the price of natural gas should be fixed as mentioned in the contract. Earlier the High Court had charged IPCL to pay for the loss of transportation charges which was unfair as IPCL was asked to set up its own pipeline. Even after incurring a huge cost for the establishment, it would otherwise be unjust to pay for the transportation cost. The IPCL also claimed that it had no bargaining power and was asked to accept the contract within 60 days by the Authorities i.e., comes within the ambit of Article 12. Due to time constraints and unrestricted power possessed by GAIL, it dominated the clauses of the contract. Hence the writ petition is maintainable.

Respondent’s Contention:

The GAIL challenged the petition and claimed that the clauses were not unjust. It also claimed that it did not possess any dominating position and that equal rights were provided to both parties. It further said that the contract was a mutual one and was carefully discussed before the implementation.

Judgement:

The Court after hearing about the sides came to the conclusion that the writ petition was maintainable. It also said that there was unjust and unfairness in the contract and asked GAIL to refund the loss of transportation charges within two months failing which interest amounting to 8 per cent per annum will be charged. The IPCL had incurred huge costs in building the pipeline which was mandated in the contract and now cannot be burdened with the establishment cost and transport cost even when it is not using the HBJ Pipeline.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3YwTTou