Tag: #IndianPenalCode

–Report by Shreya Gupta

In the recent case of SURAJ MALIK Versus THE STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI, the bail was sought under section 439 of CrPC, 1973. The applicant was arrested under Sections 498A/306/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The petitioner, in this case, is Suraj Malik and the respondent is the state govt. of NCT of Delhi.

FACTS:

Shefali Malik the deceased was admitted to the hospital on account of burn injuries by her neighbour. It was revealed to the police that she was married for less than 7 years to her husband who had a 4-year-old son from his previous marriage on account of which F.I.R. was registered. The statement the patient was taken in which she admitted that she burned herself because she did not want to live as her mother-in-law used to taunt her for dowry and harasses her. She also claimed that her husband used to abuse her and that her sister-in-law was innocent. The F.I.R. was filed under Sections 498/306/34 of the IPC was registered and an investigation was taken up.

PETIONER’S CONTENTIONS:

The advocate of the applicant stated that the statement given by the father of the deceased varied completely from the dying declaration of the deceased. He alleged that statement was given by the father only to add section 304B to the F.I.R. since earlier it was registered only under section 306 of the IPC. He stated that there was no abetment to suicide. He also added that the deceased in the hospital asked the applicant to stay with her. He stated that since the chargesheet is already filed there is no useful purpose in making him stay under custody. He supported his arguments with previous judgements of i. Ranjeet Singh v. State, 2005 (2) J.C.C. 905 ii. Kamal @ Kailash Joshi v. State, 2007 I.A.D. (Delhi) 31 iii. Nitin Kumar v. State, 2015 IVAD (Delhi) 109 iv. Deepak v. State, 120 (2005) D.L.T 146.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:

The father of the deceased alleged that she was harassed and demanded a dowry. He alleged that the applicant and the mother-in-law burnt his daughter to death. He alleged that her daughter was asked for Rs. 25 lakhs out of which he already gave Rs. 10 lakhs in demand of it. He also alleged that her daughter was pregnant but they got her aborted because Suraj malik already had a son from his previous marriage. He also alleged that she was maltreated when she got pregnant for the second time. The advocate mentioned that it is stated in the dying declaration that she was harassed and abused by her husband and mother-in-law.

JUDGEMENT:

The court stated that “Perusal of the aforesaid dying declaration made by the deceased reflects that the deceased was not happy at her matrimonial home, more specifically, with her relationship with her mother-in-law, but at the same time the fact that she did not make any allegation with respect to demand of dowry made by the present applicant cannot be lost sight of.” The court further passed his application for bail provided with some terms and conditions and a personal bond of Rs. 50,000 and a surety.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/40YO59g

Neutral Citation Number: 2023/DHC/001062

Case Number

Criminal Appeal No. 34 of 2015 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 2961 of 2013), Criminal Appeal No. 35 of 2015 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 3161 of 2013) and Criminal Appeal Nos. 36-37 of 2015 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 3326-3327 of 2013)

Citation

AIR 2015 SC 923 or (2015) 4 SCC 609 

Forum

Supreme Court of India

Bench

H L Dattu CJI., Madan B Lokur, A K Sikri JJ.

Decided on

January 9, 2015

Introduction

The criminal liability of directors is a core concept in corporate criminal law; it helps regulatory authorities and courts control, prosecute and punish crimes of a corporate nature. Given the artificial nature of companies and corporates, it is the employees and executives of the company that act as its agents. Executives are the ones who take the major decisions on behalf of the company. They can easily control the acts and omissions of the company on a short and long-term basis. Given the enormous controlling power that executives possess, it is vital to have laws, regulations and principles governing the actions of these executives. This ensures that they do not violate the law without fear of repercussions and do not use certain concepts of law to evade punishment. 

In the case discussed below, there is a clear explanation of the requirements for holding executives responsible for the acts of their companies, especially in the context of the executives’ names being unlisted in the charge sheet. 

Rule of Law decided upon by the Bench

The rule of law in this case is: 
Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, read with Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 

Facts & Procedural History of the case

The central allegation, in this case, was regarding the 2G spectrum case. An additional spectrum that was beyond the usual spectrum that the Telecom Ministry approves. This approval of an additional spectrum was done with a 1% additional revenue share. Multiple cases had been registered, coupled with investigations by authorities. This transaction caused losses to Government Revenue. It was alleged in multiple investigations that this plan resulted from a conspiracy between Mr Ghosh, the then Telecom Minister and certain Cellular Operators.

The case in question is an appeal against an impugned order by a Special Judge, which had issued a summons to the accused in a charge sheet. This order, passed in March 2013, mentioned that the Special Judge was satisfied with the incriminating material recorded so that a summons could be issued against the accused. The Special Judge also stated that the summons was being issued to three executives – Mr Sunil Mittal of Bharti Cellular Ltd., Mr Asim Ghosh of Hutchison Max Telecom Ltd., and Mr Ravi Ruia of Sterling Cellular Ltd. 

The Special Judge went on to specify the doctrine of ‘alter ego’ and applied the same to this case. He held that these executives (the appellants in the case) are the alter ego of their companies. So through vicarious liability, they shall be prosecuted for the crimes of their companies. It is pertinent to note that the Special Judge mentioned that their state of mind is the companies’ state of mind, and any acts of the companies shall be attributed to them. Notably, he had not mentioned the reasons for issuing an order of summons to the three executives. 

The order was sought to be challenged by two of the three executives, to the extent of the order implicating them as the accused. 

Issues raised in the Court of law

A singular issue was raised. However, the Court opined on a variety of topics concerning the issue below: 

Is the impugned order of the Special Judge, which stated that the Appellants were not named in the charge sheet, valid in law?

The decision of the Court on the issues drafted

The Court decided that the order must be set aside, given the ambiguity in the impugned order and the wrongful application of a principle to the issue at hand. They had also mentioned clearly that they were not stating that the executives were free of guilt; they merely quashed the impugned order. It is up to the Special Judge to review the incriminating material again and issue fresh summons to the Appellants. Based on the evidence uncovered, the Special Judge may apply Section 319 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, to include the Appellants in the proceedings to prosecute them further. 

Analysis of the judgement

The judgement, which Justice A K Sikri wrote, was systematic in its breakdown of the facts and circumstances of the case, along with an analysis of the principle of alter ego and criticism of its application in the present case. 

Initially, the counsel for the Appellants contended that the impugned order was erroneous in two parts. The first three paragraphs of the order are regarding Mr Ghosh and the cellular companies involved. The Special Judge had perused all the documents submitted on record to conclude that these accused persons can be further proceeded against. In paragraph four, the Judge detailed the principle of alter ego and stated that the executives of the three cellular companies were responsible for the acts of their respective companies. The Judge had connected these paragraphs to conclude that the three executives (two of whom are appellants) must be issued a summons. Explaining all this, Senior Advocate Salve (counsel for the Appellant) stated that the Judge’s order was erroneous and did not hold good in law. 

Continuing, he detailed that the doctrine of ‘alter ego’ has been applied in reverse and that the companies were accused first rather than the directors. For the doctrine to apply, the directors must be held guilty, and so they shall be deemed guilty for the acts of the corporate body. Only when the principle is correctly applied can the agency mode of liability also be applied. For the same, he relied on Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc.¹, Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. v. Datar Switchgear Ltd.², and Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Ltd.³, which are all landmark judgements by the Supreme Court of India. 

Sr. Adv. Salve closed his arguments by pointing out that the CBI had investigated and concluded that there was no information or submitted material to implicate the Appellant. 

Other counsels for the Appellants seconded these arguments and mentioned that some of the appellants were not mentioned in the charge sheet in the first place. 

In terms of the arguments for the respondents, Senior Counsel K K Venugopal refuted the appellants’ submissions by bringing to the forefront the reasoning behind the decision to implicate the appellants. He stated that once companies are charged with mens rea offences, they need to be punished for the same, and the only way to do that is to punish their Directors or Officers. He then pointed out the actions of these executives on behalf of their companies, which had resulted in the 2G Scam. In a nutshell, Sr. Adv. Venugopal has reinforced the human agency doctrine and stated that, despite the omission of appellants’ names in the charge sheet, the Special Judge had powers to make an order such as the one in question. 

In support of his arguments, the cases of M C Mehta v. Union of India (Taj Corridor Scam)⁴, Kishun Singh v. State of Bihar⁵ and Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana⁶ were used.  

In a rejoinder, counsel for the Appellant, Mr Fali Nariman, argued that for vicarious liability to be applied, there is a need for a statutory provision or something to be imputed. Therefore, the Special Judge has wrongfully applied the principle of alter ego. 

After listening to the extensive arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court began examining the order and applying the principle of alter ego. 

The Bench refused to discuss the comments made by the appellants concerning the 2G scam itself, making it clear that the matter is beyond the scope of their appeals. 

Firstly, the impugned order was dissected. At the outset, the Court admitted the trial courts could issue that summons to persons not mentioned as accused in the charge sheet. The only requirement is that there must be sufficient incriminating material on record to empower the Judge to issue a summons. The question, in this case, is not about the incriminating material; instead, it is about the lack of a convincing reason behind the Judge’s decision to issue a summons. The Judge has not clearly stated why he had decided to implicate the three executives as accused and issue summons. He had merely stated that the executives were or are in control of their company’s affairs – this makes them the mind and will of the companies and that this makes them the alter ego of their companies. 

Secondly, the doctrine of alter ego was dealt with. The Court reiterated a landmark Judgement from 2005 – Standard Chartered v. Directorate of Enforcement⁷, and explained that the Bench, in that case, opined that companies could be prosecuted and punished for offences with mandatory imprisonment. Then, the Iridium Infra case was discussed, wherein the same subject was discussed, with the addition of mens rea element. The judgement held that the criminal intent would be imputed to the corporate body. That is to say, the group of people controlling the company must have criminal intent, which will implicate the company to have criminal intent and therefore be punished. 

In the case at hand, the company was first held guilty of criminal intent, following which the executives were held to have criminal intent. The Special Judge had applied the principle in reverse – the company’s criminal intent had been established first, and then its executives were implicated. Thus, applying this principle in this manner makes it erroneous to apply the theory of vicarious liability to the case. 

Thirdly, the Court discussed the circumstances when the company is accused, and its executives can also be prosecuted. It is mainly concerning intent that the decision is made. There must be sufficient evidence for the same. In other cases, the statute in question must refer to the vicarious liability of the company’s executives. Cases discussed included Jethsur Surangbhai v. State of Gujarat.⁸, Sham Sunder v. State of Haryana⁹, Hira Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati v. CBI¹⁰ and Sharon Michael v. State of TN¹¹ among others. 

Based on these discussions, the Court concluded that the Special Judge had used an inaccurate principle of law. It is essential to the case that the Judge mention the reasons for his satisfaction with the incriminating material. However, the Judge failed to do the same. 

After making a brief statement on the powers of the Special Judge to issue summons when the accused is not on the charge sheet, the Court went on to conclude its analysis of the case. They held the impugned order invalid in law as the Special Judge failed to adequately explain the reasons or grounds behind his act of proceeding with the case by issuing a summons. Therefore, the impugned order was quashed and set aside, and the appeal was allowed. However, the Special Judge does have the power to revisit the case, review the documents, and prepare a fresh order that lists the reasons for the satisfaction of incriminating material clearly and in a prima facie manner.    

Conclusion

As seen from the case analysis above, Judges and legal professionals must be careful in their acts and omissions, as an error may lead to the entire proceedings being vitiated. While everything else on the part of the Special Judge’s order was abiding by the law, two points left the entire order of a significant financial scandal quashed. Therefore, it is vital that essential points are included in documents and that the law is followed to a T. 

On the other hand, it is equally essential to ensure that executives of companies do not evade punishment on procedural or theoretical grounds. In order to recover money from white-collar crimes, theories of vicarious liability should be prudently applied in relevant circumstances. 

---

Citations

1. Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., (2011) 1 SCC 74 (India)
2. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. v. Datar Switchgear Ltd., (2010) 10 SCC 479 (India)
3. Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661 (India)
4. M C Mehta v. Union of India, (2007) 1 SCC 110 (India)
5. Kishun Singh v. State of Bihar, (1993) 2 SCC 16 (India)
6. Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana, (2014) 3 SCC 306 (India)
7. Standard Chartered v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2005) 4 SCC 530 (India)
8. Jethsur Surangbhai v. State of Gujarat, (1984) Supp. SCC 207 (India)
9. Sham Sunder v. State of Haryana, (1989) 4 SCC 630 (India)
10. Hira Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati v. CBI, (2003) 5 SCC 257 (India)
11. Sharon Michael v. State of TN, (2009) 3 SCC 375 (India)

This case analysis is authored by Vibha Chinni Krishnan, a student of Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad.

–Report by Pranav Mathur

The Madhya Pradesh High Court, on 31st January 2023, dismissed an appeal filed before it by a murder convict, in the case of Ashok Malviya v. State of Madhya Pradesh. It deliberated on provisions of law related to Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”), which prescribes punishments for the commission of murder, and for the commission of culpable homicide relating to murder. It also dived into the question of whether the facts of the case represent a culpable homicide amounting to murder as given under Section 304 of the IPC, or not.

FACTS:

The incident occurred on the 21st of December 2011, approximately three years after their marriage. After the passage of a year of their marriage, the appellant had started physically assaulting the deceased, mainly because she was incapable of bearing a child, due to the size of her uterus. On the date of the incident, the appellant and the deceased were in their home, and around 10 pm when the parents of the appellant came back after their day’s work, they found the deceased lying on the bed, and subsequently to this, called a few relatives to their place to assess the situation. Two of those relatives went to the police station and filed a complaint against him. He was arrested on the 23rd of December 2011. The police also recovered the dupatta that had been used to strangle the deceased.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS:

The appellant outrightly denied committing the offence and signified his intention to move the case to trial. The first and foremost contention of the appellant was the lack of eyewitnesses to corroborate the sequence of events. His parents, and then his relatives did not, with their own eyes, see him strangle her, and therefore the court relying on the testaments of the witnesses should not have been enough to decide the case. It was also contended that the neck injury, even if proved was caused by the appellant, isn’t sufficient enough to attract the charge of murder, rather the charge of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, under Section 304 of the IPC. The counsel for the appellant placed huge reliance on the cases of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Abdul Latif and Lavghanbhai Devjibhai Vasava v. State of Gujarat, which had held the contentions presented in the form of applicable judgments.

COURT’S OBSERVATION AND THE JUDGMENT:

Initially, the Court deliberated upon the issue of whether the particular death was a homicide or not, and a thorough inspection of the medical records and investigations that had been submitted concluded that it indeed was a case of homicide. It considered the cross-examinations of various relatives of the appellant who were witnesses and concluded that the deceased was previously married, from which she had obtained a divorce, and the appellant had the knowledge of her uterus and still made the voluntary decision of marrying her. According to the post-mortem report of the deceased, she had ante-mortem injuries, and the cause of death was revealed to be asphyxiation, which was concluded from the mark on her neck. The Court further held that the appellant had a clear motive to commit the offence. The relations between the deceased and the appellant had grown severe after her inability of conceiving a child started frustrating him, and their relations were also corroborated by the examinations in chief of the witnesses. The Court was of the opinion that the crime did not occur pursuant to a sudden quarrel, which may have given provocation to the appellant, and therefore ruled out Section 304 of the IPC, and instead, charged the appellant with culpable homicide amounting to murder, which is punished under Section 302 of the IPC. Therefore, observing how the essentials of Section 300 of the IPC, which defines and gives exceptions to and of murder, were fulfilled in the present scenario and also observing how the minimal sentence possible had been given to the appellant by the Trial Court, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dismissed the appeal.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/40Jp9Tm

–Report by Arun Bhattacharya

The Delhi High Court on Wednesday 8^th of February 2023 in the matter of THE STATE versus SACHIN SINGH & ORS reiterated the stand taken by the Additional Sessions Judge’s observation that “Mere vague allegations that accused tried to commit rape upon her does not ipso facto attract the penal provision of offence u/Section 376 read with Section 511 IPC.”

FACTS

The present matter invoked revisional jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court whereby an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge was in question. The order dealt with chargesagainst a brother-in-law and father-in-law, who had allegedly committed attempts to rape. The complainant had alleged that the brother-in-law had gotten hold of the complainant in an attempt to commit rape, while in another instance the father-in-law had forcefully entered the complainant’s room to rape her. Although the complainant tried to raise these issues with her husband and mother-in-law, all such attempts were suppressed forcefully with the only reason provided by them being that the brother-in-law happens to be a police official. Therefore, the complainant filed a complaint to the Commissioner of Police and accordingly registered an FIR against her in-laws. They were also made parties to the initial chargesheet filed in the court of learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Rohini which was later transferred to the Court of Sessions. 

SESSIONS COURT’S ORDER

The Court of Sessions initially discharged the brother-in-law and the father-in-law under Sections 356 (Punishment of Rape) and 511 (Punishment for attempting to Commit Offences Punishable with imprisonment for life or another imprisonment) but framed separate charges of 498 (enticing or taking away or detaining with criminal intent a married woman), 406 (Punishment for criminal breach of trust), 354(Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty) and 34 (Common intention). The court’s primary focus whilst discharging the two respondents was that the mere fact of the brother-in-law getting hold of her hand and the father-in-law barging into her room late at night does not suffice to prove a case of rape. These allegations of the complainant involved attempts but no specific action was committed which may indicate a clear intention of rape. This order has been challenged in today’s petition.  

PROSECUTION’S CONTENTION

The learned APP submitted that the learned Sessions court was not intended to satisfy itself on the graveness of evidence produced but merely on prima facie allegations of the complainant and he confined himself to the fact that the complainant had made specific allegations regarding her father-in-law and brother in the law regarding an attempt to commit rape on different occasions.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

The learned counsel for the respondents’ primarily focused on the fact that no specific allegations were made against the father-in-law and brother-in-law and no such proof was also submitted on record. He also highlighted the fact that no action was committed in compliance with the definition provided under Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code and this would suffice as a reason for discharging the same. To point out the same the counsel had referred to the judgment of Tarkeshwar Sahu v. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand), IV (2006)  CCR 115 (SC).

DELHI HIGH COURT’S JUDGEMENT

The honourable high court pointing out that the revisional power under Section 397 of CrPC is very narrow which only allows it to satisfy itself to check the legality and correctness of an impugned order, reiterated the stance taken by the Court of Sessions and accordingly dismissed the revision petition.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/40EQy8S

CITATION: 2023/DHC/000883

-Report by Nawvi Kamalnathan

In the case of Jabir and Others (hereinafter referred to as the appellants) Versus the State of Uttarakhand (hereinafter referred to as the respondents) the Supreme Court has decoded the need to understand the time frame between seeing the accused or deceased to the actual offence having occurred and thus the doctrine of last seen cant be applied in every case where the witnesses testify for seeing someone on relation to the case as it has its own limitations.

FACTS

Haseen, the son of Prosecution Witness 1, is about 7 years old and went missing on 08.10.1999 around 4.30 pm. Later on, on 10.10.1999, his dead body was found in a sugarcane field in a village situated at a distance from his village. The post-mortem report showed the death occurred two days earlier.

After an order from the magistrate, the First information report was investigated and witnesses were produced by the police officers in charge. Also, in their final reports, the police alleged the appellants to be guilty of the crime.
The appellants were convicted under sections 302, 364, and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and were sentenced to life imprisonment, seven years, and five years imprisonment respectively. The sentence and the conviction were upheld by the High Court of Uttarakhand.

PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTIONS

The counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants contended that the conviction and the sentence given by the trial court are unsustainable, as there were no reasons as to why the FIR was delayed by almost five weeks after the seven-year-old deceased went missing.

Further, it was contended that the application under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was moved only after a month and no such application was sent to any officer. The police witness didn’t seem to support the statement made by the PW-1 (father of the deceased boy) and said to contain suspicions.

Per the testimonies of a few witnesses, it could be understood that the role of the accused was not known to PW-1. However, it could not be inferred from the inquest report. The complete point of focus of the counsel for appellants was that they were named as a result of enmity with the father of the deceased and his family.

It was highlighted that all the witnesses bought before the court from the prosecution’s side were members of the deceased and his family. The enmity could be traced back to an FIR lodged by the appellant’s family against the PW-2 the previous year to this incident.

DEFENDANT’S CONTENTIONS

The counsel appearing on behalf of the defendants contended that the court shall not disturb the current findings of the lower and the High Court. First dealing with the issue concerning the delay to file FIR the counsel said PW-1 didn’t sense anything unnatural and went to search for his son throughout.

Only after obtaining knowledge of the dead body did, he go to the police station after the post-mortem. The last-seen theory was not inaccurate in this case because as per A-1 to A-3’s statement, they have seen the boy latest with the appellants.

The inquest conducted following the day of the death was found to have occurred under suspicious circumstances. The investigations conducted by the police were not satisfactory as it was done much later to the death.

JUDGEMENT

The court held that as per the basic principle of criminal jurisprudence, in case of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution shall be obliged to prove beyond any reasonable doubt. That all the links between the circumstances shall be established so as to complete the chain of the crime.

The court was also of the opinion besides crucial infirmities as there was no evidence in any form be it oral or objective that creates a connection between the appellant or the accused in this crime. The doctrine of last seen shall also have its limitations considering the time lag between the time the deceased was last seen with the accused and the time between the murder.

Therefore, the appellant-accused’s conviction and sentence passed by the lower courts shall not be sustained and the impugned judgment was set aside, thus ordering the acquittal of the accused.

–Report by Sanstuti Mishra

The Supreme Court bench comprising Justices S Abdul Nazeer and V Rama Subramaniam observed that a minister or public servant could file a private complaint alleging defamation and need not follow the particular procedure prescribed by Section 199(2) & (4) CrPC on 17th October 2022 in the case of MANOJ KUMAR TIWARI vs MANISH SISODIA & ORS.

Facts 

Manish Sisodia herein filed a   complaint under   Section   200 of the Code of   Criminal   Procedure, 1973 against six individuals, on the file of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Rouse Avenue Courts, New Delhi, alleging commission of the offences under Sections 499 and 500 read with Sections 34 and 35 of the Indian Penal Code.

The petitioner held that Manoj Tiwari, apprehended a Press Conference making false and defamatory statements as though he was involved in corruption to the tune of Rs. 2000 crores, in the matter of award of contracts for building classrooms in Delhi Government Schools. Shri Vijender Gupta also tweeted defamatory content against   Sisodia, and the person named Respondent No.6 in the complaint also made defamatory statements in his tweets. 

Petitioner’s contention 

Sisodia had accused three BJP leaders of defaming him through “insulting publications” it said were based on “fabricated” allegations. The deputy Chief minister necessitated an apology.

In November 2019, a trial court ordered the summons of BJP leaders and others accused of defamation in a criminal case filed by the Deputy CM of Delhi. BJP leaders sought relief from the Supreme Court, which denied it.

Respondent’s contention 

Shri R. Venkataramani and Ms Pinky Anand, learned senior counsel appearing for Manoj Tiwari and others argued that respondent   No.1   should have followed the special procedure prescribed in Section 199(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as he happens to be a Minister of a Union Territory; they also put forward that the transcript of the tweets attributed to him was not accompanied by a valid certificate in terms of Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act. They argued that the tweets made by him per se do not make out a case of defamation in terms of   Section   499   IPC, punishable under Section 500 IPC. The counsel referred to past judgements in P.C Joshi and Another vs. State of   Uttar Pradesh; Subramanian Swamy vs. Union of India; and K.K. Mishra vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another. 

Judgement 

The bench concluded that on grounds that the history of the law commission report was not properly traced, the appeal by Vijender Gupta was allowed and on the other hand the appeal by Manoj Tiwari was dismissed. 

“The special procedure is in addition to and not in derogation of the right that a public servant always has as an individual. He never lost his right merely because he became a public servant and merely because the allegations related to the official discharge of his duties”, the bench of Justices S. Abdul Nazeer and V. Ramasubramanian said.

The court ruled that Shri Vijender Gupta’s appeal was successful only because the statements contained in his tweets were not considered defamatory within the meaning of Section 499 of the IPC.

The court explained that defamatory statements should be specific as an essential ingredient and not too vague or general. Hence statement made by Sri Vijender Gupta “your answer will disclose your scam” cannot be one, It cannot be intended to damage the reputation of Defendant Manish Sisodia.

-Report by Gourav Jain

The Supreme Court, in the case of Menon Ekka @ Smt. Menon Ujjana Ekka vs. Union of India laid down that it can provide a criminal bail where an appeal is pending before the High Court even when the person has already gone through a part of his sentence, given the conditions are right.

Facts

The appellant was sentenced to 7 years of Rigorous Imprisonment by the Ranchi High Court. The appellant is a lady who had been convicted with her husband for an offence of the Prevention of Corruption Act, keeping in possession of inappropriate assets. Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, the lady has decided to appeal in the high court and as she had already undergone almost 3 years of her sentence, she asks for criminal bail from the Supreme Court.

Appellant’s Contentions

Shri Gaurav Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the lady has been sentenced to 7 years of rigorous imprisonment, for which the appellant has already undergone 2 years and 9 months sentence. It was further contended that the appeals filed by the appellant and the others are not likely to be heard in near future and thus, it is asked for the court to release the appellant on bail during the time pending disposal of the appeal before the High Court.

Respondent’s Contention

Opposing the appeal, Ms. Swati Ghildiyal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has actively submitted that as such the High Court was ready to take up the appeals for the last disposal, however, the appellant and others were not ready for the hearing of the appeals. It is submitted that the appellant shall not make an unjustified unfairness that the appeal is not likely to be heard. It is said that looking at the charges against the appellant and the nature of the evidence, the High Court has refused correctly to suspend the sentence and release the lady on bail during the settlement of the appeal.

Judgement

Taking into consideration that the appellant is a lady and has already undergone 2 years and 9 months sentence, the appeal is allowed. She is ordered to be released on bail during the pendency of the Criminal Appeal pending before the High Court on the condition that it may be given by the learned Trial court. It is observed and made clear that the benefit of the order may not be available to the other accused persons and the present order may not be written as a precedent so far as the others are concerned. The court directed the Registry of the High Court to notify the Criminal Appeals of all the accused before the Bench taking up these appeals and the court requested the High Court to finally decide the said appeals as fast as possible but not after six months from the first listing.

All concerned appellants are ordered to cooperate in the disposal of the appeals by the High Court and within the time stated.  Any attempt on the part of the appellant and/or the other accused to delay the hearing of the appeals shall be seen seriously.

-Report by Sanstuti Mishra

THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA in case of CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION, MARIANO ANTO BRUNO & ANR. Vs THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE held that upon the appreciation of evidence of the eyewitnesses and other material adduced by the prosecution, Trial Court wrongly convicted the Petitioners and the High Court was also not justified in upholding the conviction of the Petitioners under Sections 306 and 498A IPC.

Facts 

This appeal is filed under Criminal Appeal No. 166 of 2021 of the Madras High Court of January 31, 2022, wherein, appellants were sentenced to 3 years of imprisonment with a fine of  5,000/- each, and failure to do so would amount to simple imprisonment for a month under section 498A IPC and imprisonment of 7 years with 25,000 fine, non-adherence of which would amount to 3 months simple imprisonment u/s 306 IPC. On appeal, the High Court upheld the applicant’s conviction for violations under Sections 498A and 306 IPC. 

The marriage of Applicant No. 1 and Dr. M. Amari Victoria was ordained on September 8, 2005, and had a child in 2007. The husband was informed that his wife had collapsed in the bathroom, she was unable to resuscitate and she died on November 5, 2014. An autopsy on her corpse was performed on November 6, 2014, and her cause of death was asphyxiation due to external compression on her neck. FIR was registered by the police based on the appellant’s statements u/s 174 CrPC, which was further converted into Sections 498A and 306 IPC on PW-1’s complaint.

Petitioner No. 1 caused immeasurable emotional distress to the deceased by forcing the deceased to have another child, even though the deceased miscarried in her second pregnancy.  She was deceased, required to do all of her household chores and suffered constant abuse from her in-laws. For the same reason, the deceased was driven to suicide on November 5, 2014.

After reviewing prosecution witness testimony and defence evidence, the Trial court convicted the Appellants (husband and mother-in-law) u/s 498A and 306 IPC. The deceased’s father-in-law was acquitted by the Court.

Petitioner’s Contention 

Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal filed that allegations of atrocities were first raised by the deceased’s mother who was never raised in nine years of marriage. The relations between both families were good. It cannot be claimed that the deceased committed suicide due to the applicant’s abetment. 

It was then submitted that when their statements were taken shortly after the deceased’s death, there was no evidence of animosity between the families. The summary recorded by PW-9 shows a past medical history of depression, attempted suicide, and suicidal ideation. Further that the courts also convicted the applicant based solely on her PW-1 through PW-3 testimony alleging the applicant committed continued sexual and emotional abuse.

Defendant’s Contention

PV Yogeswaran, appearing for the respondents, said evidence from PW-1 to PW-3 clearly showed that all defendants demanded a higher dowry after marriage and further were forced to drink cow urine under the name of ‘pooja’.

It was also submitted that PW-1 to her PW-3 repeatedly reported on the nature of the harassment and incidents in which victims committed suicide and left their only child behind. It was then vehemently argued that there was clear evidence of an exponential increase in abuse, harassment, and agitation by the accused following the termination of her second pregnancy in 2014.

Judgement 

The honourable Supreme court concluded the Courts ought to be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide.

Accordingly, the facts and evidence Supreme court analysed facts which were ignored by both the Trial Court as well as the High court. The bench concluded that there was not a shred of evidence with respect to the offence alleged under Section 498A of the IPC meted out to the deceased by the Petitioners. There has been no marital discord between Appellant No. 1 and the deceased during their 9 years of married life. The deceased was suffering from bipolar order and also had suicidal ideas from a few days before suicide. The Trial Court as well as the High Court did not take the evidence of PW-9, the Psychiatrist into consideration while convicting the Appellants under Sections 306 and 498A of IPC. The conviction of the appellants is solely based on the oral evidence of the mother and sister of the deceased, who are interested witnesses. As a result, the impugned judgment dated 31.01.2022 passed by the High Court as well as the judgment and order of the Trial Court dated 26.03.2021 are unsustainable and deserve to be set aside and are hereby set aside. The appellants are acquitted of the charges levelled against them. The bench opined that to convict a person under Section 306 IPC, there has to be clear mens rea to commit the offence.

-Report by Deepti Dubey

The Punjab and Haryana High Court, on 12th October quashed the FIR lodged against Kumar Vishwas, former Aam Aadmi Party leader, on the allegations of issuing provocative statements and other offenses on April 12, 2022. The controversial statements were made in regard to the separatist motive of AAP.

FACTS

Mr. Kumar Vishwas gave an interview on 16th February, during Vidhan Sabha elections wherein he made accusations regarding the involvement of Mr. Arvind Kejriwal, CM of Delhi with anti-social elements, including separatist groups. The interview was widely spread all over social media and included deliberate intentions to associate every leader of the AAP (Aam Aadmi Party) with nefarious activities. 

On 12th April, 2022 as per the complaint, the complainant was faced by a group of 10-12 persons who attempted assault, following the victory of the AAP in Vidhan Sabha Elections. The complainant alleged that the incident was a result of the alleged incitement by Kumar Vishwas in his interview. 

A written complaint was given to the SHO, Police Station Sadar, Rupnagar, Punjab, based on the mentioned events, against the petitioner, following which an FIR was filed. On 15th April, the investigation was handled by the SIT. The Special Investigation Team [SIT], revealed that the hooligans had apprised the complainant that they had watched the interview of Kumar Vishwas who repeated the statements made in the interview. The petitioner was given a notice under S. 41-A of the CrPC, following which, he approached the court for quashing the FIR.

CONTENTIONS

The petitioners contended that the FIR was driven by political motives. It was argued that the state machinery was being misused to avenge the petitioner’s defiance of AAP.

The complainant submitted that there is a prima facie case and the petition must be dismissed. The state contended that the investigation reveals that the interview flared up the sentiments and led to the outburst and hooliganism. 

The petitioner has been arraigned as an accused for violating sections 153, 153-A, 505, 505(2), 116, 143, 147, 323, 341, 120-B of IPC and Section 125 of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951. 

REASONING AND DECISION OF THE COURT

The court, while quashing the FIR, reasoned that there is no nexus between the incident in April and the interview in February. The allegations levelled in the FIR even if taken on face value and accepted in entirety, though not admitted, do not prima facie constitute any offense against the petitioner under the abovementioned sections. An act of provocation intended to cause a riot under S.153A of IPC involves a substantial factor of mens rea i.e. the intention. The court in the instant case held that there was no element of culpability, even if all investigations were to be considered valid. Consequently, The Court invoked the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC and held that none of the penal provisions under which Kumar Vishwas stood arraigned is prima facie made out against him.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION

The Punjab and Haryana High court in the instant judgment took a step further and referred to, S Rangarajan v. P Jagjivan Ram (1989) wherein the Supreme Court held in paragraph 45 that the anticipated danger to the freedom of speech should not be remote. It should have a proximate and direct nexus with the expression. The expression of thought should be intrinsically dangerous to the public interest.

It also referred to the Shreya Singhal judgment which highlighted three concepts which are fundamental in understanding the reach of this most basic of human rights, they are discussion, advocacy and incitement. It is only when the freedom of speech reaches incitement, should it be curbed to protect the public interest.

While upholding the foundation of democracy, the right to freedom, the court quashed the FIR against Kumar Vishwas, to prevent abuse of the process of law.

INTRODUCTION

According to the IPC, man’s relics are an integral part of the crime. However, these offenses fall under the general exceptions set out in Articles 76 to 106 of the Indian Penal Code, where there is no personal reason and the act is committed under clearly persuasive circumstances. As a result, perpetrators must be held accountable for their actions in court. Waivers are granted if the defense is successfully defended in court.  The insanity defense in a criminal case helps prove that the perpetrator was suffering from a serious mental disorder at the time of the examination. Because of this, the person may not be paying attention to their actions. Non-psychotics may, in certain circumstances¹, attempt to invoke the insanity defense to avoid paying a fine, but this is rare. Although the insanity defense was intended to improve justice, most people use it to avoid fines and other punishments. Such situations have no deterrent and are serious as people become more and more involved in such activities causing problems. 

MEANING OF INSANITY

Insanity is the inability of a person to understand the meaning of his actions or to realize that he is wrong or illegal. This alludes to mental illness, in which a person’s mental faculties are severely impaired and he is unable to comprehend the consequences of his actions. Insanity is difficult to define in a way that meets legal standards. For ordinary people, insanity is usually associated with mental illness or some kind of mental illness. 

According to Black’s Law Dictionary², any mental illness serious enough to deprive a person of legal capacity and exempt them from criminal or civil liability is considered insanity. “Mental illness,” “mental condition,” and “mental disorder” refer to illnesses that require psychiatric or psychological help, while insanity is a legal term. As a result, one can have a mental illness, illness, or disability without being legally considered insane. However, the reverse is also true.

INSANITY AS DEFENCE AND ITS TYPE

The defendant, who is defending himself on the charge of insanity, admits to having committed the crime but claims that his insanity absolves him of responsibility. It’s more of an explanation for what the person did than an apology. A defendant may raise this defense during a criminal trial in court. It has become necessary to determine the psychology of criminals. While criminal law focuses on the suspect’s “state of mind,” it also deals with “men’s rea.” Men’s rea is a legal term that focuses on a person’s mental health. It is necessary to consider not only the physical behavior of the offender but also the emotional state. The mental state of the mentally ill person prevents him from having criminal intentions, 

In the Indian criminal justice system, the ‘insanity defense is a strategy used to acquit criminal suspects. It is based on the idea that the person was suffering from a mental illness and could not understand his actions.

There are two kinds of reasons for him: 

Permanent Insanity: The condition in which a person is permanently insane. Past actions and experiences can indicate that a person is permanently insane and obscure the seriousness of the situation. 

Temporary Insanity: Occasional or temporary loss of consciousness. Examples of temporary insanity include depression, anxiety disorders, schizophrenia, and other temporary mental illnesses. There are two possible consequences of this transient madness: he is “insane and therefore innocent” and “guilty but insane and therefore not a crime”.³

To qualify for an exception under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, the suspect must have engaged in an illegal or unlawful act at the time the offense was suspected or he had a mentally ill comprehension and must indicate that when there is suspicion of a crime. No one is allowed to cite mental illness as a valid reason for committing a crime. The suspect’s mental state is so bad that he cannot fully comprehend the nature of the crime.⁴

REPERCUSSIONS OF SANITY DEFENCE

Insanity Defense has been misused time and time again, releasing guilty people under various scenarios of insanity and undermining the effectiveness of the rule of law. Due to the prevalence of misuse, many countries have eliminated this defense including Germany, Argentina, Thailand, and much of the United Kingdom. It is difficult to prove insanity legally and requires concrete evidence, but it is easy to prove insanity medically. It is difficult to meet all the requirements of Section 84 to avoid criminal liability. Therefore, most insanity defense cases end with the defendant being criminally detained and punished. Mental illness defenses are commonly misused because it is difficult to determine whether a person was “healthy or unhealthy” at the time the crime was committed.

CRITICISM

Although rarely used in criminal cases, the defense of insanity remains controversial. The question of whether the defense of insanity is necessary often comes to our minds. Due to evidence of insanity, defendants charged with more gruesome and serious crimes cannot be found guilty of committing such crimes. If the defense alleges insanity, the suspect pleads guilty and demands a plea of ​​not guilty based on his mental state. Criminals sometimes pretend to be insane to avoid punishment. In reality, claiming an insanity defense is a dangerous defense at best. A basic rule of criminal law seems to be at stake. The insanity defense is based on the idea that punitive action is acceptable only if the accused deserves it. As a prerequisite for punishment, the perpetrator of the crime must bear the moral responsibility of being a moral agent. When a person’s mental illness is so severe that he can no longer control his irrational or compulsive behavior, he can no longer act as a moral agent would be unfair. 

Section 84 considers mental illness a cognitive impairment. Other types of mental illness are not admissible in court. Various mental illnesses can affect your ability to work to the point where you lose control of your activities. Many crimes are committed out of anger and emotion. A person can understand what he has done only after he has performed the act. However, his actions were governed by the emotions of the time. His cognitive abilities can be fairly normal.⁵

Although Section 84 seeks to provide appropriate treatment for mentally ill offenders, there are circumstances in which false acquittals or convictions are made. Therefore, broader ideas such as emotions, pre-action states, etc. should be included. The definition of legal insanity has been expanded to include other features of medical insanity. Instead of focusing on criminals, we need to focus on eliminating crime.  On the contrary, in the general interest of society, these criminals should not be released, given proper mental health evaluations to avoid false acquittals or convictions, and placed in psychiatric facilities. In all these situations, a psychiatrist should be consulted and an individual’s fate should not be left to the discretion of a single judge. Judges may be required by law to make certain decisions. He should get a medical opinion.

LANDMARK CASE LAWS

Ashirudeen Ahmed v. The King⁶ was intended to create a new test. It has been determined that to be eligible for protection under Section 84 of the IPC, 

1. a defendant must produce evidence of one of the following: 
2.  did not know that the act was illegal; 
3.  did not know that the act was illegal; 

Dayabhai ChhaganBhai Thakkar v State of Gujarat⁷ found that consideration of the defendant’s mental state depends on the period during which the crime was committed. If the suspect was in a  state of mind eligible for protection under Section 84 of the  IPC, only the events before, during, and after the crime can be used to make that determination.

The Supreme Court has indicated which diseases are covered by this defense and which are not included in her Bapu Gajraj Singh v State of Rajasthan⁸. By law, this defense does not apply to bizarre, selfish, or impatient behavior or illnesses that impair the intellect and affect emotions and willpower. Also, it is not enough for the defendant to experience occasional insanity or epileptic seizures but otherwise behave normally. 

In Hari Singh Gond v. State of Madhya Pradesh⁹ case, the Supreme Court ruled that Section 84 of the IPC is the legal standard of accountability in cases of suspected mental illness. Courts, on the other hand, have largely associated the phrase with insanity. But the definition of “madness” is vague. It is a term used to describe varying degrees of mental illness severity. Therefore, people with mental illness are not always exempt from criminal responsibility. A distinction must be made between medical insanity and legal insanity. Medical insanity is not a matter of court. It’s legal madness. 

In Surendra Mishra v. State of Jharkhand¹⁰, the Supreme Court held that “legal insanity,” not “medical insanity,” must be proven to acquit a suspect of criminal liability under section 84 of the IPC. 

CONCLUSION

The section on insanity deals with all forms of insanity, such as “temporary or permanent,” “natural or consequential,” and “caused by disease or birth,” and treats the suspect as the sole criterion for establishing criminal liability. completely dependent on the behavior of the person. As it is difficult to determine whether someone is mentally unstable at the time of a crime, it is also difficult to determine their mental health status. Also, defending oneself is quite a challenge for an insane person. In addition, rational individuals use this defense to avoid punishment. This state makes it difficult for the law to achieve its main purpose, turning it into a loophole. The fact that a court must determine a person’s truthfulness in itself a very difficult situation makes this rule an additional loophole.  Only legitimate entities should be allowed to use insanity defenses. Ultimately it is left to the discretion of the courts, but laws made in the public interest must be applied fairly. It is reasonable to assume that the laws on insanity no longer serve their original purpose and is being used by criminals as a defense against law enforcement. Indian courts have often sought a more progressive approach to enforcing the concept of “mental insanity” in criminal law in the light of advances in medicine, and psychiatry in particular.

---

References:

1. Parthasarathy Ramamurthy & Vijay Chatoth, How does India decides Insanity Plies? A review of the High Court judgements in the past decades, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.4103/IJPSYM.IJPSYM_373_18 (Visited on May 29, 2021).
2. Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Ed., p.810.
3. Russell Covey, “Temporary Insanity: The Strange Life and Times of the perfect defense”, Available at: https://www.bu.edu/law/journals-archive/bulr/documents/covey.pdf (Visited on May 28, 2021).
4. Manas Shrivastava & Adatsa Hota, “Privacy and Legal Rights of People with Mental Illness”, available at: https://www.ijlmh.com/wp-content/uploads/Privacy-and-Legal-Rights-of-People-with-Mental-Illness.pdf (Visited on May 30, 2021).
5. Ashiruddin Ahmed v The King, 1949 CriLJ 255.
6. Dayabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat AIR 1964 SC 1563.
7. Bapu Gajraj Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2007) 3 SCC Cri.509.
8. Hari Singh Gond v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2008) 16 SCC 109
9. Surendra Mishra v State of Jharkhand, AIR 2011 SC 627

This article is written by Jay Kumar Gupta, a second-year BBA LL.B.(Hons.) student at the School of Law, Narsee Monjee Institute of Management Studies, Bangalore.