S.noContents
1.Introduction
2.Constant Turbulence Between Article 13 and Article 368
3.The Parliament’s Comeback
4.The Conflict Between the Judiciary and Former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi: 39th Amendment
5.The Contextual Constitution
6.Conclusion

The Preamble, which is incorporated into the basic structure of the Constitution, demonstrates the relevance of Article 368[1] even to the present day. Recent amendments to the Constitution concerning fundamental rights are made by Parliament. The Constitution, including its fundamental rights, was initially drafted in response to the socio-political requirements deemed necessary at the time. These requirements may not be sufficient or appropriate for the rapidly expanding socio-economic, technological, and legal climate of today. As a result, it is always necessary to amend the Constitution. 

For instance, the 86th Amendment to the Constitution in 2002 made the right to education a fundamental right. In a similar vein, Articles 19(f) and 31 of the Constitution were struck down by the 44th Amendment in 1978, rendering the right to property non-essential. The extent of Article 368’s authority to modify fundamental rights has been interpreted by higher  Indian courts. 

In Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan[2], for instance, the dissenting opinion stated that Article  368 did not grant the Parliament absolute powers and could not be used indiscriminately to usurp citizens’ fundamental rights. Even though there is a lot of literature on how to look at  Article 368 from the point of view of changing the basic structure as a whole, very few recent cases have focused on specifically changing fundamental rights from a legal point of view.  Therefore, I as an author want to fill that knowledge gap. 

From Shankari Prasad v. Union of India[3] in the First Constitutional Amendment Act of 1951 to Waman Rao v. Union of India[4], I will aim to trace the path. I will sincerely put efforts into determining the reasoning behind the bench’s various decisions challenging or upholding certain Parliamentary amendments to fundamental rights, as well as include their own opinion on the subject in the analysis section. I will be using doctrinal methods for in-depth research, also I will address the principles of the law and the constitution, as well as provide a sociopolitical context for the decisions made. 

Introduction

The basic structure of the Indian Constitution includes the fundamental or essential elements that run throughout the document or serve as its foundation. It joins significant arrangements of our Constitution, without the ground standards is outlandish. 

Because of its goal of achieving equity, for instance, the 2019 Constitution (One Hundred and  Third Amendment) Act, which makes reservations for economically disadvantaged groups,  has implications for Article 14 of the Constitution, which is the first fundamental right.

Additionally, on February 4, 2022, the Rajya Sabha debated K.J. Alphons, a BJP Kerala MP,’s proposal to amend the Preamble of the Constitution with a private member’s bill. This was gone against by the RJD MP Manoj Jha and MDMK MP Vaiko in December 2021, on the grounds of abusing the standard in the Kesavananda judgment which was that law and order are essential for the fundamental construction of the Indian Constitution. 

As a result, Parliament would be unable to alter any aspect of the Constitution’s fundamental structure. Fundamental rights are included in the Constitution’s fundamental structure in Part III. According to A.V. Dicey, a nation is said to adhere to the rule of law only if it upholds citizens’ liberties. Article 368 of the Constitution both grants and restricts Parliament’s powers to amend specific sections of the Constitution. 

Constant Turbulence Between Article 13 and Article 368

First Constitutional  Amendment According to Article 13 of the Indian Constitution[5], the Parliament cannot enact laws that restrict, infringe, or violate the fundamental rights outlined in Part III. In contrast,  Parliament is empowered to amend specific sections of the Constitution by Article 368. There is still no answer to the question of whether the two articles can coexist harmoniously. 

The fundamental rights, Preamble, basic structure, and other elements necessary to regulate the three organs of governance and the Indian people are all encapsulated in the Constitution,  according to many. The amount of power Parliament has under Article 368 to amend the  Indian Constitution is symbolized by the scissors used to cut or change the cloth into something else. 

The Constitution only contained seven fundamental rights when the 1st Constitutional  Amendment Act of 1951 was enacted, including the right to property under Articles 31A and  31B[6], which was later eliminated by the 44th Constitutional Amendment. 

The introduction of this right at the time of independence was motivated by two reasons: first and foremost, to boost agricultural production; secondly, to provide farmers, cultivators, and the rural population, who were oppressed by the pre-independence zamindari system, with opportunities, land, and job security. 

They used socialist-welfarist methods and set limits on how much land a person could own to prevent too much land and power from being concentrated in a few hands; a term that is comparable to constitutionalism. In addition, the State was permitted to legally seize someone’s property instead of providing compensation for rehabilitation following displacement. 

A revolutionary policy of the Indian National Congress later led to the establishment of such an exploitative structure to close the gap between the widespread inequality in land ownership. Further changes were set up by the ideological group through the Agrarian Changes Council with Administrator J.C. Kumarappa, overcoming the need to keep the right to property as a key right in a free India.

The 9th Schedule and reasonable restrictions stipulated in Article 19(1)(g)[7] were also included in the First Amendment Act, making it possible for the government to completely or partially acquire the person of any individual. Many citizens were dissatisfied with this Act because it reduced the scope of the most important aspect of the Constitution—the fundamental rights— and gave the Centre too much power to interfere with their lives. 

They filed a case against this Amendment Act in the Supreme Court of India because the Parliament did not have the authority to change fundamental rights. This case became known as Shankari Prasad v. Union of India[8], which was a landmark decision. 

The Supreme Court held that Article 368 allowed Parliament to amend any of the fundamental rights through Constitutional Amendments and that the changes made by the first Constitutional Amendment stand. This proportion smothered the fight for control between the lawmaking body and the legal executive since they explained that Article 13  simply applied to common privileges and not Protected Revisions. 

Numerous state governments incorporated their respective Land Reforms Acts into the 9th Schedule of the Constitution as a result of this decision. This had a significant impact because, normally, any law that violates fundamental rights would be invalidated; however,  by including it in the 9th Schedule, the laws would not be invalidated regardless of whether they violate fundamental rights. 

In Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan[9], this provision of the 17th Constitutional Amendment was challenged. With a 3:2 vote, the five-judge bench decided that the 17th Constitutional Amendment Act does not fall under Article 13. Chief Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar looked into the deeper intentions of the people who wrote the Constitution and concluded that they didn’t want to protect fundamental rights completely because they didn’t put in place a clause that said fundamental rights couldn’t be changed. As a result, both Shankari and Sajjan appeared to favour Article 368 over Article 13. 

The disagreeing assessment given by Equity M. Hidayatullah and Equity J. R. Mudholkar set forward the inquiry with regards to whether changing an essential element of the Constitution would be considered as a revision or as a revamping, and thus, whether the ability to roll out this improvement was presented by Article 368. 

This reexamining of the composers’ aim drove the Court to allude the case to a bigger seat,  forming it into the Golaknath v. State of Punjab[10], which tested the Sajjan choice. By the majority’s decision in Sajjan, the 11-judge bench ruled that the parliamentary powers granted by Article 368 were not absolute and that the Parliament cannot curtail fundamental rights because they are included in Part III, giving them a transcendental status outside of the  Parliament’s purview. In addition, it stated that any amendment violating a fundamental right granted by Part III is unconstitutional, restricting the Parliament’s authority and requiring a  judicial review. 

Golaknath, in contrast to Shankari and Sajjan, prioritized Article 13 over Article 368 because the Supreme Court ruled that Parliament can enact a Constitutional Amendment. This decision by a larger bench of the Supreme Court effectively overturned its previous two decisions and sided with those who opposed amending fundamental rights. 

The Parliament’s Comeback

The 24th Constitutional Amendment, which removed the right to property as a fundamental right that had been included in the 1st Constitutional  Amendment, was challenged in the courts shortly after Golaknath by a large number of cases brought by the general public. The Supreme Court had to clarify that Golaknath would apply retroactively to previous amendments to prevent all of this chaos. 

The Golaknath case narrowed the scope of Parliament’s powers, while the first constitutional amendment restricted the scope of fundamental rights. The decision to enact the 24th Constitutional Amendment, which effectively added a fourth sub-clause to both Articles 13 and 368, was made by Parliament to expand its power to amend. 

The 24th Amendment stated in Article 368(4) that if Parliament enacts another Constitutional  Amendment, it will not apply to Article 13, whereas Article 13(4) stated the opposite to reverse the Golaknath decision. As a result, following the passage of the 24th Amendment  Act, the position was that Parliament could alter any section of the Constitution, including fundamental rights. 

Following the 24th amendment, additional constitutional amendments were enacted to repeal previous amendments that restricted citizens’ rights. The 29th Amendment introduced land reforms, while the 25th Amendment restricted property rights. In 1947, the Privy Purse, a  payment made to ruling families to give up their powers and merge their princely states, was made obsolete by the 26th Constitutional Amendment. In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala[11] and Golaknath’s position as well, the 24th, 25th, 26th, and 29th Constitutional Amendments were challenged. 

The Supreme Court made it clear that Parliament has the full power to change fundamental rights even before the 24th and 26th Amendments to the Constitution. The 24th Constitutional Amendment, which clarified parliamentary powers, was also upheld by the  Court. In this instance, the issue of how much power the Parliament has over the applicability of fundamental rights came up once more. The Court decided to take a balanced approach in support of a harmonious interpretation, which is referred to as the basic structure doctrine. It did not investigate whether Article 13 or Article 368 is more powerful. 

The Conflict Between the Judiciary and Former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi: 39th Amendment

On the twelfth of June 1975, Allahabad High Court set out a verifiable choice wherein they suppressed the discretionary triumph of Indira Gandhi’s administration, referring to proof of constituent misrepresentation. They also decided that no one in her cabinet could hold an election office position for six years as punishment. 

After that, Indira Gandhi appealed to the Supreme Court. Just one day before the hearing, she enacted the 39th Constitutional Amendment Act and declared a national emergency on the grounds of internal unrest.

The 39th CAA resulted in the addition of Article 329A and the elimination of Article 71. The dispute over the election was still before the Court at this point. According to Article 329A,  an independent body would handle all electoral disputes involving the Speaker of the Lok  Sabha, the Prime Minister (at the time, Indira Gandhi), the President, or the Vice President. 

Because of the death of this CAA, the forthcoming legal dispute against her could as of now not be active. As a result, the 39th CAA’s goal was clear: to allow Indira Gandhi to continue serving as India’s Prime Minister without interference. The constituent outcomes incidentally showed that Janata Dal Party won the political decision overwhelmingly, making Morarji  Desai the new State head. 

As a result, Indira Gandhi was forced to resign from her position reluctantly. The ruling party then decided to remove Article 329A, which was found to be unconstitutional in the case of  Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain[12], applying the principles of the Kesavananda case, to undo everything the previous government had done wrong, including the 39th CAA and the unsolicited national emergency. Article 71 was likewise brought back, which offered back the powers to attempt constituent questions to the High Court. 

The Contextual Constitution

After the emergency period under Indira Gandhi’s rule in  1975, the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution made a significant number of changes to prevent similar power abuses from occurring again. It underwent two significant modifications: To begin, it added sub-clause 4 to Article 31C, which discusses property rights; Second, it added paragraphs 4 and 5 to Article 368. 

Article 368(4) stated that Parliament can amend, alter, or remove any fundamental rights under Part III and cannot be subjected to judicial review like Article 31C(4). On the other hand, Article 31C(4) stated that any law could be put in Part IV under the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP), even if it violates fundamental rights under Part III. This made it immune to even someone challenging it before the courts. 

As a result, Parliament can add or change any provision in Parts III and IV. The Parliament was granted absolute amending powers by Article 368 (5). Since the legal powers were diminished and the decent methodology in Keshavananda, the 42nd Established Alteration was tested in Minerva Mills v. Union of India and Ors[13]

Conclusion

The petitioners in Minerva owned the Bombay Minerva Mills company, which the government occupied under the guise of nationalization. In this case, the Supreme Court  ruled that the 42nd Amendment and all of its amendments were unconstitutional because of  the following three fundamental characteristics: 

First, judicial review, in which rights granted by courts of law are regarded as fundamental  features and cannot be suppressed through an amendment by Parliament; 

Second, Parliament’s limited amending power, which means that Parliament cannot use its limited amending power to expand its capabilities; Thirdly, the balance between Parts III and IV must be maintained so that DPSPs and fundamental rights do not conflict.

All the Established Alteration Acts after the Kesavananda essential regulation case were tested in Waman Rao v. Union of India[14], where the most relevant issue that emerged under the watchful eye of the court was regardless of whether these alterations sabotaged the fundamental construction. 

The Court provided an odd solution to this question by stating that the Kesavananda-based basic structure test will be applied in future amendments and laws. As a result, the Court made it clear that any amendment to the Constitution made after April 24, 1973, can be challenged if it does not adhere to the basic structure doctrine. 

As a result, this case reaffirmed the significance of the Kesavananda rule by allowing  Parliament to alter a portion of the fabric—representing the Constitution—but not the entire fabric. Even though Parliament had the power to change any part of the Constitution,  including the Fundamental Rights, this did not mean that the Constitution’s fundamental structure could be changed even by a Constitutional Amendment. This shows how strong the  Constitution still is in the social and political context of today. 


Endnotes

  1. The Indian Constitution, Article 368
  2. Sajjan Singh v. State Of Rajasthan, 1965 AIR 845, 1965 SCR (1) 933
  3. Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, AIR. 1951 SC 458
  4. Waman Rao v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 362
  5. The Indian Constitution, Article 13
  6. The Indian Constitution, Article 31(A) and Article 31(B)
  7. The Indian Constitution, Article 19(1)(g)
  8. Ibid 3
  9. Ibid 2
  10. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR. 1967, SC 1643
  11. Kesavanand Bharti v. State of Kerala, AIR. 1973 SC 1461
  12. Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 S.C. 2299
  13. Minerva Mill Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC, 625
  14. Ibid 4

This article is written by Shaurya Sharma, a third-year law student from Fairfield Institute of Technology and Management.

Equivalent Citation

[1992 SCR (1) 686, 1992 SCC Supl. (2) 651]

Bench

By Hon’ble Justice Sharma, L.M.,
By Hon’ble Justice Venkatachalliah, M.N.,
By Hon’ble Justice Verma, Jagdish Saran,
By Hon’ble Justice Reddy, K. Jayachandra and
By Hon’ble Justice Agrawal, S.C

Date of Judgment

February 18, 1992

Provisions Involved

Articles 102(2), Article 122(1), Article212(1), Article 368 of Constitution of India

Introduction

A constitution is a written document that contains rules, laws, and regulations for the government of a country. The Indian Constitution is regarded as the country’s supreme or “grundnorm” law. Its preamble speaks of people’s sovereignty, democratic polity, justice, liberty, equality, and brotherhood, all of which ensure the individual’s dignity as well as the nation’s unity and integrity. The Preamble is based on Nehru’s beliefs, which constituted the foundation for the constitution’s construction After the constitution was created, it didn’t take long for political insiders to convince Indian framers. Following Nehru’s death, India experienced a decline in political morals and an unpleasant increase in political corruption. The disorderly floor-crossing was a blow to the electoral system and weakened the government’s three organs. Parliament passed the Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act in early 1985, making defections illegal.

Factual Observations

The constitutional legitimacy of the Tenth Schedule established by the Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act, 1985, was challenged in the case of Kihota Hollohon v. Zachilhu and Ors. Writ Petitions, Transfer Petitions, Civil Appeals, Special Leave Petitions, and other proceedings presenting common questions were all heard jointly, bringing the petitioners together. The Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act substituted the tenth schedule for four articles of the Constitution, namely 101(3)(a), 102(2), 190(3)(a), and 191(2). In a 3:2 judgment in the case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld the constitutional legitimacy of the Anti-Defection Law. Justices M.N. Venkatachaliah, K.J. Reddy, and S.C. Agrawal made up the majority, while Justices L.M. Sharma and J.S. Verma made up the minority. Simultaneously, the Supreme Court ruled that the speaker’s directives under the law barring an MLA from serving because of defection are subject to judicial review.

Issues Raised

  1. Whether the changes made by the 52nd amendment are legally acceptable?
  2. Whether the additions made by the 52nd amendment have constitutional validity?

Applicability of Doctrine of Severability

As stated in the definition itself, the doctrine of severability can be applied to a composite amendment that contains amendments that do not require ratification by States as well as amendments that do require such ratification, and the amendment can be upheld in respect of the amendments that do not require ratification and are within the competence of Parliament alone by applying the doctrine of severability. Only the revisions to the proviso’s provisions that require approval must be struck down or declared illegal. The severability test asks the Court to determine whether the legislature would have adopted the legislation at all if the severed element was not a part of it, and if what remains after severance can stand alone and is functional.

The doctrine of severability applies when a piece of otherwise lawful legislation contains a provision that is invalid due to a lack of legislative competence, and the invalid section is severable, leaving the remaining valid provisions intact. This theory does not apply where legislation is invalidly enacted because of non-compliance with a mandatory legislative procedure, such as the mandatory special procedure for exercising constituent power. The theory does not apply to legislation that has not yet been enacted. Even if it may be feasible to keep a stillborn alive by surgical skillfully removing a congenitally faulty portion, it is not possible to infuse life into a stillborn referred in The Bribery Commissioner v. Pedrick Ranasinghe1.

Laws/Provisions Involved

Schedule 10
The first paragraph begins with definitions, the second with disqualifications, the third with divisions within the party (now deleted by the 2003 amendment to the constitution), the fourth with a few disqualifications that do not apply just in mergers, and the fifth with some exemptions. The sixth and seventh paragraphs state who will resolve disputes and restrict courts from hearing concerns about a member’s disqualification, and finally, the last paragraph allows a speaker to make rules for a House to give effect to the provisions of the Schedule.

Most of these provisions are subject to adjudication and interpretation by the courts of the land. Paragraph 2, which outlines a member’s disqualifications, is perhaps the one provision that has been scrutinized by the courts.

Ratio Decidendi

People’s lifestyles shape the law’s profile, not the other way around. A finality clause is not a magical legislative incantation that prevents Judicial Review from proceeding. A decision’s statutory finality assumes and is dependent on its adherence to the law. The scope of judicial review under Articles 136, 226, and 227 of the Constitution in relation to an order made by the Speaker/Chairman under would be limited to jurisdictional errors, such as infirmities based on constitutional mandate violations, mala fides, non-compliance with natural justice rules, and perversity. The courts follow the notion that, notwithstanding a finality provision, it is open to the court to determine whether the action of the challenged authority is ultra vires the powers conferred on it. An action can be ultra vires if it is carried out in violation of a mandatory provision of the law granting the authority the ability to do so. If the authority’s powers are vitiated by mala fides or a colorable use of power based on extraneous and irrelevant considerations, it will be supra vires.

Case Law Referred

Eight sections of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 were found illegal by the court in State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara2 on the grounds that they were in violation of certain constitutional provisions and essential freedoms. The Supreme Court ruled that the sections of the law that were declared unconstitutional were valid because they were not inextricably linked with the remainder of the Act, they were severable from the rest of it. It was one thing to say that the Legislature would not have enacted the Act, but it was another to say that the Legislature would not have enacted it. It would be impossible to pass the Act without adding the elements that were judged to be illegal.

Likewise, the Supreme Court stated in A.K. Gopalan v. the State of Madras3 that if a law is unconstitutional, just the part that is unconstitutional will be declared void, not the entire law, and every effort should be made to save as much of it as possible. If the invalid part’s omission has no effect on the character or structure of the document, it will be considered a severable legislative object.

Judgment

The minority judges held that the Constitution was violated because the Constitutional scheme for deciding on questions of disqualification of members after being duly elected contemplates adjudication of such disputes by an independent authority outside the House, namely the President or Governor, in accordance with the opinion of the committee, all of whom are high Constitutional functionaries.

The Election Commission came to the same conclusion as the minority judges in this instance. It issued suggestions in 1977, recommending that disqualification for defection be referred to the Election Commission for an opinion to be given to the President or Governor, because the matter might potentially be, and as with other disqualifications alluded to in Articles 102 and 191 of the constitution, the President or the Governor will act on the Election Commission’s recommendation.

As a result, it was determined that paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule did not create a non-justiciable territory. The Speaker/power Chairman’s to resolve disagreements could be considered judicial. The ‘finality clause,’ which prepared the way for the majority to prevail in the verdict, is an important construction.

Own Analysis/Opinion

The Anti-Defection Law was enacted to counteract the “evil of political defections.” However, the phrase “voluntarily giving up membership in a political party” must be defined more clearly. The President/Governor should make agreements under the Tenth Schedule based on the Election Commission’s binding advice. Disqualification should be limited to situations in which a member voluntarily resigns from his political party, abstains from voting, or votes against the party whip in a confidence/non-confidence vote.

The law that has prevented individual defections must now be used to prevent mass defections. It’s also necessary to challenge the speaker’s function. For his tenure, the speaker is reliant on the support of the legislature’s majority. As a result, he does not meet the criteria for an ‘individual adjudicatory body.’ It is not practical to repeal the Anti-defection law completely, but the long-term solution is to keep a check on political culture, and legislators who act in contempt or with mala fide intent should be voted out in subsequent elections, as the ultimate agency in the world’s largest democracy rests with the Indian people. That’s why the doctrine of severability has made it easy to combat with kind of issues and help in avoiding any kind of misuse of arbitrary powers.

The president of the parliament, and the governor of the state legislature, may report the subject to the Election Commission under Articles 102 and 192, respectively. This appears to be the only way to avoid the speakers’ political biases in their judgments. If the government wishes to keep the current arrangement, the Supreme Court will have to exercise far more judicial review power over the Speaker’s decision under the Anti-defection law than the Supreme Court is willing to do now under the Kihota Hollohon case.

Concluding Observations

After analyzing the situation in the instant case, it can be concluded that the concerns of construction and severability are distinct because, where more than one reasonable interpretation is available, one upholding the legitimacy of the legislation and the other invalidating it, the former would be accepted, and in the situation that both are possible, the former would be accepted.

If this isn’t practicable, the court has no choice but to decide whether the entire statute should be repealed, stricken down, or the excellent and bad elements can be separated. Also, the Separation of valid and invalid provisions of a statute is not determined by whether the law is enacted in the same section or in distinct parts; what matters is the substance of the matter, which must be determined through a thorough examination of the Act as a whole, as well as the enactment of the applicable provisions. Despite its relative obscurity, the philosophy has far-reaching implications. On the one hand, rejecting entire legislation for one erroneous provision is the most invasive remedy; on the other hand, the Supreme Court is hesitant about amending statutes by removing portions of them. Prior to the passage of the Tenth Schedule, there was no such thing as a “political party” under the Constitution, but their existence is now acknowledged under the Anti-defection Act.

Citations:

  1. [1965] AC 172
  2. AIR 1951 SC 318.
  3. AIR 1950 SC 27.

Analysis by Hemant Bohra student at School of Law, Lovely Professional University, Punjab.