-Report by Karan Gautam


The defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in O.S. No.6456 of 1993 filed an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, calling in question the judgment and decree dated 09.09.2010 passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in RFA No.1966 of 2007. During the pendency of the captioned appeal, the second appellant died and his legal heirs were impleaded as additional appellants 2.1 to 2.4. The original first appellant and the impleaded legal heirs of the deceased second appellant are collectively described as ‘appellants’. The plaintiff prayed for a judgment for decree of permanent injunction restraining the first and second defendants from interfering in the plaintiffs right, title and interest over and in the suit schedule property.


FACTS:


The appellants filed a written statement contending that the suit is not maintainable, that there is no prayer for possession, that the suit was not valued correctly, and that the real owners of the suit property were not arraigned as parties. Subsequently, they amended the plaint by adding schedules A, B and ‘C’ and prayers qua them. The prayers in the amended plaint read as under: a judgment and decree of perpetual injunction directing the defendants to restore the possession of the schedule premises to the plaintiff and not to interfere in the plaintiffs’ lawful possession and enjoyment of the schedule property.


PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:


The plaintiff/respondent adduced oral and documentary evidence in support of his claims, but the defendant did not lead any evidence. The Trial Court partially decreed the suit as per judgment dated 04.07.2007, holding that the plaintiff was entitled to recover possession of suit ‘B’ schedule property from the defendants and directed the defendants
to vacate and deliver it to the plaintiff within two months. The surviving defendants challenged the judgment and decree before the High Court in RFA No.1966 of 2007. They did not adduce any evidence before the trial court. The plaintiff objected to the maintainability of the appeal as the original suit was filed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The High Court dispelled the objection and remanded the matter to the Trial Court for fresh disposal. Leave was granted and the Civil Appeal was disposed of as per judgment dated 03.09.2009. The trial Court was directed to record the evidence and submit a report to the High Court to dispose of the appeal within the time stipulated. The

Court to which the case is remanded has to comply with the order of remand and acting contrary to it is contrary to law. In this case, the High Court remanded the matter to the trial Court for fresh disposal and directed the trial Court to record the evidence as directed by the High Court and forward it along with report to enable the High Court to dispose of the appeal taking into account the additionally recorded evidence of the defendants.


RESPONDANT’S CONTENTIONS:

The High Court dismissed the appeal of the appellants and confirmed the judgement and decree of the Trial Court. The appellants had raised multiple grounds to assail the judgment, including that the plaintiff/the respondent had failed to establish his possession over plaint ‘B’ schedule property. The High Court failed to consider the contention that the subject suit was abated due to the failure of the respondent to bring on record the legal representatives of Sri Hanumaiah, the third respondent, and Sri Rama @ Ramamurthy, the deceased second defendant, who had purchased the suit property from Sriman Madhwa Sangha and Sri Vittal Rao as per sale deed executed on 05.10.2000.


JUDGEMENT:


The High Court held that the defendants did not disclose their defence in their written statement and did not even contend that they are in possession of the suit property, which is based on the maxim ‘Possessio contra omnes valet praeter eur cui ius sit possessionis‘. The High Court is also correct in holding the question of maintainability of the suit in the affirmative and in favour of the respondent. The appellants argued that the suit ought to have been held as abated against all the defendants due to non-substitution of the legal representatives of the deceased defendant No. 3 upon his death, but the courts below have held that the original defendants failed to raise sufficient and appropriate pleadings in the written statement that they have better right for possession. The appeal is dismissed and there will be no order as to costs.

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-Report by Saloni Agarwal


The Supreme Court in Union of India vs Indian Navy Civilian Design Officers Association and Anr., decided the rights and rules of the judiciary in interfering with the functioning of the executive and decided the parameter for the same.

Facts:


The appellant challenged the decision of the tribunal court regarding the pay scale of Junior Design Officers (JDOs). The respondent had filed before the tribunal court regarding the pay scale of JDOs to be equal to that of Civilian Technical Officers (CTOs) i.e. Rs 7500-12000. The pay scale was fixed by the Fifth Pay Commission. But the plea to equate the pay from Rs 7450-11500 to that of CTOs was rejected by the Finance Minister. The respondent filed another case before the tribunal and the tribunal was directed to grant the pay scale equal to that of CTOs. The appellant was aggrieved by this filled before the High Court and the decision of the tribunal was dismissed by it. The question which arises is the tribunal and High Court are justified in deciding the pay scale and post of the JDOs and CTOs.

Appellant’s Contention:


The plaintiff claimed that the JDOs and CTOs are governed by different sets of Rules and the release period is also longer in the case of CTOs. The UOI also said that the duties and responsibilities of the CTOs are more complex than the JDOs. The post of CTOs exists in different fields and the Pay Scale was fixed based on a recommendation given by Fifth Pay Commission and the Tribunal and High Courts had committed errors by upgrading it. The pay scale was fixed according to the working and requirements of the JDOs.

Respondent’s Contention:


The respondent claimed that the Commission ignored that from the very start, the pay scale of JDOs and CTOs is the same. The responsibilities and duties of both are somewhat similar. Till the Fourth Commission, the pay scale was the same for both. All the essential qualifications and rules followed were more or less equal. Equal Pay for Equal Work should be given.

Judgement:


The court said the Tribunal and High Court has committed gross error in interfering with the post and pay scale and upgrading the same. The decision of the post lies with the executive and it requires an exclusive framework and careful observation. The judiciary cannot interfere ordinarily unless there is something unfair and injustice done in matters regarding finance. The court said the rules, responsibilities and duties performed by the CTOs were different from JDOs. The court quashed the decision of the Tribunal and High Court and the appeal stands true and the appellant was held correct.

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-Report by Pranav Mathur

The Gwalior Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, on the 15th of February 2023, allowed for the partial acceptance of an appeal, by allowing a majority of it, in the case of Tinku@ Vijay Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh. The appeal was against the Trial Court’s decision of convicting the two appellants for murder, as punished under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”), 1860. Provisions of the Arms Act, 1959 were also included in the charges, which one of the appellants was convicted for.

FACTS:

On the morning of the 10th of December 2022, the two appellants arrived at the place of occurrence, an English Liquor shop. Both of them demanded alcohol, but on credit. When they were denied being given any, they hurled abuses at the workers there, and left, after exclaiming that they’d be returning shortly. Upon their return, they assaulted one of the workers of the liquor shop, and one of the appellants fired at him using a country-made pistol that he had procured. Subsequently, both of the appellants fled from the spot. The injured worker’s dying declaration was recorded, proceeding which he succumbed to his injuries after he was en route to a hospital. The appellants were charged with murder, and the appellant who shot the worker was additionally charged with Section 25 (1B) (a) read with Section 27 of the Arms Act. Both of them abjured their guilt, and pleaded their false implication in the case.

APPELLANTS’ CONTENTIONS:

The appellants contended that the decision of the Trial Court had been based on the misappreciation of evidence which had not been materially interpreted in the right perspective. Furthermore, they argued that the purported eye-witness in the present case cannot be considered as reliable since he witnessed the incident through gratings encasing the liquor shop, which have to have hampered with his vision during the incident. Additionally, they argued that the dying declaration of the injured worker does not bear the signature of a medical official, and his condition was critical at the time of his death. Had his condition not been critical, they argue, the injured worker would’ve filed the complaint himself, and not through a person. The other eye witnesses were relatives of the deceased, making them interested witnesses. They further contended that due to the non-deposition of the fact that a quarrel had arisen between the appellants and the deceased, mens rea cannot determinedly be proven. The pistol seized from the one of the appellants cannot truly be construed as the weapon of crime, as it had not been produced before the court, and the possibility of it being tampered cannot be ruled out, due to the delay in sending it for examination. They even contended that the statements of the witnesses and the deceased have contradictions in them which renders the entire case made by the prosecution rather doubtful. 

THE COURT’S CONTENTIONS AND THE JUDGMENT:

The Court concluded that fatal gunshots were, as a matter of fact, fired by one of the appellants, which led to the death of the deceased. The Court also opined that the Trial Court had, rather correctly, not given importance to minor depositional inconsistencies as they do not materially alter the case. The Court took the help of the case of Laxman v. State of Maharashtra and held that the dying declaration cannot be called unacceptable just because a doctor’s certificate of fitness was missing. Further, the Court held that the mere presence of relatives doesn’t make the dying declaration doubtful. At this juncture the Court recalled the maxim – nemo moriturus proseumitur mentiri – which means that when one is about to meet his maker, one does not lie. As for the nature of the crime committed, the Court opined that mens rea was absent in the conduct of the appellants, as they committed this offence in the heat of passion, which is considered an exception to the definition of murder, as given in Section 300 of the IPC. The non-recovery of the murder weapon is essential for conviction, however, if enough evidence is available on record, even in the absence of the weapon itself, it may still lead to a conviction, as was held in State through the Inspector of Police v. Laly @ Manikandan and Anr. The Court therefore altered their punishments from those of Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part I of the IPC. Their sentences were subsequently reduced to the time they had already spent in prison, and hence, their appeal was partially allowed.

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Report by Shweta Sabuji

The State of Haryana has filed the current appeals because it feels wronged and unsatisfied by the impugned common judgment and order dated 18.10.2019 issued by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Chandigarh, which increased the amount of compensation for the lands acquired at Rs. 2,98,54,720/- per acre with all other statutory benefits and allowed the said first appeals in part preferred by the original land owners. 

FACTS:

Under the terms of the Property Acquisition Act of 1894, a substantial portion of land in the village of Kherki, Majra, measuring roughly 58 acres, was purchased for public use. The awards were made public by the land acquisition officer. The original landowners requested that references be made under Section 18 of the Act of 1894. The reference court increased the compensation for the notification dated 13.01.2010 from Rs. 60 lakhs per acre as awarded by the land acquisition officer to Rs. 1,56,24,000/per acre. The State’s appeals against the decision and award rendered by the reference court, which set the compensation at Rs. 1,56,24,000, were ultimately dismissed.

But by the impugned judgment and order, which considered the compensation amount increased by the High Court and modified by this Court to Rs. 2,38,00,000/per acre concerning the lands acquired in January 2008 and granted a 12% cumulative increase, the High Court has partially allowed the appeals raised by the landowners and determined and awarded the compensation at Rs. 2,98,54,720. The State of Haryana has filed the current appeals because it is unhappy with the impugned decision and order made by the High Court that determined and awarded compensation for the lands acquired via a notification dated 13.01.2010 at Rs. 2,98,54,720 per acre.

PLAINTIFF CONTENTION:

While calculating the compensation at Rs. 2,98,54,720/- per acre for the lands acquired via a notification dated 13.01.2010, Shri Nikhil Goel, learned AAG, appearing on behalf of the State, has vehemently argued that the High Court materially erred by considering and/or relying upon the judgment of this Court [State of Haryana vs. Ram Chander (2017 SCC Online SC 1869)]concerning the lands acquired.

It is argued that this Court clearly said in the decision and order it issued that the compensation figure of Rs. 2,38,00,000 per acre established by the judgment shall not be regarded as precedent in any other case. Considering this, it is argued that the High Court committed a grave error by considering the sum awarded by this Court in the decision and order given at a value of Rs. 2,38,00,000.

Furthermore, it is argued that prices for the lands were artificially raised because, concerning the community specifically, lands started to be acquired starting in 2008. Therefore, it is claimed, the High Court erred significantly by increasing the award price of Rs. 2,38,00,000 per acre by 12% for the notification of 25.01.2008.

DEFENDANTS CONTENTION:

The learned attorney representing the landowners has argued that after the State’s appeals were rejected and the impugned common judgment and order were issued in the landowners’ appeals, the State is no longer permitted to contest the impugned common judgment and order issued by the High Court.

Further, it is argued that there was a price increase even after considering the sale instances that were provided on record from 09.03.2007 to 31.03.2008; as a result, the High Court did not mistake in approving the 12% increase on Rs. 2,38,00/- per acre. It is argued that, as of this point, no conclusive evidence nor a sale instance to the opposite has been recorded by the acquiring authority, demonstrating a decline in market value between 2008 and 2010.

JUDGMENT:

This Court made it clear in the judgment and order that it should not be regarded as a precedent. It must be observed, however, that even on the merits, this Court considered and approved the sale cases presented on behalf of the landowners between 2007 and 2008. Because the compensation amount of Rs. 2,38,00,000/- per acre for the land acquired through a notification issued on January 25, 2008,can be considered the base and the time interval between the 2008 notification and the 2010 notification, a suitable enhancement of 8% to 15% is given, which is held in the case of [Pehlad Ram Vs. HUDA; (2014) 14 SCC 778]

It will not be safe or wise to grant the cumulative increase of 12% nonetheless, especially because the purchase processes in the current case were just started in January 2008 concerning the exact hamlet. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, as well as the sale cases that have been presented on the record, we believe that accepting a 10% increase above the original amount of Rs. 2,38,00,000 can be considered just compensation and may further the interests of justice. The market value of the land in question for the lands acquired via a notification dated 13.01.2010 will be Rs. 2,87,98,000/- per acre considering this situation. The current appeals are partially granted to the degree, and it is decided that the original landowners are entitled to compensation at a rate of Rs. 2,87,98,000 per acre together with any additional legal advantages that may be provided by the Land Acquisition Act, of 1894.

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Report by Harishri

In the case of The Chief Engineer, Water Resources Department & Ors. Versus Rattan India Power Limited through its Director & Ors., the appeal was filed by the State of Maharashtra against the judgement of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, whereby the High Court has reduced the ‘irrigation restoration charges’ that the Respondent has contracted to pay.

Facts:

The State of Maharashtra came up with a circular prescribing that when water is diverted for non-irrigation purposes, then the entity using such water shall pay 50,000 per hectare irrigation restoration charges. It also prescribed that no water shall be diverted unless an agreement is entered into between the concerned industry and the government.

Sophie Power Company Ltd. Intended to set up a thermal power plant. A communication was sent by the respondent to the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation to confirm the availability of 240 million litres of water per day to facilitate smooth running. Pursuant to the application made by SPCL granted approval for the usage of water. This was subject to SPCL paying capital contributions and irrigation restoration charges. The Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation granted final approval for the usage of water. SPCL was directed to pay Rs.100000 per hectare. The respondent sent a letter to the government against the levy of higher charges. Later, the charge was increased to Rs.100000 per hectare by the government. Ultimately, the Appellant and Respondent entered into a water supply agreement to pay Rs. 100000 as in 5 instalments. Six months after signing the agreement, he initiated a writ petition before the High Court of Judicature of Bombay at Nagpur to direct him to pay irrigation restoration charges at Rs.50000 per hectare. It was held that it would be appropriate for the rate prevailing as of the date of the grant of in-principal approval.

Appellant’s Contention:

The appellant contended that the order is against the agreement dated 22.05.2012 entered into between the appellant and the respondent. It is submitted that after accepting Rs.100000 as irrigation restoration charges, the respondent is not entitled to challenge it. The essence of his contention was that a contract is sacrosanct and must be respected.

Respondent’s Contention:

The respondent contended that the irrigation restoration charge is directly linked to the date of approval and the relevant date since the circular dated 21.02.2004 was applicable. The appellant could have only levied Rs.50,000 per hectare. Also, similarly placed companies were given the relief that the Respondent was seeking. It was also contended that the undertaking given by the respondent after signing the agreement was not unconditional. It was subject to numerous representations by the respondent for the reduction of the irrigation restoration charge. The Government Circular will apply prospectively and will not apply to ongoing contracts.

Decision:

The bench was not satisfied with the approach adopted by the High Court when the respondent himself wilfully and deliberately entered into an agreement knowing the legal and business consequences. The High Court has committed an error in entertaining a fresh writ petition, which effectively claimed the same reliefs as the previous one. It also has committed a mistake in supplanting its view over that of the contract. The bench also directed that the balance amount due payable towards the irrigation restoration charge shall be paid by the respondent on or before 30.06.2023. Further, interest @ 12% p.a. shall be payable from the date the instalment fell due till the date of the impugned order. The bench allowed the civil appeal and set aside the impugned final judgement.

-Report by Pragati Prajeeta

In the case of Delhi Development Authority Vs Manpreet Singh with Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Secretary Land & Building Department vs Manpreet Singh, a common question of law and facts arose in appeals out of the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, and hence both the appeals are being decided and disposed of together in a common judgment and order by the Supreme Court of India. And the main question, in this case, was Whether a subsequent purchaser has the locus to challenge the acquisition and/or lapsing of the acquisition?

FACTS

The subsequent purchaser is the original writ petitioner, who in the year 2018 acquired the rights and interest in the land. But the original writ petitioner was not the recorded owner when under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, of 1894 the award was issued concerning the land in question. And from all the records, it appeared before the High Court, that the claimed right by the original writ petitioner was based on the 2015 Assignment. Under Section 4 of the Act, 1894 notifications in this present case were issued and the award was declared.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS

The appellants vehemently submitted that as such the respondent is the subsequent purchaser and is the original writ petitioner, who after the Act,2013 came into force purchased the property hence therefore as observed by this Court in the case, they held that he had no locus to challenge the acquisition/lapsing of the acquisition proceedings under the Act, 2013 as he is a subsequent purchaser. Then it was submitted that the High Court declared material that the acquisition is deemed to lapse in the writ petition filed about because of the reason that the respondent is a subsequent purchaser, and had no locus to challenge it as observed and held by the Court.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

The learned senior counsel, however, has submitted that the decision of this Court needs some re-consideration under the Act, 2013 for certain relevant aspects which have not been previously dealt with and/or have been considered. But at the same time, he is not disputing or contradicting the fact that the subsequent purchaser is the original writ petitioner, who in the year 2018 acquired the right, title and interest in the disputed property or even after Act, 2013 came into force.

JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court after looking into the facts and reasons stated the appeal is successful. And in the view of the latter case, the High Court committed some serious error while for instance entertaining the writ petition of the response that is the original writ petitioner. Then it was also seen that the court has materially erred while declaring concerning the land in question, acquisition under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 has lapsed in a writ petition filed by, the original writ petitioner, the respondent who is a subsequent purchaser.

The Supreme Court then held that the judgment and order passed by the High Court are hereby quashed and set aside. The original Writ Petition filed before the High Court stands dismissed. At the same time all the pending applications, stand disposed of and the present appeals are allowed accordingly. But at the same time looking into the facts and circumstances of the case, it held that there shall be no order as to costs.

The court today has declined to stay the release of the film Nyaay: the justice which is based on the life of Sushant Singh Rajput. So the K.K Singh had made an Appeal that the movie has been released on a website and he sought to stay on its release on any other OTT Platform and in cinema halls.

The division bench of Justice Anup Jairam Bhambhani and Jasmeet Singh, while issuing a notice for July 14 to the respondents in the Appeal filed by Singh, said that there was nothing in this movie that would affect the investigation in the SSR case.

The court further said that you have not written a script or a story that has been used by the filmmaker. There is nothing that they have or they could have had. Expect what is available in the public domain. Therefore, the movie is something which the public is interested in and they have made just a movie. The court stated. The bench further added that there does not seem to be any interference in the investigation because of the production of movies on Rajput’s life. It further said that is it your case that life story of that celebrity is itself copyrightable which is nothing in material form asked the court.

Senior Advocate Harish Salve, representing K.K Singh, said that the Rajput was an extremely successful actor and the filmmakers were using his personal life story. There is a right of a father to protect the reputation of his son. So K.K Singh’s lawyer said this in front of the court. The Bench further said that we will have it on 14th July, while hearing the application of Rajput’s father Krishna Kishore Singh, in the appeal against the single judge order refusing to stay the release of the film. And also said that I’m not disposed at this stage.

-Report by RAVINUTHALA VAMSI KRISHNA

Introduction

ORIGIN:

The inception of speedy trial, as per several writers dates back to the twelfth century and can be traced in Assize of Clarendon [act of Henry II of England in 1166], famous tomes of Sir Edward Coke and it can also be traced in Magna Carta of 1215 which states, ”we will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right”.

 The first constitution in which the right to a speedy trial can be found is the constitution of the United States of America. This right is enshrined under the 6th amendment of the American constitution.

DEFINITION:

The right to a speedy trial is a human right granted to a defendant to be tried for alleged crimes within a reasonable time after being taken into custody.

MEANING:

Right to a speedy trial is the basic feature of a judicial system. Forthwith, the right to speedy trials is internationally recognized as a human right. In general, speedy trial means that the accused must be brought to trial within a reasonable amount of time unless the defendant affirmatively waives the right to a speedy trial or if there is a good cause for delay. It also signifies that the government is legally not permitted to lock people up for an un-definite period without trying them and that the defendant has the right to be free from the unlawful seizure. 

Brief

POSTULATION:

The right to a speedy trial is a right framer designed to protect a person from prolonged de facto punishment which is an extended accusation that limits the liberty and besmirches the good name of an accused. In common, the word speedy means something done without delay or promptly. And trial means a judicial examination and determination of issues between parties by a judge.  In general, the term speedy trial is a trial conducted without undue delay or within a reasonable period of time in accordance with established rules and procedures. 

A number of states adopted speedy trial legislation before the late sixties and periodically bills related to speedy trials were introduced starting from American congress early initiatives on invoking the defendant’s sixth amendment right to a speedy trial, article 21 of Indian constitution, article 6 of the European convention on human rights and so on.  The roots of speedy trial can be traced in a bill introduced by representative Abner J. Mikva in November 1969 entitled “Pretrial crime reduction act”.

Speedy trial is the essence of criminal justice.  It is a prominent right of a person and also it is of paramount importance. The speedy trial makes sense only when it includes the ingredients of fairness in all stages of trial which include (i) Investigation (ii) inquiry(iii) trial(iv) Appeal (v) Revision (vi) Re-trial. In A.R.  Antualy  v. V. S. R. Nayak5, the supreme court of India held that it is neither desirable nor advisable to fix any time limit for the trial of offenses. In case of delay in the trial, the prosecution is to justify the delay. Sometimes delay in the speedy trial would depend on the nature, facts, circumstances of the case which has been discussed in many prominent cases. The right to a speedy trial cannot be denied to the accused on the grounds that he failed to demand a speedy trial. In case, if a person’s right to a speedy trial is infringed, the accused person can seek relief from the competent court having jurisdiction.

ADVANTAGES:

  • Speedy trail reduces the defendants stress and allows them to collect and present evidence while it is still fresh.
  • It safeguards and prevents undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial.
  • It further protects the interest of the public, victims and witnesses, in the fair, accurate and timely resolution of criminal cases.
  • It helps in monitoring the performance of the courts and there justice system along with timely management.
  • It ensures that many cases are resolved rapidly, scheduling functions with a high rate of certainty in regard to case scheduling.
  • It helps in formally recognizing the right to speedy trial conferred to an accused.
  • It protects the accused from the turmoil of stress by quick and faire trials.

DISADVANTAGES:

  • It is not possible to determine the speed or delay of a case   because, the speed or delay would depend on the nature of the case and the existing  situations prevailing in a country.
  • Some prosecutors say that delay in trial helps in ‘’high quality prosecution’’ and hence speedy trial may not deliver justice in real.
  •  Hurried trial may lead to unnecessary steps which may give rise to large number of cases that ends in guilty pleas.

GROUNDS FOR DELAY IN TRIAL:

  • Docket explosion.
  • Delay in delivering justice.
  • Failure to testify   witnesses however present.
  •  Prevailing Situations in the country like pandemics.
  • Less number of judges and courts in accordance with the existing population.
  • Delay in process of investigation and enquiry.
  • Improper system for day to day hearings.

LANDMARK CASES:

  • BARKER  V. WINGO[1972]

This is a United States Supreme Court case that specifically involves about right of the defendant in criminal cases to a speedy trial. In the case, the court held that it is not possible to determine with precision when a right like a speedy trial is denied. It is impossible to say how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be deliberate. The court rejected the approach to “quantified speedy trial into a specified number of days or months” and “demand-waiver doctrine”. Rejecting these two rigid approaches in knowing the violation of speedy trial, the court adopted more flexible factors. Those factors include (i) Length of delay (ii) Reason for the delay (iii) Defendants assertion of his rights (iv) Prejudice to the defendant.

  • HUSSAINARAR KHATOON AND ORS  V. HOME SECRETARY, STATE OF BIHAR:

In this case, the Supreme Court of India held that there is absolutely no reason for undertrials to be allowed to continue in jail for a moment longer. And such continuance of detention would violate not only human dignity but also their fundamental right under article 21 of the Indian constitution.  The lordship also observed that the procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person’s liberty cannot be reasonably fair or just unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of guilt of such person. 

  • STATE OF MAHARASTRA V. CHAMPA LAL:

In this case, the court held that the grounds of delay in a case would depend on the facts like nature of the case, circumstances of the case, etc.  And hence, there is a distinction between the delay caused by the accused and the delay caused by the prosecution agencies.

EPIDEMICS AND SPEEDY TRIAL:

  COVID-19 has postponed many trials due to which undertrials languished behind the bars with no clear indication of when their cases will be heard.  Though the courts need to keep people safe during pandemics, they need to make sure that every avenue is explored to protect people’s constitutional rights. Languishing in jail is not justice, especially when a person is found innocent once a trial is held. The court can treat people fairly by first clearing serious cases, home detention over non-violent people, use of technology to initiate early court proceeding through E-Courts, digitalization of case records, and investigation reports. 

Right to Speedy Trial in Context of India:

  1. EVOLUTION OF SPEEDY TRIAL IN INDIA:

During medieval period, the Mughal king Aurangzeb was the first ruler who evolved the concept of speedy trial. The “Fatawa Alamgiri” is the drafted evidence which says that no person shall be arrested without permission of Kasi and justice shall be done quickly after the arrest of the accused and no person could be anguished in jail for an indefinite period unless the guilt is proved.

  1. ARTICLE 21:

The right to speedy trial is a fundamental right inherent under article 21 of Indian constitution which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. Though the speedy trial is not mentioned specifically, it is enumerated as a fundamental right as the content of article 21 as interpreted by the court in Maneka Gandhi v. union of India. In this case, the court held that no person can be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed or established by law and such procedure needs to be reasonable, fair, and just. It means that no person can be tried for an indefinite time after being arrested. When a person is arrested beyond a reasonable time, it violates the right to personal liberty.    

  1. LEGISLATIVE FRAME WORK:

 Not only article 21 and article 39A of directive principles of state policy but there are also several provisions in the Criminal procedure code, 1973 (Here in after Cr. P.C) which safeguards and ensures speedy trial.  Indeed there is a number of provisions in criminal procedure code that ensure speedy trial starting from arrest to passing of final judgment. There are no specific provisions as of speedy trial because speedy trial is only possible when all the agencies like police and prosecutors  work in a balanced manner with established rules and procedures with the component of fairness in every process of trial. Some of the provisions which ensure a speedy trial are:

  1. Section 57 of Cr. P. C:

 According to section 57 of the criminal procedure code, a person arrested cannot be e detained for more than 24 hours. Only when a person is arrested without a warrant and in absence of a special order of a magistrate under section 167, exceed 24 hours exclusively of time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the magistrate’s court.

  1. Section 167 (2) of Cr. P. C:

Section   167 of the criminal procedure code tells about the procedure to be followed when an investigation cannot be completed within 24 hours. This section provides the magistrate to authorize the detention of an accused in a custody, which he thinks fit for a term not exceeding 15 days on the whole.

  1. Section 167 (2A) of Cr. P. C:

 Under this section  the magistrate may authorize the detention of an accused person beyond the period of 15 days if he is  satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so but, no magistrate  shall authorize the detention of an accused person in the custody of a total period exceeding 90 days where the investigation is relating to an offense punishable with death,  imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years and 60 days where the investigation is  related to any other offenses and on expiry of such period the accused shall be released on bail if he is prepared to do so 

  1. Section 173(1) of Cr. P. C:

This section provides that every investigation under chapter XII shall be completed without undue delay. This section provides that in every inquiry or trial, the proceeding shall be held as soon as possible, and once the examination of witnesses begins the same shall be continued from day to day till all the witnesses in attendance have been examined unless the court of law thinks it’s necessary to adjourn the same beyond that following day for the reasons to be recorded.

Section 173(1A) of Cr. P.C:

This section provides that investigation in case of child rape to be completed within three months from date on which the officer in charge of police station has recorded information regarding the case.

  1. Section 309(1) of Cr. P. C:

This section provides that in every inquiry or trial, the proceeding shall be held as soon as possible, and once the examination of witnesses begins the same shall continue from day to day till all the witnesses in attendance have been examined unless the court of law thinks it is necessary to adjourn the same beyond that following day for the reasons to be recorded.

These are few prominent provisions that ensure speedy trial.

  1. VIOLATION  OF  RIGHIT  TO  SPEEDY  TRIAL:

The right to a speedy trial is available to an accused at all stages of trial namely investigation, inquiring, trial appeal, revision, and re-trial. According to the 221st report of the law Commission of India, speedy trial is the fundamental right of every citizen to get speedy justice and Speedy trial is the fundamental requirement of good judicial administration. The Indian constitution provides that whenever there is a violation of a fundamental right, a person can move to the Supreme Court under article 32 and the high court under article 226 of the constitution. 

  1. FAST TRACK COURTS:

Fast track courts were established in India in the year 2000 with the aim to clear the long-pending sessions and other lower judicial cases. As of September 2020, there are 597 fast track courts of which 321 are exclusively POCSCO courts. According to National crime record bureau data,  nearly  26965 pending cases were completed by fast-track courts. Though the fast track courts have been functioning well in matters of many cases there still has been an evidence of large-scale protests demanding stricter punishments and speedy trial in cases of sexual assault against women. One such incident is gang rape of a 23-year-old woman which is also known as Nirbhaya case. In this case the Delhi fast track court sentenced the four accused to death on 13th September 2013. But, the convicts were hanged in Tihar jail in the month of March in the year 2020. Such huge delay in few cases especially in criminal cases has affected not only a single society but also the whole country.

  1. JUVENILE AND SPEEDY TRAIL:

The juvenile justice (care and protection of children) act, 2015 ensures speedy trial in section 36 which orders speedy social investigation and section 14(5) which tells about steps to be followed for a fair and speedy inquiry in case of juveniles. In Sheela Barse and Ors v. union of India and Ors (1986), the court held that the problem of detention of children accused of an offence would become easier if the investigation by the police and the trial by magistrate could be expedited.  This case focuses on the constitutional and statutory rights of a huge number of children being violated due to which they have been suffering custodial restrains.  It is important for a juvenile to have a speedy trial so that the juvenile can be addressed proper treatment and rehabilitation as the children are very prominent assets of a society.

Conclusion:

Speedy trial is the need of the hour.  The purpose of speedy trial is to protect the innocent and to punish the guilty within a reasonable time with the component of justice.  There is a proverb – justice delayed is justice denied.   But there is another proverb which says   justice hurried is justice buried. Though it is true that delay defeats justice, it is also true that a quick trial cannot be ensured as reasonable, fair, and just. This is because a delayed trial is always not an unfair trail. Only when there is a proper balance between speed and justice, it would serve its actual purpose. 

Finally, the state, concerned authorities and agencies as a guardian of people’s rights are duty bound to ensure speedy trial so as to avoid delay in a trial which would lead to miscarriage of justice. 

This article is authored by Jakkula Hilda who is pursuing BA.LLB at University College of law (Osmania University).

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