Author: LEXPEEPS editor

-Report by Ankit Hinnariya

In a recent ruling, the High Court of Delhi granted anticipatory bail to Faheem Ahmed and Danish Khan, the petitioners in a case registered under Sections 323/354/354B/376/34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) at Laxmi Nagar Police Station. The judgment, delivered by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajnish Bhatnagar, took into account the arguments presented by both the petitioners and the State. This article provides an overview of the case, the contentions raised by the parties involved, and the court’s decision.

Facts

The case at hand involves an FIR registered at Laxmi Nagar Police Station in Delhi under Sections 323/354/354B/376/34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The FIR was lodged against Faheem Ahmed and Danish Khan, the petitioners, on the basis of allegations made by the complainant. The FIR accused the petitioners of offences including assault, molestation, and rape.

The initial PCR call made by the complainant on September 9, 2022, alleged molestation by the petitioners. The following day, another PCR call was made, claiming that the petitioners had threatened the complainant and intended to rape her along with their friends. 

Subsequently, at 2:04 PM on the same day, another PCR call reiterated these allegations.

It was only on September 26, 2022, when the written complaint was forwarded to the concerned Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP) and Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP), that the allegations of rape were levelled against the petitioners. Prior to this, the charges primarily revolved around molestation.

The medical examination of the complainant conducted on September 9, 2022, did not reveal any signs of rape. The observations made by the doctor from Hedgewar Hospital suggested physical assault rather than rape.

On October 19, 2022, another PCR call was made by the complainant, alleging molestation once again by the petitioners.

These facts form the basis of the case, indicating the sequence of events leading to the filing of the FIR and the subsequent allegations against the petitioners. The court took into consideration these facts while evaluating the merits of the case and deciding on the grant of anticipatory bail to the petitioners.

Petitioner’s Contention

In their petition for anticipatory bail, the petitioners, Faheem Ahmed and Danish Khan, presented several contentions to support their innocence and request protection from arrest. These contentions were put forth by their advocate, Ms. ParulAgarwal, during the court proceedings.

The petitioner argued that the allegations levelled against them in the FIR were false and frivolous. They claimed that there was an ongoing family dispute and various civil suits related to property matters, which might have prompted the filing of the FIR as an attempt to harm their reputation and grab their share of the property.

The petitioner highlighted inconsistencies in the statements of the complainant, specifically regarding the charges under Section 376 of the IPC (rape). They contended that the allegations of rape were added later, after the complainant’s statement was recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), suggesting that these additional charges were an afterthought.

The petitioners’ counsel argued that custodial interrogation of the petitioners was unnecessary. They emphasized that the petitioners were willing to cooperate with the investigation and were ready to join it whenever required by the investigating officer. The petitioner further stated that no recovery was to bemade from the petitioners, indicating that their presence in custody was not warranted.

The petitioner asserted that there were no grounds to believe that the petitioners would abscond or tamper with evidence. They assured the court that their clients had no intention of evading the law and would actively participate in the proceedings.

These contentions were presented to establish the petitioners’ innocence and argue for the grant of anticipatory bail, ensuring their protection from arrest pending the investigation.

Respondent’s Contention

The respondents, represented by Mr. Amit Ahlawat, Assistant Public Prosecutor, He was accompanied by SI Sanyukta from the Laxmi Nagar Police Station. Additionally, Mr. Ankit Mehta, Mr. Varun Singh, and Mr. Sanjay Kumar served as advocates representing the second respondent in the case, and presented their contentions opposing the grant of anticipatory bail to the petitioners, Faheem Ahmed and Danish Khan.

The prosecution argued that the allegations against the petitioners were grave and serious in nature. They emphasized the severity of the charges under Sections 323/354/354B/376/34 of the IPC. The respondents contended that considering the seriousness of the offences, the petitioners should not be granted anticipatory bail.

The respondents highlighted that the complainant had submitted a detailed complaint to the police, providing a comprehensive account of the allegations made against the petitioners. They also pointed out that the complainant’s statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. further supported the charges brought against the petitioners.

The complainant opposed the grant of anticipatory bail to the petitioners. The respondents argued that the complainant’s objection was based on the serious nature of the allegations and the need for a thorough investigation into the matter.

While the respondents focused on the gravity of the charges and the complainant’s detailed complaint, they did not contest the petitioners’ contention that custodial interrogation was unnecessary or that no recovery was to be made from the petitioners. Instead, their primary contention revolved around the seriousness of the allegations and the complainant’s opposition to the grant of anticipatory bail.

JUDGMENT 

Justice Rajnish Bhatnagar carefully considered the arguments presented and examined the facts of the case. The court noted that the initial PCR calls made by the complainant only alleged molestation and the charges of rape were added at a later stage. Additionally, the medical examination conducted on the complainant did not indicate signs of rape but suggested physical assault.

Referring to relevant judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Justice Bhatnagar emphasized that the severity of the accusations alone should not be the sole basis for denying anticipatory bail. The court emphasized the presumption of innocence and the importance of an individual’s liberty. Taking into account the overall facts and circumstances of the case, the court allowed the bail applications and ordered that if arrested, the petitioners be released on bail upon furnishing a personal bond of Rs. 25,000 each with one surety to the satisfaction of the Arresting Officer/SHO concerned.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3Bkc33a

-Report by Harshita Kaul

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was enacted with the object of resolving disputes within a certain time framework which will promote confidence among the individuals who are opting for this Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism.

Therefore, the view of the Supreme Court was in the right direction that the applications filed must be decided within a specific time period as provided in the Act to foster and protect the very idea for which the Act was enacted in the first place.

Facts

On 06.10.2010, M/s Shree Vishnu Constructions, who was the applicant in this case entered into a Contract Agreement with Engineer in Chief, Military Engineering Services and others, who were the respondents for the construction of two blocks of Admin-cum-Technical accommodation with double storey in RCC framed structure with PCC solid block masonry along with connected services.

During this period, certain modifications were requested by the Respondents, and accordingly, the Applicant carried out the required modifications as per the instructions. The dispute arose when the Applicant requested for the release of payment and even after making persistent requests, the Respondent kept postponing the same as according to them the items used for modifications were not scheduled items.

When the dispute was not been able to settle amicably, the Applicant on 30.03.2013 issued a notice to the Respondents for appointment of the Arbitrator within 30 days as per the conditions 70 and 71 of IAFW-2249 under the contract but the Respondents did not give any reply to the notice. Due to this unresolved issue, an Arbitration Application was filed by the Applicant under Section 11(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the High Court for the State of Telangana seeking to appoint an Arbitrator for resolution of the dispute between the parties.

On 30.06.2020, the Application filed under Section 11(5) of the Act was dismissed by the High Court on the basis that in the case no Arbitral Dispute exists as satisfaction and accord was established.

Aggrieved by the impugned final judgment and order passed by the High Court, for the appointment of an Arbitrator, a Special Leave Petition was filed by the Applicant before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.

Judgement

Pursuant to the earlier orders, the respective High Courts have sent the statements regarding the pending applications under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, pending in the respective High Courts. It is seen that the number of applications under Sections 11(5) and 11(6) of the Arbitration Act are pending for more than one year. In many High Courts, applications for appointment of the arbitrator(s) are pending for more than four to five years. Even, in the statement of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur, many applications are pending, which are found to be defective. Some of the defective applications are pending since 2016 onwards. The pendency of a large number of applications under Sections 11(5) and 11(6) of the Arbitration Act, shows a very sorry state of affairs.

The arbitration proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act are said to be a part of the Alternative Dispute Resolution System. Having found that it takes a number of years in deciding and disposing of suits by the civil courts for a variety of reasons and with a view to see that Commercial disputes are decided and disposed of and resolved at the earliest, the Arbitration and Conciliation Act has been enacted and hence, the Arbitration proceedings have been accepted as an effective Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism. Therefore, if the arbitrators are not appointed at the earliest and the applications under Sections 11(5) and 11(6) of the Arbitration Act are kept pending for a number of years, it will defeat the object and purpose of the enactment of the Arbitration Act and it may lose the significance of an effective Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism. If the Commercial disputes are not resolved at the earliest, not only it would affect the commercial relations between the parties but it would also affect the economy of the country. It may affect the ease of doing business in the country. If the country has to compete with global business, confidence has to be fostered that in our country commercial disputes are resolved at the earliest and it does not take a number of years in resolving such Commercial disputes.

Even the amended Arbitration Act as well as the Commercial Courts Act mandate that the Commercial disputes are to be decided and disposed of within a period of one year. Further, the Arbitrators are mandated to declare the award within a period of one year. Therefore, if the applications under Sections 11(5) and 11(6) of the Arbitration Act for the appointment of arbitrators are kept pending for a number of years, it would defeat the object and purpose of the enactment of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act as well as the Commercial Courts Act. The litigant may lose faith in the justice delivery system, which may ultimately affect not only the rule of law but commerce and business in the country. Therefore, the applications under Sections 11(5) and 11(6) of the Arbitration Act and other applications, either for substitution and/or change of the Arbitrator have to be decided and disposed of at the earliest.

In that view of the matter, we request all the Chief Justices of the respective High Courts to ensure that all pending applications under Sections 11(5) and 11(6) of the Arbitration Act and/or any other applications either for substitution of arbitrator and/or change of arbitrator, which are pending for more than one year from the date of filing, must be decided within six months from today. The Registrar General(s) of the respective High Courts are directed to submit the compliance report on completion six months from today. All endeavours shall be made by the respective High Courts to decide and dispose of the applications under Sections 11(5) and 11(6) of the Arbitration Act and/or any other like application at the earliest and preferably within a period of six months from the date of filing of the applications.

Conclusion

A key step towards strengthening the process of appointing arbitrators is to amend the Act in light of the Supreme Court’s direction in Shree Vishnu Constructions and prescribe a time limit for the Courts’ appointment of arbitrators. Second, the government should notify the 2019 Amendment at the earliest by establishing arbitral institutions and providing a procedure for the appointment of arbitrators by such institutions. Further, it could adopt international best practices which allow for the quick and timely appointment of arbitrators while also involving the disputing parties in the process of constituting an arbitral tribunal. In the meantime, the respective High Court could, in its first hearing, designate an existing arbitral institution to appoint arbitrators as per institutional rules. These measures will not only help address the issue of the pendency of arbitration applications but also streamline the entire process in the long term.

Arbitration provides a sense of confidence to the parties to resolve their dispute but the delay in disposing the case not only dilutes the purpose of the Act, but the litigants may also lose faith in the justice delivery system. It will raise the question of Arbitration as an effective mechanism to resolve the dispute and will also affect the ease of doing business as well as the economy of the country.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/42tHQuH

-Report by Tushar Yadav

Applications of 299 organisers were rejected by the Ministry of MinorityAffairs out of 810 applications to organize Haj 2023, in the case of AL HATIM TOURS AND TRAVELS PVT. LTD. Vs UNION OF INDIA.

Facts:

The judgement was given by a single judge bench of Delhi High Court, by Justice Pratibha M. Singh. These petitions were filed by Haj Group Organisers (HGOs) for Haj 2023, challenging the public notice dated 5th May 2023 issued by the Ministry of Minority Affairs (Haj Division). By way of the impugned public notice, the Ministry has declared the eligible and ineligible HGOs for Haj 2023. The Ministry of Urban Affairs invited a total of 810 applications for Haj 2023, under 2 categories (244 in Category-1 and 566 in Category-2) out of which, 171 HGOs in Category-1 and 340 HGOs in Category-2 have been found eligible for registration for Haj 2023. The rest of the 280 HGOs were not found eligible for Haj 2023.

Petitioner’s Contention:

The grievance of the petitioners is that they fall on the list of 280 HGOs who have been rendered ineligible as per the above public notice by the Ministry of Minority Affairs. The issue raised by the petitioners is that the reasons for declaring them as ineligible have not been communicated to thePetitioners.

Thus, though the above public notice gives an opportunity to the Petitioners tosubmit a representation by the due date of 8th May 2023 (5:00 pm), since the petitioners are not even aware of the reasons which have rendered themineligible, no representations can be made.

Respondent’s Contention:

The Ministry of Minority Affairs through Mr. S.S Verma, Deputy Secretarysubmitted that the reasons for all of the Petitioners, who have been renderedineligible, are being prepared and shall be served upon all the 280 HGOs latestby tomorrow i.e., 10th May 2023, such HGOs are free to file their

representations within two working days. The representations would bedecided within one week and the allotment of quota would not be exhausted prior to the decision on the representations.

Judgement:

After hearing from both sides, the court came to the conclusion that the totalnumber of visas that are to be allotted to the HGOs this year is 35,005 in whicheach Category-1 and category-2 operators are entitled to 60 visas and 50 visasrespectively. Thus, insofar as the eligible HGOs are concerned, a total of 10,260and 17,000 would be exhausted. There would be a large number of remainingvisas which would have to be dealt with in accordance with the HGO Policy 2023 of the Ministry.

Considering the fact that the reasons for declaring the petitioners have not beencommunicated to the petitioners, the opportunity to make representations by 8thMay 2023 at 5 PM is of no account now, as there is no basis for filing arepresentation. Accordingly, the new directions are issued under which theMinistry will communicate the reasons for ineligibility to the Petitioners on orbefore 10th May 2023 by 6:00 pm. and the petitioners who are aggrieved by thereasons which are communicated to them are free to make their respectiverepresentations to the Ministry by 12th May 2023 midnight, as also remove deficiencies, through the e-mail address mentioned in the public notice. Therepresentations shall be decided by the Ministry and shall be communicated tothe Petitioners through email by 6 pm on 19th May 2023. In case any of the Petitioners are found eligible, their candidature shall be considered for the allotment of the remaining visas in accordance with the Ministry’s Policy.

Judgement on-09/05/23

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/41tE2bi

Case Number

Civil Appeal No. 230 of 1977.

Equivalent Citation

1957 AIR 540

Bench

The Supreme Court of India

Decided On

1st February 1957

Relevant Acts / Sections

The sections that are relevant in the case of Garikapatti Veeraya v N. Subbiah Choudhury are:

• Article 133 of the Constitution of India¹, deals with the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the appeals that can be filed before it.
• Order XLV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, which provides the procedure for filing Special Leave Petitions before the Supreme Court.
• Section 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908², allows for appeals to the Supreme Court in civil cases if certain conditions are fulfilled.
• Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908³, lays down the grounds on which a second appeal can be filed before a High Court.
• Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908⁴, which defines a “decree” is the official statement of a judgment that definitively settles the rights of the parties concerning one or more of the contested issues.
• According to Section 2(14) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908⁵, a “judgment” is defined as the pronouncement made by a judge based on a decree or order.

Brief Facts and Procedural History

OVERVIEW

This legal case concerns an application for special leave to appeal, which arises from a previous lawsuit that was filed on April 22, 1949, and had a value of Rs. 11,400. On February 10, 1955, the high court overruled the decision of the trial court, which had earlier dismissed the suit. However, when the applicant sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, the high court refused the application, arguing that the value of the lawsuit did not meet the minimum requirement of Rs. 20,000.

The applicant contended that they had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court, which was the highest court in the land at the time the suit was instituted, and that this right of appeal had been transferred to the Supreme Court under Article 135 of the Constitution⁶. The applicant argued that they were therefore entitled to appeal to the Supreme Court as a matter of right.

The court held, with Chief Justice Das and Justices Bhagwati, B. P. Sinha, and S. K. Das concurring and Justice Venkatarama Ayyar dissenting, that the applicant’s contention was well-founded. 

The court held that the right to appeal was a significant right that could be utilized only in situations where the verdict was unfavourable. However, it stated that this right was subject to the laws applicable at the commencement of the legal action and included all subsequent appeals from one court to another, effectively forming a single proceeding. The court also held that such a right could be taken away only by a subsequent enactment either expressly or by necessary intendment.

The court cited the case of Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. v. Irving (1905) A.C. 369⁷ and held that the vested right of appeal was a matter contemplated by Article 135 of the Constitution. The court ruled that Article 135 could not be limited to cases where the right of appeal had actually arisen in a concrete form and that the appeal was entertainable by the Supreme Court.

The court also held that Article 133 of the Constitution had no application to such cases. It was not intended to have a retrospective operation so as to take away this vested right, nor did it do so either in express terms or by necessary intendment. To summarize, the court ruled that the applicant had an inherent right to appeal to the Federal Court, and under Article 135 of the Constitution, he had the right to appeal to the Supreme Court. The court also held that Article 133 of the Constitution did not apply to such cases. Furthermore, the appellant’s vested right of appeal acquired under the old law fell under the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

Appellant’s Argument: Acquisition of Vested Right to Appeal to the Federal Court

The appellant in this case argued that he had a vested right to appeal to the Federal Court from the time he filed the suit on April 22, 1949. He contended that the Indian Independence Act of 1947 expanded the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to allow it to hear appeals that previously went to the Privy Council. 

As per the Act, starting from the appointed day, i.e., February 1, 1948, any decision falling under the purview of the Act could be appealed to the Federal Court. The appellant argued that he was entitled to appeal to the Supreme Court as of right under Article 135 of the Constitution, and Article 133 of the Constitution did not apply to cases like his.

Respondent’s Argument: Inapplicability of Article 135 and Refusal of Special Leave

The respondent argued that the appellant’s reliance on Article 135 of the Constitution was misplaced, as Article 133 was the relevant provision. They claimed that there was no vested right to appeal to the Federal Court immediately before the Constitution came into effect, and therefore, Article 133 applied. The respondent contended that since the jurisdiction to hear appeals to the Federal Court ceased to exist, the appellant had no right to appeal to the Supreme Court. Consequently, they maintained that the application for special leave to appeal should be dismissed.

Issues before the Court

• Should the petition for special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution⁸ be granted or not, in relation to the judgment and decree dated March 4, 1955, of the Andhra High Court?

In this particular case, the main issue revolved around the petitioner’s entitlement to appeal to the Supreme Court. The petitioner claimed that he had a vested right to appeal to the Federal Court, which was replaced by the Supreme Court. This right, according to the petitioner, was acquired at the time of the suit’s institution, which occurred before the Constitution came into force. In contrast, the respondent argued that the case fell under the jurisdiction of Article 133 of the Constitution, and there was no vested right to appeal to the Federal Court. As per the respondent’s argument, the petitioner had no right to appeal since the Constitution had extinguished this right.

Therefore, the court was required to determine whether the petitioner had a valid claim to appeal under the previous law and whether Article 135 or Article 133 of the Constitution was applicable to the case. Ultimately, the correct interpretation of these articles was key to the final decision, and whether the petitioner’s right to appeal had been preserved despite the constitutional changes.

Decision of the Court

After considering the opinions of several courts, the final decision was reached in this case. The majority of the courts agreed that the appellant should be granted Special Leave to Appeal to the Court on usual terms. In its judgment, the Court clarified the interpretation of Article 133 and stated that it applies to all appeals against judgments, decrees, and final orders of the High Courts in India, regardless of whether the proceedings were initiated before or after the Constitution’s commencement in civil proceedings.

The Court’s decision provides a clear and consistent legal framework for all appeals against the High Courts’ judgments. This interpretation ensures that all appeals are treated uniformly, irrespective of the time the proceedings were instituted. It also provides clarity to litigants seeking to appeal a decision, as they can now have a clear understanding of the legal provisions applicable to their case.

The Court’s ruling is an essential milestone in Indian legal history, as it resolves the ambiguity surrounding the interpretation of Article 133 and provides much-needed clarity on the scope of appeals against the High Court’s decisions. This decision will have far-reaching implications for future cases, as it provides a standard framework for interpreting and applying Article 133 in all cases involving appeals against the High Court’s decisions.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of India’s ruling in the case of Garikapatti Veeraya v N. Subbiah Choudhury, handed down in 1957, is a significant milestone in the legal history of India. This ruling provided valuable insights into the interpretation of Article 133 of the Indian Constitution, which applies to all appeals against judgments, decrees, and final orders of the High Courts in India, irrespective of when the proceedings were initiated in civil cases. As a result, this case established a uniform and unambiguous legal framework, ensuring fair and equitable treatment for all litigants.

The Garikapatti Veeraya case underscores the importance of having a clear and consistent legal system that provides clarity and consistency in the interpretation and application of the law. This landmark decision has far-reaching implications for future cases, emphasizing the need for uniformity and consistency in legal rulings. The Court’s decision, in this case, serves as a guiding light for Indian courts and legal practitioners, helping to establish a clear and uniform legal framework for the entire nation. Overall, the Garikapatti Veeraya case is a crucial milestone in India’s legal history, representing a significant step forward in ensuring the fair and equitable treatment of all litigants.

---

Endnotes:

1. INDIA CONST. art. 133.
2. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, § 109.
3. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, § 100.
4. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, § 2(2).
5. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, § 2(14).
6. INDIA CONST. art 135.
7. Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving, (1905) A.C. 369.
8. INDIA CONST. art. 136.

This case is analysed by Sohini Chakraborty, a first-year law student at RGNUL Patiala.

The Directorate of Legal Affairs, Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs is entrusted with defending all indirect taxes matters (Customs, Central Excise, Service Tax and GST) before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. The Directorate hereby invites applications for internships for the FY 2023-24.

Eligibility

(i) Law students who are pursuing a 3-year LLB course/5-year integrated LLB course.
(ii) Law graduates who have completed a 3-year LLB course/5-year integrated LLB course for not more than two years.

Students who have appeared in the final year/ semester examination on the cutoff date are eligible to apply in the Law graduate category. Such candidates, applying as having appeared in the final year/ semester examination, will have to
show proof of having passed the LLB course at the time of joining.

Scope of internship

The internship shall take place in Delhi. The interns are expected to study case files, assist in legal research and drafting of petitions, brief the counsels and extend any other related legal/general assistance to officers/counsels. The interns may also accompany the departmental officers to the briefing meetings if needed. The interns will be deployed in different sections of the legal establishment in CBIC.

Number of Positions

A maximum of ten law students and ten law graduates (a total of twenty) will be taken at a time for an internship. The internship is likely to commence on 01.07.2023.

Tenure

• Law students shall be taken as interns for one to two months. The period of internship may be increased to the maximum total period of three months by the Principal Commissioner, Directorate of Legal Affairs on mutual
  agreement.
• Law graduates shall be taken as interns for up to six months. The period of internship may be increased to the maximum total period of one year by the Principal Commissioner, Directorate of Legal Affairs on mutual
  agreement.

Stipend

• The student interns will receive a stipend of Rs. 5,000/- per month for satisfactory conduct of the internship.
• The graduate interns will receive a stipend of Rs. 15,000/- per month for satisfactory conduct of the internship.

Application Process

Eligible & willing candidates may furnish their application in the attached form by emailing to dlasmc-cbic@gov.in by 19.05.2023. Selected candidates shall be informed by email. No further communication shall be made with the rest of
the candidates.

Disclaimer: All information posted by us on Lexpeeps is true to our knowledge. But still, it is suggested that you check and confirm things on your level.

EXPLORE MORE SUCH OPPORTUNITIES HERE!

For regular updates on more opportunities, we can catch up at-

WhatsApp Group:

https://chat.whatsapp.com/Iez749mZfpaGfG4x2J6sr9

Telegram:

https://t.me/lexpeeps

LinkedIn:

https://www.linkedin.com/company/lexpeeps-in-lexpeeps-pvt-ltd

About Arbour Investments

Arbour Investments is a leading asset manager in real estate alternative investments. With over 40 years of team experience, we invest in real estate core/core+, debt and opportunistic investment strategies. Arbour Investments provides investment and asset management services in the real estate market, partnering with other divisions and external parties as appropriate. Our work is multi-dimensional covering key markets, industry sectors, product types and geographies.

Job Title

Legal Advisor

Job Description

• Drafting, and scrutinizing transactional documents with respect to real estate financing, including debentures, loan agreements, conditions precedent, Facility Agreements, Mortgage Deeds, Deed of Hypothecation, Guarantee Documents including Corporate and Personal Guarantees, Deed of Assignment, Indemnity Bonds and other legal documents.
• Conducting Title Investigation & Search Reports in respect of the property forming part of the security. i.e. Freehold, Leasehold, Gaothan Land. Etc.
• Must have a good understanding of Company Laws, Financing Laws, and Real Estate Laws.
• Prepare/Scrutinize related compliance documents.
• Providing Legal Opinion and Search Reports.
• Coordinating with clients, stakeholders and Banks/ Financial Institutions as relevant.
• Visits for vetting of legal documents & legal audit as required by the business.
• Advising and providing legal opinion on corporate matters and external commercial borrowings documentation.
• Preparing legal opinions on various matters;
• Drafting to issue/responding to notices.

Basic Requirements

• Qualification: LLB/LLM
• Excellent communication and analytical skills.
• Ability to proactively identify and provide for risk mitigation through legal process/documentation.
• Exposure to Capital raising (Debt / Equity), Real Estate Finance background is preferred.
• Solid analytical/logical mindset and attention to detail
• Strong interpersonal and time management skills
• Strong written and verbal communication skills (clear, concise, and confident) with the ability to manage internal and external relationships
• Ability to work under pressure and to meet deadlines ensuring high-quality output.

CLICK HERE TO APPLY

Disclaimer: All information posted by us on Lexpeeps is true to our knowledge. But still, it is suggested that you check and confirm things on your level.

EXPLORE MORE SUCH OPPORTUNITIES HERE!

For regular updates on more opportunities, we can catch up at-

WhatsApp Group:

https://chat.whatsapp.com/Iez749mZfpaGfG4x2J6sr9

Telegram:

https://t.me/lexpeeps

LinkedIn:

https://www.linkedin.com/company/lexpeeps-in-lexpeeps-pvt-ltd

About AAA Insolvency Professionals LLP

AAA Insolvency Professionals LLP is the second and the largest Insolvency Professional Entity (IPE) to be registered with Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI). The IPE has 29 Designated Partners, 42 Associate Partners and about 75 employees engaged in CIRP & Liquidation process divided into various teams viz. CIRP team, Claim Verification team, Corporate Debtor Operations team, Legal team.

Job Title

Legal Associate (CIRP Process)

Roles and Responsibilities

• Perform various tasks under CIRP as per timelines in IBC/ CIRP Regulations independently.
• To plan for attending to various tasks and allotting them to various team members in CIRP
• To conduct due diligence on the work by Team Members to ensure its quality and timeliness
• Provide legal support to the Insolvency Professionals for the efficient conduct of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) and Liquidation Process

Requirements

• Expert knowledge of the IBC Code, CIRP Process, & other ancillary Laws.
• Excellent Drafting Skills, Proficient in MS Word and a decent knowledge of MS Excel
• Should have procedural knowledge of CIRP and Liquidation process such as claim verification, conducting COC meetings, drafting minutes of meetings, and interaction with COC members.
• Should have administrative and managerial skills
• Should be very good at English writing and speaking
• Should have confidence and appetite to work on a new project and should be ready to accept challenges.

Experience

2 to 5 years of Experience in Insolvency and Bankruptcy code.

Professional Qualifications

• Should be a Law graduate or company secretary.

Perks

• 5.5 days working (2nd & 4th Saturday Off)
• Salary- 5 Lakh Per Annum to 7 Lakh Per Annum
• The incentive for eligible tasks as per the policy of the Company.

Application Process

Interested candidates may send an email to hr@aaainsolvency.in

Disclaimer: All information posted by us on Lexpeeps is true to our knowledge. But still, it is suggested that you check and confirm things on your level.

EXPLORE MORE SUCH OPPORTUNITIES HERE!

For regular updates on more opportunities, we can catch up at-

WhatsApp Group:

https://chat.whatsapp.com/Iez749mZfpaGfG4x2J6sr9

Telegram:

https://t.me/lexpeeps

LinkedIn:

https://www.linkedin.com/company/lexpeeps-in-lexpeeps-pvt-ltd

About Firm

JAIN & PARTNERS is an IPR & Corporate law consultancy firm. It provides services to domestic companies, start-ups and individuals for their overseas investment and also to foreign companies and individuals for their investment in India in all respects that includes Corporate Law, Intellectual Property Law, Foreign Exchange Management Law, Import Export Law and Taxation Law etc. Besides a vibrant and enthusiastic team of young professionals with good academic and practice backgrounds, our team of professionals consists of persons with diverse and rich experience like Company Secretaries, Chartered Accountants, M.B.As, B.Scs, M.Scs and Lawyers.

They are looking for an Assessment intern ( Paid Opportunity) for the IPR Team on an immediate basis.

Area of Law

Intellectual Property Rights with a prime focus on TRADEMARK LAW

Eligibility

Only Final Semester students/recent Law Graduates with prior experience in the field of intellectual property would be given preference

Joining

At the earliest

Office Location

Sector-8, Rohini East, Delhi

Application Process

Interested candidates can mail at jainandpartners@gmail.com.

Note- Only shortlisted candidates will be notified!

Disclaimer: All information posted by us on Lexpeeps is true to our knowledge. But still, it is suggested that you check and confirm things on your level.

EXPLORE MORE SUCH OPPORTUNITIES HERE!

For regular updates on more opportunities, we can catch up at-

WhatsApp Group:

https://chat.whatsapp.com/Iez749mZfpaGfG4x2J6sr9

Telegram:

https://t.me/lexpeeps

LinkedIn:

https://www.linkedin.com/company/lexpeeps-in-lexpeeps-pvt-ltd

-Report by Sava Vishnu Vardhan

In the case of Nagarathinam V. State Through The Inspector Of Police | Criminal Appeal No. 1389 Of 2023, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India overturned the order of the State of Tamil Nadu rejecting the request for the Appellant’s premature release in the case of murder. 

FACTS OF THE CASE: 

Due to repeated threats from her spouse, Suresh, the mother, the appellant, chose to kill herself along with her children. She purchased pesticides intended for plants and, in accordance with her determination to pursue this line of action, she administered poison to her two children, Ramar and Laxmanan, who are identical twins. Then, the appellant’s niece pushed the pesticide down when she put it in a tumbler to drink it herself. Unfortunately, the two kids were pronounced dead when they got to the hospital. The appellant’s niece forced it down just as she was going to eat it herself.

Upon conviction of the appellant under Sections 302 and 309 of the IPC, Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Dindigul sentenced her to life in jail.

Following a trial, the appellant was found guilty of violating Sections 302 and 309 of the IPC by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Dindigul by Judgement and Order in Sessions Case No. 92 of 2004 dated 10.01.2005 and sentenced to life in jail. The Appellant requested an early release after serving nearly 20 years in jail. However, in light of the heinous and savage character of the offence (s) perpetrated by her, the State of Tamil Nadu rejected the State Level Committee’s proposal in G.O. (D) No. 1127, dated 24.09.2019.

APPELLANT‘S CONTENTIONS: 

Even if it is considered that the appellant attempted to poison herself and her children in order to end their lives, learned senior counsel for the appellant argued that this was only possible as a result of an unexpected provocation. Comes under IPC Section 300’s Exception 1. In addition, the fact that the appellant committed family suicide alongside her two boys is an extenuating circumstance protected by Section 300 of the IPC’s Exception 1. Additionally, if the mother had survived or managed to flee while the children perished, it would be illegal under Section 304 Part I of the IPC. In this regard, the Madras High Court’s learned Division Benches’ rulings in Guruswami Pillai v. State, 1991 (1) MWN (Cr.) 153 and Suyambukkani v. State, 1989 SCC OnLine Mad 481 were cited.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS: 

It was strongly maintained by knowledgeable counsel for the lone Respondent-State opposing the petitions that the act(s) perpetrated by the Appellant were cruel and violent as young children were given poison and put to death, hence it was only fair that the State had rejected the Appellant’s early release. It was argued that the High Court maintained the conviction under Section 302 of the IPC since both the Trial Court and the High Court carefully considered every aspect of the 6 issues.

JUDGEMENT:

The Judgement was delivered by Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J. the hon’ble Supreme Courtdetermined that the scenarios presented by the appellant are not protected by the exceptions listed under Section 300 of the IPC given the facts and circumstances of the current instance. Even more so when the people who were fed the pesticide administered by the appellant and perished from it did not provide their consent. In Guruswami Pillai v. State of Madras, the father attempted suicide as well as killing his little daughter by slicing her throat with a knife. It was revealed during the trial that the father and daughter had decided to take their own lives together. Thus, the High Court in that case determined that it was prudent to provide a benefit by converting the conviction from Section 302, IPC to one under Section 304 Part I, IPC. This was done in light of the background information, as well as the parties’ mental and social conditions, financial situation, and the surrounding circumstances. The appellant has already endured the brutal hand of fate, according to the supreme court. The Court further pointed out that it can’t only be said that the act was “cruel and brutal” because the appellant tried to kill herself but was saved just in time by her niece. She had already served nearly 20 years in prison, to add to it. This prompted the Bench to overturn the government injunction and order her release.

The order of the State of Tamil Nadu, as stated in G.O. (D) No. 1127 dated 24.09.2019, issued by the Home (Prison-IV) Department and signed by the Additional Chief Secretary to Government, rejecting the request for the Appellant’s early release is reversed for the aforementioned reasons.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3BejUPP

-Report by Gopal Kumar

This case is related to Judge’s power to put questions or order production to discover or obtain proper proof of relevant fact under section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act. 

FACTS

In this case, the appellant-accused along with the other co-accused were charged with kidnapping and murder of a person in the year 2000. The Trial Court convicted both the accused persons for offences under Section 302, Section 364, Section 392, Section 394, Section 201 and Section 34 of IPC and awarded a life sentence under Section 302 IPC, and the remaining accused was convictedlesser sentence, vide order dated July 11, 2003. Further, the appellant filed the case to   The Punjab and Haryana High Court which dismissed the file and upheld the conviction and sentence of the Trial Court vide order dated May 31, 2017. Hence, the appellant-accused filed the appeal before the Supreme Court.

In this case, the apex court found that the case of the prosecution is entirely based on circumstantial evidence and the ‘evidence’ of last seen and the “discoveries” made from the information given by the appellant.

The Court further observed that the case of the prosecution rests on two circumstantial pieces of evidence

1. The disclosure is given in police custody and the discovery is on its basis.

2. The evidence of last seen in the form of PW-10 (the neighbour of the complainant).

The court rightly points out that in the case of circumstantial evidence motive plays a significant role. The prosecution case is that the two accused killed the deceased only to steal his tractor. The prosecution case is that the deceased was kidnapped and murdered by the two accused, for his tractor which they had robbed from the deceased, after putting him to death. The Court pointed out that the facts that led to certain discoveries were already known to the police in the earlier discovery made by the co-accused. The Court further noted that the discoveries which were made on the pointing out of co-accused cannot be read against the present appellant.

According to section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act “If the disclosure has been made by the accused to the police while he was in their custody and such a disclosure leads to the discovery of a fact then that discovery is liable to be read as evidence against the accused. A fact discovered in a piece of information supplied by the accused in his disclosure statement is a relevant fact and that is only admissible in evidence if something new is discovered or recovered from the accused which was not within the knowledge of the police before recording the disclosure statement of the accused.

On the evidence of ‘last seen’ the Court noted:

“In this case, even if we take the time between the last seen and the approximate time of death as per the postmortem, which would go beyond 48 hours preceding the time of post-mortem the time of death can be stretched to the morning of May 9, 2000, which still begs an explanation from the prosecution as to the time gap, as the deceased was last seen with the two accused on 08.05.2000 at 7:00 P.M.” The Court further noted that the evidence of last seen itself is on a weak footing, considering the long gap of time between last seen by PW-10 and the time of death of the deceased, Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 would not be applicable to facts and the circumstances of the present case. When a person does an act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, the burden of proving that intention is upon him.

The court said “In order to establish a charge of guilt on the accused, the chain of evidence must be completed and the chain must point out to one and only one conclusion, which is that it is only the accused who have committed the crime and none else. 

RATIO DECIDENDI

The Court held that the evidence placed by the prosecution, in this case, does not pass muster the standard required in a case of circumstantial evidence.

JUDGEMENT

The judgement given by the division bench of Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia and Justice Sanjay Kumar noted:

In the present case, the prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence of last seen only leads up to a point and no further. It fails to link it further to make a complete chain. All we have here is the evidence of last seen, which as we have seen loses much of its weight under the circumstances of the case, due to the long duration of time between last seen and the possible time of death. The Court set aside the conviction of a murder accused on the ground that the evidence last seen on which the conviction was based, failed to make a complete chain of circumstantial evidence. 

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/44Lb5KM