INTRODUCTION

Human trafficking is the type of modern-day slavery in which a person is sold or used forcefully for the point of labor or commercial sex act. This is all that happens to intend to earn money. Human trafficking is not just a heinous crime against society but is a sin for our society. It has no boundaries for anyone irrespective of sex, gender, caste, or race anyone can be a victim of human trafficking but the most vulnerable ones are women and children. Children being innocent and getting easily influenced by others became victims of sexual acts. Due to the overpopulation and lack of job opportunities, many women from poor families are forced to get indulged in this profession and in some cases, a close family member becomes the hoes and sells them for such work.

According to the survey of the United Nations Office for drugs and crime [UNODC], it was found that the victim of human trafficking were 51% women, 28% children, and 21% men. Majorly women were abused by sexual violence which is 51%, 28% for children, and 21% for men. There are 43% of victims who are domestically within the national borders have been trafficked, it is shocking to know that the traffickers are not only men but it also constitutes 37% of women and 63% of men.

Some articles in the constitution are related to human trafficking.

ARTICLE 23
Article 23 talks about the prohibition of human trafficking and forced labor. Forced labor means less than minimum wage is paid. Any trafficking in human beings and beggars is prohibited and punishable in accordance with the law. In this article, the state is not prevented from commanding compulsory services for public purposes. The state shall not discriminate based on sex, color, caste, race, or any other. This article not only protects the state but also private citizens.1

ARTICLE 21
Article 21 is a fundamental right under part 3 of the Indian constitution, which talks about the right to life and personal liberties. It is one of the most essential articles in the Indian constitution. The supreme court of India mentioned it as the ‘heart of fundamental rights ‘. It states that no person shall be deprived of life and liberty except as per the procedure established by law. Everyone is entitled to live with full dignity by birth.2

ARTICLE 51 A [E]
Article 51 A [e] is a fundamental duty to promote Peace, Harmony, and a sense of unity amongst the people of India cut across linguistic, religious, and regional basis, to repudiate practices that can be insulting to women.3

LAWS RELATED TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING

INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860

  • SECTION 366A
    If any person induces any minor to go with him to any other place with the intention of seducing her or doing illicit activities he or she will be punishable with the imprisonment of 10 years or fine or both.4
  • SECTION 366B
    Whoever imports a girl from any other country under the age twenty one with the intent to force or seduce her for intercourse with another person then, a person can be liable for imprisonment of 10 years and a fine can also be imposed.5
  • SECTION 374
    This section deals with unlawfully forcing someone to labor against their will or desire. Such a person can be punished with imprisonment which can be extended to 1 year or fine or both.6
  • SECTION 370
    Whomever imports, exports, removes, buys, sells, or disposes of any person as a slave, or accepts, receives, or detains any person as a slave against his will, will be punished by imprisonment of either kind for a duration up to seven years, as well as a fine.7

THE IMMORAL TRAFFIC [PREVENTION] ACT, 1956

This act was passed by the parliament of India in 1956 and the main objective or purpose of this act is to prevent commercial sex or immoral traffic among women and girls. This act covers the entire country. This act defines a brothel as a “house or any portion of the house, room or any portion of any room, conveyance or portion of any conveyance, and place or portion of any place.” And prostitution is “the sexual exploitation or abuse of persons for commercial purposes or consideration in money or any other kind.” In this act, if any person runs a brothel or aid in such activities then he or she will be punishable with imprisonment for one year which can be extended to 3 years, and a fine of rupees 2000 can also be imposed. If any tenant knowing allows them to use the property for such use then he or she can be imprisoned for two years and a fine of rupees 2000 can also be imposed on them.

THE ANTI TRAFFICKING BILL, 2021

This bill focuses on the prevention of human trafficking, providing rehabilitation cure compensation to the victims, and providing stringent punishments for the traffickers. The early bill of 2018 was never introduced in the Lok Sabha. The 2021 bill is different from the previous bill as it also extends outside India. In this bill, the national investigation agency will also be set up. This will also include transgenders along with women and children in the definition of a victim. The central government will also set up a national anti-trafficking committee and many committees will be set up at state and district levels for the better implementation of rules and regulations.

CASE LAWS

PEOPLE’S UNION FOR DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS VS UNION OF INDIA
In this case, the people’s union of democratic rights filed a writ petition before the supreme court of India under Article 32 of the Indian constitution for the violation of fundamental rights and certain rights for laborers.8 People union of democratic rights is an organization set up to make a report on the exploitation of living conditions of laborers under contractors. In this case, the court defined forced labor under article 23, forced labor basically means employing labor and providing them wages which is less than the minimum wage rate. In this case, the court held that forced labor is a violation of the fundamental right of article 23 and the person can file a writ petition under Article 32 for the violation of their fundamental rights.9

LAXMI KANT PANDEY VS UNION OF INDIA
In this case, a writ petition was filed by Laxmi Kant Pandey regarding the malpractices in adopting children from foreign parents. This case brings to highlight the need for having rules and regulations regarding intercountry adoptions. The children go to another country and get neglected by their adopted parents, making a toxic and unhealthy environment for the children and resulting in sexual exploitation. To proving protection to the intercountry adopted children a comprehensive framework was formed. In this it was decided that the international adoptions would follow the regulations of the guardians and wards act, 1860 and the provisions of articles 15[3], 24, and 39 along with the united nations declaration on the rights of the child. It was made mandatory for foreigners to be sponsored by the licensed agencies of their country.10

GAURAV JAIN VS UNION OF INDIA
In this case, the public interest litigation was filed before the supreme court by the advocate to set up a distinct education system for the children of prostitutes and get them educated so that they didn’t have to live undesirable and the life full of misery. The court held that having separate schools for the children of prostitutes will isolate them and will be against the well-being of the children and society in general. The supreme court set up a committee consisting of advocates and social workers to look into the matter and find solutions. The court held that the prostitutes are not offenders but they are the victim of unfavorable socio-economic conditions and to set up juvenile homes for the rehabilitation and the safety of children.11

CONCLUSION

There are many provisions related to human trafficking which are both domestically and globally recognized but still, there are numerous cases of human trafficking in our country. Human trafficking violated fundamental rights and constitutional rights and human rights of the people just for the sake of earning monetary benefits. Women and children are the victims of human trafficking people take advantage of the innocent behavior of the children and get them involved in sexual exploitation. In a country where there are fewer jobs for more people applying they are left unemployed and for the need for money women are forced to take up prostitution. Making laws and provisions is not enough this is an issue of great concern and it is needed to be seen from a socio-economic perspective also. The government should provide them with jobs so that they can live with dignity and comfort. Awareness related to human trafficking should be spread in schools among students. High-quality education should be promoted in government schools and colleges. This is a grave crime and needed to be lookup at in creating a safe and healthy environment for children and women to live in.

References:

  1. The Indian constitution, 1950, art.23
  2. The Indian constitution,1950, Art 21
  3. Indian constitution, 1950,Art 51A[E]
  4. Indian Penal Code, 1860, section 366 A
  5. Indian penal code, 1860, Section 366B
  6. Indian penal code, 1860 section 374
  7. Indian penal code, 1860 section 370
  8. Indian constitution,1950,Art.32
  9. People union of democratic rights vs union of India, [1982 AIR 1473]
  10. Laxmi Kant Pandey vs Union of India, [[1984 AIR 469]
  11. Gaurav Jain vs Union of India, [{1997} 8 SCC 114]

This article is written by Prerna Pahwa, a student of Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies, New Delhi.

Abstract

Every person’s life revolves around the concept of justice. Courts have been established in every country for the purpose of regulating justice. The courts are held in high regard as the guardians of the rule of law. This element of the courts contributes to the development of a trusting connection between the general public and the courts. When this relationship is harmed by unlawful influence in the courts, a miscarriage of justice occurs. A miscarriage of justice is the responsibility of the courts. The Supreme Court of India, the country’s highest court of appeal, declared that the rule of law is in place. As the ultimate bidder to justice, it is the apex court that gets to decide what is right and what is wrong. When the top court commits a miscarriage of justice, the entire country is thrown into chaos, and the public loses faith in the country’s judiciary.

The comment of Justice A.S. Anand, former Chief Justice of India and Chairman of the National Human Rights Commission, that the acquittal decision in the Best Bakery trial by a fast-track court was a “miscarriage of justice,” is not limited to that case, but can be applied to the entire mechanism of so-called fast-track courts as envisaged by the previous NDA government and now scrapped by the current UPA administration. The state did very little to return justice to its proper ‘quick’ track, and it is impossible for the average person to appreciate the question of when he will receive final justice in criminal or civil litigation.

Introduction

The decision to close the fast-track courts by the end of April, a year earlier than the five-year deadline, by starving them of funds because the Twelfth Finance Commission did not recommend any allocations, will put an end to the experiment without finding a viable replacement or doing anything to resolve pending cases.

The subject of the nation’s justice system’s very existence arises. Delivering justice is a challenging task since it must not only be done, but it must also appear to be done. This means that the court’s role does not end once the judgment is rendered, which offers justice to the parties in the case, but also after the court ensures that the judgment is applied. In recent days, there have been several cases of miscarriage of justice that have impacted not only the people engaged in the case but also the general public. Many people are confused about who is to blame for a miscarriage of justice: the courts or the judges who give the verdict. In either case, the integrity of the court system as a whole is jeopardized.

As a result, the court system has developed a number of strategies in order to limit the rising number of miscarriages in the delivery of justice and to carry out its mission efficiently and without hindrances. They can be successful at times and also fail at other times. As a result, the judiciary must keep a close eye on itself in order to avoid miscarriages of justice.

Miscarriage of Justice Explained

Justice can be defined as justness or righteousness, whereas miscarriage denotes failure. As a result, a miscarriage of justice denotes a failure to declare what is right and just. A miscarriage of justice happens when an innocent person is found guilty, allowing the true perpetrator to flee the scene. The criminal justice system is meant to be set up in such a way that it punishes those who are found guilty as well as acquits those who are found not guilty. If any of these ingredients are missing, a miscarriage of justice will very certainly result. True, the criminal justice system cannot ensure the punishment of the wicked or the acquittal of the innocent, but it may certainly attempt. Even after being exonerated of the erroneous prosecution, it is difficult for an innocent individual to lead a normal life after being tried as a criminal. As a result, it is the responsibility of the state to guarantee that the person has a normal existence.

Under Article 14(6) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, read with General Comment 32 of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany have already adopted the same remedial method in which the State regulates statutory responsibilities by providing compensation to victims of wrongful prosecution. The High Court of Delhi emphasized the rehabilitation of victims of unfair prosecution in the case of Babloo Chauhan v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi1, in order to assist them to lead a normal life following their acquittal. The court stressed the creation of a legal framework that would govern the formation of a committee to care for these innocent victims. Miscarriage of justice results in wrongful prosecution and humiliation of the innocent party. Miscarriage of justice can occur not only in the courts but also in the hands of investigating officials on the ground. Innocent people are also affected. Taking note of these factors, the Supreme Court issued a historic decision in 2016 in the case of Rudul Sah v. the State of Bihar2, declaring that innocent people who have been subjected to shoddy investigation and unfair prosecution shall be compensated by the state in question. A miscarriage of justice can be caused by a hasty decision on the part of the court in certain cases to clear out pending judgments, plea bargaining, which involves providing an incentive to the judge hearing the case in order to declare the innocent as guilty, bias in the investigation procedure by the officials, evidence gathered by the police associated with the offense is frequently destroyed, and judicial misconduct on the part of the judge. As a result, a miscarriage of justice is an unwelcome activity carried out by the judiciary or investigating officials that, to a considerable extent, violates human rights.3

Alarming Rate of Pendency

The amount of unresolved cases is upsetting. As indicated by data accessible on July 5, 2000, there were 21,600 cases forthcoming under the steady gaze of the Supreme Court, contrasted with 1.05 lakhs 10 years earlier. In the High Courts, there are presently 34 lakhs of forthcoming cases, contrasted with 19 lakhs a decade prior. The Supreme Court has 645 cases progressing for over a decade, while the High Courts have 5,00,085. The inability to fill judge vacancies sooner rather than later is one of the reasons for the huge expansion in the number of forthcoming cases in High Courts. There are presently around 100 such vacancies. The quantity of cases anticipating preliminary in the country’s 12,378 locale and subordinate courts is assessed to be in large numbers. 1,500 of the 12,205 judge and justice positions in these courts are vacant.

Fundamental Rights of Speedy Trial

The fundamental right to a speedy trial has become a daily farce due to the delays, lack of accountability, and half-baked ideas. “A timely trial is essential to criminal justice, and there can be no doubt that the delay in trial by itself constitutes a denial of justice,” the Supreme Court stated.4 “There can be no question that rapid trial — and by speedy trial, we mean a properly expedited trial — is an integral and vital aspect of the fundamental right to life and liberty contained in Art 21,” it continued in another case. It is a vital responsibility.5 Even if Art. 21 is not enforced, the demand for quick justice is unavoidable under the Constitution. According to the preamble of the Constitution, the state is required to guarantee social, economic, and political justice to all of its citizens.6 The state should strive for a social order in which justice is represented in all aspects of national life, according to the Directive Principles of State Policy. “The State shall ensure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice; to ensure that no person is denied access to justice because of economic or other disadvantages,” it continues.7 The Supreme Court has held that “social justice would include ‘legal justice,’ which means that the system of administration of justice must provide a cheap, expeditious, and effective instrument for realizing justice by all sections of the people, regardless of their social or economic position or financial resources” in interpreting this provision.8

Need for a fair Judge-Population Ratio

The way public authority has would not take on a suggestion by the Law Commission of India to upgrade the judge-to-populace proportion. As indicated by the 120th Law Commission Report, “In the event that official portrayal can be determined in light of populace, as recently expressed, and other state administration, police, and different administrations can be arranged similarly, there is not a great explanation for why a similar standard can’t be applied to legal administrations. While the populace is a segment unit, it is additionally a vote-based unit, it should be recognized transparently. At the end of the day, we’re discussing residents who have popularity-based privileges, for example, the option to admittance to equity, which the state is committed to giving “. While proposing a fivefold expansion in legal strength at all levels of the Indian legal executive (from 10.5 to 50 judges for every million of the populace), the 120th Law Commission additionally noticed that India’s judge-populace proportion could not hope to compare to a few different nations. Rather than spending Rs 4750 crore to redesign the current legal executive by expanding the judge-populace proportion, the NDA government has proposed a 502-crore quick track court project for a five-year term, which is a specially appointed, silly endeavor to deal with a huge issue of confusing pendency.

The arrangement required the foundation of 1750 quick track courts, five in each locale, to speed up the goal of forthcoming lawbreaker cases. The idea is sound since it tackles the issue of undertrials grieving in jail for a really long time and turning into a monetary weight on the public authority. An amount of Rs. 502.90 crores was endorsed as an exceptional issue and upgradation award for the legal organization for a long time, till 2005, under the Fast Track Court Scheme. There are at present 1.8 lakh undertrials in bars, with the public authority paying around Rs. 361 crores each year on their upkeep at a pace of Rs. 55 for each individual, consistently in jail. As indicated by the sources, “just about two crore cases were anticipated to be settled by 2005,” bringing about tremendous reserve funds in prison uses while likewise settling a “genuine basic liberties worry.” “No less than five such courts work with full government help with each locale the nation over,” said Mr. Arun Jaitley, then, at that point Minister of Law (2000-2002, 2003-2004). The system, which would likewise deal with undertrial cases, was financially savvy since it would cost an expected Rs. 100 crores each year, contrasted with the Rs. 360 crores spent by states every year on undertrials upkeep. The Center set out just Rs 100 crore each year for this reason, with the assumption that all forthcoming detainee cases would be settled in something like a time of the most optimized plan of attack courts’ foundation. It is obscure whether the undertaking will be finished in something like four years. As per Union Law Minister H R Bhardwaj (2004-2009), the most optimized plan of attack courts could resolve 3.8 lakh of the 8 lakh cases allotted to them in four years. The middle would not give them Rs 100 for the undertaking’s fifth and last year, compelling them to close down the nation over.

Initial Setback

At the point when it was first presented, the allies were irritated, truth be told. The arrangement was tested by the Andhra Pradesh Bar Council as unlawful and incapable of giving quick equity. The AP High Court requested a stay on the activity of quick track courts after the appeal was acknowledged. The bar chamber’s reactions to the most optimized plan of attack courts are legalistic in the most terrible feeling of the world. For instance, it scrutinizes the Finance Commission’s affirmation that the expense of undertrials (assessed at Rs 20,000 for each individual each year) will diminish as quick track courts speed up the goal of their cases. The bar board asserted, rather grandiosely, that a court’s only intention is to administer equity, not to diminish prison spending.

It likewise goes against the directing officials being named on a two-year agreement from among resigned judges. The bar committee contended that the most optimized plan of attack courts’ authoritative judges will be less responsible than the customary courts’ long-lasting judges. The AP High Court deferred the plan’s execution since it seemed to have major legitimate and sacred flaws. The Union government pursued the High Court’s choice to the Supreme Court in a Special Leave Petition (SLP). As indicated by the SLP, the High Court made a lawful blunder by really giving the writ request through an ex-parte request in light of a simple at first sight assessment of the legitimacy of laying out quick track courts without articulating the grounds. The High Court’s structure was deferred on May 2 by a Supreme Court seat comprising Justice B.N. Kirpal and Justice Ruma Pal. Afterward, while hearing a case on the situation with undertrials in different States, one more Supreme Court Bench, drove by Chief Justice of India (CJI) Justice A.S. Anand, Justice R.C. Lahoti, and Justice Doraiswamy Raju, communicated lament that the plan of quick track courts, notwithstanding its significance, was not brought to the CJI’s consideration before the public authority made a declaration in such manner. The judges called attention to that the assets given to state legislatures to layout quick track courts ought to have been put in the possession of the Chief Justices of the High Courts for appropriate use.

“On the off chance that you fabricate structures first, pick judges,” the Bench noticed, “the most optimized plan of attack courts will turn out to be incredibly sluggish.” The Court inferred that the course of action would have worked better assuming the Chief Justices of the High Courts included picked the cases and areas that the most optimized plan of attack courts ought to attempt. The Bench additionally considered how previous District Judges could be enlisted as managing officials and who might be responsible for them. Its basic comments have caused frustration, as Law Ministry authorities keep up with that the plan’s draft was conveyed to all states and Chief Justices of every single High Court, and that it was just executed after intensive interviews with the legal executive at all levels. As per these sources, just the Chief Justices of the High Courts would allow judges to quick-track courts. In reply to a TV interview, H R Bharadwaj demonstrated that by March 2004, 1400 such courts were working, with 8 lakh cases going over to them, with 3.8 lakh cases getting a decision. Notwithstanding, he asserts that the strike rate is excessively low and that the explanation for this is that the most optimized plan of attack courts are dealt with by judges who come up short on energy for equity. “More youthful blood ought to be allowed an opportunity as opposed to resigning judges; they can acquire advancements and have a future,” Bharadwaj commented. He additionally expressed that he will start filling vacancies in different courts in the nation in the following three weeks.

Impact

The media claimed in 2002, while the courts were still getting up to speed, that the plan was beginning to have, “It had a positive influence on crime, since the number of heinous crimes had decreased, notably in Rajasthan and Maharashtra. Uttar Pradesh and Bihar had also suffered the effects.” The Parliamentary Standing Committee, which includes members from all political parties and is chaired by an opposition member, expressed pleasure in May 2003 and asked the government to do more.9

Lack of Accountability

Ad hoc Judges would be appointed for a two-year term from among retired sessions or additional sessions Judges, members of the Bar, and judicial employees who would be elevated on an ad hoc basis under the fast-track court program. The High Courts will be in charge of appointing judges. The Centre has urged state governments to use a particular drive to fill any vacancies that may arise as a result of ad hoc promotions. They did not anticipate the issue of presiding officers’ lack of accountability as a result of the provision of a short tenure in office after retirement.

There are serious concerns that litigants with clout at the district level could use the plan to their advantage to advocate for the fast disposition of causes they care about, which could lead to a miscarriage of justice. The model does not allow for the infusion of new and youthful judicial talent, which is plentiful. There were no fundamental changes in the legal system as a result of the fast-track courts program. There has been no new procedure code established. Retired judges, who have served in the past but have no plans for the future, are dispensing justice at a breakneck pace. It’s worth noting that these gentlemen never performed at even half their normal speed in their regular jobs. This is due to two factors. One, because they were vulnerable to disciplinary hearings during their ordinary jobs, the judges were cautious. A person who has already retired and is serving on a short end-of-career tenure is not subject to disciplinary action. This is compounded by the Indian legal system’s complete lack of judicial accountability. Two, some judges see this term assignment as their last chance to make some money while the sun is shining. As a result, there was a greater emphasis on speedy wheeling-dealing and the disposal of the greatest number of cases possible.

Is it permissible to follow the easy way of acquitting the accused because of a mechanical adherence to the idea that “hundreds of criminals may escape, but one single innocent must not be punished”? Though it is a commonly accepted principle that no innocent person should be punished, courts are obliged to be sensitive and cautious in order to ensure that no criminal escapes. In such circumstances, the criminal justice system’s sustainability is put to the test. Otherwise, criminal activity will continue uninterrupted.

Worst Example of Fast-Track Injustice: Best Bakery

At its Special Leave Petition (SLP) in the Supreme Court, the National Human Rights Commission challenged the judgment of the Fast Track Court of H.U. Mahida acquitting all 21 accused in the Best Bakery case, which involved the murder of 14 Muslims in communal riots in Vadodara on March 1, 2002. The NHRC claimed in its petition to the Supreme Court that even as one witness after another, including the main eyewitnesses, became hostile, Judge Mahida made no attempt to figure out why this was happening. The NHRC objected strongly, citing documents, that there was no adequate cross-examination of Zahira Sheik and Lal Mohammad, who contradicted their earlier written statements. “Instead of attempting to bolster the prosecution case, it appears that steps to the contrary were done,” according to the NHRC appeal. The NHRC also noted how the trial was reduced to a farce by excluding a full cross-examination of the investigating officer, who testified on June 21. The Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 1, Vadodara, completed the examination and recording of all 21 accused people’s statements under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) on the same day and proceeded to hear arguments in part. The Fast Track Court, as its name suggests, handed down its decision on June 27.10

On February 20, the trial began. Was the trial court completely powerless in the face of a dearth of evidence? Apparently, the trial court believed it lacked the authority and jurisdiction to determine who was the genuine criminal if the accused were not guilty, or to compel restitution from the government to the victim. In his ruling, Judge Mahida stated, “The court of justice is not a court of justice in the true sense, rather it is a court of evidence.” “The prosecution was required to petition to the court to have the trial conducted in camera under Section 9 (6) of the CrPC when one witness after another was observed by the court to be resiling from the earlier statement made. Even if the prosecution did not do so, the court had the authority to request that the trial be held in private “The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) drew attention to this. The trial court can postpone the trial under Section 309 of the CrPC for reasons that must be stated in writing in order to guarantee that a safe environment is provided for witnesses to depose without fear. It is also conceivable to recall and re-examine any person previously examined under Section 311, particularly if his or her testimony appears to be critical to the case’s just conclusion. The Fast Track Court did not use these powers and instead chose to acquit everyone. On August 8, the Supreme Court Bench appeared to concur with the NHRC’s petition in broad terms. It ordered the Centre and the Gujarat government to produce a report within two weeks detailing any plans to reform the criminal justice system.11

Recent instances of miscarriage of justice

The case of Parsa Kente Collieries Ltd v. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited, in which leave was eventually granted, was decided in haste and without much deliberation by the Supreme Court. According to the notification dated May 9th, 2018, the matter was meant to be heard by the summer vacation bench of the court, but it was instead taken up by a different bench. The case was put on hold since the court couldn’t reach a decision owing to a lack of evidence. In addition, the court took up the matter on May 21st on its own, hearing an argument from one of the parties involved. The judgment date was given the very following day.

The decision was made without informing the attorneys engaged in the case. The court’s action appeared to be ambiguous because the subject was not urgent enough to be dealt with before the deadline. As a result, this ruling was seen to be a miscarriage of justice because there was no necessity involved and the court made its decision in haste in order to clear out the pending cases. M/s Adani Power (Mundra) Ltd v. Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission and Ors was a case similar to this one in which the court acted similarly. In this case, too, the court’s decision was based on a new date chosen by itself rather than the previously specified dates. This clearly demonstrates that the court was biased in favor of one of the parties in the case. Both of these cases involved Adani Business Groups, and because the verdicts were in their favor, the business group profited by crores of rupees. Both rulings were rendered in an unreasonable and rushed way, which is contrary to the court’s regulations.

It’s possible that the court reached a decision as it saw fit, but the process by which the cases were handled, both of which were affiliated with a huge business company, was not fair. Another case in which the court committed a miscarriage of justice was Zulfikar Nasir & Ors v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors, often known as the Hashimpura massacre. The Hashimpura massacre occurred during the Rajiv Gandhi government’s reign of terror in India. The massacre resulted in the deaths of approximately 45 Muslim men who were being transported by a Provincial Armed Constabulary truck. Those men were wrongfully detained and held in detention for an indefinite period of time. As a result, the actions of the members of the Provincial Armed Constabulary were manifestly illegal. The killings occurred while the Muslim men were being held in jail. Because neither the men who were taken away nor their dead corpses were ever returned to their families, the High Court made it plain that the victims’ families had the right to know the reason and the truth as part of their access to justice. In a 2015 verdict, twenty years after the occurrence, the court acquitted all of the accused males on the basis of a lack of transparent evidence. The court’s decision has sparked a number of questions and debates about the country’s justice delivery system. After the matter had been neglected in the High Court of Uttar Pradesh for so long, such a move by the Supreme Court was a clear indication of a miscarriage of justice. The compensation which was decided by the Uttar Pradesh government to be provided to the families of the victims of the massacre was not put into effect as well. Many legal experts simply labeled this as genocide, and the court’s inaction on the topic was not welcome.

The court may have reached a rational judgment, but it should have also devised some means of obtaining justice for the victims’ families and should not have delayed the case for so long. Because jihadists are responsible for a large number of terrorist activities, many innocent Muslims have been exposed to abuse and harassment as a result of investigative officials declaring them guilty. The court had recognized the police officials’ miscarriage of justice in a case from 1996, in which the officials had arrested a few Muslim males and accused them of being responsible for an explosion at New Delhi’s Lajpat Nagar Market. These guys were cleared of the same charges in a 2012 ruling. If the court had not reviewed the police investigation, this case would have been considered a terrible miscarriage of justice. Following the 2011 attack, a new investigative team was developed in order to avoid future mismanagement and carelessness when conducting investigations. This episode, which occurred after the formation of the new time, exemplifies how officials’ carelessness and stupidity caused innocent individuals to suffer as a result of the improper prosecution of a case in which they were not even involved.

This case also highlights the Supreme Court’s role in the case, which is to keep a check on the activities of the police officers involved. Along with the courts, the government bears the duty of policing officials’ carelessness. The fact that the cases are being handled in his state must be made known to the state governments. Strict actions must be taken to ensure that authorities work diligently and with care. Taking a cue from Indian cases, the insights of a miscarriage of justice are nothing new in international situations. The United States of America has long struggled with racial issues, so the Florida bench’s decision in the case of Florida v. George Zimmerman, which involved the assassination of Trayvon Martin, an African-American teenager, by George Zimmerman, an American, was not a welcome one, as it exacerbated the society’s long-standing racial divide and was thus declared a miscarriage of justice. In this instance, the defendant was hurt as a result of the plaintiff’s murder and thus claimed self-defense. As a result, he was cleared of the murder allegations leveled against him. Several civil rights activists were opposed to the verdict, which was deemed to be discriminatory.

The court’s decision may not be incorrect, but the fact that a youngster was slain without cause should have been causing alarm. These examples show when a case has reached a court and has been heard by that court. There are a number of different situations that lead to a miscarriage of justice even before the case reaches the courts. The rape instances stand out among them. Several times, the victim of a rape case has been forced to withdraw their petition from the court due to pressure from society, the families involved, and political considerations. This implies a terrible miscarriage of justice by the courts due to the lack of support it is meant to provide to the victims and the inability to withdraw the claims that are pending. The oppression of African-Americans by whites has been a long-running social fight. The courts exist to promote equality and to eliminate any disparities that may arise. The Florida Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Florida v. George Zimmerman served to accentuate the social divides that previously existed. It is usually preferable for the courts to end a case with a conclusion based on grounds and clarity, as the absence of these factors leads to injustice.

Rape cases are a serious societal issue, and it is not difficult to press charges in such circumstances because there are statutes dedicated solely to rape. According to police officials, even after a successful investigation, the case is delayed due to a lack of judicial participation in such instances. Following that, the nation was made aware of the delays in the court’s decision-making ability through the case of Mukesh & Anr v. State for NCT of Delhi & Ors, also known as the Nirbhaya case. After nine years of litigation, the victim achieved justice when the rapists were sentenced to death by the court. However, not all rape cases have the same resources and support as Nirbhaya’s. This is a reflection of the court system’s flaws, which result in a miscarriage of justice. The events described above occurred within the last five to ten years. They were chosen because they reflect the direction in which the country and the world as a whole are heading. When the courts have gone to the aid of the victim to prevent injustice, they have also stayed silent or absent when justice has been denied.12

Why not the system is strengthened?

Poor litigants will continue to suffer unless systematic reforms are implemented to eliminate delays. Even within the current system, there is no reason why formal court processes should not be developed to expedite the hearing of urgent matters rather than leaving it to chance or using fast-track courts. Decisions on requests for early hearings are often made without regard for the consequences of any delay for poor litigants under the current system. Fast-track courts are unlikely to make a difference to the massive backlog of cases if there isn’t a rational and sensible system in place to support the rapid disposition of cases.

There is a need for studies that assess the quality of decisions rendered and the level of public confidence in the judicial system on a regular basis by the Law Commission, the National Human Rights Commission, law schools, and the nation as a whole. The fast-track court plan was a temporary fix that appears to have worked on the surface, as the backlog of cases has likely decreased and cases are being resolved more quickly. On the other side, it has caused major problems by resulting in a massive ‘miscarriage of justice’ in thousands of instances, eroding the judiciary’s credibility. On a legitimate mission, the entire legal system should be run on a fast track.

Ways to avoid a miscarriage of justice

No court wants to issue a decision that could result in a miscarriage of justice. It is not only the courts that are responsible for delivering an unjust verdict, but also the investigating officers who arrive before the case reaches the courts. Miscarriage of justice, if it occurs, should be prevented in order to ensure that the courts provide justice in a clear, affordable, and consistent manner. Below are some suggestions about how to go about doing so.

Special Courts

When courts are inundated with cases, they issue hasty decisions in an attempt to reduce the number of pending cases, which leads to miscarriage of justice. By their very nature, decisions made in haste are destined to be unjustified. To avoid this, special courts have been recommended and are being built up to handle a few cases and give justice quickly and without any loopholes. It has been suggested that special courts be established in each area to prevent unjust prosecutions from being carried out. The harmed person can file a claim alleging that he or she was wrongly prosecuted. The claimant bears the burden of proof for the unjust prosecution.

The special courts provide an efficient system for filing cases, payment options for clearing fees, a list of timetables for case disposition, the time limit for filing an application, and so on. For ordinary folks, this has made the court system easier, faster, and smoother. This is one technique to ensure that judges’ actions are monitored and that miscarriages are avoided. The special courts are required to send notice of the appeals hearing to the parties concerned in the case after receiving a claim.

The special court will provide an award for damages, whether monetary or non-monetary, to any party in the case after hearing the case and hearing both sides’ appeals. This simplifies the entire legal process for both the parties and the courts. The court must consider a few issues before awarding compensation to the victim, which is given below:

  • A brief financial history
  • Emotional harm to the aggrieved person
  • Damages to the aggrieved party’s health, and so forth.

Human Rights

Human rights are fundamental rights that are granted to all citizens, regardless of their background. Human rights include the right to a fair trial, the right to freedom of speech and expression, and the right to liberty, all of which might be considered essential aspects in preventing a miscarriage of justice. The right to a fair trial is guaranteed under Article 6 of the Human Rights Convention, which states that everyone is presumed innocent until proven guilty. Article 5 of the Human Rights Convention guarantees liberty.

The phrase “liberty” refers to the fact that a person will be prosecuted according to the method laid out, and that the person imprisoned must be aware of the reasons for his detention. The guarantee of access to justice within a certain time frame is accompanied by liberty. The right to freedom of expression is addressed in Article 10 of the Human Rights Convention. This freedom allows an individual to connect with others who can help him get out of trials or provide a larger platform to demand justice, such as the media.

The special courts provide an efficient system for filing cases, payment options for clearing fees, a list of timetables for case disposition, the time limit for filing an application, and so on. For ordinary folks, this has made the court system easier, faster, and smoother. This is one technique to ensure that judges’ actions are monitored and that miscarriages are avoided. The special courts are required to send notice of the appeals hearing to the parties concerned in the case after receiving a claim.

Principles of Natural Justice

Natural justice principles have served as an important check on the possibility of a miscarriage of justice. In a similar way to human rights, the Indian Constitution includes natural justice principles in some of its sections to protect public rights. When there is a miscarriage of justice, it is the general public who suffers the most. Natural justice principles underpin all other statutes in place, hence they must be kept in mind for the Constitution to work effectively, as their violation amounts to the arbitrary exercise of power.13

Curative Petition

Curative petitions are those that serve as the last constitutional alternative for redressing grievances that have arisen in the court after the review plea has been exhausted. The Supreme Court adopted a curative petition for the first time in the matter of Rupa Ashok Hurra V. Ashok Hurra and Anr, in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice from occurring. In this case, the court stated that curative petitions can only be filed if the petitioner can show that the principles of natural justice have been violated.

In addition, the petition has the burden of establishing that the court was unaware of the presence of a curative petition at the time of the judgment. Although curative petitions are viewed with suspicion in unusual circumstances that are witnessed in open court proceedings, they are one of the tools for preventing miscarriages of justice and placing limits on the use of the courts’ power. In plain terms, a curative petition is a second review by the courts of its own judgments that have previously been issued. Article 137 of the Indian Constitution gives the Supreme Court the power to reconsider its decisions after they have been declared obligatory. The party that has been wronged has a legal right to make an appeal to the court for a second time to have its judgment reviewed, which must be done according to the court’s regulations.

Judicial review

Judicial review is a judicial power that allows the courts to check the constitutionality of the legislature’s and executive branches’ responsibilities. True, miscarriage of justice does not always arise as a result of court orders, but it can also emerge from the influence of the legislature and executive branches of government. Several cases have occurred that demonstrate how the executive’s influence and statutes enacted by legislatures might leave the judiciary unsure of what verdict to issue. To be on the safe side, courts frequently fail to pursue the road of justice, resulting in a miscarriage of justice. To avoid this, the courts can control the power of judicial review to keep a check on the other branches of government, and rather than being influenced individually, the three branches of government can work together to avoid a situation that could result in a miscarriage of justice.14

Conclusion

Miscarriage of justice is not a welcome development because it violates human rights. For the judiciary, a miscarriage of justice raises a lot of questions. The judiciary’s goal is to correct injustice. Because it leads to unfairness on the side of the parties concerned in the case, a miscarriage of justice negates the judiciary’s goal. The judiciary is well aware of the duties and responsibilities it bears to the nation’s residents. As a result, there is no need to instruct the courts. The judiciary, for its part, has already taken a number of steps to address the miscarriage of justice.

The judiciary should use more of these types of corrective procedures in order to successfully carry out the application of law and protect the innocent by administering justice. It is important to remember that the courts have served as a guiding light in countless cases, providing justice to both parties involved. Default does occur from time to time, but this is because of the confidence that courts have built with the public through time. The remedies and instruments established by the courts to provide safeguards will serve to maintain the judiciary’s independence and, as a result, allow it to function effectively.

References:

  1. 247 (2018) DLT 31
  2. 1983 AIR 1086
  3. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/may/09/miscarriage-of-justice-victims-uk-supreme-court
  4. Hussainara Khatoon V. State of Bihar AIR 1979 SC 1364
  5. Maneka Gandhi V. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597
  6. Constitution of India, 1949, art.38(1)
  7. Constitution of India, 1949, art.39(A)
  8. Babu V. Raghunathji AIR 1976 SC 1734
  9. https://eachother.org.uk/5-shocking-miscarriages-justice-prisoners-need-human-rights/
  10. https://www.news18.com/news/india/miscarriage-of-justice-delhi-hc-acquits-man-of-raping-daughter-10-months-after-his-death-1978487.html
  11. Dr. Madabhushi Sridhar, Miscarriage of Fast Track Justice, Legal Service India http://www.legalservicesindia.com/articles/misoj.htm
  12. Oishika Banerji, Recent instances of miscarriage of justice, iPleaders https://blog.ipleaders.in/recent-instances-miscarriage-justice/
  13. Laskit, Concept of Natural Justice, Legal Service India https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-1549-concept-of-natural-justice.html
  14. https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2018/09/08/wrongful-prosecution-miscarriage-of-justice-legal-remedies-law-commission-of-india-report-no-277/

This article is written by Arryan Mohanty, a student of Symbiosis Law School.

INTRODUCTION

A transfer is an act of transferring something from one person to another. Any physical or virtual entity possessed by a person or group of people is considered property. A property asset can be transferred from one person to another through transferring rights, interests, ownership, or possession. Either or all of the ingredients can be satisfied. It can happen in two ways: by the parties’ acts and by law.

Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act of 1882 defines the term “transfer of property.” It describes an activity in which a live person transfers property to one or so more people, or to himself or to one or so more living people, in the present or future. A living person is defined as a corporation, an association, or a group of individuals, whether or not they are incorporated.

Some important concepts in this act are as follows:

  1. Immovable property involves land, benefits resulting from the land, and goods linked to the land, according to the General Clauses Act of 1897. Immovable property can be defined as including all property that is not standing wood, growing crops, or grass in the context of property transfer.
  2. Mortgage debt was omitted from actionable claims following the amendment of 1900. Wallis C.J. held in Peruma animal vs. Peruma Naicker that mortgage debts might be transferred as actionable claims before 1900, but that they were excluded from the actionable claims because the legislature meant that the mortgage debt is transferred in the mortgagee’s interest through an instrument that is registered.
  3. Instrument: The instrument is defined as a non-testamentary instrument according to the 1882 Transfer of Property Act. It serves as proof of a property transfer between living parties. An instrument is a formal legal document, according to the legal terminology.
  4. Attested: A formal document signed by someone acting as a witness is referred to as attested. The executors are the persons who are in charge of transferring the property. In 1926, the amendment legislation was passed, stating that two or more witnesses must sign the document in the presence of the executant, not necessarily at the same time, and they must not be parties to the transfer.
  5. Registered: According to the 1882 Transfer of Property Act, “registered” refers to any property that is registered in a jurisdiction where the Act is in effect. Various registration procedures must be followed.
    a. The property’s description should be stated.
    b. Avoid being a victim of fraud.
    c. A competent person should present the deeds.
    d. The property must be listed in the very jurisdiction as the registered office.
  6. Actionable claims: A claim to any debt, except a debt acquired by a mortgage of immovable property or pledge o or hypothecation of movable property, or to any equitable interests in movables, not in the claimant’s possession, either actual or constructive possession, which the civil courts recognize as providing grounds for relief, whether such debt or advantageous interest is existent, accusing, or conditional.
  7. Notice: The term “notice” refers to being aware of a fact. The individual is well-versed in a variety of scenarios. The Transfer of Property Act of 1882 settled 2 kinds of notices.

    Other important concepts are actual or implied notice means the one who is aware of a specific truth and constructive notice means that reality is discovered as a result of circumstances.
  8. Transfer of property must be done by a competent person: For a legitimate transfer, the person transferring the property must be of sound mind, not intoxicated, a major, or not a person prohibited by law from entering into a contract of transfer of property with another person.
  9. The transfer must be made in the following format: Property transfers do not have to be in writing, but if there is a specific property to transfer, it should be in writing:
    a) Over a hundred rupees was spent on the sale of the transportable property.
    b) The sale of intangibles must be done in writing.
    c) All mortgages with a value of more than a hundred rupees must be transferred in writing.
    d) A documented transference of actionable claims is required.
    e) Immovable property is given as a gift.
    f) A lease of more than one year on immovable property.

OSTENSIBLE OWNER

The provision is founded on the idea of proportionality. No one can confer a higher right on a property than what he owns, and alium transferee potest quam ipsa habet and nemo plus juris, which means that no one may transfer a right or title larger than what he owns. The ostensible owner’s transfer emphasizes the notion of holding out.

To make use of this section, you must meet specific qualifications, according to the law for its application. They are as follows:

  1. The most important need is that the individual transferring the property is the ostensible owner.
  2. The property owner’s permission should be given either implicitly or explicitly.
  3. The transfer ought to be in exchange for something.
  4. The transferee must exercise reasonable caution in determining the transferor’s authority to complete the transaction and whether he acted in good faith.
  5. The idea of ostensible owner transfer is founded on the doctrine of estoppel, which states that when a genuine owner of property makes someone appear to be the owner to third parties and they engage on that representation, he cannot retract his representation.
  6. This clause and its rules apply only to immovable property but not to movables.

However, the ostensible owner is really not the true owner, but he can pretend to be the real owner in such transactions. By the purposeful neglect or acquiescence of the genuine owner of the land, he has obtained that right, rendering him an ostensible owner. A guy who has been away for a number of years has donated his property to a close cousin to utilize for agricultural purposes and whatever else he sees suitable.

In this situation, the ostensible owner is a family member, and if he transfers the property to a third party during that time, the true owner cannot claim his property and claim that the person was not permitted to transfer it. Another scenario is when the property is in the wife’s name but the husband used to handle the finances and other aspects of the property. If the husband sells the property as a result, the wife will be unable to reclaim it.

In Ram Coomar v. MacQueen, the privy council declared that when it comes to transfers by apparent owners, somewhere along that lines that it is a principle of natural equity that where one man allows another to hold himself out as the owner of an estate and a third person buys it for value from the obvious owner believing that he is the real owner, the third person shall not be allowed to recover on a secrete title until he can overthrow that of notice, or something that adds up to constructive that ought to have put him on an inquiry, which, if put on trial, would have led to a discover.

ESSENTIALS

There are essentials that need to be meant to be an ostensible owner of any property. Like the term itself, the word ‘ostensible’ denotes ‘seeming’ or ‘apparent’. An ostensible owner is a person who poses as the one who owns that immovable property but is not the true owner.

  1. A person must be the property’s ostensible owner.
  2. That person must be such an owner with the genuine owner’s express or implied approval.
  3. The one who is transferring must buy the property for consideration from the ostensible owner.
  4. The transferee must take reasonable care before accepting the transfer to ensure that the transferor has the authority to make the transition; in other words, it should be done in good faith.

Reasonable care can be defined as the level of care that a reasonable and average person would take. It is his responsibility to check the transferor’s title.

As in the case of Nageshar Prasad v. Raja Pateshri, where the name of the proprietor was incorrectly recorded in the revenue records. The name was written was that of someone else, and the rightful owner had already complained about the mistake. The individual whose name was on the revenue records later sold it to a third party, who took possession of the property without making required investigations, and the rightful owner later objected. The third party is obligated to provide all available documents that may provide more information on the property’s title, which may include police registers, municipal registers, and other documents.

Also, there is a safety net in place for the true owner. As in the case of Mathura v. Ambika, in which the actual owner had disposed of the property to another person and had it registered prior to the ostensible owner’s transfer could even be registered, it was held that the real owner’s transfer would be valid because he has a greater title to the property than the ostensible owner, and that the rights of a third party who had purchased the property from the ostensible owner will not be protected under this section.

Only if the foregoing necessary conditions for the section’s applicability are met does the true owner lose his rights in the property here under the section.

There are steps to register an ostensible owner. Firstly, the documentation pertaining to the property must be examined to see if the transferor’s name appears as the owner.

Second, if the individual whose name appears on the records for the property in issue intends to buy it or not. Thirdly, look into “who has ownership of the site property and who is using it.” If the individual is the owner of the property according to the records and documents in the case at hand, the chances of it being a property of an ostensible owner or him being an ostensible owner are slim. However, “enjoying the property” doesn’t merely mean “being in possession of the property,” but also “selling rights,” “right to enjoy the benefits of the said property,” “right to lease out the stated property and receive compensation,” and “right to enjoy the benefits of the said property,” among other things. In this scenario, the term “enjoyment” has now been given a larger meaning.

Finally, the reason for it being given the ostensible ownership element, i.e. why the true owner has not bought it in his own name.

The transfer must be made without considering some factors:

  1. The ostensible owner’s transaction is always for consideration. There should be some sort of exchange. Gratuitous transfers are not covered in this section.
  2. When there is a transfer by an ostensible owner, care must be taken. He is unable to give the property away as a gift. As stated in the Indian Contract Act of 1872, consideration is a required component of every contract, and an ostensible owner’s property can only be transferred via contract. In addition, section 4 of the act states that anything that’s not expressly specified in this act must be determined from the basic definitions set forth in the Indian Contract Act of 1872.

THE BURDEN OF PROOF

The transferee bears the burden of proof in demonstrating that the transferor was the ostensible owner and also had permission to sell the property.

He must also demonstrate that he behaved in good conscience and took all reasonable precautions while obtaining possession of the property. It’s because he needs to show that he wasn’t at fault when he took the property and that the burden of proof should be shifted to the rightful owner. To shift his burden of proof, he can show that the transferor did not permit the transferee to know the true facts and went to great lengths to conceal them.

CONCLUSION

The Act’s Section 41 has done a good job of safeguarding the interests of the said innocent third party. However, this section may appear to be prejudiced in favor of the third party, this is only the case if the genuine owner is at fault. No one else can simply claim that he now owns the property and can no longer be evicted. The third party must exercise extreme caution when purchasing the property, and these criteria have been imposed by law to prevent the apparent owner and the third party from abusing this section. In a way, this also protects the genuine owner’s interests.

This article is written by Tingjin Marak, a BA/LLB student at Ajeenkya DY Patil University Pune.

Introduction

Transgender1 or the third sex denotes those people who cannot align themselves to their given respective biological genders with their inherent biological features. They are usually born as male or female but their innate perseverance of gender turns out to be different from their bodily features. Their self-proclaimed gender identity doesn’t match with their sex leading to the discrepancy in their gender orientation. Transgender, transsexual, and hijra are synonymous with each other and are used to denote them.

Since the dawn of human civilization, the existence of transgender people has been acknowledged but they have been devoid of subsequent approval from mainstream society. Even in this 21st century, such people are viewed as taboo and are subjected to persecution and a state of constant denial. Shame and stigma still continue to characterize such subjects in both public and private spheres thus engendering grave misconceptions. They are systematically denied equal rights in spheres of education, employment, marriage, divorce, inheritance, property, adoption, etc. The rudimentary reason for their denial of equal rights is ambiguity in recognition of their gender status as most of the civil rights especially succession, inheritance, marriage, and property rights are gender-specific and the policymaking in India has been always conceived primarily in respect of only two genders i.e. male and female, thereby preventing them from exercising their civil rights in their desired gender.

National Legal Services Authority vs Union of India

The Supreme Court in its landmark judgment of National Legal Services Authority vs Union of India2 declared the transgenders as the third gender and endowed them with the right of self-identification of gender as female/ male / third gender. This self-perceived gender identity forms a very crucial part of one’s right to life under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. The two-judge bench affirmed their entitlement to the fundamental rights granted to them via the constitution of India. Any denial of their fundamental rights in the civil or criminal sphere owing to their third gender is discriminatory to them. The court held transgenders as socially and economically backward classes (OBC) who are entitled to reservation in educational institutions and public sector appointments.

Constitutional Rights

Article 14 of the Constitution of India states that the State shall not deny to “any person” equality before the law or the equal protection of the law within the territory of India. The phrase “any person” includes transgender too. And article 15 prohibits discrimination against any citizen on grounds of sex. Non-recognition of the identities of transgender/hijras leads to the systematic denial of the rights of equality and equal protection of the law. Article 19 (1) (a) of the Indian Constitution describes that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. It guarantees one of the most basic and fundamental human rights. Expression and alignment of one’s gender is hence an obvious derivative of article 19 (1)(a). Denial of the right to express one’s sexual identity through speech and choice of romantic/sexual partner would lead to violation of Article 19

The Transfer of Property Act 1882 and Miscellaneous rights

The Transfer of Property Act 18823 and its subsequent amendments regulate the transfer of property. The phrase ‘transfer of property’ denotes a demonstration by which a person transfers or passes the property to at least one person, or himself, and at least one different person. It basically implies the transfer of property from one person to another. The term person consists of an individual, or body of individual or company, or association. Section 5 of the Act provides that transfer of property must take place between two or more persons who are living or it must take place inter vivos. The word “person” above forth holistically includes male, female and third gender. The other property-related laws such as The Hindu Disposition Of Property Act, 1916, The Indian Easements Act, 1882, etc include the word “person” to connote and include transgender within its sphere and do not per se disqualify them from legal transactions.

Inheritance Laws

The inheritance and succession laws lay down rules pertaining to the devolution of property on the death of an individual. The property is devolved on the basis of the relationship between the deceased and the inheritor. The succession laws in India are governed by the respective personal laws of the religious communities that chiefly recognize inheritors into the watertight compartments of the male and female genders. In order to claim property rights, transgenders are required to recognize themselves as male or female.

The Hindu Succession Act 19564 which governs the inheritance of properties is completely silent pertaining to the rights of transgender. It explains who is Hindu and whom all comprise the inheritance schedule (such as son, daughter, spouse, etc.) within the said definition. The Act establishes a comprehensive and uniform system of inheritance. Ownership over the property is granted only to males and females thereby excluding the third gender. Such trans people are devoid of property rights and subject to extreme prejudice and vulnerability. They have to align their genders to respective categories of either male or female in order to claim property rights. So they have to establish their gender identity as per the one assigned to them at their birth certificate. Moreover, trans people are not entitled to the status of legal heir of their parent’s separate property nor coparcener in the Joint Hindu Family with their gender identity.

Similar to the line of succession rules of The Hindu Succession Act, the personal law of Muslims i.e. Shariat too follows similar rules pertaining to transgender property rights. Indian Succession Act, 1925 governs property inheritance of Christians. Notably, Section 44 of the act has included transgender and elucidates upon their inheritance of the ancestral property.

THE TRANSGENDER PERSONS (PROTECTION OF RIGHTS) ACT, 2019

THE TRANSGENDER PERSONS (PROTECTION OF RIGHTS) ACT, 20195 has made a decent effort to protect the rights of transgender and promote their welfare by prohibiting discrimination on grounds of education, employment, healthcare, movement, access to goods and services, choice of occupation, etc. The act has sought to remove discrepancies in unfair treatment with regard to the right to reside, purchase, rent, or otherwise occupy any property. Section 4(2) of the Act provides the right to self-perceived gender identity. Section 5 of the Act provides that a transgender person could be perceived as third gender (transgender) by making an application to the District Magistrate for issuing a certificate of identity as a transgender person. But the act does not delineate anything about property rights thereby perpetuating lacunae in the system.

Evolving Sphere

Recently States such as Uttar Pradesh6, Uttarakhand, etc have sought to enforce progressive laws on property inheritance of transgender people. It has successfully passed an amendment to include transgender people in the UP Revenue code wherein they will be included in the inheritance nomenclature. The transgender people will now be recognized as members of a landowner’s family and will hold an equal right to inherit agricultural property.

Conclusion

The SC judgment in the NALSA case coupled with THE TRANSGENDER PERSONS ACT, 2019 has sought to create a level playing field by endowing trans people with the right to self-identification and creation of the label of the third gender. Transgenders cannot be denied the right to property per se as they have the absolute right to inherit family property unless disqualified by law. The State must strive to ensure equality of rights and promote the holistic development of the trans community as a whole.

References:

  1. FAQs, https://transequality.org/issues/resources/frequently-asked-questions-about-transgender-people
  2. WP (Civil) No 400 of 2012
  3. https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/2338/1/A1882-04.pdf
  4. https://www.ijlmh.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Inheritance-Rights-of-Transgender-A-Cry-of-Humanity.pdf
  5. https://www.news18.com/news/buzz/why-transgender-people-still-have-to-go-through-hoops-to-get-married-or-inherit-property-in-india-2842545.html

This article is written by Riya Ganguly, 2 nd year BBA LLB student at Bharati Vidyapeeth New Law College, Pune.

INTRODUCTION:

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 came into existence to govern the easy exit of businesses, it has been witnessed from time to time that India has been lacking the legal framework for the companies whose businesses have been hindered and they want to exit the market although it had also been a matter of concern to determine the order of distribution of assets at the time of liquidation of the company. Previously there were no specific provisions to govern the distribution of assets amongst the creditors. But in the present era section 53 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy code, 2016 deals with the mechanism for the distribution of assets under liquidation.

The mechanism laid down under the code is termed as “waterfall mechanism”. In a general sense, the waterfall mechanism lay put the list of stakeholders in a sequential manner to indicate the priority in getting the payments from liquidation.

HISTORICAL PERSPETIVE:

At the time of Insolvency proceedings, the Inter-se ranking amongst creditors plays an important role as it dictates the arrangement and determines the priority in which the financial offerings by the resolution applicant shall be distributed to the secured creditors. The status of determining the priority was the different pre-IBC regimes and post IBC regimes.

Pre-IBC Regime:
The Supreme Court of India in the case of ICICI Bank v. Sidco Leathers Ltd. and Others1 addressed the issue of priority under Sections 529 and 529A of the Companies Act, 1956, which govern the ranking of creditors’ claims in a company in liquidation similar to what is given under section 53(1) (b) of the code. In this instance, the Supreme Court interpreted the meaning and scope of Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to rule that the first-charge holder’s claims would persuade over the second-charge holder’s. The Supreme Court also noted that there was a lack of legislative clarity on this issue and that if the legislature had intended to reduce a right as important as the right of priority, it would have done so explicitly in the legislation.

Post- IBC Regime:
Even after the IBC came into force, there has been no clarity on this subject. Explanation: Section 53 of the IBC provides that “Each of the debts will be paid in full, or in equal proportion within the same class of beneficiaries, if the proceeds are inadequate to meet the debts in full, at each step of the distribution of proceeds in respect of a class of recipients who rank similarly.”

As a result, the IBC envisions the distribution of liquidation proceeds on a pari passu basis, or on an equal level, among the same class of stakeholders. Any agreement that upsets the priority ranking established by Section 53 of the IBC must be rejected, according to Section 53(2) of the code. Moreover, the issue of priority of inter-se secured creditors who have relinquished their security interests has not been specifically cleared by the code.

The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal in the matter of Technology Development Board v Anil Goel2 held that “the moment when a secured creditor relinquishes their security interest in the liquidation estate, the sale proceeds shall then be strictly distributed as per the waterfall mechanism given under section 53 of IBC remains unpaid following the enforcement of security interest thereby when compared to a secured creditor, it has a lower priority.”

THE WATERFALL MECHANISM UNDER IBC:

The waterfall mechanism lays down that at the time of the company’s liquidation and while distributing the assets of the company the secured financial creditors shall be given the priority and the amount belonging to them shall be paid fully according to their admitted claim before initiating any distribution to unsecured financial creditors.

The Appellate Authority in its recent landmark judgment in the case of Technology Development Board vs. Anil Goel, Liquidator of Gujarat Oleo Chem Limited (GOCL) & Ors3 made it specifically held that: “Whether the Secured Creditor holds a first charge or second charge is material only if the Secured Creditor elects to realize its security interest.” “However, once a Secured Creditor opts to relinquish its security interest, the distribution of assets would be governed by Section 53(1)(b)(ii), which states that – all Secured Creditors who have renounced security interests rank equally.”

Statutory provision:
The statutory provision which sets out the order of priority for the distribution of sale proceeds from the sale of liquidation assets is categorically mentioned under Section 53 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

According to section 53 (1) (b):
“The following debts will be ranked equally between and among them:
(i) workmen’s dues for the period of twenty-four months preceding the liquidation commencement date; and
(ii) debts owed to a secured creditor in the event such secured creditor has relinquished security in the manner set out in section 52”

According to Section 53(2) of the code:
“The liquidator will overlook any contractual arrangements between receivers under sub-section (1) with equal ranking if they disturb the sequence of priority under that sub-section.”

WATERFALL MECHANISM AND MEANING OF SECURED CREDITOR:

A secured creditor is one in whose favor a “security interest” has been created by the corporate debtor.4 Section 52 of the code provides the secured creditors with two options:

  • either to realize its security interest, or
  • give away its security interest to the liquidation estate5

It is the duty of each secured creditor to communicate to the liquidator about his decision to either relinquish his security interest or to realize its security interest.
If the secured creditor fails to inform the liquidator of its intention within 30 days from the commencement of the liquidation process, the security interest held by such secured creditor is deemed to be relinquished.6
In case a secured creditor chooses to relinquish its security interest then it has to stake its claim to the liquidation estate.

CONCLUSION:

The prevailing approach towards the Secured creditors’ priority rights, established at the time of lending, supposedly provides them with a security net in the event that the firm defaults and insolvency procedures are initiated. Even after the IBC was enacted, there is nothing in the IBC that specifically addresses this issue. Furthermore, Section 53(2) of the IBC only prohibits agreements that disrupt the waterfall mechanism’s sequence of precedence. The problem of priority of inter-se secured creditors who have renounced their security interests is left unanswered. As a result, it is clear that there is still lacking legal certainty on this topic.

The intrinsic ambiguity in the topic, as well as the lack of a clear legal precedent, leaves no answer to the difficulty. It is conceivable, however, that any priority rights connected to a security interest stay tied to the security interest, and that when the security interest is abandoned, the priority rights associated with the security interest expire as well. Although it appears that lawmakers considered all issues when establishing the IBC’s liquidation waterfall, which favored secured creditors, legislators should give equal weight to the interests of other stakeholders in order to fulfill the IBC’s goals.

References:

  1. (2006) 10 SCC 452.
  2. Technology Development Board v Anil Goel, Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No.731 of 2020
  3. Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No.731 of 2020
  4. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, Section 3 (30).
  5. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, Section 52 (1).
  6. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, Regulation 21A.

This article is written by Shubhendra Joshi, a BBA.LL.B 4th-year student of Indore Institute of Law.

Introduction

Tort is a civil wrong, meaning it is a wrong committed against a person. Tort comes from the Latin word “tortum,” which means “crooked” or “twisted.” It is equivalent to the English term ‘wrong’ in this sense. There are two kinds of law: civil and criminal. Tort and contract law are two subsets of civil law. It’s essentially a violation of a legal obligation. It violates the legal rights of others. A tort happens when someone intentionally or carelessly harms another person.

Civilization and law coexist. It is not possible for one to exist without the other. If one thrives, the other develops as well, and if one declines, the other suffers. As a result, tort law was created to deal with everyday offenses.

The Tort Law can be traced back to the Roman precept alterium non-laedere. The maxim means “not to harm another,” implying that no one should be harmed by their actions or words. This maxim is similar to the maxims of honesty vivere, which means “to live honorably,” and suum clique tribuere, which means “to render to every man that which belongs to him,” or “to bring fairness to every person.” The development of tort law can be traced back to these three maxims.

What is Tort according to jurists?

Salmond defined tort as, “It is a civil wrong for which the remedy is a common-law action for unliquidated damages and which is not solely a violation of contract, trust, or other essentially equitable obligation.”

Winfield mentions, “Tortious liability comes from the breach of a primary legal obligation: this duty is owed to all individuals, and its failure is redressable by an action for unliquidated damages,” Winfield says.

The definitions of Winfield and Salmond are incompatible. The practical point of view is represented by Salmond’s definition, but the theoretician point of view is represented by Winfield’s definition. Salmond’s point of view is preferred by lawyers, but Winfield’s is preferred by students. Furthermore, Salmond’s perspective is narrower, whereas Windfield’s perspective is larger.

Application of English Law of Torts in India

In India, tort law is based on English tort law.
The English Law of Torts has a significant influence on Indian tort law, despite the fact that the act has been changed to reflect Indian legislation. When the British ruled India, they established their own set of rules and procedures for administering justice. Jimha, which means crooked in Sanskrit, was believed to be akin to “tortious of fraudulent conduct” in ancient Hindu law. At the time, the scope of British tort was limited.

Because the Indians were utterly uninformed of the English laws, they were found to be unjust and inequitable. It was difficult to administer Indians in the early days of British law since there was an English Judge who had to deal with a case in a foreign language. As a result, they resolved to draught an Indian Tort Law based on English concepts in order to avoid chaos. They chose to set up courts in India in the 18th century after studying the Indian laws at the time and obtaining the necessary approval.

Mayors Courts in the Presidency Towns of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay were the first courts established by the British in India. These courts were subject to English statutes and Acts, which were then implemented in England.
The courts established that “justice, equity, and good conscience” were the guiding principles at the time. The Privy Council understood the phrase “justice, equity, and good conscience” to include norms of English law that are suitable to Indian society and circumstances. All of this meant that the High Courts of Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras adhered to the Common Law of Torts, while the other courts applied the principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.
Also, when looking at Indian decisions, Justice Bhagwati stated in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India,

“In a highly industrialized economy, we need to develop new ideas and lay down new rules that will effectively deal with new challenges that occur.” We cannot allow our judicial thought to be shaped by the law as it currently exists in England, or for that matter, in any other country. We are absolutely open to receiving illumination from any source, but we must first establish our own jurisprudence.” We can infer from the words that Justice Bhagwati recognized the importance of having one’s own law and how it contributes to the nation’s growth.”

The main purpose of Law of Torts in India

The primary goal of tort law is to provide compensation to people who have been injured. Though, in current times, the goal is to distribute losses among those who are connected in some way.

Furthermore, some authors argue that Tort Law is more concerned with punishing than compensating. For the purpose of Torts, everyone has their own point of view. The violation of a general duty is a common ingredient in both crimes and torts. Murder, robbery, burglary, and other major crimes are all under governmental supervision. The state has power over all common wrongs in Tort Law as well. Individual harm is thought to be equivalent to societal harm.
As a result, the primary goal of tort law is to punish wrongdoers and foster social peace.

Reasons for the slow development of Law of Torts in India

In comparison to other countries, India’s tort law is not well developed. Even the Indian Tort Law does not have a codified version. There are several reasons for India’s sluggish development of tort law, some of which are stated below:

  1. The law is ambiguous. People face a great deal of uncertainty because the legislation is not codified and is still in its early phases of development. This is why only a small number of cases are filed under Indian Tort Law. Furthermore, there are few precedents, which adds to the vagueness of Tort law. The existing precedents are from English Tort law and cannot be applied to Indian law.
  2. There is a general lack of political awareness among the general public. Because most people are unaware of their rights, tort law is rarely employed in the country. This issue arises as a result of India’s widespread illiteracy, which also causes people to avoid going to court to exercise their rights. People who carry out their responsibilities are given more weight than those who demand their rights.
  3. Why do people disregard their legal rights? This is due to a lack of awareness of their rights and the country’s high illiteracy rate. Because of their illiteracy, people are unaware of their rights and are hesitant to seek redress through the courts.
  4. Poverty continues to be a factor in India’s delayed development of tort law. The majority of India’s population is economically poor, and as a result, they are unable to afford the hefty costs of litigation. This is still a major reason to avoid bringing a Tort case.
  5. The court system is also highly expensive. The cost of going to court and hiring a lawyer is extremely significant. As a result, rather than approaching the court, the poor man chooses to suffer the torture. The cases are likewise handled in a molasses-like manner. On the other hand, in England, the administration of justice is so cheap and quick that these types of cases are resolved in under a year. All of these issues contribute to the tort law’s delayed evolution.

The number of pending cases in India as of October 13, 2018, is depicted in the graph below.

The graph was created using data from the National Judicial Data Grid. Due to the sluggish evolution of Indian legislation, a considerable number of cases are still waiting.

Have Torts been Ignored in India?

The next stage will be to see if the Indian court system has disregarded tort law. Simply said, tort law has not been forgotten. The M.C. Mehta case, which established the absolute liability rule, the Supreme Court’s direction on Multinational Corporation Liability, recognition of Governmental tort by government employees, principles on the legality of the state, the evolution of the tort of sexual harassment, a grant of interim compensation to a rape victim, and award of damages for violations of human rights under writ jurisdiction are all examples of this.

Despite the fact that most areas of law, such as crimes, contracts, property, trusts, and so on, have been systematically organized, India’s lack of a torts code is notable. The work of Indian attorneys and judges has contributed significantly to the evolution of tort law. Tort reform has been advocated for about a century and a half, with the earliest support coming from Sir F Pollock in 1886, who drafted the ‘Indian Civil Wrongs Bill.’ The bill, however, was not brought up for consideration in the legislature.

The value of code cannot be denied, but it is vital to remember that tort law is still in its infancy, and codifying it would not only be difficult but may also stifle its progress. However, the lack of a code prevents torts from becoming the dominant mode of litigation. The evolution of tort law in India pales in comparison to that of other progressive countries, where tort law is substantially more mature.

As previously stated, codification of tort law at this time would be premature. A more prudent approach would be, to begin with, enactments in areas where case law is lacking. The subject of the government’s liability when it comes to torts committed by its workers is one of the first suggestions made by the Law Commission in this regard.

In the report of the commission led by MN Venkatachaliah CJ, the National Commission for Review of the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC) has also recommended a statute that makes the state liable for the torts of its employees (2002). The small volume of tort litigation in Indian courts, on the other hand, contributes considerably to why an Indian code on this branch of law may be premature. Currently, only a small percentage of tort lawsuits are ever brought to court. However, this is a catch-22 since until a code for tort law is developed, there will be few tort cases brought in courts because people have no means of knowing what they are getting into.

Concerns with Tortious Litigation in India

Despite the fact that India is regarded as a litigious country, the number of lawsuits filed is quite modest. This is because of the limits and roadblocks that have been placed in place, including prohibitive fees, lengthy delays, and inadequate harm grants. In recent years, there has been a notable increase in the number of cases completed, particularly in cases involving the administration. This is typically linked to India’s financial development and, as a result, increased awareness of legal rights.

Common law jurisprudence shaped the Indian legal system and was introduced to the Indian people in an uncommon way. Although the English tort law served as a model for its Indian counterpart, its application is still ambiguous and limited. Several decisions and cases involving defamation and contributions between joint tortfeasors plainly illustrate that India cannot and does not adhere to English common law.

The English tort law applied differentially to Presidency towns and the mofussil throughout the colonial era. Indian citizens are exempt from the champerty and maintenance statutes. In fact, only those provisions of English tort law that suit the local conditions in India have been upheld and are valid in India. Given this situation, determining whether a given English statute also applies in India is difficult.

It was also unclear whether a specific statute remained in force in India after being abolished or changed under English law. For such a question, there is no final answer. As a result, unless a judge decided otherwise, it was difficult to know whether aspects of English law were applicable in India. Tort law remained uncodified even after the Constitution took effect. Article 372 of the Indian Constitution states that legislation in effect immediately prior to the adoption of the Constitution remains in effect. Any rulings issued by English courts, on the other hand, are no longer required to be upheld by Indian courts.

These decisions may only have persuasive power at most. As a result, the state of tort law remains unchanged. Because English tort law cannot be applied generally to the Indian setting, Indian tort law as a whole remains ambiguous. Furthermore, there is still a discrepancy in the application of laws in Presidency towns against the mofussil.
Citizens do not have a clear knowledge of their rights and responsibilities before going to court. Lawyers are likewise constrained in how much assistance they can provide in this circumstance because many areas of the law are still uncertain. The judge presiding over the case also has a difficult assignment ahead of him.

It’s simple to understand why victims often accept the wrongdoings they’ve been subjected to without pursuing legal redress. Is there always a way to stand up for one’s rights? The explanation, according to Professor Northrop, could be found in the cultural contrasts between eastern and western nations. Compromise is encouraged in Eastern societies. Furthermore, Asian tribes have a reluctance to use Western, right-wing legislation to resolve their conflicts. As a result, when it comes to torts, there is very little litigation.

People have been skeptical of such sweeping generalizations for a long time, while also urging that we reconsider the need for tort law litigation in India and its repercussions. Such recommendations strongly propose that empirical research be conducted to evaluate the validity of such reasons, which are mostly based on sociological, civilizational, and cultural elements.

If there is one thing that is certain in today’s culture, it is that quality justice is not provided; rather, it can only be purchased at a hefty cost. This is not to imply that the court is corrupt; rather, it demonstrates how a common man cannot even imagine receiving proper recompense for the damages to which he is entitled. This is true because the adversary can always use his money or influence to get around our country’s complicated judicial structure.

The commoner, on the other hand, will face a chain reaction of procedural issues as soon as he approaches the judicial system with his grievance, which will absorb all of his money, willpower, and time. The aggrieved will be obliged to pay hefty lawyer’s fees, court fees, and other incidental charges just to file his claim in court. To the uninitiated, it may not seem true, yet his legal expenses in seeking to recover his losses might sometimes much outweigh the original amount of his claim.

Unfortunately for him, if he loses at the conclusion of the trial, he may be forced to pay even more money to the court, first as costs, and then to file an appeal in a higher court. We haven’t even discussed the length of time it takes to resolve a civil case in India. According to studies, courts in tortious litigation cases take an average of nearly 6 years to reach a judgment. So far, the shortest time it has taken for a tort case to be resolved in 5 years, while the longest time it has taken is 13 years. Even severely harmed people are discouraged from resorting to civil action due to the excessive costs and lengthy decision-making process involved in tort claims.

We have highlighted a few cases that have further discouraged those who have been wronged in order to show the court attitude in such scenarios where compensations must be paid. According to precedent, in a case where the plaintiff’s claim was for Rs. 10,000/-, he was only awarded Rs. 1/- in compensation. In another case, two civil actions were valued at Rs. 500/- apiece, but the court only granted the aggrieved parties Rs. 60/- and Rs. 50/-, respectively.

The Hon’ble Nagpur Bench of the erstwhile Bombay High Court determined that in a matter where the claim was for Rs. 11,300/-, the aggrieved would be satisfied with an award of only Rs. 315/-. In a case before the Hon’ble Madras High Court, a plaintiff filed a claim for Rs. 10,000/- but was only given Rs. 650/- in compensation. It should be noted that these examples are somewhat ancient, yet they have been mentioned to emphasize the Indian judiciary’s inclination to ignore tort proceedings and award grossly disproportionate amounts when contrasted to the plaintiff’s claims.

Major Breakthroughs in Tort Law in India

UPHAR CINEMA CASE –The Gateway to Tort Law in India

The Uphaar Cinema, located in a wealthy suburb in the center of the country, New Delhi, caught fire on June 13, 1997, due to a malfunctioning generator mounted by the Electricity Board in the theatre’s basement. The exits from the balcony were clogged due to the installation of unlicensed seats years ago. As a result, the occupants inside the theatre were unable to flee, and fifty-nine people perished and another hundred were injured.

In November 1997, all of the injured’s outraged family members established an association and filed a complaint in the High Court of New Delhi, represented by a volunteer lawyer. The group sought Rs. 22.1 crore in compensation and Rs. 100 crore in punitive damages, which would be used to establish a trauma center, making it the biggest demand in an Indian tort case to date.

Following that, in 2003, the court ordered Rs. 21 crores in compensation for the families of the deceased people, as well as Rs. 1.04 crore for the 104 injured theatre-goers. In addition, a sum of Rs. 2.5 crore has been approved for the establishment of a trauma center in this regard.

The multimillionaire theatre owners were then charged with criminal offenses, and the Sessions Court found them guilty and sentenced them to two years in prison. However, the aggrieved association, dissatisfied with the penalty, went to the Supreme Court in 2007, which maintained the convictions and enhanced the sentence.

In India, the Uphaar Cinema Case was a watershed moment for tort relief in catastrophes. It had well-organized and affluent appellants represented by a dedicated lawyer who did not charge for his services, as well as a case with no evidentiary issues.

However, fourteen years after the fire, on October 13, 2011, the Supreme Court reduced the damages awarded to the deceased victims to a fraction of their original amount, from 2.5 crores to 25 lakhs, a 90% reduction, and all government agencies charged with the fire were exonerated except the Delhi Electricity Board. Even when it was a win-win case totally in favor of the appellants who had been tortured by the incompetent authorities, the future of mass tort in India appeared dismal once again.

In 2014, the Supreme Court heard a new appeal in the criminal case of Uphaar. It upheld the Ansals’ convictions, i.e. the cinema owners who had previously been found guilty, but it couldn’t agree on the amount of compensation to be paid to the victims. Justice T.S. Thakur favored restoring the Ansals’ original punishment, but Justice Gyan Sudha Mishra favored awarding Rs. 100 crore as compensation for the establishment of a Trauma Center in the Uphaar Victims’ memory. The judge’s readiness to award such a large sum for a tort law case in India, far bigger in magnitude than had previously been contemplated, demonstrated the growth of mass torts in India.

INDIAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION VS. V.P. SHANTHA– The Saha Case

In 1986, Parliament passed the Consumer Protection Act, which established a three-tiered consumer grievance redress system to give remedies for substandard “goods and services” across the country. In 1995, the Supreme Court ruled that “medical services” would fall under the Consumer Protection Act of 1986’s “goods and services” category. As a result, medical claimants no longer have to travel to court and pay high court fees, and they began submitting claims in Consumer Tribunals, which accounted for the majority of the cases handled by the Consumer Tribunals at the time.
From 2008 to 2014, the National Consumer Dispute Redressal Service delivered 154 medical malpractice lawsuits, accounting for 8% of its total judgments. Surprisingly, the claimants won over the medical practitioner in nearly 45 percent of the cases. From the moment the lawsuit was filed until the final verdict was reached, it took an average of 11.7 years.

An Indian-American couple traveled to Kolkata a year after the Uphaar tragedy to meet their relatives. The husband was a medical doctor, and the wife was a child psychologist who was 36 years old. The wife had a treatable but uncommon skin ailment and was admitted to the AMRI hospital, where she was cared for by a number of famous medical professionals. The treatment involved the administration of massive amounts of Depomoderol, which exacerbated the wife’s condition and finally led to her death.

Dr. Kunal Saha, the dissatisfied spouse, filed a complaint with the West Bengal Medical Council, which cleared the doctors. The spouse then filed criminal charges against the doctors under section 304A of the Indian Penal Code. The doctors were convicted by the West Bengal courts, but the Calcutta High Court overruled the District Court’s decision and exonerated them. Regrettably, the Supreme Court confirmed the Calcutta High Court’s decision regarding criminal responsibility.

Dr. Saha’s wife died as a result of the negligence of the three AMRI doctors, and a claim of Rs. 77 crore was made with the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC). The National Consumer Disputes Redress Commission (NCDRC) dismissed his claim and complaint in 2006. Dr. Saha represented himself in all of these proceedings, which cost him in a number of ways: (1) He had to travel 50 times from the United States to India as the case advanced. (2) Due to legal and travel expenditures, he declared bankruptcy in the United States of America. (3) He did not take up his academic position in Cincinnati, and as a result, his academic career was cut short.

Finally, the Supreme Court of India rejected the NCDRC’s ruling in 2009, and the matter was referred back to the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission to determine the amount of compensation. In October 2011, the commission finally awarded Dr. Saha damages of Rs. 1.5 crore. When the matter was appealed to the Supreme Court, a sum of Rs. 6.08 crores was awarded to Dr. Saha, directed against the doctors and the hospital, plus interest of 6% per annum, more than double the compensation previously awarded.

The Saha Case is a classic example of a one-on-one case that resulted in a milestone in Indian tort law. The Supreme Court granted increased damages because of the loss of a long career with a high American income that was harmed. The Saha case is an interesting reversal of the Bhopal Gas Tragedy, in which the perpetrator was an American Union Carbide Company and the victims were Indians, whereas the Saha case involved Indian wrongdoers and an American victim. We still don’t know if the broad tort damages based on monetary losses perpetuate gaps and inequality among the general public.

The Future of Torts in India – Conclusion

There is no empirical evidence to claim that India is a litigious nation. The truth is that Indian courts move slowly not because they are inept, but because there are too many cases for too few judges. We need to increase capacity in order to make our judicial system more strong, not just for civil cases, but also for criminal proceedings. Personal harm, which is addressed by tortious litigation elsewhere in the globe, requires significant attention in India, as has been adequately portrayed in this study. Tortious responsibility claims, both against the government and private parties, abound in the country. The procedure of approaching the court, on the other hand, is so delirious for the plaintiff that they are better off not going.

In general, as things stand now, those with money and privilege are able to buy their way out of the judicial system and avoid responsibility for their own negligent behavior. With little resources, it is the poor who must fight the system and the aggressor. This deplorable state of affairs necessitates a reassessment of tort litigation in India. Perhaps there is a need to constantly issue statutes that correctly deal with diverse tort law principles, rather than codifying and therefore making the entire branch immobile. A strong civil-litigation system will undoubtedly strengthen the government’s and citizens’ discipline, while also protecting human life and dignity. A strong civil-litigation system will undoubtedly strengthen the government’s and citizens’ discipline, while also elevating the value of human life and dignity for all people, not just the wealthy.

This article is written by Uday Todarwal.

Introduction

One of the primary players in India’s journey to prevailing in quick structure its economy has been the banking sector. Since our present legal framework for business exchanges has not stayed aware of developing strategic policies and monetary sector changes. This outcome in an extended recuperation of defaulted advances and an expansion in the number of nonperforming resources held by banks and monetary organizations. The Central Government laid out the first and second Narasimham Committees, as well as the Andhyarujina Committee, to look at banking sector changes. These committees surveyed the need for changes in the legal framework in these sectors. These committees, among others, have proposed new regulations for securitization that would permit banks and monetary organizations to take care of protections and sell them without the requirement for judicial activity.1

In light of these suggestions, the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act (SARFAESI) were passed by the Parliament on December 17, 2002. The motivation behind this act is to permit banks and financial organizations to expeditiously recover cash progress. The Act licenses banks and financial organizations to sell sold property to recover outstanding obligations that poor person been paid for quite a long time in spite of various updates. Non-performing assets (“NPA”) in the records of banks and financial foundations must be dealt with in much the same way. The property being referred to could be a private or business property that has been sold with a bank or financial establishment as security for the assets progressed. Before the execution of the SARFAESI Act, distressed parties, like banks or financial establishments, would record a common recuperation claim in common court, and the interaction would delay for quite a long time in light of the fact that the common suit was battled by the two sides. Considering this, the law-making body chose to enact regulation that would permit such nonperforming assets (NPAs) to be quickly settled, permitting the bank to reinvest the recuperated reserves. Banks and financial foundations will save time by not recording a claim in common court, which would regularly be an extensive strategy.2 Unstable advances, credits under $100,000, and obligations that are under 20% of the underlying guideline are excluded from the resolution. This regulation allowed the arrangement of resource reconstruction organizations (ARCs) and the offer of non-performing assets by banks to ARCs. Without the assent of a court, banks are approved to take responsibility for the property and sell it.

Objective and Applicability

It’s a legal framework that governs securitization transactions. Security interests can be implemented without the support of a court. The Act encourages banks and financial institutions to manage their assets to successfully deal with NPAs, asset reconstruction, and asset securitization organizations are being established. This Act empowers banks and financial institutions to seize hypothecated or mortgaged assets to recover nonperforming assets (NPAs). Without the participation of the court, the SARFAESI Act enables the following recovery channels for NPAs: securitization, asset reconstruction, and security enforcement.

The following topics are covered under the Act:

  • The Reserve Bank of India regulates and registers Asset Reconstruction Companies (ARCs). Facilitating the securitization of banks’ and financial institutions’ financial assets, with or without the use of underlying securities.
  • The ARC supports the consistent transferability of financial assets by issuing bonds, debentures, or any other instrument as a debenture to buy financial assets from financial organizations and banks.
  • By entrusting the Asset Reconstruction Companies with the task of raising cash through the sale of security receipts to eligible buyers, the Asset Reconstruction Companies will be able to obtain funds.
  • Facilitating the reconstruction of financial assets obtained when exercising securities enforcement authorities, management change powers, or other powers intended to be placed on banks and financial organizations.
  • The borrower’s account is classified as a non-performing asset following the Reserve Bank of India’s instructions or guidelines released from time to time.
  • In this case, the officials authorized shall exercise the rights of a secured creditor in line with the Central Government’s laws.
  • An appeal to the relevant Debts Recovery Tribunal and a second appeal to the Appellate Debts Recovery Tribunal against any bank or financial institution’s activity.
  • The Central Government may establish or compel the establishment of a Central Registry to register securitization, asset reconstruction, and security interest formation transactions.
  • Applicability of the proposed legislation to banks and financial institutions initially, with the Central Government empowered to expand the proposed legislation’s application to non-banking financial enterprises and other organizations.
  • The proposed regulation does not apply to security interests in agricultural lands, loans under one lakh rupees, or circumstances where the borrower repays 80% of the loan.

Asset Reconstruction

Asset Construction is covered by RBI regulations and legislative provisions under the SARFAESI Act, 2002. It consists of the following:

  • The fundamental definition of “asset reconstruction” is the process of transforming nonperforming assets (NPAs) into performing assets.
  • It all starts with a specialist Asset Reconstruction Company purchasing defective assets, including hypothecated assets, and financing them by issuing Bonds, Securities, and cash.
  • The Asset Reconstruction Company takes over or changes the management of the borrower’s business, sells or leases a part or all of the borrower’s firm, and reschedules the borrower’s debt payments using this approach.

Working of Security Enforcement

The SARFAESI Act gives banks and financial institutions the authority to enforce their securities. The procedure begins with the Debtor being given a 60-day notice period to pay the owing amount. If the outstanding dues are not paid within the required term, the Banks and FI’s have the authority to enforce their SECURITY INTEREST by taking the following steps:

  • Banks and financial institutions have the legal right to take ownership of the secured property.
  • Banks and financial institutions have the option of selling or leasing such property or assigning the right to security.
  • Appointment of a “Manager” to oversee the aforementioned security.

It can approach the borrower’s debtors for payment of the borrower’s debts.

Landmark Cases

M/S Transcore vs Union of India & Anr3
The appellant is M/s Transco, while the respondent is Union of India and Anr. This case is of general interest since it brings up a public approach issue about whether the principal stipulation to Section 19(1) of the DRT Act, 1993 (added by the Amending Act No.30 of 2004) is a condition that should be met prior to utilizing the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. The respondent (Indian Overseas Bank) recorded activity with the DRT in Chennai for the recuperation of duty from the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 3228 of 2006. In 2005, the Respondent gave a Possession Notice to the appellant under segment 13(4) of the Act, expecting him to reimburse his duty of Rs. 4.15 crores (around) in addition to premium inside sixty days, and expressing that the appellant had neglected to do as such and that the bank had claimed the undaunted properties recorded in the timetable to the Notice, which was then sold. In any case, a common allure has been recorded, and the sale deal has been deferred.

In this case, the Supreme Court reasoned that pulling out a case forthcoming before the DRT is definitely not essential for utilizing the SARFEASI Act. This choice has settled the lawful issue encompassing the send-off of simultaneous procedures under the SARFAESI Act. The allure/I.A. made by the appellant in this Court is excused, yet the allure/I.A. is presented by the banks/FIs. is allowed with no expense’s choice. Besides, the choice in the Transcore case permitted banks and monetary foundations to start systems under both the SARAESI Act and the DRT Act simultaneously. The court likewise held that segment 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act is a notification of interest expecting activity to be directed inside the time expressed and not a simple show-cause notice. At the point when a notice is given to the indebted person it is adequately evident, that borrower has neglected to put in his time and his record is classed as NPA. The obligation is distinguished and the record is delegated a nonperforming resource (NPA) under RBI rules. Prior to the bank/FI can summon Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, the requirements of Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act should be met. Following the culmination of Section 13(2) conditions, the bank or FI would be qualified to assume responsibility for the borrower’s gotten resources or make different moves. For this situation, the possibility of the political race doesn’t matter in light of the fact that the Act is a beneficial solution for the DRT Act. They are joined to frame a solitary cure; henceforth the possibility of the political race doesn’t have any significant bearing. The SARFAESI Act gives an additional cure that isn’t in a struggle with DRT. The SARFAESI Act was intended to safeguard the bank/premium FI’s in monetary resources that it claims because of an agreement or the use of customary regulation standards. Segment 13 of the SARFAESI Act intends to recuperate reserves utilizing a non-adjudicatory way. Under the SARFAESI Act, a got resource is one in which the borrower makes revenue for the bank/FI and the SARFAESI is determined exclusively on that premise. The reason for adding the stipulation to Section 19(1) of the DRT Act is to bring the arrangements of the DRT Act, the SARFAESI Act, and Order XXIII CPC into the arrangement.4

Mardia Chemicals Ltd. vs Union of India5
Here, the protected authenticity of SARFAESI was addressed, especially Sections 13, 15, 17, and 34, on the grounds that they are erratic and outlandish. Whenever the Act became real, IDBI Bank gave a notification to Mardia. Mardia defaulted-spoke to the court, where a progression of comparable petitions was assembled and tended to as a solitary case. The appellant battled that section 13 of the SARFAESI Act gives full freedoms to banks and monetary establishments while overlooking the privileges of defaulters. Likewise, borrower interest was not thought about by any means in Section 13. Besides, the borrowers had no right of direction or response to an adjudicatory technique. Section 17(2) of the Act expressed that the defaulter should store 75% of the sum to like and allure the sum was inordinate and subsequently restricted admittance to the legal plan of action of allure maybe a suggested bar had been made/to this, respondent battled that few different regulations accommodated such preconditions/Pet contended that those were for the claim and not for the use of first occurrence/respondent attempted to invalidate that by expressing that The strategy for assuming control over the business and the board of an element, especially a firm, was canvassed in Section 15 of the 15. The appellant likewise fought that section 34 was indistinguishable from Section 34 of the RDB Act, which announced that DRTs have selective locale, i.e., no respectful court will give any request or order against a bank practicing privileges under the Act. SARFAESI was pointless on the grounds that there was at that point a regulation managing this subject issue, and a few regulations were not expected to deal with a similar topic. It was additionally brought up that the most inconvenient obligation section somewhere in the range of 25,000 and 1 lakh dollars-didn’t require separate regulations.

For this situation, the Supreme Court held that the Parliament’s prevalence in concluding the requirement for regulation is underlined. The association between the RDB Act and SARFAESI was dismissed since the last option manages the exceptionally specific issue of nonperforming resources (NPAs) (among different contrasts, for example, the last option managing got leasers). Accordingly, it really depends on Parliament to conclude regardless of whether regulation is required. Section 13 was viewed as intrinsically authentic by the Court. The got bank is just practicing his privilege on the grounds that the default that prompted the sec 13 measure may be viewed as a “second default”- NPA + 60 days additional chance to reimburse following notification. Prior to the 2016 Amendment, Section 13 recognized the Right of Redemption it might be said. Rule 8 and 9 of the SI Rules expressed that the bank should serve a notification affirming the offer of gotten property and that the borrower might take care of the commitment and recover ownership any time before the genuine deal. While the Supreme Court affirmed the section’s legality, it pushed it difficult for borrowers to reserve the privilege to the portrayal. The Supreme Court decided Section 17(2) to be inconsistent and requested that the heading be modified from “claim” to “application.”6

Pandurang Ganpati Chaugale v. Vishwasrao Patil Murgud Sahakari Bank Ltd7
“‘Banking’ relating to cooperatives can be included within the purview of Entry 45 of List I, and it cannot be said to be over inclusion to cover provisions of recovery by cooperative banks in the SARFAESI Act,” a five-judge bench of Justices Arun Mishra, Indira Banerjee, Vineet Saran, MR Shah, and Aniruddha Bose, has held in this case. The ruling of the Court came in a reference made in light of contradictory decisions in Greater Bombay Coop. Bank Ltd. v. United Yarn Tex (P) Ltd.8, Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India9, T. Velayudhan Achari v. Union of India10, and Union of India v. Delhi High Court Bar Association11.

The seat held that the whole situation and banking action of helpful banks is represented by a regulation authorized under Entry 45 of List I, i.e., the BR Act, 1949, and the RBI Act ordered under Entry 38 of List I, saying that “recuperation of duty would be a fundamental capacity of any banking foundation, and the Parliament can sanction a regulation under Entry 45 of List I as the action of banking done by agreeable banks is inside the domain of Entry 45 of List I.” Obviously, under Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, Parliament has the position to endorse the solution for recuperation.” The Court likewise clarified that the principal part of the matter of the agreeable bank connecting with banking was covered by the BR Act, 1949, and the Reserve Bank of India Act, such regulations are connected with Entries 45 and 38 of List I of the Seventh Schedule. The parts of ‘joining, regulation and twisting up’ are covered by Entry 32 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. “As we would see it, such bankers’ banking movement is covered by Entry 45 of List I, which considers the Doctrine of Pith and Substance, as well as the passability of accidental infringement on the field held for the State.” The court reasoned that disturbing ‘banking,’ the regulation connecting with Entry 45 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India administers cooperative banks enrolled under State regulation and multi-State level cooperative social orders enlisted under the Multi-State Cooperative Societies Act, 2002 (MSCS Act, 2002). The cooperative banks run by cooperative social orders enrolled under State regulation for ‘joining, regulation, and ending up,’ specifically, to issues that are outside the domain of Entry 45 of List I of the Constitution of India, are administered by the said regulation connected with Entry 32 of List II of the Constitution of India. The significance of ‘Banking Company’ is characterized under Section 5(c) read with Section 56(a) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, which is a regulation associated with Entry 45 of List I. It manages the ‘banking’ part of co-employable social orders’ banks. The Banking Regulation Act, 1949, and some other regulation appropriate to helpful banks interesting in ‘Banking’ in Entry 45 of List I, and the RBI Act appealing to Entry 38 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, deny agreeable banks from participating in any movement except if they conform to the arrangements of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, and some other regulation relevant to such banks engaging to ‘Banking’ in Entry 45 of List I. Under section 2(1)(c) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, state-contracted helpful banks and multi-state agreeable banks are alluded to as “banks.” The recuperation component laid out under section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, regulation connected with Entry 45 List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India is pertinent on the grounds that recuperation is a significant part of banking.12

Amendment to the SARFAESI Act

The Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debts Laws and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment) Bill, 2016, was introduced in Parliament to amend four laws: the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI), the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (RDDBFI), the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, and the Depositories Act, 1996. When secured creditor defaults on a loan, the SARFAESI Act permits secured creditors to seize the collateral used to finance the transaction. This procedure is carried out with the help of the District Magistrate and does not necessitate the involvement of courts or tribunals. The District Magistrate must finish this process within 30 days, according to the Bill. Furthermore, the Bill authorizes the District Magistrate to assist banks in assuming management of a company if it is unable to repay loans. This will be done if the banks convert their outstanding loans into equity shares and hold a 51 percent or greater ownership in the company as a result.

The Act establishes a single registry to keep track of secured asset transactions. The bill establishes a consolidated database that will allow property records from diverse registration systems to be integrated into one central registry. This contains registrations made under the Companies Act of 2013, the Registration Act of 1908, and the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988. Secured creditors will not be able to take possession of collateral unless it is registered with the central registration, according to the bill. Furthermore, after the registration of a security interest, these creditors will have priority over others in the repayment of their debts.13

Conclusion

With the recent judgment made by the Supreme Court of India, all state and multi-state cooperative banks will now be subject to the SARFAESI Act of 2002. Banks can now sell and seize defaulters’ properties to recover their debts, because of the Supreme Court’s crucial decision. The court bench also recognized a 2003 notification that cooperative banks are covered by the SARFAESI Act and are entitled to seek redress. Cooperative banks had to go to court to recover their dues before this notification was written. The Supreme Court went on to say that this decision was made to eliminate delays in collecting dues because cooperative banks are required to resort to civil courts under the Cooperative Societies Act to do so. The court also held that co-operative banks that engage in banking activities are subject to Sections 5 (c) and 56 (a) of the Banking Regulation Act of 1949, which are laws related to List I Entry 45. (Union List).14 After the judgment made by the Court regarding this issue, experts hope that it would bring the much-needed reforms in the cooperative banks sector, which has been subjected to bankruptcy and corruption. They also believe that it would bring large-scale implications.

References:

  1. SARFAESI ACT, 2002- Applicability, Objectives, Process, Documentation, cleartax.in https://cleartax.in/s/sarfaesi-act-2002 
  2. An overview of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI), Arun Bapat, iPleaders https://blog.ipleaders.in/overview-securitisation-reconstruction-financial-assets-enforcement-security-interest-act/
  3. 2006(5) CTC 753(SC)
  4. M/S Transcore vs Union of India & Anr, Darshika Rughani, Pro Bono India https://probono-india.in/research-paper-detail.php?id=415 
  5. Case No.: Transfer Case (civil) 92-95 of 2002
  6. Constitutional Validity of SARFAESI Act of 2002 tested under ‘Mardia Chemicals vs. UOI’, Shubham Phophalia, taxguru  https://taxguru.in/finance/constitutional-validity-sarfaesi-act-2002-tested-mardia-chemicals-vs-uoi.html
  7. 2020 SC 431
  8. (2007) 6 SCC 236
  9. (1993) 2 SCC 582
  10. (1983) 4 SCC 166
  11. (2007) 6 SCC 236
  12. SARFAESI Act applicable to Cooperative Banks: Constitution Bench, Prachi Bharadwaj, SCC Online https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2020/05/05/sarfaesi-act-applicable-to-cooperative-banks-constitution-bench/ 
  13. The Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debts Laws and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment) Bill, 2016, PRS India https://prsindia.org/billtrack/the-enforcement-of-security-interest-and-recovery-of-debts-laws-and-miscellaneous-provisions-amendment-bill-2016#:~:text=Amendments%20to%20the%20SARFAESI%20Act,intervention%20of%20courts%20or%20tribunals.
  14. What is SARFAESI Act? Jagran Josh https://www.jagranjosh.com/general-knowledge/sarfaesi-act-1588850144-1

This article is written by Arryan Mohanty, a student of Symbiosis Law School.

This article talks about Section 13(B) and the effects of the cooling period being waived off and various cases to understand this better.

INTRODUCTION 

Marriage is considered one of the essential sacraments for all Hindus. None other than the Hindus have endeavored to Idealize the institution of marriage. Due to this a divorced person was stigmatized and hindered in the Hindu Society but over the years as our nation developed and Hindu Marriage Act came into force eventually the divorce aspects also found their own place in the act. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 under Section 13 (B) states that a petition for mutual consent divorce is presented by the parties with the following averments: –

  1. That both the spouses are living separately for a period of one year,
  2. The Spouses have not been able to live together,
  3. Both the spouses have been living separately by consent.

In recent years Supreme Court has given a new perspective to the cooling period in mutual and consented divorce. The court held that this clause of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955 which allows a cooling-off period of six months is not compulsory but just directory to the courts. According to this, the courts in which the divorce proceedings are ongoing under extraordinary cases have the right to suspend this time if other conditions are met, including the fact that the spouses have been piecemeal for a period of more than18 months, that all comforting and concession attempts to reunite the parties have collapsed and the parties have truly resolved their controversies, indeed in regard to alimony.

MEANING OF THE TERM ‘COOLING-OFF PERIOD’?

Under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 a married couple can get a divorce on the grounds of mutual consent through filing a petition to the court. It’s a straightforward method to dissolve the marriage where both the parties peacefully agree to the separation. According to Section 13 (b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for a statutory interregnum understanding, a cooling period of six months between the first and the last motion for divorce by mutual consent so as the possibility of cohabitation and settlement could be explored. This period of 6 months is called the cooling-off period.

APPLICABILITY OF COOLING PERIOD IN CASES OF DIVORCE

The expenses are the clearest preferred position of consensual divorce. Consensual divorce that stays uncontested is sort of often the foremost economical method of dissolving the wedding. The minimal effort of the cooling period isn’t, be that because it may, but it’s the littlest bit of leeway in consensual divorce. In the event that the degree of contention between the 2 partners stays low, a consensual divorce offers an approach to stay it that way. It is extremely private and progressively helpful and is helpful to keep a greater amount of your advantages in all of your personal assets and not on the hands of the law, and other required things within the procedure of the dissolution of marriage. Separation by mutual consent expels superfluous squabbles and saves a lot of time and money. With the expanding number of uses being applied for a separation, a consensual divorce is the best alternative. Uncontested separation offers to break away life partners the chance to finish their marriage discreetly and with dignity.

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES IT CAN BE WAIVED OFF?

In Abhay Chauhan v. Rachna Singh, 2006 both the parties were 30 years old, well educated, and mature and the marriage of the parties was solemnized four years ago and there was absolutely no possibility of reconciliation. The Delhi High Court in such a case held that the cooling period of 6 months can be exempted in certain cases but this controversy is still continuing. High Courts are overwhelmingly waiving this period by calling it directory rather than mandatory provision but some high courts beg to differ.

In an important judgment of Amardeep Singh vs Harveen Kaur on 12th September 2017, the Supreme Court held that this cooling period of 6 months can be waived in cases of mutual consent. Section 13B (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act deals with the petitions sustainability therefore it cannot be abolished and Section 13B (2) in spite of being administrative should be repealed after the details of every situation as they may vary from each other, wherever the little possibility of reconciliation is seen.

In the Avneesh Sood vs. Tithi Sood case and in the Shikha Bhatia case vs Gaurav Bhatia & Ors case, the courts held that a spouse who undertakes to comply with the consent given in the first motion for the dissolution of marriage under Section 13B (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act and for filing a second motion he/she would not be allowed to withdraw such an undertaking subject to an agreement reached between both the spouses.

Rajiv Chhikara vs. Sandhya Mathu, the Delhi High Court held that retracting from mediation would be considered as mental cruelty. The Court also noted in the case that the partner had lived apart since 2009 and that their relationship was now beyond repair. Therefore, under these circumstances, one partner demands that the marital bond be maintained and the same would be as putting the partner in extreme mental cruelty.

In Suman v. Surendra Kumar, the High Court of Rajasthan addressed this question for the purpose of the cooling period whose purpose is to give both the partner time and opportunity to reflect on their decision. The partners or one of them may have second thoughts in this cooling period and may change their minds about the dissolution of marriage.

However, the court always takes into consideration the following aspect before waving off the cooling period:

  1. The statutory cooling period of 6 months as given under Section 13B (2) and the period of one year as specified under Section 13B (1) is already over before the commencement of the first movement of the divorce case.
  2. If the parties have already dealt with their differences and have come to terms in matters such as alimony, custody of their child, and all other disputes between them then the waiting period only increases their agony and there is no point of it.
  3. That all means of conciliation/mediation and efforts made in terms of Section 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955 and Order XXXII A Rule of Code of Civil Procedure have failed to reunite and save the marriage, and no hope is left for saving the marriage.

Thus, the Supreme Court has given family courts the discretion to determine whether to waive the six-month cooling-off period or not. The Court also held that the application for a waiver of the cooling period can be made as early as one week after the divorce petition had been filed in the court.

SOME OTHER IMPORTANT CASES UNDER SECTION 13 (B)

In the Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the phrase ‘living separately’ refers to not living as husband and wife. It has no reference to where the spouses live. It is possible that the partners may are living under the same roof and still may not live as husbands and wives. The partners don’t wish to fulfill marital obligations. The Supreme Court of India had ruled that mutual consent is a sine qua non I.e an essential condition for passing a decree of divorce and the said agreement must be binding and subsist until a final decree of divorce has been issued.

In Hirabai Bharucha vs. Pirojshah Bharucha, the High Court held that the courts are obliged to make every effort to maintain the institution of marriage. That is an arrangement between the partners specifying the terms of settlement runs counter to public policy, they should be regarded as void ab initio and it is unenforceable and, in such cases, it cannot be recourse to contempt proceedings.

The court ruled that where a solicitation is submitted for divorce through common concurrence under Section 13B of the Act, the Court will move that the concurrence granted by the mates persists until the date of the allocation of the divorce decree. And if one mate freely withdraws its support, in view of the provision of Section 13B of the Act, the Court doesn’t have the power to grant a divorce decree by collective concurrence.

CONCLUSION

Consensual divorce refers to that stage where both the partners dissolve their marriage by mutual consent. Divorce is an equally important part of society as marriage. As we all know that all marriages are not perfect and cannot be sustained or continued, ending such marriage is the best possible damage control that can be done for both spouses. Divorce by Mutual-consent is one of the recent addition to the Indian jurisprudence of divorce and is fairly integral. Earlier, Indian couples resorted to the very time-consuming and expensive method of ground-based litigation, which did no good to the parties but rather induced animosity between them and involved many maligning.

Reference: 

  1. https://nrilegalconsultants.in/waiving-off-period-of-6-months-cooling-off-period in-case-of-a-mutual-divorce/ 
  2. https://www.latestlaws.com/latest-news/couple-gets-divorce-without-6-month cooling-off-period/ 
  3. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/sc-sanctions-divorce-to-couple-without six-months-cooling-off-period/article25237873.ece 
  4. https://health.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/industry/future-of-artificial intelligence-in-healthcare-in-india/56174804

This article is written by Tanya Arya, a second-year law student at Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies.

Abstract

Gambling, in the current time, is mushrooming at an enormous speed, thereby posing a grave threat to the stakeholders involved due to its inherent vulnerability. The vociferous and the reverberating calls for its legalization newer assume more significance given the nebulous state of gambling laws in the country. Although the legalization would bring with itself a gush of entailing benefits, the profound and the pressing issues at hand pertaining to legalization are required to be given a thorough perusal including the pricking need to overhaul enforcement mechanism rather than venturing into the question of how and when to legalize the gambling given the legal and socioeconomic intricacy of India.

Introduction

It would be apposite, to begin with, the scrutinization of the term “gambling”. Gambling is a game that involves chances of winning or losing money or possessions of bet. Cambridge dictionary defines betting as the habit of risking money and placing a wager on the outcome of sports events. Gambling is a genus while betting is a species and both function on the coefficient of unpredictability especially those of the sporting events. The modern world thrives on the perpetuities of monetary gains and gambling serves as a handy way to satiate those materialistic needs.

This article seeks to systematically articulate the advantages and disadvantages that ensued due to the legalization of gambling, thereby concluding with some apposite and congruous solutions.

Background

India and gambling have had a substantiative co-relationship since ancient times, with the Rig Veda believing to have documented its first description. Since then, gambling has been a popular choice in India among the masses when it came to quick monetary gains in the course of satisfaction with worldly needs. Initially, gambling was encouraged in colonial India due to its economic benefits, but soon, it was illegalized due to its ensuing negative consequences such as bankruptcy, criminal delinquency, etc.

Thus, the Public Gambling Act of India was passed in 18671 to regulate and restrict gambling practices, thereby, illegalizing gambling albeit without sufficient punitive sanctions. The Act sought to restrict most forms of gambling including sports gambling (lotteries, casinos, festive gambling, etc were allowed and regulated in a few states) that was wagering in nature involving pure chance (eg: using the roll of dice or marble to determine the outcome) baring the few games that involved “skill” and not pure chance such as horse racing; online games of skill such as rummy, poker, fantasy games, etc. In K.R. Lakshmanan v. State of Tamil Nadu2, the Apex court held that “The test of the legality of gambling vis-à-vis nature of sports is dependent upon the dominance of the element of skill/chance with regard to a recognized sport.”

With the advent of the constitution, Subjects of betting and gambling were kept in the State list as entry no. 34. The States have been given the liberty to delve into their own legislation on betting and gambling, having the freedom to regulate and deregulate it. While some states such as Sikkim (which has legalized betting in the online form), Kerala (conducts State-run lotteries), Goa3 (which has legalized casinos), etc have framed their own betting laws, others continue to govern themselves via the Central legislation of 1867. In a nutshell, both online and offline sports betting baring the games involving “skill” are currently illegal in India.

In recent times, gambling has unfettered its wings, mushrooming at an enormous speed with no signs of ebbing down in near future, more so due to the advent of advanced technology, penetration, and access to the internet in even the remotest corner of the world. India, too remained at the forefront to exploit this vice opportunity, with the 2016 ICC and the 2013 IPL betting scandals that involved thousands of crores of Rupees, giving testimony to this booming trend. It was in light of such massive illegal betting markets and the large-scale flouting of the law by the masses that the Supreme Court of India, in 2016, mandated the Law Commission of India (LCI)4 to examine a logical way to deal with India’s illegal gambling.

The LCI mentioned in its report that– “since it is not possible to prevent these activities completely, effectively regulating them remains the only viable option” Also, a Private Member Bill was introduced by Mr. Shashi Tharoor in 2018 in this regard, which articulated the legalization of sports betting in India under strict surveillance as it would curb the illegalized betting ecosystem in India which was under the monopolistic ambit of underworld mafias. It would curb the black money market, along with the generation of massive revenues for the government which could then be utilized for funding the sports infrastructure and betterment of athletes. Some of the potential restrictions that the bill sought to introduce were barring the minors from participating and limiting the highest betting fees one can bid. The bill impeccably envisioned the regulation mechanism by introducing a 7 member committee that would be responsible for formulating the rules and regulations monitoring sports online gaming. The bill also sought to criminalize the activities of sports fraud and match-fixing to the extent of 5 years of imprisonment and hefty fines which in turn would espouse deterrence. The bill also focused on maintaining the integrity of sports and preventing any event such as manipulations or match-fixing as those current pressing issues were not dealt with by the present legal framework.

Advantages of legalizing gambling

Gambling is one of the forms that has been an inherent phenomenon in Indian society and curbing it entirely won’t be certainly possible, more so because of the willful and brazen flouting of the legal norms by masses. Hence, giving it a legal sanctity would be a desirable approach in the discourse of its regulation and fund generation thereby espousing public consent and adherence rather than remaining oblivious to its incongruous existence. Far from this realization has been the seemingly illogical approach of the legislative setup which has still kept it within the cloak of illegality. This has been further reinforced by the Indian Judiciary by keeping horse race (on the basis of predicting the winnability) under the gamut of ‘games of skill’ but not the other games involving technicality and intricacy of similar nature such as cricket or hockey.

The most popular form of gambling has been in the sporting activities involving bets, which has evolved itself as a clandestine ecosystem possessing a huge network of people and enormous amounts of money. The Drastic modernization in the sports ecosystem coupled with the digital boom has led to sweeping revolutionary changes across the spectrum. This in turn accentuated the gambling culture creating a mammoth web of individuals and finances involved in this subculture. The first step in the legalization process would involve systematic identification and acknowledgment of these prevailing entities. Next would come regulation, owing to the fact that an exorbitant amount of Rs 300,000 Crores of black money is used annually for betting and the sector involves an enormous cash flow worth 60 billion dollars which is 3.5% of India’s GDP. It will lead to transparency as the source of cash flow could be traced and tracked thereby keeping a tight check on the black money market. Licensing of the brokers would further keep a check on them by curbing the black money laundering in illegal betting which is often used to fund terrorism and related nefarious activities1. Involving in such illegal activities could lead to the cancellation of their licenses which in turn would serve as a deterrence to them. The legalization of sports betting would also ensure the protection of the subtle interests of minors, uneducated, poor fellows with a limited income and lack of bargaining power, and the elderly with shrinking life savings, who are often cheated by brokers. They remain at disadvantage due to unregulated and unenforceable market agreements lacking legal recourse owing to the wagering nature of the contract where the interests of the weaker party lacking bargaining power is jeopardized.

Currently, the earnings under betting are not reported as a source of taxable income under the Income Tax Act, 1961, thus, creating an avenue for black money. Legalizing the same would make the disclosure of such income mandatory (paving the way for effective surveillance and regulation) along with the generation of revenue receipts for the government to the tune of a minimum of Rs 12000 crores per annum5. It would also check on the tax evasions by brokers and bettors. The fund generated could be used for revamping sports infrastructure and related welfare schemes of the country along with peddling the development of the tribal and conventional sports that have been grossly neglected owing to their unpopularity and lack of resources.

Legalization would also serve as the panacea for ever-rising unemployment in the country by providing jobs ranging from the post of officers (required to monitor betting transaction) to a new catena of brokers who would specialize in sports betting along with a majority of unskilled workers employed in the implementation of menial economic activity in the betting industry. India, having the required knowledge, expertise and population could also evolve itself into a niche avenue for cyber betting like Denmark, the USA, etc, thus bringing with itself valuable foreign exchange which in turn would fuel the economic prosperity of the country.

Further, policing of the current gambling laws which illegalize it becomes a major problem due to the sheer numbers of “law-breakers” and exhaust colossal time of the law keepers which could be efficiently used for other productive work. Even effective policing results in large numbers of people gaining criminal records, with all of the consequential social problems. (employment problems, social and family stigma due to criminal record, etc). Hence, legalization would serve to meet the above ends. One other argument often posed in favor of legalization/regulation is that gambling adversely affects only a minority (less than 1% of the population due to problem gambling). So depriving the majority of a harmless leisure activity when it could add to a mix of other advantages is not worth it

Disadvantages of legalizing gambling

It is argued that the job of the government is to lead the people and not to simply follow popular views, especially if there are “public interest” reasons for pursuing unpopular routes. The concept and practice of gambling have historically been frowned upon in the Indian context. The moral issues constrain the government from peruse the idea of legalization as this has been a forbidden virtue in the Indian sub context given its entailing disadvantages. Giving it a legal sanctity would go against this entrenched ideal of morality.

Legalization would entail massive social costs as various studies have revealed that adolescents engaging in such activities possess a higher rate in school and academic failure accompanied by a history of family conflict triggered by the loss of household income, erratic sexual activity, severe financial difficulties such as large debts, poverty, and even bankruptcy; conflict and breakdown in relationships and a variety of psychological illnesses including anxiety and depression and psychiatric disorders, thus, paving way for baleful tendencies to commit suicide arising out of the ensuing depression.

State-sanctioned gambling would disproportionately burden the socially and economically backward people who expend a greater portion of their income into such wagering contracts, thus, exposing them to the channels of destituteness and crimes such as fraud and embezzlement, to address the mounting financial demands of their gambling. It will also push them into the scourging avenues of alcohol and drug addiction thereby instigating a vicious cycle of economic losses. Apart from the above menaces, gambling would also seriously impact the integrity and the true sportsmanship spirit of the sports due to the money factor and instances of match-fixing.

A logical argument against gambling follows that if gambling were to be legalized, it follows that more people would gamble (due to its enticing nature), and subsequently, more would become problem gamblers who face the adverse effects of gambling. Studies corroborate the above fact showing that increased availability of and easy accessibility to 2 gambling increased the participation in gambling and also the consequent prevalence of problematic gambling that entails massive social costs. Studies show that in India, although the prevalence of gambling was low, the proportion of people who had developed problem gambling among those who did gamble was considerably higher as compared to other countries. The final argument against legalization is that, even if it were to be considered a good idea, in theory, the time for such a major policy change in India is not right, because India did not possess the infrastructure to conceive, implement, monitor, or regulate such a huge change.

Suggestions

Certain suggestions could be considered in the light of the given circumstances. First, because of India’s inherent diversity, changes should be piloted in one or few states instead of going for pan India legislations so as to evaluate the post and pre-policy changes along with avoiding the deleterious and incongruous effects. Second, sufficient research needs to be undertaken so as to generate the local and relevant empirical pieces of evidence vis a vis the Indian sub context instead of relying on foreign pieces of evidence. Third, the question of government or private ownership of gambling monopoly needs to be delved upon. Fourth, the safeguard mechanism for the stakeholders needs to be put in place along with relevant and requisite standardized norms for regulation.

Conclusion

Keeping gambling under the scope of criminal legislation in spite of its nonviolent nature has been a source of contention amidst the scholars who view this as a step to give legitimacy to State paternalism. Section 30 of the Indian Contracts Act 1872 renders such betting (wagering) agreements voidable and takes off the recourse of legal enforceability, thus, exemplifying its vulnerability to financial exploitation and illegitimate transactions. Now in recent times, with a drastic surge in online gambling, the IT Act, falls short to curb people from engrossing in illegitimate offshore gambling websites where there is the absence of the protective blanket of national laws.

Thus, the archaic legislation of 1867 and the present laws being incompetent, abruptly fail to regulate the ongoing inconsistencies pertaining to betting. Further, nonchalance concerning the present penal provisions and the recklessness of the stakeholders exacerbate the administrative incapacities and ineffective framework of government. Against this backdrop, the vociferous and the reverberating calls for newer legislations assume more significance given the nebulous state of gambling laws in the country.

Given the pros and cons of the current issue at hand, there is no unambiguous evidence to support the status quo. Although the legalization would bring with it a gush of entailing benefits, the profound and the pressing issues at hand pertaining to legalization are required to be given a thorough perusal including the pricking need to overhaul enforcement mechanism rather than venturing into the question of how and when to legalize the gambling.

References

  1. The Public Gambling Act, 1867. http:// www.sangrurpolice.in
  2. 1996 AIR 1153, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1248365/
  3. https://www.scams.info/online-casino/india/#laws
  4. Law Commission of India. Legal framework: Gambling and sports betting including in cricket in India. Report number 276. New Delhi: Law Commission of India, 2018.
  5. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Goa-casinos-contribute-Rs-135cr-revenue-in-2012-13/articleshow/19524670.cms

Written by Riya Ganguly student at Bharati Vidyapeeth New Law College, Pune.