Tag: supremecourtcases

Case Number

WP (Criminal No.) 115 of 2009

Equivalent Citation

AIR 2011 SC 1290, 2011 AIR SCW 1625

Petitioner

Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug

Respondent

Union of India, State of Maharashtra, Dean- KEM Hospital Mumbai

Bench

Justice Markandey Katju, Justice Gyan Sudha Misra

Decided on

March 07, 2011

Relevant Act/Section

Article 21 of Constitution of India, Section 309, 306 of Indian Penal Code

Brief Facts and Procedural History

Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug, the petitioner in this case, was a nurse at the King Edward Memorial Hospital in Parel, Mumbai. On the evening of November 27, 1973, a sweeper from the same hospital attacked her and used a dog chain to yank her back while wrapping it around her neck. Additionally, the sweeper attempted to rape her; however, when he discovered she was menstruating, he sodomized her instead. He tightened the chain around her neck in order to stop her from moving or causing any havoc. A cleaner discovered her body the following day, unconscious and covered in blood. It was thought that the chain’s strangulation caused the brain’s oxygen supply to stop, which led to brain damage. She entered a permanent vegetative state as a result of this incident, which permanently injured her brain (PVS). Later, journalist and activist Pinki Virani petitioned the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, claiming there was no chance of her being resurrected and recovering. She ought to be released from her suffering and allowed to die through passive euthanasia.

The respondent parties, KEM Hospital, and Bombay Municipal Corporation submitted a counter-petition in response to this petition. The gaps between the two groups widened as a result. Due to the discrepancies, the Supreme Court appointed a group of three distinguished doctors to conduct an investigation and provide a report on the precise mental and physical state of Aruna Shanbaug. They thoroughly researched Aruna Shanbaug’s medical background and concluded that she is not brain dead. She responds differently depending on the situation. She favors fish soups and gentle religious music, for instance. If there are many people there, she feels uneasy and becomes upset. When there are fewer people around, she is at ease. The KEM Hospital personnel were adequately caring for her. She was constantly kept tidy. Additionally, they found no indication from Aruna’s body language that she was willing to end her life. Additionally, the KEM Hospital nursing team was more than happy to take care of her. Thus, the doctors opined that euthanasia in this matter is not necessary. She held this job for 42 years before passing away in 2015.

Issues before the Court

1. Is it acceptable to remove a person’s life support systems and equipment if they are in a permanent vegetative state (PVS)?
2. Should a patient’s preferences be honored if they have previously said that they do not want to undergo life-sustaining measures in the event of futile treatment or a PVS?
3. Does a person’s family or next of kin have the right to request the withholding or removal of life-supporting measures if the individual has not made such a request already?

Decision of the Court

This decision was made on March 7, 2011, by the prestigious Supreme Court of India Division Bench, which also included Justices Markandey Katju and Gyan Sudha Mishra. The Transportation of Human Organs Act of 1994’s definition of brain death and the doctor’s report were both used by the court to rule that Aruna wasn’t brain dead. She didn’t need the assistance of a machine to breathe. She used to exhibit various signs and felt things. She was in a PVS, but she was still in stable condition. The justifications offered here are insufficient to end her life. It wouldn’t be acceptable. In addition, the court stated during its discussion of the matter that Pinki Virani would not be the next-of-kin in this particular situation, but rather the personnel of the KEM Hospital. Therefore, KEM Hospital has the authority to make any such choice on her behalf. In this instance, it was the food that she was relying on for survival. As a result, removing life-saving measures, in this case, would entail denying her sustenance, which is not permitted by Indian law in any way.

The Supreme Court recognized passive euthanasia under specific circumstances. The High Court would have to approve the decision to end a person’s life after following the proper procedure, the court decided, in order to prevent future abuse of this option.

When a request for passive euthanasia is made to the High Court, the Chief Justice of the High Court must convene a Bench of at least two justices to decide whether the request should be accepted or denied. Before rendering a decision, the Bench should take into account the advice of a panel of three reputable physicians. The Bench also proposes these physicians after consulting with the pertinent medical professionals. Along with appointing this committee, the court also has to notify the state, kin, family, and friends and provide them a copy of the committee of doctors’ report as soon as it is practical. After the court has heard from all parties, it should then issue its ruling. In India, this method must be followed up till relevant legislation is passed.

Aruna Shaunbaug was refused euthanasia in the end after taking into account all of the relevant facts of the case. The High Court further ruled that if the hospital staff ever feels the need for the same thing, they may petition the High Court in accordance with the established procedures. By giving a comprehensive framework of standards that must be fulfilled, the decision in this case has helped to clarify the concerns surrounding passive euthanasia in India. The court also suggested that Section 309 of the IPC be repealed. Every aspect of the case has been covered in detail. Now, let’s talk about the appearance of two crucial characteristics that emerged in this situation and have been addressed previously. The court also advocated for the abolition of IPC Section 309.

India is now among the nations that have legalized passive euthanasia. However, there are still flaws in the way passive euthanasia is carried out. It was a laborious process because it was mandated that every case obtain approval from the High Court after the Shanbaug case. Passive euthanasia is now more difficult to put into practice thanks to the new ruling, which calls for the execution of the directive in the presence of two witnesses, verification by a judicial magistrate, approval from two medical boards, and a jurisdictional collector. The fundamental goal of passive euthanasia is to terminate the suffering of the person in question, therefore this delay is a significant obstacle. On the other hand, if the process is made too liberal and simple, it is always open to serious abuse.

The Supreme Court established standards for passive euthanasia in the case of Aruna Shanbaug. These regulations allowed for the removal of a person’s life support system, which might ultimately result in death. Passive euthanasia is now legal in India under certain circumstances that will be ruled by the High Court. Later in 2018, the Supreme Court issued a new ruling in the case of Common Cause v. Union of India¹, reinstating the right to a dignified death, legalizing passive euthanasia, and granting permission to remove life support from patients who are terminally ill and in a life-long coma. The Court also introduced the idea of “living wills” along with this. In these cases, the directions to be followed are-

1. A Passive Euthanasia application must be pending with the relevant High Court. In any case, two appointed authorities must make up the Bench that the Chief Justice of the High Court appoints, and they will decide whether or not to approve the grant.
2. The Bank must first consider the opinions of a three-person medical committee that it will select before making a decision. One of the three professionals should be an expert in the nerve system, while the other two should be specialists and therapists.
3. When a person goes missing, the High Court Bench will notify the State and those closest to the missing individual, such as guardians, companions, siblings, and sisters.
4. When it becomes available, the Court must send them a copy of the expert council report.
5. After hearing from each gathering, the High Court’s seat must announce its decision.
6. The Supreme Court must make a decision immediately. The court expressed its extreme gratitude to the KEM staff for their dedication over an extended period of time.

This case clarified the euthanasia-related concerns and established criteria for widespread euthanasia. In addition, the court recommended that Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code be repealed. The subject of passive euthanasia, which was previously hardly ever considered, started with this case. It significantly broadens the scope of Article 21 of our Constitution and explains the stance on the right to a dignified death. In the Indian context, this decision is hailed as progressive.

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REFERENCES

1. WP © 215/2005

This article is written by Sanskar Garg, a last year student of School of Law, Devi Ahilya University, Indore.

CITATION

1992 AIR 1858, 1992 SCR (3) 658

APPELLANT

Miss Mohini Jain     

RESPONDENT

State Of Karnataka And Ors.

BENCH

Kuldip Singh (J)

DECIDED ON

30 July, 1992

ACTS/SECTIONS

Constitution of India, 1950-Articles 41, 45-Right to Education, Karnataka Educational  Institutions  (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1984 ( Section 3)

BRIEF FACTS

Mohini Jain was a young lady initially from Meerut, Uttar Pradesh, and needed to seek after MBBS from a confidential school in Karnataka named Sri Sriddharatha Medical College, Agalokote, Tumkur. As per the Karnataka Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, it was laid out by the state government that Private Medical Colleges will charge just ₹2000 per annum from understudies conceded on Government seats, ₹25,000 from understudies from the territory of Karnataka and ₹60,000 from understudies of the other states in India. Aside from this, no expense ought to be requested from the understudy. This step was taken to guarantee that the Private Medical Colleges don’t charge cash from understudies in return for affirmation.

The administration of the school illuminated her that she would need to present an amount of ₹60,000 for each year however her dad passed on to the specialists that ₹60,000 is an enormous measure of cash and he was unable to manage the cost of that. On this premise, she was denied confirmation in the school. Miss Jain later affirmed that separated from the ₹60,000 the school likewise requested ₹4,50,000 as a capitation charge however this was denied by the school.

The Respondents guaranteed that she was approached to pay a measure of Rs. 60,000, and thusly, the Management got a call from the Petitioner’s dad who pronounced that he didn’t possess the ability to pay the extreme sum.

The Petitioner guaranteed that she was approached to pay an extra amount of around four and a half lakhs as capitation expense, which was denied by the Respondents energetically. Ms. Jain recorded a request under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution testing the notice of the Karnataka Legislature that considers requesting such excessive sums from understudies for the sake of educational cost.

The appeal guaranteed that the warning was violative of Articles 12, 14, 21, and 41 of the Indian Constitution as it conspicuously denied the Right to training to Indian residents on an erratic premise. The expense charged could without much of a stretch be recognized as a capitation charge. It was, in this manner, violative of Section 3 of the Act and against the excellencies of Right to Equality and Right to Education.

ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT

• Whether the Right to Education is ensured to the residents of India in consonance with Fundamental Rights, and whether charging a capitation expense infracts something similar?
• Whether the charging of capitation expense is violative of the fairness statement cherished in Article 14?
• Whether the criticized warning allowed the charging of a capitation expense dishonestly?
• Whether the notice is violative of the arrangements of the Act restricting the charging of such expenses?

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

The Petitioner battled that the burden of such colossal charges for training by the confidential school is against the different articles under the Indian Constitution.

For this situation, the Respondent battled at first that the rules which have been continued in the confidential school with respect to the capitation expenses are not chargeable from those understudies who were equipped for the Government situates yet just from those understudies who were from various classes. They additionally contended that as they were following such grouping of seats in the school under merit list or under nonmeritorious list, which suggests that Government seats for up-and-comers who were under merit rundown and other people who were not. Accordingly, the administration leading group of the school has the option to charge expenses from the individuals who didn’t go under the legitimacy list.

One more contention by the Respondent was that as they were a confidential clinical school and there was no monetary guide which was given from the public authority Karnataka or the focal government furthermore basically these confidential clinical universities used to cause 5 Lakh Rupees as use for MBBS course. Ultimately, they additionally battled that the confidential clinical universities have consistently observed the Guideline of regulation and submitted to every one of the regulations for the smooth working of the organization and were legitimate in charging the capitation expenses.

HELD

After hearing the contentions from both the gatherings the Apex Court held that however the Right to Education isn’t explicitly referenced as a Fundamental Right; Articles 38, 39(a), (f), 41, and 45 of the Indian Constitution, it is clarified that the of the constitution makes it required for the State to instruct its residents. Article 21 of the constitution peruses “No individual will be denied of his life or individual freedom besides as indicated by the technique laid out by regulation”. Under Article 21 of the constitution and a singular’s poise can’t be guaranteed except if he has a Privilege of Education and taught himself. Further, the Court thought about the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, by the United Nations and a few cases that held that the Right to Life envelops more than “life and appendage” including necessities of life, sustenance, haven, and education.

Charging immense expenses limits admittance to instruction to the lower layers of society and makes it accessible just to the more extravagant segment of individuals. Poor meriting up-and-comers can not get confirmation because of the failure to pay the endorsed charges and as a result, in instructive establishments, a resident’s “All in all correct to Education” gets denied. Further, permitting the charging of an exceptionally high capitation expense disregards Article 14 of the Constitution of India the Court noted. The main strategy for admission to clinical universities ought to be founded on merit alone. The court likewise said that the judgment cannot is applied reflectively and cases past this cant receive the reward of the judgment.

CONCLUSION

The Hon’ble Court displayed its choice of standards of social government assistance and value. 10 years and a half before ‘Right to Education’ was officially presented in the Constitution. The judgment is moderate and somewhat radical. The Court was constant in its understanding of what summed as a capitation expense and its relevance — or deficiency in that department. Its exhaustive assessment of Fundamental Rights interlinked with the Right to training was exemplary. The Court underscored the Right to rise to the opportunity being similarly essentially as vital as the Right to uniformity itself. An extreme assertion in the recently changed Indian setting, the idea that the Right to training moved from the Right to life honored the philosophies of the days of yore. The Court put import on merit as opposed to monetary capital, a demonstration that should have been visible as an obstruction against privatizing instruction.

This article is written by Arpita Kaushal, a student of UILS, PUSSGRC, HOSHIARPUR.

CITATIONS

1990 AIR 1412

BENCH

Justice S.R. Pandian; Justice K. Jayachandra Reddy 

FACTS

Due to poverty and unemployment, many children are forced to work in manual labor or as maids but, those who get into the hands of people like pimps and brothel keepers are deceived by them, and eventually pushed into ‘Flesh trade’. The trauma they suffered after living in claustrophobic rooms for countless days makes them fearful of the outside world and they may suffer psychological problems for an infinite duration of time. Some of them may be unwilling to live a life of respect and dignity after suffering so much in their life and may surrender to the end of life. The petition was filed by a vigilant citizen Vishal Jeet, he requested the Hon’ble Supreme Court to give direction for inquiry of those police officials in whose jurisdiction the practice of forced prostitution, devdasi system, and jogin traditions were used widely and for rehabilitation of those who become victims of such system.

ISSUE

Whether Supreme Court can issue guidelines or not?

LAWS

Indian Constitution– Article 23: Provides that exploitation against human beings in the form of begar, forced labor, and trafficking of human beings must be prohibited and anyone who contravenes this law is punishable with the due procedure of law.

Article 32: It gives a citizen of India, Right to Approach the Supreme Court in case of violation of any right mentioned in Part 3 of the Indian Constitution. Supreme Court has the power to issue writs whichever is suitable for enforcement of violated Fundamental rights.

Article 35: Any offenses committed against any individual under Part 3 of the Indian Constitution must be punishable with the suitable legislation enacted by Parliament.    

Article 39 Clause (e): It directs that it’s a duty of the state to protect men and women are treated well and children must not be pushed to work in factories or any working companies due to their economic conditions.

Article 39 Clause (f): States must ensure that all children are treated with dignity and healthy manner and must not be exploited. 

Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956– This act was made with the objective of punishing those who are involved in trading human beings as products for the purpose of sexual exploitation.

Indian Penal Code, 1860– Section 366A: Anyone who by whatever means forces or deceives a minor girl to do anything where she will be forced to be in illicit with another person shall be punishable with fine and 10 years imprisonment.   

Section 366B: Any person who is importing a girl under the age of 21 years from any country that is not India knowing that she would be forced to have illicit intercourse with another person shall be punishable with imprisonment of 10 years with a fine.    

Section 372: Any person who sells or buys a girl under the age of 18 years for the purpose of prostitution or is forced to have illicit intercourse with another person would be punished with imprisonment up to 10 years and liable to pay a fine. 

Section 373: Anyone who buys or has possession of a minor where she would be forced to have illicit intercourse with another person shall be punished with a fine and imprisonment up to 10 years.

Juvenile Justice Act, 1986–  Section 13: Empowers a police officer or any other official appointed by the state government to look after any neglected juvenile and bring them within the umbrella framework of this act.

Section 15: The Board can hold an inquiry under this act and can pass order which it may deem fit in favor of Juvenile.

DECISION OF COURT

Supreme Court denied giving any directions in this regard on the opinion that this is a socio-economic problem, hence, the measures must be taken carefully giving more emphasis to the prevention of such incidents and not the aftermath of such events. To obtain better results government must keep the laws in check. Supreme Court was of the opinion that issuing direction to the Central Bureau of Investigation to enquire throughout India about the social evils that girl children may face is not possible. The Supreme Court after hearing contentions of both the parties stated that both the Central and State government should organize a committee that would give advice to the government on the need for schemes for care, protection, and rehabilitation of victims of ‘Flesh Trade’. To suggest government laws that needed amendments and programs to create awareness among people who possibly may become victims of trafficking. Supreme Court also directed the government both at the state and central levels to ensure that Devdasi System and Jogin traditions come to an end. Governments must ensure the successful implementation of schemes made for the victims.  

This case analysis is written by Simran Gulia, presently pursuing BA LLB from Maharaja Agrasen Institute of Management Studies.

CASE NUMBER

1708  of 2015

CITATION

(2015), 834 SC

APPELLANT

RAJIV SINGH

RESPONDENT

STATE OF BIHAR

BENCH

V. Gopala Gowda, Amitava Roy

DECIDED ON

December 16, 2015

ACTS / SECTIONS

Sections 304B, 201, 498A of the Indian Penal Code , Section 365, Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, Section 323 Cr.P.C, Section 313, Section 293 Cr.P.C.

BRIEF FACTS

An affectionate vacation excursion of a recently marry youthful couple met with a sad end, with the puzzling vanishing of the spouse from the organization of her significant other, on the train where they were going coming back home. The litigant, the spouse, in the orderly realities and conditions, stands charged and sentenced under Sections 304B, 201, 498A of the Indian Penal Code, what’s more, has been condemned to go through thorough detainment for shifting terms for the offenses in question. The High Court of judicature at Patna, having avowed the conviction and sentence recorded by the learned preliminary court, the litigant looks for a change in the moment procedures, challenge being laid to the judgment and request dated 16.05.2014 delivered in Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 1169 of 2011.

A short introduction to the horrendous episode is imperative. Rani Archana Sinha got hitched on 29.04.2007 with the appealing party as indicated by Hindu rituals and had properly joined the marital home. Archana was a rehearsing advocate and had shown up in a cutthroat assessment in which, according to the outcomes proclaimed on 10.08.2007, she was not chosen. The couple arranged their special night outing to Darjeeling and continued thereto, by Capital Express on a similar date. They landed at New Jalpaiguri Station, and in the wake of visiting the spots of their advantage, as planned, they on 14.08.2007 boarded a similar help for the return venture at 1500 hrs. As the realities have unfurled from the First Information Report stopped by the appealing party with the Mokamah G.R.P.S. on 15.08.2007, the couple ate at Katihar Junction at 2000 hrs whereafter they turned in their particular billets No. 33 (appealing party) and negative. 35 (Archana) in mentor S 1 of sleeper class roughly at 2100 hrs.

According to the adaptation of the appealing party, he awakened at 0510 hrs on 15.08.2007 at Bakhtiarpur Station, to observe that his better half was absent from her introduction to the world whereafter, he began looking for her on the running train. As per him, when the train arrived at Patna Junction, he searched for her on different trains likewise thereat. His supplication is that on being enquired, the travelers in his mentor avowed that the woman was accessible in the train up to 0400-0430 hours. The litigant’s statement arranged subsequently, he revealed the matter first with the GRP, Patna, and at last stopped the First Information Report with Mokamah G.R.P.S.

ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT

• Whether Archana had vanished of consumption or real wounds or whether her passing had happened in any case than in typical conditions? Assuming such passing is demonstrated, whether it very well may be incidental and neither self-destructive nor desperate?
• Whether soon before her passing, she had been exposed to brutality and provocation by the litigant and any of his family members for or regarding interest for settlement?

HELD

In the current realities of the current case, the assumption engrafted under Sections 304B IPC and 113B of the Indian Evidence Act isn’t accessible to the arraignment as the fundamental central realities to set off such assumption have stayed unproved. The indictment has neglected to lay out for certain the demise of Archana. To repeat, the proof all in all bearing on endowment interest and provocation or abuse in association therewith is likewise not persuading.

On a combined examination of the proof on record, we are consequently compelled to hold that in current realities and conditions of the case, the indictment has neglected to demonstrate the charge under Sections 304B/498A/201 IPC against the litigant. The courts underneath, in our gauge, have neglected to look at and assess the proof on record in the right point of view both genuine and legitimate, and consequently have horribly failed in returning a finding of responsibility against him on the above charges.

It is very much dug on a basic level of a criminal statute that a charge can be supposed to be demonstrated just when there is sure and express proof to warrant lawful conviction and that no individual can be held liable on unadulterated moral conviction. Howsoever grave the supposed offense might be, generally blending the inner voice of any court, doubt alone can’t replace legitimate evidence. The deeply grounded cannon of law enforcement is “fouler the wrongdoing higher the evidence”. In undeniable terms, it is the command of regulation that the indictment prevails in a criminal preliminary and needs to demonstrate the charge(s) without question.

Doubt, despite how grave it very well might be, can’t replace evidence, and there is an enormous contrast between something that “maybe” demonstrated and “will be proved”. In a criminal preliminary, doubt regardless of areas of strength how should not be allowed to happen during verification. This is for the explanation that the psychological distance between “maybe” and “must be” is very enormous and separates ambiguous guesses from sure ends. In a lawbreaker case, the court has an obligation to guarantee that simple guesses or doubts don’t replace legitimate confirmation. The huge distance between “maybe” valid and “must be” valid, should be covered via clear, fitting, and irreproachable proof created by the indictment, before a blamed is censured as a convict, and the fundamental and brilliant rule should be applied.

In supplementation, it was held in confirmation of the view taken in Kali Ram versus Province of H.P. (1973) 2 SCC 808 that assuming two perspectives are conceivable on the proof cited for the situation, one highlighting the responsibility of the denounced and the other to his blamelessness, the view which is positive for the charged ought to be taken on.

This Court, among others, in Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah versus Focal Bureau of Investigation and another (2013) 6 SCC 348, while underlining the vitality of a fair, top to bottom examination had seen that researching officials are the head bosses in the law enforcement framework and dependable examination is the main step towards confirming total equity to the survivors of the case. It was decided that regulating law enforcement is a two-end process, where watching the guaranteed freedoms of the denounced under the Constitution is pretty much as basic as guaranteeing equity to the person in question.

This article is written by Arpita Kaushal, a student of UILS, PUSSGRC , HOSHIARPUR.