Tag: sexualharrasment

Critically examining the matter of skin to skin contact in POCSO cases

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Introduction

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in its judgment Attorney General for India v. Satish and another put away the judgment of Bombay H.C. which held that skin-to-skin contact is an essential facet for a crime of sexual assault to be made out under the POCSO Act, 2012. The case emerged out of requests documented by the Attorney General of India, the NCW, and the State of Maharashtra against two decisions of the Bombay court, both composed by Justice Ganediwala. In this article, the writer will feature current realities, entries made, and the judgment given by the Supreme Court of India for this situation.

Background

A 12-year-old minor girl was brought away by a man to his back home under the guise to give guava and afterwards this very nearly 40 years of age man grabbed her, attempted to take off her garments, and limited her in a room. She began crying and yelling and fortunately, her mom acted the hero in time and her cry was heard by a couple of neighbors, who were sufficiently benevolent to affirm. On nineteenth January 2021, a woman judge of the Bombay H.C. gave a decision that, as there was no skin-to-skin contact there was no offense of  “sexual assault” under the POCSO Act, and this episode just sums up “Insulting Modesty of Woman” under the IPC.  Further, the term of detainment was decreased to 1 year from 3 years. Thus, following shock and fights all through the country, on 27th January 2021, this request for the Bombay H.C. was retained by the Supreme Court. Further, the Judge has been downgraded because of passing such silly orders, as the Supreme Court Collegium has removed suggestions to make the appointed authority super durable.

Interpretation By The Cout

The sole explanation given by the woman judge in diminishing the detainment terms to 1 year and holding the individual not blameworthy under the POCSO Act for Sexual Assault is because the appointed authority felt that the base discipline of 3 years under the POCSO Act is unbalanced for the detailed occurrence, and the episode explained above isn’t serious enough in that frame of mind to draw in 3 years of thorough detainment except if there are more serious episodes where there is skin to skin contact. It has additionally been investigated by the academicians that such a silly end to prohibit the above episode of youngster sexual offense as rape for the absence of skin to skin contact under the POCSO Act, can not be arrived at because of any law on the translation of rule nor by straightforward use of rationale. There is positively not a great reason to legitimize this decision.

Judiciary Response On Skin To Skin Contact

A total of 4 appeals were recorded under the steady gaze of the Supreme Court of India by the appellants – Attorney General for India, NCW, State of Maharashtra, and litigant – denounced accused against the judgment dated 19 January 2021 passed by Bombay H.C. holding that skin to skin contact is important to comprise an offense of rape under Section 7 of the POCSO Act. One more allure was recorded by the State of Maharashtra against the judgment of a similar seat dated 15 January 2021 wherein it was held that demonstrations of ‘holding the hands of the minor young lady’, or ‘opening the speed of gasp’ don’t comprise rape under the POCSO Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India heard and discarded every one of the requests together. The translation of the arrangements of the POCSO Act as finished by the Bombay H.C. would devastatingly affect society at large. All the supposed demonstrations of the charge including taking the casualty to his home, eliminating salwar, squeezing bosoms and mouth were acts adding up to ‘sexual assault inside the significance of section 7 culpable with section 8 of the POCSO Act.

The understanding of the word ‘actual contact’, as signifying ‘skin-to-skin contact’ is a restricted understanding that nullifies the very point and object of the POCSO Act. There was no extension for use of the standard of ejusdem generis and it ought not to be applied where it would overcome the actual object of the statute. Section 7 incorporates two sections first, is a demonstration of ‘contacting with sexual purpose the vagina… ‘ and the second, relates to ‘some other demonstration with a sexual plan which includes actual contact without entrance’.

In this way, means the rea-the sexual goal of an individual is the most significant and material thing in the event of the offense of sexual assault. The terms ‘contact’ and ‘actual contact’ in section 7 have been utilized conversely by the legislature. In expressions of sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, the court is expected to assume the sexual aim concerning the blamed and it is for him to demonstrate that he had no such aim or guilty mental state. The attack is supposed to be aggravated in nature. For example, sub-section (m) of section 9 states that whoever commits the offense of sexual assault on a child under 12 years is said to commit the offense of aggravated sexual assault. As mentioned under section 10 of the said act It accommodates discipline for aggravated sexual assault for example detainment of one or the other portrayal for a term which will not be under five years yet which might reach out to seven years, and fine.

Provisions Under POCSO Act

The central concern for the situation connects with the translation of section 7 of the POCSO Act. The Court saw that while deciphering a rule, such a development must be taken on which advances the object of the regulation and forestalls its conceivable maltreatment. The Court likewise saw that the POCSO Act was established to keep youngsters from rape, lewd behavior, and pornography. After breaking down the word reference significance of the words ‘contact’ and ‘actual contact’, the court communicated its concurrence with the accommodation of appellants that the two words have been utilized reciprocally in section 7 by the legislature. The Court concurred with the accommodation made for the sake of denouncing that articulation ‘sexual plan’ in section 7 can’t be bound to any foreordained construction and is an issue of reality to be chosen for each situation. The Court anyway dismissed the accommodation that actual contact in section 7 methods skin-to-skin contact.

Depending on the proverb ‘Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat’, the court saw that any limited translation which would overcome the object of an arrangement can’t be acknowledged. Deciphering the articulation ‘actual contact’ to imply ‘skin-to-skin contact’ would prompt a ridiculous translation that could never have been the goal of the governing body. Such translation would disappoint the actual object of the resolution and would be exceptionally unfavorable as the demonstrations of contacting the body of the youngster with gloves material or condoms wouldn’t add up to rape under section 7 regardless of whether they are committed with sexual aim. The court saw that it is a settled place that corrective resolutions must be understood rigorously yet it is similarly settled that conditions of a rule ought to be understood concerning the specific circumstance and different arrangements to make a predictable sanctioning of the entire rule connecting with the subject matter. The Court would not make a difference to the standard of lenity and saw that it is a settled recommendation of regulation that the legal equivocalness ought to be summoned if all else fails of translation.

Where the aim of the lawmaking body is clear, the courts can not make vagueness to overcome such a goal. The Court held that there is no vagueness or lack of definition in section 7 to summon the Standard of Lenity. for a term at the very least five years under section 10 of the POCSO Act. Justice Ravindra S. Bhatt in his agreeing judgment directed out the need to decipher the resolution with regards to the conditions that brought about its introduction to the world. In his judgment, the Hon’ble judge depended on the underhandedness rule of understanding of resolutions which gives that courts need to decipher the law in order to stifle the wickedness and advance the cure. He noticed that the judgment given by the Bombay Court will in general proceed with the naughtiness that the Parliament wished to avoid. He likewise noticed that in section 7 of the POCSO Act, the term ‘actual contact’ is of more extensive import than the word ‘contacting’ and isn’t restricted to contact. The articulation ‘some other demonstration’ including ‘actual contact’ may incorporate direct actual contact by the wrongdoer, with some other body a piece of the casualty with the exception of those referenced in the initial segment of section 7 and different demonstrations like the utilization of an item by the guilty party, drawing in actual contact with the person in question.

Indeed, even no contact by the wrongdoer might go under the domain of the saying “some other demonstration”. For instance for a situation where the casualty is constrained to contact oneself. To decide if contact or actual contact is made with sexual purpose, one needs to check out the encompassing conditions. For example, the idea of the relationship with the youngster, the length of contact, its intentionality, and whether there was a genuine non-sexual reason for the contact, spot and direct of the denounced when such leads are significant contemplations. Courts need to remember that sexual purpose isn’t characterized but is subject to the current realities of a case.

Judgment Pronounced By the Court

The Supreme Court of India put away the request passed by the Bombay Court on account of blaming the accused and reestablished the request for the Exceptional Court. The accused was sentenced for the offenses culpable under section 8 of the POCSO Act and sections 342, 354, and 363 of the Indian Penal Code. The accused was ordered to go through detainment for a considerable length of time and a fine of Rs.500/ – and in default thereof to go through basic detainment for one month for the offense under section 8 of the POCSO Act. As the accused was condemned for a significant offense under section 8 of the POCSO Act, no different sentence was forced upon him for different offenses under the Indian Penal Code. The accused was indicted for the offenses under section 354-A (1)(i) and 448 of the Indian Penal Code as and for the offenses under sections 8, 12, and 10 read with section 9(m) of the POCSO Act. The court guided him to go through detainment for a very long time for the offense under section 10 of the POCSO Act and to pay a fine of Rs. 25,000 and in default thereof to languish straightforward detainment for over a half year. No different sentence was forced upon him for different offenses under the Indian Penal Code and the POCSO Act.

Concluding Remarks

For this situation, the Supreme Court of India has given a milestone judgment by switching the questionable decisions passed by the Bombay H.C. which were vigorously scrutinized for being terrible in regulation. In any case, it is lamentable the Court in a nation would pass such a judgment that makes a joke of the law by totally dismissing the regulative history of the POCSO Act and the significant articles that the Demonstration tries to accomplish. To close, it is appropriate to refer to the accompanying perception made by Hon’ble Equity Ravindra S. Bhatt, “It is no important for any appointed authority’s obligation to strain the plain expressions of a resolution, to the point of being indistinguishable and to the mark of its obliteration, subsequently denying the call of the times that youngsters frantically need the confirmation of a regulation intended to safeguard their independence and respect, as POCSO does”.

References

This article is written by Saumya Tiwari, student of Graphic Era University, Dehradun.

Sex Education and India: With Reference to POCSO

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Introduction

When I explored this topic, a video appeared in the search results. It was a satirical video1. But I am more concerned with the letters on the blackboard in that video at 06:49. The phrase which was displayed was: “Sex is not a stigma, Ignorance is.” The phrase is eminently true of the situation prevailing not only in Indian society but in the world as a whole. Only some countries have managed to develop and deliver quality sex education to their citizens. More importantly, the need for sex education is not only necessary for young adults and teenage students, but also for the elderly members of society who are reluctant to talk about this concept logically but take it as a joke.

This ignorance is responsible for our encountering sex crimes in our daily lives. Some are reported while others are buried deep inside by the victim, his/her parents, relatives, or the police. In this twenty-first century, information about anything emerged as wealth. But regarding sex education, only a few are informed about the relevant information. Every person has some information about sex, but whether that information is helping to develop a law-abiding citizen is unknown. The rape convicts, testify in courts that they watched porn before committing the offence of rape. This shows that they have access to information but that information is injurious to not only their health but also the health of society at large. Penal provisions are intensified but are fruitless to restrain the offence of rape.

Now we shall focus on the legal aspects of sex education and the laws regarding it. POCSO was enacted to protect children from offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment, and pornography and to provide for the establishment of special courts for the trial of such offences and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto2 as provided under the preamble to that Act.

Under this Act, we have some areas to focus on in detail in connection with sexual education under this article—

  1. Definition of Child and legal grey area
  2. Child pornography
  3. Domestic relationship
  4. Shared household
  5. Special court and special procedures
  6. Public awareness about the Act

Definition of Child and Legal Grey Area

Section 2 clause (d) of the Act defines “child” as a person under 18 years of age.

The first reason for this definition is that the Act is for the protection of the rights of children. The age group of teens, from 13 to 18 years old, is the most prone to sexual offences without being reported. In this phase, they are at the age of becoming sexually active. Due to hormonal changes, they eagerly move to sexual acts, and if they are not protected by any law, the offenders are ready to attack their physical and mental health through sexual offences.

The second reason is that sexual acts require free consent for being excepted to be rape or sexual offence. The law regards the consent of minors, which is also for more laws, a person under the age of 18 years, as no consent. So, consented sex is legal and not an offence only for persons above 18 years. And this creates a legal grey area among the person between the age group of 17-18 who consented to sex.

Under the Indian Penal Code, the maxim “Doli capax” is enshrined under section 83, which states that if an offence is committed by a child above 12 years of age, having sufficient maturity regarding the offences done by him, he can be prosecuted. But this Act is enacted for the benefit of the Child, and hence there is no such provision required. There is a different situation in which the juveniles are the offenders, and this is the main concern to be dealt with under the Act. The targeted juveniles act against the provision because,

  1. Lack of proper sex education
  2. Lack of awareness of the legal provisions of the POCSO Act.
  3. Lack of awareness among the victim child who is victimised yet doesn’t know of being victimised.

When both juveniles consent to sex with sexual intent, they are liable to be tried and convicted under the Act’s provisions because their consent is no consent in the eyes of the law and they are both committing the sexual offence against each other under the Act’s provisions. This seems to be a harsh law regarding this situation, but it is, in fact, a good law. The only requirement is that such people be made aware of the Act. The Act is not against them. The Act only seeks to protect their rights against anyone who attempts to assault a child for sexual gratification. This view is also to some extent supported by different High courts in which cases like these appear and High Courts have repeatedly asked the concerned authorities to disseminate information about the Act, especially to teenagers. This will ensure:

  1. Prevention of unwanted Child Pregnancy
  2. Informed decisions by the Child about sexual acts.
  3. Prevention of Sexual offences against the Child.
  4. HIV/AIDS prevention.
  5. Prevention of other sexually transmitted diseases; and most importantly
  6. Avoidance of prosecution of such children in the legal limbo.

Therefore, the Child is more prone to sexual attacks when he doesn’t know about the sexual intents. The word “sexual intent” is of the utmost importance. The Supreme Court continuously decided through a catena of judgments that it is the Sexual intent that makes any act to be included in the offence of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment.

The decision of the Bombay High Court, which was stayed by the Supreme court for its nebulous interpretation of section 7 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2013 (POCSO) about skin-to-skin contact constituting sexual assault, is worth mentioning here.

The appellant in Satish v. State of Maharashtra3 was acquitted under section 8 of POCSO by the High court citing an interpretation of section 7 of POCSO that there was no physical contact between the appellant and victim, that is skin-to-skin contact along with sexual intent but without penetration. The Bombay high court had an opinion which was challenged by the attorney general of India to the supreme court by noting that this interpretation would be against the law.

The court in Attorney General of India vs. Satish and Another4 dealt with this case and interpreted that only sexual intent is required and not skin-to-skin contact for the constitution of the offence of sexual assault. The term “physical contact” under section 7 does not require skin-to-skin contact but only “touch with sexual intent”. Another aspect of this definition is that it recognizes only biological age and not mental age as interpreted in the case.

EERA through Dr. Manjula Krippendorf vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) – It is essential to mention what the Supreme Court held in this case5:

“The Parliament deemed it appropriate that the term “age” be defined by chronological age or biological age as the safest standard rather than refer to a person who has mental retardation. It might be because different standards for mental retardation need to be established by a professional body.  Additionally, the degree varies. It appears that the Parliament did not take mental age into account. It is within the purview of legislative knowledge. It should be noted that Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2000, provided a procedure for age determination. The process was intended to establish biological age.  It should be noted that under Section 2(12) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), a person who has not reached the age of eighteen is considered a “child.” The method for calculating biological age has been provided.  This is provided to demonstrate that the age of the child has been purposefully set by Parliament and is based on biological age, and if any determination is necessary, it only concerns the biological age and nothing more.”

Hence, through this judgment, it is expected of the legislature to review this definition because the consent to sex is made by the mind, and if the mind is below the age of 18, the mind shall behave like a child, and a child is to be protected against all forms of offences. The prevailing legal grey area needs not be reviewed because such an area is very limited. Awareness about the legal provisions should be made available to this target group.

Child Pornography

The Act provides for the offence of Child pornography in section 2, clause (a) as any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct involving a child, which includes

i. Photograph

ii. Video

iii. Digital or computer-generated image indistinguishable from an actual child and

iv. Image created, adapted, or modified, but appear to depict a child.

Section 13 provides for the use of children for pornographic purposes. This section does not differentiate it for personal use or distribution. Both are considered the same. The other notable term is sexual gratification, including

  1. A representation of the sexual organs of a child.
  2. Usage of a child engaged in real or simulated sexual acts whether with or without penetration
  3. An indecent or obscene depiction of a child.

Sexual education in the world is mostly focused on the teenage group. It contains concepts about hormonal change, development of sex organs, safer sex, prevention of unwanted pregnancies, menstrual hygiene and mental health and sexual offences. Also, in the name of sex education, some people design sexually explicit content involving children and wish to take the protection of sex education as a defence. As there is a need to impart sex education among children, the offender of child pornography often takes the defence of imparting sex education when they are prosecuted, especially regarding a video or a book.

One such case is Fathima A.S. vs. State of Kerela6 in which the appellant took the defence of imparting sex education to his children.

The facts are worth noting: The appellant made her children aged 14 and 8, draw body art on her half-nude body and then posted the video. The court also noted in the case for bail that in the initial years of life, a child learns from his/her mother and this is not a thing which the mother should impart in such a manner. Hence, from this note, we can assume that there is a need to impart specialized sex education as per the age of the child.

Domestic relationship

The Act defined the term as having the same meaning as provided under Clause (F) of Section 2 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2002.

The definition is explained here: “Domestic relationship” is defined as when two persons related with consanguinity, marriage, or relation being in nature of marriage, or adoption or who live or lived together in a shared household, or as family members living together in a joint family

If any person commits a sexual crime against a child while having a domestic relationship, such an offence will be an aggravated offence against the child. The child trusts the person having a domestic relationship with the child, and when such a person is to attack the child, then the law will be more strict in punishing such a person. 

Shared household

A shared household is defined in Section 2 (k) of POCSO as: “Shared household” means a household where the person charged with the offence lives or has lived at any time in a domestic relationship with the child.” These words are used to include the offence as an aggravated form of offence which is penalized with more punishment than the simple form. This definition is included in the Act because 80% of the sexual offences against the Child are done by persons who are relatives, family friends, or whom the Child trusts. Sections 5(n) and 9(n) are made aggravated through domestic relationships and shared households.

The reason for this is to protect the child at home.

Special court and special procedures

Sex education is not only about the dissemination of information about sexual offences, sexual acts and sexual problems, but also about how to deal with situations where someone becomes a victim of sexual offences. The Act makes special procedures regarding post-offence measures to punish the crime and rehabilitate the victim child.

Special courts are constituted which level sessions courts for the trial of offences under the POCSO Act. Section 28 declares the constitution of special courts for speedy trials. The same court is competent to try any other offence as it would be competent to try under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It has jurisdiction to try offences under section 67B of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which relates to the publication or transmission of sexually explicit material depicting a child.

In this digital era, crimes are committed digitally and the law has to evolve itself to punish such crimes. Hence, the jurisdiction makes a special court competent to try such offences against the child. The most important sections which the author considers most effective against crimes against the child are sections 24, 25, 29, and 30.

Section 25 makes provisions for the recording of statements of a child. It includes protective measures for the child, such as recording the statement in a place where the child can freely make a statement and to a female police officer as far as practicable and in civil dress, and avoiding contact of the child with the accused during the recording of the statement, so that fear in the child’s mind is washed out.

Moreover, the child is not to be detained in the police station at night. Also, the identity of such a child is not to be disclosed to any person whatsoever. Section 25 makes provision for recording statements by the magistrate under 164 CrPC as they are spoken by the child and without the presence of the advocate of the accused. 

Section 29 shifts the onus of proof on the accused in an offence under sections 3, 5, 7, and 9 under this Act. The court is mandated to presume the offence was committed by the accused until the contrary is proved. This is a major shift from the general criminal jurisprudence, which places the burden of proof on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the offence was committed by the accused.

The accused is given a defence under section 30 in any offence in which the culpable mental state of the accused is relevant that he/she had no such mental state at the time of the commission of the offence. ‘Culpable mental state’ under section 30 includes intention, motive, knowledge of a fact and the belief in, or reason to believe, a fact. Such measures are necessary to protect the child from being harassed at the hands of the accused or the family, which seldom report such cases. EERA through Dr. Manjula Krippendorf vs. State (govt. Of NCT of Delhi)7 demonstrates the significance of this provision—

The petition was filed in the High Court under section 482 to transfer the case to the special court constituted under the POCSO Act, 2012. The mentally retarded woman, aged 38, was subjected to rape. The mental age of that woman is approximately 6 to 8 years old, and there is a necessity for the trial to be conducted in a most congenial, friendly, and comfortable atmosphere, and the proceedings should be video-graphed. Hence, the petition was filed. The court rejected this reasoning, as the definition of a child under the Act is the biological one and not the mental one.

Public awareness about the Act

Section 43 makes provisions for Central Government and every state government to take all measures for public awareness about the Act by resorting to different media such as print, electronic, audio, video, or any such medium. The government is also required to inform the victim’s parents and government officials about the act. This will ensure that the offender under the Act does not escape after committing the offence under the Act, as when the child is informed, the child will report to parents, special juvenile police, or NGOs.

Conclusion

Finally, the Act establishes effective measures to combat sexual assault against children. But the need of the hour is more and more dissemination of sex education, not only among the children prone to such offences but also to the public at large and generally, so that the world can punish and recognize the offence, as it did in the cases of rape, dowry deaths, and domestic violence, under which the victims were reluctant to even report the offence, and instead of punishing the crime, we made the victims as the criminals. This situation is prevalent today for offences against children under 18 years of age.

The measure to prevent such behaviour is to impart sex education. But this should not be generalized to all age groups.  Instead, the groups are formed with age groups up to 6 years, then 7–12 years, thirdly, 13–18 years, and lastly, 19–24 years, and different topics are to be covered under this program. Sensible and balanced training in such topics by psychologists and teachers is required to make students aware of the negative and dark elements of society and when to do what in their lives so that they are not in trouble without fault.

Citations

  1. Preamble to Protection of Children from sexual offences Act, 2012.
  2. Satish v. State of Maharashtra; (2021) 1 Crimes 175.
  3. Attorney General of India vs. Satish and Another, AIR (2022) SC 13.
  4. Eera through Dr. Manjula Krippendorf vs. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI), AIR 2017 SC 3457.
  5. Fathima A.S. vs. State of Kerela, (2022) 2 KLT 396.
  6. Ibid n(5).

This article is written by Somnath Sharma, a law graduate.

Bombay High Court refuses to grant a Decree of Divorce- Monika Sharma v. Mukesh Bhagal

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–Report by Rhea Mistry

In the case of Monika Sharma v. Mukesh Bhagal, the court disposed of the appeal for annulment of the marriage of Monika Sharma due to the bar of limitation.

The appellant is a graduate of Master of Science from Singhania University in Rajasthan and is not known the age, education, and occupation of the respondent. She is an officer at the Union Bank of India in Mumbai. The appellant and respondent, both are Hindus. Monika Sharma, the appellant knew the respondent since the year 2000.

In the appeal, the appellant asserted that in the year 2003 when she was pursuing her 10th-grade studies and was of 14-15 years of age, the respondent made his first physical contact under duress with her and clicked obscene photographs. The respondent had threatened her he would leak her obscene photographs if she told anyone about his actions. Monika was suffering silently as she comes from a very religious family in the State of Haryana where the Khap Panchayat is practiced.

This continued till 2008 when she moved to pursue her higher studies. When the appellant returned in 2010, the respondent threatened to defame her and her family and disfigure her by throwing acid on her if she didn’t marry him.

In 2011, when the appellant was working as a teacher at a Coaching Centre, the respondent slapped her in front of everyone just because the appellant had refused to go out with him. The appellant had secured a job as a single-window operator at a branch of Punjab National Bank located in the village Dhanora and was staying in a PG. The respondent constantly pressurized her for marrying him taking the advantage of her situation.

On December 28th, 2011, the respondent called the appellant to come out of her office, or else he would create a fiasco there. On going out of the office the respondent took the appellant’s phone, pulled her into the car, and gave a prasad to eat. The prasad was spiked and the appellant wasn’t aware of it, but, later, realized it. After eating the spiked prasad, the appellant had become helpless and a silent observer of the events unfolding with her. She remembered that on the way the respondent picked up his friends, took her to a mandir, clicked some photos, and made her sign some blank papers. And on the next day, 29th December 2011, the respondent dropped her at her office. The respondent had threatened her not to reveal the incidents or else he would harm her and her family.

In March 2012, the appellant shifted to Mumbai as she got the opportunity to work at Union Bank of India, the respondent followed her to Mumbai and harassed her continuously to come and live with him. When the appellant refused all his proposals, he again threatened to leak her photographs. In April 2012, the respondent left Mumbai after threatening the appellant that if she does not marry him, he would kill her parents in Haryana. The respondent came back to Mumbai and started extorting money from the appellant. The respondent continued his force, abuse, and harassment. His family started exerting pressure on her to marry him, so the appellant informed them about the respondent’s behavior and actions, still, the family did not pay any heed and pressured her to marry him. The appellant claimed the respondent also sexually and physically abused her once which left her mentally sick for some time.

In November 2013, gaining courage, she canceled her cards as she had given them to the respondent for use. On December 3rd, 2013, the appellant informed her parents about the incidents and the events following which the parents filed a complaint against the respondent. Upon this, the respondent filed an application for restitution of conjugal rights in the Court of Civil Judge at Bilaspur on 17th January 2014 under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act.
This was the first time the appellant came to know that the respondent purported to be her supposed husband. The appellant had not gone forward with her complaint, but in July 2014, with her lawyer, she filed a complaint and went forward with it. A crime was registered under sections 376, 366, 354, 506 (2) of the Indian Penal Code and 9 of 25 under section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 against the respondent and she had filed her statement at Bilaspur.

The court stated that the appellant was suffering since 2003 when she was of 14-15 years, and when she was of 18 years in 2007, she did not file a complaint and kept silent. After 6 years, the appellant has filed her complaint. There are just her bare words and no verification from any source, including her parents, brothers, sisters, or Union Bank of
India personnel. There is also no evidence of alleged extortion of a considerable amount by manipulating her debit card, which might have easily been obtained as electronic evidence. There is also no evidence of a medical evaluation of the appellant, who claims that the respondent sexually exploited, and subjected her to unnatural intercourse.
The court said that the overall evidence is improbable, unbelievable, and unacceptable.

The judge held that once the appellant came to know that she was forcefully taken to a mandir, the force and fraud ceased to exist. If the aforementioned truth was known on December 29, 2011, the petition might have been presented within a year. Nothing stopped her, and thus the bar under sub-section-2 of Section 12 of the Act operates in the relevant facts and circumstances.

The appeal made is without any substance and stands dismissed.