Tag: #legalnews

-Report by Deep Shikha

In the case of Sorin Group Italia S.R.L vs. Neeraj Garg, it was held that when the dispute is non-arbitrable, it will be adjudicated by the court and not by the Arbitration. And it is upon the discretion of the plaintiff to refer the dispute to which competent court leading to the present application being made successful.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Sorin, the plaintiff, entered into a Sole Distribution Agreement with the defendant to supply certain goods. Sorin supplied the goods as per the agreement and issued three invoices to the defendant. Since the defendant failed to make full payment for the goods purchased, this led to the present suit under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure for recovery of money.

In the course of the hearing, the defendant filed an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act for seeking leave to defend. When the defendant was given the liberty to file an application under Section 45 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, which gives the power to judicial authority to refer the parties to the arbitration. He lifted up the application filed under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, which led to the present application being issued for this case.

As per the agreement between both parties, the rules set out are under Article 15 of the Memorandum of Understanding. As per Clause 1 of Article 15, the choice of law is being considered. It says if any dispute arose, it shall be governed in accordance with the laws of Italy and the rules of the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods and the place would be Milan, Italy. According to Clause 2 of Article 15, dispute resolution laws are mentioned which says that if disputes arise between parties relating to grounds of termination or termination or for potential claims for indemnification or compensation thereof, and if this dispute is not resolved within 60 days from the dispute, it will be submitted to final and binding Arbitration with current Commercial Arbitration Rules of the Chamber of Commerce Milan, by three arbitrators. The language would be exclusively English. The other disputes are to be adjudicated in the courts of Milan, Italy. Even as per the agreement, the plaintiff will have sole discretion to invoke the jurisdiction of any competent court.

PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTION

The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff contended that as per the terms of the agreement only the termination dispute was to be resolved by the Arbitration. In this case, the dispute is about unpaid invoices not about the termination clause, therefore, the dispute cannot be adjudicated by Arbitration. And as per the agreement, a plaintiff has the sole discretion for the right to invoke the jurisdiction of any competent courts. As per the agreement, the disputes to be arbitrated are not the present dispute. It says that ‘excepted matters’ will be adjudicated by the court. In the present case since the dispute is about unpaid invoices, it will term an excepted matter.

DEFENDANT’S CONTENTION

The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant contended that since the dispute is of recovery of money which is covered under the aforesaid arbitration clause under Section 45 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. As per the agreement, a case can be filed in any court having competent jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the case. They even contended that they have counted claims that they want to be adjudicated in Arbitration and not in front of judicial authorities. In the Vidya Drolia case, it was held that the court may interfere at Section 8 or 11 when the dispute is ex-facie certain or the disputes are non-arbitrable. The limited view of the court is to check and protect the parties from being forced to arbitrate when the matter is non-arbitrable. When the dispute is arbitrable, the dispute will be adjudicated by Arbitration. 

JUDGEMENT

The court held that the dispute in the present case comes within the ambit of ‘excepted matters’ which is unpaid invoices. Therefore, the present suit is maintainable before this court. In the present case, the issue is with regard to the non-arbitrability of the dispute and not with regard to the Agreement being null and void with reference to the clause of the sole discretion of the plaintiff to refer the dispute to the competent court.

-Report by Gourav Jain

The Delhi High Court in BALWANT SINGH DHAMRAIT & OTHERS V. STATE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHER, decided that even if you pay rent on time and according to the conditions set by the owner of the property, you can’t become the legal occupant if the owner has shown his wish to evict you after the due date.

Facts

The property was given on lease to the SBI for a term of 10 years. For the first five years of the lease, the monthly rent was Rs. 3,21,000/-. After five years, as in the Deed, the monthly rent was increased by 25% to Rs.4,01,250. The SBI paid Rs. 19,26,000/- as six months’ advance rent at the start of the lease. The lease was renewable for a further five years on terms and conditions to be mutually agreed upon between the parties. Balwant Singh and others issued a letter dated 20th June 2012 to the SBI stating that they are in need of the property and the SBI should vacate the property on the expiry of the lease. A reply on 18th February 2013 was received from the SBI saying that the bank intends to continue the lease with the consent of Balwant Singh and others. In the reply, the SBI also requested Balwant Singh and others for a meeting in this regard. Later on, an offer for extending the lease for a further period of 5 years was given by Balwant Singh and others to the SBI. In the bank’s letter dated 20th September 2013, Balwant Singh and others sent their bid dated 23rd September 2013, offering the suit property for a fresh lease at a monthly rent of Rs. 22 lacs. No mutual agreement ever happened between parties for renewal of the Deed. The term of the Lease Deed expired on 12th November 2013 and the SBI was liable to evict the property. The SBI issued a letter saying that the bank is looking for a suitable space for shifting and till then the bank would do their work on the same property. The SBI deposited a sum of Rs. 34,50,750/- from 13th November 2013 to 31st July 2014 @ Rs. 4,01,250/- per month, in the account of Balwant Singh and others.

The present suit was filed by Balwant Singh and others for the eviction of the defendant Bank from the mentioned premises and recovery of damages.

Defendant’s Contention

Balwant Singh and others have no right to end the tenancy of the SBI. As per Clause II(j) of the Lease Deed, the SBI is to be given the lease for further 5 years after the expiry of the period of 10 years. The SBI is in possession of the property as a tenant and has regularly paid rent to the plaintiffs.

In the suit, the relief is claimed based on the area of the suit property measuring 5567.4 sq. ft, whereas the measurement of the same in the Lease Deed is 4729 sq.ft. The SBI informed the plaintiffs during their visit to the bank that the bank wants to eradicate the clause so that it can increase the tenancy period to 5 years, they further tried to mutually settle the terms for the extension of the lease for 5 years. 

SBI contended that the plaintiffs were liable to refund the security amount of Rs. 19,26,000/- back to them.

Judgment

In this case, the Lease Deed expired on 12th November 2013 and the possession was handed over by the SBI to the plaintiffs on 30th June 2016. Therefore, the mesne profits have to be considered for 31 months 17 days. None of the lease deeds or other evidence placed on record by Balwant Singh and Others can be the basis for deciding mesne profits in respect of the property. Therefore, the mesne profits have to be decided based on the last paid rent by the SBI to Balwant Singh and Others. As per the Lease Deed dated 13th November 2003 between the parties, the lease was to be renewed after 5 years with 25% increase of the last rent. Applying the same principle of increasing rent at the rate of 25% after 5 years, the plaintiffs would be entitled to mesne profits at the rate of 25% over the last rent for the period of 13th November 2013 to 12th November 2014. Following the rules set by the Court in the previous judgments (like, Sneh Vaish & Anr. v. State Bank of Patiala, 182 (2012) DLT 153; M.C. Agrawal and Ors. v. Sahara India and Ors., 183 (2011) DLT 105 and; Indian Tourism Development Corporation v. Anil Kumar Khanna, MANU/DE/0935/2016), the plaintiffs would be granted an increase in mesne profits by 15% every year on the amount. 

Hence, the Defendant Bank was liable to pay the damages to the Plaintiffs.

-Report by Manya Sharma

A two Judge-Bench discussed fair and just compensation for the affected parties related to the deceased and provided for the heads to be considered while calculating the same. After considering a variety of factors, the Supreme Court ruled in the favour of the Appellants and allowed an enhanced compensation of Rs.10,29,260/-, who had felt aggrieved by the earlier judgement of the Punjab and Haryana High Court.

FACTS

On 11.08.2009, a bus of Jammu and Kashmir State Road Corporation, which was being driven by the deceased husband of the first Respondent, fell into river Chenab. It was carrying Sudesh Kumar, aged 32 years, who drowned in the river. The Appellants claimed that the accident was due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver and filed the claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, for total compensation of Rs. 50 Lakhs, under different heads.

The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal found that the claim of the petitioners was correct and the accident was due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver, Mohd. Rasid. State Road Transport Corporation was held vicariously liable with Mohd. Rasid and the petitioners were entitled to an amount of Rs. 17,73,704/- with an interest of 6% per annum.

Dissatisfied by the compensation, the Appellants approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court for higher compensation and additional compensation of Rs. 2,95,000/- was granted to them at the interest rate of 9% per annum and the total compensation thus went up to Rs. 20,68,704/-. The Appellants still felt that the compensation was inadequate and hence approached the Supreme Court under Section 168 of the MV Act.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION

The Appellants, referring to the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Pranay Sethi and Others, contended that the High Court, while giving the judgment and quantifying the amount payable, did not consider the future prospects of the deceased, under the head of ‘loss of dependency and other heads. It is also contended that no amount was added under the heads, ‘loss of estate’ and ‘funeral expenses.’

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

Contrary to the Appellants, the Respondents contended that the High Court has granted just compensation to the Appellants, under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, and no other factors need to be considered for the same as it is adequate. It is also further contended that the compensation under the head ‘loss of love’ is impermissible and under ‘loss of consortium,’ only Rs. 40,000 is to be granted going by the Pranay Sethi case.

COURT’S DECISION

The Hon’ble Supreme Court found that there is no justification for not reckoning the future prospects which he would have had but for his untimely death. The Court took the decisions in Pranay Sethi’s case and Sarla Verma and Ors. V. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr., and held that they have no hesitation to uphold the contention of the Appellants that 50% of the actual salary of the deceased has to be added while calculating the compensation. The added amount of Rs. 15,000/- each, under the heads ‘loss of estate’ and ‘funeral expenses’ was granted to the Appellants, by the Supreme Court, which was not granted by the Tribunal and the High Court. The Court discussed the Pranay Sethi case, where three heads were recognized for the consideration of compensation and these heads were ‘loss of estate,’ ‘loss of consortium’ and ‘funeral expenses’ and accordingly fixed the amounts to be added and deducted for the same in the calculation of total compensation. Apart from this, referring to the Magma General Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram, the court held that compensation to the head of ‘love and affection’ is impermissible for ‘loss of spousal consortium to wife’ and ‘loss of parental consortium to children’ are admissible. Further, Rs. 40,000/- each was granted to minor children of the deceased and adjusted against ‘parental consortium’, the amount to be taken from the head of ‘love and affection which has to be removed from the list of heads, after deduction of the remaining Rs. 1,20,000/- from the same.

Thus, the Appellants were entitled to an enhanced amount of compensation of Rs. 10,29,260/- which would be paid within 8 weeks from the date of judgement, and in case of failure of the same, would carry interest at 6% per annum from the date of filing of this appeal till the date of realisation.

-Report by Gourav Jain

The Supreme Court, in the case of Menon Ekka @ Smt. Menon Ujjana Ekka vs. Union of India laid down that it can provide a criminal bail where an appeal is pending before the High Court even when the person has already gone through a part of his sentence, given the conditions are right.

Facts

The appellant was sentenced to 7 years of Rigorous Imprisonment by the Ranchi High Court. The appellant is a lady who had been convicted with her husband for an offence of the Prevention of Corruption Act, keeping in possession of inappropriate assets. Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, the lady has decided to appeal in the high court and as she had already undergone almost 3 years of her sentence, she asks for criminal bail from the Supreme Court.

Appellant’s Contentions

Shri Gaurav Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the lady has been sentenced to 7 years of rigorous imprisonment, for which the appellant has already undergone 2 years and 9 months sentence. It was further contended that the appeals filed by the appellant and the others are not likely to be heard in near future and thus, it is asked for the court to release the appellant on bail during the time pending disposal of the appeal before the High Court.

Respondent’s Contention

Opposing the appeal, Ms. Swati Ghildiyal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has actively submitted that as such the High Court was ready to take up the appeals for the last disposal, however, the appellant and others were not ready for the hearing of the appeals. It is submitted that the appellant shall not make an unjustified unfairness that the appeal is not likely to be heard. It is said that looking at the charges against the appellant and the nature of the evidence, the High Court has refused correctly to suspend the sentence and release the lady on bail during the settlement of the appeal.

Judgement

Taking into consideration that the appellant is a lady and has already undergone 2 years and 9 months sentence, the appeal is allowed. She is ordered to be released on bail during the pendency of the Criminal Appeal pending before the High Court on the condition that it may be given by the learned Trial court. It is observed and made clear that the benefit of the order may not be available to the other accused persons and the present order may not be written as a precedent so far as the others are concerned. The court directed the Registry of the High Court to notify the Criminal Appeals of all the accused before the Bench taking up these appeals and the court requested the High Court to finally decide the said appeals as fast as possible but not after six months from the first listing.

All concerned appellants are ordered to cooperate in the disposal of the appeals by the High Court and within the time stated.  Any attempt on the part of the appellant and/or the other accused to delay the hearing of the appeals shall be seen seriously.

-Report by Sanstuti Mishra

THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA in case of CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION, MARIANO ANTO BRUNO & ANR. Vs THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE held that upon the appreciation of evidence of the eyewitnesses and other material adduced by the prosecution, Trial Court wrongly convicted the Petitioners and the High Court was also not justified in upholding the conviction of the Petitioners under Sections 306 and 498A IPC.

Facts 

This appeal is filed under Criminal Appeal No. 166 of 2021 of the Madras High Court of January 31, 2022, wherein, appellants were sentenced to 3 years of imprisonment with a fine of  5,000/- each, and failure to do so would amount to simple imprisonment for a month under section 498A IPC and imprisonment of 7 years with 25,000 fine, non-adherence of which would amount to 3 months simple imprisonment u/s 306 IPC. On appeal, the High Court upheld the applicant’s conviction for violations under Sections 498A and 306 IPC. 

The marriage of Applicant No. 1 and Dr. M. Amari Victoria was ordained on September 8, 2005, and had a child in 2007. The husband was informed that his wife had collapsed in the bathroom, she was unable to resuscitate and she died on November 5, 2014. An autopsy on her corpse was performed on November 6, 2014, and her cause of death was asphyxiation due to external compression on her neck. FIR was registered by the police based on the appellant’s statements u/s 174 CrPC, which was further converted into Sections 498A and 306 IPC on PW-1’s complaint.

Petitioner No. 1 caused immeasurable emotional distress to the deceased by forcing the deceased to have another child, even though the deceased miscarried in her second pregnancy.  She was deceased, required to do all of her household chores and suffered constant abuse from her in-laws. For the same reason, the deceased was driven to suicide on November 5, 2014.

After reviewing prosecution witness testimony and defence evidence, the Trial court convicted the Appellants (husband and mother-in-law) u/s 498A and 306 IPC. The deceased’s father-in-law was acquitted by the Court.

Petitioner’s Contention 

Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal filed that allegations of atrocities were first raised by the deceased’s mother who was never raised in nine years of marriage. The relations between both families were good. It cannot be claimed that the deceased committed suicide due to the applicant’s abetment. 

It was then submitted that when their statements were taken shortly after the deceased’s death, there was no evidence of animosity between the families. The summary recorded by PW-9 shows a past medical history of depression, attempted suicide, and suicidal ideation. Further that the courts also convicted the applicant based solely on her PW-1 through PW-3 testimony alleging the applicant committed continued sexual and emotional abuse.

Defendant’s Contention

PV Yogeswaran, appearing for the respondents, said evidence from PW-1 to PW-3 clearly showed that all defendants demanded a higher dowry after marriage and further were forced to drink cow urine under the name of ‘pooja’.

It was also submitted that PW-1 to her PW-3 repeatedly reported on the nature of the harassment and incidents in which victims committed suicide and left their only child behind. It was then vehemently argued that there was clear evidence of an exponential increase in abuse, harassment, and agitation by the accused following the termination of her second pregnancy in 2014.

Judgement 

The honourable Supreme court concluded the Courts ought to be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide.

Accordingly, the facts and evidence Supreme court analysed facts which were ignored by both the Trial Court as well as the High court. The bench concluded that there was not a shred of evidence with respect to the offence alleged under Section 498A of the IPC meted out to the deceased by the Petitioners. There has been no marital discord between Appellant No. 1 and the deceased during their 9 years of married life. The deceased was suffering from bipolar order and also had suicidal ideas from a few days before suicide. The Trial Court as well as the High Court did not take the evidence of PW-9, the Psychiatrist into consideration while convicting the Appellants under Sections 306 and 498A of IPC. The conviction of the appellants is solely based on the oral evidence of the mother and sister of the deceased, who are interested witnesses. As a result, the impugned judgment dated 31.01.2022 passed by the High Court as well as the judgment and order of the Trial Court dated 26.03.2021 are unsustainable and deserve to be set aside and are hereby set aside. The appellants are acquitted of the charges levelled against them. The bench opined that to convict a person under Section 306 IPC, there has to be clear mens rea to commit the offence.

-Report by Deepti Dubey

The Punjab and Haryana High Court, on 12th October quashed the FIR lodged against Kumar Vishwas, former Aam Aadmi Party leader, on the allegations of issuing provocative statements and other offenses on April 12, 2022. The controversial statements were made in regard to the separatist motive of AAP.

FACTS

Mr. Kumar Vishwas gave an interview on 16th February, during Vidhan Sabha elections wherein he made accusations regarding the involvement of Mr. Arvind Kejriwal, CM of Delhi with anti-social elements, including separatist groups. The interview was widely spread all over social media and included deliberate intentions to associate every leader of the AAP (Aam Aadmi Party) with nefarious activities. 

On 12th April, 2022 as per the complaint, the complainant was faced by a group of 10-12 persons who attempted assault, following the victory of the AAP in Vidhan Sabha Elections. The complainant alleged that the incident was a result of the alleged incitement by Kumar Vishwas in his interview. 

A written complaint was given to the SHO, Police Station Sadar, Rupnagar, Punjab, based on the mentioned events, against the petitioner, following which an FIR was filed. On 15th April, the investigation was handled by the SIT. The Special Investigation Team [SIT], revealed that the hooligans had apprised the complainant that they had watched the interview of Kumar Vishwas who repeated the statements made in the interview. The petitioner was given a notice under S. 41-A of the CrPC, following which, he approached the court for quashing the FIR.

CONTENTIONS

The petitioners contended that the FIR was driven by political motives. It was argued that the state machinery was being misused to avenge the petitioner’s defiance of AAP.

The complainant submitted that there is a prima facie case and the petition must be dismissed. The state contended that the investigation reveals that the interview flared up the sentiments and led to the outburst and hooliganism. 

The petitioner has been arraigned as an accused for violating sections 153, 153-A, 505, 505(2), 116, 143, 147, 323, 341, 120-B of IPC and Section 125 of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951. 

REASONING AND DECISION OF THE COURT

The court, while quashing the FIR, reasoned that there is no nexus between the incident in April and the interview in February. The allegations levelled in the FIR even if taken on face value and accepted in entirety, though not admitted, do not prima facie constitute any offense against the petitioner under the abovementioned sections. An act of provocation intended to cause a riot under S.153A of IPC involves a substantial factor of mens rea i.e. the intention. The court in the instant case held that there was no element of culpability, even if all investigations were to be considered valid. Consequently, The Court invoked the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC and held that none of the penal provisions under which Kumar Vishwas stood arraigned is prima facie made out against him.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION

The Punjab and Haryana High court in the instant judgment took a step further and referred to, S Rangarajan v. P Jagjivan Ram (1989) wherein the Supreme Court held in paragraph 45 that the anticipated danger to the freedom of speech should not be remote. It should have a proximate and direct nexus with the expression. The expression of thought should be intrinsically dangerous to the public interest.

It also referred to the Shreya Singhal judgment which highlighted three concepts which are fundamental in understanding the reach of this most basic of human rights, they are discussion, advocacy and incitement. It is only when the freedom of speech reaches incitement, should it be curbed to protect the public interest.

While upholding the foundation of democracy, the right to freedom, the court quashed the FIR against Kumar Vishwas, to prevent abuse of the process of law.

-Report by Deep Shikha 

The Hon’ble High court of Delhi in the case of Panasonic India Private Ltd vs. Shah Aircon Through its Proprietor Shadab Raza, held that the court cannot intervene in the arbitral proceedings as well as the parties can refer the disputes to arbitration even without an agreement but at some point of time in the course of the agreement must show the intention to refer the disputes to arbitration.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioner, hereby, entered into a distributorship agreement to sell electronic goods to the respondent. The agreement contains a clause of dispute resolution by arbitration saying that all issues relating to appointment of arbitrator or any petition to be made to the court under the applicable arbitration law with the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 or any issue arising out of arbitration proceedings and award shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of courts at New Delhi. 

The dispute arose between them over alleged unpaid invoices. Therefore, a legal notice was sent on behalf of the respondent dated 20.08.2020. It was further alleged that even after the distributorship agreement between them, petitioner sold goods to some dealer directly and bills were made in the name of respondent which resulted in huge loss to the respondent, but the payment was not received by them. In reply to legal notice, petitioner demanded a sum of Rs. 37,29,976/- in the event of failure of payment and invoked the arbitration clause contained in the agreement. This led to the present petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 on 15.07.2021. In response to it, the respondent contended to be the dispute of civil nature which can be resolved under the jurisdiction of court. 

There are mainly three issues addressed in this case namely:-

1. Whether the purported arbitration clause is a valid clause in an agreement?
2. Whether the distributorship agreement is under the limitations for the agreement to be made enforceable?
3. Whether the court has jurisdiction to resolve the dispute by way of civil nature?

Hence, it brings to the present petition for resolving civil disputes in arbitration rather under the jurisdiction of court.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

The learned counsel appearing from respondent’s side stated that it did not sign any agreement with the petitioner. Therefore, the arbitration clause in the agreement is not a valid clause as the term “can” and “shall” makes the agreement uncertain, cases like Jagdish Chander vs. Ramesh Chander and Ors. and Jyoti Brothers vs. Sree Durga Mining Company, were relied on.

It also pointed out the second issue of limitation of the agreement which is not mentioned in agreement is one year as per Clause II(xi) of the General Terms & Conditions of the agreement, to be read with Schedule II and III. In this present case, it is outside the limitation of the agreement making an agreement void. 

While addressing the third issue by the learned council from respondent side, it further questioned that the dispute is related to arrears in accounts, which provide jurisdiction to court through civil proceedings in Gurugram, Haryana. And the petitioner has no power to appoint any learned arbitrator. The respondent contended that courts lacked jurisdiction over the venue of arbitral proceedings.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION

The learned counsel appearing from appellant’s side made an application to address the first issue in the suit for reference to arbitration under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Since, the parties’ intention to take reference to arbitration is sufficient for the parties to mutually refer the dispute to Arbitral Tribunal even without any expressly or impliedly agreement under the reference of the Clause XXIV and XXV of the agreement, the arbitration clause stands forth under the provisions of Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

While addressing the second issue, on the question of limitation, they contended that this issue be adjudicated by the arbitral tribunal during arbitral proceedings. Further on the question of jurisdiction which is the last issue, exclusive jurisdiction of contract will prevail over the intention of the parties to signify the place for the conduct of arbitral proceedings.

JUDGEMENT

The Hon’ble High court of Delhi grants the petition of referring the dispute to Arbitral Tribunal. Addressing this, the court appointed an arbitrator for resolving the dispute and pronounced an Arbitral Award. The remuneration is to be calculated on the basis of Schedule IV of the Act. All rights and contentions of the parties are left open for adjudication under the Arbitral Tribunal by the learned Arbitrator.

-Report by Sanket Pawar

Delhi High Court grants bail to the petitioner (spouse of the co-accused, Vinod) whose vehicle was used for the transportation of Heroin, in the case of SIMRANJEET KAUR Vs STATE OF GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI.

Facts

A raid was conducted jointly by the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) and Delhi police upon receiving secret information on 29/09/17. The information said that a person named Imran, who resides at Dakshinpuri area of Delhi, will be bringing heroin from Bareilly, U.P. in large quantities. Imran would be bringing these large quantities of heroin at the instance and order of a person named Vinod a.k.a Rinku a.k.a. Mota Bhai. Imran could be caught on the road from Kalindi Kunj to Sarita Vihar near Drain (Nala) and opposite Shaheen Bagh at about 12:15 p.m. Accordingly, the raid was conducted and Imran was apprehended along with the vehicle in which he was transporting the heroin and 500g of heroin was recovered from him. Upon investigation, the name of Mota Bhai came forward, and a supplementary charge sheet was also filed with the Charge sheet of Imran. The supplementary charge sheet is also named the petitioner. The vehicle which Imran was using to transport the heroin was registered in the name of petitioner Simranjeet Kaur. She is the spouse of the co-accused Vinod a.k.a. Mota Bhai. Mota Bhai is a habitual offender and there are other FIRs registered in his name. The trial court had dismissed the bail application of the petitioner twice.

Petitioner’s Contention

The petitioner sought bail on the grounds that she was not aware of the recovery of any narcotic substances from her vehicle. It also argued that the phrase in Section 25 of the NDPS act “knowingly permitted” does not mention the transportation of narcotic substances by use of the vehicle. The counsel relied on the case of Sujit Tiwari vs the State of Gujarat, wherein the apex court granted bail to the accused on the ground that the accused was not aware of the illegal activities procured by his brother.

Respondent’s Contention

The Respondent argued that during the investigation the prime accused, Imran, revealed the vehicle which is registered in the name of the petitioner. The same vehicle was used for the transportation of heroin. The petitioner along with her husband, Mota Bhai, was absconding for a long time. The counsel claimed that the petitioner was having full knowledge of the transportation of the heroin which was to take place.

Judgement

The court observed that there has been no recovery of the heroin from the petitioner. The only allegation levelled against the petitioner is that she is the registered owner of the vehicle in which the heroin was transported by the prime accused. There is not any evidence which shows the major involvement of the petitioner in the commission of the crime. The court also relied on the judgement of the apex court in the case of Sujit Tiwari vs State of Gujarat. Relying on all the above factors the court decided to grant bail to the petitioner along with a bail bond of 50,000/-.

-Report by Anette Abraham

In a Delhi HC ruling, Hon’ble Justices Suresh Kumar Kait and Saurabh Banerjee directed Kirori Mal College, to pay arrears to a faculty whose permanent appointment was inappropriately deterred. In this case, Kirori Mal College v. Dr. Kusum Lata, the Hindi Lecturer, who was expected to receive permanent employment under the provisions of the PWD quota was deprived of her post in a slight that occurred in 1998. 

FACTS

The lecturer, Dr. Kusum Lata, was visually impaired and fell under the provisions of the Persons with Disability Act, 1995. She applied to Kirori Mal College under the advertisement that posted two vacancies: one for the permanent Hindi Lecturer post and another for part-time Hindi Lecturer. She was given the post of part-time lecturer on 16^th July, 1997.

 In the year 2000, another advertisement was posted by the college which detailed the availability of two posts, one – the post of Permanent Hindi teacher under the Scheduled Caste category and the other – a temporary post against leave vacancy. Dr. Kusum was allotted the position of temporary post on 16^th April, 2001. Two more permanent posts for Permanent Lecturer were opened where one was reserved for candidates under Persons with Disability, the respondent was given the post of permanent employee on 4^th March, 2006. 

Kusum filed a writ petition in the year 2001, assailing the reservation that occurred in 2001 and contesting the lack of appointment she faced. The Court held that Kirori Mal College had failed to implement the reservation aptly and directed the college to pay for the arrears. 

The College was told to pay a sum of Rs. 8,84,583/- to Dr. Kusum to make up for the loss in income she suffered due to incorrect appointment. Further, they were instructed to provide a detailed calculation sheet for the arrears and put the funds in a Fixed Deposit that Dr. Kusum could access within eight weeks. This judgement was then modified slightly by the Delhi High Court where the college was only expected to pay arrears from the year 2001 forward when she was slighted of her position and also the year the petition was filed. 

APPELLANT’S ARGUMENT 

1. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has argued that the petition in which the impugned judgment was rendered was only filed in 2008, and that there was no challenge to the selection process undertaken in 1997, under which the Respondent was appointed on a part-time basis, prior to the filing of the said petition. Thus, the Petitioner’s challenge in the writ petition to the non-grant of the reservation to physically challenged category applicants in the 1997 selection process was greatly delayed and prevented by laches.
2. The Counsel proceeded to contend that Dr. Kusum’s petition did not stand under the ambit of reservation since the quota that she falls under, physically challenged, is a horizontal reservation (Article 16 (1) ) and that of the Scheduled Tribe Reservation is a vertical reservation (Article 16 (4) ). 
3. The appellant additionally claims that the respondent provided inaccurate calculation(s), citing inconsistencies in the values for “Transport Allowance” and “Dearness Allowance.” Finally, the appellant claims that the respondent is incorrectly claiming promotion to Reader with effect from January 1, 2007, as well as concomitant advantages accruing to the higher pay scale as a result of such promotion.

COURT’S DECISION

The Delhi HC held that the circumstances of the case and the court proceedings show that the college freely paid a sum of Rs. 8,84,583/- before the Registrar General, without providing any calculations and on its own free choice. Furthermore, the appellant hasn’t charged Dr. Kusum Lata with any fraud or deception, nor has it made the argument that the money it deposited was more than what was owed to the respondent or that it was an error on its side. Last but not least, the appellant has never requested release of the aforementioned deposited sum on its own and has only made a brief mention of it in its response to the respondent’s application without pressing the matter. 

Further, the Hon’ble Court held that, in light of the facts and the aforementioned conduct of the college, they strongly believe that the appellant, would have deposited the said amount of Rs. 8,84,583/- after making proper calculations and tallying it with the records available, to which it has not objected or raised a dispute. This caused the Court to draw the obvious conclusion that the respondent has a right to the aforementioned already-deposited sum of Rs. 8,84,453/-. Therefore, they concluded that the respondent is qualified to collect the aforementioned amount as the appellant had no good reason to voluntarily deposit it before the Registrar General. After more than four years have passed with no provocation or fault attributable to the respondent, the appellant cannot be permitted to undertake an improper endeavour to collect the previously voluntarily deposited sum. 

About Games24x7:

Games24x7 was one of the first entrants in the gaming industry in 2006 when India started showing the first signs of promise for online gaming. We turned profitable by 2010 in just four years and grew 200x in the next decade. We are a technology-powered analytics and data science company that happens to love games! In 2018-19, the mobile games market in India generated over $600 million in revenues. With close to [600] people in its Mumbai and Bangalore offices, Games24x7 is India’s largest mobile games business today and is very well positioned to become the 800-pound gorilla of what will be a $2 billion market by 2022. While Games24x7 continues to invest aggressively in its India centric mobile games, it is also diversifying its business by investing in the international gaming and other tech opportunities

About the job

Role –

• The candidate must be able to take on the role of Legal Counsel who will principally assist the lead in-house M&A deal lawyer (AVP – M&A)
• Provide support for all aspects of M&A activity, including structuring, due diligence, documentation and closing.
• Assist in legal due diligence on target companies.
• Working on FEMA and securities laws aspects of M&A activity.
• Work with international law firms in cross border M&A activity.
• Engaging with other in-house departments including tax, finance and accounting, secretarial, HR, legal and IT.
• Work with AVP – M&A to assist the corporate development team with respect to developing and executing on integration plans for acquired businesses.
• Engaging with and reviewing the work of outside M&A counsels.
• Providing legal counsel (under guidance of AVP- M&A) on a diverse range of matters related to Corporate Development and the M&A activities of the Company.

Skills and Experience

Candidates should have mandatory corporate M&A experience of at least 2-4 years in a top tier law firm (corporate in-house/PE firm experience in special situation can be considered) covering the following range of activities:

• Conducted legal due diligence on the target companies/vendor due diligences representing the companies
• Advised and assisted in domestic as well as multi-national M&A transactions.
• Worked on transaction structuring; drafting, and vetting of transaction documents (term sheets, investment agreements, share subscription & shareholders agreements, closing related documents etc.).
• Assisted in closing and compliance activities as part of the M&A transaction.
• Worked on memos and opinions on FDI, ODI, share transfer issues involving nonresidents.

Qualifications/Preferences –

• LLB from reputed law college
• Minimum 2-4 years of experience with a reputed top tier law firm or as in-house M&A counsel in corporate entity/PE firm.
• Good drafting and communication skills
• Total PQE of 3-5 years.
• Candidate should be based in Mumbai

How to Apply?

https://www.linkedin.com/jobs/view/2633107798/

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