-Report by Pragati Prajeeta

In the case of Delhi Development Authority Vs Manpreet Singh with Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Secretary Land & Building Department vs Manpreet Singh, a common question of law and facts arose in appeals out of the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, and hence both the appeals are being decided and disposed of together in a common judgment and order by the Supreme Court of India. And the main question, in this case, was Whether a subsequent purchaser has the locus to challenge the acquisition and/or lapsing of the acquisition?

FACTS

The subsequent purchaser is the original writ petitioner, who in the year 2018 acquired the rights and interest in the land. But the original writ petitioner was not the recorded owner when under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, of 1894 the award was issued concerning the land in question. And from all the records, it appeared before the High Court, that the claimed right by the original writ petitioner was based on the 2015 Assignment. Under Section 4 of the Act, 1894 notifications in this present case were issued and the award was declared.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS

The appellants vehemently submitted that as such the respondent is the subsequent purchaser and is the original writ petitioner, who after the Act,2013 came into force purchased the property hence therefore as observed by this Court in the case, they held that he had no locus to challenge the acquisition/lapsing of the acquisition proceedings under the Act, 2013 as he is a subsequent purchaser. Then it was submitted that the High Court declared material that the acquisition is deemed to lapse in the writ petition filed about because of the reason that the respondent is a subsequent purchaser, and had no locus to challenge it as observed and held by the Court.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

The learned senior counsel, however, has submitted that the decision of this Court needs some re-consideration under the Act, 2013 for certain relevant aspects which have not been previously dealt with and/or have been considered. But at the same time, he is not disputing or contradicting the fact that the subsequent purchaser is the original writ petitioner, who in the year 2018 acquired the right, title and interest in the disputed property or even after Act, 2013 came into force.

JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court after looking into the facts and reasons stated the appeal is successful. And in the view of the latter case, the High Court committed some serious error while for instance entertaining the writ petition of the response that is the original writ petitioner. Then it was also seen that the court has materially erred while declaring concerning the land in question, acquisition under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 has lapsed in a writ petition filed by, the original writ petitioner, the respondent who is a subsequent purchaser.

The Supreme Court then held that the judgment and order passed by the High Court are hereby quashed and set aside. The original Writ Petition filed before the High Court stands dismissed. At the same time all the pending applications, stand disposed of and the present appeals are allowed accordingly. But at the same time looking into the facts and circumstances of the case, it held that there shall be no order as to costs.

Report by Hans Rathi

The High Court of Delhi recently held in the case of TARUN DUTT versus GOVERNMENT OF NCT, DELHI that undertrial prisoners cannot be detained in custody for an indefinite period. It stated that an undertrial accused cannot be made to spend the entire period of trial in custody especially when the trial is likely to take considerable time. The court reasoned that once the majority of the co-accused are out on Bail it cannot be argued that it is only the accused person against whom there is an apprehension that he will tamper with the evidence and influence the witnesses. The Hon’ble Mr Justice Amit Mahajan presided over the case.

Facts:

An FIR was registered on a complaint of Shri Matadeen Gora, who alleged to have been dishonestly induced on the pretext of receiving the insurance policy bonus amount and the insurance gratuity value on the lapsed insurance policies from the year 2013 till date. He claimed that a group of people had called him from different mobile numbers claiming to be senior officials from the insurance regulatory body. They induced him by stating that the unclaimed insurance amount can be released to the complainant. On the allurement, he deposited a sum of ₹ 80 lakhs and another sum of ₹ 39 lakhs at different times. The chargesheet has already been filed in the present case. It was found that most of the money was transferred to the accounts of accused persons including one main accused herein. In a disclosure statement made by one of the accused, the present applicant was arrested on 14.01.2021. The applicant had joined the other accused persons – Arvind and Sunil, as partners in a fake insurance bonus scam and has cheated innocent victims/persons on the pretext of receiving a huge insurance policy bonus. The applicant is alleged to be the main caller who induced the complainant and impersonated himself as Senior Director of Income Tax and MCA. The co-accused Sunil was admitted on bail by an order dated 30.05.2022 passed by the learned ASJ and the co-accused Arvind was granted bail by this Court by order dated 28.02.2022, whereas one co-accused person Ratnesh Chauhan is stated to be released on interim bail granted by the learned ASJ by order dated 28.04.2022. The present appeal is filed by the main accused still in custody under Section 439, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“Cr.P.C.”), seeking regular bail in FIR No. 0012/2021 dated 08.01.2021 registered at Vasant Kunj. 

Petitioner’s Contentions 

Learned senior counsel for the applicant argued that the applicant was in the employment of the main accused and has been falsely implicated in the case. 13. He further submits that all the other four co-accused have been already enlarged on bail and despite that the applicant is languishing in jail and his application for grant of bail was dismissed by the Trial Court on an erroneous presumption that the applicant is likely to tinker with the ongoing investigation. In the present case, even though the FIR was registered way back in January 2021 and the chargesheet was filed long back, still even as per the prosecution there is a major part of the investigation which is still in progress. Therefore, the trial is not likely to proceed and will take a long period of time before it gets over. The Applicant is in custody for almost 2 years and has a family to look after, including a six-year-old daughter and an eleven months old son. 15. He further submits that when all the main accused persons have already been enlarged on bail, no purpose would be served by keeping the applicant in further incarceration and he is also entitled to bail on the ground of parity.

Respondent Contentions

Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for the State opposes the bail application and submits that the gravity of the offense and the manner in which the accused persons are found to have cheated the complainant, disentitles the Applicant of any discretion.

Judgment

The court in the present case held that undertrial prisoners cannot be detained in custody for an indefinite period. The speedy trial in the present case does not seem a possibility. Keeping the applicant in further incarceration would cause deprivation of his right to legal defence. It further reasoned that once the majority of the co-accused are out on Bail it cannot be argued that it is only the applicant against whom there is an apprehension that he will tamper with the evidence and influence the witnesses. Therefore, the court directed the appellant to be released on bail on furnishing a bail bond for a sum of ₹50,000 with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court / Duty Metropolitan Magistrate, subject to some terms and conditions.

Report by Anjali Pandey

Without commenting further on the merits of the case, keeping the facts and circumstances in mind and the fact that the trial is likely to take some time, I am satisfied that the applicant has made out a case for a grant of regular bail. In the event of there being any FIR/DD entry/ complaint lodged against the applicant, it would be open to the State to seek redressal by way of seeking cancellation of bail. It is also made clear that the observations made in the present case are only to consider the bail application and should not influence the outcome of the trial and not be taken as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.

FACTS:

The FIR was registered on a complaint made by the father of the deceased, Shri Sarvesh Kumar, alleging that the son of the applicant, Sonu was married to the deceased, Neha, who committed suicide on 19.09.2021, due to harassment and torture, being caused by her husband, Sonu, and his family members, including the applicant, Ram Ashre. The applicant is the father-in-law of the deceased.

Learned Counsel for the applicant submits that the accused, husband and the mother-in-law of the deceased who has been specifically named by the complainant are in judicial custody. He submits that no role has been alleged to the applicant and a vague allegation has been made that the entire family of the husband was responsible for the dowry death.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:

Learned Counsel for the applicant submits that the accused, husband and the mother-in-law of the deceased who has been specifically named by the complainant are in judicial custody. He submits that no role has been alleged to the applicant and a vague allegation has been made that the entire family of the husband was responsible for the dowry death.

He further submits that the learned Trial Court, by order dated 12.11.2021, has already granted pre-arrest bail to the brother-in-law of the deceased, specifically noting that the prime witness, Anisha, whose statement has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution, had only named the husband, Sonu, the mother-in-law, Maya Devi, and she had also specifically said in the statement that the deceased did not take anyone else’s name.

JUDGMENT:

Without commenting further on the merits of the case, keeping the facts and circumstances in mind and the fact that the trial is likely to take some time, I am satisfied that the applicant has made out a case for a grant of regular bail.

The applicant is, therefore, directed to be released on bail on furnishing a bail bond for a sum of ₹50,000/- (rupees Fifty thousand only) with two sureties of the like amount to the satisfaction of learned Trial Court / Duty Metropolitan Magistrate on the following conditions:a) He shall under no circumstance leave Delhi without informing the concerned IO / SHO.b) He shall not take adjournment and attend the Trial Court proceedings on every date.c) He shall join and cooperate in further investigation.d) The applicant shall not, in any manner, try to contact any of the witnesses.e) He shall provide his mobile number to the investigating officer (IO) concerned/SHO concerned at the time of release which shall be kept in always working conditions.

In the event of there being any FIR/DD entry/ complaint lodged against the applicant, it would be open to the State to seek redressal by way of seeking cancellation of bail.

About Lexpeeps Pvt. Ltd.

Lexpeeps Pvt. ltd. is an organization that works to assist and help law schools in organizing and managing their events. We’re seeking to provide young and dynamic law students with a platform to experience the legal world in their academic capacities. We organize different events where budding lawyers can experience the legal world. With a self-directed educational strategy and the guidance of industry experts, Lexpeeps also provide you with the recent happening in the legal world in the form of news, opportunities where you can find what suits you the best, articles to explore your interests, and many more.

Lexpeeps Placement Cell established in 2021 operates with a vision to ensure maximum placement of students studying in different law schools across the country. The sole purpose of Lexpeeps Pvt. Ltd. is to provide law students and law schools quality and to create value for the legal fraternity.

Lexpeeps Xcell is an Initiative of Lexpeeps Pvt Ltd to bring the practical aspects of law subjects to the desk of law students via personalized and curated courses.

Lexpeeps provides you with internships, where legal experts and budding lawyers come in touch with each other and grow by associating with the company. Lexpeeps Pvt. Ltd. has taken an oath to ensure the right of the student and to help them in every possible way so that they reach immense heights of success.

“Lexpeeps Pvt. Ltd. thrives on commitment and creativity”.

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  • Drafting an analysis of one legal judgment per day passed by the apex court or high court
  • Analyzing weekly important judgments and key happenings

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-Report by Gaurav Raj

The special leave petition in the case ANJALI BHARADWAJ v/s CPIO, was dismissed by the Supreme court on 9th December because one cannot rely on news articles and reports.

FACT

Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Delhi high court, the petitioner filed an appeal by Special Leave in the Supreme Court. The petitioner herein preferred an RTI application before CPIO, Supreme court regarding the decision taken in collegiums of supreme court held on December 12, 2018.

Vide communication dated 12 December 2018, the said application was turned down. Due to this, the appellant further filed an appeal before the First appellate authority under RTI Act, 2005. The authority rejected the appeal by contending that there has not been any final decision taken in the collegiums dated 12.12.2018. The second appeal by the petitioner was also turned down by the single judge bench by reiterating that there has not been any final decision taken in the subsequent meeting dated 10.01.2019. The learned single judge believed that there was no formal resolution came to be drawn up so there is no question of providing any information regarding the decision taken on 12.12.2018. The order passed by the learned single judge was upheld by the Division bench of the high court by impugned judgement and order. Feeling Aggrieved by the order and judgement the petitioner has preferred the present appeal.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION

Shri Prashant Bhushan, appearing on the behalf of petition contended that certain decisions were taken by the collegiums in the meeting held on 12.12.2018. and it must be uploaded into the public domain the decision taken by the collegiums is required to be informed under the RTI act 2005.

Shri Prashant Bhushan heavily relied upon an article uploaded by Bar and Bench that one of the members of the collegium had stated that he was disappointed that the decision taken by the collegiums was not uploaded on the supreme court’s website.

It is submitted that as per the article certain decisions were taken by the collegiums in the meeting held on 12.12.2018. However, it cannot be contended that no decision was taken at the meeting held on 12.12.2018 only because the decision was altered at a subsequent meeting held on 10.01.2019. it was submitted that everybody has the right to be informed about the decision taken in collegiums as per the previous resolution of the high court dated 03,10,2017.

COURT’S DECISION

The learned court has refused to comment upon the statement given by one of the members of the collegiums. The court is of the view that, in the earlier meeting dated 10.01.2019, it was mentioned that in the meeting dated 12.10.2018, the process for consultation was not over and remained un- concluded and it is only after the final resolution is drawn and signed by the members of the collegiums, the same to be published on the website of the Supreme Court of India as per resolution date 03.10.2017. Therefore, no reliance can be made on any news article in the media. What is to be seen is the final resolution signed by the members of the collegium. So, there is no substance in the above special leave to appeal and the same deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.

-Report by Asma Khan

The Honourable Apex Court in the case of Amit Singh Vs. Ravindra Nath Pandey & Ors. Etc., upheld the decision of both the single and division bench of the Allahabad High Court and held that the list of seniority prepared in 2005 has no stance and must be quashed.

FACTS

The appellant and the respondents both were appointed to the post of Assistant Consolidation Officers (hereinafter referred to as the ACOs) in the year 1997-1998 respectively. The appellants were appointed as direct recruits on 18th August 1997 whereas the respondents were promoted on 16th December 1997. The promoters were promoted to the post of ACOs whereas the direct recruits were directly appointed to the post of ACOs through the Uttar Pradesh Subordinate Services Selection Commission and were given seniority over the promoters because of the seniority list of 29th July 2005. The promoters filed a petition before a single judge in the High Court of Allahabad claiming that they should be given seniority over the direct recruits as per Rule 8(3) of the U.P. Government Servants Seniority Rules, 1991. The learned judge observed that seniority should be given based on the 1991 rules and quashed the 29th July 2005 list which gave seniority to direct recruits and held that promotions should be given superiority over direct recruits. The direct recruits then appealed to the Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad, Lucknow and the division bench on 4th September 2014 upheld the order of the single judge but also held that the State must apply the rota system in case the direct recruits or the promoters are appointed in the same year.

The appellant, that is, the direct recruits appealed to the apex court. 

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION 

The learned counsel for the appellant contended that when the direct recruits were appointed to the post of ACOs, the promotees had not even entered the Cadre and so the 2005 list of seniority was right in placing direct recruits above the promotees and the 1991 rules had an overriding effect and so cannot be applied here. He also contended that the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court was not right in applying the rota system for the recruitment of the same year. He also contended that the promoters would be promoted retrospectively if the decision of the bench of the High Court is taken into consideration. He referred to the case Uttaranchal Forest Rangers’ Assn. (Direct recruit ) and Ors. V. State of UP and Ors.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION 

The respondent contended that the order of the single bench and the division bench should not be interfered with because both the direct recruits and the promotions were recruited in the same year.

JUDGEMENT 

As per Rule 8(1) of the 1991 Rules, if recruitments are made in the same year for promotions and direct recruits then seniority would depend upon the date of order of substantive appointment and it shall be in the order in which their names are arranged. Further, if appointments are made by direct recruitment and promotion on the result of any one selection, then seniority will be in a cyclic order, that is, the promoter will be Senior. Therefore, if the ratio is 1:1 then the first post will go to a promoter and the second to a direct recruiter. 

New rules were issued on 25th March 1992 and they had an overriding effect on the existing rules and orders. Rule 3 (m) of the 1992 rules laid down “Year of recruitment” shall amount to “12 months starting from 1st day of July”. Further, rule 5 provided that 33% of posts would be filled by promotions and 66% by direct recruits.

A combined list shall be prepared as per Rule 18 and rule 19 (2) states that when both appointments are made in the same year then it shall be made from both sources and it is mandatory to prepare a combined list. As per Rule 19(3), names must be arranged in cyclic order if appointments are made by both direct recruitment and promotion. 

The court further observed that 1992 rules shall have supersession over other rules and orders. The court relied on the case of Pawan Pratap Singh and others V. Relevant Singh and Ors. As per this case, the date on which the selection procedure starts or the advertisement of the post is issued is the date of selection and if this process is not followed then it would be inconsistent with both articles. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The apex court in this case held that seniority cannot be determined as per the date of vacancy and cannot be given retrospectively because it would affect those employees who were already appointed. 

As per the 1992 rules, the year of recruitment in the present case is from 1st July 1997 to 30th June 1998. On 15th September 2003, a combined seniority list was prepared based on 1992 rules but the list of 25th July 2005 changed it. The Court observed that the list of 25th July was in contravention of rules 18 and 19 of 1992 rules because the 2005 list provided seniority to direct recruits over the promotees and as per the rules if appointments are made both by direct recruitment and by promotion then a combined shall be prepared and selections must be made from both the sources. 

The court further pointed out the case of Uttaranchal Forest Rangers Assn. which was relied upon by the appellants and observed that in this case the promoters were appointed in 1991 and the direct recruits were appointed in 1990 and so 1992 rules did not apply here. 

-Report by Akshita Singh

The Supreme Court, in M/S POLYFLEX (INDIA) PVT. LTD. V THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX & ANR, held and has appropriately set aside the request passed by the ITAT and has indeed restored the proposal passed by the assessing official denying the deduction asserted under Section 80-IB of the IT Act, henceforth declaring the appeal declared to be dismissed.

FACTS OF THE CASE:  

 In its production facility in Pune, the appellant produces “polyurethane foam,” which is ultimately used to make car seats. Deduction was requested under Income Tax Act (also known as the “IT Act”) Section 80-IB in the appellant’s income tax return for the assessment year 2003–2004. Because the appellant is a “manufacturer of polyurethane foam seats,” which is covered by entry 25 of the IT Act’s Eleventh Schedule, the assessing officer denied the appellant’s request for deduction under Section 80-IB of the IT Act. As a result, the appellant was declared ineligible for the deduction. Although different sizes/designs of polyurethane foam are used to make car seats, it is the appellant’s stance that the finished product—an automobile seat—is distinct from the polyurethane foam and does not, therefore, fall under entry 25 to the Eleventh Schedule of the IT Act. The assessing officer rejected the claim, noting that because “polyurethane foam” is made of polyol, isocyanate, and other ingredients, Section 80-IB(2)(iii) of the IT Act prohibits the appellant-company from receiving the benefit of the deduction as it manufactures or produces the items listed in the list in the Eleventh Schedule of the IT Act.

To challenge the assessment order, the appellant filed an appeal with the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) (abbreviated “CIT(A)”). The CIT(A) upheld the assessing officer’s decision. The CIT(A) noted that because the two chemicals, Polyol and Isocyanate, employed in the production of polyurethane foam seat assemblies were the essential components of polyurethane foam, the case would naturally come under the guidelines enumerated in the Eleventh Schedule. The Appellant filed an appeal with the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (also known as “ITAT”) in opposition to the CIT(A)’s ruling. The ITAT overturned the assessment order as well as the CIT(A) order and granted the appellant’s appeal, noting that polyurethane foam was used as an automobile seat and was neither produced as a final product nor an intermediate product nor a by-product by the appellant, so it does not fall under entry 25 to the Eleventh Schedule of the IT Act. As a result, the appellant was eligible to claim a deduction under Section 80-IB. The High Court specifically noted in the impugned judgment and order that what the appellant manufactures is polyurethane foam in different sizes/designs and that there is no further process undertaken by the appellant to convert it into automobile seats, so polyurethane foam being manufactured by the appellant falls in entry 25 to Eleventh Schedule, therefore, the appellant shall not be entitled to any relief under the ITAT order.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION: 

When the ITAT allowed the appeal and determined that the appellant was entitled to claim a deduction under Section 80-IB of the IT Act after appreciating all of the evidence on file, taking into account the process used by the appellant, and considering the fact that the end product was an automobile seat, Shri Preetesh Kapur, appearing on behalf of the appellant, has argued that this decision did not require interference from the High Court. He further asserted that entry 25 of the Eleventh Schedule refers to “latex foam sponge and polyurethane foam” and did not refer to “latex foam sponge and polyurethane foam preparations” or items or articles made from the aforementioned foam. There is a specific entry for that, such as entries 2 and 3, where it is specifically mentioned “tobacco and tobacco preparations and cosmetics and toilet preparations,” according to the argument made. Therefore, it was proposed that the appellant shall be entitled to a deduction under Section 80-IB of the IT Act because the polyurethane foam used as an ingredient in the end product, an automotive seat, loses some of its original properties.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:

When speaking on behalf of the revenue, Shri Balbir Singh vehemently asserted that the appellant manufactures and sells polyurethane foam in a diverse range of sizes and designs, which is ultimately used by the assembly operator to manufacture seats of cars and other vehicles as an ingredient after going through the moulding and other manufacturing processes, therefore, the appellant cannot be producing and selling car seats. It was asserted that the polyurethane foam that was being produced and sold was made utilizing the chemicals polyol and isocyanate.

DECISION:

The court held that the final product manufactured by the appellant was automobile seats merely because the appellant uses the chemicals and ultimately what was being manufactured is polyurethane foam and the same is used by assembly workers after the process of moulding as car seats. The appellant itself must carry out a further step in the car seat manufacturing process. Other than providing or selling polyurethane foam in various sizes, forms, and shapes that may ultimately be used as end products by others as car seats or automobile seats, the appellant does not appear to have engaged in any additional processes therefore, according to Section 80-IB(2)(iii), the appellant is not eligible for the benefit under Section 80-IB of the IT Act. 

About Lexpeeps Pvt. Ltd.

Lexpeeps Pvt. ltd. is an organization that works to assist and help law schools in organizing and managing their events. We’re seeking to provide young and dynamic law students with a platform to experience the legal world in their academic capacities. We organize different events where budding lawyers can experience the legal world. With a self-directed educational strategy and the guidance of industry experts, Lexpeeps also provide you with the recent happening in the legal world in the form of news, opportunities where you can find what suits you the best, articles to explore your interests, and many more.

Lexpeeps Placement Cell established in 2021 operates with a vision to ensure maximum placement of students studying in different law schools across the country. The sole purpose of Lexpeeps Pvt. Ltd. is to provide law students and law schools quality and to create value for the legal fraternity.

Lexpeeps Xcell is an Initiative of Lexpeeps Pvt Ltd to bring the practical aspects of law subjects to the desk of law students via personalized and curated courses.

Lexpeeps provides you with internships, where legal experts and budding lawyers come in touch with each other and grow by associating with the company. Lexpeeps Pvt. Ltd. has taken an oath to ensure the right of the student and to help them in every possible way so that they reach immense heights of success.

“Lexpeeps Pvt. Ltd. thrives on commitment and creativity”.

Responsibilities and Duties:

  • Reviewing two legal news and preparing an analysis of the same on a daily basis
  • Drafting an analysis of one legal judgment per day passed by the apex court or high court
  • Analyzing weekly important judgments and key happenings

Eligibility:

  • The students currently pursuing their bachelor’s degree in law i.e., 3-Year LL.B. course or 5-Year LL.B. course from any recognized university/college in India.
  • A student pursuing their Post Graduation.

Mode of Internship:

Online

Perks:

  • Internship Certificate on completion of the internship.
  • Best Research intern of the month award.
  • Discount on paid events organized by Lexpeeps Pvt. Ltd.
  • Publication on Lexpeeps blogs
  • Live session every Saturday/ Sunday for our interns to boost their legal researching skills. (Optional)

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None

For Applying, send your updated CV and a sample write-up to newsstories.lexpeeps@gmail.com.

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-Report by Akshita Singh

In the case of The State of Uttarakhand Vs. Nalanda College of Education and Others, it was held by the Supreme Court that the High Court committed a serious error in holding the communication/order of the State Government to be arbitrary as the State Government is expected to make its recommendations or comments to the Regional Committee in accordance with Rule 7(5) of the NCTE Regulations, 2014, upon receipt of the notification from the office of the Regional Committee to the State.

FACTS

The State of Uttarakhand has filed the current appeal in response to the learned Single Judge’s decision on July 16, 2013, which nullified the State Government’s order rejecting the new B.Ed. colleges’ application for recognition and instead ordered the National Council for Teachers Education (NCTE) to make the proper determination regarding respondent No. 1’s request to increase the number of seats in the B.Ed. course. On 22.02.2008, Respondent No.1, in this case, Nalanda College of Education, Dehradun, received recognition from the NCTE under Section 14(1) of the NCTE Act for B.Ed. degree course with a one-year duration and an annual intake of 100 students.

The initial writ petitioner was affiliated with the HNB University after being recognised under the 1973 U.P. State University Act. The College requested an increase in student admission seats from the Northern Regional Committee of the NCTE for the academic year 2013–2014. According to the NCTE Regulations, 2014 the State Government’s viewpoint was requested. According to the State Government’s order/communication dated 16.07.2013, the majority of B.Ed. graduates would be jobless because only 2500 teachers are required against the 13000 students who complete the programme each year. As a result, the State Government recommended that no new recognition be provided for those pursuing a B.Ed. course and that the recognition of the College is revoked. 

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS

Shri Krishnam Mehra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Uttarakhand argued that a deliberate policy decision was made by the State Government not to grant recognition to the new colleges for B.ed. course based on valid grounds and the High Court’s Division Bench made grave mistakes in rescinding the communication/order dated 16.07.2013 as the High Court did not need to intervene with it to exercise its authority under article 226 of the Indian constitution. He further submitted that according to the NCTE Regulations, before the Regional Committee decides to award recognition or expand the intake capacity, the State Government’s opinion, which includes the comprehensive grounds with the appropriate facts, is the sine qua non, therefore the State Government’s decision was not arbitrary as it was also backed by the required facts and statistics and by declaring it to be arbitrary and throwing it aside, the High Court made a grave error.

Ms Manisha T. Karia, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the NCTE also supported the appellant by relying on the cases namely, Maa Vaishno Devi Mahila Mahavidyalaya v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, in which this court had not interfered with the similar decisions of the State Governments. Also, in State of Rajasthan v. LBS B.Ed. College & Others, (2016) 16 SCC 110 it was stated that the State has a crucial role to play in providing appropriate comments supported by adequate reasoning, hence NCTE is compelled to consider the State Government’s viewpoint.

COURT’S DECISION

The issue before the Court was,

“whether the policy decision taken by the State Government can be said to be arbitrary which calls for interference of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India?”

The court by applying the law laid down in Vidharbha Sikshan Vyawasthapak Mahasangh held that the High Court committed a serious error in holding the communication/order of the State Government to be arbitrary as the State Government is expected to make its recommendations or comments to the Regional Committee in accordance with Rule 7(5) of the NCTE Regulations, 2014, upon receipt of the notification from the office of the Regional Committee to the State. It further stipulates that the State Government must offer specific justifications for its opposition to the recommendation, together with any appropriate statistics, so that the concerned Regional Committee can take them into account when deciding how to proceed with the application. As a result, the need and/or requirement are included when the State Government is expected to give thorough justifications against the award of recognition with appropriate figures. As a result, the State Government was perfectly within its rights to advise against continued recognition of the new B.Ed. colleges and/or express this opinion.

-Report by Manya Sharma

The Supreme Court after considering the arguments of both the counsels and the income of the Defendant, directed an enhanced compensation of Rs.32,82,000/- with an interest rate of 7.5%, to the claimants.

FACTS 

An automobile accident caused the untimely death of the appellant’s wife. The deceased was 25 years old and worked as a homemaker at the time of her death. The Motor Accident Claim Tribunal concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to Rs.19,12,200 in total compensation, including 7.5% interest. Taking into account the Defendant’s monthly income of Rs. 1,500/­, the Learned Tribunal found that the loss of dependency was worth Rs. 3,24,000/­. The learned Tribunal ordered an additional Rs. 50,000/­ for the foetus. The High Court enhanced the amount of compensation to Rs.29,34,000/- under various heads. Feeling aggrieved by the distribution of the amount and the total amount, the aggrieved party went to the Supreme Court.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION

It was contended that the calculation of the amount under different heads was not proper in the High Court’s judgment. The amount under the head’s loss of dependency was decided to be Rs.6,000/- keeping the income of the deceased in mind but this was not proper as even minimum wages payable to workers was more than that amount and also the prospects of the deceased were not taken into consideration while calculating the amount. It is also contended the High Court miscalculated the amount towards the foetus, the same being Rs.50,000/-, where it should be Rs.40,000/- each towards loss of consortium or loss of love and affection. 

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

The respondents contended that the deceased was only a housewife and therefore the High Court’s calculation of Rs.6,000/- towards loss of dependency was fair. The respondents also fairly conceded that the High Court should have considered the prospects while awarding loss of dependency.

COURT’S DECISION

The Court, after hearing the learned counsels of the appellants and the respondents, decided that after considering the income of the deceased, who was a 25 years old housewife, should be at least Rs.7,500/- per month. The position of law on the calculation of the amount under the head of loss of dependency provides that 40% of the income is to be added to prospects. The claimants will be entitled to an amount of Rs. 1 lakh for the loss of the foetus and an amount of Rs.40,000/- each for loss of consortium or loss of love and affection. Therefore, in total, an enhanced compensation of Rs.32,82,000/- with an interest rate of 7.5%, was awarded to the claimants.