Report by Umang Kanwat


Arbitration is the out-of-court resolution of a dispute by one or more (odd number) individuals chosen by both parties to serve as arbitrators. Any type of arbitration, regardless of its nature, has been legally recognised in India by placing it under the purview of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The arbitral award has the same legal force and effect as a judicial order or judgement. The present case of Union of India v Pushkar Paint Industries talks about the power or ability of the arbitrator.

Facts:


In the present case of Union of India v Pushkar Paint Industries, the Arbitral Tribunal’s mandate has been terminated under the current petition, which had been submitted under Section 14 of the Arbitration & Conciliation (Amended) Act. The Indian Army’s Ordnance Department, which is a division of the Ministry of Defence, was the petitioner in this case and the respondent in the arbitration procedures. Due to the respondent’s failure to produce the advance sample by the deadline specified in the contract, the petitioner suffered significant losses and was forced to revoke the previously approved Supply Order.

Petitioner’s Contentions:


The petitioner stated that the learned Arbitrator began pressuring the petitioner’s conducting officer to assist him in receiving the maximum amount as his fee, but the conducting officer retorted that it was beyond his purview. Furthermore, it ed claimed that the proceedings were not concluded by the learned Tribunal within the allotted year. The petitioner believed that the learned Arbitrator was biased towards the respondent/claimant and was operating in their favour.

He argued that the learned Sole Arbitrator failed to determine the case’s final fee because he continued to oppose the petitioner’s schedule of fee payment and insisted on paying under the Fourth Schedule of the Act. Allegedly the learned Arbitrator’s actions do not reflect well on the Office and instead, he was vehemently opposing the petitioner to further his interests. By bringing false accusations, he had attempted to harm the Conducting Officer’s career. He was not accurately capturing the events. In reality, he never documented the events as they happened but instead created fictitious orders later on according to his whims and fancies.

Therefore, a request was made that the learned Arbitral Tribunal’s mandate is terminated and replaced by the appointment of another Arbitrator.

Respondent’s Contentions


The petitioner’s claims that the arbitrator was demanding a high charge were unjustifiable in that he had been acting on his whims without ever getting the respondent’s permission to agree to any such fee structure. No agreement would be possible without the other party’s approval.
According to the Act, which does not make a distinction between Government and private parties and is equally applicable to both, the petitioner was not an exception.

It is submitted that the petition is without merit and is liable to be dismissed.

JUDGEMENT


The petitioner’s assertion was unfounded. It was plain that the petitioner was bringing frivolous objections, which are clearly against the statute’s requirements, to evade its obligation to pay the arbitrator’s fees. In the current instance, there is no evidence to suggest that the learned Arbitrator ever agreed to the petitioner’s proposed fee schedule, nor at any stage did he ever admit to it. According to the court, this claim made by the petitioner had no support. The petitioner in this matter, in the view of the court, was unable to show any of the grounds listed in Sections 14 or 15 of the Act. The current petition was determined to be without merit and dismissed with the remark that the learned Arbitrator may continue the arbitration and publish the Award following the Rules.

Conclusion


The dedication of the Indian government to turning India become a hub for arbitration and other ADR mechanisms is demonstrated by the several revisions made to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act to meet the demands of the constantly changing international business community. India can only strengthen its position as the global leader in rapid and effective dispute resolution by continuous adjustments based on lessons learned from the relevant commercial jurisdictions throughout the world and proper execution of those learnings concerning arbitration.

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CITATION: 2003/DHC/000894

Report by Shweta Sabuji

The appeal in the case of ITC LIMITED Vs. AASHNA ROY was made under Section 23 of the Consumer Protection Act of 1986. It questions the validity of the decision made by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in Consumer Complaint No.1619/18 between Aashna Roy and Yogesh Deveshwar and another in which the consumer’s rights were communicated.

FACTS:


On April 12, 2018, the respondent went to the ITC Maurya Hotel’s saloon for hair styling so that she would look presentable and well-groomed when she appeared before the interview panel a week later. She asked for Ms Alem, the hairdresser who had previously cut her hair on several occasions when she had visited the saloon. Since Ms Alem was unavailable, the respondent’s hair was styled by Ms Christine, a different hairstylist. The respondent, who had previously expressed dissatisfaction with Ms Christine’s services, agreed to hire her after the saloon’s manager assured her that Ms Christine had significantly improved her performance over some time.


The reply specifically instructed the mentioned hair stylist to “length flicks/layers covering her face in the front and at the back and 4-inch straight hair trim from the bottom,” using those exact words. The respondent was told to keep her head down since she was wearing high-powered glasses, which were taken off for the hairstyling process, and she was unable to view herself in the mirror to see what the hairdresser was doing. The respondent claimed that the directions were straightforward and would not require much time, but when the hair stylist spent more than an hour styling the subject’s hair, the respondent questioned why.


The hairstylist responded by telling her that she was giving her “the London Haircut.” When the hair styling was finished, she was shocked to see that the hair stylist, Ms Christine, had completely chopped off her hair, leaving only 4 inches from the top and barely brushing her shoulders, which was quite the opposite of what she had requested. She voiced her complaint to Mr Gurpreet Acharya, the saloon manager, right away. The Manager did not present a bill because she had complained, so she did. She was, however, so irritated and angry that she left the saloon.


Later, the saloon offered the respondent services for free treatment and hair extensions for the interview, and it appears that she accepted both offers. To extend its offerings, the salon hired an outside technical hair specialist from MoeHair (an international brand). She was instructed to repeat the procedure two to three more times. On March 5, 2018, the respondent underwent hair treatment once more. She was told that Ms Alem would supervise Mr Vicky, the on-staff hairdresser, as he performed the procedure. The respondent was informed that Mr Vicky was a highly skilled hair stylist with training. It ends up being a disaster for the respondent once more. Her hair and scalp were severely damaged during the treatment because too much ammonia was utilized, which caused intense scalp burning and irritation.

PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTIONS


The appellant, who was positioned as Opposite Party No. 2 before the NCDRC, raised several issues in separate written objections, including doubting the respondent’s status as a consumer given the free services provided; the compensation claim was extremely excessive; no documentary evidence had been presented to support such a large claim; and the complaint should be dismissed for lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. The appellant presented its argument even on the merits. The respondent also submitted a response affidavit to the NCDRC. Affidavits were used to present the evidence by both parties. Additional photos, CCTV footage, social media talks, and other materials were also included in the package.


DEFENDANT’S CONTENTIONS


The NCDRC determined that the respondent’s hair had been cut shorter than she had requested. Additionally, it noted a conclusion that the respondent’s appearance may have changed as a result of poor hair styling. The NCDRC further determined that the appellant had been careless in how it treated the respondent’s hair and had also damaged the respondent’s scalp. After then, the NCDRC handled the quantification of the compensation.


JUDGEMENT


In the aforementioned ruling, the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission accepted the solitary respondent’s complaint and ordered the present appellant, who is Opposite Party No. 2, to pay compensation in the amount of Rs. 2 crores to the NCDRC.

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-Report by Saloni Agarwal

The Delhi High Court in Arun Chauhan v State case convicted the accused of the murder of his wife and his son’s tuition teacher on the account of having an extramarital affair.

Facts:


The appellant was convicted of the murder of Akash. The appellant took the deceased to an under-construction site and stabbed him with a knife. The deceased was the tuition teacher of the appellant’s son and he had a feeling that his wife was having an extramarital affair with the teacher. He murdered the man on 15th November 2014. The appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine by the trial court in 2019. In this case, the appellant has challenged the order passed by the trial court. The major injuries sustained by the deceased were enough to cause death. The body of the deceased was found later by someone and after verification, he was identified. The appellant was arrested. He was charged under Section 302 IPC i.e., murder. The appellant also murdered his wife but he admitted that crime.

Appellant’s Contention:


The plaintiff’s claim was that there was not enough evidence to prove him guilty of such a heinous crime. He further claimed that there was no existing rivalry between them and his kids used to visit the deceased home to take tuition. The reason given for the murder was vague. It was that the court had made a wrong decision based on insufficient proof and reasons. It was further asked that the appellant should be left free. The plaintiff also killed his wife on the same day and accepted the crime.

Respondent’s Contention:


The State claimed that the chain of events are sufficient enough to prove the guilt of the appellant. The witness gave their testimony and all statements lead to the fact that after suspecting the extramarital relationship the appellant planned to kill both.

Judgement:


The Judges after hearing all the witnesses came to the conclusion that the reason for the murder is clear as the appellant first killed his wife and later that same day the deceased. The evidence was also sufficient as testified by the witnesses. The knife was also recovered and the blood stains on the appellant’s clothes were sufficient to hold him liable. The injuries suffered by the deceased were sufficient to cause death. The murder was hence proved without reasonable doubt. The court refused the challenge and held the appellant guilty of the murder of his wife and the deceased.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3x7vnyM

​​​-Report by Shivansh Pratap Singh

The case MASUDEO RAMA KUSALKAR Vs THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS dated 6 February 2023 revolves around alleged misconduct while carving out a new revenue village, namely Joshi Vasthi.

Facts:

A petition is filled by a group of villagers seeking the quashing of orders for the creation of a new revenue village, Joshi Vasthi (pop. 2000-2500) from village Limpangaon. The respondents of the case are majorly the government officers inches (tehsildar, etc) who claim no major misconduct and adherence to the law of the land while the creation of the respective village is under purview.

Applicant’s Contention:

  1. The impugned notification dated 07-11-2017 issued by Additional Collector(Ahmednagar) is contrary to law and provisions of section 4 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code,1966 and Section 24 of the Bombay General Clauses Act.
  2. Further the declarations dated 23-08-2018 & 31-08-2018 are contrary to law.
  3. The Petitioner seeks issuance of the writ of certiorari to quash notifications dated 07-11-2017 & 23-08-2018.
  4. Claim that no publication seeking objections were made by the respective authority before
    06-12-2017.
  5. Objections made thereafter were not considered.
  6. The publication of notification was not given the required publicity as stated by Section 4 of the code.
  7. The land under consideration is a forest area according to the 1992 notification.
  8. According to the forest act,1980 in absence of no objection from the central government the action of carving out could not have been undertaken.

Respondent’s Contention:

  1. Proposal for carving out Joshi Vasthi was received in 30-01-2015.
  2. The provisional notification was published on 07-11-2017 declaring the carving out of Joshi Vasthi and objections were called up to 28-11-2017, the notification was published by the govt. Gazette, notice board of Tehsil Office, Shrigonda, Talahati office, etc.
  3. Objections were received, duly discussed and dismissed following the relevant provisions contemplated under Section 4(1) and 4(4) with Section 24 of the General clauses act.
  4. The final decision was taken in tune with section 4(4) of the Code.

Judgement:

  1. After hearing the arguments from both sides respected judge reached the conclusion that according to the provisions of sections 4 and 24 a legit publication of intention for the carving of a new village, followed by reasonable time to raise objections and consideration of objections while following the principles of natural justice are the only requirements.
  2. The draft notification dated 07-11-2017 has been published in accordance to section 4(4). The objections were accordingly called on 28-11-2017.
  3. Evidence points towards that required publicity to the publication of the notification was provided.
  4. Objections were received, stakeholders were granted the opportunity of being heard, and an enquiry was done on the directions of the sub-divisional officer, Shrigonda.
  5. All the principles of natural justice were adhered to.
  6. The area covered under the proposed Joshi Vasti is already part and parcel of the village panchayat so the impugned notification has not been impeded by any provisions of the forest act or the rules.
  7. The writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3DOVkXA

CITATION: WP/11923/2018

Report by Tannu Dahiya

The Delhi High Court on 6th February 2023 held a sadar bazar trader guilty of violating the restraining order by selling counterfeit products of the famous Louis Vuitton brand.

Facts:


Everyone desires to own luxury items like Prada, lv, etc. But these items are so costly that even the upper middle class can’t afford them. Traders take advantage of this situation and make duplicate branded products to deceive customers. The same happened in the present case. The famous LV brand has sued several small entities that manufactured and sold products under its name. The court in its decision has used the term counterfeit, to let us know its meaning. A counterfeit is an item which uses someone else’s trademark without their permission.


On 23rd September 2021, the court found the trader guilty and passed interlocutory orders to restrain them.
According to the order, the defendants were restrained from importing, selling, manufacturing, or dealing directly or indirectly with the lv-labelled goods.


The present appeal was filed by the plaintiff alleging that even after injunction orders, defendant 2 and defendant 3 have been selling products under the brand’s name. The application prayed that the defendant must be punished for this violation of the injunction.

Plaintiff’s contention:


Mr Anand, the learned counsel for the plaintiff claimed that defendant 2 has continued the business of selling belts of lv till September 2022. Opposing the request of the defendant party to take lenient action, he submits that counterfeiting has now become a social evil and the court must take strict action against it, as it has eroded the brand value which was built over the years. He said that leniency, in this case, would encourage others to commit this wrong.


Defendant 2 has also imitated other reputed brands. Mr Anand also stated that the court must consider this strictly as a breach of its order. He also wants the court to take action for counterfeiting other brands like Gucci, etc.
He urges that the punishment should be proportionate to the wrong. If it is the first time counterfeiting then strict action must be taken as it has become a habitual business for the defendant.


He also submitted a report to the civil justice council under the UK Civil Procedure Act 1997, titled ―Anti-social behaviour and the Civil Code to prove his points.


He also took the decisions made by Various learned single judges High Court of Bombay in Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Curetech Skincare10 and decisions of the Federal Court of Singapore in Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Singga Enterprises11 and Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Lin Pi-Chu Yang12. He also relied on section 105 of the Trade Marks Act.

Defendant’s contention:


Mr Burender Bhatt, learned counsel for defendant 2, acknowledged the fact that his client has been selling the lv belt even after the injunction orders. He apologised for the breach and asked for leniency in the matter. He also argued that the court must not rely on sentencing practices in foreign jurisdictions while deciding on this case.


He said even Mr Anand has not pointed out any case in India where the court has relied on foreign practices. The action must be limited to the injunction which was granted by the court, and which has been breached by the defendant and it has no relation to counterfeiting of other brands. Mr Anand has failed to present any proof to show that the defendant has counterfeited any other brand. He also claimed that section 105 of the trade mark act is not applicable in the present case.


The cases presented by Mr Anand dealt with the damage being awarded while the decree was being passed. Thus they have no such relevance here. However, counterfeiting is a serious matter and the defendant has committed it even after the orders of the court. Mr Bhatt apologised for the same but it would hardly make any difference.


Judgement:


Justice C Hari Shankar expressed that the defendant is not entitled to any sympathy. The court added that there should be a message for all those who indulge or propose to indulge in the practice of counterfeiting. The defendant was directed to pay Rs. 5 Lakhs within four weeks. If failed to do so the proprietor of defendant 2 Javed Ansari shall be punished with a sentence in prison for 1 week in Tihar jail.

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CITATION: 2023/DHC/000810

Report by Shreya Gupta

The petitioner, in this case, was Masudeo s/o Rama Kusalkar and there were 8 respondents, The State of Maharashtra, The Divisional Commissioner, The Collector, The Additional Collector, The Sub-Divisional Officer, The Tahsildar, The Talathi, Bhalchandra Dattatraya Sawant. The history of the case lies in 1989 when the government of Maharashtra ordered to allot 1 acre of land to each beneficiary of the backward class.

FACTS:


The case is filed under article 226 of the Indian constitution. The government of Maharashtra allotted 1-acre land to 179 people of backward class for rehabilitation provided to some terms and conditions. The issue arose since land is a part of the revenue village Limpangion known as Joshi Vasti and was getting separated from it to become a different village. For this, the notification to raise objections was sent which caused the main dispute since it was contended that no such notification was issued.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:


According to the petitioner, the notification declared by respondent no. 4 is bad in law and contrary to section 4 of the Maharashtra land revenue code, 1966 and section 24 of the Bombay general clauses act. The petitioner contends that there should be an issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash and set aside the notification. It was contended that the notification was not given publicity by law. He contends that the action of the respondent is arbitrary and illegal. He took the support of previous judgements like Prashant Bhausaheb Ghiramkar Vs. The state of Maharashtra reported in 2013 (6) Mh.L.J. 703 and Dr Avinash Ramkrishna Kashiwar and others Vs. The state of Maharashtra and others reported in 2015 (5) Mh.L.J. 830.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:


According to the respondent’s contention, the proposal for consideration of a new revenue village with details was received. It is also contended that under section 4 (1) of the code, the collector can carry out the powers vested in the state government. They also contended that a village that has more than 300 population needs to be separated and created as a new village. They also contended that the call for objection from the public was issued, published on the notice board and a further hearing was also done. They further contended that the report from the District Superintendent of Land Record, Ahmednagar opined towards the creation of the new revenue village. They contend that they have compiled section 4 of the Maharashtra land revenue code, 1966 and section 24 of the Bombay general clauses act.

JUDGEMENT:


The court declares that the respondents have compiled by the law, issued the notifications, heard the objections and further published it too. The court stated that “We cannot sit in the appeal and appreciate the minor procedural lapses caused during the process undertaken by competent authority towards creating separate revenue village. We are concerned with substantive compliance with the provisions keeping in mind the object sought to be achieved. We are satisfied that there is the compliance of requirements indicated under section 4 of the Code.” The court stated that the petitioner cannot derive any advantage from the previous judgements that they have mentioned for reference. The court declared that no such evidence has been brought to our notice that shows that the notification issued impeded any provisions of the Forest act or rules. The court further declared that there is no merit in the writ petition and is therefore dismissed.

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CITATION: WP-11923-2018-J..odt

Report by Eshna Ray

The petitioner in the case of Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay Vs. Union of India and Another, challenged the constitutional validity of Section 33(7) of the Representation of the People Act 1951, which allows a person to contest an election for the same office from more than one constituency simultaneously. The petition seeks direction from the court to the Central government and the Election Commission to take appropriate steps to prevent this practice. The basis for the challenge is the Chief Election Commissioner’s request to the Prime Minister in 2004 to amend the act and the Law Commission’s 255th Report opinion that the act should be amended to restrict a person from contesting from multiple seats at a time. The petition is filed under Article 32 of the Constitution.

Facts:

The petitioner filed a petition to challenge the validity of Section 33(7) of the Representation of the People Act 1951, which allows a person to contest from more than one constituency for the same office simultaneously. The Law Commission in its 255th Report recommended amending the act to prevent this. The Election Commission of India and the Union of India filed counter-affidavits. The court heard arguments from both parties and the Attorney General for India. The court noted that the provision falls under the legislative domain and can only be challenged if there is a violation of a Fundamental Right or if the legislature lacks the competence to enact a law. Permitting a candidate to contest from more than one seat in a Parliamentary or State Legislative Assembly election is a matter of legislative policy, determined by Parliament. The court found no manifest arbitrariness in the provision or violation of Article 19 and concluded that the provision cannot be struck down as unconstitutional. The petition was therefore dismissed.

Plaintiff’s Contention:

The petitioner argues that contesting from multiple constituencies for the same office undermines the right of citizens to know about a candidate’s character, qualifications, and criminal record, as stated in Article 19 of the Constitution. When a candidate is elected from multiple seats, they have to vacate one, leading to a financial burden on the public and depriving the electorate of representation. The petitioner contends that this deprives the electorate of their right to know, as stated in Article 19(1)(a), and that this legislative issue should be addressed to prevent a drain on public resources through bye-elections. The contention is that the current provision allowing multiple constituencies is invalid.

Defendant’s Contention:

The defendant argues that the provision in the Representation of the People Act 1951 that allows a person to contest from more than one constituency for the same office simultaneously is a matter of legislative policy. It is within the legislative authority of Parliament to make the decision and enact or amend legislation. The defendant argues that unless there is manifest arbitrariness or a violation of a Fundamental Right in the provision, the Court cannot strike it down as unconstitutional. The defendant also mentions that Parliament has already intervened in the form of Act 21 of 1996 which restricts a candidate’s choice for an electoral contest to two seats in one and the same election.

Judgment:

The petition challenging the validity of Section 33(7) of the Representation of the People Act 1951, which permits a candidate to contest from more than one constituency in the same election, has been dismissed by the court. The court held that this provision, allowing a candidate to contest from multiple seats, is a matter of legislative policy and within the discretion of Parliament. The court stated that a statutory provision can only be struck down if it is made by a legislature lacking the competence to enact a law or if there is a violation of a fundamental right. In this case, the provision does not violate any fundamental rights, and therefore, the court cannot interfere with it. The Parliament has the authority to make legislative choices, and it has intervened in the past by restricting the choice of a candidate to two seats in the same election.

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​​​​​​​-​Report by Shivansh Pratap Singh

In the case of MR. JAY SURYAKANT KAKADE Vs MRS. ANUNAYA JAY KAKADE  dated 02.Feb.2022 a husband has filed an application for transfer of proceedings from the magistrate to the family court but the wife argues her right to appeal will be infringed.

Facts of the case:

The Applicant (Husband) seeks to transfer the proceedings filed by the wife under the Protection of Women under the Domestic Violence act,2005 before the Judicial Magistrate to the family court where he has filed a divorce petition.

Applicant’s Contention:

As the primary evidence in both cases remains the same there is the risk of conflicting judgements by two different judges. Further, the efficiency of cross-examination would be reduced and the judicial time of different courts will be wasted.

Respondent’s Contention:

Respondent disputed the applicant’s contention about conflicting judgements and the efficiency of cross-examination as misplaced. Domestic Violence Act aims to provide speedy remedy to women and such transfer will take away that right and also would be a serious infringement upon her right to appeal.

Judgement:

Amit Borkar opined that it is consistent with the court’s previous decisions to transfer the proceedings under Domestic Violence Act to the family court as the application filed under the Magistrate can be effectively tried under the family court. Further, the transfer is “Necessary” to avoid conflicting judgements. Whereas when it comes to the right to appeal, no such right is being infringed upon as the right being referred to here is just the right of revision. Further, the claim for speedy right of justice can be negated by the inversion test as not being the orbiter dicta or binding precedent.

KeyTakeaway from the judgement:

While delivering the judgement Amit Borkar sir referred to the ‘inversion test’ by Eugene Wambaugh to counter two points of the respondent, inversion test is a test to identify the ratio decidendi or obiter dicta of a judgement by treating a point to be absent and checking if the outcome/result varies. If it does vary then it’s the ratio decidendi or orbiter dicta but not if the resulting doesn’t vary. Further Orbiter Dicta is that part of the judgement that has to be treated as a binding precedent. 

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: MCA/500/2022

Report by Sanya Luthra


The case Sandesh Mayekar vs Union of India and Ors deals with the petitioner demanding a fair election procedure for a member of the Dental Council of India in the state of Maharashtra and therefore suggesting the process for the elections and how it should be free of all biases and should take place fairly and everyone have an equal chance of being a member.


FACTS:


A writ petition was filed by the petitioner challenging the electoral process of the member of the Dental Council of India as the maintenance of the register for the election was done by the Indian Dental Association whose president was also a member of the Dental Council of India which might have resulted in the business and not a fair decision would have been taken, as the party involved must have been partial towards their organization and as the next elections are on the board, so hoping for reform a writ petition has been filed.


PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:


He submits that there should be two stages of preparation for an electoral list, in stage one the date should be fixed for preparing the preliminary electoral list and then he says that there should be at least thirty days for the public to raise objections to the preliminary electoral list and then he also suggested to publish both the preliminary and the final list in both English and local newspaper which has a wide circulation in the state of Maharashtra, he also suggests that the final list should be published on the official website of Maharashtra State Dental Council.


DEFENDANT’S CONTENTIONS:


Defendant has presented no contentions and has positively taken everything.


JUDGMENT:


The court was of opinion that the petitioner is correct in suggesting a two-stage preparation of the electoral list and then publishing it in both the newspapers and also on the official website of Maharashtra State Dental Council as it will ensure a fair electoral process and will not result in any personal biasedness. The court also clarifies that the new electoral process decision is prospective and has no relation with prior elections result.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3XkMLe9

CITATION: 2023/DHC/000799

Report by Umang Kanwat

Issues only arise when one party affirms and the other party disputes a crucial truth or legal premise. The legal or factual assertions are considered material propositions. Such essential claims must be made by the plaintiff to establish his legal standing. Similarly, the defendant must allege to support his defence. A distinct issue won’t arise unless each relevant statement is supported by the plaintiff and refuted by the defendant.

The Court may revise already-framed questions, frame new issues, recast matters as may be necessary to resolve a dispute before it, or strike out concerns that have been improperly brought or formed, according to Order XIV Rule 5 of the CPC. As a result, the Court has the power to alter or eliminate the concerns as necessary.

The case of PRIME TIME INDIA Vs. SOMNATH VIJ revolves around Order XIV Rule 5 of the CPC, wherein the court tries to evaluate if the contentions on which the applicant argues are satisfactory or not. The word “issue” has not been defined in the CPC, however, Order XIV Rule 1 of the CPC indicates that “issues arise when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by one party and denied by the other”.

Facts: 

The applicant in the present case filed an application requesting the Honourable Supreme Court of India to remove certain legal issues framed by the defendants in the case considering them to be baseless and motionless under Order XIV Rule 5 of CPC. The application is based on a previous case over a disputed property where the present applicant was the defendant and the case ended with a settlement between the parties.

Applicant’s Contentions:

The applicant has filled out this application regarding striking off certain issues that were framed in the case over a property dispute. According to the applicant they agreed on the settlement and hence these issues in the aforementioned suit consequently sabotaged the interest of the applicant. Based on the joint application filed dismissing the objections to the settlement terms, this was done with malice aforethought. 

Defendant’s Contentions:

The defendant argued that the applicant filed the case even though it is unauthorized to do so. The defendants acknowledged that their culpability for the applicant’s claim had been reduced, and they would not object if the settlement included a decision granting the applicant’s request for specific performance. The present application under Order XIV Rule 5 read with Section 151 CPC was not submitted with a board resolution and was not embossed with the company’s seal; as a result, it is subject to being rejected simply on this basis. The applicant also violated the court’s order by adding construction to the disputed property and so the defendant has a right to take legal action against the applicant. 

The court made no mistake in the framing of the issues the issues were framed by the applicant who was previously the defendant’s pleadings.

JUDGEMENT:

The application was rejected because it had no merit. 

This was because the court believed that the legal concerns or issues raised by the Defendants’ arguments, which were requested to be deleted through the present application, were relevant for the adjudication of the current lawsuit.

Furthermore, an issue is a topic of contention between the parties in a civil lawsuit. Additionally, when parties differ on “material propositions” of truth or law, a problem arises. An issue that can limit the scope of disagreement may be presented to identify the genuine dispute and resolve it. In this instance, it was clear that the Court’s prior bench had given proper consideration to all pertinent arguments, including the compromise decree while framing the problems.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3RuuHNb