Tag: #legalnews

-Report by Kontheti Subrahmanya Sai Lakshmi Anuhya 

In the recent judgment of K. L. SUNEJA & ANR. Vs. DR. (MRS.) MANJEET KAUR MONGA (D) THROUGH HER LR & ANR., issued by a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court, an order was passed directing all courts and judicial bodies to establish rules to guarantee that sums paid to the office or registry of the courts or tribunals be invariably deposited in a bank or other financial institution. The directive was given to ensure that litigants would never lose interest in money deposited with courts or tribunals in the future.

Facts

1. In the current case, Smt. Gursharan Kaur (Complainant) was pursuing a case against a Developer for delaying the allotment of a property to the Complainant. After paying up to six instalments, the Complainant declined to pay additional instalments, citing a delay in completion progress. The Developer revoked the allotment on April 30, 2005. Along with the Cancellation Letter, the Developer encloses a Pay Order dated 30-04-2005 for Rs. 4,53,750/- issued by Citibank in the full repayment of the Complainant’s payments.
2. Dissatisfied with the withdrawal of the allocation, the Complainant filed a Complaint under Section 36 of the then Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (MRTP Act) before the previous Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Commission insinuating unfair trade practices by the Developer and seeking custody of the flat. The Complainant declined the reimbursement and did not cash the Pay Order. The Pay Order was also included in the Petition lodged with MRTP.
3. However, while the case was pending, the Competition Act 2002 went into effect on September 1, 2009, thus repealing the MRTP Act. As a result, the MRTP Commission’s cases were transferred to the previous Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT).

PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTIONS

• It was argued that NCLAT erred in failing to recognize that as the complainant’s legal team did not receive the reimbursement of the amount of 4,53,750/- from the developer until 7th May 2016, the interest on the said principal amount should have operated from 4th October 1993 until the date of implementation of the amount, which was 7th May 2016.
• It was asserted that after the Tribunal determined that the developer was at fault. a decision upheld by this court, which held that the complainant was obligated to compensation in the form of compound interest.
• It was argued that the developer’s claim that the money had been taken from its account and that it was unaware of the initial Pay Order filing could not be accepted. Furthermore, learned counsel stated that the developer took full advantage of the complainant’s deposits and, after cancelling the sale, quickly assigned the property to another customer for a significantly greater sum of 21 lakhs. 

 DEFENDANT’S CONTENTIONS

• The developer argued, both in answer to the complainant’s appeal and in its own appeal, that no blame could be assigned to it and that it could not be held liable once the complainant got the Pay Order dated 30th April 2005. Senior attorney for the developer argued that the inquiry was strictly limited to whether any obligation arose owing to any fault or shortcoming on its part after April 2005, given that the Pay Order was not encased by the complaint. In this regard, it was asserted that Citibank had unequivocally stated that the money was withdrawn from the developer’s account after the Pay Order was placed.
• It was contended that the Pay Order was in the MRTP Commission’s file and so authorized its recertification. In these instances, the developer addressed the Commission, leading in the instrument’s verification and eventual giving over to the complainant.
• Legal representatives for the developer claimed that once the money in dispute was settled through the bank (i.e., through an instrument payment, such as a Pay Order, the responsibility would stop. The developer’s counsel relied on the rulings in Hindustan Paper Corporation Ltd vs. Ananta Bhattacharjee.

Judgment/Conclusion:

Accordingly, the Apex Court said that the Complainant should have taken either of the following actions given the observations mentioned above:

She may have asked to deposit the Pay Order earnings in an account handled by the MRTP Commission Registrar. She may have asked for a “without prejudice” order, allowing her to cash the money and preventing the denial of her claim.

She might have also sought appropriate directions that the Developer keep the sum, who could then be instructed to pay the principal plus such interest as the MRTP Commission or the Tribunal judged reasonable and in the interests of justice. As none of these options was chosen, and because the money in question was unquestionably deducted from the Developer’s Current Account, the Apex Court ruled that the Developer cannot be held accountable for paying interest on the Pay Order amount of Rs. 4,53,750/- beyond 30-04-2005. As a result, the Developer’s Appeal was granted, while the Complainant’s Appeal was denied.

All these data made it abundantly evident that the developer was not at fault; in fact, the complaint confirmed receiving the Pay Order that the developer had returned in a letter dated September 26, 2005. The complaint’s database and the evidence presented with it include no mention of or reference to the original Pay Order, according to learned counsel who cited the pleadings before the MRTP Commission.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/40rgvZm

-Report by Sanya Luthra

The case Pawan Arora vs State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) deals with the petitioner being liable for keeping the substances for which he didn’t possess a suitable license which was considered unlawful and because of this the petitioner has been in custody since 4th August 2020 and Trial Court has also rejected the bail application and observed that the firm did not possess a such license which authorised them to sell those substances.

FACTS:

As a result of some secret information, a raid was conducted in the Jhuggis of Kamla Nehru Camp Kirti Nagar, New Delhi by the Narcotic Cell and because of that raid on the night of 17th and 18th June 2020 when the raid was conducted a huge amount of the consignment of psychotropic substance Tramadol, Nitrazepam based tablets and Codeine based syrups were recovered from the godown situated there. When police inquired about the same then Shravan Kumar (who was there at the time of the raid) revealed that the medicines of the godown belonged to the petitioner and his manager Chander Shekhar. With this an FIR was lodged regarding the same and Shravan Kumar was arrested at that time, later on, it was revealed that the petitioner and his manager had the office of the same substance, later on, the petitioner and his manager were also arrested, further, it was held that the license to sell and possess medicines was of Chander Shekhar. So now it is up to Delhi High Court to check the liability of the three people involved and also to grant bail or not.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:

It was put forward by the petitioner that the authenticity of the secret information is doubtful and the petitioner also argued that the license to sell the following substance was there with the petitioner so he was lawful in selling those and it was also stated that these substances do not fall within Schedule I of the NDPS Act hence compliance to Chapter VII A of the NDPS Rules 1985 is not required. Instead, they fall under Schedule H-1 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. Schedule H-1 has been issued under Rules 65 and 97 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 and the said substances which have been recovered and have been attributed to the petitioner, fall under Sr.No.20 (Codeine), No.36 (Nitrazepam) and No.45 (Tramadol), so they were emphasizing that they possess a lawful license for everything and can’t be said to conduct unlawful activities.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:

The learned counsel from the state argued that the FSL report which has arrived also proves that the substances they were carrying include substances which they were not supposed to be sold or possessed by anyone, that’s why they were having the unlawful substances and should be punished for the same, also the license which they were having was not eligible to possess such substances.

JUDGMENT:

The Delhi High Court held that at this stage when a trial has to be conducted and will take much time and 37 witnesses have to be examined and prima facie it does seem violation of license rules and not of illegal stocking and sale of substances, without a license, so the petitioner can be released on regular bail and therefore he is released on regular bail with the sum amount of 1,00,000 as bond and two sureties with certain conditions which are that he will not leave the country, will provide his all mobile numbers, permanent address, join the investigation and will appear before the court when called.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3DHbrX1

CITATION: 2023/DHC/000688

–Report by Sneha Sakshi

In the case of MAHARASHTRA STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATION EX-EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION & ORS.
VERSUS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS., the appellants had brought a discrimination claim against the Maharashtra government’s Industry, Energy and Labour Department’s decision dated 29.03.2010 in that procedure.

FACTS:

The workers of the Maharashtra State Financial Corporation who retired or passed away between January 1, 2006, and March 29, 2010, were not granted the benefit of the pay scale change that the Fifth Pay Commission had recommended. The modification, however, became effective on January 1, 2006.

The determination of the implementation date for the Fifth Pay Commission’s recommendations as they relate to the respondent corporation is at issue in this case. That formulating a policy on fixation of pay for the wages of its employees, the scope of its revision, as well as the date of its execution, are undeniably matters of exclusive executive decision-making power. Special leave to appeal granted.

The appeal was finally heard with the parties’ knowledgeable counsel’s permission. A ruling by the Bombay High Court is being contested by the appellant organisation.

CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANT:

➢ The expert counsel for the appellants, Mr Jay Salva, asserted that, notwithstanding the fact that the most recent pay modification had been in effect for its employees from 1986 to 1989, MSFC believed it had gone into effect on January 1, 1999. While the previous version was being authorised, five more revisions were due.
➢ The board of directors decided to follow the pay commission’s recommendations starting in January 1996 without giving those modifications any thought.
➢ Only the 115 current employees who were working at the time that the benefits were passed on were subject to the enhanced salary, depriving the 900 previous employees of comparative advantages.
➢ All people who were employed received temporary reliefs beginning in September 1993, including those who ultimately lost out on the pay revision owing to retirement.
➢ Mr Salva contended that the MSFC owed no more than 32 crores to all former workers, including those who had retired, asked for VRS, or had passed away. He said the GR failed to recover the money paid for interim relief and ad hoc amounts paid to current employees between September 1993 and July 2001.

CONTENTIONS OF RESPONDENT:

➢ The employee in question was not subject to any scheme and chose to leave the company of his or her own volition. However, the Corporation had less obligation to pay salary dues.
➢ The defence attorney for MSFC contended that the state government shouldn’t intervene because of the contested judgement.
➢ It was contended that MSFC is an independent company and is exempt from Maharashtra Government regulations.
➢ Expert counsel emphasised that by paying the benefits on the terms proposed by the appellants, the Corporation was suffering losses.
➢ These characteristics made these workers eligible for benefits above and beyond what they would have gotten if they had remained in their jobs.
➢ Before issuing such a ruling, the Court, according to Mr Patil, must consider the financial impact on the employer.

JUDGMENT:

On January 1, 1996, the State Government adopted and put into practice the Fifth Pay Commission’s recommendations. Without choosing whether to impose those scales for its employees, the MSFC forwarded the idea to the State Government (as required by S. 39 of the State Financial Corporations Act). During this period, all present employees received a little reprieve in the form of wage revision.

The Fifth Pay Commission’s recommendations for pay modification were put into action by MSFC on March 29, 2010. The State of Maharashtra letter dated 29.03.2010 served as the basis for the decision to apply the wage revision to the workers who were already working there and to minimise the arrears that would be due as of the first of January 2006 in the future.

By Office Order dated 09.04.2010, the MSFC decided to implement the decision of the Government of Maharashtra and grant the benefits of the Fifth Pay Commission to employees of the Corporation who were on its rolls on that date.

The highest court in India has ruled that voluntarily leaving one’s job before finishing it is still eligible for rewards. The employer cannot discriminate against or split a homogeneous class of workers using a fake cut-off date, the court said.

It was held that VRS employees cannot claim parity with others who retired upon achieving the age of superannuation. Those who died during that period shall be entitled to arrears based on pay revision, accepted by the Corporation. The Corporation was directed to pay interest @ 8% p.a. on these arrears from 01.04.2010 till the end of this judgment.

LINK TO FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3Rw1Qbk

-Report by Shweta Sabuji

In the recent case of K.T.V. OIL MILLS PRIVATE LIMITED VERSUS THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, UNION OF INDIA & ORS., an appeal filed in opposition to the judgment and decree rendered on the file of the Commercial Division of this Honourable High Court on July 3, 2018, by the learned Single Judge in A.No.1253 of 2018 in C.S.No.706 of 2017.

FACTS:

The appellant was established in 2008 as a company under the Companies Act of 1956. The purpose of forming this Company was to take over K.T.V. Oil Mills’ operations. The late Shri. K. T. Varadaraj Chetty launched an oil trading company in Kotwal Market in 1971. Under the name and style “K.T.V Oil Mills,” the company operated from 1999 to 2008 as a partnership firm. The partnership firm was then changed into a private limited company in 2008 under the name “K.T.V. Health Food Private Limited,” and they applied to the Trademark Registry for the registration of the trademark “ROOBINI,” claiming usage as of June 1, 1995.

On December 30, 2007, K.T.V. Oil Mills and the appellant engaged in an assignment deed, and as a result, the trademark “ROOBINI” was transferred. The K.T.V. Oil Mills partners all acquired shares in the appellant-Company. The assignment deed was completed in favor of the appellant by the partners of K.T.V. Oil Mills because they chose to operate the company under the appellant’s Company name. As a result, the appellant learned that the respondent was using the contested trademark “ROOBEN” in 2017, which is a slavish replica of the appellant’s trademark “ROOBINI” regarding a similar product.

PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTIONS:

The plaintiff responded to the request for the plaint to be rejected by filing a counter, claiming that the plaintiff’s predecessor, K.T.V. Oil Mills, conducted business from 1995 to 2007 under the name and style of “ROOBINI,” and that all necessary applications for the trademark’s registration were also made. Ultimately, the trademark “ROOBINI” was registered on 22.01.1999 under registration number 837894, claiming use from 01.06.1995. Totake its business to the next level, K.T.V. Oil Mills, a partnership firm, became a private limited company. As a result, the Partners of K.T.V. Oil Mills assigned their ownership of the entire business as well as the trademark “ROOBINI” to the appellant-Company, which then became known as “K.T.V. Health Food Private Limited.”

On December 30, 2007, an assignment deed was made. After that, the appellant filed the proper paperwork to transfer the trademark “ROOBINI” that the Partnership Firm had previously assigned to the appellant in favor of the plaintiff. As a result, the Trademark Registry registered the same on January 25, 2018. Due to the assignment deed executed on December 30, 2007, only theappellant/plaintiff is currently the owner of the trademark “ROOBINI” at the time the lawsuit was filed.

Additionally, the appellant submitted the required paperwork in 2015 to modify the registration in the appellant Company’s name. As a result, the plaintiff is the “ROOBINI” trademark’s owner. Since the plaintiff has been conducting business through its branch office on Chennai’s Thambu Chetty Street, which is squarely within this Court’s jurisdiction, the matter was brought before this Hon’ble Court.

JUDGEMENT:

Following a hearing with both parties, the learned Single Judge granted the request to dismiss the complaint, concluding that the telephone bills by themselves were insufficient to establish that the appellant was operating at the branch office, which is located at Thambu Chetty Street in Chennai. Furthermore, the appellant/plaintiff was not the owner of the trademark “Roobini” when it was registered. Even if it is assumed without admission that the assignment deed was executed in the plaintiff’s favor and that the trademark “Roobini” was registered in the plaintiff’s name as a result of the said assignment deed, the plaintiff is not entitled to any rights in the trademark “ROOBINI” based on the assignment deed.

The plaintiff is also not permitted to file the current lawsuit in this court without having their principal place of business within its jurisdiction, even though they maintain a branch office at Thambu Chetty Street in Chennai, which they claim is within that court’s jurisdiction because those provisions, as well as Sections 134(2) of the Trademarks Act and Section 62(2) of the Copy Act, define “carrying on business” respectively.

The plaint is therefore susceptible to being dismissed as long as neither the defendant nor the plaintiff’s primary place of business is engaged in business within the jurisdiction of this Court. As a result, the plaint was dismissed by the contested order. The appellant has chosen the current Original Side Appeal because he is unhappy with the aforementioned order.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3I1cbcl

-Report by Shreya Gupta

In the case of UNIVERSITY OF DELHI Vs. M/S KALRA ELECTRICALS, the two parties Delhi University and M/S Kalra Electricals were the former was the petitioner and the latter was the respondent. The dispute between the parties arose from a work contract and the dispute was referred to the arbitration for settlement where the arbitrator ordered the petitioner to pay rupees 20 lakhs for other 44 contracts which were not referred to it.

FACTS:

The case was filed under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation act, of 1966. The dispute arose from the work contract dated 09.06.2005. There was no dispute regarding the other 44 contracts between the parties. The dispute was regarding the sum of Rs. 92,101.25. It was referred to arbitration in view of clause 25.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:

The petitioner’s advocate contends whether the arbitral tribunal can provide relief for the case that has not been referred to it. She contends that the awarded sum was time-barred. She further states about section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1966 which states that “the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration: Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside”. She contended that the relief provided under the other 44 contacts to the respondent was not disputed and the respondent would have filed a claim under it if that was the case.

The court has separated the subject work contract from all other contracts and therefore it was beyond the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction. She further in support stated some of the previous cases- Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Company Limited vs. National Highways Authority of India (NHAI), MSK Projects India (JV) Limited vs. the State of Rajasthan and Another, State of Goa vs. Praveen Enterprises, Alupro Building Systems Pvt Ltd vs. Ozone Overseas Pvt Ltd, Indus Biotech Private Limited vs. Kotak India Venture (Offshore) Fund (Earlier Known as Kotak India Venture Limited) and Others5 and DLF Home Developers Limited vs. Rajapura Homes Private Limited and Another.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:

The respondent’s advocate stated that the arbitrator was well within his jurisdiction because the case arose regarding the other 44 contracts from the subject contract and that the petitioner paid for it maliciously. He stated that the assistant engineer gave the letter to the arbitrator to give orders for the other 44 contracts as well.

JUDGEMENT:

The court stated that the payment of Rs. 93,033 is not due and is in order and so DU should deduct any amount in payment to KE. The court ordered DU to make the pending payments of 20lakh at 9% per annum interest to KE from the date of raising the bill to the date of actual payment. The court stated that the award of Rs. 20 lakhs regarding the other 44 contracts were out of the arbitral jurisdiction and is set aside. The court further stated that the arbitrator fell foul of Section 34 (2) (a) (ⅳ) which is impermissible in law as it caused patent illegality. The order of arbitration was set aside from the other contracts and was followed for the subject contract. The court stated in its order “I find that since there is no fraud committed by KE and since the contracts are not inter-related it was wrong and illegal on part of DU to withhold the amount of Rs 20 Lakh in 44 contracts for settling an amount of Rs.92,033/- or Rs. 93,688/-or even both related to just one or two contracts”.

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–Report by Prapti Prajeeta

In this case of IFB AGRO INDUSTRIES LIMITED vs SICGIL INDIA LIMITED, the court determined the forum appropriate for adjudication and determination of violations of SAST and SEBI Regulations. In this case, the contention that under Section 59 the National Company Law Tribunal exercises a parallel jurisdiction with the Securities and Exchange Board of India for addressing violations of the Regulations framed under the SEBI Act was rejected.

In this very case, an appeal was filed against the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal for a judgment passed. 

FACTS:-

The Appellant is a company listed and engaged in manufacturing and selling rectified spirits, etc. And respondent No. 1 is a too-listed company engaged in producing the same type of products. Other respondents are the managing director, his wife and some close relatives of the respondents. 

In August 2003, one respondent came up with a proposal for a business between the Appellant and Respondent No. 1. The Appellant rejected the proposal. After this rejection, the Respondents started acquiring shares of the Appellant from the open market to eliminate competition and strengthen its dominant position in the relevant market. 

As of 2004, the Respondents held under 5% of the Appellant’s total paid-up share capital. At the same time, Respondent No. 1 acquired 600 equity shares of the Appellant, and as a result, the respondents aggregate shareholding crossed the paid-up share capital of the Appellant in total by 5%, it triggered the SEBI (SAST) Regulation 7(1)9

Four months later, Respondent No. 1 acquired additional shares of the Appellant; as a result, the total paid-up share capital of the Appellant exceede5% by shareholding. This triggered the SEBI (PIT) Regulations, and Respondent No. 1 failed to disclose within the prescribed time. 

After this, the Appellant filed a petition before the Company Law Board under the 1956 Act for its register rectification by deleting the name of the Respondents as the owner of shares over and above the 5% threshold. 

Upon receiving notice of the petition above, but then Respondent No. 1 sold a few shares of the Appellant and then brought down to 4.91%its shareholding. But the Appellant claims that Respondent No. 1 never reduced its shareholding. Then SEBI was also informed that the individual shareholding of Respondent No. 1 stands below 5%. And as a result, SEBI has not taken any regulatory action.

But then the matter stood transferred to the Tribunal. The tribunal held that it violated the SEBI (PIT) Regulations. Further, the Tribunal also held that there had been SEBI (SAST) Regulations violation as the Respondents did not disclose in the proper format. However, the Tribunal held that the CLB and SEBI exercised powers fall in different and distinct jurisdictional fields. The tribunal thus allowed the company petition.

The Respondents then went to Appellate Tribunal in an appeal where it allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Tribunal. Being aggrieved by it the plaintiff brought this appeal.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS:-

the Appellant contended that no time intimation was prescribed in format and given by the Respondents when SEBI (SAST) Regulations got triggered; Respondent Nos. 1 – 6 were “connected persons” and were “acting in concert.” He then emphasized that the Respondents had previously admitted to the non-disclosure. Thus the Appellant has the right under Section 111A of the Act to approach the tribunal for rectification of the register. 

DEFENDANT’S CONTENTIONS:-

The Respondents contended that filing a petition under Section 111A is an abuse of process. No violation under the SEBI (SAST) Regulations has occurred as the Respondents did give timely intimation in the prescribed format. The SEBI (PIT) Regulations do not apply to the other Respondent as shareholding never crossed 5% in individual limit. And under section 111A (3), the Tribunal doesn’t have any power to annul the transfer or to direct the buy-back of the shares.

JUDGMENT:-

The court held that the SEBI (SAST) regulation is a comprehensive scheme, the complained transaction should suffer regulator scrutiny and only the regulator has to determine the provisions of the SEBI Act and the Regulations.

Further, the court held that the Appellant is not justified to invoke the CLB jurisdiction under Section 111A for violation of SEBI regulations. And the Tribunal was wrong in allowing and entertaining the company petition filed under Section 111A of the 1956 Act. However, the tribunal did exceed its jurisdiction, so the Appellate Tribunal’s decision in setting aside the judgment was correct. The court then dismissed the appeal with no order as to costs.

–Report by Nawvi Kamalnathan

In the case of The Chief Engineer, Water Resources Department and Others (hereinafter referred to as appellants) Versus Rattan India Power Limited through its Director and Others (hereinafter referred to as respondents) the important issue of, the party signing the contract is entitled to the amount of consideration or not was dealt with by the Supreme Court.

FACTS

The respondent has entered into a contract with the appellant to Pay the sum of Rs.1,00,000/- for irrigation restoration charges reserved for irrigation purposes. The same consideration was agreed to be paid on the date of signing the contract. A writ petition filed before the High Court of Bombay directed the respondent to pay Rs 50,000/- per hectare by reducing the irrigation restoration charges affecting the total liability reduction.

The appellant sought an appeal as per the Irrigation Department of the State of Maharashtra. As per the circular, no water shall be utilized for other purposes unless an agreement is entered into by the concerned government and the industry. Water usage for industrial purposes is seen as a loss of water rather than being directed to agricultural purposes.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS

The substance of the argument made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant was that the contract is sacrosanct in nature. The impugned order entered by the respondent and the appellant for accepting the irrigation restoration charges shall not be entitled to be challenged.

DEFENDANT’S CONTENTIONS

On the other hand, the counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent contended that the rate prevailing in the in-principle approval granted by the high-powered committee is directly linked to the approval or sanction was applicable and the appellant could have levied the charges.

The government circular shall apply prospectively and not to ongoing contracts. If the circular is given a retrospective effect, it would certainly undermine it.

JUDGEMENT

The respondent is not justified in levying the charges when he agreed to pay the same while entering into a contract he issued an undertaking to pay the specific sum within the specific time period. The agreement and undertaking shall be stopping the respondent from challenging the irrigation restoration charges.

The rights and liabilities of the parties are standing crystallized from the date when entered into the contract. The in-principle approval granted in favour has been cancelled as they failed to execute an agreement with the appellant. Also, the central government undertaking was given an exemption as the power produced from it shall be used for public benefit. In comparison to all other parties, the respondent has been drawing high amounts of water, especially from an area scarce of water resources.

However, the records before the court state only two instalments being paid by the respondents, and therefore, the court directed the respondents to pay the balance amount with interest from the date of instalment fell from the date of the impugned order.

In conclusion, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India allows the Civil Appeal arising from the special leave petition and sets aside the impugned judgment passed by the High Court of Bombay, and directs the parties to bear their own costs.

–Report by Harishri

In the case of The Chief Engineer, Water Resources Department & Ors. Versus Rattan India Power Limited through its Director & Ors., the appeal was filed by the State of Maharashtra against the judgement of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, whereby the High Court has reduced the ‘irrigation restoration charges’ that the Respondent has contracted to pay.

Facts:

The State of Maharashtra came up with a circular prescribing that when water is diverted for non-irrigation purposes, then the entity using such water shall pay 50,000 per hectare irrigation restoration charges. It also prescribed that no water shall be diverted unless an agreement is entered into between the concerned industry and the government.

Sophie Power Company Ltd. Intended to set up a thermal power plant. A communication was sent by the respondent to the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation to confirm the availability of 240 million litres of water per day to facilitate smooth running. Pursuant to the application made by SPCL granted approval for the usage of water. This was subject to SPCL paying capital contributions and irrigation restoration charges. The Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation granted final approval for the usage of water. SPCL was directed to pay Rs.100000 per hectare. The respondent sent a letter to the government against the levy of higher charges. Later, the charge was increased to Rs.100000 per hectare by the government. Ultimately, the Appellant and Respondent entered into a water supply agreement to pay Rs. 100000 as in 5 instalments. Six months after signing the agreement, he initiated a writ petition before the High Court of Judicature of Bombay at Nagpur to direct him to pay irrigation restoration charges at Rs.50000 per hectare. It was held that it would be appropriate for the rate prevailing as of the date of the grant of in-principal approval.

Appellant’s Contention:

The appellant contended that the order is against the agreement dated 22.05.2012 entered into between the appellant and the respondent. It is submitted that after accepting Rs.100000 as irrigation restoration charges, the respondent is not entitled to challenge it. The essence of his contention was that a contract is sacrosanct and must be respected.

Respondent’s Contention:

The respondent contended that the irrigation restoration charge is directly linked to the date of approval and the relevant date since the circular dated 21.02.2004 was applicable. The appellant could have only levied Rs.50,000 per hectare. Also, similarly placed companies were given the relief that the Respondent was seeking. It was also contended that the undertaking given by the respondent after signing the agreement was not unconditional. It was subject to numerous representations by the respondent for the reduction of the irrigation restoration charge. The Government Circular will apply prospectively and will not apply to ongoing contracts.

Decision:

The bench was not satisfied with the approach adopted by the High Court when the respondent himself wilfully and deliberately entered into an agreement knowing the legal and business consequences. The High Court has committed an error in entertaining a fresh writ petition, which effectively claimed the same reliefs as the previous one. It also has committed a mistake in supplanting its view over that of the contract. The bench also directed that the balance amount due payable towards the irrigation restoration charge shall be paid by the respondent on or before 30.06.2023. Further, interest @ 12% p.a. shall be payable from the date the instalment fell due till the date of the impugned order. The bench allowed the civil appeal and set aside the impugned final judgement.

-Report by Nawvi Kamalnathan

In the case of Jabir and Others (hereinafter referred to as the appellants) Versus the State of Uttarakhand (hereinafter referred to as the respondents) the Supreme Court has decoded the need to understand the time frame between seeing the accused or deceased to the actual offence having occurred and thus the doctrine of last seen cant be applied in every case where the witnesses testify for seeing someone on relation to the case as it has its own limitations.

FACTS

Haseen, the son of Prosecution Witness 1, is about 7 years old and went missing on 08.10.1999 around 4.30 pm. Later on, on 10.10.1999, his dead body was found in a sugarcane field in a village situated at a distance from his village. The post-mortem report showed the death occurred two days earlier.

After an order from the magistrate, the First information report was investigated and witnesses were produced by the police officers in charge. Also, in their final reports, the police alleged the appellants to be guilty of the crime.
The appellants were convicted under sections 302, 364, and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and were sentenced to life imprisonment, seven years, and five years imprisonment respectively. The sentence and the conviction were upheld by the High Court of Uttarakhand.

PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTIONS

The counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants contended that the conviction and the sentence given by the trial court are unsustainable, as there were no reasons as to why the FIR was delayed by almost five weeks after the seven-year-old deceased went missing.

Further, it was contended that the application under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was moved only after a month and no such application was sent to any officer. The police witness didn’t seem to support the statement made by the PW-1 (father of the deceased boy) and said to contain suspicions.

Per the testimonies of a few witnesses, it could be understood that the role of the accused was not known to PW-1. However, it could not be inferred from the inquest report. The complete point of focus of the counsel for appellants was that they were named as a result of enmity with the father of the deceased and his family.

It was highlighted that all the witnesses bought before the court from the prosecution’s side were members of the deceased and his family. The enmity could be traced back to an FIR lodged by the appellant’s family against the PW-2 the previous year to this incident.

DEFENDANT’S CONTENTIONS

The counsel appearing on behalf of the defendants contended that the court shall not disturb the current findings of the lower and the High Court. First dealing with the issue concerning the delay to file FIR the counsel said PW-1 didn’t sense anything unnatural and went to search for his son throughout.

Only after obtaining knowledge of the dead body did, he go to the police station after the post-mortem. The last-seen theory was not inaccurate in this case because as per A-1 to A-3’s statement, they have seen the boy latest with the appellants.

The inquest conducted following the day of the death was found to have occurred under suspicious circumstances. The investigations conducted by the police were not satisfactory as it was done much later to the death.

JUDGEMENT

The court held that as per the basic principle of criminal jurisprudence, in case of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution shall be obliged to prove beyond any reasonable doubt. That all the links between the circumstances shall be established so as to complete the chain of the crime.

The court was also of the opinion besides crucial infirmities as there was no evidence in any form be it oral or objective that creates a connection between the appellant or the accused in this crime. The doctrine of last seen shall also have its limitations considering the time lag between the time the deceased was last seen with the accused and the time between the murder.

Therefore, the appellant-accused’s conviction and sentence passed by the lower courts shall not be sustained and the impugned judgment was set aside, thus ordering the acquittal of the accused.