Tag: #legalnews

-Report by Muskan Vasaani

High Court Of Bombay while hearing the writ petition on 14th February 2023 in the case of Milind B. Jadhav & Ors. (Petitioners) Versus Usha S. Patel & Ors. (Respondents), dismissed the writ petition with exemplary costs of Rs. 25000/-

FACTS:

In the present case, the Respondents herein who were the Original Plaintiffs filed a suit against Mr Rafique Malbari (Original Defendant No. 1), Mr Bhimdas Jadhav (Original Defendant No. 2) and Mr Milind Jadhav (Original Defendant No. 3, son of Defendant no. 2and Petitioner herein) for seeking possession, non-payment of license fee and compensation concerning the room bearing chalta No. 589 (part) situated on the ground floor in Municipal House No.25 – Shambhu Building in Survey No. 1/3/3/C of village Mohone, Taluka Kalyan (herein referred to as a “suit premises”). A suit was instituted against Defendant No.2 and Defendant No.3 (Petitioner No.1 herein) because they were found to have the suit property as they were servants of Defendant No.1. Petitioners are legal heirs of deceased Defendant No.2 who expired on 18.09.2016. The Respondents herein had executed a leave and license agreement with the Original Defendant No. 1 for 33 months which expired in 2006. Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 had no connection in the suit as they were only the servants but they have trespassed into the suit property and are occupying the same since before 2006 which is not justified.

However the suit property was not vacated and the Repondents herein (Original Plaintiffs) visited the site and found that it owned Defendant No.2 and 3 i.e. Petitioner No.1 herein and that Petitioners are owners of ‘Shreenath Dairy’, run by the Petitioner No.1 and it stands immediately adjacent to the suit premises and Petitioner No.1 is carrying on business in the name of ‘Sunny Building Materials’ from the suit premises.

The suit filed against Original Defendant Nos.1 to 3 came to be decreed after a full-length trial by the Learned 5th Jt. Civil Judge Senior Division, Kalyan and the Petitioners were aggrieved and dissatisfied with the decree filed Civil Appeal along with Civil Miscellaneous Applicationseeking condonation of delay of 5 months and 23 days in filing the Appeal.

However, the Civil Miscellaneous Application was rejected by the impugned order and the Petitioners filed a Civil Writ Petition which was withdrawn by them themselves and they filed a second appeal in which a stay was granted to the Petitioners for some time but the same appeal was dismissed in the admission stage and therefore the present writ petition was filed

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:

The petitioner contended before this hon’ble court that the impugned order dated 03.01.2022 be set aside and the delay in filing the Civil Appeal be condoned and Civil MiscelleaneousApplication is allowed.

RESPONDENT‘S CONTENTIONS:

The respondents contended before this Hon’ble Court that the Petitioners have no right or grounds to file this petition or appeal whatsoever in respect of the suit premises and that petitioners have not shown any sufficient cause to condone the delay and such applications are required to be dismissed with exemplary costs and the application is filed with an ulterior motive which should be dismissed with exemplary costs of Rs. 5,00,000/- and that this Court should uphold the impugned order.

JUDGEMENT:

The Hon’ble High Court of Bombay dismissed the petition along with exemplary costs on the following grounds :
• Petitioners have no title, entitlement or interest whatsoever in the suit premises. They are rank trespassers who have taken advantage of the legal system and have abused the due process of law at all stages without having been put in possession of the suit premises by the owner.
• Petitioners are owners of ‘Shreenath Dairy’, run by Petitioner No.1 and it stands immediately adjacent to the suit premises. Petitioner No.1 is carrying on business ‘Sunny Building Materials’ from the suit premises and as per the findings returned by the trial court; the possession and occupation of the suit premises is completely illegal.
• that if the delay in such cases is condoned in favour of Petitioners and if they are allowed to prosecute their appeal, it will amount to a bad representation of justice in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3Xw6WWf

–Report by Umang Kanwat

According to the legal dictionary, an appeal memorandum explains the grounds on which it is desired and why a court hearing has been requested. When the parties to the proceedings are unhappy with the orders or decisions made by the tribunal, they may appeal to the national company law appellate tribunal. This is mentioned in Section 421 of the 2013 Companies Act. The present case of Regal Machine Tools Private … vs Mrs Kaushy Lal & Ors revolves around the same.

FACTS:

M/s. Regal Enterprises, a sole proprietorship business owned by Mr S.M. Mohan Lal, received a one-acre parcel of land bearing Plot No. 39, Bommasandra Industrial Area, Attibele, Hobli, Ankal Taluk, Bangalore, measuring 3948 square metres in exchange for paying a portion of the consideration. The aforementioned allotment was initially given on a “lease basis” for a period of 11 years, and after that, a Sale Deed was to be executed subject to the satisfaction of further requirements. The Balance Payment was to be made after 11 years, it is further noted.

In order to convert the company from a sole “Proprietorship Concern” to a “Private Limited Company” with the name and designation of “M/s. Regal Machine Tools Private Limited,” Mr S.M. Mohanlal had to hold 51% of the company’s “Shares” until the end of the 11-year lease period. This request was granted by KIADB. It is alleged that the Appellants had asked KIADB to execute the Sale Deed and that KIADB had informed them that the Sale Deed would only be done if the Original Allottee, Mr SM Mohanlal, maintained a 51% shareholding, but the Appellants received no answer to their request.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS:

The Appellant’s learned counsel claimed that the Respondents made the offer to buy 2,243 “Equity Shares” for Rs. 53,83,200/-, and the abovementioned consideration amount was given to the appellant by check as part of an MoU on July 1, 2011, but it was never presented and was given back to the respondent. Therefore, no deal has ever been reached to buy 2,243 “Equity Shares.”

RESPONDANT’S CONTENTIONS:

The Supplementary Agreement that the Appellant had recorded, according to the Respondents, was never ever signed. The Schedule Property was assigned for the purpose of constructing and operating an industrial unit for a period of 11 years, failing which the Sale Deed could not be performed in their favour. This is also important to note. A review of the documentation shows that there is no documentary proof that any transfer of shares was made with the approval of the Respondent or the legal heirs of Late Shri S.M. Mohan Lal, as shown by the pertinent Minutes of the Board Meeting or any other key documents.

JUDGEMENT:

The basic goal of the Memorandum of Understanding, it was stated, was for KIADB to allot land in the company’s name and for a check to be written in exchange for shares to be issued, but the same was subject to conditions. No transaction by the Company may be engaged in that would effectively reduce the Shareholding of the Respondents below 51% without the consent of the Respondents, who currently own 51% of the shares.

The Tribunal was of the sincere opinion that the Appellants had violated the Company’s Articles of Association and had not come before the Tribunal with clean hands. This is worth repeating. The well-reasoned order of the National Company Law Tribunal is dismissed as a result because the Tribunal finds no illegality or flaw in it, and the costs of the court are borne by each side separately.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3lr2mv9

–Report by Arun Bhattacharya

The honourable Supreme Court of India in HAJI ABDUL GANI KHAN & ANR. V UNION OF INDIA & ORS. on Monday 13th of January, 2023 observed that “A Constitutional Court cannot casually interfere with legislation made by a competent Legislature” while dismissing the writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

FACTS

The legality of the action of forming a Delimitation Commission for the rearrangement of constituencies in the Union territories of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh was challenged.
On 5th of August, 2019 a Presidential Order was issued under the powers provided in clause (1) of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution with the objective of application of the Constitution along with its amendments in the state of Jammu & Kashmir. Application of all provisions of Article 370 was discontinued by a subsequent Presidential declaration.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION

The petitioners’ primary objection was to the increased number of Assembly seats and the subsequent challenge was that the constitution of the Delimitation Commission was in complete violation of the order passed by the Election Commission of India in 2008 (Delimitation of Parliamentary and Assembly Constituencies Order,2008). The petitioners mainly relied on Article 170 of the Indian Constitution which restrained any rearrangement of assembly seats before the first census after the year 2026. Certain other violations by Articles 330,332, 82 and 83 have also contended which may be read in the original judgment but the essential focus was on the violation of the jurisdiction of the Election Commission of India due to the noncompliance with the order of 2008. Further, sections 59 to 63 were also challenged on the ground of contradiction.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

The Union of India represented by the learned Solicitor General highlighted the delay since the delimitation order had already been passed and the said order of the Delimitation Commission was operative from 20th March 2022 and that such an order by a Delimitation commission stands beyond the purview of court’s review jurisdiction according to Section 10 (2). The validity of sections 60 and 62 was highlighted because the Election Commission had already notified the Government of India of the non-necessity of its interference with the rearrangement of constituencies since the same had already been directed to the Delimitation Commission by a letter proving the sections’ non-contradictory nature.

COURT’S CONSIDERATION

The honourable Supreme Court observed a lack of specificity of allegations and since the grounds on which the said Act’s constitutionality may be verified is not mentioned, it fell short of gaining an in-depth reply from the respondent as well as it did not provide the honourable court with enough room for a constitutionality check. The honourable court denied the validity check of the J&K Reorganisation Act and the Presidential Order of 2019 since they were not at all challenged by the petitioners. The Supreme Court observed the legislative action of constituting the Delimitation Commission in compliance with Articles 3, 4 and 239A and pointed out that the argument on Article 170 does not stand since it dealt with the Legislature of a State and not a Union territory. Applying similar legal analogies the sections 60 and 62 of the J&K Reorganisation Act, the apex court completely refuted the question of legality raised about the exercise of delimitation conducted by the Delimitation Commission.
On the question of the legality of the Order of 6th March 2020 the apex court weighed on the fact that statutory interpretation must be by the legislative intent and that a practical approach must be adopted to “make it workable”.

JUDGMENT

Considering all other legal points and dogmas the apex court stated that the petition lacked merits and that it was a ‘vague attempt’ to portray the exercise of delimitation as an illegal affair. Pointing out the non-bearing of this judgment’s observations on other matters which are subject to judicial scrutiny, the court intentionally refrained from weighing on the validity of the exercise of Parliamentary powers and dismissed this petition.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3Kd0twu

–Report by Shweta Sabuji

The State of Haryana has filed the current appeals because it feels wronged and unsatisfied by the impugned common judgment and order dated 18.10.2019 issued by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Chandigarh, which increased the amount of compensation for the lands acquired at Rs. 2,98,54,720/- per acre with all other statutory benefits and allowed the said first appeals in part preferred by the original land owners. 

FACTS:

Under the terms of the Property Acquisition Act of 1894, a substantial portion of land in the village of Kherki, Majra, measuring roughly 58 acres, was purchased for public use. The awards were made public by the land acquisition officer. The original landowners requested that references be made under Section 18 of the Act of 1894. The reference court increased the compensation for the notification dated 13.01.2010 from Rs. 60 lakhs per acre as awarded by the land acquisition officer to Rs. 1,56,24,000/per acre. The State’s appeals against the decision and award rendered by the reference court, which set the compensation at Rs. 1,56,24,000, were ultimately dismissed.

But by the impugned judgment and order, which considered the compensation amount increased by the High Court and modified by this Court to Rs. 2,38,00,000/per acre concerning the lands acquired in January 2008 and granted a 12% cumulative increase, the High Court has partially allowed the appeals raised by the landowners and determined and awarded the compensation at Rs. 2,98,54,720. The State of Haryana has filed the current appeals because it is unhappy with the impugned decision and order made by the High Court that determined and awarded compensation for the lands acquired via a notification dated 13.01.2010 at Rs. 2,98,54,720 per acre.

PLAINTIFF CONTENTION:

While calculating the compensation at Rs. 2,98,54,720/- per acre for the lands acquired via a notification dated 13.01.2010, Shri Nikhil Goel, learned AAG, appearing on behalf of the State, has vehemently argued that the High Court materially erred by considering and/or relying upon the judgment of this Court [State of Haryana vs. Ram Chander (2017 SCC Online SC 1869)]concerning the lands acquired.

It is argued that this Court clearly said in the decision and order it issued that the compensation figure of Rs. 2,38,00,000 per acre established by the judgment shall not be regarded as precedent in any other case. Considering this, it is argued that the High Court committed a grave error by considering the sum awarded by this Court in the decision and order given at a value of Rs. 2,38,00,000.

Furthermore, it is argued that prices for the lands were artificially raised because, concerning the community specifically, lands started to be acquired starting in 2008. Therefore, it is claimed, the High Court erred significantly by increasing the award price of Rs. 2,38,00,000 per acre by 12% for the notification of 25.01.2008.

DEFENDANT’S CONTENTION:

The learned attorney representing the landowners has argued that after the State’s appeals were rejected and the impugned common judgment and order were issued in the landowners’ appeals, the State is no longer permitted to contest the impugned common judgment and order issued by the High Court.

Further, it is argued that there was a price increase even after considering the sale instances that were provided on record from 09.03.2007 to 31.03.2008; as a result, the High Court did not mistake in approving the 12% increase on Rs. 2,38,00/- per acre. It is argued that, as of this point, no conclusive evidence nor a sale instance to the opposite has been recorded by the acquiring authority, demonstrating a decline in market value between 2008 and 2010.

JUDGMENT:

This Court made it clear in the judgment and order that it should not be regarded as a precedent. It must be observed, however, that even on the merits, this Court considered and approved the sale cases presented on behalf of the landowners between 2007 and 2008. Because the compensation amount of Rs. 2,38,00,000/- per acre for the land acquired through a notification issued on January 25, 2008,can be considered the base and the time interval between the 2008 notification and the 2010 notification, a suitable enhancement of 8% to 15% is given, which is held in the case of [Pehlad Ram Vs. HUDA; (2014) 14 SCC 778]

It will not be safe or wise to grant the cumulative increase of 12% nonetheless, especially because the purchase processes in the current case were just started in January 2008 concerning the exact hamlet. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, as well as the sale cases that have been presented on the record, we believe that accepting a 10% increase above the original amount of Rs. 2,38,00,000 can be considered just compensation and may further the interests of justice. The market value of the land in question for the lands acquired via a notification dated 13.01.2010 will be Rs. 2,87,98,000/- per acre considering this situation. The current appeals are partially granted to the degree, and it is decided that the original landowners are entitled to compensation at a rate of Rs. 2,87,98,000 per acre together with any additional legal advantages that may be provided by the Land Acquisition Act, of 1894.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3RXb5S4

–Report by Sanya Luthra

The case Keshaw sanyasi gawo shewasharam vs Govt of NCT, New Delhi and Anr was filed by the petitioner as the result of a public notice issued by the Welfares Department which directs the petitioner to empty the slum area in which he is running a Gaushala for 15 years.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The petitioner-Keshaw Sanyasi Gawo Shewasharam is running a Gaushala or a cow shelter for 15 years and it is a registered trust according to him and then on 23rd Jan an eviction notice is being issued by the Public Welfare Department where they are asking to empty the slum area where the cow shelter is situated within fifteen days of the notice.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:

It was said by the petitioner that he is running the cow shelter for 15 years, electricity is installed by him and even an Aadhar card has been issued concerning the said premises only. As he is staying there for 15 years he demands the legal right for the same, also he mentions that impugned notices have been issued without any show cause notice or without providing any hearing to the petitioner.

DEFENDANT’S CONTENTIONS:

It was said by the defendant that the petitioner Jhuggi doesn’t comes under the notified clusters which are 675 and 82 in number and they also rely on the court’s order to demolish the jhuggi and now they are of opinion that unless the jhuggi clusters are not duly notified, stay on demolition would not be feasible.

JUDGMENT:

The court held that the petitioner cannot be granted relief and also said that the clusters that are not identified by the DUSIB would not be open for rehabilitation also asked the respondent to give an alternate place to the petitioner within a week and to also give some time to the petitioner to shift to another place while cows to be moved to alternate cow shelter.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3K2jv8P

–Report by Umang Kanwat

In the present case of Vibhuti Shankar Pandey v The State Of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., the Supreme Court discusses the degree to which the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court’s prior order can be interfered with.

FACTS:

The appellant, who felt wronged by an order the Madhya Pradesh High Court’s Division Bench had overturned, led this appeal. The order from the learned Single Judge dated which had awarded the present appellant the advantage of regularisation.

The appellant claims that he was hired in 1980 as a Supervisor under a project of the State Water Resources Department of Madhya Pradesh, on a daily rate basis. The appellant asked for the position of supervisor/timekeeper to be regularized. The applicant lacked the matriculation with mathematics requirement that was the minimal requirement for the position in question. The government eased these requirements via a circular, and the appellant requested his regularisation in the position of Supervisor/Time Keeper because he was competent for the position and had previously worked for a daily rate.

According to an order from the Chief Engineer for the Rani Avanti Bai Lodhi Sagar Project, the claim of the appellant for regularisation was denied for the following reasons: even though the appellant does not lack the necessary matriculation with mathematics credentials to be regularised, the appellant has never been appointed to a position. Furthermore, the appropriate authority never appointed him because there were no open positions at the time for regularisation.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS:

The appellant based his claim for regularisation on the fact that individuals who were daily wagers but less senior to him were regularised in 1990 or earlier. While granting the writ petition, the learned Single Judge provided instructions for regularising the appellant as of the date his juniors were regularized.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:

The State Government appealed against the petitioner’s order in the current case to a Division Bench, which upheld the State Government’s appeal. The Division Bench correctly concluded that the learned Single Judge had not adhered to the legal standard established by this Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Umadevi and Ors., as the initial appointment had to be made by the appropriate party, and the daily rated employee had to be employed in a sanctioned position. These two requirements were categorically absent in the case of the current petitioner. So, in the respondent’s opinion, the Division Bench of the High Court was correct to allow the appeal.

Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Umadevi and Ors
The court held that precise position in this case, the issue of regularising the services of such employees may need to be evaluated on an individual basis in this particular situation. When temporary workers or daily wage earners ll vacant sanctioned positions that need to be filled, the Union of India, the State Governments, and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularise their services as a one-time measure. These individuals were irregularly appointed and have worked for at least ten years in those positions without the benet of court or tribunal orders.

JUDGEMENT:

According to the law established by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Uma Devi, the court in the current instance determined that the appellant had no grounds for regularisation. Therefore, there is no justification for the court to intervene with the Madhya Pradesh High Court Division Bench’s decision. As a result, the appeal was ultimately denied.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3XpT6EO

-Report by Saloni Agarwal

The Supreme Court of India recently in the case of Gas Authority of India Limited v Indian Petrochemicals Corp. Ltd. & Ors concluded the dispute between parties relating to the contract signed for natural gas supply. The case was in favour of IPCL as its claim was just.

Facts:

The Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas provided a letter for the allocation of a Natural Gas Pipeline to IPCL. The contract was to be signed with GAIL and the pipeline would be from Hazira to the Gandhar unit carrying semi-rich gas. IPCL was asked to lay down the plant and a pipeline of its own which would be used to transport the gas. GAIL claimed that it was being charged with transportation costs. The clauses of the contract were clear that the buyer has to bear all the charges of transportation for himself and the seller. The main point of argument is the transportation cost dispute.

Appellant’s Contention:

IPCL claimed that the price of natural gas should be fixed as mentioned in the contract. Earlier the High Court had charged IPCL to pay for the loss of transportation charges which was unfair as IPCL was asked to set up its own pipeline. Even after incurring a huge cost for the establishment, it would otherwise be unjust to pay for the transportation cost. The IPCL also claimed that it had no bargaining power and was asked to accept the contract within 60 days by the Authorities i.e., comes within the ambit of Article 12. Due to time constraints and unrestricted power possessed by GAIL, it dominated the clauses of the contract. Hence the writ petition is maintainable.

Respondent’s Contention:

The GAIL challenged the petition and claimed that the clauses were not unjust. It also claimed that it did not possess any dominating position and that equal rights were provided to both parties. It further said that the contract was a mutual one and was carefully discussed before the implementation.

Judgement:

The Court after hearing about the sides came to the conclusion that the writ petition was maintainable. It also said that there was unjust and unfairness in the contract and asked GAIL to refund the loss of transportation charges within two months failing which interest amounting to 8 per cent per annum will be charged. The IPCL had incurred huge costs in building the pipeline which was mandated in the contract and now cannot be burdened with the establishment cost and transport cost even when it is not using the HBJ Pipeline.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3YwTTou

–Report by Tannu Dahiya

Hon’ble Supreme while hearing the appeal on 8th February 2023 in the case of NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. Versus THE CHIEF ELECTORAL OFFICER & ORS., set aside the decision of Patna High Court made in 2017 and directed that the terms of the insurance policy should be strictly interpreted. 

Facts:

An MOU i.e memorandum of understanding was signed between the insurance company (Appellant) and Chief Electoral Officer, Bihar, Patna, on 9th Feb 2000, to cover the insurance of persons working for the Bihar Legislative Assembly Elections in the year 2000. 

Now clause 3 of the MoU mentioned that the insurance will be for the death caused by accident in extra violence and any other means. 

Now the duration of the scheme was extended from 24.05.2000 to 23.06.2000 seeing the period of the by-polls. 

The husband of respondent no.2, who was a constable died while performing his duty in Bihar Legislative Assembly. It happened during the extended time of the scheme. 

After a long time, the wife of the constable (respondent no. 2) claimed compensation in 2008.

The Assistant election officer of that time wrote to the secretary of Lokayukta, Patna, that it was not election duty but heat stroke which was the reason behind the death of the constable thus, no such compensation can be made. 

The wife filed a writ in High Court for quashing the above-said statement. The learned single judge first asked the insurance company to pay the claim but then relied on the judgement made in Lilawanti Devi v. The State of Bihar & Ors 1, which opined that the duration to make a claim has expired and it was chief electoral office liability to make the compensation. 

The chief electoral officer filed an appeal stating that it was the insurance company which should pay the compensation. The insurance company was then asked to take the liability. 

Plaintiff’s contentions

The appellant contended before the court that the chief electoral officer had already paid the claim to respondent 2 and just wanted to fasten the liability on the company. The learned counsel claimed that the death of the deceased was due to heat stroke which is beyond the scope of the MoU. The appellant insurance company was not made aware of the time issue. And was notified only after eleven years. 

Defendant’s contentions:

It was found that the chief electoral officer had already paid the claim to the wife. Also, it was clarified that the death was due to heat stroke which was beyond the scope of the MoU. The delay in raising the claim was not driven by the chief electoral officer. Its role was only till recommended, which it did. It was pleaded that the insurance company was under an obligation to honour the promise. 

Judgement :

The SC raised two aspects which need to be answered

• The result of a delay in claiming the amount
• Whether all the insurance policies covered the scenario of the death of the constable. 

To answer the first, respondent no. 2 never claimed the chief electoral officer to get compensation till 2008. Thus the claim was beyond the period. 

To answer the second, it said that the conduct of respondent no 1 would not allow them to fasten the liability on the appellant. 

The Supreme Court in its verdict said that the chief electoral officer ‘has been playing ducks and drakes’. 

The Supreme Court thus dismissed the judgement of Patna High Court calling it unsustainable. The insurance company was not liable. Also, the chief electoral officer would not recover any amount paid to the deceased wife. 

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3JOZYsq

Civil appeal no. 4769 of 2022

–Report by Arun Bhattacharya

The Delhi High Court on Wednesday 8^th of February 2023 in the matter of THE STATE versus SACHIN SINGH & ORS reiterated the stand taken by the Additional Sessions Judge’s observation that “Mere vague allegations that accused tried to commit rape upon her does not ipso facto attract the penal provision of offence u/Section 376 read with Section 511 IPC.”

FACTS

The present matter invoked revisional jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court whereby an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge was in question. The order dealt with chargesagainst a brother-in-law and father-in-law, who had allegedly committed attempts to rape. The complainant had alleged that the brother-in-law had gotten hold of the complainant in an attempt to commit rape, while in another instance the father-in-law had forcefully entered the complainant’s room to rape her. Although the complainant tried to raise these issues with her husband and mother-in-law, all such attempts were suppressed forcefully with the only reason provided by them being that the brother-in-law happens to be a police official. Therefore, the complainant filed a complaint to the Commissioner of Police and accordingly registered an FIR against her in-laws. They were also made parties to the initial chargesheet filed in the court of learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Rohini which was later transferred to the Court of Sessions. 

SESSIONS COURT’S ORDER

The Court of Sessions initially discharged the brother-in-law and the father-in-law under Sections 356 (Punishment of Rape) and 511 (Punishment for attempting to Commit Offences Punishable with imprisonment for life or another imprisonment) but framed separate charges of 498 (enticing or taking away or detaining with criminal intent a married woman), 406 (Punishment for criminal breach of trust), 354(Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty) and 34 (Common intention). The court’s primary focus whilst discharging the two respondents was that the mere fact of the brother-in-law getting hold of her hand and the father-in-law barging into her room late at night does not suffice to prove a case of rape. These allegations of the complainant involved attempts but no specific action was committed which may indicate a clear intention of rape. This order has been challenged in today’s petition.  

PROSECUTION’S CONTENTION

The learned APP submitted that the learned Sessions court was not intended to satisfy itself on the graveness of evidence produced but merely on prima facie allegations of the complainant and he confined himself to the fact that the complainant had made specific allegations regarding her father-in-law and brother in the law regarding an attempt to commit rape on different occasions.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

The learned counsel for the respondents’ primarily focused on the fact that no specific allegations were made against the father-in-law and brother-in-law and no such proof was also submitted on record. He also highlighted the fact that no action was committed in compliance with the definition provided under Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code and this would suffice as a reason for discharging the same. To point out the same the counsel had referred to the judgment of Tarkeshwar Sahu v. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand), IV (2006)  CCR 115 (SC).

DELHI HIGH COURT’S JUDGEMENT

The honourable high court pointing out that the revisional power under Section 397 of CrPC is very narrow which only allows it to satisfy itself to check the legality and correctness of an impugned order, reiterated the stance taken by the Court of Sessions and accordingly dismissed the revision petition.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/40EQy8S

CITATION: 2023/DHC/000883

–Report by Shreya Gupta

The petitioner in this case of LAL VEDANT NATH SHAH DEO v STATE (NCT OF DELHI) was Lal Vedant Nath Shah Deo and the respondent was the State. The petitioner filed the application for bail under section 439 of CrPC.

FACTS:

The sub-inspector Gajendra Singh found Raghav Mandal a 23-year-old student of Amity University with 334 grams of charas. He disclosed about the co-accused Himanshu Singh and Lal Vedant Nath Shah Deo who was also arrested. Lal Vedant was arrested under a non-bailable warrant. Raghav further disclosed that he used to get paid Rs. 500 to 1000 for every delivery. Their phones were checked and details of the Paytm account where they used to receive the payments were taken out. The Paytm account details showed that Himanshu Singh had credited a total sum of Rs. 4,70,390 and Rs. 28,03,561.11 to Lal Vedant. The petitioner was charged with section 82 of the CrPC and section 201 of the IPC.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:

The advocate of the petitioner contends that no incriminating material was obtained from the petitioner on the raid in his house and that his name was earlier not mentioned in the FIR. He states that the rigours of section 37 are not applicable. He stated that section 35 and 54 of the NDPS act is not applicable since there was no conscious and intelligible possession. He stated that only on the basis of the disclosures by the co-accused the petitioner can’t be denied bail. He stated that mere phone calls among the accused and Paytm transactions can’t be the means to deny bail since the accused were college friends.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:

The advocate contended that a total sum of Rs. 4,70,390 and Rs. 28,03,561.11 was credited to Lal Vedant. He contended that the petitioner tried to run away and was so charged with section 82 of the CrPC and section 201 of IPC for trying to disappear the evidence.

JUDGEMENT:

The court stated that the rigours of section 37 of the NDPS act are not applicable if the cannabis quantity is less than 1 kg and the quantity found in this case is only 334 grams. It further stated that since there is no evidence to show that the transaction between them took place for the recovery therefore it concludes that they were not involved in any other offence under the NDPS act except the buying and selling of drugs. The court stated that no useful purpose will be served by keeping the petitioner in custody and therefore the application for bail was passed on some terms and conditions and on the furnishing of a personal bond of Rs. 50,000. The Hon’ble Supreme Court to conclude referred to the Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2012.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT:

CITATION: 2023/DHC/000885