Author: LEXPEEPS editor

–Report by Umang Kanwat

Issues only arise when one party affirms and the other party disputes a crucial truth or legal premise. The legal or factual assertions are considered material propositions. Such essential claims must be made by the plaintiff to establish his legal standing. Similarly, the defendant must allege to support his defence. A distinct issue won’t arise unless each relevant statement is supported by the plaintiff and refuted by the defendant.

The Court may revise already-framed questions, frame new issues, recast matters as may be necessary to resolve a dispute before it, or strike out concerns that have been improperly brought or formed, according to Order XIV Rule 5 of the CPC. As a result, the Court has the power to alter or eliminate the concerns as necessary.

The case of PRIME TIME INDIA Vs. SOMNATH VIJ revolves around Order XIV Rule 5 of the CPC, wherein the court tries to evaluate if the contentions on which the applicant argues are satisfactory or not. The word “issue” has not been defined in the CPC, however, Order XIV Rule 1 of the CPC indicates that “issues arise when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by one party and denied by the other”.

Facts: 

The applicant in the present case filed an application requesting the Honourable Supreme Court of India to remove certain legal issues framed by the defendants in the case considering them to be baseless and motionless under Order XIV Rule 5 of CPC. The application is based on a previous case over a disputed property where the present applicant was the defendant and the case ended with a settlement between the parties.

Applicant’s Contentions:

The applicant has filled out this application regarding striking off certain issues that were framed in the case over a property dispute. According to the applicant they agreed on the settlement and hence these issues in the aforementioned suit consequently sabotaged the interest of the applicant. Based on the joint application filed dismissing the objections to the settlement terms, this was done with malice aforethought. 

Defendant’s Contentions:

The defendant argued that the applicant filed the case even though it is unauthorized to do so. The defendants acknowledged that their culpability for the applicant’s claim had been reduced, and they would not object if the settlement included a decision granting the applicant’s request for specific performance. The present application under Order XIV Rule 5 read with Section 151 CPC was not submitted with a board resolution and was not embossed with the company’s seal; as a result, it is subject to being rejected simply on this basis. The applicant also violated the court’s order by adding construction to the disputed property and so the defendant has a right to take legal action against the applicant. 

The court made no mistake in the framing of the issues the issues were framed by the applicant who was previously the defendant’s pleadings.

JUDGEMENT:

The application was rejected because it had no merit. 

This was because the court believed that the legal concerns or issues raised by the Defendants’ arguments, which were requested to be deleted through the present application, were relevant for the adjudication of the current lawsuit.

Furthermore, an issue is a topic of contention between the parties in a civil lawsuit. Additionally, when parties differ on “material propositions” of truth or law, a problem arises. An issue that can limit the scope of disagreement may be presented to identify the genuine dispute and resolve it. In this instance, it was clear that the Court’s prior bench had given proper consideration to all pertinent arguments, including the compromise decree while framing the problems.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3RuuHNb

-Report by Kontheti Subrahmanya Sai Lakshmi Anuhya 

In the recent judgment of K. L. SUNEJA & ANR. Vs. DR. (MRS.) MANJEET KAUR MONGA (D) THROUGH HER LR & ANR., issued by a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court, an order was passed directing all courts and judicial bodies to establish rules to guarantee that sums paid to the office or registry of the courts or tribunals be invariably deposited in a bank or other financial institution. The directive was given to ensure that litigants would never lose interest in money deposited with courts or tribunals in the future.

Facts

1. In the current case, Smt. Gursharan Kaur (Complainant) was pursuing a case against a Developer for delaying the allotment of a property to the Complainant. After paying up to six instalments, the Complainant declined to pay additional instalments, citing a delay in completion progress. The Developer revoked the allotment on April 30, 2005. Along with the Cancellation Letter, the Developer encloses a Pay Order dated 30-04-2005 for Rs. 4,53,750/- issued by Citibank in the full repayment of the Complainant’s payments.
2. Dissatisfied with the withdrawal of the allocation, the Complainant filed a Complaint under Section 36 of the then Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (MRTP Act) before the previous Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Commission insinuating unfair trade practices by the Developer and seeking custody of the flat. The Complainant declined the reimbursement and did not cash the Pay Order. The Pay Order was also included in the Petition lodged with MRTP.
3. However, while the case was pending, the Competition Act 2002 went into effect on September 1, 2009, thus repealing the MRTP Act. As a result, the MRTP Commission’s cases were transferred to the previous Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT).

PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTIONS

• It was argued that NCLAT erred in failing to recognize that as the complainant’s legal team did not receive the reimbursement of the amount of 4,53,750/- from the developer until 7th May 2016, the interest on the said principal amount should have operated from 4th October 1993 until the date of implementation of the amount, which was 7th May 2016.
• It was asserted that after the Tribunal determined that the developer was at fault. a decision upheld by this court, which held that the complainant was obligated to compensation in the form of compound interest.
• It was argued that the developer’s claim that the money had been taken from its account and that it was unaware of the initial Pay Order filing could not be accepted. Furthermore, learned counsel stated that the developer took full advantage of the complainant’s deposits and, after cancelling the sale, quickly assigned the property to another customer for a significantly greater sum of 21 lakhs. 

 DEFENDANT’S CONTENTIONS

• The developer argued, both in answer to the complainant’s appeal and in its own appeal, that no blame could be assigned to it and that it could not be held liable once the complainant got the Pay Order dated 30th April 2005. Senior attorney for the developer argued that the inquiry was strictly limited to whether any obligation arose owing to any fault or shortcoming on its part after April 2005, given that the Pay Order was not encased by the complaint. In this regard, it was asserted that Citibank had unequivocally stated that the money was withdrawn from the developer’s account after the Pay Order was placed.
• It was contended that the Pay Order was in the MRTP Commission’s file and so authorized its recertification. In these instances, the developer addressed the Commission, leading in the instrument’s verification and eventual giving over to the complainant.
• Legal representatives for the developer claimed that once the money in dispute was settled through the bank (i.e., through an instrument payment, such as a Pay Order, the responsibility would stop. The developer’s counsel relied on the rulings in Hindustan Paper Corporation Ltd vs. Ananta Bhattacharjee.

Judgment/Conclusion:

Accordingly, the Apex Court said that the Complainant should have taken either of the following actions given the observations mentioned above:

She may have asked to deposit the Pay Order earnings in an account handled by the MRTP Commission Registrar. She may have asked for a “without prejudice” order, allowing her to cash the money and preventing the denial of her claim.

She might have also sought appropriate directions that the Developer keep the sum, who could then be instructed to pay the principal plus such interest as the MRTP Commission or the Tribunal judged reasonable and in the interests of justice. As none of these options was chosen, and because the money in question was unquestionably deducted from the Developer’s Current Account, the Apex Court ruled that the Developer cannot be held accountable for paying interest on the Pay Order amount of Rs. 4,53,750/- beyond 30-04-2005. As a result, the Developer’s Appeal was granted, while the Complainant’s Appeal was denied.

All these data made it abundantly evident that the developer was not at fault; in fact, the complaint confirmed receiving the Pay Order that the developer had returned in a letter dated September 26, 2005. The complaint’s database and the evidence presented with it include no mention of or reference to the original Pay Order, according to learned counsel who cited the pleadings before the MRTP Commission.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/40rgvZm

-Report by Tannu

It was held by the Delhi high court in the case of GAGAN KHOKHA V. STATE NCT OF DELHI, that under section 438 of CrPC 1973 anticipatory bail was granted to every person, but only after checking the facts and circumstances of each case.

Facts:

The judgment was made by justice Amit Sharma. This is reserved on 20 January 2023 and pronounced on 3rd February 2023. The FIR was made under section 323/342/376 on 21 .9.2020 by the complainant against the application and his family members. The complainant stated that she lives with her old-aged mother they both are harassed and threatened (physically, and mentally) by the applicant and his family members.
The complainant stated that the applicant forcefully entered in house by breaking the door and windows and she already made a complaint against him in PS Rajinder Nagar. Further alleged that one day applicant entered their house by jumping over a wall and forcing her to do sexual intercourse with him otherwise he threatened to kidnap her.
The complainant further alleged that Devendra Khokha is applicant’s father and (co-accused )of the present case, followed her and passed sexually coloured remarks.

Plaintiff’s contentions:

On 20.09.2020 complainant alleged that applicant followed her to her house and tried to have sexual intercourse with her and when she told him that she already informed the police the applicant ran away after that his family along with him threatened her again on the same day her medical examination was conducted at ram Manohar Lohia hospital, New Delhi. On 23.09.2020 complainant’s statement was recorded under section 164 of CrPC. And chargesheet was filed on 08.02.2022 under sections 354/450/454/506/509/34 of IPC.

Applicant’s contentions:

Learned counsel was present on behalf of the applicant and stated that applicant Gagan Khokha live separately from his parents and his house is very far from the complainant’s residence. It also submitted that the complainant began visiting his home around May 2019 for the care of his mother Smt. Suman khokha , suffering from lympnode asphyxia. It was produced that the complainant had a relationship with his father Devendra Khokha (applicant’s father). They had a relationship for some time and stayed together at various hotels around Delhi and all bills of hotels were attached or various voice recordings and call recordings between them.
As the opposite of this learned counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant and disclosed the allegations against the applicant and stated that the applicant created a false story of the complainant’s affair with his father and also created false evidence (bills, invoices) tampering, fabricating with the documents including Adhar card of the complainant.
The complainant made another complaint on 17.04.2021 against the applicant and his father and FIR was made under section 323/345 registered at PS Rajinder Nagar.
The investigation of the present case is almost complete and the trial is underway. The applicant has already been interrogated and no custodial interrogation is required for him.

Judgement:

After looking at the facts and circumstances of the present case the application for anticipatory bail is allowed to the applicant. Because of arrest with the present case FIR, the applicant is released after filing a personal bond of 50,000 rupees with some terms and conditions:
●The applicant is not to leave India without Court’s permission
●The applicant is not to tamper with evidence
●The application has to give all his mobile numbers to investigating officer
●If the applicant tried to temper with evidence then bail shall be cancelled.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/40F8bpd

CITATION: 2023/DHC/000766

-Report by Sanya Luthra

The case Pawan Arora vs State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) deals with the petitioner being liable for keeping the substances for which he didn’t possess a suitable license which was considered unlawful and because of this the petitioner has been in custody since 4th August 2020 and Trial Court has also rejected the bail application and observed that the firm did not possess a such license which authorised them to sell those substances.

FACTS:

As a result of some secret information, a raid was conducted in the Jhuggis of Kamla Nehru Camp Kirti Nagar, New Delhi by the Narcotic Cell and because of that raid on the night of 17th and 18th June 2020 when the raid was conducted a huge amount of the consignment of psychotropic substance Tramadol, Nitrazepam based tablets and Codeine based syrups were recovered from the godown situated there. When police inquired about the same then Shravan Kumar (who was there at the time of the raid) revealed that the medicines of the godown belonged to the petitioner and his manager Chander Shekhar. With this an FIR was lodged regarding the same and Shravan Kumar was arrested at that time, later on, it was revealed that the petitioner and his manager had the office of the same substance, later on, the petitioner and his manager were also arrested, further, it was held that the license to sell and possess medicines was of Chander Shekhar. So now it is up to Delhi High Court to check the liability of the three people involved and also to grant bail or not.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:

It was put forward by the petitioner that the authenticity of the secret information is doubtful and the petitioner also argued that the license to sell the following substance was there with the petitioner so he was lawful in selling those and it was also stated that these substances do not fall within Schedule I of the NDPS Act hence compliance to Chapter VII A of the NDPS Rules 1985 is not required. Instead, they fall under Schedule H-1 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. Schedule H-1 has been issued under Rules 65 and 97 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 and the said substances which have been recovered and have been attributed to the petitioner, fall under Sr.No.20 (Codeine), No.36 (Nitrazepam) and No.45 (Tramadol), so they were emphasizing that they possess a lawful license for everything and can’t be said to conduct unlawful activities.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:

The learned counsel from the state argued that the FSL report which has arrived also proves that the substances they were carrying include substances which they were not supposed to be sold or possessed by anyone, that’s why they were having the unlawful substances and should be punished for the same, also the license which they were having was not eligible to possess such substances.

JUDGMENT:

The Delhi High Court held that at this stage when a trial has to be conducted and will take much time and 37 witnesses have to be examined and prima facie it does seem violation of license rules and not of illegal stocking and sale of substances, without a license, so the petitioner can be released on regular bail and therefore he is released on regular bail with the sum amount of 1,00,000 as bond and two sureties with certain conditions which are that he will not leave the country, will provide his all mobile numbers, permanent address, join the investigation and will appear before the court when called.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3DHbrX1

CITATION: 2023/DHC/000688

–Report by Sneha Sakshi

In the case of MAHARASHTRA STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATION EX-EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION & ORS.
VERSUS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS., the appellants had brought a discrimination claim against the Maharashtra government’s Industry, Energy and Labour Department’s decision dated 29.03.2010 in that procedure.

FACTS:

The workers of the Maharashtra State Financial Corporation who retired or passed away between January 1, 2006, and March 29, 2010, were not granted the benefit of the pay scale change that the Fifth Pay Commission had recommended. The modification, however, became effective on January 1, 2006.

The determination of the implementation date for the Fifth Pay Commission’s recommendations as they relate to the respondent corporation is at issue in this case. That formulating a policy on fixation of pay for the wages of its employees, the scope of its revision, as well as the date of its execution, are undeniably matters of exclusive executive decision-making power. Special leave to appeal granted.

The appeal was finally heard with the parties’ knowledgeable counsel’s permission. A ruling by the Bombay High Court is being contested by the appellant organisation.

CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANT:

➢ The expert counsel for the appellants, Mr Jay Salva, asserted that, notwithstanding the fact that the most recent pay modification had been in effect for its employees from 1986 to 1989, MSFC believed it had gone into effect on January 1, 1999. While the previous version was being authorised, five more revisions were due.
➢ The board of directors decided to follow the pay commission’s recommendations starting in January 1996 without giving those modifications any thought.
➢ Only the 115 current employees who were working at the time that the benefits were passed on were subject to the enhanced salary, depriving the 900 previous employees of comparative advantages.
➢ All people who were employed received temporary reliefs beginning in September 1993, including those who ultimately lost out on the pay revision owing to retirement.
➢ Mr Salva contended that the MSFC owed no more than 32 crores to all former workers, including those who had retired, asked for VRS, or had passed away. He said the GR failed to recover the money paid for interim relief and ad hoc amounts paid to current employees between September 1993 and July 2001.

CONTENTIONS OF RESPONDENT:

➢ The employee in question was not subject to any scheme and chose to leave the company of his or her own volition. However, the Corporation had less obligation to pay salary dues.
➢ The defence attorney for MSFC contended that the state government shouldn’t intervene because of the contested judgement.
➢ It was contended that MSFC is an independent company and is exempt from Maharashtra Government regulations.
➢ Expert counsel emphasised that by paying the benefits on the terms proposed by the appellants, the Corporation was suffering losses.
➢ These characteristics made these workers eligible for benefits above and beyond what they would have gotten if they had remained in their jobs.
➢ Before issuing such a ruling, the Court, according to Mr Patil, must consider the financial impact on the employer.

JUDGMENT:

On January 1, 1996, the State Government adopted and put into practice the Fifth Pay Commission’s recommendations. Without choosing whether to impose those scales for its employees, the MSFC forwarded the idea to the State Government (as required by S. 39 of the State Financial Corporations Act). During this period, all present employees received a little reprieve in the form of wage revision.

The Fifth Pay Commission’s recommendations for pay modification were put into action by MSFC on March 29, 2010. The State of Maharashtra letter dated 29.03.2010 served as the basis for the decision to apply the wage revision to the workers who were already working there and to minimise the arrears that would be due as of the first of January 2006 in the future.

By Office Order dated 09.04.2010, the MSFC decided to implement the decision of the Government of Maharashtra and grant the benefits of the Fifth Pay Commission to employees of the Corporation who were on its rolls on that date.

The highest court in India has ruled that voluntarily leaving one’s job before finishing it is still eligible for rewards. The employer cannot discriminate against or split a homogeneous class of workers using a fake cut-off date, the court said.

It was held that VRS employees cannot claim parity with others who retired upon achieving the age of superannuation. Those who died during that period shall be entitled to arrears based on pay revision, accepted by the Corporation. The Corporation was directed to pay interest @ 8% p.a. on these arrears from 01.04.2010 till the end of this judgment.

LINK TO FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3Rw1Qbk

About the Organization

A full-service law company was established in 1993 by Mr Paritosh Sinha and is situated in Kolkata (the Advocate-on-Record for the State of West Bengal).

Areas of Work

A long-term intern for their High Court Original Side Department, which essentially deals with Civil Laws and IPR matters.

Eligibility Criteria

The candidates preferably should be in their 4th year or Final year and based in Kolkata.

Application Procedure

Interested please send your CV to internship@sinhaco.com 

Disclaimer: All information posted by us on Lexpeeps is true to our knowledge. But still, it is suggested that you check and confirm things on your level.

For regular updates on more opportunities, we can catch up at-

WhatsApp Group:

https://chat.whatsapp.com/Iez749mZfpaGfG4x2J6sr9

Telegram:

https://t.me/lexpeeps

LinkedIn:

https://www.linkedin.com/company/lexpeeps-in-lexpeeps-pvt-ltd

About LPJ and Partners LLP

They are one of the fast-emerging and leading law firms in Delhi with a nationwide presence through its channel partners. Some of their areas of expertise include Debt Recovery, Litigation & Dispute Resolution, Mergers & Acquisitions, Contract Management and Employment Law, Intellectual Property Rights, Policy & Regulatory Advice, Due Diligence, Deal Management, Consumer Protection, Labour Law Incorporations, Certifications, Compliances, etc.

They are well conversant with the drafting of representations and initiating, defending, and pursuing litigation on the original and appellate side in civil, criminal, consumer protection and service matters in District Courts, Commissions/Forums/Tribunals, High Courts and the Supreme Court.

They are offering internships to law students interested in pursuing a career in litigation after graduation.

Stipend

Promising interns will be offered long-term internships along with a stipend.

How to Apply?

Interested candidates can apply to office@lpjpartners.com

Disclaimer: All information posted by us on Lexpeeps is true to our knowledge. But still, it is suggested that you check and confirm things on your level.

For regular updates on more opportunities, we can catch up at-

WhatsApp Group:

https://chat.whatsapp.com/Iez749mZfpaGfG4x2J6sr9

Telegram:

https://t.me/lexpeeps

LinkedIn:

https://www.linkedin.com/company/lexpeeps-in-lexpeeps-pvt-ltd

-Report by Shweta Sabuji

In the recent case of K.T.V. OIL MILLS PRIVATE LIMITED VERSUS THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, UNION OF INDIA & ORS., an appeal filed in opposition to the judgment and decree rendered on the file of the Commercial Division of this Honourable High Court on July 3, 2018, by the learned Single Judge in A.No.1253 of 2018 in C.S.No.706 of 2017.

FACTS:

The appellant was established in 2008 as a company under the Companies Act of 1956. The purpose of forming this Company was to take over K.T.V. Oil Mills’ operations. The late Shri. K. T. Varadaraj Chetty launched an oil trading company in Kotwal Market in 1971. Under the name and style “K.T.V Oil Mills,” the company operated from 1999 to 2008 as a partnership firm. The partnership firm was then changed into a private limited company in 2008 under the name “K.T.V. Health Food Private Limited,” and they applied to the Trademark Registry for the registration of the trademark “ROOBINI,” claiming usage as of June 1, 1995.

On December 30, 2007, K.T.V. Oil Mills and the appellant engaged in an assignment deed, and as a result, the trademark “ROOBINI” was transferred. The K.T.V. Oil Mills partners all acquired shares in the appellant-Company. The assignment deed was completed in favor of the appellant by the partners of K.T.V. Oil Mills because they chose to operate the company under the appellant’s Company name. As a result, the appellant learned that the respondent was using the contested trademark “ROOBEN” in 2017, which is a slavish replica of the appellant’s trademark “ROOBINI” regarding a similar product.

PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTIONS:

The plaintiff responded to the request for the plaint to be rejected by filing a counter, claiming that the plaintiff’s predecessor, K.T.V. Oil Mills, conducted business from 1995 to 2007 under the name and style of “ROOBINI,” and that all necessary applications for the trademark’s registration were also made. Ultimately, the trademark “ROOBINI” was registered on 22.01.1999 under registration number 837894, claiming use from 01.06.1995. Totake its business to the next level, K.T.V. Oil Mills, a partnership firm, became a private limited company. As a result, the Partners of K.T.V. Oil Mills assigned their ownership of the entire business as well as the trademark “ROOBINI” to the appellant-Company, which then became known as “K.T.V. Health Food Private Limited.”

On December 30, 2007, an assignment deed was made. After that, the appellant filed the proper paperwork to transfer the trademark “ROOBINI” that the Partnership Firm had previously assigned to the appellant in favor of the plaintiff. As a result, the Trademark Registry registered the same on January 25, 2018. Due to the assignment deed executed on December 30, 2007, only theappellant/plaintiff is currently the owner of the trademark “ROOBINI” at the time the lawsuit was filed.

Additionally, the appellant submitted the required paperwork in 2015 to modify the registration in the appellant Company’s name. As a result, the plaintiff is the “ROOBINI” trademark’s owner. Since the plaintiff has been conducting business through its branch office on Chennai’s Thambu Chetty Street, which is squarely within this Court’s jurisdiction, the matter was brought before this Hon’ble Court.

JUDGEMENT:

Following a hearing with both parties, the learned Single Judge granted the request to dismiss the complaint, concluding that the telephone bills by themselves were insufficient to establish that the appellant was operating at the branch office, which is located at Thambu Chetty Street in Chennai. Furthermore, the appellant/plaintiff was not the owner of the trademark “Roobini” when it was registered. Even if it is assumed without admission that the assignment deed was executed in the plaintiff’s favor and that the trademark “Roobini” was registered in the plaintiff’s name as a result of the said assignment deed, the plaintiff is not entitled to any rights in the trademark “ROOBINI” based on the assignment deed.

The plaintiff is also not permitted to file the current lawsuit in this court without having their principal place of business within its jurisdiction, even though they maintain a branch office at Thambu Chetty Street in Chennai, which they claim is within that court’s jurisdiction because those provisions, as well as Sections 134(2) of the Trademarks Act and Section 62(2) of the Copy Act, define “carrying on business” respectively.

The plaint is therefore susceptible to being dismissed as long as neither the defendant nor the plaintiff’s primary place of business is engaged in business within the jurisdiction of this Court. As a result, the plaint was dismissed by the contested order. The appellant has chosen the current Original Side Appeal because he is unhappy with the aforementioned order.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3I1cbcl

-Report by Shreya Gupta

In the case of UNIVERSITY OF DELHI Vs. M/S KALRA ELECTRICALS, the two parties Delhi University and M/S Kalra Electricals were the former was the petitioner and the latter was the respondent. The dispute between the parties arose from a work contract and the dispute was referred to the arbitration for settlement where the arbitrator ordered the petitioner to pay rupees 20 lakhs for other 44 contracts which were not referred to it.

FACTS:

The case was filed under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation act, of 1966. The dispute arose from the work contract dated 09.06.2005. There was no dispute regarding the other 44 contracts between the parties. The dispute was regarding the sum of Rs. 92,101.25. It was referred to arbitration in view of clause 25.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:

The petitioner’s advocate contends whether the arbitral tribunal can provide relief for the case that has not been referred to it. She contends that the awarded sum was time-barred. She further states about section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1966 which states that “the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration: Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside”. She contended that the relief provided under the other 44 contacts to the respondent was not disputed and the respondent would have filed a claim under it if that was the case.

The court has separated the subject work contract from all other contracts and therefore it was beyond the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction. She further in support stated some of the previous cases- Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Company Limited vs. National Highways Authority of India (NHAI), MSK Projects India (JV) Limited vs. the State of Rajasthan and Another, State of Goa vs. Praveen Enterprises, Alupro Building Systems Pvt Ltd vs. Ozone Overseas Pvt Ltd, Indus Biotech Private Limited vs. Kotak India Venture (Offshore) Fund (Earlier Known as Kotak India Venture Limited) and Others5 and DLF Home Developers Limited vs. Rajapura Homes Private Limited and Another.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:

The respondent’s advocate stated that the arbitrator was well within his jurisdiction because the case arose regarding the other 44 contracts from the subject contract and that the petitioner paid for it maliciously. He stated that the assistant engineer gave the letter to the arbitrator to give orders for the other 44 contracts as well.

JUDGEMENT:

The court stated that the payment of Rs. 93,033 is not due and is in order and so DU should deduct any amount in payment to KE. The court ordered DU to make the pending payments of 20lakh at 9% per annum interest to KE from the date of raising the bill to the date of actual payment. The court stated that the award of Rs. 20 lakhs regarding the other 44 contracts were out of the arbitral jurisdiction and is set aside. The court further stated that the arbitrator fell foul of Section 34 (2) (a) (ⅳ) which is impermissible in law as it caused patent illegality. The order of arbitration was set aside from the other contracts and was followed for the subject contract. The court stated in its order “I find that since there is no fraud committed by KE and since the contracts are not inter-related it was wrong and illegal on part of DU to withhold the amount of Rs 20 Lakh in 44 contracts for settling an amount of Rs.92,033/- or Rs. 93,688/-or even both related to just one or two contracts”.

About the Organization

Dubey Law Associates are a team of effective attorneys with considerable experience appearing before numerous courts, including the Supreme Court of India. Since 2012, they have been represented before the Supreme Court of India. The Supreme Court of India, the Delhi High Court, District Courts, NCLT, NCLAT, APTEL NCDRC, DRT, DRAT, DRAT, NGT, SAT, CCI, CAT, and other Courts and Tribunals are all places where we as a team practise. The following are the areas in which they practise and offer advisory services: Litigation in the areas of civil, criminal, company, competition, financial, intellectual property, securities, labour, arbitration, family, and property law, among others. We are skilled, dependable, and dedicated specialists.

About the Opportunity

The firm has a requirement for in-office Law Interns at its office in Delhi.

No. of Position

2

Stipend

The stipend would be Rs.4000/- per month.

Eligibility

3rd, 4th, or 5th-year student would be preferred. The student must possess a good academic background, research, and content creation skills.

How to Apply?

Interested candidates may apply at career@edla.in

Location

Delhi, India.

Disclaimer: All information posted by us on Lexpeeps is true to our knowledge. But still, it is suggested that you check and confirm things on your level.

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https://chat.whatsapp.com/Iez749mZfpaGfG4x2J6sr9

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