Author: LEXPEEPS editor

The Bombay High Court saw noteworthy arguments and exchanges in the ongoing PIL filed against Media Trials, on account of media coverage, into the issue of death of actor Sushant Singh Rajput.

A bench of Chief Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice GS Kulkarni heard the matter for the entire day.

Senior Advocate Siddhartha Bhatnagar appeared on behalf of the National Broadcasters Federation and batter for self-regulatory mechanisms on the press. He told the court that the guidelines that currently exist were sufficient and enough and that government control of the press was unwarranted, which, if brought in, could be dangerous. While elaborating on the effectiveness of the NBF, Bhatnagar informed the court that the NBF is a private association, having its own regulatory mechanisms headed by a retired Supreme Court judge. “It has set up a self-regulatory body called Professional News Broadcasting Standards Organization (PNBSO),” he added. Further, he stated that the fact that the Programme Code was being amended from time to time was proof that it was effective and did not remain static.

Bhatnagar then took the bench through judgments to substantiate the dangers of Government control over the press. To do this, he referred to Indian Express Newspapers vs. Union of India, which is a 1985 judgment of the Supreme Court.

Bhatnagar then referred to Shreya Singhal V. Union of India which was a challenge to Section 66A of the Information technology Act.

The Senior Counsel told that the court that persons who are likely to be attacked by the media, perhaps more viciously are government’s officials and if the limits are crossed, enough safeguards are present to deal with it. The court then asked Bhatnagar whether the NBF could have suo motu cognizance powers. To this, he responded by stating that this was something he would be suggesting to his client. The court also expressed concerns over the practice of “media trial” while hearing a batch of petitioners seeking regulations on the reportage of the Sushant Singh Rajput death case.

“If you become the investigator, prosecutor and the judge what is the use of us? Why are we here”, the bench asked Advocate Malvika Trivedi. The lawyer representing Republic TV. The court also asked the lawyers of Republic TV if asking the public who should be arrested in a case is part of investigating journalism. The bench posed the query in reference to the has tag campaign “#ArrestRhea” run by the Channel in Twitter following the death of Bollywood actor Sushant Sigh Rajput.

The court is set to hear the plea(s) further on Friday at noon.

The Delhi High Court recently held that students shall have the choice to give exams.

The central government had earlier announced that the universities and colleges across the country are required to complete the final semester exams for the final year undergraduate and postgraduate students by the end of September 2020. The colleges would be provided with the option of completing the exams online, offline, or in both the modes as per the convenience of the students.

In its general meeting on October 5, BCI said its circulars and press releases had “clearly spelled out that no physical exams were to be held till physical reopening of colleges, which should only re-open after the crisis of pandemic is averted”.

The directions were also issued to promote all students except those in the final year to ensure that classes for the next academic year would begin, it added. Promoting intermediate students were regularized by adding a clause that exams should be held within a month of re-opening of colleges, BCI has clarified.

Prodyut Bhattacharya, the controller of examinations at IP University, said “we will wait for now as there is a court hearing on October 21 where our counsel would place the university’s view.”

The university had a plan to start the exams on November 2, “which would have been better as otherwise students will have to sit for two semesters exams in December”, he said, “We had decided on a two hour exam as an arrangement for the Covid- 19 precautions.”

On 21^st October 2020, Justice Nath acknowledged that a situation of  back logging of exams can be there if postponed whereas the petitioners have assured the students would be willing to give 10-15 exams. Directions have been given to the students whether to give exams on 2^nd November or later when the reappear exams are to be given.

Operative part to remove any confusion:-

1. Students shall have the choice to give exams any of the two exams. It is pertinent to note that the first chance is in the lieu of the desire of the students who wish to write exams commencing from 2^nd November 2020 and second alternative is given in the light of the BCI Communication/ Clarification where the exams will be held post 1 month of the Physical reopening of the college.
2. There shall lie no penal consequence for those students who wish to miss the exam commencing from 2^nd November 2020, but they have to give exams post the physical reopening of the colleges.(No student is exempted from giving exams, rather it’s a choice left for the students whether to give it now or later)
3. The mode for the exams commencing from 2nd November 2020 shall be physical and shall be in the home institution which shall have 3 questions and will be of 2 hours.

Also, it has been submitted in the petition that the students are comfortable to have 2-3 semester examination together later on who skips this exam and have no objection for the same. Thus, no matter how many exams will be lined up in the future the students shall have to give exams.

The Supreme Court ordered an interim stay on an earlier Orissa High Court judgement banning animal sacrifice during the Chatar Yatra at the Manikeswari temple at Bhawanipatna. The High Court had imposed a ban on sacrifice of the animals and birds in and around the precincts of Maa Manikeshwari temple during the festival. Petitioner Bhawani Shankar Nial had moved the Supreme Court seeking interim direction to perform the sacrifices. It was stated that in the name of traditional religious custom and rituals, cruelty is being caused to the animals and birds by mass butchery in public places during ‘chatar Yatra’ festival every year and she sought for appropriate direction in the matter for stoppage for such illegal and superstitious animals and birds sacrifice. According to the petitioner, Article 21 of the Constitution is violated which assures every citizen of India to live with dignity as it is hit by forcefully watching and feeling the pain of slaughter of thousands of animals and birds on the public road during the festival. It is further stated that inaction of the district administration of Bhawanipatna in stopping the butchery has compelled her to approach this Court on a number of occasions and even though some though some directions have been passed in that respect to check such activities but no fruitful result came out for which she has approached this court again. The festival is being celebrated during the Mahastami of Durga puja festival every year. Animal sacrifice is prevalent during this festival. Though the State Governemnt has strictly banned these kinds of activities, still devotees do not follow the rule. About 50,000 animals sacrifices take place during this festival. The court had fixed responsibility on Collector and SP of Kalahandi to ensure the ban is imposed in letter and spirit. Sacrificing the animals to please the deity is nothing but a sheer superstition which needs to be addressed so that it can come to an end by way of district administration, police, educated mass, students and people from all walks of life is necessary.

After Bar Council of India objected to the conduct of law examinations before resumption of physical classes, IP University has decided to rethink its strategy. The university has said it will take a call after October 21 as the matter is in court.

In its general body meeting on October 5, BCI said its circular and press releases had “clearly spelled out that no physical exams were to be held till phusical reopening of colleges, which should only re-open after the crisis of pandemic is averted.”

The directions were also issued to promote all the students except those in the final year to ensure that classes for the next academic session would begin, it added. Promoting intermediate students are regularized by adding a clause that exams should be held within a month of re-opening of colleges, BCI has clarified. Prodyut Bhattacharya, the controller of examinations at IP University, said “we will wait for now as there is a court hearing on October 21 where our counsel would place the university’s view.”

The university has a plan to start a examination on November 2, “which would have better as otherwise students will have to sit for two semester exams in December”, he said. “We had decided on a two hour exam as an arrangement for the Covid 19 precautions.”

Bhattacharya claimed that the decision was taken after BCI had said that “exams should be conducted”. The official was referring to a June 9 circular of BCI stating that all students, except final year ones, will be promoted on the basis of previous years exams and the marks obtained in the internal examination of the current year. It had also clarified physical examinations would be held only after opening of the colleges/ universities.

The Leave is granted Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order passed by the Madurai Beach of the Madras High Court, by which the High Court has released the appellant on default bail, on condition to deposit rs.8,00,000/- before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Nagercoil, Kanyakumari district, the original accused has preferred present appeals. That the appellant herein was arrested and remanded to the judicial custody for the offences punishable under section 420 on the file of the D.C.B. Police Station, Kanyakumari District. That the appellant herein filed an application before the learned Judicial Magistrate seeking bail under Section 437 Cr.p.c That the wife of the appellant filed an affidavit before the learned Magistrate and assured to pay 7,00,000/- and the balance amount to be paid against the alleged amount of Rs. 15,67,338/-. Therefore by order, the learned Magistrate released the appellant on bail on the conditions stated in the said order. One of the condition was directing the appellant to deposit money in the court, and the balance amount was directed to be deposited.

The appellant approached the High Court and prayed to release the appellant on default bail. It was the case on behalf of the appellant that non-deposit of any amount which was required to be deposited pursuant to the order passed by the learned magistrate, imposed while releasing the appellant on regular bail.., shall not come in the way of the appellant accused in getting default bail. It was submitted that the default bail is mandatory bail, provided the conditions in Section 167 Cr.P.C are satisfied i.e. investigation is not completed and the charge sheet is not filed by the investigation agency within the time stipulated. The High Court by the impugned judgment and order accepted the same, however, considering the earlier undertaking given by the wife of the appellant in the court of the learned magistrate while considering the bail application, to deposit money, while releasing the appellant on default bail, the High Court has imposed the condition that the appellant shall deposit sum before the learned magistrate. That thereafter, the appellant preferred application before the High Court to modify condition by which the appellant was directed to deposit amount before the learned Judicial Magistrate and the appellant was directed to report before Judicial Magistrate and the appellant was directed to report before the concerned police station until further orders for interrogation. By the impugned order, The High Court has dismissed the said application for modification observing that earlier wife of the appellant filed affidavit before the learned magistrate. And the alleged are not required to be modified. Hence, the present appeals.

The bench of Justices Ashok Bhushan, MR Shah and Subhash Reddy was considering a petition filed by the father- in- law who claimed that the suit property is exclusively owned by him and was not a shared household. His son, it was contended, had no right in the property. The appellant had purchased a property in 1983. In 1995, his son got married and started staying on the first floor with his wife. In 2014, the husband filed for divorce alleging cruelty by the wife. In 2015, the wife filed a case against her husband, father –in-law and mother- in- law under the Domestic Violence Act. However  in the trial court, the father- in- law stated that he and his wife were victims of domestic violence by the daughter-in-law and that he had no duty to maintain the daughter – in- law when the husband was alive.

The daughter in law had claimed that she cannot be removed from the house as it was a shared household, and that she had a right to reside therein. The trial court in April 2019 granted asked the daughter- in- law to handover possession of the property to the appellant.

In an appeal against this order, the Delhi High Court set aside the trial court decree and sent the matter back for fresh adjudication in December 2019. The High Court also noted that the husband needed to be made a party to the case. Thus, the father- in- law approached the Supreme Court against this order, seeking that the trial court verdict be upheld.

The primary contention of the father- in- law stemmed from the verdict of the Supreme Court Bench of Justices SB Sinha and Markandey katju in SR Batra and Anr.v. Taruna Batra, where it was held that since the house belongs to the mother-in-law of the wife and does not belong to the husband, the wife cannot claim any right to live in the said house.

However, overruling the SR Batra verdict, the present Bench held that “shared household referred to in Section 2(s) is the shared household of aggrieved person where was living at the time”. It was stated that, “the definition of shared household given in Section 2 (s) cannot be read to mean that shared household can only be that household which is household of the joint family of which husband is a member or in which husband of the aggrieved person has ashare.

The pendency of proceedings under Domestic Violence Act, or any order interim or final passed under the DV Act under Section 19 regarding right of residence is not an embargo for initiating or continuing any civil proceedings, which relate to the subject matter of order interim or final passed in proceedings under the DV Act.

The bench went on to highlight the precarious position of women in Indian society, and the reasons why domestic violence cases go unreported. “ the domestic violence in this country is rampant and several women encounter violence in some form or the other or almost everyday. The reason why most cases of domestic violence are never reported is due to the social stigma of the society and the attitude of the women themselves, where women are expected to be subservient , not just to their male counterparts but also to the male’s relatives.

Thus Court overruled the SR batra verdict, where it was held that if the house belongs to the mother- in- law of the wife and does not belong to the husband, the wife cannot claim any right to live in the said house.

Leave granted in an F.I.R dated 18.11.2018, involving sections 302,307,452,427,341,34 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959, Sections 3,4,5,6 of  the Explosive Substances Act,1908 and Section 13 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. Pursuant to this F.I.R, After 90 days in custody, which expired on 21.02.2019, an application for default bail was made to the Sub-Divisional Judicial magistrate, Ajnala. This application was dismissed on 25.02.2019 on the ground that the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate had, by an order dated 13.02.2019, already extended time from 90 days to 180 days under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as amended by the Unlawful Activities Act, 1967.  However, this order was challenged by way of a revision petition by the Appellant and his co-accused, which revision succeeded by an order dated 25.03.2019, by which the learned Additional Sessions Judge being the Special Court set up under the National Investigation Agency Act,2008.

Shri Colin Gonsalves, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the Appellant, referred to both the enactments as aforesaid in copious detail and stressed the fact that once the Special Court had been set up as an exclusive Court had been set up as an to try all offences under the UAPA, such offences being scheduled offences relatable to the NIA Act, it was the special Court alone which had exclusive jurisdiction to extend the period of 90 days to 180 days under Section 43-D (2) (B) of the UAPA. This being the case, on an application having been made prior to the filing of the charge sheet for default bail, his contention was that the indefeasible right to default bail arose immediately after 21.02.2019, when the 90 day period was over. An order that is passed without jurisdiction by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate dated 13.02.2019, had been corrected by the learned Additional Sessions Judge/Special Court vide the order dated 25.03.2019 as a result of which his right to default bail sprung into action filing of the charge sheet dated 26.03.2019. He, therefore, assailed the High Court judgment on both country-

Firstly, that the exclusive jurisdiction to extend time vested only in the Special Court and not in the Ilaqa Magistrate, despite the fact that it was the State Police Agency that investigated these offences. Secondly, he also argued relying upon a number of judgments, that the Appellants right to default bail was not extinguished by the filing of the charge sheet dated 26.03.2019, as was incorrectly held by the High Court.

Smt. Jaspreet Gogia, learned Advocate who appeared on behalf of the State of Punjab, also took us through the provisions of both the aforesaid enactments. She stressed in particular in particular Section 10 of the NIA Act, stating that nothing in the said Act would affect the powers of the State Government to investigate and prosecute any scheduled offence. She also stressed the fact that the entire investigation was done only by the state policy and not by the National Investigation Agency. This being the case, she argued that the Ilqa magistrate had jurisdiction to extend time, and having so extended time on 13.02.2019, any application for default bail after the 90 day period was over i.e. after 21.02.2019 had necessarily to be dismissed. She also argued that the first application for default bail which was filed on or before 25.03.2019, had spent its force, having been dismissed, and that the application dated 08.04.2019 filed for default bail was clearly after 26.03.2019, when the charge sheet was filed and therefore was correctly dismissed by the order of the learned Special Judge Dated 11.04.2019.

Having heard learned counsel for the parties, it is important at this stage to set out all the relevant provisions of the three enactments that we are directly concerned with- the code, UAPA and NIA Act.

The appeal is, accordingly, allowed, and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside.

The bench comprising the Chief Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice S. Kumar observed that mere possession of a Pan Card; a Voter ID Card; or an Aadhar Card cannot be said to be proof of Indian Citizenship. The court also added that relinquishment of Citizenship of Nepal does not confer any right of Indian Citizenship. As per appellant Kiran Gupta was born and brought in Nepal and was married with Ashok Prasad Gupta and after she started residing permanently with him in India. After she got her name entered into the voters list prepared in the year 2008 for elections to the Assembly of Bihar; (b) in her name she has (i) an account with a bank in India,(ii) a Pan Card issued by the Income Tax Department, and (iii) and Aadhaar; (c) names of her children born out of the wedlock are registered in India under the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 and the respective Rules framed thereunder; (d) pursued her higher education in India (e) purchased an immovable property in India. She was elected as a Mukhiya of Gram Panchayat. State Election Commission set aside the election commission set aside the election under Section 136(1) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 on the ground of her not being an Indian citizen. Then she approached the High Court claiming  that she voluntarily relinquished Citizenship of Nepal and thus has acquired Indian Citizenship. The Single bench dismissed her writ petition holding that, she being not a citizen of India, entailed disqualification under the Panchayat Act.

The court observed that mere relinquishment of original Citizenship cannot be perceived as an intent of seeking Indian Citizenship. The court made the following observations that; “the Citizenship Act does not provide for a scenario where a person residing in India, upon relinquishment her /his original Citizenship is automatically considered to be a citizen of India, possibility of a person, though not the appellant, migrating to a third country cannot be ruled out. The foreign national does not become an Indian Citizen on marriage with a citizen under the Act. After the marriage, the foreign national has an option to get registered as an Indian citizen. Even then, the person must fulfill the requirement of residency before they can apply residency before they can apply for Indian Citizenship. The object of the Citizenship Act is to provide for the acquisition and determination of Indian Citizenship. As in case of Sate Trading Corporation of India Ltd v. Commercial Tax  Officer & Ors, the Hon’ble Apex Court clarified that the Indian Constitution and the Citizenship Act Exhaustively deal with the issue of Citizenship, confined only to a natural person. Further, nationality and Citizenship are not interchangeable, terms and expression ‘person’ under the Act have to be natural and not legal entities. There is also no doubt in our mind that Part II of the Constitution when it deals with Citizenship refers to natural persons only. This is further made absolutely clear by the Citizenship Act which deals with Citizenship after the Constitution came into force and confines it only to natural persons. However, Citizenship is not a criterion for having a bank account in India. Voter ID cards are not incontrovertible evidence of Indian Citizenship – presumption attached to the issuance of the voter ID card may be challenged by a complaint that states material facts under Section 136 of the Panchayat Act. The bench also refused the plea to direct the Central Government to grant the petitioner Indian citizenship observing that it would impinge upon the Executive’s functions.

In the wake of a political turmoil after arrest of a leader of opposition party in Lok Sabha on 3^rd January, 2017, a national debate was held and telecast by a national channel, named, NDTV 24X7. The said debate was anchored by one Ms. Barkha Dutta and titled as “The Buck Stops Here”. In the aid debate the petitioner, an elected MP and the then ruling party of the Central Government and the opposite party No. 2, an elected member of Legislative Assembly of the State of West Bengal and National Spokesperson on behalf of her political party at the relevant point of time took part in the discussion. In course of such debate, when the opposite party No.2 was opposing the petitioner’s contention, he made a comment, “Mohua , are you on Mohua?”

According to opposite party No.2 the said comment was derogatory alluding of the intoxicating liquor called Mohua which is drunk in many tribal areas in India. She also alleged that the petition made such comment at the fage end of the programme. The opposite party could not raise any protest against the said remark. However, the anchor of the programme immediately reprimanded the petitioner and asked him not to make any personal remark in course of debate.

According to the opposite party 2 such remark made by the petitioner against her caused great offence and distress and was clearly a violation of Section 509 of the Indian penal Code. The said comment is patently untrue, false and made to maliciously defame her in clear violation of Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code. The opposite party no. 2 accordingly lodged an FIR against the petitioner before the officer in charge, Alipore P.S. Police registered Alipore P.S. Case No.2 dated 4^th January 2017 under section 509 of the Indian Penal Code and commenced investigation of the case. On Completion of investigation the charge sheet was submitted against the petitioner under Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and issued warrant of arrest against the petitioner.

Vide order dated 23^rd March 2017, the aforesaid application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which was registered as CRR 903 of 2017 was admitted for hearing and stay for further proceeding of the criminal case being CGR 62 of 2017 was granted for a limited period of time. It is further ascertained from the order dated 28^th April 2017, that the opposite party No.2 made an application prying for vacating the interim order. The said application was directed to be treated as an affidavit of opposition to the revision petition and directed to be disposed of along with the instant revision. Finally the aforesaid criminal revision is heard by this court on the basis of specific determination allotted to this court by the chief Justice of the Court in terms of  the last order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay vs. Union of India.

In the view of the discussion the instant criminal revision under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is allowed on contest, however without cost. The connected applications are also disposed of. However the opposite party No.2 is at liberty to take any action according to law, if available to her against the petitioner before the appropriate forum and in such case, the learned court below will take appropriate steps without being influenced or swayed over by any observation made by this court in this judgment.

Republic TV’s Chief Financial officer S Sundaram had moved the Supreme Court challenging the summons issued to the network in relation to the TRP scam case into a “media spectacle,” and that rights under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution cannot act be used as a shield against commission of a crime. Republic TV’s Chief Financial Officer S Sundaram had moved the Supreme Court challenging the summons issued to the network in relation to the TRP scam claimed to have been unearthed by Mumbai Police. The petition filed in the Apex Court challenges the October 9 summons issued to the CFO of the Republic Media Network in relation to investigation in FIR CR NO. 143 of 2020. Terming the writ petition as a gross abuse of process of law, the Mumbai Police has urged the Court to dismiss the plea with exemplary costs. It was stated that “any investigation in an alleged crime by an investigating agency cannot be urged as a ground for violation of rights under Article 19 (1)(a).  Article 19(1)(a) cannot be used to side- step, or prevent any investigation by a competent agency into the alleged fudging of the TRP ratings. Right under 19(1) (a) is not a shield which can used against the commission of any crime under the extent criminal of the land.”

Republic TV had issued a public statement asserting that the channel has not even been named in the FIR, and that only India Today has been named. It has thus questioned why it is being dragged into the case. Pointing to the fact that officers of several TV channels were summoned in the case, the Police has submitted that all have been co-operating in the investigation. A writ petition was filed by AGR Outlier Media Private Limited in the Supreme Court against the Registration of an FIR by Mumbai Police regarding the alleged TRP Scam by the TV Channel. Republic TV’s CFO Shiva Sundaram’s had approached the Supreme Court against the summons issued by Mumbai Police to the news channel. The Broadcast Audience Research Council an organization under the Union Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, and the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India measure TRPs with the help of barometers. This installation of barometers was done by a company called Hansa Research Group.

During their interrogation, these homeowners agreed that they had received money to keep their TV sets switched on to a particular channel, even if they did not want to watch it. Line of interrogation cannot be order by the persons who are being investigated or under the inquiry. Thus, the petition that now been withdrawn challenged the summons issued to the CFO of the Republic Media Network in relation to investigation in the TRP scam case.