Tag: supremecourtofindia

-Report by Anurag Sinha

As part of a petition contesting the blood donor standards, the Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare has filed an affidavit challenging the guidelines’ outright restriction on transgender people, gay males, female sex workers, and others donating blood.

It has been reported that the National Blood Transfusion Council (NBTC, an organisation made up of medical and scientific professionals) is responsible for determining which groups of people are barred from being blood donors and that this conclusion is grounded in data from scientific studies.

The affidavit begins by arguing that the petition’s concerns are within the purview of the executive and must be evaluated from the perspective of public health rather than individual rights.

Facts:

The Public Interest Litigation by a member of the Transgender community. Thangjam Santa A lawsuit against Singh, represented by lawyer Anindita Pujari, was filed in federal court “Under the auspices of the Central Health Ministry, the National Blood Transfusion Council and the National Aids Control Organization released their 2017 Guidelines for Blood Donor Selection and Blood Donor Referral in October.

Guidelines clauses 12 and 51 exclude transgender people, gay males, and female sex workers from donating blood since they are a high-risk group for contracting HIV/AIDS. The Ministry now claims in its affidavit that there is sufficient information to show “HIV, Hepatitis B, and Hepatitis C diseases pose a threat for transgender people, men who have sex with males, and female sex workers. It claims that the petitioners haven’t contested the exclusion of people at risk for HIV, Hepatitis B, or Hepatitis C infections, but rather the inclusion of transgender people, gay males, and female sex workers in the ‘at risk’ category. The affidavit responded to the challenge by citing the following academic papers in an effort to back up its assertion that the named persons were, in fact, at risk.

Two gay men from Hyderabad have filed a new public interest litigation (PIL) with the Supreme Court of India, arguing for the legalisation of same-sex marriage in India under the Special Marriage Act of 1954.

Our Chief Justice DY. Chandrachud will preside over a Supreme Court bench today.

Supriyo Chakraborty and Abhay Dang, the petitioners, have been in a relationship for over a decade. Because of the epidemic, both couples and their families were reminded of life’s fragility. They were both infected with COVID during the second wave. As soon as they felt well, they made plans to celebrate their 9th anniversary with family and friends by having a wedding-cum-commitment ceremony. In December 2021, they conducted a commitment ceremony when their loved ones gave their approval to their partnership.

Plaintiff’s Contention:

Petitioners argued that the Special Marriage Act violates India’s constitution because it treats same-sex couples differently than those of the opposite sex by denying them the legal protections, social recognition, and legal standing that come with marriage. The petitioners state that the Indian Supreme Court has historically upheld the freedom to marry anyone regardless of caste or religion. The constitutional movement towards same-sex marriage is an extension of this trend. As the Supreme Court has already ruled in the Navtej Singh Johar and Puttaswamy cases that LGBTQ+ people have the same rights to equality, dignity, and privacy as any other citizen, the Petitioners contend that the right to marry the person of one’s choice should also apply to LGBTQ+ people.

Judgement:

The Special Marriage Act, Foreign Marriage Act, and Hindu Marriage Act have all been challenged in nine separate cases before the Delhi High Court and the Kerala High Court, all seeking to recognise same-sex marriage. The Ministry’s Deputy Solicitor General told the Kerala High Court earlier this month that preparations are being made to have all writ petitions transferred to the Supreme Court.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/400UmAJ

-Report by Nandini Gupta

In the case of The State of Maharashtra and Anr. v. Ms. Madhuri Maruti Vidhate, Hon’ble Justice M.R. Shah ordered that appointment on the mere grounds of compassionate after several years is unsustainable.

FACTS

The father of the respondent died in harness while working in clerical cadre with the appellants. Following this incident, the mother of the respondent i.e., the wife of the deceased was given an appointment on the grounds of compassion. But she also died in service. On 18th August 2011, the elder daughter (elder sister of the respondent) submitted an application for an appointment on the grounds of compassion which got rejected as she was married and not dependent on the deceased parents. Later, after two years on 26th February 2013, government issued another notice instructing to provide employment to one of the legal heirs and representatives of the deceased government servant on the grounds of compassion.

In the following next month, another daughter (respondent) of the deceased mother who is also married submitted an application asking to provide employment on the grounds of compassion. This application was also rejected dated 23rd April 2013. The respondent filed an application in Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal and High Court of Judicature at Bombay where the judgement was in favor of the respondents ordering to consider the appointment on compassionate grounds.

The court while delivering the judgement considered the precedents where it was ordered that the appointment on compassionate grounds for all the vacancies or posts of the government equal opportunity should be provided to all the aspirants as per Article 14 (Equality before Law) and Article 16 (Equality of Opportunity in Matters of Employment under the State) of Constitution of India.

Moreover, the appointment on compassionate grounds is merely a concession instead of a right granted for the sake of economic stability to the family member or one of the dependent of the deceased. Reference was made to the case of Mumtaz Yunus Mulani v. State of Maharashtra [(2008) 11 SCC 384] where the court has adopted the principle that appointment on compassionate grounds is not a source or gateway for recruitment, instead it is a way to walk over the sudden financial crisis suffered by the deceased of the family.

COURT’S DECISION

The Supreme Court considering all the facts of the case and precedents, quashed the order passed by the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal and High Court and dismissed the writ petition. The court observed that the High Court of Judicature at Bombay and Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal have given an erroneous decision by directing the appellants to appoint the respondents on the grounds of compassion when appointment after several years of death of the mother is unjustifiable.

-report by Deepti Dubey

The Supreme Court, pronouncing the judgement in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation V. Bharat  Singh Jhala  (Dead) Son of Shri Nathu Singh, through Legal Heirs & Anr expressed that the labour court cannot take a view contrary to the Industrial Tribunal. A Bench of Justice MR Shah and Krishna Murari was considering an appeal plea by the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation.

FACTS

Mr. Bharat Singh Jhala was working as a conductor. A departmental inquiry was initiated against him for not issuing tickets to 10 passengers even though he collected the amount for the same. Thereafter, his services were terminated by the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation in 2007. The termination was the subject matter of the approval application before the Industrial Tribunal in an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Act. The tribunal approved of the same after examining the evidence from both parties.

After a period of 19 years, the dispute was raised in a labour court by the workmen. The Labour Court passed an order awarding 50% back wages from the date of termination till his death in 2018. This order was challenged before a Single Judge in the High Court who dismissed this writ petition and upheld the award of back wages from the Labour Court, which gave rise to the present appeal.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION

The appellant i.e. the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation submitted that under the proceedings before the Industrial tribunal, the appellant had been permitted to lead evidence and prove the charge against the conductor. This was later approved by the Industrial Tribunal, which cannot be challenged after 19 years and quashed by the Labour Court. Therefore, they prayed to approve the present appeal.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

The respondents relied upon the judgement of John D’Souza vs. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, (2019). They stated that: the proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act is summary in nature and findings recorded while deciding the application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act shall not affect the substantive right in a reference under Section 10 of the I.D. Act.

They attempted to discredit the proceedings of the Industrial tribunal by regarding it as speedy without due formalities. At the same time, more importance was given to the substantive right of a workman to raise an individual industrial dispute. It was insisted that the Supreme Court in the present case must not interfere with the judgement of the lower court.

COURT’S DECISION

The Supreme Court noted that the Industrial Tribunal is a higher forum than the Labour Court and the order passed by them in 2015 had attained finality. The Bench also noted that evidence on record, both oral and documentary were considered before approval of the termination order by the Industrial tribunal. Thus, fresh reference under Section 10 of the I.D. Act challenging the order of termination was not permissible. It concluded that the High Court, in the present case had failed to consider these factors and committed a serious error in dismissing the writ petition. Thereafter, the order passed by the High Court confirming the judgment and award passed by the Labour Court was set aside the order of termination and the judgment and award passed by the labour Court setting aside the order of termination were quashed and set aside.

The supreme court expressed its discontentment with the High Court’s lack of precision in analysing the facts and circumstances of the present case. The Industrial Disputes Act, of 1947 is focused on the mechanism and procedure for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes. Whilst taking into consideration the welfare of the workmen, due regard also has to be given to the procedure for investigation under the act. Once the dispute has been settled after a thorough examination of evidence, as in the present case, raising the same dispute after 19 years is redundant. In law, the principle applied for the same is res judicata, which means, a matter which has been adjudicated upon once cannot be pursued further by the same parties.

-Report by Harshita

It was held by the hon’ble Supreme Court recently in the case of Ahmednagar Mahanagar Palika vs Ahmednagar Mahanagar Palika Kamgar Union that the provision of employment to the heirs of employees on compassionate grounds was unsustainable and thus prohibited.

FACTS

Ahmednagar Municipal Council was converted to Ahmednagar Mahanagar Palika in 2003, and an important demand on the part of employees was the assurance that their heirs would be employed by the Ahmednagar Mahanagar Palika. As a major demand of its employees, it was agreed upon by the Municipal Council. Hence, the Industrial Court administered that the employees in Class-IV category(if they die before their retirement, if they become invalid, or if they retire), their heirs should be given employment in their stead. When some further demands were raised and the decision was supposed to be modified, the Industrial Court changed the condition. This led to the Ahmednagar Mahanagar Palika being instructed to (1) provide employment to heirs of ‘CLASS-IV’ employees working in healthcare only, (2) provide employment to heirs of all the classes on compassionate grounds as per government regulations and directions. This meant that the heirs of employees won’t be rewarded with employment on compassionate grounds on retirement and only provided to heirs of deceased employees of the Class-IV category.

Later on, Ahmednagar Mahanagar Palika Kamgar Union went on to demand the employment of heirs of the retired employees according to the previous judgment. Under the guidance of the High court, the Industrial court changed the course of action and provided the legal heirs of the employees with work on grounds of retirement and superannuation.

Dissatisfied with the decision, Ahmednagar Mahanagar Palika presented the current appeals.

APPELLANT’S SIDE

The Learned Counsel contended that both the Industrial Court and the High Court have based their judgment on the decision from the original situation when Ahmednagar Mahanagar Palika was a Municipal Council, which was regarded as an error by the petitioner side. The judgment for the case of The Secretary to Govt. Department of Education (Primary) & Others v. Bheemesh alias Bheemappa was considered relevant in this situation.

Another argument was that such employment given to the heirs of retired employees is opposing Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. Further, the provision of such employment should be based on other factors which are the financial situation of the employees’ family, the role of the deceased and such. Again, the remuneration of the sum of Rs. 5 lakhs instead of employment for heirs who have crossed the age of 45 should itself be unfeasible.

RESPONDENT’S SIDE

With the case of Subhadra v. Ministry of Coal and another as reliance, the respondent’s side supported their situation that neither the Industrial Court nor the High Court made any mistake in presenting the judgment. Introducing the concept of ‘varas hakka’, they said the employment is not based on compassionate grounds but because of varas hakka.

COURT’S DECISION

Regarding the present situation of the country as opposed to when the first judgment came out in 1979, it is unreasonable to provide employment to heirs of employees on compassionate grounds as observed by both the Industrial Court and the High Court. After the conversion of the institution, it is now under the jurisdiction of the State government and there is no provision for any such heirs’ rights. Compassionate employment is already considered as an exception and cannot be provided as it opposes Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. Even if it is known as ‘varas hakka’, it is not provided by any act or employment scheme. It was observed

“the employees of the Mahanagar Palika/Municipal Corporation shall be governed by the scheme of the State Government at par with the government employees, which does not provide for appointment on compassionate grounds to the heirs of the employees on their retirement and/or superannuation. Even otherwise, such an appointment to the heirs of the employees on their retirement and/or superannuation shall be contrary to the object and purpose of appointment on compassionate grounds and is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India.”

The court also observed that if the compassionate employment is not scrutinized properly, it may be unfair to the outsiders who are more qualified, as only the heirs will be reappointed. Therefore the appeal was allowed.

-Report by Nandani Soni

It was held by the Supreme Court of India that the order passed by the High court convicting the accused must be quashed and the appellants must be acquitted.

FACTS

An appeal had been registered against the order passed by the division bench of the High Court. The appellants namely, Chaitu Gowala and Ajay Ahari were tried for the offences under sections, 392/149/302/148/323 IPC for having murdered the Managing director of the company in which they were working, named Rupak Kumar Gogoi. Eyewitnesses were examined by the prosecution, who had identified the appellants and the other accused. After the trial, the trial court acquitted 57 of the accused and convicted 13 of them. The present appeal only remained for Chaitu Gowala and Ajay Ahari.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION

The learned counsel who appeared on behalf of the accused stated that the appellants were merely office bearers at that time and the labourers gathered while they were talking and attacked. They further submitted that there was no evidence to prove that the appellants had in fact committed the offence, hence the conviction of the accused becomes baseless.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

The eye witnesses saw the appellants engaging with the mob and talking to them in their language. Therefore, the appellants were rightly convicted under Section 149 of IPC.

COURT’S DECISION

The court observed that the prosecution failed to gather any concrete evidence for the offences, it was proved that the appellants were merely office bearers at that time and there was hardly any evidence that the appellants even instigated the mob. It was observed:

“If the entire evidence and the deposition of the eye witnesses are scanned, it appears that in fact the appellants were present there as office bearers of the Union. There were some disputes with respect to wages. Even as per the deposition of PW3, on being called, the appellants entered into the office room but soon both of them came out and told the assembled labourers that the Managing Director would distribute their dues and asked them to go to the place where dues were to be distributed. Despite the same, the labourers protested that they would not accept anything other than the full dues and they started shouting…….. in absence of any concrete evidence that the appellants attacked and/or caused any injury to the deceased and/or even the PSO and in absence of any evidence what was uttered by the appellants – accused in their own language and in absence of any evidence that the appellants instigated the labourers – others co-accused, we are of the opinion that the appellants cannot be convicted for the offence under Section 302 IPC with the aid of Section 149 IPC.”

Therefore, the decisions of the High court and the Trial Court were set aside as far as the appellants were concerned and the punishment for the other accused was confirmed.

JOB DESCRIPTION

Law Chambers of Jai Anant Dehadrai is looking to immediately hire two Legal Associates. Their focus is on white-collar criminal matters (PMLA, SEBI etc.), commercial litigation, general arbitration and constitutional issues. The office is located in Neeti Bagh, New Delhi.

• Responsibilities will include drafting, court appearances and filings.
• Remuneration: Rs. 40, 000/- per month + expenses.
• Experience: 1-2 years (preferably in litigation).
• Timings: We work 6 days a week from 9 AM to 8 PM (typically Monday to Saturday).

APPLICATION PROCESS

Interested candidates can send their applications to Jai@Dehadrai.in and CC to Siddharth@Dehadrai.in before the 25th of September 2022. Preference will be given to candidates who are passionate about law, legal writing, pro bono advocacy and the art of litigation.

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-Report by Harshita

The matter of determining the arbitration fee was discussed in detail in the case of ONGC v. Afcons Gunanusa JV.

In May 2009, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited(ONGC) and Afcons Gunanusa entered into a contract for the construction of an ICP-R Platform. The Platform was completed in October 2012. Due to some disparities between the parties, Afcons invoked arbitration in the case in July 2015. In August of the same year, ONGC appointed Justice Gyan Sudha Mishra as their arbitrator with Afcons appointing Justice Mukul Mudgal. Both the arbitrators appointed Justice GN Ray as the guiding arbitrator. In a preliminary meeting of the tribunal in November 2015, the members agreed that the fee schedule for the arbitration fee suggested in the contract was impractical. ONGC was not agreeing to the revision in the schedule whilst the arbitrators and Afcons agreed. In a letter to ONGC by the council, it was suggested to revise the fee schedule according to the fourth schedule of the Arbitration and Conciliation act 1996. The fee given was Rs. 30 lakhs for cases above the jurisdiction of Rs. 20 crores which were Rs. 900 crores here. Again, the tribunal informed ONGC on the matter that they would no longer bargain for this amount if ONGC would agree to the amount in the fourth schedule and also provide a reading fee of Rs. 6 lakhs each. ONGC could not agree on providing a reading fee. In August 2016, The tribunal fixed a fee of Rs 1.5 lakhs for every arbitrator for sitting for three hours. Thus, after not agreeing to the set arbitration fee, ONGC filed a petition in the Bombay High Court u/s 14 and 15 of the Arbitration Act. They filed for a termination of the current tribunal and a substitution. In October 2021, the Bombay High Court bailed out of the case claiming that it doesn’t fall under their jurisdiction as the tribunal was on an international level. That is when ONGC filed for a new arbitration petition.

While ONGC argued, with a letter in August 2020, let the arbitration tribunal know that the executives of the institute did not approve of the change in fees. They stood by the same throughout the situation. The respondents contended that the tribunal wanted to fix the correct amount of fees and suggested following the fourth schedule of the Arbitration Act, also an exclusive reading fee for the sessions was requested.

COURT’S DECISION

A fee schedule was already prescribed in the LSTK contract, which was rejected by the tribunal in a preliminary meeting. And the tribunal by itself decided on the fee of Rs. 1.5 lakh for a 3-hour sitting at the end. It was observed

“In view of our directives in Section C.2.4, we exercise our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and direct the constitution of a new arbitral tribunal in accordance with the arbitration agreement. For this purpose, Arbitration Petition (C) No. 5 of 2022 would be listed for directions before this Court on 21 September 2022. The above directions should not be construed as a finding on the conduct of the arbitration proceedings. These directions are an attempt to ensure that the arbitral proceedings are conducted without rancour which may derail the proceedings. In consonance with our findings, the fee payable to the earlier arbitral tribunal PART G 135 would be the fee payable in terms of the Fourth Schedule of the Arbitration Act. Though the Fourth Schedule is per se not applicable to an international commercial arbitration, since ONGC had indicated (following the suggestion of the arbitral tribunal) that it would be agreeable to pay the fee payable in terms of Schedule, it cannot now take recourse to the arbitration agreement between the parties to pay a lesser fee. We further clarify that if the fee in excess of the amount payable under the Fourth Schedule has been paid to the members of the arbitral tribunal, such amount will not be recovered from them.”

The court took a look at the comparison of India’s situation in this matter and the international views. India lacks jurisdiction on the matter of arbitration fees. Usually, when a tribunal is constituted, the fee is determined by the institution or discussed with and finalized by the presiding arbitrator. The parties are not a part of such discussions but in ad hoc arbitrations the parties can discuss such fees with the members of the tribunal on their own. The issues that arose in these cases have been concluded by giving the following decisions:

● Arbitrators cannot be the sole judges in the determination of the arbitration fees. They cannot issue any binding orders on this matter. Even though they have the power to apportion the cost between the parties u/s 31(8) and 31A of the Arbitration Act.
● It has been held that the arbitration fee should be fixed at the establishment for the avoidance of matters arising including conflicts between the parties and arbitrators.
● The terms of the fourth schedule refer to claim and counterclaim differently. Thus, arbitrators can charge fees in both situations in an ad hoc case and the ceiling will be applied to both the claim and counterclaim fee.
● The price ceiling given as Rs. 30 lakhs applies to the sum of Rs. 19,87,500 and the variable amount. The highest fee is to be Rs. 30 lakhs.
● The fee applies to each arbitrator on the bench and not the tribunal as a whole. Although, a sole arbitrator is to be paid 25 percent above this amount.

ABOUT THE CHAMBERS OF SWARNENDU CHATTERJEE

Chambers of Swarnendu Chatterjee is an Advocate on Record, Supreme Court of India. The Chambers deal in legal, constitution, property, civil, criminal, IBC, arbitration, dispute resolution, insolvency, and service matters.

INTERNSHIP DESCRIPTION

• No. of Position(s): 2 (two)
• Qualification: Law students (BALL.B or LL.B)
• Duration: 2 weeks (can be extended for another two weeks if found suitable)
• Applications should be sent in three months advance from the date of joining
• The stipend shall be based on an internal assessment

HOW TO APPLY?

Interested candidates can email their updated resumes to  Deepakshi Garg and Yashwardhan Singh (deepakshi1602@gmail.com) and (yashwardhan102@gmail.com)

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ABOUT THE FIRM

Formed in the year 1925, P N A M & Co. (formerly Soni Chatrath & Co.) is one of the oldest assurance, tax, and advisory firm of Chartered Accountants in India. With over 95 years of existence, our specialized team of accountants are entrusted to provide a comprehensive range of Assurance, Taxation and Corporate Advisory Services to clients in India and Worldwide.The firm provides robust compliance services and growth navigation solutions on complex business and financial matters through focused practice groups.

The firm is a member firm of Allinial Global. Allinial Global is an accounting firm association of legally independent accounting and consulting firms with offices in North America and throughout the world through international members and partnerships.

The team is comprised of highly qualified professionals who bring with them varied national and international experiences. With a good strength of qualified, semi qualified, paid staff and articles, the Team is bunch of highly motivated and dedicated personnel.

Service Capabilities :

• Audit & Assurance
• Taxation Advisory
• Transaction & Risk Advisory
• Corporate & Secretarial
• Accounting Advisory

INTERNSHIP DESCRIPTION

1. Assisting in all legal work.
2. Should be well versed with procedural laws and drafting skills.
3. The candidate will be required to fulfill a combination of one or more of the job responsibilities given below depending upon the nature of the project that is assigned to him/her.

Eligibility: Law students in their 3rd to 5th Year.

Location: New Delhi

Mode: Physical/Offline

HOW TO APPLY?

Interested candidates can email their latest CVs to hr@pnam.co and CC to rishabh.sachdeva@pnam.co

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-Report by Riddhi Ray

It was held by the Supreme Court of India in the case of MUNUWA @ SATISH ETC. V. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH that If the prosecution fails to prove its stand without any doubt the accused will be benefitted and will be set free from all the charges of the crime.

FACTS

An appeal had been filed challenging the judgment of Allahabad high court upholding the punishment of life imprisonment and imprisonment for 4 years of the Bareilly sessions court u/s 302, 307 of IPC respectively. The facts are as follows.

On 24th August 1979 around 6:30 p.m. Iqbal bahadur was sitting along with Dr. Asghar (PW-6) in verandah of his office within college campus. Three accused Gullu Rajesh (A1), Vimal Chunnu (A2), and Munuwa Satish (A3) entered the verandah and fired gunshots toward the deceased as well as the deceased’s physician friend (PW-6) and fled away. PW-6 carried the deceased first to the dispensary and then to Aliganj station. At 8:30 p.m. Deceased lodged an FIR u/s 307 of IPC.

After the FIR was registered, he was sent to Bareilly General Hospital by the Head Constable (PW-4) at around 11:00 p.m. PW-6 reached there at 2:00 a.m. on the next day. The statement of the deceased was recorded there by Tehsildar and the magistrate between 11:10 a.m. to 11:20 a.m. And later he passed away on 27th August 1979 at 2:35 a.m. owing to shock and hemorrhage.

The trial court in the judgment dated 31st January 1981 declared the FIR valid and quashed the appellant’s contention. The FIR was considered as the first dying declaration of the deceased against A-2 but the same cannot be applied against A-1 & A-3. The appellants had stated therein that there is an ambiguity in the statements of PW-1 & PW-6 due to intimidation by the accused. Further, the deceased’s statement recording on the 25th is skeptical. However, the trial court discarded these contentions and sentenced the accused u/s 302, 307 & 34 of IPC for life imprisonment & imprisonment for 4 years respectively.

The high court in its judgment rendered the same view as was previously observed by the Trial court. It gave preference to the first declaration made by the deceased over the second one and ambiguity of PW-1 & PW-6 was considered normal as they used to live in the same locality as of accused. During trial A-2 died so, the appeal was concerned with A-1 & A-3.

Appellant’s Contention

Shri Venkita Subramaniam claimed the FIR to be false as it was submitted to the court later than it was supposed to. The place of occurrence and the statement of witnesses PW-1 & PW-6 are suspicious. If the eyewitnesses are discarded then the whole story of prosecution becomes baseless as there’s no strong evidence like the recovery of weapons.

Respondent’s Contention

Sh. Sanjay Kumar Tyagi submitted that the Trial Court and the High court’s decisions are based on reliable evidence and eyewitnesses had no interest or enmity towards the appellant so the courts’ decisions are just.

COURT’S DECISION

The court observed that the cross-examination amplified a lot of ambiguity in the statement of PW-1. The prosecution was not able to produce any weapons or bullet cartridge which is alleged to have been used in such murder. It was observed:

“the prosecution failed to recover blood-stained materials from the place of occurrence, empty cartridges, pellets,
or any other weapon used for commission of the crime, coupled with the contradictions and unnatural conduct of the eye witnesses PW-1 and PW-6, and the inconsistencies in the two dying declarations, we believe that the prosecution has not proved the case beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused are entitled to be given the benefit of doubt.”

The decision of the High Court was set aside and the accused were set free from all the charges.