Tag: #SupremeCourt

-Report by Shweta Sabuji

In the recent case of K.T.V. OIL MILLS PRIVATE LIMITED VERSUS THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, UNION OF INDIA & ORS., an appeal filed in opposition to the judgment and decree rendered on the file of the Commercial Division of this Honourable High Court on July 3, 2018, by the learned Single Judge in A.No.1253 of 2018 in C.S.No.706 of 2017.

FACTS:

The appellant was established in 2008 as a company under the Companies Act of 1956. The purpose of forming this Company was to take over K.T.V. Oil Mills’ operations. The late Shri. K. T. Varadaraj Chetty launched an oil trading company in Kotwal Market in 1971. Under the name and style “K.T.V Oil Mills,” the company operated from 1999 to 2008 as a partnership firm. The partnership firm was then changed into a private limited company in 2008 under the name “K.T.V. Health Food Private Limited,” and they applied to the Trademark Registry for the registration of the trademark “ROOBINI,” claiming usage as of June 1, 1995.

On December 30, 2007, K.T.V. Oil Mills and the appellant engaged in an assignment deed, and as a result, the trademark “ROOBINI” was transferred. The K.T.V. Oil Mills partners all acquired shares in the appellant-Company. The assignment deed was completed in favor of the appellant by the partners of K.T.V. Oil Mills because they chose to operate the company under the appellant’s Company name. As a result, the appellant learned that the respondent was using the contested trademark “ROOBEN” in 2017, which is a slavish replica of the appellant’s trademark “ROOBINI” regarding a similar product.

PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTIONS:

The plaintiff responded to the request for the plaint to be rejected by filing a counter, claiming that the plaintiff’s predecessor, K.T.V. Oil Mills, conducted business from 1995 to 2007 under the name and style of “ROOBINI,” and that all necessary applications for the trademark’s registration were also made. Ultimately, the trademark “ROOBINI” was registered on 22.01.1999 under registration number 837894, claiming use from 01.06.1995. Totake its business to the next level, K.T.V. Oil Mills, a partnership firm, became a private limited company. As a result, the Partners of K.T.V. Oil Mills assigned their ownership of the entire business as well as the trademark “ROOBINI” to the appellant-Company, which then became known as “K.T.V. Health Food Private Limited.”

On December 30, 2007, an assignment deed was made. After that, the appellant filed the proper paperwork to transfer the trademark “ROOBINI” that the Partnership Firm had previously assigned to the appellant in favor of the plaintiff. As a result, the Trademark Registry registered the same on January 25, 2018. Due to the assignment deed executed on December 30, 2007, only theappellant/plaintiff is currently the owner of the trademark “ROOBINI” at the time the lawsuit was filed.

Additionally, the appellant submitted the required paperwork in 2015 to modify the registration in the appellant Company’s name. As a result, the plaintiff is the “ROOBINI” trademark’s owner. Since the plaintiff has been conducting business through its branch office on Chennai’s Thambu Chetty Street, which is squarely within this Court’s jurisdiction, the matter was brought before this Hon’ble Court.

JUDGEMENT:

Following a hearing with both parties, the learned Single Judge granted the request to dismiss the complaint, concluding that the telephone bills by themselves were insufficient to establish that the appellant was operating at the branch office, which is located at Thambu Chetty Street in Chennai. Furthermore, the appellant/plaintiff was not the owner of the trademark “Roobini” when it was registered. Even if it is assumed without admission that the assignment deed was executed in the plaintiff’s favor and that the trademark “Roobini” was registered in the plaintiff’s name as a result of the said assignment deed, the plaintiff is not entitled to any rights in the trademark “ROOBINI” based on the assignment deed.

The plaintiff is also not permitted to file the current lawsuit in this court without having their principal place of business within its jurisdiction, even though they maintain a branch office at Thambu Chetty Street in Chennai, which they claim is within that court’s jurisdiction because those provisions, as well as Sections 134(2) of the Trademarks Act and Section 62(2) of the Copy Act, define “carrying on business” respectively.

The plaint is therefore susceptible to being dismissed as long as neither the defendant nor the plaintiff’s primary place of business is engaged in business within the jurisdiction of this Court. As a result, the plaint was dismissed by the contested order. The appellant has chosen the current Original Side Appeal because he is unhappy with the aforementioned order.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3I1cbcl

About Aditya Jain

After finishing his integrated Law, Arts and Economics degree from Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar (ranked 5, NIRF 2021), he practised in the Supreme Court of India representing the State of Andhra Pradesh by assisting the Standing Counsel for the State in Constitutional, Commercial, Regulatory and Criminal Disputes. He also represented the State of Rajasthan in various property disputes and service matters before Supreme Court.

About the Job

Associates with PQE of 1-2 years in Commercial Litigation and Dispute Resolution with Good Research and Drafting Skills and experience in Supreme Court Practice.

Position

Legal Associate

Areas of Practice

• Criminal Law
• Commercial Law
• Income Tax Law
• Company Law

Location

Jaipur (would be required to visit New Delhi occasionally)

Remuneration

As per industry standards + Regular Incentives

How to Apply?

Interested candidates may send their CVs to jandgassociates@gmail.com with the following subject line

Deadline for Application

5th February 2023

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Disclaimer: All information posted by us on Lexpeeps is true to our knowledge. But still, it is suggested that you check and confirm things on your level.

For regular updates on more opportunities, we can catch up at-

WhatsApp Group:

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-Report by Gaurav Raj

The special leave petition in the case ANJALI BHARADWAJ v/s CPIO, was dismissed by the Supreme court on 9th December because one cannot rely on news articles and reports.

FACT

Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Delhi high court, the petitioner filed an appeal by Special Leave in the Supreme Court. The petitioner herein preferred an RTI application before CPIO, Supreme court regarding the decision taken in collegiums of supreme court held on December 12, 2018.

Vide communication dated 12 December 2018, the said application was turned down. Due to this, the appellant further filed an appeal before the First appellate authority under RTI Act, 2005. The authority rejected the appeal by contending that there has not been any final decision taken in the collegiums dated 12.12.2018. The second appeal by the petitioner was also turned down by the single judge bench by reiterating that there has not been any final decision taken in the subsequent meeting dated 10.01.2019. The learned single judge believed that there was no formal resolution came to be drawn up so there is no question of providing any information regarding the decision taken on 12.12.2018. The order passed by the learned single judge was upheld by the Division bench of the high court by impugned judgement and order. Feeling Aggrieved by the order and judgement the petitioner has preferred the present appeal.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION

Shri Prashant Bhushan, appearing on the behalf of petition contended that certain decisions were taken by the collegiums in the meeting held on 12.12.2018. and it must be uploaded into the public domain the decision taken by the collegiums is required to be informed under the RTI act 2005.

Shri Prashant Bhushan heavily relied upon an article uploaded by Bar and Bench that one of the members of the collegium had stated that he was disappointed that the decision taken by the collegiums was not uploaded on the supreme court’s website.

It is submitted that as per the article certain decisions were taken by the collegiums in the meeting held on 12.12.2018. However, it cannot be contended that no decision was taken at the meeting held on 12.12.2018 only because the decision was altered at a subsequent meeting held on 10.01.2019. it was submitted that everybody has the right to be informed about the decision taken in collegiums as per the previous resolution of the high court dated 03,10,2017.

COURT’S DECISION

The learned court has refused to comment upon the statement given by one of the members of the collegiums. The court is of the view that, in the earlier meeting dated 10.01.2019, it was mentioned that in the meeting dated 12.10.2018, the process for consultation was not over and remained un- concluded and it is only after the final resolution is drawn and signed by the members of the collegiums, the same to be published on the website of the Supreme Court of India as per resolution date 03.10.2017. Therefore, no reliance can be made on any news article in the media. What is to be seen is the final resolution signed by the members of the collegium. So, there is no substance in the above special leave to appeal and the same deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.

-Report by Asma Khan

The Honourable Apex Court in the case of Amit Singh Vs. Ravindra Nath Pandey & Ors. Etc., upheld the decision of both the single and division bench of the Allahabad High Court and held that the list of seniority prepared in 2005 has no stance and must be quashed.

FACTS

The appellant and the respondents both were appointed to the post of Assistant Consolidation Officers (hereinafter referred to as the ACOs) in the year 1997-1998 respectively. The appellants were appointed as direct recruits on 18th August 1997 whereas the respondents were promoted on 16th December 1997. The promoters were promoted to the post of ACOs whereas the direct recruits were directly appointed to the post of ACOs through the Uttar Pradesh Subordinate Services Selection Commission and were given seniority over the promoters because of the seniority list of 29th July 2005. The promoters filed a petition before a single judge in the High Court of Allahabad claiming that they should be given seniority over the direct recruits as per Rule 8(3) of the U.P. Government Servants Seniority Rules, 1991. The learned judge observed that seniority should be given based on the 1991 rules and quashed the 29th July 2005 list which gave seniority to direct recruits and held that promotions should be given superiority over direct recruits. The direct recruits then appealed to the Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad, Lucknow and the division bench on 4th September 2014 upheld the order of the single judge but also held that the State must apply the rota system in case the direct recruits or the promoters are appointed in the same year.

The appellant, that is, the direct recruits appealed to the apex court. 

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION 

The learned counsel for the appellant contended that when the direct recruits were appointed to the post of ACOs, the promotees had not even entered the Cadre and so the 2005 list of seniority was right in placing direct recruits above the promotees and the 1991 rules had an overriding effect and so cannot be applied here. He also contended that the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court was not right in applying the rota system for the recruitment of the same year. He also contended that the promoters would be promoted retrospectively if the decision of the bench of the High Court is taken into consideration. He referred to the case Uttaranchal Forest Rangers’ Assn. (Direct recruit ) and Ors. V. State of UP and Ors.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION 

The respondent contended that the order of the single bench and the division bench should not be interfered with because both the direct recruits and the promotions were recruited in the same year.

JUDGEMENT 

As per Rule 8(1) of the 1991 Rules, if recruitments are made in the same year for promotions and direct recruits then seniority would depend upon the date of order of substantive appointment and it shall be in the order in which their names are arranged. Further, if appointments are made by direct recruitment and promotion on the result of any one selection, then seniority will be in a cyclic order, that is, the promoter will be Senior. Therefore, if the ratio is 1:1 then the first post will go to a promoter and the second to a direct recruiter. 

New rules were issued on 25th March 1992 and they had an overriding effect on the existing rules and orders. Rule 3 (m) of the 1992 rules laid down “Year of recruitment” shall amount to “12 months starting from 1st day of July”. Further, rule 5 provided that 33% of posts would be filled by promotions and 66% by direct recruits.

A combined list shall be prepared as per Rule 18 and rule 19 (2) states that when both appointments are made in the same year then it shall be made from both sources and it is mandatory to prepare a combined list. As per Rule 19(3), names must be arranged in cyclic order if appointments are made by both direct recruitment and promotion. 

The court further observed that 1992 rules shall have supersession over other rules and orders. The court relied on the case of Pawan Pratap Singh and others V. Relevant Singh and Ors. As per this case, the date on which the selection procedure starts or the advertisement of the post is issued is the date of selection and if this process is not followed then it would be inconsistent with both articles. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The apex court in this case held that seniority cannot be determined as per the date of vacancy and cannot be given retrospectively because it would affect those employees who were already appointed. 

As per the 1992 rules, the year of recruitment in the present case is from 1st July 1997 to 30th June 1998. On 15th September 2003, a combined seniority list was prepared based on 1992 rules but the list of 25th July 2005 changed it. The Court observed that the list of 25th July was in contravention of rules 18 and 19 of 1992 rules because the 2005 list provided seniority to direct recruits over the promotees and as per the rules if appointments are made both by direct recruitment and by promotion then a combined shall be prepared and selections must be made from both the sources. 

The court further pointed out the case of Uttaranchal Forest Rangers Assn. which was relied upon by the appellants and observed that in this case the promoters were appointed in 1991 and the direct recruits were appointed in 1990 and so 1992 rules did not apply here. 

-Report by Akshita Singh

In the case of The State of Uttarakhand Vs. Nalanda College of Education and Others, it was held by the Supreme Court that the High Court committed a serious error in holding the communication/order of the State Government to be arbitrary as the State Government is expected to make its recommendations or comments to the Regional Committee in accordance with Rule 7(5) of the NCTE Regulations, 2014, upon receipt of the notification from the office of the Regional Committee to the State.

FACTS

The State of Uttarakhand has filed the current appeal in response to the learned Single Judge’s decision on July 16, 2013, which nullified the State Government’s order rejecting the new B.Ed. colleges’ application for recognition and instead ordered the National Council for Teachers Education (NCTE) to make the proper determination regarding respondent No. 1’s request to increase the number of seats in the B.Ed. course. On 22.02.2008, Respondent No.1, in this case, Nalanda College of Education, Dehradun, received recognition from the NCTE under Section 14(1) of the NCTE Act for B.Ed. degree course with a one-year duration and an annual intake of 100 students.

The initial writ petitioner was affiliated with the HNB University after being recognised under the 1973 U.P. State University Act. The College requested an increase in student admission seats from the Northern Regional Committee of the NCTE for the academic year 2013–2014. According to the NCTE Regulations, 2014 the State Government’s viewpoint was requested. According to the State Government’s order/communication dated 16.07.2013, the majority of B.Ed. graduates would be jobless because only 2500 teachers are required against the 13000 students who complete the programme each year. As a result, the State Government recommended that no new recognition be provided for those pursuing a B.Ed. course and that the recognition of the College is revoked. 

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS

Shri Krishnam Mehra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Uttarakhand argued that a deliberate policy decision was made by the State Government not to grant recognition to the new colleges for B.ed. course based on valid grounds and the High Court’s Division Bench made grave mistakes in rescinding the communication/order dated 16.07.2013 as the High Court did not need to intervene with it to exercise its authority under article 226 of the Indian constitution. He further submitted that according to the NCTE Regulations, before the Regional Committee decides to award recognition or expand the intake capacity, the State Government’s opinion, which includes the comprehensive grounds with the appropriate facts, is the sine qua non, therefore the State Government’s decision was not arbitrary as it was also backed by the required facts and statistics and by declaring it to be arbitrary and throwing it aside, the High Court made a grave error.

Ms Manisha T. Karia, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the NCTE also supported the appellant by relying on the cases namely, Maa Vaishno Devi Mahila Mahavidyalaya v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, in which this court had not interfered with the similar decisions of the State Governments. Also, in State of Rajasthan v. LBS B.Ed. College & Others, (2016) 16 SCC 110 it was stated that the State has a crucial role to play in providing appropriate comments supported by adequate reasoning, hence NCTE is compelled to consider the State Government’s viewpoint.

COURT’S DECISION

The issue before the Court was,

“whether the policy decision taken by the State Government can be said to be arbitrary which calls for interference of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India?”

The court by applying the law laid down in Vidharbha Sikshan Vyawasthapak Mahasangh held that the High Court committed a serious error in holding the communication/order of the State Government to be arbitrary as the State Government is expected to make its recommendations or comments to the Regional Committee in accordance with Rule 7(5) of the NCTE Regulations, 2014, upon receipt of the notification from the office of the Regional Committee to the State. It further stipulates that the State Government must offer specific justifications for its opposition to the recommendation, together with any appropriate statistics, so that the concerned Regional Committee can take them into account when deciding how to proceed with the application. As a result, the need and/or requirement are included when the State Government is expected to give thorough justifications against the award of recognition with appropriate figures. As a result, the State Government was perfectly within its rights to advise against continued recognition of the new B.Ed. colleges and/or express this opinion.

-Report by Manya Sharma

The Supreme Court after considering the arguments of both the counsels and the income of the Defendant, directed an enhanced compensation of Rs.32,82,000/- with an interest rate of 7.5%, to the claimants.

FACTS 

An automobile accident caused the untimely death of the appellant’s wife. The deceased was 25 years old and worked as a homemaker at the time of her death. The Motor Accident Claim Tribunal concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to Rs.19,12,200 in total compensation, including 7.5% interest. Taking into account the Defendant’s monthly income of Rs. 1,500/­, the Learned Tribunal found that the loss of dependency was worth Rs. 3,24,000/­. The learned Tribunal ordered an additional Rs. 50,000/­ for the foetus. The High Court enhanced the amount of compensation to Rs.29,34,000/- under various heads. Feeling aggrieved by the distribution of the amount and the total amount, the aggrieved party went to the Supreme Court.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION

It was contended that the calculation of the amount under different heads was not proper in the High Court’s judgment. The amount under the head’s loss of dependency was decided to be Rs.6,000/- keeping the income of the deceased in mind but this was not proper as even minimum wages payable to workers was more than that amount and also the prospects of the deceased were not taken into consideration while calculating the amount. It is also contended the High Court miscalculated the amount towards the foetus, the same being Rs.50,000/-, where it should be Rs.40,000/- each towards loss of consortium or loss of love and affection. 

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

The respondents contended that the deceased was only a housewife and therefore the High Court’s calculation of Rs.6,000/- towards loss of dependency was fair. The respondents also fairly conceded that the High Court should have considered the prospects while awarding loss of dependency.

COURT’S DECISION

The Court, after hearing the learned counsels of the appellants and the respondents, decided that after considering the income of the deceased, who was a 25 years old housewife, should be at least Rs.7,500/- per month. The position of law on the calculation of the amount under the head of loss of dependency provides that 40% of the income is to be added to prospects. The claimants will be entitled to an amount of Rs. 1 lakh for the loss of the foetus and an amount of Rs.40,000/- each for loss of consortium or loss of love and affection. Therefore, in total, an enhanced compensation of Rs.32,82,000/- with an interest rate of 7.5%, was awarded to the claimants.

–Report by Sanstuti Mishra

The Supreme Court bench comprising Justices S Abdul Nazeer and V Rama Subramaniam observed that a minister or public servant could file a private complaint alleging defamation and need not follow the particular procedure prescribed by Section 199(2) & (4) CrPC on 17th October 2022 in the case of MANOJ KUMAR TIWARI vs MANISH SISODIA & ORS.

Facts 

Manish Sisodia herein filed a   complaint under   Section   200 of the Code of   Criminal   Procedure, 1973 against six individuals, on the file of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Rouse Avenue Courts, New Delhi, alleging commission of the offences under Sections 499 and 500 read with Sections 34 and 35 of the Indian Penal Code.

The petitioner held that Manoj Tiwari, apprehended a Press Conference making false and defamatory statements as though he was involved in corruption to the tune of Rs. 2000 crores, in the matter of award of contracts for building classrooms in Delhi Government Schools. Shri Vijender Gupta also tweeted defamatory content against   Sisodia, and the person named Respondent No.6 in the complaint also made defamatory statements in his tweets. 

Petitioner’s contention 

Sisodia had accused three BJP leaders of defaming him through “insulting publications” it said were based on “fabricated” allegations. The deputy Chief minister necessitated an apology.

In November 2019, a trial court ordered the summons of BJP leaders and others accused of defamation in a criminal case filed by the Deputy CM of Delhi. BJP leaders sought relief from the Supreme Court, which denied it.

Respondent’s contention 

Shri R. Venkataramani and Ms Pinky Anand, learned senior counsel appearing for Manoj Tiwari and others argued that respondent   No.1   should have followed the special procedure prescribed in Section 199(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as he happens to be a Minister of a Union Territory; they also put forward that the transcript of the tweets attributed to him was not accompanied by a valid certificate in terms of Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act. They argued that the tweets made by him per se do not make out a case of defamation in terms of   Section   499   IPC, punishable under Section 500 IPC. The counsel referred to past judgements in P.C Joshi and Another vs. State of   Uttar Pradesh; Subramanian Swamy vs. Union of India; and K.K. Mishra vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another. 

Judgement 

The bench concluded that on grounds that the history of the law commission report was not properly traced, the appeal by Vijender Gupta was allowed and on the other hand the appeal by Manoj Tiwari was dismissed. 

“The special procedure is in addition to and not in derogation of the right that a public servant always has as an individual. He never lost his right merely because he became a public servant and merely because the allegations related to the official discharge of his duties”, the bench of Justices S. Abdul Nazeer and V. Ramasubramanian said.

The court ruled that Shri Vijender Gupta’s appeal was successful only because the statements contained in his tweets were not considered defamatory within the meaning of Section 499 of the IPC.

The court explained that defamatory statements should be specific as an essential ingredient and not too vague or general. Hence statement made by Sri Vijender Gupta “your answer will disclose your scam” cannot be one, It cannot be intended to damage the reputation of Defendant Manish Sisodia.

-Report by Manya Sharma

A two Judge-Bench discussed fair and just compensation for the affected parties related to the deceased and provided for the heads to be considered while calculating the same. After considering a variety of factors, the Supreme Court ruled in the favour of the Appellants and allowed an enhanced compensation of Rs.10,29,260/-, who had felt aggrieved by the earlier judgement of the Punjab and Haryana High Court.

FACTS

On 11.08.2009, a bus of Jammu and Kashmir State Road Corporation, which was being driven by the deceased husband of the first Respondent, fell into river Chenab. It was carrying Sudesh Kumar, aged 32 years, who drowned in the river. The Appellants claimed that the accident was due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver and filed the claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, for total compensation of Rs. 50 Lakhs, under different heads.

The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal found that the claim of the petitioners was correct and the accident was due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver, Mohd. Rasid. State Road Transport Corporation was held vicariously liable with Mohd. Rasid and the petitioners were entitled to an amount of Rs. 17,73,704/- with an interest of 6% per annum.

Dissatisfied by the compensation, the Appellants approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court for higher compensation and additional compensation of Rs. 2,95,000/- was granted to them at the interest rate of 9% per annum and the total compensation thus went up to Rs. 20,68,704/-. The Appellants still felt that the compensation was inadequate and hence approached the Supreme Court under Section 168 of the MV Act.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION

The Appellants, referring to the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Pranay Sethi and Others, contended that the High Court, while giving the judgment and quantifying the amount payable, did not consider the future prospects of the deceased, under the head of ‘loss of dependency and other heads. It is also contended that no amount was added under the heads, ‘loss of estate’ and ‘funeral expenses.’

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

Contrary to the Appellants, the Respondents contended that the High Court has granted just compensation to the Appellants, under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, and no other factors need to be considered for the same as it is adequate. It is also further contended that the compensation under the head ‘loss of love’ is impermissible and under ‘loss of consortium,’ only Rs. 40,000 is to be granted going by the Pranay Sethi case.

COURT’S DECISION

The Hon’ble Supreme Court found that there is no justification for not reckoning the future prospects which he would have had but for his untimely death. The Court took the decisions in Pranay Sethi’s case and Sarla Verma and Ors. V. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr., and held that they have no hesitation to uphold the contention of the Appellants that 50% of the actual salary of the deceased has to be added while calculating the compensation. The added amount of Rs. 15,000/- each, under the heads ‘loss of estate’ and ‘funeral expenses’ was granted to the Appellants, by the Supreme Court, which was not granted by the Tribunal and the High Court. The Court discussed the Pranay Sethi case, where three heads were recognized for the consideration of compensation and these heads were ‘loss of estate,’ ‘loss of consortium’ and ‘funeral expenses’ and accordingly fixed the amounts to be added and deducted for the same in the calculation of total compensation. Apart from this, referring to the Magma General Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram, the court held that compensation to the head of ‘love and affection’ is impermissible for ‘loss of spousal consortium to wife’ and ‘loss of parental consortium to children’ are admissible. Further, Rs. 40,000/- each was granted to minor children of the deceased and adjusted against ‘parental consortium’, the amount to be taken from the head of ‘love and affection which has to be removed from the list of heads, after deduction of the remaining Rs. 1,20,000/- from the same.

Thus, the Appellants were entitled to an enhanced amount of compensation of Rs. 10,29,260/- which would be paid within 8 weeks from the date of judgement, and in case of failure of the same, would carry interest at 6% per annum from the date of filing of this appeal till the date of realisation.

-Report by Gourav Jain

The Supreme Court, in the case of Menon Ekka @ Smt. Menon Ujjana Ekka vs. Union of India laid down that it can provide a criminal bail where an appeal is pending before the High Court even when the person has already gone through a part of his sentence, given the conditions are right.

Facts

The appellant was sentenced to 7 years of Rigorous Imprisonment by the Ranchi High Court. The appellant is a lady who had been convicted with her husband for an offence of the Prevention of Corruption Act, keeping in possession of inappropriate assets. Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, the lady has decided to appeal in the high court and as she had already undergone almost 3 years of her sentence, she asks for criminal bail from the Supreme Court.

Appellant’s Contentions

Shri Gaurav Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the lady has been sentenced to 7 years of rigorous imprisonment, for which the appellant has already undergone 2 years and 9 months sentence. It was further contended that the appeals filed by the appellant and the others are not likely to be heard in near future and thus, it is asked for the court to release the appellant on bail during the time pending disposal of the appeal before the High Court.

Respondent’s Contention

Opposing the appeal, Ms. Swati Ghildiyal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has actively submitted that as such the High Court was ready to take up the appeals for the last disposal, however, the appellant and others were not ready for the hearing of the appeals. It is submitted that the appellant shall not make an unjustified unfairness that the appeal is not likely to be heard. It is said that looking at the charges against the appellant and the nature of the evidence, the High Court has refused correctly to suspend the sentence and release the lady on bail during the settlement of the appeal.

Judgement

Taking into consideration that the appellant is a lady and has already undergone 2 years and 9 months sentence, the appeal is allowed. She is ordered to be released on bail during the pendency of the Criminal Appeal pending before the High Court on the condition that it may be given by the learned Trial court. It is observed and made clear that the benefit of the order may not be available to the other accused persons and the present order may not be written as a precedent so far as the others are concerned. The court directed the Registry of the High Court to notify the Criminal Appeals of all the accused before the Bench taking up these appeals and the court requested the High Court to finally decide the said appeals as fast as possible but not after six months from the first listing.

All concerned appellants are ordered to cooperate in the disposal of the appeals by the High Court and within the time stated.  Any attempt on the part of the appellant and/or the other accused to delay the hearing of the appeals shall be seen seriously.

-Report by Sanstuti Mishra

THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA in case of CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION, MARIANO ANTO BRUNO & ANR. Vs THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE held that upon the appreciation of evidence of the eyewitnesses and other material adduced by the prosecution, Trial Court wrongly convicted the Petitioners and the High Court was also not justified in upholding the conviction of the Petitioners under Sections 306 and 498A IPC.

Facts 

This appeal is filed under Criminal Appeal No. 166 of 2021 of the Madras High Court of January 31, 2022, wherein, appellants were sentenced to 3 years of imprisonment with a fine of  5,000/- each, and failure to do so would amount to simple imprisonment for a month under section 498A IPC and imprisonment of 7 years with 25,000 fine, non-adherence of which would amount to 3 months simple imprisonment u/s 306 IPC. On appeal, the High Court upheld the applicant’s conviction for violations under Sections 498A and 306 IPC. 

The marriage of Applicant No. 1 and Dr. M. Amari Victoria was ordained on September 8, 2005, and had a child in 2007. The husband was informed that his wife had collapsed in the bathroom, she was unable to resuscitate and she died on November 5, 2014. An autopsy on her corpse was performed on November 6, 2014, and her cause of death was asphyxiation due to external compression on her neck. FIR was registered by the police based on the appellant’s statements u/s 174 CrPC, which was further converted into Sections 498A and 306 IPC on PW-1’s complaint.

Petitioner No. 1 caused immeasurable emotional distress to the deceased by forcing the deceased to have another child, even though the deceased miscarried in her second pregnancy.  She was deceased, required to do all of her household chores and suffered constant abuse from her in-laws. For the same reason, the deceased was driven to suicide on November 5, 2014.

After reviewing prosecution witness testimony and defence evidence, the Trial court convicted the Appellants (husband and mother-in-law) u/s 498A and 306 IPC. The deceased’s father-in-law was acquitted by the Court.

Petitioner’s Contention 

Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal filed that allegations of atrocities were first raised by the deceased’s mother who was never raised in nine years of marriage. The relations between both families were good. It cannot be claimed that the deceased committed suicide due to the applicant’s abetment. 

It was then submitted that when their statements were taken shortly after the deceased’s death, there was no evidence of animosity between the families. The summary recorded by PW-9 shows a past medical history of depression, attempted suicide, and suicidal ideation. Further that the courts also convicted the applicant based solely on her PW-1 through PW-3 testimony alleging the applicant committed continued sexual and emotional abuse.

Defendant’s Contention

PV Yogeswaran, appearing for the respondents, said evidence from PW-1 to PW-3 clearly showed that all defendants demanded a higher dowry after marriage and further were forced to drink cow urine under the name of ‘pooja’.

It was also submitted that PW-1 to her PW-3 repeatedly reported on the nature of the harassment and incidents in which victims committed suicide and left their only child behind. It was then vehemently argued that there was clear evidence of an exponential increase in abuse, harassment, and agitation by the accused following the termination of her second pregnancy in 2014.

Judgement 

The honourable Supreme court concluded the Courts ought to be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide.

Accordingly, the facts and evidence Supreme court analysed facts which were ignored by both the Trial Court as well as the High court. The bench concluded that there was not a shred of evidence with respect to the offence alleged under Section 498A of the IPC meted out to the deceased by the Petitioners. There has been no marital discord between Appellant No. 1 and the deceased during their 9 years of married life. The deceased was suffering from bipolar order and also had suicidal ideas from a few days before suicide. The Trial Court as well as the High Court did not take the evidence of PW-9, the Psychiatrist into consideration while convicting the Appellants under Sections 306 and 498A of IPC. The conviction of the appellants is solely based on the oral evidence of the mother and sister of the deceased, who are interested witnesses. As a result, the impugned judgment dated 31.01.2022 passed by the High Court as well as the judgment and order of the Trial Court dated 26.03.2021 are unsustainable and deserve to be set aside and are hereby set aside. The appellants are acquitted of the charges levelled against them. The bench opined that to convict a person under Section 306 IPC, there has to be clear mens rea to commit the offence.