Introduction

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in its judgment Attorney General for India v. Satish and another put away the judgment of Bombay H.C. which held that skin-to-skin contact is an essential facet for a crime of sexual assault to be made out under the POCSO Act, 2012. The case emerged out of requests documented by the Attorney General of India, the NCW, and the State of Maharashtra against two decisions of the Bombay court, both composed by Justice Ganediwala. In this article, the writer will feature current realities, entries made, and the judgment given by the Supreme Court of India for this situation.

Background

A 12-year-old minor girl was brought away by a man to his back home under the guise to give guava and afterwards this very nearly 40 years of age man grabbed her, attempted to take off her garments, and limited her in a room. She began crying and yelling and fortunately, her mom acted the hero in time and her cry was heard by a couple of neighbors, who were sufficiently benevolent to affirm. On nineteenth January 2021, a woman judge of the Bombay H.C. gave a decision that, as there was no skin-to-skin contact there was no offense of  “sexual assault” under the POCSO Act, and this episode just sums up “Insulting Modesty of Woman” under the IPC.  Further, the term of detainment was decreased to 1 year from 3 years. Thus, following shock and fights all through the country, on 27th January 2021, this request for the Bombay H.C. was retained by the Supreme Court. Further, the Judge has been downgraded because of passing such silly orders, as the Supreme Court Collegium has removed suggestions to make the appointed authority super durable.

Interpretation By The Cout

The sole explanation given by the woman judge in diminishing the detainment terms to 1 year and holding the individual not blameworthy under the POCSO Act for Sexual Assault is because the appointed authority felt that the base discipline of 3 years under the POCSO Act is unbalanced for the detailed occurrence, and the episode explained above isn’t serious enough in that frame of mind to draw in 3 years of thorough detainment except if there are more serious episodes where there is skin to skin contact. It has additionally been investigated by the academicians that such a silly end to prohibit the above episode of youngster sexual offense as rape for the absence of skin to skin contact under the POCSO Act, can not be arrived at because of any law on the translation of rule nor by straightforward use of rationale. There is positively not a great reason to legitimize this decision.

Judiciary Response On Skin To Skin Contact

A total of 4 appeals were recorded under the steady gaze of the Supreme Court of India by the appellants – Attorney General for India, NCW, State of Maharashtra, and litigant – denounced accused against the judgment dated 19 January 2021 passed by Bombay H.C. holding that skin to skin contact is important to comprise an offense of rape under Section 7 of the POCSO Act. One more allure was recorded by the State of Maharashtra against the judgment of a similar seat dated 15 January 2021 wherein it was held that demonstrations of ‘holding the hands of the minor young lady’, or ‘opening the speed of gasp’ don’t comprise rape under the POCSO Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India heard and discarded every one of the requests together. The translation of the arrangements of the POCSO Act as finished by the Bombay H.C. would devastatingly affect society at large. All the supposed demonstrations of the charge including taking the casualty to his home, eliminating salwar, squeezing bosoms and mouth were acts adding up to ‘sexual assault inside the significance of section 7 culpable with section 8 of the POCSO Act.

The understanding of the word ‘actual contact’, as signifying ‘skin-to-skin contact’ is a restricted understanding that nullifies the very point and object of the POCSO Act. There was no extension for use of the standard of ejusdem generis and it ought not to be applied where it would overcome the actual object of the statute. Section 7 incorporates two sections first, is a demonstration of ‘contacting with sexual purpose the vagina… ‘ and the second, relates to ‘some other demonstration with a sexual plan which includes actual contact without entrance’.

In this way, means the rea-the sexual goal of an individual is the most significant and material thing in the event of the offense of sexual assault. The terms ‘contact’ and ‘actual contact’ in section 7 have been utilized conversely by the legislature. In expressions of sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, the court is expected to assume the sexual aim concerning the blamed and it is for him to demonstrate that he had no such aim or guilty mental state. The attack is supposed to be aggravated in nature. For example, sub-section (m) of section 9 states that whoever commits the offense of sexual assault on a child under 12 years is said to commit the offense of aggravated sexual assault. As mentioned under section 10 of the said act It accommodates discipline for aggravated sexual assault for example detainment of one or the other portrayal for a term which will not be under five years yet which might reach out to seven years, and fine.

Provisions Under POCSO Act

The central concern for the situation connects with the translation of section 7 of the POCSO Act. The Court saw that while deciphering a rule, such a development must be taken on which advances the object of the regulation and forestalls its conceivable maltreatment. The Court likewise saw that the POCSO Act was established to keep youngsters from rape, lewd behavior, and pornography. After breaking down the word reference significance of the words ‘contact’ and ‘actual contact’, the court communicated its concurrence with the accommodation of appellants that the two words have been utilized reciprocally in section 7 by the legislature. The Court concurred with the accommodation made for the sake of denouncing that articulation ‘sexual plan’ in section 7 can’t be bound to any foreordained construction and is an issue of reality to be chosen for each situation. The Court anyway dismissed the accommodation that actual contact in section 7 methods skin-to-skin contact.

Depending on the proverb ‘Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat’, the court saw that any limited translation which would overcome the object of an arrangement can’t be acknowledged. Deciphering the articulation ‘actual contact’ to imply ‘skin-to-skin contact’ would prompt a ridiculous translation that could never have been the goal of the governing body. Such translation would disappoint the actual object of the resolution and would be exceptionally unfavorable as the demonstrations of contacting the body of the youngster with gloves material or condoms wouldn’t add up to rape under section 7 regardless of whether they are committed with sexual aim. The court saw that it is a settled place that corrective resolutions must be understood rigorously yet it is similarly settled that conditions of a rule ought to be understood concerning the specific circumstance and different arrangements to make a predictable sanctioning of the entire rule connecting with the subject matter. The Court would not make a difference to the standard of lenity and saw that it is a settled recommendation of regulation that the legal equivocalness ought to be summoned if all else fails of translation.

Where the aim of the lawmaking body is clear, the courts can not make vagueness to overcome such a goal. The Court held that there is no vagueness or lack of definition in section 7 to summon the Standard of Lenity. for a term at the very least five years under section 10 of the POCSO Act. Justice Ravindra S. Bhatt in his agreeing judgment directed out the need to decipher the resolution with regards to the conditions that brought about its introduction to the world. In his judgment, the Hon’ble judge depended on the underhandedness rule of understanding of resolutions which gives that courts need to decipher the law in order to stifle the wickedness and advance the cure. He noticed that the judgment given by the Bombay Court will in general proceed with the naughtiness that the Parliament wished to avoid. He likewise noticed that in section 7 of the POCSO Act, the term ‘actual contact’ is of more extensive import than the word ‘contacting’ and isn’t restricted to contact. The articulation ‘some other demonstration’ including ‘actual contact’ may incorporate direct actual contact by the wrongdoer, with some other body a piece of the casualty with the exception of those referenced in the initial segment of section 7 and different demonstrations like the utilization of an item by the guilty party, drawing in actual contact with the person in question.

Indeed, even no contact by the wrongdoer might go under the domain of the saying “some other demonstration”. For instance for a situation where the casualty is constrained to contact oneself. To decide if contact or actual contact is made with sexual purpose, one needs to check out the encompassing conditions. For example, the idea of the relationship with the youngster, the length of contact, its intentionality, and whether there was a genuine non-sexual reason for the contact, spot and direct of the denounced when such leads are significant contemplations. Courts need to remember that sexual purpose isn’t characterized but is subject to the current realities of a case.

Judgment Pronounced By the Court

The Supreme Court of India put away the request passed by the Bombay Court on account of blaming the accused and reestablished the request for the Exceptional Court. The accused was sentenced for the offenses culpable under section 8 of the POCSO Act and sections 342, 354, and 363 of the Indian Penal Code. The accused was ordered to go through detainment for a considerable length of time and a fine of Rs.500/ – and in default thereof to go through basic detainment for one month for the offense under section 8 of the POCSO Act. As the accused was condemned for a significant offense under section 8 of the POCSO Act, no different sentence was forced upon him for different offenses under the Indian Penal Code. The accused was indicted for the offenses under section 354-A (1)(i) and 448 of the Indian Penal Code as and for the offenses under sections 8, 12, and 10 read with section 9(m) of the POCSO Act. The court guided him to go through detainment for a very long time for the offense under section 10 of the POCSO Act and to pay a fine of Rs. 25,000 and in default thereof to languish straightforward detainment for over a half year. No different sentence was forced upon him for different offenses under the Indian Penal Code and the POCSO Act.

Concluding Remarks

For this situation, the Supreme Court of India has given a milestone judgment by switching the questionable decisions passed by the Bombay H.C. which were vigorously scrutinized for being terrible in regulation. In any case, it is lamentable the Court in a nation would pass such a judgment that makes a joke of the law by totally dismissing the regulative history of the POCSO Act and the significant articles that the Demonstration tries to accomplish. To close, it is appropriate to refer to the accompanying perception made by Hon’ble Equity Ravindra S. Bhatt, “It is no important for any appointed authority’s obligation to strain the plain expressions of a resolution, to the point of being indistinguishable and to the mark of its obliteration, subsequently denying the call of the times that youngsters frantically need the confirmation of a regulation intended to safeguard their independence and respect, as POCSO does”.

References

This article is written by Saumya Tiwari, student of Graphic Era University, Dehradun.

CASE NUMBER

Bail Appl. No. 8346 of 2018

CITATION

2019 SCC OnLine Ker 13012

BENCH

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V

DECIDED ON

Decided on January 24, 2019

FACTS OF THE CASE

The applicant is a PMSAMA Higher Secondary School Urdu teacher. He oversaw the NSS’s activities. On November 6, 2018, the victim, a minor child, and a student from a different school went to a camp at PMSAMA Higher Secondary School in Malappuram. The applicant is said to have complimented her on her accomplishments. He invited the victim to the principal’s chamber at 4 p.m. He took two pens from his drawer, one of which he gave to the sufferer. He then kissed her on the forehead after touching her hand. It was offensive to the victim since, according to her, it was done with sexual purpose. A complaint was filed on November 27, 2018, alleging these claims, which resulted in the subject offense being registered under Section 10 read with Section 9 of the Protection of Women from Sexual Offenses Act, 2012.

RELEVANT SECTION

Under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this case was filed under the Hon’ble court. Section 438 of CrPC talks about anticipatory bail regarding the commencement of doing some nonbailable offense. Anticipatory bail means that a person who is apprehending an interest can apply for bail in advance. The addition of this provision was a recommendation made by the 41st Law Commission of India.

ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT

Is the accused liable under Section 10 read with Section 9 of the Protection of Women from Sexual Offences Act, 2012?

Section 9 of the POCSO Act: Talks about Aggravated Sexual Assault
Whoever conducts a sexual assault on a child while serving as a police officer: inside the confines of the police station or premises to which he is assigned; or (ii) within the confines of any station house, whether or not located within the police station to which he is assigned;
or
(iii) while performing his responsibilities or otherwise; or
(iv) where he is identified or known as a police officer; or

(b) whomsoever commits sexual assault on a child while serving in the armed forces or security forces in jail, remand home, protection home, observation home, or other places of custody or care and protection established by or under any government authority; or whoever commits sexual assault on a child in a hospital, whether government or private; or whoever is on the staff of management of a jail, protection home, remand home, observation home or other
place of custody or care and protection established by or under any government authority.

Hence, that a child is sexually assaulted by one or more members of a group in furtherance of their common goal, each of those members is deemed to have committed gang sexual assault within the meaning of this clause, and each of those members is liable for the act in the same way as if he had done it alone;

SECTION 10 of the POCSO Act: It talks about Punishment for aggravated Sexual Assault
Anyone who commits serious sexual assault faces a sentence of imprisonment of either kind for a period of not less than five years but not more than seven years, as well as a monetary fine.

DECISION OF THE COURT

The High Court of Kerala held that the entire dispute between the respondent and the petitioner was settled amicably. The bench of Justice Alexander Thomas in the judgment wrote that the dispute was settled amicably and ordered that petitioner’s mother was required to submit an affidavit stating that she had no problem with the quashing of FIR.

SUPREME COURT ON THE DECISION

Justice M.R. Shah of the Supreme Court held in Laxmi Narayan that the High Court in that the case had not taken into account the relevant facts and circumstances of the case, particularly the seriousness of the offenses and their social impact while quashing the FIR as a result of the parties’ settlement, despite the fact that it was a non-compoundable offense. In that case, Justice Shah found that the High Court failed to assess the distinction between a personal or private wrong and a social wrong, as well as the societal impact.

During the hearing of the Kerala Government’s appeal against the ruling, the bench observed the government’s argument that quashing the FIR is not relevant in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in the case State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan & Ors (2019). Justice M.R. Shah of the Supreme Court held in Laxmi Narayan that the High Court in that the case had not taken into account the relevant facts and circumstances of the case, particularly the seriousness of the offenses and their social impact while quashing the FIR as a result of the parties’ settlement, despite the fact that it was a non-compoundable offense. In that case, Justice Shah found that the High Court failed to assess the distinction between a personal or private wrong and a social wrong, as well as the societal impact. In this case, the High Court has taken no pains to examine the complete set of facts in context and has quashed the criminal proceedings on a mechanical basis.

This is written by Dalima Pushkarna student at Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow.