Tag: #lawstudents

-Report by Karan Gautam

The defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in O.S. No.6456 of 1993 filed an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, calling in question the judgment and decree dated 09.09.2010 passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in RFA No.1966 of 2007. During the pendency of the captioned appeal, the second appellant died and his legal heirs were impleaded as additional appellants 2.1 to 2.4. The original first appellant and the impleaded legal heirs of the deceased second appellant are collectively described as ‘appellants’. The plaintiff prayed for a judgment for decree of permanent injunction restraining the first and second defendants from interfering in the plaintiffs right, title and interest over and in the suit schedule property.

FACTS:

The appellants filed a written statement contending that the suit is not maintainable, that there is no prayer for possession, that the suit was not valued correctly, and that the real owners of the suit property were not arraigned as parties. Subsequently, they amended the plaint by adding schedules A, B and ‘C’ and prayers qua them. The prayers in the amended plaint read as under: a judgment and decree of perpetual injunction directing the defendants to restore the possession of the schedule premises to the plaintiff and not to interfere in the plaintiffs’ lawful possession and enjoyment of the schedule property.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:

The plaintiff/respondent adduced oral and documentary evidence in support of his claims, but the defendant did not lead any evidence. The Trial Court partially decreed the suit as per judgment dated 04.07.2007, holding that the plaintiff was entitled to recover possession of suit ‘B’ schedule property from the defendants and directed the defendants
to vacate and deliver it to the plaintiff within two months. The surviving defendants challenged the judgment and decree before the High Court in RFA No.1966 of 2007. They did not adduce any evidence before the trial court. The plaintiff objected to the maintainability of the appeal as the original suit was filed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The High Court dispelled the objection and remanded the matter to the Trial Court for fresh disposal. Leave was granted and the Civil Appeal was disposed of as per judgment dated 03.09.2009. The trial Court was directed to record the evidence and submit a report to the High Court to dispose of the appeal within the time stipulated. The

Court to which the case is remanded has to comply with the order of remand and acting contrary to it is contrary to law. In this case, the High Court remanded the matter to the trial Court for fresh disposal and directed the trial Court to record the evidence as directed by the High Court and forward it along with report to enable the High Court to dispose of the appeal taking into account the additionally recorded evidence of the defendants.

RESPONDANT’S CONTENTIONS:

The High Court dismissed the appeal of the appellants and confirmed the judgement and decree of the Trial Court. The appellants had raised multiple grounds to assail the judgment, including that the plaintiff/the respondent had failed to establish his possession over plaint ‘B’ schedule property. The High Court failed to consider the contention that the subject suit was abated due to the failure of the respondent to bring on record the legal representatives of Sri Hanumaiah, the third respondent, and Sri Rama @ Ramamurthy, the deceased second defendant, who had purchased the suit property from Sriman Madhwa Sangha and Sri Vittal Rao as per sale deed executed on 05.10.2000.

JUDGEMENT:

The High Court held that the defendants did not disclose their defence in their written statement and did not even contend that they are in possession of the suit property, which is based on the maxim ‘Possessio contra omnes valet praeter eur cui ius sit possessionis‘. The High Court is also correct in holding the question of maintainability of the suit in the affirmative and in favour of the respondent. The appellants argued that the suit ought to have been held as abated against all the defendants due to non-substitution of the legal representatives of the deceased defendant No. 3 upon his death, but the courts below have held that the original defendants failed to raise sufficient and appropriate pleadings in the written statement that they have better right for possession. The appeal is dismissed and there will be no order as to costs.

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-Report by Bhavana Bhandari

In a recent judgment, the Supreme Court of India held that a simple and literal interpretation of the severe requirements under Section 37 of the NDPS Act 1985 would make bail difficult to grant. The court was considering a criminal appeal in the case Mohd Muslim vs State (NCT) of Delhi to adjudicate whether grant bail to an undertrial prisoner who was arrested seven years ago under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 for alleged participation in the distribution of a prohibited drug.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND:

The case involved the seizure of 180 kg of marijuana from a total of four co-accused individuals seven years ago, namely Nitesh Ekka, Sanjay Chauhan, Sharif Khan, and Virender Shakiyar/Sakyabar @ Deepak and afterward Mohd Muslim. When the co-accused were found in possession of the prohibited drug, the appellant, Mohd Muslim, was implicated based on a confessional statement. When his co-accused was granted bail, the Delhi high court refused him bail. Nevertheless, despite Mohd Muslim was not found in possession of ganja, the assistant attorney general of India, Vikramjit

Banerjee stated that ” he prima facie looks to be the brains behind the supply and transportation of narcotic drugs from Chhattisgarh.”

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS:

The appellant stated that because he has been imprisoned for more than seven years and the criminal the prosecution is only midway, the impugned judgment invalidated his plea for ordinary release under Sections 439 and 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (hereafter “CrPC”) before the Delhi High. The court, even if he was not found in possession of any drugs. Yet, his co-accused were granted bail despite this.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:

According to the prosecution, the four accused people who were allegedly in possession of 180 kg of marijuana—Nitesh Ekka, Sanjay Chauhan, Sharif Khan, and Deepak—were apprehended by the police as a result of secret details that were provided to authorities.

As part of the inquiry, the co-accused Nitesh Ekka was transported to Chhattisgarh to be identified, and on his request, the current appellant Mohd. Muslim was put into custody from the night of October 3, 2014, to October 4, 2015.

Based on several considerations, including the gravity of the alleged offenses, the severity of the sentence, and the appellant’s claimed involvement, the district court denied the appellant’s request for bail. It was observed that he had been in constant touch with his co-accused during the commission of the crime and that key witnesses had not yet been interviewed.

Further, the challenged decision states that the present accused was in prima facie frequent touch with other co-accused, as evidenced by phone records, and that the main accused, Virender Singh @ Beerey had made payments to the appellant’s bank account repeatedly. During the trial, one of the witnesses reportedly stated that the current appellant gave him Rs. 50,000.

As there was a prima facie case against him and no justification for relying on Section 37 of the NDPS Act’s exclusions, the application for normal bail was denied, and the trial court was ordered to accelerate and conclude the matter within six months.

JUDGEMENT:

This observation was stated in the judgment by a bench of Justices S. Ravindra Bhat and Dipankar Datta considered that the requirement of Section 436A, which applies to offenses implies that the grant of bail based on an unreasonable delay in the trial cannot be considered to be restricted by Section 37 of the Act. The bench observed that section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1985 positions that a court may only issue bail to an accused person if it is convinced that there are reasonable reasons to believe that he is innocent of the crime and that he is not likely to commit another crime.

The Supreme Court further cited the decision of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kajad [(2001) 7 SCC 673, which said that a ‘liberal’ approach to Section 37 of the NDPS Act should not be applied. The bench ruled that to effectively rule out the grant of bail completely, the appellant’s request for release must be evaluated ” within the framework of the NDPS Act, specifically Section 37.”

CONCLUSION:

As a response, the bench led by Justice Bhat remarked that the supreme court had maintained such stringent conditions in light of the balance between two conflicting goals, namely, the right of an accused to enjoy freedom based on the presumption of innocence and the interest of society at large. And yet, it also acknowledged that the only way a particular condition in law, like the one in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, could be taken into account within the bounds of the constitution is by relying on a prima-facie finding of the matter based on the evidence on the record. The bench ruled unequivocally that any alternative reading would result in a person accused of offenses such as those authorized under Section 37 of the NDPS Act is completely denied bail.

Therefore, since the appellant has been in detention for more than 7 years and 4 months and the the trial is moving at a snail’s pace, bail cannot be denied to an accused charged with NDPS Act offenses due to the operation of Section 37 where there has been an excessive delay in the trial.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3nuRIEN

-Report by Harshit Yadav

This is an appeal filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 against the award passed by the Presiding Officer, MACT, North West District, Rohini Courts, Delhi in MACT No. 50797/2016. The case involves the death of Naresh due to injuries suffered in a motor vehicular accident that occurred on 08.05.2014 in front of the NDPL office, inside Shiv Vihar Road, Karala road, Delhi. Naresh was driving his engine-fitted rickshaw thela when a Tata Tempo, which was being driven by its driver in a rash and negligent manner, hit the rickshaw thela with great force. Due to the impact, Naresh fell and sustained grievous injuries which resulted in his death. An FIR was registered at PS Kanjhawala. The main issues involved in this appeal are whether the compensation awarded towards “loss of consortium” is justified and proper and whether the compensation awarded towards “loss of love and affection” would be payable or not.

FACTS

The case involves the death of Naresh, who died as a result of injuries suffered in a motor vehicular accident on 08.05.2014. Naresh was driving his engine-fitted rickshaw thela when suddenly a Tata Tempo bearing registration no. HR-46D-0998, which was being driven by its driver in a rash and negligent manner, hit the rickshaw thela of the deceased with great force. Due to the impact, Naresh fell and sustained grievous injuries which resulted in his death. The main issues involved in this appeal are whether the compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal towards “loss of consortium” is justified and proper and whether the compensation awarded towards “loss of love and affection” would be payable or not. The appellant’s counsel argued that the compensation towards the non-pecuniary heads shall be Rs. 70,000/- only in a lump sum and that the rate of interest awarded by the learned Tribunal is on the higher side and should be reduced to 6% per annum. The Tribunal had awarded a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- towards loss of consortium and Rs. 2,50,000/- towards loss of love and affection to the respondents.

ISSUES RAISED

a) Whether the compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal towards “loss of consortium” is justified and proper?

b) Whether the compensation awarded towards “loss of love and affection” would be payable or not?

CONTENTIONS

The appellant argues that the learned Tribunal has erroneously awarded compensation towards loss of consortium and loss of love and affection. They contend that as per recent judgments and prevailing law, compensation towards loss of love and affection should not have been awarded. Furthermore, the compensation awarded towards the loss of consortium is excessive, and only the widow of the deceased is entitled to such compensation. The appellant also contends that the rate of interest awarded is on the higher side and should be reduced.

The respondent argues that the compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal towards loss of consortium and loss of love and affection is justified and proper. They contend that as per settled law, compensation towards loss of consortium should be awarded to all the claimants, including the children of the deceased. Furthermore, compensation towards loss of love and affection is also payable as per recent judgments. The respondent also contends that the rate of interest awarded is appropriate and should not be reduced.

JUDGEMENT

Based on the facts presented, the appeal was filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 against an award passed by the Presiding Officer, MACT, North West District, Rohini Courts, Delhi in MACT No. 50797/2016. The appeal sought to challenge the compensation awarded towards “loss of consortium” and “loss of love and affection.”

The accident occurred on May 8, 2014, in front of the NDPL office on Shiv Vihar Road, Karala road, Delhi, where the deceased was driving his engine-fitted rickshaw thela. A Tata Tempo, driven by the offending vehicle’s driver in a rash and negligent manner, hit the rickshaw thela, resulting in the deceased falling and sustaining grievous injuries, leading to his death. An FIR was registered at PS Kanjhawala under sections 279/304A IPC.

After hearing the counsel for the appellant and reviewing the award, the court found that the compensation awarded towards “loss of consortium” was justified and proper, as per the settled law that all claimants are entitled to compensation under this head. However, regarding the compensation awarded towards “loss of love and affection,” the court referred to the judgment of National Insurance Co Ltd. vs. Pranay Sethi & Ors. and reduced the compensation to Rs. 70,000/- only in a lump sum to be payable only to the widow of the deceased. The court also reduced the rate of interest from 9% to 6% per annum.

Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal in part, reduced the compensation awarded towards “loss of love and affection” to Rs. 70,000/- payable only to the widow of the deceased, and reduced the rate of interest to 6% per annum.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/42OTwbY

-Report by Bhavana Bhandari

In the case of Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam Home Department and anr. 2023 (SC) 234, the Supreme Court ruled on Friday that membership in an organization deemed unlawful by the Central government is sufficient to establish an offence under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA). In the decision, the court reversed its previous ruling from 2011, in which it had concluded that mere membership in a prohibited organization under the Act could not be grounds for conviction unless it was accompanied by some overt violent behaviour. Whereas the Solicitor General of India represented the respondents, Senior Advocate Sanjay Parikh represented the appellants.

FACTS:

In 2011, a two-judge bench comprising justices Markandey Katju and Gyan Sudha Mishra exonerated Arup Bhuyan and Indra Das for the violations of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA). The judgment was reached relying on an alleged confession statement and that mere membership in a prohibited organization under the Act could not be considered a valid ground for conviction under the Act.

In State of Kerala v. Raneef, the 2011 Bench made the pertinent observation that, among other things, the American Bill of Rights and a few US Supreme Court decisions maintaining that Section 3(5) of the Act cannot be properly interpreted without violating Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, a person is not necessarily a criminal just because they belong to a prohibited organization until they use violence, inspire others to use violence, or cause a commotion by using violence or inciting others to use violence. “

When the Union Government filed a request for reference in 2014, a two-judge panel composed of Justices Dipak Misra and AM Sapre referred the case to a larger bench. The matter was finally heard on February 8, 2023, and a conclusion was reached on March 24, 2023.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS:

Senior Attorney Sanjay Parikh argued for an intervenor-NGO that in cases involving substantive rights, such as personal liberty, provisos might be read down even when not directly challenged. He argued that as civil freedoms are protected by the Indian and American constitutions, it would be improper to invalidate the orders that are being challenged because they were based on US court decisions.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, appearing as counsel for the Central Government asserted that it was intrinsically difficult to show formal involvement in prohibited organizations since the requirements mentioned were a barrier and a safeguard. The SG further emphasized that under the current structure, terrorist activity might be permitted as long as it wasn’t ostensibly committed under the banner of groups that were outlawed or considered a terrorist.

The Union government and certain state governments contended that the supreme court’s reading of the UAPA cases had effectively read down the aforementioned proviso by referencing the American Bill of Rights, making it more challenging to fight terrorism. The Central Government argued that the Court could not pronounce the contents of an anti-terror law unconstitutionally without first hearing its defences and relying on probable legal abuse.

The Court’s reliance on the Bill of Rights was improper in light of the Supreme Court’s prior decision in Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra, which was decided by a five-judge panel. Consequently, American jurisprudence could not be authorized under the constitution as there are not any provisions in the American Constitution that equate to Article 19 Clauses (2) through (6).

JUDGEMENT:

The decision came from a three-bench judge comprising of justices MR Shah, CT Ravikumar, and Sanjay Karol holding the validity of section 10(a)(i) of the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA). Since the primary intention of the UAPA act is to prevent certain unlawful activities and penalize people who are members of such unlawful groups under the Act. As a result, Section 10(a)(i) is fully compliant with Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(2) of the Constitution and, as a result, with the purposes of the UAPA.

Another issue that the Court had to address was whether or not sections of central legislation may be read down in a situation where those provisions were not challenged and the central government had not been heard. In this regard, the Court found that the State would suffer severe injury if the same was not heard. The Centre was required to submit arguments to support 10(1)(i) and to establish the goals and objectives. Hence, this Court should not have read down Section 10(a)(i), especially when the Section’s constitutionality was not in doubt.

FINAL WORDS:

The bench stated in its ruling today that the 2011 decisions were made in bail petitions when the constitutionality of the rules was not contested. In addition, past decisions have upheld the constitutionality of the UAPA and TADA. The 2011 pronouncements were also heavily criticized for interpreting the laws without addressing the Union of India.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3K5riCi

-Report by Sejal Jethva

In the matter of BHUSHAN KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. vs. RAJINDER KUMAR GUPTA, Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 19081, the drawl of a preliminary decree of partition with regard to property is requested.

FACTS

The late Sh. Hem Chander Gupta unquestionably bought the suit property on September 12, 1976. The following information about Sh. Hem Chander Gupta’s wife and five boys who he is said to have left behind after his intestate death on December 31, 1999: –

i. Smt. Premwati Gupta

ii. Shri Mange Ram Gupta

 iii. Shri Rajinder Kumar Gupta

 iv. Shri Santosh Kumar Gupta

v. Shri Satish Chander Gupta

 vi. Mr. Bhushan Kumar Gupta

On July 12, 2018, the mother, Premwati Gupta, also passed away intestate. Her 1/6th undivided portion in the suit property, therefore, passed to her five surviving sons, and the plaintiffs claim that as a result, each of the five surviving sons acquired a 1/5th undivided stake in the suit property.

According to reports, Sh. Mange Ram Gupta, the oldest son of the late Sh. Hem Chander Gupta and Smt. Premwati Gupta gave his daughter-in-law Smt. Shalini Gupta his 1/5th undivided share. It is important to highlight that the plaintiffs in the current lawsuit are Sh. Santosh Kumar Gupta, Sh. Satish Chander Gupta, Sh. Bhushan Kumar Gupta, and Smt. Shalini Gupta. Only Sh. Rajender Kumar Gupta, the other son of the late Sh. Hem Chander Gupta and Smt. Premwati Gupta, and Smt. Premwati Gupta, are opposed to the relief for division.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION

The plaintiffs addressed the defendant to request a mutually agreeable division of the subject property, with each party having a right to a 1/5th portion. It is claimed that the plaintiffs approached the defendants regarding a partition that would be impacted by metes and bounds. The current lawsuit was filed on April 18, 2022, as a result of the aforementioned request not being granted.

 Learned lawyers appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs argued that, given the accepted position in the parties’ briefs that the property was itself acquired, the plea of ​​oral division could be clearly rejected. Furthermore, since the property was acquired by the father of the parties himself and he remained the owner during his lifetime, there could have been no division, at least until his death, according to which the property could have been divided between his legal heirs. It was also claimed that if the father wished at all, the property could have been transferred either by gift or by transfer. It was argued that neither the plea of ​​oral division nor the plea of ​​such division raised by the father while he was alive could possibly stand.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

In these proceedings, the defendant has submitted a written statement. It is important to note that the written declaration does not contest the fact that the suit property was bought by the late Sh. Hem Chander Gupta. The property would unquestionably be seen as having been bought by the late Sh. Hem Chander Gupta on his own. The sole argument put out is that the late Sh. Hem Chander Gupta, who was the Class-1 legal heir, requested all of his sons during his lifetime to divide the suit property on or around March 1999. According to the defendant, parties agreed to an equitable split of the suit property and that an oral partition came about at that time.

JUDGEMENT

1. The Court is adamant that the presented defence is completely unworthy of consideration after giving it full attention. The defendant has not provided any evidence to support how an oral partition could have been created or established during the father’s lifetime. It was also uncontested that the fathers of the parties were the only ones to obtain the land.

2. As a result, a preliminary partition decree for the property at 14/1 Shakti Nagar, Delhi, is issued, designating plaintiffs Bhushan Kumar Gupta, Satish Chander Gupta, Santosh Kumar Gupta, Shalini Gupta, and defendant Rajinder Kumar Gupta as each owning a fifth undivided portion of the property.

3. The creation of a preliminary decision for division.

4. It is regarded as necessary to give the parties some time to decide if they can divide the property by metes and bounds. If not, a definitive decree of partition and/or sale of the property, including through the parties placing inter se bids, shall be made on the next hearing date.

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-Report by Harsh Singh Rajput

In the case of Delhi Development Authority and Govt. of NCT of Delhi vs Batti and others, the respondents in this case i.e., Batti and others filed a writ petition in Delhi high court to claim the compensation of the land which was taken by them 20 years back for the development project and later the two authorities i.e., plaintiffs appeal before SC against the compensation requested by respondents.

FACTS:

Delhi development authority and Govt. of NCT of Delhi appeal before the SC with the Civil Appeal no 2402/2008. Under section 4 of the land acquisition act, 1894(for short ‘the Act’) an order was passed on 23-06-1989 for the acquisition of land measuring about 3,500 hectares for the development of part of Delhi and this order was further followed up by notification under sec 6 of ‘the Act’ on 20 June 1990.

The respondent was the wife of Mange Ram who was the son of the Late Harkesh. The issue was that the late Father-in-law of respondent i.e., Mr. Harkesh was asserted as the owner of the 1/12th share i.e., (01 bighas and 19 biswas and 03 biswansi from the land area measuring upto 23 bights and 2 biswas having khasra no. 281/4(10-11). 282/4(10-3) and 80(2-8)).

Now writ petition was filed by the respondent in 2015. They stated that the other party hasn’t paid them the compensation and also the possession of land hasn’t been taken and the acquisition has lapsed. But the high court stated that the land was handed over to the forest department as per the facts after the possession of the land was taken. And it was taken because the land comes under the ‘O’ zone. And HC also stated the fact that land was also vested in Gaon Sabha. Therefore, the respondent will not be given any compensation and due to the dispute over the titles regarding land, the issue related to compensation was kept open.

The constitution bench stated two conditions to prove the acquisition which are as follows:

1. Taking over the possession of the land or,
2. Payment of compensation

And the bench stated that from the facts, we came to know that the acquisition was done after the land was taken in possession, and due to the dispute in the title, the HC also had kept the question of title open.

The question of acquisition which was holdup by the Delhi high court in this case by relying upon the judgment of this court (SC) in the case of Pune municipal corporate and another’s case ‘supra’ was overruled by relying on the judgment of this court in the Indore Development Authority.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:

Learned counsel on behalf of the respondent provided the facts that respondent no. 1 is the daughter-in-law of later. Harkesh. Harkesh was entitled to compensation as he was the owner of the land as per the records and he also have the Bhoomidari rights. And they submitted that the land was not been taken up also by the authorities.

JUDGEMENT:

The honourable Supreme Court allowed the present appeals of the plaintiff and stated that there will not be any compensation to the predecessor or respondent due to the dispute regarding the title of the land, also the land was found to be recorded in the name of Gaon Sabha.

Also, there were no records of any action or step for seeking compensation on behalf of the respondents and the person who owned the land 20 years ago. So by putting aside the impugned order of HC, the present appeals are allowed and the writ petition of respondents in HC is dismissed.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3ZdLcPQ

-Report by Radhika Mittal

This is a case about an eviction notice issued by the Public Welfare Department for the land occupied by the Appellant, which is a Trust established for the purpose of maintaining a Shiv Temple and Gaushala located in New Delhi. This case delves into the rights of the aggrieved slum dwellers as well as the statutory adherence to government policy.

FACTS :

The Appellant is aggrieved by the Eviction Notice and filed a petition seeking quashing of the Impugned Notice and the issuance of appropriate directions prohibiting the Respondents from carrying out demolition/evacuation proceedings in the said premises.

The learned Single Judge, while disposing of the petition, found that the premises in question do not come within the jhuggi cluster which has been notified as per the Delhi Slum and JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy, 2015. The learned Single Judge, therefore, held that the occupants of the premises were not entitled to protection from demolition.

Aggrieved by the Impugned Order, the Appellant filed an instant appeal. The Appellant contends that the cow shelter and temple have been present on the said premises for more than 15 years and that the Impugned Notice is illegal and arbitrary. The Respondent, on the other hand, has defended the Impugned Order by bringing to the attention of this Court that the place where the premises exist does not come within any notified cluster as notified under the Delhi Slum and JJ Rehabilitation Relocation Policy, 2015.

The Court analyzed the said Policy and held that in order to get the benefit of the said Policy, a jhuggi jhopri basti cluster defined under the Act ought to have been in existence prior or 01.01.2006 and the person should have constructed his jhuggi within the cluster prior to 01.01.2015. The Court held that the premises in question do not come within any notified cluster and, therefore, the demolition cannot be stayed for the said premises.

CONTENTIONS :

This is an appeal against an order passed by a Single Judge in a writ petition filed by the Appellant challenging an eviction notice issued by the Respondent Public Welfare Department for the land occupied by the Appellant’s Trust, which runs a Shiv Temple and Gaushala, and provides shelter to ailing, old and abandoned cows. The notice was issued to all occupants of the premises, including the Appellant’s Trust, directing them to vacate the premises within 15 days. The eviction notice stated that if the occupants failed to do so, they would be removed and relocated to a Shelter Home at Dwarka, Geeta Colony, where they could reside for a period of 3 months. The Single Judge found that the premises did not come within the jhuggi cluster that had been notified under the Delhi Slum and JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy, 2015, and therefore the occupants were not entitled to protection from demolition. The Single Judge directed the Respondent to allot an alternate accommodation for the cow shelter within a week, and further that such alternate cow shelter would be exempt from the maximum stay period of three months. The Appellant challenged this order in the instant appeal, arguing that the cow shelter and temple have been present on the said premises for more than 15 years and that the eviction notice is illegal and arbitrary. The Respondent argued that the place where the premises exist does not come within any notified cluster as notified under the Delhi Slum and JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy, 2015, and therefore the demolition cannot be stayed for the said premises.

JUDGEMENT :

The court heard both parties and perused the material on record, including the Delhi Slum and JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy, 2015, and the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board Act, 2010, and held that in order to get the benefit of the said Policy, a jhuggi jhopri basti cluster defined under the Act, ought to have been in existence prior or 01.01.2006 and the person should have constructed his jhuggi within the cluster prior to 01.01.2015. A survey was conducted to identify various clusters which were entitled to get the benefit of the said Policy. The court found that the premises in question did not come within any notified cluster and the occupants were not entitled to protection from demolition. However, the court directed the Respondent to allot an alternate accommodation for the cow shelter within a week, and such alternate cow shelter would be exempt from the maximum stay period of three months.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/40glb3l

-Report by Sejal Jethva

The parties involved in this case are SUBHASH SOLANKI (Appellant) and DELHI URBAN SHELTER IMPROVEMENT BOARD & ORS. (Respondents). The appellant is allegedly occupying the store illegally and it is claimed that he continued to run his business out of the aforementioned shop after his father passed away and that no one else took over the operation.

FACTS:

The business in dispute was reportedly given to the appellant’s father in 1976 when he was just 14 years old. According to the claim, the appellant was not aware of the terms and circumstances of the allotment at the time of his father’s death in 2009, and as a result, he was unable to submit an application to change the name of the business in question as his father’s legitimate heir. According to the claim, the father of the appellant died away on July 1, 2010, and that day the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board was established.

It is claimed that the appellant kept operating his company out of the aforementioned shop following the death of the father and that no one else took over the operation.

APPELLANTS CONTENTION:

The skilled attorney for the appellant claims that just a possession slip has been given to the appellant’s father in relation to the store in question, and no official allocation letter has been issued in his favour. It is argued that the appellant was unable to request a shop’s modification since he was not aware of the terms and circumstances of the allotment.

The knowledgeable Attorney for the Appellant further asserts that there is no disputing the fact that the Appellant’s father owned the store in question, hence the DUSIB had no difficulty transferring ownership of the shop to the Appellant.

The learned attorney representing the appellant claims that the DUSIB’s policy should be to grant mutation in favour of the legal heirs if there is no dispute regarding who is the initial allottee’s legal heirs so that they can make a living from the store or property that had been allocated to the initial allottee.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:

In contrast, Mr. Parvinder Chauhan, knowledgeable Counsel representing the DUSIB, argued that not only had it been established that the original allottee had entered into an agreement to hire or transfer the appellant to the shop in question, but also that the shop had undergone significant unpermitted construction. The knowledgeable attorney for the DUSIB further notes that shop No. 38, which is currently occupied by the appellant, was also discovered to have been amalgamated with shop No. 37, which is obviously against the terms of allotment and the policy under which the shop was initially allotted to the allottee.

The knowledgeable Attorney for DUSIB also asserts that following the death of his father, the appellant never requested a formal allocation of the store in issue from the authorities.

The evidence on file demonstrates that the Appellant was the subject of proceedings under Sections 41/42 of the DUSIB Act, 2010 for eviction from the aforementioned store. Records show that the in-issue store was given on a licensee fee basis and that the sale or purchase of the shop was prohibited under the terms and circumstances.

JUDGEMENT:

1. The appellant in this case currently resides in Shop No.38 Block-4, Dakshinpuri Extn., New Delhi, and his wife Meena Solanki currently resides in Shop No.37 Block-4, Dakshinpuri Extn., New Delhi. According to documents, one Sh. Ram Lal S/o Sh. Giasi Ram was given this business on a licensee fee basis in 1976. The sale or purchase of the shop is prohibited under the terms and conditions. During a study by the DUSIB survey unit, it was discovered that the shop had been sold to the original allottee, that it had been combined with Shop No. 37, and that there had been extensive unlawful development up to five floors and encroachment on departmental land. The store is being illegally occupied by

2. The learned Single Judge declined to overturn the authorities’ contemporaneous conclusions. The following are the briefly listed requirements for allocation:

1. “a) The sole basis for the allocation was a license;
2. The allotment was made for commercial use and not for residential purposes;
3. the allottee(s) do not have any right to transfer, alienate, or in any other way dispose of the allotted shop(s) in favour of a third party;
4. the allottee(s) do not have any right to carry out structural additions or alterations in the premises without prior written permission from the DUSIB; and
5. as a matter of public policy

3. As a result, the appeal is rejected together with any outstanding applications, if any.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3ZWH881

About the Advocate

Advocate Sattyajeet Karale Patil is one the top three youngest advocates in India, practising in crimes, Narcotics, cyber law, family, consumer and other arenas. He is enrolled with the Bar Council of India and the Bar Council of Maharashtra & Goa.

Vacancy

09 interns

Mode of the Internship

Hybrid (Virtual/Offline)

Duration

2 months

Application Procedure

Send your RESUMES at +91 7977564462 before 26th February 2023

Note – Applicants will be selected through ONLINE INTERVIEW only.

Contact details

Mahenoor Khan (Associate): +91 7977564462

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About Harvard Law School

Harvard Law School is the oldest continuously operating law school in the United States and is home to the largest academic law library in the world.

About the Fellowship

A primary duty of the Rappaport Fellow will be to design, plan, and help execute a distinguished speaker series to promote and model full, vigorous, and civil discourse.

Working closely with the Communications Office, the Dean’s Office and a wide array of HLS faculty, staff, and students, the Rappaport Fellow will contribute to and bolster the Law School’s vibrant intellectual community through this and other initiatives.

The fellowship also facilitates participation in faculty workshops relating to the Fellow’s field of interest and establishes mentoring relationships with faculty working in those fields.

Roles and Responsibilities

• Engage in law-related research, writing, and scholarship
• Help develop and launch a new distinguished speaker series and conceive of, plan and help promote several related high-profile events each year
• Work collaboratively with a broad number of constituents within the Law School – including HLS leadership, faculty, staff, and students – to identify potential topics and speakers, build awareness of the Rappaport Forum, and work with HLS student organizations to encourage participation
• Oversee Rappaport Forum event logistics, manage outreach to guest speakers, develop discussion framework and questions, and prepare associated briefing materials
• Work closely with colleagues in the Office of Communications on news articles on the Forum and other related content
• Participate in developing community-wide intellectual life initiatives
• Serve as an advisor to the student-run HLS Forum
• Perform other duties as assigned

Eligibility Criteria

J.D. degree and superior academic record are required

Stipend

$ 60,000.

How to Apply?

Interested applicants can apply through the link given at the end of the post.

Application Deadline

March 1, 2023.

Location

United States.

Click here to apply
Click here for the official notification

Disclaimer: All information posted by us on Lexpeeps is true to our knowledge. But still, it is suggested that you check and confirm things on your level.

For regular updates on more opportunities, we can catch up at-

WhatsApp Group:

https://chat.whatsapp.com/Hr6aDgJxFpr0XIMD1bl18l

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