Tag: #HighCourtcase

Equivalent citations

1965 AIR 491, 1964 SCR (4) 576

Petitioner

The University of Mysore and Anr

Respondent

C. D. Govinda Rao and Anr

Date of Judgement

26/08/1963

Bench

Gajendragadkar, P.B., Subbarao, K., Wanchoo, K.N., Ayyangar, N. Rajagopala, Mudholkar, J.R.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The appeal was recorded by C. D. Govinda Rao, in the Mysore High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. C.D. Govinda Rao needed by that appeal, that a writ of quo warranto ought to be given, to call upon Anniah Gowda to show the authority under which he had the position of a Research Reader in English in the Central College, Bangalore. It was additionally implored that a writ of mandamus is allowed calling upon the University of Mysore to choose him as the Research Reader.

There were sure capabilities to be selected as the exploration peruser. The capabilities are:

1. A First or High Second Class Master’s Degree of an Indian University of an identical the capability of a Foreign University in the subject concerned;
2. A Research Degree of a Doctorate Standard or distributed work of an elevated requirement;
3. Ordinarily, a decade (at the very least five years regardless) experience of showing post-graduate classes and directing exploration on account of Professors and no less than five years’ insight of showing degree classes and free examination on account of Readers;
4. The information on the local language Kannada is considered as an alluring qualification. Inclination will be given to up-and-comers who have had insight in educating and association of examination and have additionally accomplished progressed research work (1). According to him, the arrangement of Anniah Gowda to the post of Research Reader was unlawful notwithstanding the endorsed capabilities and that he was able to be named to that post.

Hence, he needed that the arrangement of Anniah Gowda ought to be subdued. He in this way requested a writ to guide the University to designate him in that post.

ISSUES RAISED

Whether writs of mandamus and quo warranto can be given by the court?

DISPUTES RAISED

Mr. S. K. Venkataranga Iyengar, for the respondent, battled that the arrangement of Anniah Gowda was made in repudiation of the legal principles and statutes outlined by the college. He endeavored to contend that he had alluded to the legal principles and mandates in the High Court, in any case, sadly, the equivalent had not been referenced or examined in the judgment.

The court had painstakingly viewed as the oaths documented by both the gatherings in the current procedures and it had no delay in holding that at no stage did it seem to have been encouraged by the respondent under the watchful eye of the High Court that the sickness in the arrangement of Anniah Gowda continued from the way that the legal standards and laws made by the university had been contradicted.

The testimony documented by the respondent on the side of his request just portrayed the arrangement of Anniah Gowda as being illicit, and altogether added that the said arrangement and the disappointment the University to designate the respondent, were unlawful even with the endorsed capabilities, and these capabilities in the setting without a doubt alluded to the capabilities distributed in the warning by which the significant post had been promoted.

The court reviewed the four capabilities endorsed by the warning. The last one which connected with the information on the Kannada language was discovered not to be in question and was avoided concerning thought. The primary capability was that the candidate should have a First or a high Second-Class Master’s Degree of an Indian University or a comparable capability of an unfamiliar University in the subject concerned. Anniah Gowda got 50.2 percent marks in his Master’s Degree assessment.

It was encouraged by the respondent under the steady gaze of the High Court that when 50% is the base needed for getting a second class, it would be inactive to propose that an applicant, who acquires 50.2 percent, has gotten a high Second-Class Master’s Degree, thus the respondent argued that the main condition had not been fulfilled by the Anniah Gowda. The High Court has maintained this request. As to the subsequent capability, apparently, Anniah Gowda has gotten a degree of Master of Arts of the University of Durham. The High Court has held that as to this capability, assuming the Board took the view that the Gowda fulfilled that capability, it would not be only for the Court to vary from the assessment. At the end of the day, the High Court didn’t make a finding for the respondent concerning capability No. 2.

As to the third capability, the matter seems to have been bantered finally under the steady gaze of the High Court. The proof was driven by both the gatherings and the respondent genuinely questioning the case made by both the appellants that Gowda fulfilled the trial of five years’ insight of showing Degree classes. The High Court inspected this proof and eventually arrived at the resolution that however the material cited by the appellants on this point was inadmissible, it couldn’t make a finding for the respondent. In this association, the High Court has seriously condemned the direction of Anniah Gowda to which we will allude later.

Consequently, significantly the High Court chose to subdue the arrangement of Gowda on the ground that it was plain that he didn’t fulfill the main capability. In this association, the High Court has additionally condemned the report made by the Board and has seen that the Members of the Board didn’t seem to have applied their brains to the inquiry which they were called upon to consider.

In managing the case introduced before it by the respondent, the High Court had condemned the report made by the Board and had seen that the conditions unveiled by the report made it hard for the High Court to treat the suggestions made by the specialists with the regard that they by and large merit. Sheets of Appointments are assigned by the Universities and when suggestions made by them and the arrangements following on them, are tested under the steady gaze of courts, typically the court should do whatever it takes not to obstruct the feelings communicated by the specialists. There is no charge about mala fide against the specialists who established the current Board.

The analysis made by the High Court against the report made by the Board implied that the High Court believed that the Board was in the place of a chief power, giving a leader fiat, or was behaving like a semi-legal counsel, concluding questions alluded to it for its choices. In managing objections made by residents concerning arrangements made by scholastic bodies, similar to the Universities, such a methodology would not be sensible or suitable.

Indeed, in giving the writ, the High Court has mentioned a specific observable fact that shows that the High Court applied tests that could authentically be applied on account of the writ of certiorari. In the judgment, it has been seen that the blunder for this situation is without a doubt a manifest mistake. That is a thought which is more pertinent and applicable in a system for a writ of certiorari.

The High Court ought to have considered the issue of whether the arrangement made by the Chancellor was against any legal or restricting guideline or mandate. In doing as such, the High Court ought to have displayed due respect to the assessment communicated by the Board and its proposals which the Chancellor has acted. In this association, the High Court had neglected to see one extremely critical truth that when the Board considered the cases of the individual candidates, it inspected them cautiously and arrived at the resolution that not a single one of them should have been delegated as a Professor in the University.

These proposals made by the Board show that they considered the applicable factors cautiously and eventually reached the resolution that Anniah Gowda ought to be suggested for the post of Reader. Hence, the court fulfilled that the analysis made by the High Court against the Board and its considerations isn’t legitimized.

JUDGMENT

The requests were permitted and the request passed by the High Court was saved. The writ request recorded by the respondent was excused with costs all through. It was held that there will be one bunch of hearing charges in both the requests documented by the two appellants.

CASE COMMENT

The writ of quo warranto continuing assistance in managing the cost of a legal cure by which any individual, who holds a free considerable public office or establishment or freedom, is called upon to show by what right he holds the said office, establishment or freedom, so his title to it could still up in the air, and if the finding is that the holder of the workplace has no title, he would be removed from that office by legal request.

This truly intends that at the end of the day, by the technique of quo warranto, the legal executive is provided with the ability to control the leader from arranging public office against the endorsed law. It likewise assists with shielding a resident from being denied of public office to which he has a right. These procedures likewise will quite often shield people in general from usurpers of public office, who may be permitted to proceed either with the intrigue of the
Executive or because of its indifference.

It will, accordingly, be seen that an individual needs to fulfill the court, that the work being referred to is a public office and is held by a usurper without legitimate authority before the person can adequately guarantee a writ of quo warranto. He additionally needs to demonstrate that it would unavoidably prompt the inquiry regarding whether the arrangement of the supposed usurper has been made as per law or not.

Written by Sara Agrawal student at Sinhgad Law College, Pune.

Case number

Criminal Appeal No. 195 of 1960

Equivalent citation

AIR 1962 SC 605

Bench

Hon’ble Justice K. Subba Rao.

Date of Judgement

November 24, 1961.

Relevant Act(s)

The “Evidence Act, 1872”; the “Indian Penal Code, 1860”.

Facts of the case

K.M. Nanavati is the petitioner. He was an Indian naval Officer then. He was married in the year 1949, to Sylvia in England. They also had three children and had shifted to Bombay, after residing in a number of places. Prem Bhagwan Ahuja was a business who also resided in Bombay along with his sister. He had a business in automobiles. Nanavatis were introduced to the Ahujas through some common friends, the Agniks. Prem Ahuja was not married. The petitioner used to stay out of the station most of the time due to his profession. In his absence, Ahuja and Sylvia became friends, and soon she fell in love with him. This resulted in an illicit relationship between both of them. After a certain period of time, Sylvia began doubting Prem and felt that he would not get married to her. Hence, in 1959, on April 27th, Sylvia confessed to Nanavati about her love for Prem Ahuja. Nanavati was infuriated. He went to his naval base to take a semi-automatic pistol along with six cartridges, on a false pretext. He then arrived at Ahuja’s place, went to his bedroom, and asked him if he is ready to marry Sylvia and take responsibility for the children. Prem denied, as a result of which Nanavati shot him thrice and he died on spot. After this whole course of events, he surrendered himself to the police. As a result, he got arrested. He was committed to the Sessions under the charges of “Section 302” as well as “Section 304” of the “Indian Penal Code”. He was declared not guilty then by the jury by 8:1. The sessions judge disagreed with the jury’s decision, and under “Section 307” of the CrPC submitted the case in the Bombay High Court.

Issues

1. Whether the Sessions Judge did not have jurisdiction to exercise “Section 307” of the CrPC?
2. Whether the act committed can be considered as an act done in a “heated moment”?
3. Was there any kind of misdirection?

Arguments

Arguments made by the petitioner:
The counsel first mentioned that Nanavati wanted to kill himself. Sylvia calmed him down. Also, it was claimed that Nanavati had gone to Ahuja’s place just to ask him if he would get married to Sylvia or not. While taking the pistol and cartridges from the base, Nanavati told the ship authorities that since he would travel at night, he needed the pistol for his own safety; and he carried it in an envelope. In reality, he was going to shoot himself and not Ahuja.
When Nanavati arrived at Ahuja’s flat, he asked him if he would marry Sylvia, to which Ahuja denied blatantly. A heated argument took place, and Nanavati had just threatened to thrash Ahuja. He then kept the pistol on a table. Ahuja tried to grab the pistol but failed. In the meantime, the argument escalated between two men. Accidentally shots got fired in the scuffle and killed Prem Ahuja. Hence, Nanavati did not kill him intentionally, and it was not premeditated at all. Even if any crime was committed by Nanavati, it would not be murder and could amount to just culpable homicide.

Arguments made by the respondent:
The counsel for the respondent first mentioned that Ahuja had just come out of the washroom and was still in a towel when Nanavati entered. Therefore, there was no brawl between the two, since the towel did not fall off. Sylvia mentioned that they went to the movies, and Nanavati had dropped them. This shows that he was in a calm mind and was not enraged then. Thus, there was no chance of any “sudden provocation”. It was not an accident, because Ahuja’s sister was in the other room and Nanavati did not bother to inform her about the mishap. Instead, he just left.

Judgement

Judgement of the Bombay High Court:
The case came to the Bombay High Court since the Sessions Judge did not agree to the jury’s decision in the Sessions court where Nanavati was declared not guilty. The case was heard by Hon’ble Justice Jaishanker Manilal Shelat, and Hon’ble Justice Naik. They decided that Nanavati should be convicted under “Section 302” of the “Indian Penal Code”, and gave the sentence of life imprisonment. The court mentioned that it was unreasonable on the jury’s part in the Sessions Court to declare Nanavati not guilty. No case was made to reduce the intensity of the event, i.e., from murder to culpable homicide.

Judgement of the Supreme Court:
The Supreme Court concluded that the concept of “suddenness” was not present in this case. This is because when Sylvia confessed to her illicit relationship with Nanavati, it was serious and grave, but Prem Ahuja was not present on the scene. According to the Hon’ble Supreme Court, since around three hours gap was present between the confession of the wife and the incident, Nanavati had enough time to cool down. Hence, the Apex Court decided in favour of the Bombay High Court’s decision of sentencing the petitioner to life imprisonment. The Court concluded that it was not an act of “grave and sudden provocation”. The Court decided that it was the judge’s duty to instruct the jury as to the legal ramifications. As per the court, the jury was misled due to the judge, which led to an unreasonable judgement by the jury. It was also held by the Court that the Sessions Judge did have jurisdiction to exercise “Section 307” of the CrPC.

Conclusion

This is an important case where the topic of “grave and sudden provocation” was discussed. This case also attracted huge media attention then. The whole nation was shocked by such a “crime of passion”. This case showed that no matter what position an individual holds in society, they would be punished by the law if they commit something unlawful. Another important part of this case was the jury trials. The jury trials were soon discontinued by the Government after this case, due to chances of such misled judgements.

This article is written by Aaratrika Bal student at National Law University Odisha.

CASE NUMBER:

Suit number 597 of 1961

EQUIVALENT CITATION:

AIR 1964 CAL 239

BENCH:

Single judge bench, Judge Bijayesh Mukherji presiding.

DECIDED ON:

Friday, 10^th January 1964

RELEVANT ACT/SECTION:

1. Section 68 of the Partnership Act, 1932
2. Section 28 of the Partnership Act, 1932
3. Section 67 of Evidence Act, 1872
4. Section 114 A of Evidence Act, 1872
5. Order 14 of the Procedure Code

BRIEF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

Shree Hanuman Transport Company (hereafter referred to as Transport Company) was a firm involved in the shipment business. Snow White Food Product Company Ltd (hereafter referred to as Snow White) contracted the Transport Company for the shipment of two products, namely refined groundnut oil and Balloon brand vegetable product, to Raiganj and Islampur in the district of West Dinajpur. The said delivery was to take place on 20^th April 1960. According to the facts of the case presented, the Transport Company, for the benefit of Snow White, had insured the goods to be delivered with an insurance company bearing the name of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (hereafter referred to as the Insurance Company). The complaint filed by Snow White Company claims that while the goods were in transit, the goods were tampered with and damaged by the partners of the Transport Company, namely Sohanlal Bagla and Madanlal Poddar, also the Insurance Company. The plaintiff claimed damages of sixteen thousand for the goods to be delivered to Islampur and a subsequent amount of rupees nine hundred and thirty-one for the goods to be transported to Raiganj. This comes to a total of rupees seventeen thousand five hundred and thirty-one. Out of this, the Transport Company had already paid the plaintiff rupees four thousand and five hundred. Snow White Food Product Company Ltd brought this suit to recover the remaining damages of Rs 13031.

ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT:

The issues in question before the Hon’ble Court were:

1. Whether Sohanlal Bagla (first defendant) was ever a partner of Shree Hanuman Transport Company (third defendant)?
2. Whether Shree Hanuman Transport Company had insured the goods delivered to Snow White Food Products Ltd. from the New India Assurance Co. Ltd for the plaintiff’s benefit (Snow White Food Products Ltd.)?
3. Whether the consignment called in question were damaged or converted to benefit their use by the defendants when the goods were in transit?
4. Whether New India Assurance Co. Ltd (fourth defendant) is liable to pay the amount of the claim to Snow White Food Products Ltd.?
5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any reliefs, and if so, then what reliefs must be granted?

RATIO OF THE CASE:

Sohanlal presented certain evidences before the Court sufficient enough to prove that he was not a partner of Shree Hanuman Transport Co. Ltd. To corroborate Sohanlal’s statements in the Register of firm’s entries, Madanlal Poddar and Babulal Saraogl were mentioned as the partners of the Transport Company. Against this evidence, Snow White put before the Court that although the terms on paper were maybe different, Sohanlal, through his various actions, has provided a reasonable reason for Snow White to believe him to be a partner of the Transport Company. It presented before the Court, evidence of official communication between Snow White and the Transport Company through letters signed by Sohanlal on behalf of the firm. Not only this but also the surveyor of the Insurance Company, on instructions from Sohanlal, had sold the damaged good to the highest bidder and returned the proceeds of the sale (Rs 11556) to Sohanlal. Thus, this gives reasonable reason for Snow White to believe him to be a partner of the Transport Company, making him liable to pay for the loss suffered due to the non-delivery of goods.

DECISION OF THE COURT:

After careful consideration of the facts of the said case and taking into account the pieces of evidence and witnesses presented, the Calcutta High Court concluded that Sohanlal had presented himself as a partner when dealings were taking place between the Transport Company and Snow White Food Product Company Ltd. He had also signed documents it the capacity of a partner and thus is qualified as a partner by holding out of the Transport Company. Therefore he was made liable to pay the remaining amount of the claim to Snow White Food Product Company Ltd.

This case analysis is provided by Debasmita Nandi, a first year law student at CHRIST (DEEMED TO BE UNIVERSITY), LAVASA.

Edited by- Deeksha Arora

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