Aureate Advocates and Solicitors, a law firm based in Defence Colony, New Delhi, is inviting applications for internships for April and May. The work would primarily be focused on tax and commercial laws.
Internship Duration
April and May
Eligibility
Position only available for students 2nd year and above students
The work is predominantly taxation based so interest in taxation is a must.
Location
Delhi
Application Procedure
Interested candidates may apply at information@aureatechambers.com . Share your CV along with a writing sample of a maximum of two pages. Application without writing sample will not be entertained.
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Disclaimer: All information posted by us on Lexpeeps is true to our knowledge. But still, it is suggested that you check and confirm things on your level.
For regular updates on more opportunities, we can catch up at-
It was held by the Delhi High Court in the case of M/S THE COMMERICAL ELECTRIC WORKS & ORS VS SHARDA GUPTA that the Delhi High Court on April 06, while not changing the decision of Trial Court for giving landlady property to his grandson for bona fide needs. Because of the dicta of the Supreme Court, this Court is of the view that the issues raised by the Petitioner herein do not merit any interference and the finding of the Trial court does not suffer from any infirmity. The petition of the petitioner is dismissed by the Hon’ble High Court.
FACTS
The judgment is made by the learned Single Judge bench on 06 April 2023. The judgment is given by “HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA”. This revision petition has been filed by the Petitioners, tenants, assailing the eviction order dated 23.03.2019, passed by the Additional Rent Controller, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi (‘Trial Court’), in Eviction Petition No. E-150/16 (New No. 15/17).
The Respondent, the landlady, is stated to be the owner of the entire property bearing No. 1814-1815, ward No. IV, Chandni Chowk, Delhi (‘subject property’) which comprises a Ground Floor (‘GF’), Mezzanine Floor, First Floor (‘FF’), Second Floor (‘SF’), and Third Floor (‘TF’).
The Respondent filed the eviction petition for recovery of the commercial premises being the ground floor, mezzanine floor, and third floor of property No. 1814-1815, ward No. IV, Chandni Chowk, Delhi (‘tenanted premises’) located in the subject property. The eviction petition was filed by the landlady on the plea that she has a bona fide need for her grandson i.e., Mr. Kanishk Gupta, who has recently graduated and wants to establish, run and operate his own business or join the landlady in her existing business and expand the said business, from the tenanted premises. It was asserted that there is no other commercial property owned by the landlady. However, before this Court, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners has restricted his oral submissions to assail the findings concerning bona fide need on the plea that FF and SF of the subject property are lying vacant and are therefore, available to the landlady for the alleged business of her grandson. The Trial Court after considering the submissions of the parties held that the Respondent is the owner as well as landlady in respect of the tenanted premises. The Trial Court further held that the tenanted premises are bona fide and required for the business of the grandson. The Trial Court rejected the submission of the Petitioners herein that the landlady has suitable alternative accommodation on the FF and SF of the subject property. The Trial Court relied upon the photographs placed on record to opine that the FF and SF are in a dilapidated condition. The Trial Court, further, held that there is no parity between commercial premises located on the ground floor vis-à-vis upper floors. In light of the aforesaid facts and findings, the Trial Court rejected the application seeking leave to defend and passed the impugned eviction order.
PETITIONER CONTENTION
The petitioner’s counsel states that the tenanted premises are not bona fide required by the Respondent, landlady, since her grandson, for whose bona fide need the tenanted premises are required, is working as a relationship manager in the HDFC Bank branch at A-9, Lajpat Nagar-4, New Delhi.
Petitioner states that the FF and SF of the subject property were recovered by the Respondent, landlady, in May 2013, in an eviction petition (E106/13/09) filed by her under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. In this regard, he has placed on record the electricity bill issued by BSES Yamuna Power Limited (‘BSES’) for the meters installed on the said floors, to show the negligible consumption of electricity in the said premises.
He relies upon the Petitioners’ averments recorded in the order dated 06.09.2019 passed by this Court, whilst issuing notice in the present petition. Petitioner states that the non-use of the FF and SF by the Respondent belies the plea of bona fide need and the Trial Court erred in dismissing the leave to defend the application.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION
In reply, learned counsel for the Respondent, the landlady, states that currently, both, the Respondent’s son i.e., Mr. Manish Gupta and grandson i.e., Mr. Kanishk Gupta are unemployed. Both the grandson was employed before but they leave their job for operating or running the business.
He states that the landlady along with her daughter-in-law i.e., Ms. Madhu Gupta had started the business of sale of women’s wear under the name and style of ‘Kanishk Sarees’ in the year 2014, from the FF of the subject property. He states that however, the said business has failed as customers are unwilling to come to FF in the subject property. However, FF and SF are unsuitable for new businesses.
He states that the Petitioners herein have abused the procedural safeguards to delay the hearing in the present revision proceedings. He states that even during the adjudication of the eviction petition, though the leave to defend application was filed, however, a copy of the same was not provided to the landlady for almost 3 years.
COURT’S DECISION
The Hon’ble High Court observed that the decision of the Trial Court was correct and there is no need to change or revision of that judgment. So, the Hon’ble High Court gives the judgment in the favour of Respondent. And the Hon’ble High Court referred the case which is related to this matter as “Abid-ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30”[2].
The subject eviction petition was filed much later on 26.12.2016 and for the bona fide need of the grandson, which in this opinion of this Court has rightly upheld by the Trial Court. The Supreme Court in the case of Abid-ul-Islam (Supra) has after discussing the law held that the scope of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited.
Accordingly, because of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds no merit in this revision petition, which is hereby dismissed and the eviction order dated 23.03.2019 is upheld. The pending applications are disposed of. The interim order dated 06.09.2019 is hereby vacated. The Respondent is at liberty to proceed with the execution of the eviction order and the Petitioners will be liable to continue to pay the use and occupation charges at Rs. 15,000/- per month, until the handing over of the possession to the Respondent.
The recent judgement of Shri Mukund Bhatia vs State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) & ORS is concerned with the grant of Letters of Administration / Probate of the Will in respect of the immovable properties left behind by the Paternal Aunt of the petitioner.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND:
The Paternal Aunt of the petitioner, Kumari Lajja Bhatia (hereinafter referred to as “The Testatrix”) was a permanent resident of 17/14, Old Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi – 110060. She expired as a spinster, leaving behind her nephew, petitioner herein; her brother, respondent no.2 herein; the wife and two sons of her pre-deceased brother, impleaded as respondent no.3 herein; and her sister, respondent no.4 herein.
The above-mentioned property acquired by Testatrix was a self-acquired property of her late father and by the virtue of the Will executed by him; the said property was bequeathed to the Testatrix. Thereafter, upon the death of the Testatrix, the said property has devolved upon the petitioner as per the Will, dated 15.01.2020, executed by her.
During her lifetime, she also purchased other immovable property in Pitampura, Delhi with a Conveyance deed dated 29.07.2004. As per the terms of the subject Will, the property is to be divided in the following manner:-
70% share of the said property shall devolve upon the petitioner;
The remaining 30% share shall devolve upon Respondent No. 5 which is a religious trust.
Therefore, the present petition has been filed in the court with reference to sections 276 and 278 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 seeking the Probate of Will executed by the Testatrix in respect of the immovable properties left behind by her.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:
The learned counsel for the petitioner alleged that during her lifetime she had executed the subject Will dated 15.01.2020 in the presence of two attesting witnesses namely Shri Vijay Vasandani and Shri Ashok Pohuja.
The learned counsel also provides the details of the moveable assets in the form of fixed deposits, PPF and shares left behind by the Testatrix.
They further contended that as per the affidavit of service filed by the petitioner, Respondent Nos. 3 to 5 were duly served. However, despite service, they failed to appear. Thereby, their right to file objections has been closed by the learned Joint Registrar (Judicial).
The learned counsel further states that respondent no.2 has filed an affidavit giving his ‘No Objection’ for the transfer of property in favour of the petitioner as per the Will dated 15.01.2020.
Therefore the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that this is an uncontended case.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:
The petition is not contested by Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 3 to 5 has failed to appear despite service.
JUDGEMENT:
The Delhi HC in its judgement relied upon sec 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which provides that where a document is required by the law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until at least one attesting witness has been called for proving its execution. In the present case, the two attesting witnesses approved that Late Kumari Lajja Bhatia had signed the Will in their presence. They further stated that the subject Will was executed by her voluntarily and when she was in sound disposing of mind. Hence, the requirements of Section 68 of the Act were fulfilled.
Apart from this, a citation was also directed to be published in two daily newspapers in the NCT of Delhi, Pune, Mumbai and Jaipur. No Objection has been received from any third person to grant Probate of Will dated 15.01.2020 in favour of the petitioner.
Considering all these facts, Delhi HC in this particular case held that the unchallenged and rebutted testimony of the petitioner which is supported by the testimony of the two attesting witnesses proves the authenticity of the Will dated 15.01.2020. Thereby, the petitioner being the nephew and beneficiary is entitled to the Probate of Will.
In a landmark decision case Income Tax Officer vs Vikram Sujitkumar Bhatia, the Supreme Court of India held that the Assessing officer under the Income Tax Act 1961 shall be authorized to initiate proceedings under Section 153C of the Act even against person non-searched persons, and the same shall have a retrospective effect for searches were conducted before the amendment in 2015.
FACTS:
On 11.09.2012, the original writ petitioner filed his Return of Income for the Assessment Year (A.Y.) 2012-13, declaring a total income of around 44 Lakhs as business income from a partnership firm and other income. A notice dated 08.02.2018 was issued by the Income Tax Assessing Officer to begin proceedings against the assessee under Section 153C of the Act, 1961. In a letter dated 01.05.2018, the assessee submitted his response and his income tax return, and the assessed officer received it to his satisfaction. Although no evidence was found against the petitioner, the assessing officer seized a hard disc containing an Excel sheet containing data from the searched person, which included references to the petitioner’s name.
The writ petitioner objected to the actions taken following Section 153C of the Income-Tax Act of 1962, claiming that the requirement that any money, bullion, jewelry, or other valuable item or thing be “belongs or belong to” a person other than the searched child was not met. In response to a writ petition submitted by the petitioner, the Gujarat High Court ruled that Section 153C of the Act of 1961 is a mechanism for determining the assessee’s income who is on search by authorities.
The Assessment Officer was satisfied with the evidence and directed the court to summon an assessee if books of account or documents about him or containing information about him were found during the search. However, the Amendment Act of 2015 went into effect, and petitioners who were not included during the search were now sought to be included because the satisfaction notes and notices under the Income Tax Act of 1961 were issued after the amendment went into effect. The Gujarat High Court’s decision to invalidate the notice under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act 1961 was challenged by the Income Tax Department in the current set of appeals and a Special Leave petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
The primary issue for the Apex Court to address was whether the Finance Act of 2015’s amendment to Section 153C of the Income Tax Act of 1961 would apply to searches conducted according to Section 132 of the Act of 1961 before 01.06.2015, the amendment’s effective date.
CONTENTIONS:
Appellant’s Contentions:
When arguing against the current appeals, the attorney representing the assesses vehemently asserted that the point of applicability of the existing law in search cases specifically, whether Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, as amended with effect from 01.06.2015 would apply to cases where the search is initiated before that date—was the subject of contention in the current group of appeals. It is further argued on behalf of the respective assessees that the Department’s position—that Section 153C of the Act, 1961 is a procedural and machinery provision—means that the amendment, even though it took effect on June 1, 2015, is retroactive and, as a result, applies to situations in which searches were conducted before the amendment but notices under Section 153C of the Act, 1961 were issued after the amendment.
Respondent Contentions:
The Additional Solicitor General of India appearing for the respondent submitted that the concerned amendment in Section 153C was necessary given the observation made by the Delhi High Court in the case of PepsiCo India Holdings Private Limited v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, wherein the High Court observed that the words “belong or belong to” should not be confused with the words “relates to or refers to,” making the former much narrower than the latter. Due to this, the court determined that the provision could only be used if the documents or other materials “belong” to a third party (other than the searched person).
JUDGEMENT:
Relying on the Delhi High Court in the case PepsiCo India Ltd. vs Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (2014) had given a restrictive meaning to the words “belong/belongs, the Supreme Court held that Section I53C of the Finance Act of 2015 was amended to replace the words with “pertain/pertains to.” It is incorrect to claim that a document “belongs” to someone simply because copies of it were taken from them because the originals were with someone else.
The Supreme Court further observed that the amendment to Section 153C of the Act, 1961 without the inclusion of incriminating materials in the form of books of account or documents or assets relating to them from the premises of the searched person may not be subjected to the proceedings under Section153C solely on the ground that the search was conducted before the amendment is accepted. The Court must avoid any interpretation that might undermine the law’s or statute’s fundamental goals and purposes. The judgment stated that the amendment to Section 153C of the Income Tax Act would not apply to searches conducted under Section 132 of the Income Tax Act before 01.06.2015, the amendment’s effective date, which is in the revenue’s favor and against the assesses.
Interest was granted to the petitioners in the case of ROSHANBI AZIZ MOTIWALA THROUGH POA MR. ILIYAS AZIZ MOTIWALA AND ORS. Vs THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY AND DEPUTY COLLECTOR AND ORS. Decided on 06-04-2023.
FACTS:
The properties of the petitioners in the present case were acquired by the Competent Authorities. It was contended by the petitioners that the authorities passed an order under section 3(G) of the national highways act dated 15th July 2017 that the compensation awarded to the petitioners according to their building structure will be for an amount of Rs. 1,08,92,995/-. The petitioners contended that the compensation amount which was paid had not been added with the interest on the amount determined by the Competent Authority under the Award from the date of declaration of the Award till the date of payment of the amount of compensation. A similar claim was rejected by the Competent Authority and the petitioners moved to the high court for redressal under Article 226 of the Indian constitution.
APPELLANT’S CONTENTION:
Petitioners claimed they are entitled to interest on the sum given under the Award from the date of the Award until the date of payment. They also claimed that the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement (Removal of Difficulties) Order dated August 28, 2015, which went into effect on September 1, 2015, provided that the provisions of The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement Act, 2013 (“the said Act of 2013”) relating to the determination of compensation. They further contended that it was the duty of the competent authority to disperse the compensation amount after passing the reward and the competent authority has failed to do the same. Petitioners also stated the case of Tarsem Singh, in which the apex court held that Sections 23(1-A) and (2) of the Land Acquisitions Act relating to Solatium and interest, as well as Section 28 in which interest is payable this provision will also apply to any acquisition made under the 1956 Act.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:
The respondent contended the notice to collect the reward to both the petitioner was issued and the petitioner by their will claimed the award in February/March 2015 and the amount was given to them during that time only. The competent authority also contended that after the award was issued the valuation of the property can’t be done therefore the award concerning structure was not passed. They stated that the supplementary compensation amount was deposited in the petitioner’s account as per the letter issued by NHAI dated 27, September 2017 and the notice for the same was issued on 28th September 2017. They claimed the petitioner is provided with the full compensation of their land therefore they are not liable to pay any interest.
JUDGEMENT:
The Bombay High Court in this case held that the claims made by the competent authority of issuing notices to both the petitioners are not maintainable in the court as there is no proof for the same. There was no material produced in the court to back up the claim. The court also held that the question here is not of providing the actual compensation, but rather providing the interest for the delay of providing the compensation by the competent authority. If there is a delay in the actual payment of compensation amount from the date of respective Awards in Petition, the Petitioners would, in our opinion, be entitled to interest from the date of respective Awards. Award valid till the date of payment. In light of the facts and circumstances of both Writ Petition and for the reasons stated above, it would be necessary to direct the Respondents to pay the Petitioners interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of award until the date of actual payment.
THE STATE OF M.P.& ORS. VS. ASHUNA SHIKSHA EVAN VIKAS SAMITY, where the plaintiff established an old age home and the collector in Bhopal was required to cover operational costs but failed to THE SAME.
FACTS:
For the benefit of the impoverished and the needy, the plaintiff founded one old age home, which was in operation until 1992. 90% of the operational costs had to be covered by the State and were paid through the Collector. The institution’s audit had to be done, and that was the responsibility of Madhya Pradesh’s Director/Commissioner of Social Welfare. The Social Welfare Department conducted an audit on 28 February 1993, and on 12 August 1994, the Collector approved the sum of Rs. 3,54,763 that should be paid to the plaintiff institution. The plaintiff was advised by defendant No. 1 that the Collector would be responsible for paying the outstanding balance. Nevertheless, the collector in Bhopal did not pay the sum.
PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTION:
As a result, the plaintiff filed a writ petition before the High Court, which was dismissed with the instruction that, upon the provision of proof, the Collector, Bhopal, decide within six months. The first defendant then expressed several concerns in a letter dated August 16, 1998. As a result, a lawsuit seeking a declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to the sum specified in a letter dated 12-8- 1994 was filed, together with a court fee of Rs. 50.
DEFENDANT’S CONTENTION:
The defendants submitted their written statement and claimed that the plaintiff had operated the senior living facility with major irregularities. When an investigation was carried out by the High Court’s judgment, the old age home was ordered to be closed by order dated January 28, 1994. Hence, it was requested that the lawsuit be dismissed.
JUDGEMENT:
A determination that the Respondent/Plaintiff was entitled to payment of the amount specified in the letter dated 12-8-1994, plus interest, was sought in the lawsuit. In reality, the plaintiff had brought the lawsuit to recover Rs. 3,74,763/- but by using wordplay, he claimed that the letter from 12-8-1994 had been enforced. In actuality, the lawsuit in question involved money. As a result, the plaintiff was required to pay court fees on the sum specified in the letter dated 22-8-1994, or Rs. 3,74,763/-, by Section 7(i) of the Court Fee Act. A stipulated court charge of Rs. 50 was nonetheless paid. As a result, neither the suit’s proper value nor the appropriate court fee was paid.
The Collector, Bhopal had only said that payment of the amount of Rs. 3,74,763/- is under the proposal in the letter dated 12-8-1994, Ex. P. The Collector made no admission of culpability.
Plaintiff’s witness Dr. D.B. Saxena (P.W.1) made an appearance. He has not specified why he appeared as a witness or in what capacity. He has not made it clear whether he holds office at the suing institution. He has ‘t specifically testified as to how the plaintiff was entitled to the sum in question. Moreover, he has not provided any resolution adopted by the Society to file the lawsuit.
This Court, therefore, believes that the plaintiff has failed to establish its entitlement to the sum of Rs. 3,74,763/-.
As a result, the judgment and decree issued by the first additional district judge in Bhopal on April 28, 1999, in Civil Action No. 27-A/1998 are therefore reversed.
The appeal is granted because it is successful. Be drafted up a decree appropriately.
Mr. Katiyar practices as a lawyer in Supreme Court, High Court, and District Courts and has filed cases in Supreme Court, High Court, and District Courts. He has worked with Pragyan Pradeep Sharma Sir and, while working with him, working on a variety of matters, majorly consumer disputes, company disputes, and writs. Has worked with Lloyd and Johnson Advocates and Consultants and worked majorly on shipping law, matrimonial disputes, and other legal aspects.
Requirements
Looking to hire an associate with prior experience working in National Green Tribunal.
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Jain & Partners are looking for Patent Associate for their law firm in Delhi.
About the Organization
JAIN & PARTNERS is an IPR & Corporate law consultancy firm. It provides services to domestic companies, start-ups and individuals for their overseas investment and also to foreign companies and individuals for their investment in India in all respects that include Corporate Law, Intellectual Property Law, Foreign Exchange Management Law, Import Export Law and Taxation Law etc. Besides a vibrant and enthusiastic team of young professionals with good academic and practice backgrounds, our team of professionals consists of persons with a diverse and rich experience like Company Secretaries, Chartered Accountants, M.B.As, B.Scs, M.Scs and Lawyers.
Joining
At the earliest
Job Profile
The responsibilities will include preparing and filing patent applications and drafting replies to the Examination reports/ Conducting Patent Searches etc.
Salary
As per Industry Standards
Eligibility
The candidate must be enrolled in BSC. +LLB course and should possess minimum experience of 6 Months- 1 year in Patents.
Office Location
1001, Vikrant Tower, Rajendra Place, New Delhi-110008
Disclaimer: All information posted by us on Lexpeeps is true to our knowledge. But still, it is suggested that you check and confirm things on your level.
For regular updates on more opportunities, we can catch up at-
Secularism is embedded in the roots of the Hindustani Soil since Ancient History. Whereas Sanatan Dharma is believed to trace its origin in the Indian Nation, Islam was prevalent in the country by the late 8th century after the invasion of Mohd Bin Qasim.
With building Muslim invasions and the Emerging Delhi Sultanate, Islam became an integral part of Indian Society. The evolution of societies took place with Khalijis, Tughlaqs, Lodhis and Mughals ruling India for over 700 years. The ethnic culture shifts and dictatorial rule of the Muslim Invaders were very prevalent reasons for the spread of Islam in the Country. Where History saw rulers like Akbar and Iltutmish stand up for secularism and give equal respect to all religions, hundreds plundered the temples and disrespected the religion.
Hindus and Muslims, the two majorly populated religions of India have been at continuous trifle and violent upsurge throughout the years. With the British ruling India for over 200 years and implementing their ‘Divide and Rule Policy’, it never got better for the people of both communities. At some point, it was the lawmakers and the cognitive Individuals from the Indian democracy who felt the need to bring in some special laws for the Muslims, to respect their religious practices and avoid the futuristic feuds.
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act of 1937[1], is just not another set of laws that enforce legality and order in our system, but also an identity that Muslims have owned for the past 8 decades. The detailed analysis stated below aims to bring out the various sources which have had a major role in shaping Islamic Laws. The sub-topics also feature the detailed History of Islamic Laws in India and their current situation in the Constitution.
History dating to the origin of Islamic Law in Hindustan
Islamic law has a long and rich history in India. The presence of Islam in India can be traced back to the 7th century when Arab traders started visiting the Indian subcontinent. Over time, Islam spread in India, and Muslim rulers established their kingdoms, which had a significant impact on the development of Islamic law in the country. You would have read it in the books of history or seen it in the movies about the laws like jazia, etc. Well, these were the foundations of Islamic Law.
Pre-Mughal Period
Before the arrival of the Mughals, Islamic law in India was largely based on the teachings of the Quran and the Sunnah. Islamic scholars in India studied and interpreted the Quranic principles and developed a legal system that was specific to India. This system was known as Fiqh, and it was based on the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence. During this period, the Indian subcontinent was ruled by various Muslim dynasties, including the Delhi Sultanate and the Bahmani Sultanate. These dynasties had their legal systems, which were based on Islamic principles.
Mughal Period
The Mughal period in India (1526-1858) was significant in the history of Islamic law in India. The Mughal emperors were patrons of Islamic scholarship, and they encouraged the development of Islamic law in the country.
During this period, Islamic scholars in India studied and interpreted the Quranic principles and developed a legal system that was specific to India. This system was known as Fatawa Alamgiri, and it was based on the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence. Fatawa Alamgiri was a compilation of legal opinions on various aspects of Islamic law, including marriage, divorce, inheritance, and succession.
British Period
The arrival of the British in India in the 18th century had a significant impact on Islamic law in the country. The British colonial government introduced secular laws that applied to all citizens, regardless of their religion. However, Muslims in India continued to follow their laws, which were based on Islamic principles.
The British government enacted the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act in 1937, which provided for the application of Islamic law to Muslims in India. The act recognized the rights of Muslim women to seek divorce and inherit property under certain conditions.
Post-Independence Period:
After India gained independence in 1947, the Indian government continued to recognize the importance of Islamic law in the lives of Muslims in the country. The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act continues to be in force, and Personal Laws continue to govern personal matters for Muslims in India.
In conclusion, the history of Indian Islamic laws is a long and rich one, dating back to the pre-Mughal period. Islamic law in India has been shaped by Islamic scholars over several centuries and is based on the teachings of the Quran and the Sunnah. The Mughal period was significant in the development of Islamic law in India, and the British period had a significant impact on the recognition of Islamic law in the country
Sources of The Islamic Laws Propagated All over the Nation
Islam is a comprehensive religion that guides its followers in every aspect of their lives. The sources of Islamic law, also known as Sharia, are the primary sources from which Muslims derive their religious guidance. The sources of these laws are dated back to the early 7th Century and are credible according to the followers of Islam. The apostles of this Religion have carried through these sources and a lot of them have been incarnated in the Laws that represent them. These sources include the Quran, the Sunnah, Ijma, andQiyas.
The Quran
The Quran is the primary and most important source of Islamic law. It is the holy book of Muslims that contains the teachings and guidance of Allah (SWT). The Quran is the word of God revealed to Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) through the angel Gabriel. It consists of 114 chapters or Surahs, each containing verses or Ayahs that provide guidance and direction to Muslims. The Quran covers a wide range of topics, including theology, ethics, morality, social norms, and legal matters. Muslims believe that the Quran is the final and complete revelation from God to mankind, and it is free from any error or contradiction. Quranic verses that deal with legal matters are known as Ahkam, and they provide the basis for Islamic jurisprudence.
The Sunnah
The Sunnah refers to the sayings, actions, and approvals of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). It is the second most important source of Islamic law. The Sunnah is recorded in the Hadith, which is a collection of narrations about the life and teachings of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). The Hadith contains the words of the Prophet (PBUH) as well as his actions and behaviour. Muslims consider the Sunnah to be a practical application of the Quranic teachings, and it provides a detailed explanation of the Quranic injunctions. The Sunnah is considered the primary source of Islamic law after the Quran.
Ijma
Ijma is the consensus of Islamic scholars on a particular issue. It refers to the collective agreement of the Muslim community on a particular matter. Ijma is considered the third most important source of Islamic law. It is based on the principle that the collective wisdom of the Muslim community is superior to that of an individual. Ijma is based on the Hadith that states: “My community will never agree on an error.” Therefore, when the Muslim community agrees on a particular issue, it becomes binding on all Muslims.
Qiyas
Qiyas refers to analogical reasoning in Islamic jurisprudence. It is the process of deducing the ruling on a particular matter based on a similar ruling in another matter. Qiyas is considered the fourth most important source of Islamic law. It is used when the Quran and Sunnah do not provide a direct ruling on a particular issue. Qiyas is based on the Hadith that states: “The likeness of things is the same as the likeness of what resembles it.“
The sources of Islamic law provide guidance and direction to Muslims in every aspect of their lives. The Quran and Sunnah are the primary sources of Islamic law, while Ijma and Qiyas are considered secondary sources. Islamic scholars use these sources to derive rulings on various issues, and they must ensure that these rulings are consistent with the teachings of Islam.
Features of The Indian Islamic Laws – The Unity in Diversity
Islamic law, also known as Sharia, is an integral part of the Indian legal system. Muslims in India are subject to Sharia laws, which govern various aspects of their lives. These laws have been shaped by Islamic scholars over several centuries and are based on the teachings of the Quran and the Sunnah. In this article, we will discuss the features of Indian Islamic laws in detail.
Personal Laws
Islamic laws in India govern personal matters such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and succession. These laws are known as Personal Laws and apply only to Muslims. Personal laws are based on the Quran and the Sunnah and are enforced by Sharia courts. Muslims in India have the right to opt for Personal Laws over the secular laws of the country, but they cannot opt for both. Section 2 and Section 4 of The Muslim Personal Law (Sharia) Application Act, 1937 deal with the personal Laws of Islamic Natives.
Article 44 of the Indian Constitution[2] provides for a uniform civil code for all citizens, regardless of their religion. However, the Indian government has not yet implemented a uniform civil code, and Personal Laws continue to govern personal matters for Muslims.
Marriage
Marriage is an important aspect of Islamic law, and it is considered a sacred bond between a man and a woman. Islamic law recognizes marriage as a contract between the two parties, and it is subject to certain conditions. The Quran states that marriage should be based on mutual love and respect, and it should be a means of finding peace and tranquillity in life. The age of marriage for girls is fixed at 18 years, and for boys, it is 21 years. Polygamy is allowed in Islam but is subject to certain conditions.
Section 3 of the Muslim Marriages Registration Act 1981[3], governs marriage and divorce for Muslims in India. The act provides for the registration of marriages and divorces and recognizes the right of Muslim women to seek divorce under certain conditions.
Divorce
Divorce is allowed in Islam, but it is considered a last resort. Islamic law recognizes several types of divorce, including Talaq, Khula, and Mubarak. Talaq is the most common type of divorce, and it is initiated by the husband. The Quran prescribes certain conditions for the validity of Talaq, and it also provides for the reconciliation of the parties before the divorce becomes final.
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939[4], provides for the regulation of Talaq, Khula, and Mubarak. The act also recognizes the right of Muslim women to seek divorce under certain conditions, such as cruelty, desertion, and impotence.
Inheritance
Inheritance is governed by Islamic law, and it is based on the Quranic principles of equity and justice. Islamic law recognizes the rights of all heirs, and it provides for the distribution of property according to a fixed formula. The Quranic formula for the distribution of property is based on the concept of shares, and it ensures that each heir receives a fair and just share of the property.
The provisions of the Indian Succession Act 1925[5] provide for the regulation of inheritance for Muslims in India. The act recognizes the rights of all heirs and provides for the distribution of property according to the Quranic formula.
In conclusion, Islamic law plays an important role in the lives of Muslims in India. Personal Laws govern personal matters such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and succession for Muslims. These laws are based on the Quranic principles of equity and justice and are enforced by Sharia courts.
The Muslim Personal Law (Sharia) Application Act, 1937, provides for the regulation of these matters and recognizes the rights of Muslim women to seek divorce and inherit property under certain conditions.
Befitting Conclusion to the Topic
Islamic Laws have been an integral part of the Indian Constitution since its very inception. The books of history have always shown us, the hostility that has prevailed between the people of the two prominent communities in India and how it has affected the Nation. The Kolkata riots of the 1930s and 1946, The Partition Riots of 1947, The Gujarat Riots of 2004 and many more have routed the Nation even after the existence of special laws for both communities. This can signify that there has been some ambiguity on the side of the public to comprehend these laws. After being drafted by the British, The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, of 1937has been amended time after time to bring out the necessary changes which were required. The abrogation and criminalisation of ‘Triple Talaq’ have been one of those key Legal Amendments that have proved that the Legal authorities stand for Humanity and not for the upliftment of cruel practices of any religion. Despite challenges and controversies, Islamic law continues to be an important part of the legal system in India, and it continues to evolve and adapt to changing social and cultural contexts. Overall, the sources and features of Islamic law in India reflect a complex interplay of history, tradition, and modernity.
In conclusion, this article sheds light on the diverse and complex sources and features of Islamic law in India. A comprehensive overview of the primary sources of Islamic law, their interpretation, and the role of Islamic law in the Indian legal system has been provided. The interplay of tradition and modernity in the evolution of Islamic law in India, which continues to be a significant aspect of the country’s legal system, has been analysed by this Article. All we can hope for is, a legal system that could keep a check on the disparities between the two religious communities and bring out the Unity and Integration, the world has been talking about for centuries now.
Endnotes:
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, Act No. 26 of 1937 (India)
Constitution of India, art. 44
Muslim Marriages Registration Act, 1981, § 3 (India)
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, Act No. VIII of 1939 (India)
Indian Succession Act, 1925
This article is authored by Rishaan Gupta, a 1st year Student at National Law University, Delhi.
