Author: LEXPEEPS editor

-Report by Himanshi Chauhan

In the recent judgement of YOGESH NAVINCHANDRA RAVANI v. NANJIBHAI SAGRAMBHAI CHAUDHARY & ORS, an appeal is filed by the appellant challenging the final judgement of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad whereby the High Court passed strictures against the appellant and restored the second appeal to its original number and status.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND:

One Jesangbhai Kachrabhai Parmar (hereinafter referred to as “original plaintiff”) had filed a suit before the Additional Senior Civil Judge, Mehsana challenging the sale deed dated 14 September 2000 which was executed by Nanjibhai Sagrambhai Chaudhary in favour of Sureshbhai Hirabhai Chaudhary with respect of suit property. The said suit was dismissed by the Additional Civil Judge and this order was passed on 12 June 2008. But it is to be noted that the original plaintiff had died on 31 December 2006 i.e. during the pendency of the suit. Therefore, a further suit is presented by his legal representatives (“LRs” for short).

The first appeal was filed by the LRs of the original plaintiff including the appellant- Lalitbhai Jesangbhai Parmar who is the son of the original plaintiff. This appeal was filed before the Additional District Judge. It was dismissed vide judgment and order dated 23 July 2015.

Thereafter, a second appeal was filed in the High Court by the LRs of the original plaintiff including the appellant. In this appeal, it was displayed that all the LRs of the original plaintiff are appellants. It is to be noted that this appeal was preferred by Vitthalbhai Maganbhai Parmar who was the Power of Attorney holder of the original plaintiff. It was executed in his favour before the death of the original plaintiff. Another Power of Attorney was also executed in his favour by the appellant i.e. Lalitbhai Jesangbhai Parmar. The appellant was Power of Attorney holder only for him and not for other LRs of the original plaintiff on whose behalf the appeal was preferred. Furthermore, the Vakalatnama was not signed by other LRs of the original plaintiff.

The High Court after recognising the said discrepancy raised office objections as to whether the Vakalatnama had been signed by all the appellants or not. In spite of repeated opportunities, these objections were not removed. Therefore, the second appeal was dismissed by High Court on 27 November 2015. Thereafter the application was filed for restoration of the second appeal wherein it was stated that the Power of Attorney holder i.e. Vitthalbhai Maganbhai Parmar had informed the registry of the High Court about his inability to obtain an authority letter from all the LRs of the original plaintiff. Thereby, their transposition as defendants were requested. The HC allowed the said application and restored the second appeal.

The appellant on coming to know about the filing of the second appeal by his Power of Attorney holder cancelled the Power of Attorney through public notice because this appeal was filed without his knowledge or instruction. Furthermore, he engaged Yogesh Navinchandra Ravani, an advocate, to file a pursis for withdrawal of the second appeal. The High Court considered the said pursis and permitted the withdrawal of the second appeal.

However, even after the cancellation of Power of Attorney, Vitthalbhai Maganbhai Parmar filed a Misc. Civil Application in HC for review of its order and consequent restoration of the second appeal. He also seeks condonation of delay. The HC allowed this application and restored the second appeal to its original number and status. In addition to it, costs were imposed upon the appellant- Lalitbhai Jesangbhai Parmar and strictures were passed against the appellant- Yogesh Navinchandra Ravani for his conduct as an advocate while seeking withdrawal of the second appeal. 

Hence the present appeal was filed in the Supreme Court challenging the final judgement or order of the High Court.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:

➢ The learned counsel for the appellant submits that application filed by Vitthalbhai Maganbhai Parmar was not maintainable because the Power of Attorney executed in favour of him stood cancelled via Public Notice.

➢ The learned counsel further submits that the application for review which was filed using earlier Power of Attorney could not have been filed as on the death of the original plaintiff he had no authority to continue with the proceedings.

➢ It was further stated that once the appellant had filed an application for transposing of the other LRs as defendants and once the HC had allowed the said application, he became the dominus litis.

➢ It is submitted that the strictures passed by HC against the appellant- Yogesh Navinchandra Ravani who was only a lawyer appearing on the behalf of appellant, were totally unwarranted and uncalled for.

 ➢ Therefore, it was urged that the second appeal should not be restored and the strictures passed against the appellant- Yogesh Navinchandra Ravani should be cancelled by this court.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:

➢ The respondent no. 5 to 7 has filed their reply stating that they had not executed any Power of Attorney in favour of said Vitthalbhai Maganbhai Parmar.

 ➢ Therefore, this reply was used by the appellants and through this they submitted that they also did not intend to challenge the order passed by the Additional District Judge.

JUDGEMENT:

The Supreme Court after considering the facts and contentions of both the parties held that the application filed by said Vitthalbhai Maganbhai Parmar was not tenable as the Power of Attorney executed in his favour by the appellant- Lalitbhai Jesangbhai Parmar stood cancelled by issuing public notice. The position of the appellant- Lalitbhai Jesangbhai Parmar being a dominus litis, has a right to withdraw the second appeal. After the withdrawal of the such appeal, an application for restoration of said appeal filed by the Power of Attorney holder whose Power of Attorney stood cancelled was not at all tenable.

The Apex Court further stated that the observations made by High Court against appellant- Yogesh were totally unwarranted and uncalled for. Thereby it was held that the decision and order passed by High Court is not sustainable in law. The same is quashed and set aside.

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-Report by Sakshi Tanwar

This is the second application under Section 439 read with Section 436A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 seeking regular bail in case FIR No. 166/2015, dated 16.11.2015, recorded at P.S. Crime Branch under Sections 3 and 9 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923. The initial application filed on behalf of the current applicant was rejected as withdrawn by a coordinate bench of this Court on February 31, 2018, with an instruction to the learned trial Court to expedite the trial.

FACTS

P.S. Crime Branch obtained classified information on alleged anti-national acts supported by Pakistan-based intelligence operatives. The operation in question was handled by an Indian. Information about the deployment of the Indian Army and the Border Security Force (“BSF”) in Jammu and Kashmir and passed it on to people across the border, threatening national security. The mobile phone numbers involved were intercepted, and the names of two people engaged – Kafaitullah Khan and Abdul Rasheed surfaced. Kafaitullah Khan lived in Rajouri and Abdul Rasheed served in the BSF. It was found that Abdul Rasheed gave classified material to Kafaitullah Khan in exchange for money, who then gave it to Pakistan intelligence operatives.  

Kafaitullah Khan came across his close friend Mohammad Saber, i.e., the present applicant, who was a primary school teacher. In confidence, Kafaitullah Khan told the applicant about his meeting with the aforesaid Pakistan intelligence officer and the task assigned to him. He agreed to the task by taking some money. Kafaitullah Khan got in touch with an ex-serviceman, Munawar, through the present applicant. Farid Khan had passed on some documents to Munawar, which were then passed on to Faizal-ur-Rehman through the present applicant. Mobile phones were recovered from Kafaitullah Khan, Abdul Rasheed, Munawar Ahmed Mir, Farid Khan and the present applicant. The Call Detail Records showed that the accused were in touch. Bank account details of all the accused persons were obtained from the concerned banksand it was found that Rs. 10,000/- were deposited in the account of the applicant. 

The found documents pertaining to the Indian Army were forwarded to the appropriate authorities for examination. It was discovered that the aforementioned documents were classified in nature. Following the completion of the investigation, the first chargesheet in the current case against Abdul Rasheed Khan, Munawar Ahmed Mir, Farid Ahmed, Kafaitullah Khan, and the present application was filed on February 23, 2016.

APPEALANT’S SIDE

The applicant, according to learned counsel acting on his behalf, was detained on December 5, 2015, and has been in judicial detention for more than 7 years. It was also claimed that he had been imprisoned for more than half the maximum time permitted for the crimes he was accused of committing. As a result, the petitioner is eligible to be released on bail under Section 436A of the CrPC. It was further submitted that the applicant was not named in the FIR and the allegations against him are solely on the basis of the disclosure of Kafaitullah Khan and Abdul Rasheed. Learned counsel for the application testified that no incriminating material had been obtained from the applicant’s possession or from his domicile. Furthermore, no incriminating evidence was discovered on his laptop or camera. It was submitted that the prosecution has not been able to connect the Rs. 10,000/- transferred to the bank account of the applicant with any of the allegations made against him. Learned counsel further submitted that there is no evidence on record which shows that the data alleged to be transmitted was passed on by the applicant.

JUDGEMENT

In view of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the applicant is admitted to bail upon his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- along with two sureties of the like amount, one of which should be a relative of the applicant, to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court/Link Court, further subject to some conditions.

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-Report by Himanshi Chauhan

In the recent case of Ruksana v. Jawahar Lal Nehru University, a writ petition was filed, in the Hon’ble Court for the violation of Articles 14 & 15 of the Indian Constitution, by the petitioner i.e. Ruksana. 

FACTS:

The petitioner i.e. Ruksana belongs to the OBC category. She applied for admission to the Ph.D course of “Social Exclusion & Inclusive Policy” at JNU for the academic year 2021-22. There were a total of 8 seats for the said course out of which only 2 are reserved for the OBC category. For admission in the said course, a computer-based test (CBT) was conducted by National Testing Agency. The petitioner took the test and secured Rank-08 in the OBC category. Therefore she was not selected for the course. 

But at the same time, Mr Shahid C. who secured Rank-07 in the OBC category was selected for the Ph.D course. He blocked his seat but had failed to submit his documents and certificates before 19.01.2022 which was the last date of admission according to the petitioner. Mr Shahid C. also via an email to the respondent university on 15.02.2022 requested the cancellation of the seat blocked by him.

Therefore, the petitioner is of the view that the vacant seat should have been offered to the petitioner as she was the next candidate on the merit list. Petitioner relied on clause 6.3 of the Admission Policy & Procedure 2021-22 notified by the JNU which provides that seats that remained vacant could be offered to the candidates next in the merit list.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:

➢ The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that through the texts received by Mr Shahid C., it is evident that the last date for submitting documents and certificates was 19.01.2022 and in the event of the failure to submit requisite documents by 19.01.2022 the admission will be deemed as cancelled.

➢ He further contended that Mr Shahid C. had failed to submit the required documents by 19.01.2022, therefore, his admission will be deemed as cancelled. He also submits that Mr Shahid C. had also conveyed his intention to the respondent university to cancel his admission through an email.

➢ The learned counsel, therefore, urged that seat should have been offered to the petitioner due to the vacancy created.

➢ The learned counsel further submits that the last date for admission according to the timetable was 20.02.2021 but the fifth and final list was issued by the university on 28.01.2022 i.e. much later than the deadline. It clearly shows that the university itself did not adhere to the last date of admission.

➢ He further contended that the date of admission written on the Semester Registration Card of Mr Saddam Hussain is 04.03.2022 which is much later than the deadline for admission. The learned counsel, therefore, submits that the respondent had the discretion in deciding whether candidates were to be admitted or not after the last date.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:

➢ The learned counsel for the respondent submits that Mr Shahid C. was pursuing M. Phil from Pondicherry University but at the same time, he had blocked a seat for Ph.D. in JNU. But a student cannot be registered in two regular courses at the same time.

➢ The council draws the attention of the court to the circulars dated 24.12.2022 which provided that the students pursuing M. Phil from other universities had to submit the dissertation in their respective universities on or before 31.01.2022 and simultaneously had to submit a certificate with the JNU for confirming their admission in Ph.D. program. 

➢ The counsel further submits that Mr Shahid C. kept the seat blocked till the final merit list i.e. on 28.01.2022 and accordingly, no vacant seat was available which could be offered to the petitioner.➢ The learned counsel further submits that the cancellation of admission by Mr Shahid C. on 15.02.2022 was of no use to the petitioner as the admission process was already closed by then.

➢ As far as the date on the registration card of Mr Saddam Hussain was concerned, it was submitted that he had already blocked his seat in Ph.D. program in the first merit list itself. Further, due to Covid, the semester started late and the date mentioned in the registration card is the date on which the same was generated at the school/centre level.

➢ Therefore it was urged by the respondent university that they had acted in the four corners of the admission policy and the petitioner had no right to seek admission when there was no vacant seat available till the last merit list.

JUDGEMENT:

The Hon’ble court while deciding the case, referred to clause 6.3 of the Admission Policy & Procedure 2021-22 which makes it clear that only such seats which are vacant before the deadline for admission, shall be offered to the eligible candidates next in the merit list. But in the present case, Mr Shahid C. had blocked his seat till 15.02.2022 which was much later than the deadline for admission i.e. 28.01.2022. Therefore the seat in the Ph.D. program was not vacant till the admission process continued and the same could not be offered to the petitioner contrary to the mandate of clause 6.3 of the Admission Policy & Procedure, 2021-22.

The court thus held that as there was no vacant available, the petitioner cannot claim the right to admission against the said seat and no mandamus can be issued directing the respondent institute to grant admission to the petitioner contrary to the approved timeline.

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-Report by Sakshi Tanwar

The question in the present writ petition is whether the past service rendered by the petitioner as a Civil Judge can be counted for the purpose of calculating the qualifying service viz. ten years as Civil Judge, for appointment to the Delhi Higher Judicial Serviceby promotion on the basis of merit through Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (‘LDCE’).

FACTS:

The petitioner joined the HCS as a Civil Judge on June 27, 2012. Following that, the petitioner successfully completed the Delhi Judicial Service. Examination, 2015, and joined the Delhi Judicial Service (‘DJS’) through the proper process, i.e., after being discharged from the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division)-cum-Judicial Magistrate. Upon her request, the petitioner was exempted from mandatory induction training and was given the benefit of her HCS service for the limited purpose of being exempted from training in the DJS, carry forward of leave, Leave Travel Concession and pay protection. In a letter, the petitioner sought that the Court enable her to appear for the LDCE 2022 for promotion to the DHJS by including her previous service with the HCS towards the required service of ten years as a Civil Judge. The petitioner’s request was heard by the Court’s Examination Committee and later rejected.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:

According to the learned counsel, the petitioner was initially appointed in the HCS on June 6, 2012. He stressed that the petitioner’s remuneration in both HCS and DJS was the same. As a result, he claims, the petitioner made a lateral entry into DJS. He stated that the provision making Civil Judges with ten years of qualifying service eligible for promotion in the 10% LDCE quota for DHJS came into effect only on April 19, 2022, as a result of a Supreme Court of India judicial order in All India Judges Association Vs. UOI & Ors. He contended that the competent authority had not considered the above judgment of the Supreme Court. He stressed that the Government of India had issued an O.M. dated September 1, 1998, for all its workers to count past service for the fulfilment of qualifying service for promotion in the new department.  He contended that the interpretation of O.M. is no longer res integra because it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in accordance with the petitioner’s claim in Renu Mullick vs. Union of India, (1994) 1 SCC 373.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:

The learned counsel submitted that the judicial officers nominated to HCS and DJS are subject to distinct service rules and are overseen by different High Courts, and so the terms of service of people subject to various rules cannot be equated as a matter of right.He submitted that Rule 2(e) of the DJS Rules categorically defines the word ‘service’ as the ‘Delhi Judicial Service’ and there is nothing in the DJS Rules which states that the service rendered as a judicial officer in another State is to be counted for calculating the qualifying service. He contended that the benefits of carry forward of leave, LTC, and pay protection, all of which fall within the monetary genre, were granted to the petitioner in accordance with the guidelines provided in O.M. dated 17th August 2016 of the Government of India. He also contended that the petitioner’s entire case violates the well-established legal concept that the fundamental qualification for a position is completely determined by the employer.

JUDGEMENT:

The High Court stated that there is no merit in the present writ petition. Accordingly, the present writ petition along with applications stands dismissed but with no order as to cost.

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-Report by Utkarsh Kamal

In this case, according to the Supreme Court, the State Government cannot argue that Rules of Business were not followed throughout its decision-making process when the Cabinet establishes a committee and the latter’s acts are approved by the Minister and the rest of the Council. The Rajasthan Industrial Development and Investment Corporation Ltd. v. M/s Arfat Petrochemicals Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. case was decided by a bench consisting of Justice Surya Kant and Justice Vikram Nath, and they upheld the subcommittee’s decisions by ruling that the rules of business were followed because the subcommittee was only carrying out its duties on behalf of the entire Council of Ministers.

FACTS:

To J.K. Synthetics Ltd. (“JKSL”) in the Large-Scale Industrial Area of Kota (“LIA, Kota”), the State of Rajasthan granted a leasehold allocation of land (“Land”). The allocation was decided in accordance with the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act of 1956 and the State Government’s industrial policy. The Rajasthan State Industrial and Mineral Development Corporation Ltd. (“RSIMDC”) were established to carry out development projects throughout the State while the lease was still in effect. Following its division into two parts, Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation Ltd. (“RIICO”) took over as the immediate successor to RSIMDC. The RIICO Disposal of Land Rules, 1979 (“1979 Rules”) were established to manage RIICO’s operations with regard to areas under its ownership. In 1998, JKSL was deemed to be a sick firm, and on the directives of the Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (“AAIFR”), M/s. Arfat Petrochemicals Pvt. Ltd. (“Respondent No.1”) took over JKSL’s operations. A change was made to the lease of land originally granted to JKSL in favour of Respondent No. 1. After a while, Respondent No. 1 was unable to resuscitate JKSL’s industrial divisions. Respondent No. 1 then presented a plan to RIICO for changing the leased land’s use from industrial to commercial and for subdividing the land. In 2018, RIICO authorized the subdivision and conversion of land; nevertheless, the Model Code of Conduct went into effect the very following day in anticipation of the forthcoming Rajasthan State Assembly Elections. Following the 2018 elections in Rajasthan, which resulted in a new administration, the conversion of leased land came under examination. On January 1, 2019, the newly elected Council of Ministers established a Cabinet Committee to examine actions performed by the former ruling administration during the six-month period prior to the elections. The approvals granted to Respondent No. 1 were revoked by order of the State Government to RIICO. Which were newly won the state assembly election so respondent no.1 file the case in the High Court under article 226 of the constitution. The Cabinet Committee’s decision and RIICO’s actions to revoke the allocation to Respondent No. 1 were both overturned by the High Court. Following that, RIICO and the State Government chose to appeal to the Supreme Court.

LAW RELATED TO THE CASE:

Article 138. Enlargement of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

(1) The Supreme Court shall have such further jurisdiction and powers with respect to any of the matters in the Union List as Parliament may by law confer

(2) The Supreme Court shall have such further jurisdiction, and powers with respect to any matter as the Government of India and the Government of any State may by special agreement confer if Parliament by law provides for the exercise of such jurisdiction and powers by the Supreme Court

Article 226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs

(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders, or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibitions, quo warranto, and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose

LEGAL ISSUE

1) Whether the action taken by the Riico without the cabinet interference is valid or not

2) Whether the Riico has the power to allot the land to the petitioner or not 

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:

The first Respondent contested the appeal on the grounds that the government judgment is illegal if it does not follow the Rules of Business established under Article 166(3) of the Indian Constitution. The Industries Department is responsible for handling RIICO-related issues, and the Minister for Industries would serve as the nodal authority for making final decisions in this regard. The decision to revoke the lease and subdivide the land is invalid because the Minister for Industries was not involved in the Cabinet Committee or when the final decision was made. Riico is not allowed to allot the land to anyone, so the land allotted to the petitioner is invalid 

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION:

The lease deed was renewed by the District Collector and not by the RIICO since the State Government, which is a party to the petitioner’s proceedings, was involved. According to the notification dated 18.09.1979, the State Government transferred the industrial areas developed and maintained by the Department of Industries to RIICO. As a result, the largest industrial area in Kota, where the subject land is located, was also transferred to RIICO by the State Government via a notification dated 28.09.1979. Therefore, as it is also authorized for the lands that have already been allocated, the RIICO is qualified to provide permissions or approvals under Rule 12 of the Rules of 1959. In order to build affordable housing under the CMJAY program, the petitioner company requested permission from the District Collector. Under this particular program, the District Collector had the right to provide permission regardless of whether the land was owned by the State Government or the RIICO. The fact that the District Collector personally sought the RIICO’s advice in this matter is clear evidence that the RIICO controlled the aforementioned land.

JUDGMENT:

One cannot claim that the State Government violated the Rules of Business when the Cabinet Sub-Committee is only acting on behalf of the entire Council of Ministers. The Bench noted that the Committees had been established by the Council of Ministers to investigate various anomalies. The investigation of the actions taken by RIICO and its alleged abuse of inexistent powers in favour of Respondent No. 1 was also given to a specific committee. It was stated that governance needed to be done in a practical and effective way. The Rules of Business also advocates for collective governance by the Council of Ministers in terms of recommendations made to the Governor. As a result, the Bench determined that the Council had a collective say in the decision to form subcommittees to review decisions made by the previous administration, including those involving activities by RIICO. The Bench determined that the subcommittee was acting on behalf of the full Council of Ministers when it advised Respondent No. 1 to revoke the licenses and approvals. As a result, the Rajasthan Rules of Business were not broken. The decision of the High Court has been overturned

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-Report by Mehul Jain

It was held by the Delhi High Court in the case of Alliance of Digital India Foundation Vs Competition Commission of India & Ors that on April 24, It is made clear that the observations made herein are only to the extent of deciding the present law before this Court and shall not tantamount to any expression on the merits of the case and the same is therefore, without prejudice to the rights and contentions of all the parties, to be taken at an appropriate proceeding. It is the conclusion of the Delhi High Court.

FACTS

The judgment is made by the learned Single Judge bench “Hon’ble Mr JusticeTushar Rao Gedela” On 24 April 2023. 

The petitioner has filed the instant writ petition that the following facts shorn of all unnecessary details and germane and relevant to decide the dispute are as under: -1. On 20.02.2020, an anonymous informant filed an information before the Competition Commission of India (hereinafter referred to as “CCI”) under Section 19 of the Competition Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as “Act”) against Respondent No. 2 – 5 (collectively referred to as ‘Google’) (First Information). The CCI registered the First Information as Case No. 07 of 2020. 2. Thereafter, on 09.11.2020, the CCI issued a prima facie order under Section 26(1) of the Act in Case No. 7 of 2020 directing the Office of the Director General (DG) to investigate Google. 3. Subsequently, on 29.06.2021, a second informant (Match Group Inc.) (Respondent No. 6 herein) filed information before the CCI against Google under Section 19 of the Act (Second Information). The Commission registered the Second Information as Case No. 14 of 2021. The same was followed by an application for interim relief filed by Alliance of Digital India Foundation (Petitioner) against Google on 06.10.2021 (First IRA) in Case No. 07 of 2020 and Case No. 14 of 2021, seeking ad-interim relief restraining Google from implementing its Payments Policy under Section 33 of the Act. 4. That thereafter, on 18.10.2021, Petitioner filed a piece of information against Google under Section 19 of the Act (Third Information). The CCI registered the Third Information as Case No. 35 of 2021, which was finally clubbed by Case Nos. 07 of 2020, 14 of 2021 vide its Order dated 02.11.2021. 5. Consequently, from 16.03.2022 till 01.09.2022, the proceedings of these cases moved in full swing by the filing of an investigation report by the DG, which was subsequently followed by its response filed by Google, and the detailed hearings conducted thereafter by the CCI. All such proceedings reached their conclusion by CCI and the matters were reserved for orders. 6. After the conclusion of CCI oral hearings and when the final order was reserved, Google swiftly announced a user choice billing (UCB) pilot program for non-gaming app developers in India on 01.09.2022. 7. The CCI passed the final order in Case No. 07 of 2020, 14 of 2021 and 35 of 2021, which was challenged by Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 by filing a statutory appeal before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). 8. Therein, Google, on 25.01.2023, submitted its Compliance Report on its supposed implementation of the eight remedial directions given by the CCI. 9. To the said Compliance Report filed by Google, Petitioner filed three applications, one after the other, under Section 42 of the Act, before the CCI, mainly for causing an inquiry into the compliance report filed by Google along with certain other prayers. That all such applications filed before CCI on 31.01.2023, 06.03.2023, and 28.03.2023 under Section 42 of the Act are still impending adjudication to date.

APPELLANT‘S CONTENTION

At the outset, Mr Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the interpretation of Section 15 of the Act, insofar as the CCI is concerned, is no more res integra since this Court in Cadd Systems and Services Private Limited vs. Competition Commission of India reported in AIR 2019 Del 194, categorically has, after examining the decision in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. vs. Competition Commission of India reported in 2019 SCC OnLine Del 8032 is also the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.K. Srinivasan and Others vs. the State of Karnataka and Others reported in (1987) 1 SCC 658and State of Gujarat vs. Utility Users Welfare Association reported in (2018) 6 SCC 21, concluded, after examining the provisions of Section 15 of the Act, that the said provisions amply make it clear that no act or proceedings of CCI would be invalid because of any vacancy or defect in its Constitution. Learned counsel submits that as a result of the aforesaid observation, the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Cadd Systems (supra) concluded that notwithstanding that a judicial member is required to be appointed at CCI, the order passed by CCI cannot be called into question. Learned counsel relies upon Paras 26,38,39 of the judgment of learned Single Judge in Mylan Laboratories (supra) and fairly submits that the judgment in Mylan Laboratories (supra) was rendered in respect of Intellectual Properties Appellate Board Particularly Section 84(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, regarding the constitution of its bench. Learned counsel has also placed on record a compilation of judgments which have also been considered.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

Learned senior counsel submits that the petitioner is aware that on merits, so far as the charges are concerned, the CCI had given a finding in favour of respondent nos. 2 and 3 and the same was never challenged by the petitioner by filing a statutory appeal thereagainst. He submits that having not challenged the said finding, now to challenge the same by way of the present writ petition or even the application under Section 42 of the Act would amount to the re-agitation of an issue which has been decided by the CCI. On that basis, the learned senior counsel submits that the observations and findings reached by the CCI are final and binding upon the petitioner. Thus, neither the application under Section 42 of the Act nor the present petition is maintainable either on facts or on the law. 

Mr Sandeep Sethi learned senior counsel appears on behalf of respondents nos. 4 and 5 and vehemently opposes the submissions made by the petitioner. According to Mr Sethi, learned senior counsel, Section 8 of the Act decides the composition of the Commission. Referring to sub-Section 1 of Section 8 of the Act, Mr Sethi submits that by the usage of the word “shall”, the legislative intent is to ensure that the Commission would necessarily consist of a Chairperson and not less than two and not more than six other members makes it clear that the minimum quorum for the composition of a competent commission would be minimum of three Members, including the Chairperson.

Learned senior counsel also submits that having said that, the respondents have challenged the directions contained in the Final Order dated 25.10.2022 before the NCLAT. On an overall conspectus, Mr Sethi submits that the present petition is devoid of any merit, is an abuse of the process of law and ought to be dismissed in limine with exemplary cost.

JUDGEMENT

This Court has heard the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and considered the ratio laid down in various judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as the judgments delivered by the Division Bench of this Court as well as other High Courts.

Moreover, according to Mr N. Venkataraman, learned ASG, the CCI is constituted following the provisions of the Competition Act, 2002 and is very much functional and also simultaneously carrying out adjudicatory functions. Because of the above, there is no impediment, legal or otherwise, in directing the CCI to take up the applications under Section 42 of the Act, as filed by the petitioner, for hearing and considering the same following law on or before 26.04.2023. Accordingly, the petition stands disposed of in the above terms. It is made clear that the observations made herein are only to the extent of deciding the present is before this Court and shall not tantamount to any expression on the merits of the case and the same is therefore, without prejudice to the rights and contentions of all the parties, to be taken at an appropriate proceeding.

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About the Organization

Epiq, a global technology-enabled services leader to the legal industry and corporations, takes on large-scale, increasingly complex tasks for corporate counsel, law firms, and business professionals with efficiency, clarity, and confidence. Clients rely on Epiq to streamline the administration of legal department and business operations, class action and mass tort, eDiscovery, regulatory, compliance, restructuring, and bankruptcy matters.

Job Position

Legal Associate

Roles and Responsibilities

• Review documents for relevancy, privilege and other issues as directed by our clients.
• Assist with research on technical and industry-specific issues.

Qualifications

• Proficiency with Microsoft Office tools (MS Word, MS Excel, MS PPT)
• Familiar with the U.S. judicial system, understanding of legal fundamentals, methods, and procedures from the U.S. perspective
• LLB (three- or five-year program),
• LLM (optional) India or Abroad

Requirements

• Good communication skills, both written and oral, and strong English reading comprehension
• Decision making: Exercises good judgment and assumes responsibility
• Be a Team Player, open to feedback, and contribute to building positive team spirit
• Ethics: Treats people with respect, keeps commitments, and works with integrity.
• Sound knowledge of the document review and e-discovery/litigation industry
• Knowledge of litigation management software: Relativity, Xerox, and/or DocuMatrix
• Industry-specific subject matter knowledge/understanding

Application Procedure

To apply, CLICK HERE

Disclaimer: All information posted by us on Lexpeeps is true to our knowledge. But still, it is suggested that you check and confirm things on your level.

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About the Organization

The world’s best businesses know that potential customers can be anywhere. TransPerfect helps our clients to be everywhere. With global headquarters in New York and offices in 104 cities across six continents, TransPerfect is the world’s largest provider of language services and related technologies.

Role Overview

The Junior Associate will be responsible for evaluating and interpreting electronic documents for relevancy and privilege with utmost care of quality on document review projects. This is 3-month contract employment with a possible performance-based extension to a permanent role.

Role Description

• Performing first-line review for relevancy and privilege on document review projects for high-profile clients and complex cases
• Ability to grasp complex subject matters
• Ensure jobs are completed according to the client and industry standards, and that job specifications and deadlines are met
• Identify Key documents, log them in review tool and communicate that to the Team Lead
• Focus on accuracy and first-time right approach to avoid any rework.
• Perform other special tasks or duties when required

Required Skills

• Knowledge of MS Excel
• Available to work overtime, including evenings and weekends as needed
• Ability to work well under pressure and meet tight deadlines
• Team player and helps in creating positive team environment.
• Attention to detail and good analytic skills

Required Experience and Qualifications

• Bachelors of Law (LL.B)
• Understanding of eDiscovery and Document Review Projects
• 0-1 year of eDiscovery experience (Freshers are welcome to apply)
• Good oral and written communication

Application Procedure

To apply, CLICK HERE

Disclaimer: All information posted by us on Lexpeeps is true to our knowledge. But still, it is suggested that you check and confirm things on your level.

EXPLORE MORE SUCH OPPORTUNITIES HERE!

For regular updates on more opportunities, we can catch up at-

WhatsApp Group:

https://chat.whatsapp.com/Iez749mZfpaGfG4x2J6sr9

Telegram:

https://t.me/lexpeeps

LinkedIn:

https://www.linkedin.com/company/lexpeeps-in-lexpeeps-pvt-ltd

Applications for physical internships are now being accepted for May 2023.

About the Organization

Utkrishtha Law Offices is a full-service law firm offering its expertise in the domain of including but not limited to Banking Laws, Arbitration Laws, Insolvency & Bankruptcy Laws, Cable & Broadcasting Laws, Commercial Laws, Real Estate, Information Technology Laws, Startup Advisory, Consumer Protection Laws, Criminal Laws, Custom & Excise Laws. 

Eligibility

• Preferably 3rd year onwards (5-year degree) or 2nd year onwards (3-year degree).
• Candidates looking for a long-term internship are also welcome.

Location

29, Ground floor, Kailash Hills, New Delhi

Timings

From Monday to Saturday, 10 AM to 6 PM.

Application Procedure

Interested candidates are requested to send their updated CVs and a writing sample to advashirvad.kr@gmail.com. Please use the subject line “Internship Application- (Your Name) May 2023” and CC contact@utkrishthalaw.com in your email.

Disclaimer: All information posted by us on Lexpeeps is true to our knowledge. But still, it is suggested that you check and confirm things on your level.

EXPLORE MORE SUCH OPPORTUNITIES HERE!

For regular updates on more opportunities, we can catch up at-

WhatsApp Group:

https://chat.whatsapp.com/Iez749mZfpaGfG4x2J6sr9

Telegram:

https://t.me/lexpeeps

LinkedIn:

https://www.linkedin.com/company/lexpeeps-in-lexpeeps-pvt-ltd

Chowdhury and Associates, having an office in Calcutta, is looking for a Junior Advocate.

Eligibility

1. Enrolled in West Bengal Bar Council or have cleared AIBE
2. 1-2 years of post-qualification experience will be preferred. However, lack of experience can be ignored if the applicant shows practical knowledge on the subject and/or internships in connection to it.
3. A person who can join immediately.
4.  A candidate having exposure to civil and commercial law and litigation related to it

Salary

Negotiable

Application Procedure

Interested people may send their CVs to arkaproy98@gmail.com with the subject “Application for Junior Advocate.”

Disclaimer: All information posted by us on Lexpeeps is true to our knowledge. But still, it is suggested that you check and confirm things on your level.

EXPLORE MORE SUCH OPPORTUNITIES HERE!

For regular updates on more opportunities, we can catch up at-

WhatsApp Group:

https://chat.whatsapp.com/Iez749mZfpaGfG4x2J6sr9

Telegram:

https://t.me/lexpeeps

LinkedIn:

https://www.linkedin.com/company/lexpeeps-in-lexpeeps-pvt-ltd