The National Essay Writing Competition is organized by the Law and Gender committee of St. Joseph’s College of Law on “Should we all be feminists”.

ABOUT

The National Essay Writing Competition is organized by the Law and Gender committee of St. Joseph’s College of Law on “Should we all be feminists”. The aim of the competition is to introduce students to the idea of feminism and help students delve deeper into the need for feminism in present-day India.

ELIGIBILITY

Participation is restricted to the bona fide – registered students only (for registration check the google form link attached at the end of the post).

DETAILS

  • The essay writing competition should be on the topic “Should we all be Feminists? “
  • Maximum word limit – 1500 words.
  • The language should be English only.
  • The essay should be typed in times new roman, 12 size with double spacing.
  • The handwritten essays will not be accepted.
  • The essay should be the original work of the student and it should not be copied from anywhere.
  • The writing should not have grammatical errors as well as overlapping of contents.
  • There should be structural coherence.
  • The introduction and conclusion of the essay should be proper and rational.
  • The evaluation will be made on the basis of content, coverage, facts, writing spirit inclined towards the topic, and logical presentation with due rationale.
  • The decision of the Jury shall be final & binding on all the participants.
  • The essay should be submitted in the registration google form only and no other form of registration will be accepted.
  • The Institute’s decision regarding the interpretation of rules or any other matter relating to the competition will be final.
  • If there is any situation not contemplated in the rules, the decision of the Institute shall be final.

DEADLINE

The last date of registration is September 15, 2022, & the last date for submission is September 22, 2022. No submission will be accepted thereafter.

https://forms.gle/dbeL8TgCdLuEGXpbA

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Marathwada Mitra Mandal’s College, Shankarrao Chavan Law College is organizing a 7-day Faculty Development Program on Legal Research Methodology.

ABOUT

Research plays an inevitable role in the development of all disciplines. Research is the systematic activity to ascertain the assumption or to verify the information based on the collected data or evidence. According to Redman and Mary research is ‘systematized efforts to gain knowledge. The methodology is the specific mode or science of a particular subject.

Research Methodology is a scientific and systematized investigation to acquire new knowledge and understanding about the issues or phenomena. Law is interrelated with every discipline. Without the scientific and systematic approach of the legal research methodology, the study and development of the law turn out to be irrelevant and irrational reasoning of law.

ELIGIBILITY

Academicians, Research Scholars, Post Graduate Students, Advocates

IMPORTANT DATES

  • Registration Deadline – October 10, 2022
  • Program Dates – October 16 to 22, 2022

CONTACT DETAILS

mmmsclc@gmail.com

https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdGor-_kfLE7XjtzPWb-Tcs4w5BZBmkKjMYtVecGy_N0yqWNg/viewform

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School of Law, Graphic Era Hill University (GEHU), Dehradun is organizing a five-day Faculty Development Program (FDP) on emerging contours of legal education and teaching techniques from September 19 to 24, 2022.

ABOUT

The five-day faculty development program (FDP) on emerging contours of legal education and teaching techniques, organized by the School of Law, GEHU, is intended to boost the teaching, learning, and research skills of researchers and academicians who are actively engaged with the legal field.

The program aims to provide an opportunity for the participants to learn and gather knowledge on contemporary issues and developments happening in various areas of law globally.

EVENT SCHEDULE

  • Day 1: Inaugural Ceremony: 11 A.M. onwards
    • Session I (11:30 AM-12:30 PM): Monday, September 19, 2022
    • Technical Session on “Issues relating to the Pedagogy of Criminal Law teaching.” By (Prof.) Dr. B.B. Pande, National Law University, Delhi
  • Day 2:
    • Session I (11:00 AM- 12:00 PM) Tuesday, September 20, 2022
    • Technical Session on “Victim discourse in teaching Criminal Procedure Law.” by Mr. Neeraj Tiwari, Assistant Professor, National Law University, Delhi.
    • Session II (2:00 PM -3:00 PM) September 20, 2022
    • Technical Session on “Teaching Techniques to teach Legal Research Methodology” by Dr. Shipra Gupta Associate Professor, Department of Laws, Panjab University, Chandigarh.
  • Day 3:
    • Session I (11:00 AM-12:00 PM) Wednesday, September 21, 2022
    • Technical Session on “Emerging Contours of Business Law: Teaching Techniques and Future Discourse.” by Dr. Avnish Bhatt, Assistant Professor, Xavier Law School, XIM University.
    • Session II (2:00 PM -3:00 PM) Wednesday, September 21, 2022
    • Technical Session on “Emerging Contours of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Teaching Techniques and Future Discourse” by Dr. Neelam Tyagi Assistant Professor, Campus Law Centre, Faculty of Law, University of Delhi.
  • Day 4:
    • Session I (11:00 AM-12:00 PM) Thursday, September 22, 2022
    • Technical Session on “Teaching Techniques to teach Taxation Law.” by Dr. Jasper Vikas Assistant Professor, National Law University, Delhi.
    • Session II (2:00 PM-3:00 PM) Thursday, September 22, 2022
    • Technical Session on “Emerging Contours of Corporate Law: Teaching Techniques and Future Discourse.” by Dr. Ankit Awasthi Assistant Professor, Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur.
  • Day 5:
    • Session I (11:00 AM-12:00 PM) Friday, September 23, 2022
    • Technical Session on “Teaching Techniques to teach International Human Rights Law.” by Dr. Manoj Kumar Sinha, Professor & Director, Indian Law Institute, Delhi.
    • Session II (2:00 PM-3:00 PM) Friday, September 23, 2022
    • Technical Session on “Interface between Public Law and Intellectual Property Law” by Dr. Uday Shankar Professor & Hon’ble Registrar, Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur.
  • Day 6: Valedictory Ceremony (11:00 AM Onwards, Saturday, September 24, 2022)
    • Chief Guest, Dr. G.S. Bajpai, Professor & Hon’ble Vice-Chancellor Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab.

ELIGIBILITY

The FDP is designed for researcher scholars, academicians and doctoral candidates who are indulged in teaching or conducting research in legal field.

DETAILS

  • Date:  September 19 to 24, 2022
  • Mode: Virtual/Online (Microsoft Teams)
  • E-certificates will be provided to the participants who attend all the sessions.
  • All participants must fill out a registration form linked at the end of this post and submit proof of payment.
  • The registration fee for the faculty development programme is INR 500/-. Fees can be paid through IMPS/NEFT on the details given below.

DEADLINE

September 17, 2022

CONTACT DETAILS

9868027388

https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSeCfROgQib9b_8aZEZ3tL4Ih3rHHs11fUp-kF_JL-7YS6qiEg/viewform

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About the Organization

The purpose of establishing the CSL is to investigate and engage in creative idea-generation processes in order to highlight the enormous legal and intellectual potential of the “sports law sector.” The goal of CSL is to give students and young attorneys access to specialists in the disciplines of sports and entertainment law as well as to give them the chance to research and investigate the numerous facets of sports and entertainment law.

About the Responsibilities  

The Center for Sports Law (CSL), UPES is excited to provide the students chances for legal research internships. The Center for Sports and Entertainment Law (CSL) invites students to investigate the legal and academic potential in this area.

Eligibility

  • Law students in their second to fifth year; strong academic standing; a love of writing; preference given to those with a few publications in national or international journals.

Perks

  • Certificate
  • Letter of recommendation
  • Regular training and mentorship on research and writing

Deadline for Applying

September 15, 2022

How to Apply?

Interested candidates may apply from here: –  Send the following documents in PDF format to csl@ddn.upes.ac.in:

– A statement of purpose (within 500 words)

– Updated Resume

– Writing sample (within 1000 words)

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-Report by Kshitiz Bhushan

It has been held by a bench of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court consisting of Justice Dinesh Kumar Sharma in the case of M/S Deutsche Lufthansa AG vs. Manisha Thakur & Ors. that while adjudicating the reference filed under Section 33 of the ID Act, the CGIT is bound to examine the justness and proper enquiry conducted against the workman.

The petitioner has challenged the order dated 08th August 2022 passed by the learned Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court-II (CGIT) in Case No.119 of 2021 whereby the learned CGIT has rejected the contention of the petitioner for framing two additional issues

(i) Whether the claimant is a workman or not as defined under the ID Act
(ii) Whether a just and proper enquiry was conducted against the complainant or not. The court ordered the CGIT to examine and adjudicate the issue as to the justness of the enquiry as well whether enquiry has been conducted in accordance with the law and the principles of natural justice

An ID was pending before the learned tribunal regarding service conditions and other matters. While it was pending the respondent-workman was terminated from service by petitioner management after conducting an enquiry according to the principles of natural justice. The respondents have claimed that the application has been filed only to delay the proceedings.

The court held that whether the respondent-workman falls within the ambit of the definition of “workman” comes within the discussion of the first issue. The court pointed out that the CGIT had observed that the scope of section 33 of the Industrial Dispute Act is not to adjudicate the correctness of the action taken or the fairness of domestic enquiry conducted. The court then relied on the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (supra) and held that

“while adjudicating the reference filed under Section 33 of the ID Act, the CGIT is bound to examine the justness and proper enquiry conducted against the workman.”

The court modified the order and held that the correctness of the enquiry shall also be added as an issue and the tribunal examine and adjudicate the same.

-Report by Prerna Gaur

The honorable High Court of Delhi held in the case of STAR INDIA PVT. LTD. & ANR. versus AAPKEAAJANESE.NET & ORS “rogue websites” that rogue websites were guilty of copyright infringement under Section 51 of the Act and were not entitled to exemptions under 52 (1)(c) of the Act or Section 79 of Information Technology Act, 2000.

FACTS

There is a contention on the behalf of the plaintiff that the defendants are stealing their original content and making it available on their websites which are prohibited under the Copyright Act of 1976 as well as the IT Act. Therefore, the plaintiff is praying for a permanent injunction as well as claiming damages of Rs 2,00,01,000/-. Plaintiff no 1. is a leading entertainment and media Company in India. It is the owner of various television channels and with due permission from Ministry and Broadcasting has exclusive rights to broadcast 64 channels in 8 languages. Plaintiff no.2 is the wholly owned subsidiary of Plaintiff no.1 and is the owner of the digital platform HOTSTAR.

PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTION

These websites are infringing the copyrights of Star India Limited. Plaintiff had asked the honorable court to put down the content from the website and the plaintiff also asked for compensation for the same. It was alleged by the plaintiff that there was illegal and unauthorized distribution, broadcasting, rebroadcasting, transmission and streaming of the plaintiff’s original content by the rogue websites. There were no traceable details of either the registrant or the user of the website. Although legal notices were sent to the defendants, however, there was no response by the defendants. The defendants have not filed any written statements.

Court’s Judgements

The court held that the concerned websites were guilty of copyright infringement under Section 51 of the Act and were not entitled to exemptions under 52 (1)(c) of the Act or Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000. As far as “rogue websites” are concerned, the Court identified the following illustrative factors to be considered in determining whether a particular website falls within that class. It was observed

“b. The details of the registrants of each of the websites are masked and no personal or traceable details are available either of the registrant or the user.
c. Despite receipt of legal notices, the Defendants nos. 1 to 67 have not complied with the requests to take down the infringing content.
d. The Defendants nos. 1 to 67 contain directories or indexes to facilitate infringement of copyright.
e. The copyrighted content is available illegally on the websites of the Defendant nos. 1 to 67 and the same is evidenced by the screenshots placed at pages 297 to 1364 of Volume II-VII of the documents filed by the plaintiffs along with the Plaint.”

In light of the above observations, the court held that the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief claimed.

-Report by Reyanshi Bansal

It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Independent School Federation v. Union of India that teachers are to be included in the definition of employee and the legal flaw of excluding them from being paid gratuity is to be terminated.

The Payment Gratuity Act, 1972, gave rights to those employees who rendered continuous service for at least five years to be paid gratuity on their retirement due to death or disability due to accident or disease. However, the definition of “employee” was restrictive in such a manner that it excluded private school teachers from receiving such payment.
This definition was rectified after the case of Ahmedabad Private Primary Teachers’ Association v. Administrative Officer via the Payment of Gratuity (Amendment) Bill, 2007 to involve teachers even though the court held that teachers were not “employees” under the Act. The constitutional validity of this amendment was challenged by several private schools.

The petitioners contended that the legislation overrules the judicial decision and goes against the doctrine of separation of powers. Furthermore, they found the amendment unreasonable, excessive and harsh, therefore, unconstitutional. Another argument was that it would be tyrannous and autocratic to make the private institutions liable for payment of gratuity for service before 1997. One of the submissions stated that the amendment should
only be valid if the Government refunds the taxes paid. Finally, the private schools and writ petitioners insisted on the enactment of the Repealing and Amending Act, 2016 by which the Amendment Act 2009 was repealed.

In response to the first ground, the court observes that the legislature can amend the language of a certain provision that was the subject matter of a court decision, and the court (in the case of Ahmedabad Private Primary Teachers’ Association) acknowledged that cognization of the situation of teachers in various establishments where gratuity is not available should be taken by the legislature.

The claim that the amendment is unconstitutional lacks merit and substance. Due to an error in law, teachers were unavailable to get access to rightly deserved gratuity whereas all other employees in the private school were. The purpose of the amendment was to remove such a technical flaw and give effect to what was intended by the Payment of Gratuity Act.

The gratuity is not despotic as argued because the employees are entitled to a gratuity if the conditions of the Act are met and there is an upper cap limit so it can be computed reasonably. This is a right accrued by the teachers and not giving them so, would be unjust. Moreover, the legislature is not confined to the tax statutes thereby making the penultimate argument unfounded and irrational. Onto the last contention of the Repealing Act, section 4 of the act directs that the repealing will not affect the validity, effect or consequence of any liability that has already been incurred. The court held that-

“The private schools would make payment to the employees/teachers along with the interest in accordance with the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act within a period of 6 weeks from today and in case of default, the employees/teachers may move the appropriate forum to enforce payment in accordance with the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act. In the facts of the case, there will be no orders as to costs.”

For the above-mentioned reasons, the court quashed the writ petitions and the transfer case and aforesaid appeals were dismissed. It was also reaffirmed that the purpose of the legislature was to give retrospective effect to the amendment made in the Payments of Gratuity Act,1972.

-Report by Harshita

The matter of determining the arbitration fee was discussed in detail in the case of ONGC v. Afcons Gunanusa JV.

In May 2009, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited(ONGC) and Afcons Gunanusa entered into a contract for the construction of an ICP-R Platform. The Platform was completed in October 2012. Due to some disparities between the parties, Afcons invoked arbitration in the case in July 2015. In August of the same year, ONGC appointed Justice Gyan Sudha Mishra as their arbitrator with Afcons appointing Justice Mukul Mudgal. Both the arbitrators appointed Justice GN Ray as the guiding arbitrator. In a preliminary meeting of the tribunal in November 2015, the members agreed that the fee schedule for the arbitration fee suggested in the contract was impractical. ONGC was not agreeing to the revision in the schedule whilst the arbitrators and Afcons agreed. In a letter to ONGC by the council, it was suggested to revise the fee schedule according to the fourth schedule of the Arbitration and Conciliation act 1996. The fee given was Rs. 30 lakhs for cases above the jurisdiction of Rs. 20 crores which were Rs. 900 crores here. Again, the tribunal informed ONGC on the matter that they would no longer bargain for this amount if ONGC would agree to the amount in the fourth schedule and also provide a reading fee of Rs. 6 lakhs each. ONGC could not agree on providing a reading fee. In August 2016, The tribunal fixed a fee of Rs 1.5 lakhs for every arbitrator for sitting for three hours. Thus, after not agreeing to the set arbitration fee, ONGC filed a petition in the Bombay High Court u/s 14 and 15 of the Arbitration Act. They filed for a termination of the current tribunal and a substitution. In October 2021, the Bombay High Court bailed out of the case claiming that it doesn’t fall under their jurisdiction as the tribunal was on an international level. That is when ONGC filed for a new arbitration petition.

While ONGC argued, with a letter in August 2020, let the arbitration tribunal know that the executives of the institute did not approve of the change in fees. They stood by the same throughout the situation. The respondents contended that the tribunal wanted to fix the correct amount of fees and suggested following the fourth schedule of the Arbitration Act, also an exclusive reading fee for the sessions was requested.

COURT’S DECISION

A fee schedule was already prescribed in the LSTK contract, which was rejected by the tribunal in a preliminary meeting. And the tribunal by itself decided on the fee of Rs. 1.5 lakh for a 3-hour sitting at the end. It was observed

“In view of our directives in Section C.2.4, we exercise our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and direct the constitution of a new arbitral tribunal in accordance with the arbitration agreement. For this purpose, Arbitration Petition (C) No. 5 of 2022 would be listed for directions before this Court on 21 September 2022. The above directions should not be construed as a finding on the conduct of the arbitration proceedings. These directions are an attempt to ensure that the arbitral proceedings are conducted without rancour which may derail the proceedings. In consonance with our findings, the fee payable to the earlier arbitral tribunal PART G 135 would be the fee payable in terms of the Fourth Schedule of the Arbitration Act. Though the Fourth Schedule is per se not applicable to an international commercial arbitration, since ONGC had indicated (following the suggestion of the arbitral tribunal) that it would be agreeable to pay the fee payable in terms of Schedule, it cannot now take recourse to the arbitration agreement between the parties to pay a lesser fee. We further clarify that if the fee in excess of the amount payable under the Fourth Schedule has been paid to the members of the arbitral tribunal, such amount will not be recovered from them.”

The court took a look at the comparison of India’s situation in this matter and the international views. India lacks jurisdiction on the matter of arbitration fees. Usually, when a tribunal is constituted, the fee is determined by the institution or discussed with and finalized by the presiding arbitrator. The parties are not a part of such discussions but in ad hoc arbitrations the parties can discuss such fees with the members of the tribunal on their own. The issues that arose in these cases have been concluded by giving the following decisions:

● Arbitrators cannot be the sole judges in the determination of the arbitration fees. They cannot issue any binding orders on this matter. Even though they have the power to apportion the cost between the parties u/s 31(8) and 31A of the Arbitration Act.
● It has been held that the arbitration fee should be fixed at the establishment for the avoidance of matters arising including conflicts between the parties and arbitrators.
● The terms of the fourth schedule refer to claim and counterclaim differently. Thus, arbitrators can charge fees in both situations in an ad hoc case and the ceiling will be applied to both the claim and counterclaim fee.
● The price ceiling given as Rs. 30 lakhs applies to the sum of Rs. 19,87,500 and the variable amount. The highest fee is to be Rs. 30 lakhs.
● The fee applies to each arbitrator on the bench and not the tribunal as a whole. Although, a sole arbitrator is to be paid 25 percent above this amount.

-Report by Ojas Bhatnagar

The Delhi High Court has restrained a Ghaziabad-based pizza outlet called ‘Dominick Pizza’ for inflicting trademark infringement by naming it after commercial giant ‘Dominos pizza’. This was held in the case of DOMINOS IP HOLDER LLC & ANR. vs MS DOMINICK PIZZA & ANR.

FACTS

A pizza outlet by the name of “Dominick Pizza” in Ghaziabad has been seriously tarnishing the image of Domino’s Pizza by using a very similar name and logo. The menu of the Dominick pizza is also quite similar to the original Dominos Pizza, by bringing in various pizza variants like “Cheese Burst” and “Pasta Italiano”. This was seen as a grave violation of trademark rules. Dominos Pizza had filed a suit to the High Court seeking an injunction and claiming damages.

Plaintiff’s Contention

There is a clear violation of infringement of the trademark. The plaintiff seeks the court’s injunction in infringement, rendition of accounts, damages and other things. They seek the protection of the mark “Dominos Pizza” and the accompanying device mark, logo mark and also the marks of pizza variants named ‘Cheese Burst’ and ‘Pasta Italiano’. These are all registered trademarks by the plaintiff, and they cannot be used by anyone else. Mr. Tom Monaghan and his brother James Monaghan had bought a pizza store by the name ‘DomiNicks Pizza’ and that is how Domino’s began. They have expanded to over 90 countries, with almost 20,000 stores operating worldwide. They have defended the ‘Dominos Pizza’ trademark in several suits and the decrees have been in their favor. The customers have been confused which is diluting the business of the plaintiff.

The defendants did not appear.

Court’s Order

After hearing the contentions of the petitioners it is clear to the court that the competing marks are deceptive and imitative of each other. The defendant has also falsely listed itself on various social media platforms and online food delivery platforms like Zomato and Swiggy. Even online reviews by various customers show that their business was confused as being similar to Dominos. This confusion has led to the tarnishment of the image of Domino’s Pizza because the reviews on Google are negative. Irreparable injury would be caused if the injunction is not granted.

It was observed:

“Accordingly, as per the facts and circumstances of this matter, the Plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case in their favour for grant of an ex-parte ad interim injunction. The balance of convenience lies in favour of the Plaintiffs, and irreparable injury would be caused if the injunction is not granted…Accordingly, the Defendant No.1, its proprietors, partners, directors, officers, servants, agents, franchisers and all others acting for and on its behalf, are restrained from advertising, selling, offering for sale, marketing etc. any product, packaging, menu cards and advertising material, labels, stationery articles, website or any other documentation using, depicting, displaying in any manner whatsoever, the impugned marks ‘Dominick Pizza’, ‘Cheese Burst’ and ‘Pasta Italiano’ or any other marks or devices/logos which are identical or confusingly/deceptively similar to the Plaintiff’s registered trademarks, till the next date of hearing.”

Interim relief was granted to the plaintiff and the domains and websites of the defendants were also blocked.

-Report by Vedanti Wanjari

It was held by the Supreme Court of India in the case of MAHADEO & ORS V. SMT. SOVAN DEVI & ORS. that the writ petition submitted by the writ petitioner is wholly misconceived and malicious. It is completely unjustified for the High Court to have handled the case under the pretext of helping a disabled ex-serviceman.

FACTS

The judgment made by the learned Single Judge on November 13, 2018, was confirmed in a judgment by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan on April 19, 2021, which was challenged in an appeal filed before the Supreme Court. In 1965, during the Indo-Pak war, Shri Bheru Lal was a Sepoy in the Indian Army who was injured and amputated his right foot. Thereafter, he was invalidated from service.

The Rajasthan Special Assistance to Disabled Ex-Servicemen and Dependants of Deceased Defence Personnel Act has been established by the State. According to Rule 2(a) of the aforementioned Rules, Shri Bheru qualified as a serviceman with a disability. Rule 6 considered allocating up to 25 Bighas of irrigated land or 50 a large amount of unirrigated land. The idea behind Rule 3 was that these Rules would only apply to government lands in the Bhakra and Chambal Rajasthan Canal Project Colonies, or, if not yet reserved, designated by official notice in the newspaper for distribution to veterans with disabilities.

Additionally, Rule 7 considered the terms and restrictions on allocation. Sub Rule 4 was inserted on 16th February 1967 in Rule 7 wherein it was stated that the allotment will be ruled void and the land will become the property of the state if the allottee does not take possession of the land within six months of the date of allotment. Afterwards, it will be available for re-allocation to anyone else based on these Rules.

Shri Bheru Lal apparently requested a land allocation for disabled military members. The District Collector received a letter from the Soldier Welfare Section of the State’s Revenue Department, On Wednesday, March 19, 1997, word spread that it had been agreed to assign 25 Bighas to Rohikhera Village. There is no letter of land allocation provided to the writ petitioner’s husband or the writ petitioner on file. This letter was internal communication between the departments and not a message for the injured soldier.

Bheru Lal died on July 17, 1998. Sovan Devi,  his wife, succeeded in his inheritance. She appears to be employed by Director General, NCC, at their main office. On January 12, 2010, the writ petitioner presented a representation while at work in the DGNCC headquarters stating that neither she nor her husband had been given control of the land. The High Court passed various orders to ensure possession of the land given to her. The learned Single Judge found
that the alternative land offered to the writ petitioner is located in a very remote/far-off area and is not 6 cultivable and therefore, a direction was issued to give possession of the land originally allotted to the writ petitioner.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION

On September 27, 2021, the appellants brought a civil lawsuit before the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Vallabhanagar, and this is when they learned for the first time about the order issued by the High Court. The writ petitioner was granted land by the High Court, and the appellants sought this Court to contest the High Court’s decision, which went out of its way to order the seizure of land. A letter of allocation was not provided in favor of the petitioner. Inter-departmental communications are firmly established as being essential to the process of deliberation for wise decision-making that cannot be trusted on which to base any claim of entitlement.

COURT’S DECISION

The court observed that the regulations mention that the allocation will expire if possession is not taken within six months. Further, the interdepartmental process is not to be regarded as a letter of allotment. The hon’ble court relied on a lot of cases and it was observed:

“The question, therefore, is whether he did in fact makesuch an order. Merely writing something on the file doesnot amount to an order. Before something amounts to anorder of the State Government two things are necessary.The order has to be expressed in the name of theGovernor as required by clause (1) of Article 166 andthen it has to be communicated. As already indicated, noformal order modifying the decision of the RevenueSecretary was ever made. Until such an order is drawnup the State Government cannot, in our opinion, beregarded as bound by what was stated in the file………...The manner in whichthe matter has been dealt with by the High Court under the guise ofhelp to disabled ex-serviceman is wholly unwarranted”

Even if it is considered to be a letter of allotment, the writ petitioner cannot ask for possession based on such communication after more than 30 years. The writ petition seems to be misconceived and mischievous. Hence the appeal was allowed and the order of the high court was set aside.