-Report by Monishka Allahbadi

The Supreme Court recently granted pre-arrest bail to a man accused of rape. An FIR for the crime of repeatedly committing rape on the same lady (Section 376(2)(n)) was filed against an accused.

In the case of ANSAAR MOHAMMAD v. THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR, an appeal was preferred before the Supreme Court bench of Justices Hemant Gupta and Vikram Nath about the Rajasthan High Court’s decision denying an anticipatory bail.

The complainant had admitted that she had been in a four-year relationship with the appellant. Additionally, it was stated by the complainant’s attorney that she was 21 years old at the time the connection started.

An application for pre-arrest bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was denied for offenses under Sections 376(2)(n), 377, and 506 IPC by the Rajasthan High Court. Ansaar Mohammad filed a petition with the Supreme Court to overturn this decision. The Apex court granted anticipatory bail to the accused.

“we allow the present appeal and set aside the order of the High Court. The appellant is ordered to be released on bail to the satisfaction of the competent authority. It is made clear that the observations in the present order are only for the purposes of deciding the pre-arrest bail application. The investigation shall proceed uninfluenced by the observations made in the present order.”

All pending applications in relation to the bail application were also disposed of.

Hidayatullah National Law University is organizing a Career Development Conclave through a series of online training/workshops/panel discussions/lectures/sessions during the months of August 2022 & September 2022.

ABOUT

The Internship and Recruitment Committee of HNLU along with the Alumni Affairs Committee and ALMA MATTERS has mapped out a series of online training/workshop/panel discussion/lecture/sessions for the months of August 2022 & September 2022 for the undergraduate and postgraduate students of HNLU and other Universities/Institutions.

The Conclave is aimed at channelizing the inherent potential of the students and the institutional presence of HNLU to provide a strong career outlet to the students. The Conclave consists of a series of lectures from professionals across the vivid spectrum of law, entrepreneurship, and public policy amongst others.

TIMELINE

  • Higher Education (Abroad): 6 August, 11:00 AM to 01:00 PM or 03:00 PM to 05:00 PM
  • Civil Services: 7 August, 11:00 AM to 01:00 PM
  • Academia– NET/SET/Ph.D.: 13 August, 11:00 AM to 01:00 PM or 03:00 PM to 05:00 PM
  • Judiciary: 14 August, 11:00 AM to 01:00 PM
  • Bank PO / Law Officer: 20 August, 11:00 AM to 01:00 PM or 03:00 PM to 05:00 PM
  • CLAT (PG) / PSU: 21 August or 11:00 AM to 01:00 PM
  • Entrepreneurs/Start-ups: 27 August, 11:00 AM to 01:00 PM or 03:00 PM to 05:00 PM
  • Public Policy: 28 August, 11:00 AM to 01:00 PM
  • Trade Analyst: 3 September, 11:00 AM to 01:00 PM or 03:00 PM to 05:00 PM
  • CV Building: 4 September, 11:00 AM to 01:00 PM
  • Litigation: 10 September, 11:00 AM to 01:00 PM or 03:00 PM to 05:00 PM
  • Law Firm: 11 September, 11:00 AM to 01:00 PM
  • Mental Well-Being and Legal Fraternity: 17 September, 11:00 AM to 01:00 PM
  • Companies/Legal Counsel: 18 September, 11:00 AM to 01:00 PM or 03:00 PM to 05:00 PM
  • Legal Journalism: 24 September, 11:00 AM to 01:00 PM

CONTACT DETAILS

+91 73552 35075

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Centre for Law, Justice and Development (CLJD), National Law University (NLU) Delhi in association with the University of Antwerp, Belgium is organizing a week-long International Workshop on Law, Development and Sustainability from August 29 to September 3, 2022.

ABOUT

Apart from offering a sound theoretical understanding of law and development discourse and developments at the international level, the workshop seeks to engage with critical intersections such as gender, rights of the marginalized, tribal rights, labour rights and development.

The resource persons for this workshop include Prof. Koen De Feyter and Prof. Wouter Vandenhole both from the University of Antwerp, Belgium and highly acclaimed scholars from India.

REGISTRATION PROCESS

Interested candidates shall the google form on this link.

Payment shall be made on this link. (2000 INR)

DEADLINE

July 31, 2022

CONTACT DETAILS

finance@nludelhi.ac.in

https://nludelhi.ac.in/UploadedImages/993672fc-3d20-400c-8ab5-314819351c96.pdf

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About the Organization

The company NLS Law Services has a lot of experience practising a wide range of corporate law.

About the Responsibilities  

The firm is hiring a Legal Associate.

As an associate you are required to: –

  • Legal Research, drafting and Court Appearance

Location

8/13. Hospital Road, Jangpura Extenstion. Jangpura, New Delhi

Salary

Salary is consistent with the candidate’s qualifications and experience.

Eligibility

  • Only those with 1-2 years of relevant work experience should apply.
  • When selecting a competent board, passionate advocates should be given preference.

How to Apply?

Interested candidates may apply from here: – nislawservices@gmail.com

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About the Advocate

Adv. Aruneshvwar Gupta is a Senior Advocate who has been actively practising law at the Supreme Court of India since 1976. For approximately 14 years, he served as the Additional Advocate General and the Office of the Representative for the State of Rajasthan in the Supreme Court. He successfully represented clients in Singapore and the United States in matters involving power projects and injury claims. He wrote the Sports Act for the states of Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and Himachal Pradesh, which brought about the Indian Premier League and changed the cricket landscape in that country. Specialties: Strategic Consultant, Expert in Arbitration, Constitutional Law, Contract law, Criminal law, Service law, and General Civil.

About the Responsibilities  

Interns in law who have completed the sixth semester and are eager to learn about and work on Simple Agreement of Future Tokens (SAFT) and related agreements pertaining to the Metaverse, gaming, and the Web

How to Apply?

Interested candidates may apply from here: – web3legal@gmail.com

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About the Firm

One of the top and biggest corporate law firms in India is Kochhar & Co., with more than 200 attorneys (“Firm”). The difference of being the only law firm with a full-service presence in all six (6) of India’s most renowned cities, including New Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore, Chennai, Gurgaon, and Hyderabad, as well as four (4) overseas offices, including Dubai, Singapore, Atlanta, and Jeddah, belongs to Kochhar & Co. (affiliate office). The Firm specialises in representing significant global and local firms with a variety of business interests in India and provides a broad range of legal services in Corporate & Commercial Laws, Dispute Resolution, Tax (Direct & Indirect), and Intellectual Property (IPR).

The top law firm for international businesses operating in India is Kochhar & Co. The firm represents some of the biggest businesses from North America, Europe, South-East Asia, and Japan, including 75 of the Global Fortune 500 organisations. The firm also provides legal representation to a number of significant and well-known Indian corporations, such as the Maharatna and Navratna firms (Public Sector Enterprises).

Awards & Recognitions: Major publications like The Legal 500, Chambers & IBLJ have ranked the firm as the Top-Tier (market leading) Firm in the fields of aviation & defence, corporate & M&A, dispute resolution, labour & employment, intellectual property, projects, energy & infrastructure laws, real estate & construction, and technology-media & telecom.

About the Responsibilities  

A Kochhar & Co. is seeking qualified applicants for the following positions as it looks to grow its team

  • Associate – IPR & Litigation (PQE 2-3 years in the relevant field)
  • Associate – Company Secretary and Corporate Governance (PQE 1-2 years in the relevant field)
  • Junior Associate – Corporate (PQE 6 months to 1 year in the relevant field)

Location

Mumbai

Deadline for Applying

August 2, 2022

How to Apply?

Interested candidates may apply from here: –

liberata@mumbai.kochhar.com and kavita@mumbai.kochhar.com with the subject line stating the role in which the applicant is interested.

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-Report by Avinash Pandey

In the case of Kailash Vs. Gordhan was presented before the Madhya Pradesh High Court challenging the legality of the first marriage and proving the second marriage was not illegal under the Indian Laws. The judgment of the Judicial First-Class Magistrate was challenged who had dismissed the appeal after allowing appeals from both sides and cross-examining all the evidences produced, the charges applied in this case were under Section 494 and Section 143
of the Indian Penal Code. The case was then presented before Justice Ani Verma at the Madhya Pradesh High Court.

In this case, the petitioner had rightfully completed his marriage with the respondent, but after some time the respondent, in this case, had committed to a second marriage while she had not obtained a divorce. After the Judicial First Class had acquitted all the respondents from the following case, the petitioner filed a criminal plea before the Madhya Pradesh High Court.

The petitioner had contested before the court that the second marriage by the respondent was illegal and the court was confronted with the argument that was the second marriage a valid marriage under the law and if not was the offense punishable under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code for remarriage while still being committed to one prior. The court in its judgment had initially defined the pointers that are important for a crime to be considered under Section 494 of IPC.

Considering the facts of the above case, the court held that the respondent had denied the marriage with the petitioner initially under Section 313 of the CRPC. The court observed that the need to prove the legality in front of the court was on the appellant, yet he had failed to discharge the burden on him. The court said that no proof or document was presented by the appellant to stand that the marriage between the petitioner and respondent was a legal Hindu marriage following all the rituals.

The court while acquitting the respondents from the following appeal had stated that the burden of proof was on the petitioner to provide relevant documents which will show that the first marriage and the second marriage were not legal which they have failed to do and hence the appeal was dismissed and the respondents were rightfully released from the case.

-Report by Rhea Mistry

The High court of Himachal Pradesh in Rakesh Kumar v. the State of Himachal Pradesh said that daughter of the family does not cease to be a member of the family just because she gets married, she is still considered a member of the family.

The petitioner Rakesh Kumar is the son of his deceased father Khajana Ram who served as a Beldar in the Arki Division of Himachal Pradesh Public Works Department perpetually. He passed away while working on 17th May 2015. His son, the petitioner, Rakesh Kumar after his father’s demise applied for a job through the government’s policy of obtaining on compassionate grounds.

In 2008, the petitioner applied for a job that got rejected by the government for the reason that he did not fulfill the financial income criteria which are provided by the government by Department of Personnel regulations. The mother of the petitioner followed with an application to the authorities on the same compassionate grounds for a job. After that, the petitioner again applied for the job on compassionate grounds but through the Right to Information Act, he came to know this application was also rejected. Thereafter, he filed the present petition.

During the petition, it came forward that the deceased has left behind four members of the family, i.e., his widow, two sons, and one married daughter. Calculating the family income at that time was Rs. 95,122/- from the income certificate given by the tehsildar on 11th September 2013.

For a family of four or more with dependents, the annual income should be Rs. 1,25,000-with an individual income of Rs. 31,250/- per annum. In the petitioners’ case, the individual income was Rs. 31,707. The claim was rejected stating that the petitioner is not judged as poor.

After the death of the father, when the petitioner applied for the job the income of the family from all the sources was Rs. 33,800/- as per the income certificate which was issued by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The pension was received by the family and including that, the annual income went to Rs. 53,280/-. According to the Notings, the annual income
of the family was judged to be under the prescribed limit of Rs. 75,000/- considering the three members of the family i.e., the wife and two sons. The Finance Department rejected the petitioners’ application because he did not suffice the financial criteria prescribed by the government.

The court heard the contentions made by the petitioner and the learned additional advocate general and said that the rejection of the petitioner’s application was a bit “harsh”. The court also stated that the individual income is Rs.31,707/- when the limit is Rs. 31,250/- because it is more than Rs. 450/-, and the petitioner’s application is rejected. If the income would have been Rs. 31,250/-, then the petitioner was eligible for application on compassionate grounds.

The court observed that while considering the family income and members, the daughter was not counted as a family member as she was married. They stated that when a girl gets married, she loses a title in two ways, one is she loses a title as a family member from her family and the other is she loses a title from her in-law’s family for the purpose that she cannot be considered a family member for assessing the annual income. The court found this “arbitrary” and “discriminatory”.

There is no reason why a daughter should not be counted as a family member while calculating family income. The court said that if they approve the standards issued by the government, it will become a party for gender discrimination. So, the Himachal Pradesh High Court asserted that while calculating family income, the daughter must be considered a member of the family. She will not cease to be a member of the family merely because she is married.

In this case, the family income is to be assessed with four members and not three. After calculating the income with four members, it comes to less than Rs. 31,250/- and so allowed the petition. The respondents are ordered to offer the appointment to the petitioner on compassionate grounds on his qualifications. The court also said that the appointment of the petitioner is said to be notional for all purposes and intents including monetary and actual benefits and shall accrue from the date of appointment of the petitioner which shall be made up to 15th July 2022.
With this, the petition was disposed of.

CITATION

1992 AIR 1858, 1992 SCR (3) 658

APPELLANT

Miss Mohini Jain     

RESPONDENT

State Of Karnataka And Ors.

BENCH

Kuldip Singh (J)

DECIDED ON

30 July, 1992

ACTS/SECTIONS

Constitution of India, 1950-Articles 41, 45-Right to Education, Karnataka Educational  Institutions  (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1984 ( Section 3)

BRIEF FACTS

Mohini Jain was a young lady initially from Meerut, Uttar Pradesh, and needed to seek after MBBS from a confidential school in Karnataka named Sri Sriddharatha Medical College, Agalokote, Tumkur. As per the Karnataka Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, it was laid out by the state government that Private Medical Colleges will charge just â‚č2000 per annum from understudies conceded on Government seats, â‚č25,000 from understudies from the territory of Karnataka and â‚č60,000 from understudies of the other states in India. Aside from this, no expense ought to be requested from the understudy. This step was taken to guarantee that the Private Medical Colleges don’t charge cash from understudies in return for affirmation.

The administration of the school illuminated her that she would need to present an amount of â‚č60,000 for each year however her dad passed on to the specialists that â‚č60,000 is an enormous measure of cash and he was unable to manage the cost of that. On this premise, she was denied confirmation in the school. Miss Jain later affirmed that separated from the â‚č60,000 the school likewise requested â‚č4,50,000 as a capitation charge however this was denied by the school.

The Respondents guaranteed that she was approached to pay a measure of Rs. 60,000, and thusly, the Management got a call from the Petitioner’s dad who pronounced that he didn’t possess the ability to pay the extreme sum.

The Petitioner guaranteed that she was approached to pay an extra amount of around four and a half lakhs as capitation expense, which was denied by the Respondents energetically. Ms. Jain recorded a request under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution testing the notice of the Karnataka Legislature that considers requesting such excessive sums from understudies for the sake of educational cost.

The appeal guaranteed that the warning was violative of Articles 12, 14, 21, and 41 of the Indian Constitution as it conspicuously denied the Right to training to Indian residents on an erratic premise. The expense charged could without much of a stretch be recognized as a capitation charge. It was, in this manner, violative of Section 3 of the Act and against the excellencies of Right to Equality and Right to Education.

ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT

  • Whether the Right to Education is ensured to the residents of India in consonance with Fundamental Rights, and whether charging a capitation expense infracts something similar?
  • Whether the charging of capitation expense is violative of the fairness statement cherished in Article 14?
  • Whether the criticized warning allowed the charging of a capitation expense dishonestly?
  • Whether the notice is violative of the arrangements of the Act restricting the charging of such expenses?

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

The Petitioner battled that the burden of such colossal charges for training by the confidential school is against the different articles under the Indian Constitution.

For this situation, the Respondent battled at first that the rules which have been continued in the confidential school with respect to the capitation expenses are not chargeable from those understudies who were equipped for the Government situates yet just from those understudies who were from various classes. They additionally contended that as they were following such grouping of seats in the school under merit list or under nonmeritorious list, which suggests that Government seats for up-and-comers who were under merit rundown and other people who were not. Accordingly, the administration leading group of the school has the option to charge expenses from the individuals who didn’t go under the legitimacy list.

One more contention by the Respondent was that as they were a confidential clinical school and there was no monetary guide which was given from the public authority Karnataka or the focal government furthermore basically these confidential clinical universities used to cause 5 Lakh Rupees as use for MBBS course. Ultimately, they additionally battled that the confidential clinical universities have consistently observed the Guideline of regulation and submitted to every one of the regulations for the smooth working of the organization and were legitimate in charging the capitation expenses.

HELD

After hearing the contentions from both the gatherings the Apex Court held that however the Right to Education isn’t explicitly referenced as a Fundamental Right; Articles 38, 39(a), (f), 41, and 45 of the Indian Constitution, it is clarified that the of the constitution makes it required for the State to instruct its residents. Article 21 of the constitution peruses “No individual will be denied of his life or individual freedom besides as indicated by the technique laid out by regulation”. Under Article 21 of the constitution and a singular’s poise can’t be guaranteed except if he has a Privilege of Education and taught himself. Further, the Court thought about the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, by the United Nations and a few cases that held that the Right to Life envelops more than “life and appendage” including necessities of life, sustenance, haven, and education.

Charging immense expenses limits admittance to instruction to the lower layers of society and makes it accessible just to the more extravagant segment of individuals. Poor meriting up-and-comers can not get confirmation because of the failure to pay the endorsed charges and as a result, in instructive establishments, a resident’s “All in all correct to Education” gets denied. Further, permitting the charging of an exceptionally high capitation expense disregards Article 14 of the Constitution of India the Court noted. The main strategy for admission to clinical universities ought to be founded on merit alone. The court likewise said that the judgment cannot is applied reflectively and cases past this cant receive the reward of the judgment.

CONCLUSION

The Hon’ble Court displayed its choice of standards of social government assistance and value. 10 years and a half before ‘Right to Education’ was officially presented in the Constitution. The judgment is moderate and somewhat radical. The Court was constant in its understanding of what summed as a capitation expense and its relevance — or deficiency in that department. Its exhaustive assessment of Fundamental Rights interlinked with the Right to training was exemplary. The Court underscored the Right to rise to the opportunity being similarly essentially as vital as the Right to uniformity itself. An extreme assertion in the recently changed Indian setting, the idea that the Right to training moved from the Right to life honored the philosophies of the days of yore. The Court put import on merit as opposed to monetary capital, a demonstration that should have been visible as an obstruction against privatizing instruction.

This article is written by Arpita Kaushal, a student of UILS, PUSSGRC, HOSHIARPUR.

INTRODUCTION

The age-old Contempt of Courts laws’ history comes way back from the period of Regulating Act enacted by the British in India, where, the Mayor’s Court was given the authority which is equal to that of the English King’s Bench court for assigning punishment for the offence of contempt of court.

The first Contempt of Courts Act was enacted in 1926. The Act gave the authority to the three High Courts in Colonial India- Bombay, Madras and Calcutta to penalise any person for the offence of contempt on itself and also its inferior courts. The punishment was imprisonment for a minimum of 6 months or a fine or both for committing the Act. However, on an apology submitted by the accused, he/ she would be discharged.

After India acquired independence, the Act of 1926 was replaced by the Contempt of Courts Act 1952. The highest court of India, i.e., the Supreme Court also known as the Court of Record has been given powers that the High Courts during British India had along with the power to penalise for contempt by Article 129 of the Constitution of India. The Act of 1954 had many shortcomings in it. The committee headed by the Former Additional Solicitor General, H. N. Sanyal, reviewed the contempt laws in 1971 after a decade of its enforcement. The Committee was mandated to: 

(i) review the law pertaining to court contempt generally, and in particular, the law pertaining to the sanctioning process;

(ii) to propose changes therein in order to (whenever necessary) clarify and revise the law; and

(iii)  to offer suggestions for the codification of the legislation.

The lacunae present in the previous Acts have been corrected and the present Contempt Courts Act 1971 was formulated as per which, it is “An Act to define and limit the powers of certain courts in punishing contempt of courts and to regulate their procedure in relation thereto.”

CONTEMPT OF COURTS

In general terms, we can understand that anyone who disrespects the court or its legal authorities or disobeys the order of the court, the judge has the right to impose fines on them or can sentence imprisonment for some time if found guilty of the act. This phrase can also be taken in terms of the judiciary’s freedom from restrictions. As is common knowledge, every judge has the authority to grant judicial proceedings within the bounds of the law. Anything that restricts or prevents a judge from granting a necessary judicial action can be considered contempt of court.

According to Section 2 (a) of The Contempt of Courts Act 1971, Contempt of Court is defined as civil or criminal contempt.1

The Constitution of India has 2 two Articles regarding the Contempt of Courts.

  1. Article 1292– This Article gives the power to Supreme Court to be the ‘Court of Record’ and it has the authority to penalise for contempt of itself and its inferior courts.
  2. Article 142(2)3– The Supreme Court shall have absolute authority to issue an order for the purpose of securing any person’s attendance, the discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself, subject to the requirements of any law established in this regard by Parliament.
  3. Article 2154– The High Courts have the right to punish for the contempt of courts and its lower courts.

CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT 1971

The Contempt of Courts Act 1971, is the only act which has defined the terms ‘Contempt of Courts’ in the enactment. As mentioned earlier, contempt of court is defined as civil or criminal contempt. In Noorali Babul Thanewala v. K.M.M. Shetty5, a person provided a court with an undertaking during civil proceedings. The court sanctioned a course of action based on the assumption that the undertaking was accurate, yet the undertaking appears to be false. As a result, this was viewed as misbehaviour and court contempt. There are various clauses in this legislation which state that doing so does not constitute contempt of court.

The Act specifies under Sections 3 to 7 that innocent publication and distribution of matter, accurate report of the proceedings, fair criticism, complaint against presiding officers of subordinate courts, and publication of information relating to proceedings in chambers or camera do not amount to contempt. Any other defences except mentioned under the act don’t affect. The Act gives the power to the high courts to try the contempt of courts cases and also the punishments are prescribed, procedures, etc., are mentioned.

Types of Contempt:

  1. Civil Contempt:

Civil contempt is defined in Section 2 (b) as “wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other processes of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court;”6

Essentials of Civil Contempt:

  • The disobedience or breach must be done wilfully.
  • The act must be done deliberately.
  • A genuine court order being issued, the respondent being aware of the order, and their capacity to comply.
  • It does not include careless, negligent, honest, or unintended behaviour or a real incapacity to follow the requirements of the order.

Cases:

In Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh7, the Supreme Court has held that mere disobedience of the decree is not enough to prove civil contempt. The element of willingness is important to charge within the Act. In the case of Dr. Sajad Majid v. Dr. Zahoor Ahmed8, the court stated that mere pendency of the appeal in the appellate jurisdiction does not protect him from contempt of court if there is a non-compliance of the order and that would cause him risk since it’s done without any legal justification.

  • Criminal Contempt:

According to section 2(c), “ ‘criminal contempt’ means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which— (i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court; or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner.”9

Cases:

In the case of Jaswanth Singh v. Virender Singh10, a lawyer made a scandalous and insulting attack on the High Court judge. A petition for an election was submitted to the High Court by an advocate. In order to hear more arguments in an election petition and to transfer election petitions, he wished to ask to remain. These things undermine the High Court’s judicial process and have a propensity to embarrass the Court. In this instance, it was determined that there had been an attempt to intimidate the High Court judge and obstruct the conduct of a fair trial.

In Anantha Lal Singh v. Alfred Henry11, it was held that any comment upon the advocate who is handling the suit amounts to contempt of court on the same principle, which is applicable to the judges or the judgement.

Punishments under The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971:

Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971, mentions the punishments for the offence of contempt. The Act states that there can be simple imprisonment which extends to 6 months or with a fine, which extends to Rs. 2,000 or both. However, on the accused apologising for the act committed, he can be discharged or the punishment can be remitted. The Supreme Court has the authority to award punishment to its subordinate courts as well.

In the case of Re: Arundhati Roy12, Supreme Court made the observation that legitimate criticism of a judge’s behaviour or the role of the judiciary as an institution may not constitute contempt if it is offered in good faith and for the benefit of the general public. The editors of the Times of India and the Indian Express were charged with contempt in 1978 as a result of the publication of articles that criticized the Supreme Court’s ruling in the habeas corpus case, ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla13, where the Supreme Court declined to defend the right to habeas corpus during the Emergency.

LACUNAE

The list continues, but on two fronts, the Act receives harsh criticism. The term “scandalizing the court,” which is used in Section 2(c)(i), is unable to identify action that scandalizes or incites biases against the judicial establishments, leaving a grey area. The meaning of contempt has not been adequately and precisely provided.

In Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India14, it was held –

  • that scandalizing the court is not only an offence under the Act but is sui generis. While courts are not unduly sensitive to fair or even outspoken comments, in the larger interest of protecting the administration of Justice, no one can be permitted to distort orders of the court and deliberately give a slant to its proceedings and bring it to ridicule.
  • Courts succumbing to the pressure tactics of litigants would result in negation of rule of law. Threats of public protests, meetings and undertaking satyagrahis against orders of Supreme Court prima facie appear to be an attempt to prejudice or interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings.
  • Courts cannot be forced by pressure tactics of litigants to change their decisions, by organizing protests against court orders in pending judicial proceedings.
  • Supreme Court’s shoulders are broad enough to shrug off comments and no action in contempt is needed to be initiated.

Criticism of the Court and restrictions on free speech – A PIL attorney named Prashant Bhushan was found guilty of contempt of court in 2020. He had criticized the judiciary for paying only partial attention to hearing cases during the lockdown after sharing a news photo of India’s then-Chief Justice, Sharad Bobde, riding a motorcycle without a face mask during the Covid-19 epidemic.

The Legal Fraternity has attacked it as having a chilling effect on this right as well since its definition is too broad and imprecise, allowing it to be used to shield the judges from criticism, and because the Freedom of Speech is constrained by the court’s power of contempt. The constitutionality of the Contempt of Courts Act was also challenged by Bhushan and others; this case is still pending.

The Supreme Court declared that merely criticizing the court does not amount to contempt of court in PN Dua v. Shiv Shankar & Ors15. The Court ruled that as long as criticisms of the legal system or of judges don’t interfere with or obstruct the administration of justice, they should be welcomed in the public realm. However, some people have thought that criticism is being linked with diminishing the authority of courts, which is completely untrue.

CONCLUSION

The Contempt of Courts Act 1971 can be said as a colonial act due to its presence in society. The act provides the provisions that protect the dignity of the courts and the judges. Contempt of court is a concept whose remedy is to prove that the information is true. There also are provisions in the act which provide exceptions for the contempt of courts. However, there is also the perspective that, the extent of the contempt authority is constrained by giving it a clear and specific meaning, making it impossible to employ it carelessly or indiscriminately.

It is undeniable that the judiciary has exceptional power when it comes to contempt. The aforementioned authority must be used to uphold the Rule of law, not the supremacy of any particular judge. The rule of law frequently manifests itself through court and tribunal judgements. Therefore, the Court’s inherent authority to protect the majesty and dignity of the courts is the Contempt Jurisdiction.

REFERENCES

  1. The Contempt of Courts Act 1971, s. 2(a).
  2. The Constitution of India, art. 129.
  3. The Constitution of India, art. 142 (2).
  4. The Constitution of India, art. 215.
  5. Noorali Babul Thanewala v. K.M.M. Shetty, 1990 AIR 464.
  6. The Contempt of Courts Act 1971, s. 2(b).
  7. Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh, AIR 2002 SC 1405.
  8. Dr. Sajad Majid v. Dr. Zahoor Ahmed, 1989 Crl.L.J. 2065
  9. The Contempt of Courts Act 1971, s. 2(c).
  10. Jaswanth Singh v. Virender Singh, 1994 suppl. (5) SCR 336 
  11. Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh, AIR 1931 Cal 257.
  12. Re: Arundhati Roy
. 
 vs — on, 2002 AIR (SCW) 1210.
  13. Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, AIR 2010 SC 2221.
  14. Re: Prashant Bhushan & Anr. 
. Alleged Contemnor(S)
  15. P.N. Dua v Shiv Shankar & Ors, 1988 AIR 208.

This article is written by K. Mihira Chakravarthy, first year BA LLB student from Damodaram Sanjivayya National Law University (DSNLU).