Tag: #SupremeCourtofIndia

–Report by Sneha Sakshi

In the case of MAHARASHTRA STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATION EX-EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION & ORS.
VERSUS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS., the appellants had brought a discrimination claim against the Maharashtra government’s Industry, Energy and Labour Department’s decision dated 29.03.2010 in that procedure.

FACTS:

The workers of the Maharashtra State Financial Corporation who retired or passed away between January 1, 2006, and March 29, 2010, were not granted the benefit of the pay scale change that the Fifth Pay Commission had recommended. The modification, however, became effective on January 1, 2006.

The determination of the implementation date for the Fifth Pay Commission’s recommendations as they relate to the respondent corporation is at issue in this case. That formulating a policy on fixation of pay for the wages of its employees, the scope of its revision, as well as the date of its execution, are undeniably matters of exclusive executive decision-making power. Special leave to appeal granted.

The appeal was finally heard with the parties’ knowledgeable counsel’s permission. A ruling by the Bombay High Court is being contested by the appellant organisation.

CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANT:

➢ The expert counsel for the appellants, Mr Jay Salva, asserted that, notwithstanding the fact that the most recent pay modification had been in effect for its employees from 1986 to 1989, MSFC believed it had gone into effect on January 1, 1999. While the previous version was being authorised, five more revisions were due.
➢ The board of directors decided to follow the pay commission’s recommendations starting in January 1996 without giving those modifications any thought.
➢ Only the 115 current employees who were working at the time that the benefits were passed on were subject to the enhanced salary, depriving the 900 previous employees of comparative advantages.
➢ All people who were employed received temporary reliefs beginning in September 1993, including those who ultimately lost out on the pay revision owing to retirement.
➢ Mr Salva contended that the MSFC owed no more than 32 crores to all former workers, including those who had retired, asked for VRS, or had passed away. He said the GR failed to recover the money paid for interim relief and ad hoc amounts paid to current employees between September 1993 and July 2001.

CONTENTIONS OF RESPONDENT:

➢ The employee in question was not subject to any scheme and chose to leave the company of his or her own volition. However, the Corporation had less obligation to pay salary dues.
➢ The defence attorney for MSFC contended that the state government shouldn’t intervene because of the contested judgement.
➢ It was contended that MSFC is an independent company and is exempt from Maharashtra Government regulations.
➢ Expert counsel emphasised that by paying the benefits on the terms proposed by the appellants, the Corporation was suffering losses.
➢ These characteristics made these workers eligible for benefits above and beyond what they would have gotten if they had remained in their jobs.
➢ Before issuing such a ruling, the Court, according to Mr Patil, must consider the financial impact on the employer.

JUDGMENT:

On January 1, 1996, the State Government adopted and put into practice the Fifth Pay Commission’s recommendations. Without choosing whether to impose those scales for its employees, the MSFC forwarded the idea to the State Government (as required by S. 39 of the State Financial Corporations Act). During this period, all present employees received a little reprieve in the form of wage revision.

The Fifth Pay Commission’s recommendations for pay modification were put into action by MSFC on March 29, 2010. The State of Maharashtra letter dated 29.03.2010 served as the basis for the decision to apply the wage revision to the workers who were already working there and to minimise the arrears that would be due as of the first of January 2006 in the future.

By Office Order dated 09.04.2010, the MSFC decided to implement the decision of the Government of Maharashtra and grant the benefits of the Fifth Pay Commission to employees of the Corporation who were on its rolls on that date.

The highest court in India has ruled that voluntarily leaving one’s job before finishing it is still eligible for rewards. The employer cannot discriminate against or split a homogeneous class of workers using a fake cut-off date, the court said.

It was held that VRS employees cannot claim parity with others who retired upon achieving the age of superannuation. Those who died during that period shall be entitled to arrears based on pay revision, accepted by the Corporation. The Corporation was directed to pay interest @ 8% p.a. on these arrears from 01.04.2010 till the end of this judgment.

LINK TO FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3Rw1Qbk

–Report by Prapti Prajeeta

In this case of IFB AGRO INDUSTRIES LIMITED vs SICGIL INDIA LIMITED, the court determined the forum appropriate for adjudication and determination of violations of SAST and SEBI Regulations. In this case, the contention that under Section 59 the National Company Law Tribunal exercises a parallel jurisdiction with the Securities and Exchange Board of India for addressing violations of the Regulations framed under the SEBI Act was rejected.

In this very case, an appeal was filed against the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal for a judgment passed. 

FACTS:-

The Appellant is a company listed and engaged in manufacturing and selling rectified spirits, etc. And respondent No. 1 is a too-listed company engaged in producing the same type of products. Other respondents are the managing director, his wife and some close relatives of the respondents. 

In August 2003, one respondent came up with a proposal for a business between the Appellant and Respondent No. 1. The Appellant rejected the proposal. After this rejection, the Respondents started acquiring shares of the Appellant from the open market to eliminate competition and strengthen its dominant position in the relevant market. 

As of 2004, the Respondents held under 5% of the Appellant’s total paid-up share capital. At the same time, Respondent No. 1 acquired 600 equity shares of the Appellant, and as a result, the respondents aggregate shareholding crossed the paid-up share capital of the Appellant in total by 5%, it triggered the SEBI (SAST) Regulation 7(1)9

Four months later, Respondent No. 1 acquired additional shares of the Appellant; as a result, the total paid-up share capital of the Appellant exceede5% by shareholding. This triggered the SEBI (PIT) Regulations, and Respondent No. 1 failed to disclose within the prescribed time. 

After this, the Appellant filed a petition before the Company Law Board under the 1956 Act for its register rectification by deleting the name of the Respondents as the owner of shares over and above the 5% threshold. 

Upon receiving notice of the petition above, but then Respondent No. 1 sold a few shares of the Appellant and then brought down to 4.91%its shareholding. But the Appellant claims that Respondent No. 1 never reduced its shareholding. Then SEBI was also informed that the individual shareholding of Respondent No. 1 stands below 5%. And as a result, SEBI has not taken any regulatory action.

But then the matter stood transferred to the Tribunal. The tribunal held that it violated the SEBI (PIT) Regulations. Further, the Tribunal also held that there had been SEBI (SAST) Regulations violation as the Respondents did not disclose in the proper format. However, the Tribunal held that the CLB and SEBI exercised powers fall in different and distinct jurisdictional fields. The tribunal thus allowed the company petition.

The Respondents then went to Appellate Tribunal in an appeal where it allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Tribunal. Being aggrieved by it the plaintiff brought this appeal.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS:-

the Appellant contended that no time intimation was prescribed in format and given by the Respondents when SEBI (SAST) Regulations got triggered; Respondent Nos. 1 – 6 were “connected persons” and were “acting in concert.” He then emphasized that the Respondents had previously admitted to the non-disclosure. Thus the Appellant has the right under Section 111A of the Act to approach the tribunal for rectification of the register. 

DEFENDANT’S CONTENTIONS:-

The Respondents contended that filing a petition under Section 111A is an abuse of process. No violation under the SEBI (SAST) Regulations has occurred as the Respondents did give timely intimation in the prescribed format. The SEBI (PIT) Regulations do not apply to the other Respondent as shareholding never crossed 5% in individual limit. And under section 111A (3), the Tribunal doesn’t have any power to annul the transfer or to direct the buy-back of the shares.

JUDGMENT:-

The court held that the SEBI (SAST) regulation is a comprehensive scheme, the complained transaction should suffer regulator scrutiny and only the regulator has to determine the provisions of the SEBI Act and the Regulations.

Further, the court held that the Appellant is not justified to invoke the CLB jurisdiction under Section 111A for violation of SEBI regulations. And the Tribunal was wrong in allowing and entertaining the company petition filed under Section 111A of the 1956 Act. However, the tribunal did exceed its jurisdiction, so the Appellate Tribunal’s decision in setting aside the judgment was correct. The court then dismissed the appeal with no order as to costs.

–Report by Nawvi Kamalnathan

The petition was filed under Article 136 of the Indian Constitution in the name of M/S Indian Medicines Pharmaceuticals Corporation Ltd Versus Kerala Ayurvedic Co-Operative Society Ltd. & Ors. to be heard before Judges on the matter concerning tenders as the preferable method to procure contracts with the state over other discretionary and arbitrary methods which tend to be violative of Fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution of India.

FACTS:

The first respondent herein this case is Kerela Ayurvedic Co-operative Society Limited, which is a licensed Ayurvedic and Unani drugs Manufacturer, filed this suit to contest the judgment passed by the High court of Lucknow Bench, Allahabad judicature in favour of the Indian Medicines Pharmaceutical Corporation Limited (IMPCL) and the state.

In the year of 2014, the GOI launched NAM to promote the department of AYUSH, Ministry of Health, and Family Welfare to procure a cost-effective medical system and services. In the Operation Guidelines of the same, it is provided that 75% of the admissible assistance shall be aided by the Central Government and 25% of that remaining shall be taken care of by the respective states. The UP-stateAYUSH society initiates its purchases from a single vendor IMPCL, and the purchase order is given to them without any tendering process just based on nomination.

In a petition filed by the first respondent against the appellant, they sought a decree to procure Ayurvedic Medicines under the AYUSH program through tenders. The High court held the method of procuring medicines is illegal. Therefore, the appellant was directed to invite tenders for competitive rates thus initiating the supply of quality drugs.

PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTIONS:

Mr. Naresh Kaushik, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants contested that IMPCL has been in the picture to cater to the needs of the Central Government to procure quality medical drugs, and thereby, the GOI holds around 98.11% of its shares. One of the prime reasons to supply drugs at an affordable price is the unique organizational setup and the prices of the drugs are vetted by the union Ministry of Finance.

IMPCL has a drug testing laboratory that is certified since it’s a government manufacturing company. Also, the Ministry of AYUSH has at various times recommended the purchase of medicines from IMPCL. Paragraph 4(vi)(b) mentions the phrase ‘at least’ that can be inferred to provide a minimum benchmark for procurement and not the upper limit.

It was further contended that the procurement of medicines may be made through tenders in cases where the property is planning to dispose of and in this case, there is no reason.IMPCL is not a private entity, so, there is no scope for monopoly, when the sale is not initiated in the open market.

DEFENDANT’S CONTENTIONS:

Whereas on the other hand, Mr. Kaleeswaram Raj, the counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents contended that Para 4(vi) provides only the establishment to procure medicines and does not address the question of whom and how. The mention of the phrase ‘or’ in para 4(vi) can be inferred to indicate that all are equally eligible to supply medicines.

UP State cannot arbitrarily fix one particular party to be eligible to procure medicines and all the entities mentioned in the para shall be recognized on an equal footing. Thus, initiating purchases in a fair process that shall enable all entities for an equal opportunity to secure orders.

There is no warrant for procurement of medicines to be obtained only from IMPCL and the prices shall be vetted by the Department of Expenditure, Ministry of Finance but it does not have the power to determine the prices of Ayurvedic medicines. So, the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority should be the authority for determining the prices of medicines.

JUDGEMENT:

The court observed from the precedents that the state while entering a contract shall not stand on the same foot as a private person, thus, it can’t act arbitrarily while dealing with the public be it in matters of jobs or contracts. It is also essential that the state and all its instrumentalities have to conform to COI to guarantee Fundamental Rights to its citizen.

In answering the question of whether the tender is a constitutional requirement the court has pointed out certainly more than once in many of its cases that Government contracts must be initiated transparently. The first cum first service policy is arbitrarily alienating resources and this is not a preferred method of allocation.

The court considered that tender allows negotiation with a private enterprise. The reason for the public auction being reasonable is that it allows a transparent process for the public and the procurement of any goods can be made at their best quality and price. The deviation of tender should not violate Article 14 and must be fair and reasonable.

The intervention application filed in the court has the scope only to interpret para 4(vi)(b) of the Operational Guidelines and the court finds that there were no records to show that other manufacturing entities of drug suppliers cannot supply better drugs. Therefore, the appeal stands disposed of.

–Report by Nawvi Kamalnathan

In the case of The Chief Engineer, Water Resources Department and Others (hereinafter referred to as appellants) Versus Rattan India Power Limited through its Director and Others (hereinafter referred to as respondents) the important issue of, the party signing the contract is entitled to the amount of consideration or not was dealt with by the Supreme Court.

FACTS

The respondent has entered into a contract with the appellant to Pay the sum of Rs.1,00,000/- for irrigation restoration charges reserved for irrigation purposes. The same consideration was agreed to be paid on the date of signing the contract. A writ petition filed before the High Court of Bombay directed the respondent to pay Rs 50,000/- per hectare by reducing the irrigation restoration charges affecting the total liability reduction.

The appellant sought an appeal as per the Irrigation Department of the State of Maharashtra. As per the circular, no water shall be utilized for other purposes unless an agreement is entered into by the concerned government and the industry. Water usage for industrial purposes is seen as a loss of water rather than being directed to agricultural purposes.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS

The substance of the argument made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant was that the contract is sacrosanct in nature. The impugned order entered by the respondent and the appellant for accepting the irrigation restoration charges shall not be entitled to be challenged.

DEFENDANT’S CONTENTIONS

On the other hand, the counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent contended that the rate prevailing in the in-principle approval granted by the high-powered committee is directly linked to the approval or sanction was applicable and the appellant could have levied the charges.

The government circular shall apply prospectively and not to ongoing contracts. If the circular is given a retrospective effect, it would certainly undermine it.

JUDGEMENT

The respondent is not justified in levying the charges when he agreed to pay the same while entering into a contract he issued an undertaking to pay the specific sum within the specific time period. The agreement and undertaking shall be stopping the respondent from challenging the irrigation restoration charges.

The rights and liabilities of the parties are standing crystallized from the date when entered into the contract. The in-principle approval granted in favour has been cancelled as they failed to execute an agreement with the appellant. Also, the central government undertaking was given an exemption as the power produced from it shall be used for public benefit. In comparison to all other parties, the respondent has been drawing high amounts of water, especially from an area scarce of water resources.

However, the records before the court state only two instalments being paid by the respondents, and therefore, the court directed the respondents to pay the balance amount with interest from the date of instalment fell from the date of the impugned order.

In conclusion, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India allows the Civil Appeal arising from the special leave petition and sets aside the impugned judgment passed by the High Court of Bombay, and directs the parties to bear their own costs.

–Report by Harishri

In the case of The Chief Engineer, Water Resources Department & Ors. Versus Rattan India Power Limited through its Director & Ors., the appeal was filed by the State of Maharashtra against the judgement of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, whereby the High Court has reduced the ‘irrigation restoration charges’ that the Respondent has contracted to pay.

Facts:

The State of Maharashtra came up with a circular prescribing that when water is diverted for non-irrigation purposes, then the entity using such water shall pay 50,000 per hectare irrigation restoration charges. It also prescribed that no water shall be diverted unless an agreement is entered into between the concerned industry and the government.

Sophie Power Company Ltd. Intended to set up a thermal power plant. A communication was sent by the respondent to the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation to confirm the availability of 240 million litres of water per day to facilitate smooth running. Pursuant to the application made by SPCL granted approval for the usage of water. This was subject to SPCL paying capital contributions and irrigation restoration charges. The Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation granted final approval for the usage of water. SPCL was directed to pay Rs.100000 per hectare. The respondent sent a letter to the government against the levy of higher charges. Later, the charge was increased to Rs.100000 per hectare by the government. Ultimately, the Appellant and Respondent entered into a water supply agreement to pay Rs. 100000 as in 5 instalments. Six months after signing the agreement, he initiated a writ petition before the High Court of Judicature of Bombay at Nagpur to direct him to pay irrigation restoration charges at Rs.50000 per hectare. It was held that it would be appropriate for the rate prevailing as of the date of the grant of in-principal approval.

Appellant’s Contention:

The appellant contended that the order is against the agreement dated 22.05.2012 entered into between the appellant and the respondent. It is submitted that after accepting Rs.100000 as irrigation restoration charges, the respondent is not entitled to challenge it. The essence of his contention was that a contract is sacrosanct and must be respected.

Respondent’s Contention:

The respondent contended that the irrigation restoration charge is directly linked to the date of approval and the relevant date since the circular dated 21.02.2004 was applicable. The appellant could have only levied Rs.50,000 per hectare. Also, similarly placed companies were given the relief that the Respondent was seeking. It was also contended that the undertaking given by the respondent after signing the agreement was not unconditional. It was subject to numerous representations by the respondent for the reduction of the irrigation restoration charge. The Government Circular will apply prospectively and will not apply to ongoing contracts.

Decision:

The bench was not satisfied with the approach adopted by the High Court when the respondent himself wilfully and deliberately entered into an agreement knowing the legal and business consequences. The High Court has committed an error in entertaining a fresh writ petition, which effectively claimed the same reliefs as the previous one. It also has committed a mistake in supplanting its view over that of the contract. The bench also directed that the balance amount due payable towards the irrigation restoration charge shall be paid by the respondent on or before 30.06.2023. Further, interest @ 12% p.a. shall be payable from the date the instalment fell due till the date of the impugned order. The bench allowed the civil appeal and set aside the impugned final judgement.

-Report by Nawvi Kamalnathan

In the case of Jabir and Others (hereinafter referred to as the appellants) Versus the State of Uttarakhand (hereinafter referred to as the respondents) the Supreme Court has decoded the need to understand the time frame between seeing the accused or deceased to the actual offence having occurred and thus the doctrine of last seen cant be applied in every case where the witnesses testify for seeing someone on relation to the case as it has its own limitations.

FACTS

Haseen, the son of Prosecution Witness 1, is about 7 years old and went missing on 08.10.1999 around 4.30 pm. Later on, on 10.10.1999, his dead body was found in a sugarcane field in a village situated at a distance from his village. The post-mortem report showed the death occurred two days earlier.

After an order from the magistrate, the First information report was investigated and witnesses were produced by the police officers in charge. Also, in their final reports, the police alleged the appellants to be guilty of the crime.
The appellants were convicted under sections 302, 364, and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and were sentenced to life imprisonment, seven years, and five years imprisonment respectively. The sentence and the conviction were upheld by the High Court of Uttarakhand.

PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTIONS

The counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants contended that the conviction and the sentence given by the trial court are unsustainable, as there were no reasons as to why the FIR was delayed by almost five weeks after the seven-year-old deceased went missing.

Further, it was contended that the application under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was moved only after a month and no such application was sent to any officer. The police witness didn’t seem to support the statement made by the PW-1 (father of the deceased boy) and said to contain suspicions.

Per the testimonies of a few witnesses, it could be understood that the role of the accused was not known to PW-1. However, it could not be inferred from the inquest report. The complete point of focus of the counsel for appellants was that they were named as a result of enmity with the father of the deceased and his family.

It was highlighted that all the witnesses bought before the court from the prosecution’s side were members of the deceased and his family. The enmity could be traced back to an FIR lodged by the appellant’s family against the PW-2 the previous year to this incident.

DEFENDANT’S CONTENTIONS

The counsel appearing on behalf of the defendants contended that the court shall not disturb the current findings of the lower and the High Court. First dealing with the issue concerning the delay to file FIR the counsel said PW-1 didn’t sense anything unnatural and went to search for his son throughout.

Only after obtaining knowledge of the dead body did, he go to the police station after the post-mortem. The last-seen theory was not inaccurate in this case because as per A-1 to A-3’s statement, they have seen the boy latest with the appellants.

The inquest conducted following the day of the death was found to have occurred under suspicious circumstances. The investigations conducted by the police were not satisfactory as it was done much later to the death.

JUDGEMENT

The court held that as per the basic principle of criminal jurisprudence, in case of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution shall be obliged to prove beyond any reasonable doubt. That all the links between the circumstances shall be established so as to complete the chain of the crime.

The court was also of the opinion besides crucial infirmities as there was no evidence in any form be it oral or objective that creates a connection between the appellant or the accused in this crime. The doctrine of last seen shall also have its limitations considering the time lag between the time the deceased was last seen with the accused and the time between the murder.

Therefore, the appellant-accused’s conviction and sentence passed by the lower courts shall not be sustained and the impugned judgment was set aside, thus ordering the acquittal of the accused.

-Report by Pragati Prajeeta

In the case of Delhi Development Authority Vs Manpreet Singh with Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Secretary Land & Building Department vs Manpreet Singh, a common question of law and facts arose in appeals out of the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, and hence both the appeals are being decided and disposed of together in a common judgment and order by the Supreme Court of India. And the main question, in this case, was Whether a subsequent purchaser has the locus to challenge the acquisition and/or lapsing of the acquisition?

FACTS

The subsequent purchaser is the original writ petitioner, who in the year 2018 acquired the rights and interest in the land. But the original writ petitioner was not the recorded owner when under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, of 1894 the award was issued concerning the land in question. And from all the records, it appeared before the High Court, that the claimed right by the original writ petitioner was based on the 2015 Assignment. Under Section 4 of the Act, 1894 notifications in this present case were issued and the award was declared.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS

The appellants vehemently submitted that as such the respondent is the subsequent purchaser and is the original writ petitioner, who after the Act,2013 came into force purchased the property hence therefore as observed by this Court in the case, they held that he had no locus to challenge the acquisition/lapsing of the acquisition proceedings under the Act, 2013 as he is a subsequent purchaser. Then it was submitted that the High Court declared material that the acquisition is deemed to lapse in the writ petition filed about because of the reason that the respondent is a subsequent purchaser, and had no locus to challenge it as observed and held by the Court.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

The learned senior counsel, however, has submitted that the decision of this Court needs some re-consideration under the Act, 2013 for certain relevant aspects which have not been previously dealt with and/or have been considered. But at the same time, he is not disputing or contradicting the fact that the subsequent purchaser is the original writ petitioner, who in the year 2018 acquired the right, title and interest in the disputed property or even after Act, 2013 came into force.

JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court after looking into the facts and reasons stated the appeal is successful. And in the view of the latter case, the High Court committed some serious error while for instance entertaining the writ petition of the response that is the original writ petitioner. Then it was also seen that the court has materially erred while declaring concerning the land in question, acquisition under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 has lapsed in a writ petition filed by, the original writ petitioner, the respondent who is a subsequent purchaser.

The Supreme Court then held that the judgment and order passed by the High Court are hereby quashed and set aside. The original Writ Petition filed before the High Court stands dismissed. At the same time all the pending applications, stand disposed of and the present appeals are allowed accordingly. But at the same time looking into the facts and circumstances of the case, it held that there shall be no order as to costs.

-Report by Akshita Singh

The Supreme Court, in M/S POLYFLEX (INDIA) PVT. LTD. V THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX & ANR, held and has appropriately set aside the request passed by the ITAT and has indeed restored the proposal passed by the assessing official denying the deduction asserted under Section 80-IB of the IT Act, henceforth declaring the appeal declared to be dismissed.

FACTS OF THE CASE:  

 In its production facility in Pune, the appellant produces “polyurethane foam,” which is ultimately used to make car seats. Deduction was requested under Income Tax Act (also known as the “IT Act”) Section 80-IB in the appellant’s income tax return for the assessment year 2003–2004. Because the appellant is a “manufacturer of polyurethane foam seats,” which is covered by entry 25 of the IT Act’s Eleventh Schedule, the assessing officer denied the appellant’s request for deduction under Section 80-IB of the IT Act. As a result, the appellant was declared ineligible for the deduction. Although different sizes/designs of polyurethane foam are used to make car seats, it is the appellant’s stance that the finished product—an automobile seat—is distinct from the polyurethane foam and does not, therefore, fall under entry 25 to the Eleventh Schedule of the IT Act. The assessing officer rejected the claim, noting that because “polyurethane foam” is made of polyol, isocyanate, and other ingredients, Section 80-IB(2)(iii) of the IT Act prohibits the appellant-company from receiving the benefit of the deduction as it manufactures or produces the items listed in the list in the Eleventh Schedule of the IT Act.

To challenge the assessment order, the appellant filed an appeal with the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) (abbreviated “CIT(A)”). The CIT(A) upheld the assessing officer’s decision. The CIT(A) noted that because the two chemicals, Polyol and Isocyanate, employed in the production of polyurethane foam seat assemblies were the essential components of polyurethane foam, the case would naturally come under the guidelines enumerated in the Eleventh Schedule. The Appellant filed an appeal with the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (also known as “ITAT”) in opposition to the CIT(A)’s ruling. The ITAT overturned the assessment order as well as the CIT(A) order and granted the appellant’s appeal, noting that polyurethane foam was used as an automobile seat and was neither produced as a final product nor an intermediate product nor a by-product by the appellant, so it does not fall under entry 25 to the Eleventh Schedule of the IT Act. As a result, the appellant was eligible to claim a deduction under Section 80-IB. The High Court specifically noted in the impugned judgment and order that what the appellant manufactures is polyurethane foam in different sizes/designs and that there is no further process undertaken by the appellant to convert it into automobile seats, so polyurethane foam being manufactured by the appellant falls in entry 25 to Eleventh Schedule, therefore, the appellant shall not be entitled to any relief under the ITAT order.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION: 

When the ITAT allowed the appeal and determined that the appellant was entitled to claim a deduction under Section 80-IB of the IT Act after appreciating all of the evidence on file, taking into account the process used by the appellant, and considering the fact that the end product was an automobile seat, Shri Preetesh Kapur, appearing on behalf of the appellant, has argued that this decision did not require interference from the High Court. He further asserted that entry 25 of the Eleventh Schedule refers to “latex foam sponge and polyurethane foam” and did not refer to “latex foam sponge and polyurethane foam preparations” or items or articles made from the aforementioned foam. There is a specific entry for that, such as entries 2 and 3, where it is specifically mentioned “tobacco and tobacco preparations and cosmetics and toilet preparations,” according to the argument made. Therefore, it was proposed that the appellant shall be entitled to a deduction under Section 80-IB of the IT Act because the polyurethane foam used as an ingredient in the end product, an automotive seat, loses some of its original properties.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:

When speaking on behalf of the revenue, Shri Balbir Singh vehemently asserted that the appellant manufactures and sells polyurethane foam in a diverse range of sizes and designs, which is ultimately used by the assembly operator to manufacture seats of cars and other vehicles as an ingredient after going through the moulding and other manufacturing processes, therefore, the appellant cannot be producing and selling car seats. It was asserted that the polyurethane foam that was being produced and sold was made utilizing the chemicals polyol and isocyanate.

DECISION:

The court held that the final product manufactured by the appellant was automobile seats merely because the appellant uses the chemicals and ultimately what was being manufactured is polyurethane foam and the same is used by assembly workers after the process of moulding as car seats. The appellant itself must carry out a further step in the car seat manufacturing process. Other than providing or selling polyurethane foam in various sizes, forms, and shapes that may ultimately be used as end products by others as car seats or automobile seats, the appellant does not appear to have engaged in any additional processes therefore, according to Section 80-IB(2)(iii), the appellant is not eligible for the benefit under Section 80-IB of the IT Act. 

INTRODUCTION

Water is indispensable to life. Human beings can survive for 3 weeks without food, but only three days without water. Moreover, there may be no food cultivation without water. Conceptually, therefore, the right to life, considered the foremost basic and fundamental of all rights, must include within it a right to water. The right to water evolved from initial references to water in numerous international treaties, including the Convention on the Elimination of All types of Discrimination against Women, 1979, the Convention on the Rights of the kid, 1990, and therefore the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2008. Ultimately, in 2010, the international organization (“U.N.”) General Assembly adopted resolutions on the “Human Right to Water and Sanitation” and on the “Human Rights and Access to Safe beverage and Sanitation” emphasizing recognition of the “right to water”. We now have a separate right to water. In 2002, the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (“E.S.C.R”.) adopted General Comment 15 noting that “The right to water is indispensable for leading a life with human dignity”. The Committee also defined the core content of the “right to water” to incorporate “everyone’s right to sufficient, safe, acceptable and physically accessible and affordable water for private and domestic uses”.

BACKGROUND

Historically, Dalits have sought integration and respect within mainstream Hindu caste society which has been denied to them for hundreds of years, in accordance with the dominant development paradigm. On the opposite hand, Adivasis have sought development on their terms outside mainstream Indian society. As a result, Dalit articulation of the “right to water” seeks not only to secure state provisioning of water within the traditional vertical exercise of their rights against the state but also to make sure enforcement of access to it water provision through the horizontal application of the correct in legal code against upper castes that block such access. For Adivasis, however, articulation of the “right to water” is inextricably linked to their rights to land and forest, seen as a part of one indivisible ecosystem.

Apart from the judicial articulation of a generally applicable “right to water”, I also describe the articulation of this right on behalf of two marginalized groups. the primary group includes Dalits or Scheduled Castes that constitute 16% of India’s population, who have historically faced systematic discrimination within mainstream Hindu society supported their caste. Originating in ancient India, and transformed by medieval elites, and later by British colonial rule, the class structure in India was a system of conditions that consigned people in several castes to different hereditary occupations, positions, and ways of life. Dalits or untouchables were placed outside the societal hierarchy and were denied access to common sources like food and water. The other group includes Adivasis or indigenous peoples which includes 8.6% of India’s population, who are historically marginalized because they need to live largely in geographical isolation in hills and forests with distinct cultures outside the society.

The right to life is continuously expanded, which has the proper to possess a clean environment and also the right to health, and after your time court mentioned that it also includes the correct to water. after we analyze various judgments of the Indian court, we will find that they need not only considered the correct to urge water as a fundamental right, but the court has also mentioned that water should be social asset.

Right to water was added to the extended interpretation of the proper to life under article 21 of the Indian constitution within the judgment of the case of Peoples Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India & Ors. W.P. (Civil) No. 196 / 2001. This judgment created a precedent that seeped all the way down to rock bottom levels of court.

The country of India hosts a large population that further creates a large demand for basic life necessities like water. However, this demand goes with major disappointment for people because of the severe scarcity of water. consistent with the 2017 UNICEF report, India’s two-thirds districts among the 718 districts, were reported to be under-supplied with water, with groundwater becoming scarcer a day

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

WATER (PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF POLLUTION) ACT, 1974

Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 is the primary enacted by the parliament in relevance to the protection and preservation of the environment. The water act came into force to make sure the restoration of the water, where the domestic and industrial effluents pollute water with no precautionary measures. The Constitution of the Central Pollution Board and State Pollution control panel is empowered under the act to perform various functions like establishing the standard, research, and investigation of the bodies creating pollution to the water bodies. The awareness about promoting the cleanliness of water streams, well and rivers is also raised by this Act. And also, one every of the most purpose of building this act was to stop and control the pollution of water.

One of the provisions of this act provides that nobody can establish any industry which discharges sewages or trades effluents into the water bodies without the permission of the state board. But within the case of Province Pollution board II v. Prof. M. V. Nayudu it had been held by Supreme Court that Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 doesn’t provide an exemption to the state for exempting the establishment of personal body or polluting industries creating pollution to the water bodies.

PROVISIONS OF ENVIRONMENT (PROTECTION) ACT, 1986

Environment Protection Act has got force on19th of November 1986. The name environment protect act itself provides the most objective of the act as protection of the environment. This act provides power to the Central Government to require appropriate measures so as to shield and improve the environment.

INDIAN EASEMENT ACT, 1882

The Indian Easement Act came into force on the 1st day of July 1882. Under this Act, the word Easement is defined in Section 4. But normally term easement means “right to enjoyment”. The rights of Riparian owners are recognized under this Act. A riparian owner is the one who has his land nearby the river or a stream.

Even after various legislations are passed the river water in India are continuously polluted River Ganga despite being worshiped by almost a billion people of this country is included among the foremost polluted river of the identical, variant liters of chemical waste is disposed of in these waters by the industries including the pollutants like cyanide, zinc, copper, lead, cadmium, and mercury including sewage waters also which is that the biggest pollutant These pollutants are so poisonous that they not only kill fishes instantly but other animals also. When these poisonous pollutants are disposed of in water it reduces the standard of water and makes them useless for drinking.

In the case of M C Mehta vs. State of Orrisa and Ors, a writ petition was filed for shielding the health of thousands of individuals living within town Cuttack and therefore the other areas which were adjacent thereto, which were plagued by the pollution caused by disposition discharged into the river by a municipal committee of Cuttack and SCB Medical Collage Hospital, also the State Pollution Board in its report concluded that the water within the city wasn’t fit human consumption and even bathing, The Apex court ordered to require immediate steps to manage the present situation and a responsible municipal corporation was formulated by the court for effective management of pollutants within the city’s beverage.

The government also because the Boards established under the legislation should attend to those matters not just by providing fines to the individuals polluting water but through imprisonment.

The case of Vikash Bansal vs Delhi pollution control committee marks an exceptional judgment given by the supreme court because, during this case of Haryana Paneer Bhandar, an offender was imprisoned for a period of 1 year with 1 Lakh Rupees fine together with 2.5 lakhs Rupees to tend to the PM relief fund, but what must be noticed during this judgment is that this case isn’t associated with any criminal offense like rape, murder, robbery or assault whereas it had been a case associated with the environment that’s polluting the river of Yamuna.

These types of convictions are seen as very rare and in line with me, the court must make such convictions more frequently so as to safeguard the environment from degrading further.

CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION

Not only a private can approach through the provisions of the legislations associated with the Environment but also through filing a Public Interest Litigation Now, pollution of water is worried to a bigger public, and any dispute associated with water may be settled through filing a Public Interest Litigation. Public Interest Litigation is filed through Article 32 of the Constitution of India which provides about the proper Constitutional Remedies and thru Article 226 of the Constitution of India which provides about the ability of the court to issue certain writ Public Interest Litigation may be filed through Section 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provides about common nuisance. Public Interest Litigation will be converted into writ and the other way around.

CASE DECISION

Right to induce clean water isn’t an enumerated right under the Constitution of India. This right was brought to light through various judicial pronouncements and has become an integral part of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. And also, in the case of Sachidanand Pandey v. State of West Bengal, the Supreme Court held that the court is guaranteed to bear in mind Article 21 which offers about Right to life and private liberty, and Article 48A which provides the basic duties and Article 51A. (g) which provides about the Directive Principles of State Policy whenever a case associated with environmental problem is brought before such court.

CENTRAL WATER COMMISSION

Central Water Commission was established to perform various functions including the initiation, coordination, and consultation of the authorities within the matter associated with the preservation, control, utilization, and distribution of water resources to the citizens of India. The central water commission is now part of the state of India. It makes sure the utilization of water resources appropriately so as to regulate floods, and droughts, maintain irrigation, and provide potable, etc.

In recent time, thanks to Covid-19, there has been large control on the pollution not only to the water bodies but also control of pollution, noise, pollution, etc. the govt. must take this as a chance to stop any more pollution of the water bodies by bringing various other legislation or simply by improving the provisions of the present legislation. The provisions of current legislation shall be made stricter which creates fear within the minds of individuals from further polluting the environment.

CONCLUSION

Water isn’t a personal asset and is the main essential ingredient for the survival of the people. It’s important to regulate pollution caused to the river water, streams, wells, etc. because India includes a total of only 4% of the world’s H2O, uses 80% of that merely for farming, and using polluted water for farming will adversely affect the health of people. The second most populated country within the world is additionally home to thousands of ethnic and tribal groups which survive on the character or jungle for his or her food and water including the little streams of water from major rivers, the presence of chemical pollutants are incredibly harmful moreover as deadly in some cases. And also, the right to induce clean water isn’t an enumerated right but could be a right enforced under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

 Hence Right to induce a clean beverages is additionally considered a a fundamental right and no one can deprive of such a right. If this right is empty a person, the one that has been aggrieved of those rights contains a right to approach under different provisions provided under the varied legislations. Different reasonable protection must even be given to major rivers and their connecting tanneries because these pollutants are directly affecting the habitat prospering around these rivers.

This article is written by Ashutosh Banshwar, a student of School of Law, Sharda University.

Introduction

Covids are a gathering of contaminations that can cause infections like the ordinary crisp, outrageous extraordinary respiratory condition (SARS) and the Middle East respiratory issue (MERS). In 2019, another Covid was recognized as the justification for a sickness discharge that started in China.

The contamination is known as outrageous extreme respiratory condition Covid 2 (SARS-CoV-2). The disease it causes is called Covid ailment 2019 (COVID-19). In March 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) broadcasted the COVID-19 episode as a pandemic.

General prosperity get-togethers, including the U.S. Places for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and WHO, are actually looking at the COVID-19 pandemic and posting investigates their locales. These social occasions have also given propositions for thwarting and treating the contamination that causes COVID-19.¹

The overall pandemic that has caused lockdowns in different nations all around the planet has caused aggravation in all highlights of life for an uncertain period. Social isolating has emerged as the most momentous weapon to condense the spread of this uncommonly irresistible contamination in the overall population generally speaking. Regardless, these social eliminating commands have reshaped and changed various endeavors all around the planet.

The Indian authentic scene has furthermore been vexed and genuinely impacted by this pandemic. Again with the social isolating responsibilities and the country again under lockdown orders, regulation workplaces in India and the Indian lawful structure have expected to close their approaches to the general populace. Eventually, considering that a complete conclusion of the Indian value structure is horrendous, the law workplaces have done work-from-home procedures, however, the legitimate directors have embraced development by coordinating hearings through video conferencing.²

The Supreme Court of India on 14.03.2020 expressed that from 16.03.2020 just dire issues will be thought about. The SC has moreover planned that super the lawyers following up with respect to this present circumstance, i.e., either for disputes or presenting oral perspectives or to help, close by one litigant just, will be permitted in the court. The SC has moreover guaranteed all power to require warm screening at all members and to deny entry to individuals found to have high inside heat levels. In addition to this, the Supreme Court vide Suo Moto Writ Petition no. 1 of 2020, has similarly raised the issue of illness of Covid-19 disease in confinement offices. The realization of desperate issues is done through video conferencing by presenting an application called “Vidyo” (informed by Supreme Court vide fliers dated 23.03.2020 and 26.03.2020). Likewise, Supreme Court vide Suo Moto Writ Petition no. 3 of 2020 expanded the Limitation period for all of the cases w.e.f. fifteenth March 2020 till extra arrangements of the Supreme Court. All tries are been expected to manage value in the country.³

Changes to the Indian Legal System

The Indian Judiciary has been overburdened for a seriously significant time frame, and COVID-19 is simply adding to this danger. As of May 27, 2020, there is generally 3.24 crore approaching cases in India’s subordinate courts and around 48.2 lakh impending cases in the High Courts. The Supreme Court, vide its notification dated March 13, 2020, restricted working of the Court to “squeezing matters” so to speak.

High Courts additionally have restricted their working to basic issues. In the customary course, a High Court hears in excess of 400 issues each day. As indicated by data accumulated from Daily Cause Lists of various High Courts, since late March, High Courts in the country over are hearing wherever between 10-100 matters consistently.

Subordinate courts address over 80% of approaching cases. On June 2, the Karnataka High Court extended the finish of all area courts, family courts, work courts, and current chambers in the state till July 6. On April 29, the Punjab and Haryana High Court mentioned that all area and sub-divisional Courts in Punjab, Haryana, and Chandigarh will work “restrictively” from May 1 “till the lockdown/time impediment is in force in the specific locale”. These restrictive measures have provoked an overabundance of impending cases, thusly growing the load on courts.⁴

The pandemic has channelized the ability of under-utilized gadgets and elective work models (like virtual hearings). Customary ways to deal with working have been changed and recognized at a stunning speed and without any problem.

With a very restricted ability to concentrate time, graduate schools had changed to electronic coaching and learning, the Courts had relied upon the Virtual Courts System and regulation workplaces are continuing to work from home giving development to be a lifeline for the Indian genuine scene.

The impact of the pandemic has been essentially tracked down in the Indian courts. To adhere to the social isolating guidelines and to control the spread of the second surge of this overwhelming contamination, the Indian Courts have relied upon Virtual Hearings in Virtual Court Rooms to guarantee that the association of value stays undisturbed. A most recent model that can be referred to here is that of Justice Jasmeet Singh of the Delhi High Court who carried on the virtual hearing beyond 11 pm on Monday, 21st June 2021 to complete the issues recorded before him!

The model similarly suggests that having changed the Indian legitimate scene by taking on development during this marvelous overall crisis, the Indian Legal System has completed and guarded our old-fashioned custom – Justice, at all Costs, Always!⁵

The impact of the pandemic has been altogether tracked down in the Indian courts. To adhere to social isolating norms and to control the spread of the second surge of this overpowering disease, the Indian Courts have again relied upon Virtual Court Rooms to ensure that the association of value stays consistent. It ought to be seen that, the possibility of Virtual Courts is certainly not a unique thought in India. In 2003, the Supreme Court of India in State of Maharashtra v. Prafulla Desai held that recording of confirmation by a Court through video conferencing will be seen ‘as per the procedure spread out by guideline’. From there on out, a couple of subordinate Courts in India have recently illustrated rules in such a manner and have held legitimate methods through video conferencing.²

Without a doubt, even free genuine aide — dependable under the Constitution — is out of reach to an enormous number of regardless of the National Legal Services Authority’s organization that there should be one legitimate organization’s office for a reasonable bundle of towns. The IJR reveals that extensively, there is only a solitary office for 42 towns. In states like UP and Odisha, there is only one for more than 500 and 300 towns independently.

Methodology makers and commitment holders need to orchestrate attempts across police prisons’ lawful chief and authentic manual for recognizing squeezing repairs than can be set missing fundamentally more weight on resources. Illustratively, ensure assortment – has the first call while enlisting, center around resources so genuine organizations are open at the doorway step of the remotest estates and towns: this could mean growing the number of police chowkies in country districts to placing assets into quick skilling up of judges, constables, board lawyers, and jailors who are individuals ready to come in case of an emergency.

The Supreme Court has, again and again, affirmed that permission to value is a significant right. Its affirmation has fumbled and unnecessarily extended. The transport of significant worth value ought to now be seen as on a very basic level significant and become truly in the presence of everyone.⁶

Conclusion

This piece has recently covered a part of the repercussions of COVID-19 on the legitimate calling and there are various locales, for instance, genuine preparation which moreover ought to be tended to on truly significant. The ongoing concedes in the general arrangement of regulations might be exacerbated by the snags COVID-19 will present to the progression of assessments, charging decisions, pre-primer cycles, etc.

Clearly, the Coronavirus is putting down profound roots, and the Judiciary needs to adjust to it. Normal working or rather “new standard” working of courts will take as much time as required. Preferably, it shouldn’t accept unreasonably extended, in the event that Lady Justice will in a little while need to, close by a blindfold, cutting edge and scales, be decorated with a facial covering.⁴

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References:

1. Kohli, Rusy. [Online] https://www.barandbench.com/columns/from-the-bubonic-plague-to-covid-19-impact-on-the-legal-profession-in-india.
2. College, Asian Law. [Online] https://alc.edu.in/blog/changes-in-justice-delivery-system-in-pandemic-virtual-hearings/.
3. Daruwala, Maja. [Online] https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/how-covid-pandemic-hit-the-justice-system-101614554343346.html.

This article is written by Cheshta Bhardwaj, a student of Delhi Metropolitan Education (GGSIPU).