Tag: #SupremeCourtofIndia

-Report by Sakshi Sneha

The current review petition in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. Versus Chandervir Singh Negi has been filed on the grounds that defendants/the State were ordered to begin the acquisition procedures for the land in question within three months of the judgment’s entry and to conclude those proceedings within one year of that date in order to acquire the land. It was argued that the court’s orders are invalid and should be amended, and that the plaintiff, ChanderVir Singh Negi’s action should be dismissed since the plaintiff had previously given the state of Himachal Pradesh the land utilised for the building of the road on June 28, 2016.

FACTS:

Feeling resentful and unsatisfied with the contested judgement and order dated 09.08.2019 issued by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Shimla in Regular Second Appeal No. 270 of 2007 by which the High Court allowed the said appeal and set aside the judgement and decree issued by the learned Trial Court dismissing the suit and subsequently decreeing the suit directing the appellant to file an appeal.

CONTENTIONS OF RESPONDENT:

The original plaintiff filed the lawsuit before the experienced Trial Court in order to obtain a declaration, a mandatory injunction, and a directive instructing the appellants in this case—original defendants—to begin and finish the acquisition proceedings with regard to the plaintiff’s land and any harm to his fruit-bearing trees. Without following the rules of the Land Acquisition Act, the plaintiff claims that the appellants in this case—original defendant nos. 1, 2, and 3—built the “Tikkari­Larot Bodra Kwar road” on his or her property without paying him or her any compensation. The fruit-bearing plants also sustained harm.

CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANT:

The initial defendants disputed the lawsuit, arguing, among other things, that the claim was waived because the plaintiff waived his right to compensation because the road was built with his consent in 1987 while he was working as a Mate in the Department and in accordance with his request. They also claimed that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the plaintiff is eligible for the declaration relief that has been requested for?

2. Whether the plaintiff is eligible for the compensation claimed?

3. Whether or not the case cannot be maintained?

4. If the lawsuit has run out of time?

5. Whether his actions and behaviour estop the plaintiff from bringing the case?

6. Does the lawsuit need to be correctly appraised for court costs and jurisdictional purposes?7. Whether the plaintiff lacks a legal claim?

8. Relief?

JUDGMENT:

The First Appellate Court upheld the challenged decision and order issued by the High Court as well as the conclusions noted by the knowledgeable Trial Court. According to the plaintiff’s witnesses’ depositions, the retaining wall and the parcel of land in dispute were both built in 1987 on the plaintiff’s property. The plaintiff’s witnesses confirmed that fruit trees were damaged or destroyed in 1987, and the suit’s claimed cause of action was the building of the road in that year. In exercising its authority under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Court should not have interfered with the factual findings in light of the aforementioned facts and circumstances.

The High Court’s contested decision and order should be annulled and overturned because they lack merit. In regards to the restriction and/or the litigation being barred by limitation, the High Court has not established any significant legal issues. The reality remains that the plaintiff’s land is where the retaining/protection wall was built in 2003, the road was built in 1987, and any trees were damaged or destroyed in the same year. Because the lawsuit was filed in 2003, it was time-barred under Articles 58 and 72 of the Limitation Act.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3Sts1ji

-Report by Mushkan Vasani 

Bombay High Court while hearing the writ petition on 24^thFebruary, 2023 in the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (Petitioner) Versus Union of India & Ors (Respondents) allows the writ petition subject to compliance of conditions. 

FACTS:

In the present case, the Petitioner is seeking permission for the execution of the proposed project of a suction tank for providing water supply (basic necessity) to the citizens of Gorai Village who are facing a shortage of water supply in their vicinity. The project is being developed on the land owned by the State Government and the said project is partly affected by the mangrove buffer zone area. 

Respondents no. 1-5 have granted sanction and NOC subject to no destruction to the mangroves due to construction and subject to the permission of this Hon’ble Court for construction in the mangrove buffer zone. The Respondents have also reserved their rights concerning revocation and suspension of sanctions granted in case of non-compliance with conditions. Another clause concerning a fresh application/proposal is to be filed by the petitioners in case of alteration/ deviation of the proposed project.  

The Respondents stated that all the sufficient safeguards in respect of environmental protection in the due course of construction and until completion of the project be taken into consideration. 

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:

The petitioner contended before this hon’ble court to permit them to execute the proposed project.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:

The respondents (except Respondent no. 6) agreed on the permit subject to compliance with the conditions mentioned in the sanction. However, Respondent no. 6 contended that the proposal should not differ from the actual work and stay be granted. 

JUDGEMENT:

The Hon’ble Court after hearing all the facts in the present case allowed the writ petition for the public interest on the following grounds :

1. The petitioners are to apply for fresh permission in case of alteration/deviation in the proposed project.

2. Undertaking by a responsible officer of the Petitioner concerning compliance of all the conditions in sanction granted be filed within 1 week from the date of this order i.e 24^th February, 2023, and copy to be served to the Respondents.

3. IA no. 4655 of 2022 stands disposed of.

4. Rejected the stay applied by Respondent no. 6 at this stage of the matter.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3YZ1flf

-Report by Arun Bhattacharya

The Supreme Court of India on Thursday 23^rd of February, 2023 had to resolve a bizarre case of appeal by a by a mother who had allegedly strangulated her five-year old child in desperation and desire to live separately. The aforementioned matter has been dealt in VAHITHA versus STATE OF TAMIL NADU. 

FACTS:

A wife having to live without her husband finds herself in desperate need to live separately and not with her mother-in-law. Out of desire to remove the only obstacle in her way of liberation that in this case happens to be her five-year old child, strangulates and murders the child causing asphyxia. Trial court had found the woman to be guilty under the offence of Murder and sentenced her accordingly. Thehonourable High court also reiterated the stand taken by the lower court hence being aggrieved by the same; she filed the present appeal under a Special Leave Petition before the apex court of the nation.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION:

The appellant highlighted many of the discrepancies in the prosecution’s case specifically focussing on the fact that there was no motive for the appellant to commit such a heinous act. (Here it must be noted that motive is something which prompts a person to take action, intention is the act done in order to achieve the motive and knowledge is merely the awareness of the consequences of such acts.) Appellant tried to establish her plea of alibi as to the absence of her during the death of the child and that she was elsewhere with her fatherand was arrested at the bus stand while she was returning after hearing the news of her child’s demise. 

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:

The prosecution/respondents clarified that the evidences were satisfactory as to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and since it was established by the witnesses that the appellant was the person with whom the deceased child was last seen, the conviction by the learned Trial Court and the High Court was justified.

JUDGEMENT:

The Apex Court while referring to the guidelines as enshrined in Sharhad Bidhichand Sharda analysed the matter on the basis of circumstantial evidences rejected the plea of alibi by the appellant citing clear contradictions in the testimonies of the hostile witnesses and upheld the prosecution’s argument regarding motive of the appellant as to the desire to live separately.

Thus upholding the decision taken by the learned Trial Court and the honourable High Court, the Apex Court dismissed the appeal.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3XZQCxt

-Report by Saloni Agarwal

The Supreme Court in Union of India vs Indian Navy Civilian Design Officers Association and Anr., decided the rights and rules of the judiciary in interfering with the functioning of the executive and decided the parameter for the same.

Facts:

The appellant challenged the decision of the tribunal court regarding the pay scale of Junior Design Officers (JDOs). The respondent had filed before the tribunal court regarding the pay scale of JDOs to be equal to that of Civilian Technical Officers (CTOs) i.e. Rs 7500-12000. The pay scale was fixed by the Fifth Pay Commission. But the plea to equate the pay from Rs 7450-11500 to that of CTOs was rejected by the Finance Minister. The respondent filed another case before the tribunal and the tribunal was directed to grant the pay scale equal to that of CTOs. The appellant was aggrieved by this filled before the High Court and the decision of the tribunal was dismissed by it. The question which arises is the tribunal and High Court are justified in deciding the pay scale and post of the JDOs and CTOs.

Appellant’s Contention:

The plaintiff claimed that the JDOs and CTOs are governed by different sets of Rules and the release period is also longer in the case of CTOs. The UOI also said that the duties and responsibilities of the CTOs are more complex than the JDOs. The post of CTOs exists in different fields and the Pay Scale was fixed based on a recommendation given by Fifth Pay Commission and the Tribunal and High Courts had committed errors by upgrading it. The pay scale was fixed according to the working and requirements of the JDOs.

Respondent’s Contention:

The respondent claimed that the Commission ignored that from the very start, the pay scale of JDOs and CTOs is the same. The responsibilities and duties of both are somewhat similar. Till the Fourth Commission, the pay scale was the same for both. All the essential qualifications and rules followed were more or less equal. Equal Pay for Equal Work should be given.

Judgement:

The court said the Tribunal and High Court has committed gross error in interfering with the post and pay scale and upgrading the same. The decision of the post lies with the executive and it requires an exclusive framework and careful observation. The judiciary cannot interfere ordinarily unless there is something unfair and injustice done in matters regarding finance. The court said the rules, responsibilities and duties performed by the CTOs were different from JDOs. The court quashed the decision of the Tribunal and High Court and the appeal stands true and the appellant was held correct.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3kqkTI4

-Report by Umang Kanwat

Family law conceptions still depend on parental control and the idea of “the family” as a unit, while privacy theories are mostly adult-centered and cannot be meaningfully applied to minors. In the recent case of Aparna Ajinkya Firodia Versus Ajinkya Arun Firodia, the Supreme Court determined that it could not forgo the rights and best interests of a third party, namely the child, in order to grant one of the parties to the marriage the benefit of a fair trial.

FACTS:

In the current case of Aparna Ajinkya Firodia Vs. Ajinkya Arun Firodia involving a married couple was going through divorce proceedings suspecting that the appellant-wife was in an adulterous relationship. The husband requested the court to order a DNA test on their second child to determine if he was the biological father. The court granted the request, and this decision was upheld by the Bombay High Court.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS:

The appellant declines to submit the kid to a DNA test in her capacity as the child’s mother and natural guardian in order to safeguard the child’s interests and welfare. She is actually acting in the child’s best interests by refusing to submit the child to a DNA test.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:

The respondent is not contesting the child’s legitimacy, but rather accusing the appellant-wife of adultery, and since she refused to submit the child to a DNA test, a presumption under Section 114(h) of the Evidence Actmight be made against her. In other words, he argues that Section 114(h) rather than Section 112 applies in this particular case and that the court is not required to expose the kid to a DNA test if the appellant is unwilling.

JUDGEMENT:

The Apex Court by concluding that the High Court and Family Court erred by granting the respondent’s request to subject the child to a DNA test, stated that in every instance when a parent declines to have their child undergo a DNA test, it is not prudent to infer the worst under Section 114 of the Evidence Act.

The court also emphasised that children have the right to protection from having their legal status inadvertently called into question in court. A child’s understanding of privacy could differ from an adult’s. However, merely because they are young, children should not be denied this right to shape and comprehend their sense of self. Furthermore, children have a specific right to maintain their identity under Article 8 of the Convention. Parental information is a characteristic of a child’s identity. As a result, it is forbidden to arbitrarily contest a child’s parentage in front of a court of law.

As a result, the appeal was granted. The court did add that this would not prevent the respondent-husband from presenting more evidence to support the claims he made against the appellant in the divorce petition.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3SnATqL

–Report by Shweta Sabuji

The judgment and order from the learned Single Judge of the High Court, dated April 4, 2019, that overturned the Trial court’s orders by Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code is being contested in the present case of MITA INDIA PVT. LTD. Versus MAHENDRA JAIN.

FACTS:

Mahendra Jain was given a contract by the appellant company, M/s.Mita India Pvt. Ltd., for the relocation of a 33 K.V. electrical overhead line at its Dewas factory. The appellant company unintentionally paid an excess payment in connection with the aforementioned contract. The respondent sent two checks to the appellant company for its return after agreeing to refund the excess money. Cheques were returned due to “stop payment” instructions. By section 138 read with Sections 141/142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881, the appellant company filed a complaint in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dewas through its authorized representative Ripanjit Singh Kohli. Respondent made two petitions in the aforementioned complaint. – Kavindersingh Anand cannot testify in court because the complaint nowhere claims that he is aware of the facts and transactions, according to the first allegation that the complaint was not submitted by an authorized person.

PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTIONS:

Ripanjit Singh Kohli, the company’s authorized representative, submitted the lawsuit on behalf of the appellant company, according to a cursory review of it. Thus, the appellant corporation is filing the lawsuit under its name. It hasn’t been submitted in the power of attorney holder’s name. The appellant corporation, the complainant, is allowed to file the complaint on its behalf through the holder of its power of attorney. 10. The appellant corporation has granted Kavindersingh Anand, one of its directors, a broad power of attorney.

The aforementioned power of attorney was implemented following its proper approval by the board of directors at its meeting on May 1, 2010, which took place. As a result, KavindersinghAnand, one of the appellant directors, business’s is the true and legal representative of the company and holds power of attorney on its behalf. The aforementioned power of attorney expressly grants him the right to choose “counsel” or “special attorneys” to handle every case and to carry out any other actions necessary for the proper prosecution or defence of legal or fictitious judicial proceedings anywhere in the world. The power of attorney mentioned is based on the aforementioned power of attorney, Kavindersingh Anand gave Ripanjit Singh Kohli permission to file the relevant complaint.

JUDGEMENT:

The trial court denied the initial application in a ruling dated January 30, 2018. After the second application was turned down on July 23 of this year, a criminal revision was filed and later dismissed by a decision dated September 26. The respondent invoked jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code to challenge these three orders. By the contested order, the High Court granted the petition brought under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code and directed that the aforementioned orders be set aside because the complaint was not brought by the person authorized and that Kavindersingh Anand, who was granted the power of attorney, lacked legal standing to sub-delegate the said power to Ripanjit Singh Kohli, the designated representative. Second, Kavindersingh Anand is not authorized to testify on the company’s behalf.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3YQqm9T

–Report by Arun Bhattacharya

The High Court of Delhi on Monday 20^th February, 2023 in SHIWANG TRIPATHI & ORS versus UOI & ORS reiterated the stance taken by a learned Single Judge’s bench while dismissing the matter that a Right of Absorption or regularization of post does not arise merely because of an agreement of apprenticeship between parties.

FACTS:

The National Insurance Company had invited applications for an apprenticeship programme on a pan India basis and the candidates participating in the same were appointed for a term of 2 years which were later extended twice. Several recommendations were made in support of regularisation of these apprentices due to their excellent performances but the responsible authority did not act accordingly. That is when the present issue arose when these apprentices demanded regularisation of their post based on the agreement for apprenticeship that were provided to them.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS:

The appellants tried to present the case in the manner that they were eligible according to the basic statistics that vacancies were open and their performances were at par with what the authorities shall ask and that is what made such absorption valid and legal.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:

The respondents tried to highlight the point that such right to absorption does not arise since the appellants were merely recruited for apprenticeship trainee purpose and no separate promise was made to them regarding any kind of conversion or regularisation of such a contract into one of a permanent appointment.

JUDGEMENT:

The primary issue was already dismissed by the learned Single Judge’s bench and nothing new happened in case of the appeal either. The honourable appellate bench by referring to Employees State Insurance Corporation & Anr. Vs. Dr.Vinay Kumar & Ors. [C.A.No. 4150 of 2022] clearly observed that no person or apprentice can claim a right to absorption or permanent employment, when they are devoid of any proper employer employee relation. By objectively pointing out the absence of a proper contract between the said parties the appellate bench reiterated the Single judge’s decision to deny the grant of such relief for regularisation and highlighted the fact that the respondents were not obligated to regularise positions just because someone has been an apprenticeship in the said organisation.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3SeHR1b

–Report by Umang Kanwat 

The recent case of Government of NCT of Delhi v Krishan Kumar was based on the Statement of Objectives and Reasons of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, which discussed the “sacrifices” of the affected individuals who were “unavoidably” losing their property rights for the greater good of society. The Land Acquisition Act of 2013 aims to correct this unbalanced paradigm of development by making the land acquisition process more collaborative and facilitating. 

FACTS:

Affirming that the acquisition of the disputed lands was deemed to have terminated in accordance with Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement Act, 2013, the Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi and the petitioner felt wronged and dissatisfied with the impugned judgement and order issued by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in a Writ Petition.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:

It was argued that since the petitioners did not assert that they had possession of the subject land in their writ petition but rather that the government was obligated to return the property to them, it was implied that they were admitting that the government had taken actual vacant physical possession of the land. The petitioners had complained about the lack of remuneration.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:

The High Court had granted the writ petition and stated that the acquisition with regard to the subject land is assumed to have expired under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013, on the grounds that the compensation has not been paid.Regarding the action brought on behalf of the Act, the High Court made no findings, including that the beneficiary department was awarded immediate ownership of the disputed lands in question. As the entire land acquisition processes are regarded to have expired, it was the contention on behalf of the respondents that possession of the land is liable to be returned to the petitioners.

Indore Development Authority:

The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement Act, 2013 (the “2013 Act”), which governs State land purchase, rehabilitation, and resettlement, was unclear in this case, but a five-judge Supreme Court bench had clarified it.The question in front of the court was whether land acquisition procedures may be terminated if the State failed to compensate landowners was a key concern. The Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was repealed in 2013, and the Court had to decide how that act interacts with it. This created complications. 

In Indore Development Authority v. Manohar Lal, the landowners argued that acquisitions undertaken in accordance with the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 had expired and that new procedures in accordance with the Land Acquisition Act of 2013 were necessary.In this landmark ruling, the Supreme Court ruled that cases still pending under the 2013 Act would have to be renewed and would expire under two circumstances.

The five-judge panel also held that landowners who rejected the offered compensation or asked for more money may not pursue compensation under Section 24(2) of the Act. However, if compensation is not given in accordance with Section 24(1)(a) of the Act, the proceedings will not be regarded as having ended, and compensation must be given in line with the Act of 2013’s rules.

JUDGEMENT:

The impugned judgement and order issued by the High Court declaring that the acquisition with respect to the lands in question was deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 as it was observed to be unsustainable and so it deserved to be quashed set aside as a result of applying the law established by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Indore Development Authority to the facts of the case at hand.

As a result, the appeal was accepted. However, the court decided that given the facts and circumstances of the case, there would be no judgement regarding costs, and any pending applications would likewise be dismissed.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3YHZgln

The Indra Sawhney vs Union of India case, also known as the Mandal Commission case, was a landmark case in the history of the Indian judiciary. The case, heard by a nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court, dealt with the issue of reservation in government jobs and education for the socially and economically backward classes of Indian society, also known as Other Backward Classes (OBCs). The judgment, in this case, has had far-reaching implications for Indian society and polity.

Background and facts

The Mandal Commission, formally known as the Socially and Educationally Backward Classes Commission, was set up by the Indian government in 1979 to identify socially and educationally backward classes (SEBCs) in India and make recommendations for their advancement. In 1980, the Commission submitted its report to the government, recommending that 27% of all government jobs and seats in educational institutions be reserved for SEBCs. This recommendation was implemented in 1990 by then Prime Minister V.P. Singh, leading to protests and agitation across the country.

The implementation of the Mandal Commission recommendations in 1990 was met with widespread protests and opposition, particularly from upper-caste communities, who argued that it violated the principle of meritocracy and was unconstitutional. The government defended the policy, arguing that it was necessary to provide opportunities to historically marginalized communities and to address the historical injustices of caste discrimination. Several petitions were filed in various high courts challenging the implementation of the reservation policy for OBCs, and eventually, the matter reached the Supreme Court. The apex court, in its judgment in the Indra Sawhney vs Union of India case, addressed several issues related to reservation and its implementation.

The case was first heard by a nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court in 1992, which delivered a split verdict.

Procedural History

The procedural history of the case can be divided into the following stages:

The Mandal Commission Report: In 1979, the Mandal Commission was constituted by the Government of India to identify the socially and educationally backward classes (SEBCs) in the country and recommend measures for their upliftment. In 1980, the Commission submitted its report, which recommended that 27% of government jobs and seats in educational institutions be reserved for SEBCs.

Implementation of the Mandal Commission Report: The implementation of the Mandal Commission Report was challenged in various courts across the country. In 1990, the government issued an office memorandum implementing the recommendations of the Commission. This led to widespread protests and agitation by various groups, including students and job seekers.

The Indra Sawhney Case: In 1992, a group of petitioners led by Indra Sawhney, a former civil servant, filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court challenging the implementation of the Mandal Commission Report. The petitioners contended that the reservation policy violated the fundamental right to equality enshrined in the Indian Constitution.

Constitution Bench: The case was heard by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court comprising nine judges. The hearings began in 1992 and continued for almost five years. The bench heard arguments from both sides and also received inputs from various experts and stakeholders.

Interim Orders: During the pendency of the case, the Supreme Court issued several interim orders. In 1993, the court directed that the reservation policy would not be applicable to posts and seats meant for technical and professional courses. In 1997, the court directed that the creamy layer among the SEBCs should be excluded from the benefits of reservation.

Judgment: In 1999, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court delivered its judgment in the case. The court upheld the constitutional validity of the reservation policy but imposed certain restrictions and conditions. The court held that the reservation should not exceed 50% and that it should be reviewed periodically. The court also held that the creamy layer among the SEBCs should be excluded from the benefits of reservation.

Controversies and Criticisms: The judgment in the Indra Sawhney case has been the subject of several controversies and criticisms. Some have criticized the court for diluting the concept of equality by upholding the reservation policy. Others have criticized the court for imposing arbitrary restrictions and conditions on the policy. However, the judgment remains a landmark in Indian legal history and continues to shape the discourse on reservations in the country.

Judgment

The Supreme Court of India rendered a historic decision in the 1992 case of Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, also referred to as the Mandal Commission case. The issue concerned the implementation of reservations for the socially and economically underprivileged sectors of Indian society in government employment and educational institutions. The Supreme Court’s nine-judge panel issued the ruling, which upheld the constitutionality of OBC reservations in government employment and educational settings. However, it also set certain limitations and conditions for the implementation of reservations.

One of the main issues before the court was whether the classification of the OBCs as a separate category was constitutional. The court held that the classification was based on intelligible differentia and was therefore constitutionally valid. The court also addressed the issue of the maximum limit for reservations. It held that the total reservation should not exceed 50% of the available seats or posts. However, it also allowed for exceptional circumstances where a higher percentage of reservations may be justified.

The court further emphasized that reservations should not be granted on the basis of economic criteria alone and that social and educational backwardness should be the primary criterion for determining eligibility for reservations. The judgment also dealt with the issue of creamy layer exclusion, which refers to excluding the relatively well-off members of the reserved categories from the benefits of reservations. The court held that the creamy layer exclusion should be applied to the OBCs as well and that the exclusion should be based on economic criteria. The court also directed the central government to create a permanent body to regularly review the implementation of reservations and to identify the backward classes that are in need of affirmative action.

Overall, the Indra Sawhney v. Union of India judgment has had a significant impact on the implementation of reservations in India. It has helped to ensure that reservations are not granted arbitrarily or on the basis of economic criteria alone and has set clear guidelines for the implementation of reservations in a fair and just manner.

Analysis

Reservations for Other Backward Classes were implemented as a result of the Mandal Commission Report (OBCs).

The “Creamy Layer” theory was developed by the court to deny the benefits of reservation to specific OBC groups based on their socioeconomic standing.

The Indra Sawhney judgment is a landmark judgment for several reasons. First, it upheld the constitutional validity of reservation for OBCs, but with certain restrictions. The court held that the total reservation, including reservations for SCs and STs, should not exceed 50% of the vacancies. The court also held that the reservation policy should not be based solely on caste but on the backwardness of the classes. The court further held that the creamy layer, i.e., the socially and economically advanced among the OBCs, should be excluded from the benefits of reservation.

Second, the court gave a detailed analysis of the concept of social backwardness and its relationship with caste. The court observed that social and educational backwardness can be caused by several factors, including poverty, lack of access to education, and geographical isolation. The court held that caste can be a factor in determining social backwardness but cannot be the sole criterion.

Third, the court recognized the importance of affirmative action in ensuring social justice and equality in a society marked by historical discrimination and oppression. The court observed that the Constitution of India envisages a society based on equality and social justice, and affirmative action is necessary to ensure that the benefits of development reach all sections of society.

Fourth, the court recognized the need to balance the competing claims of different sections of society. The court observed that while reservation is an important tool for social justice, it should not be at the cost of efficiency and merit. The court held that reservation should be a temporary measure and should be reviewed periodically to ensure that it does not perpetuate backwardness or lead to reverse discrimination.

Fifth, the court recognized the importance of diversity in a democratic society. The court held that diversity is a source of strength and vitality in a democracy, and any attempt to homogenize society would be against the spirit of the Constitution.

The Indra Sawhney judgment has had a significant impact on Indian society and polity. First, it has led to the implementation of reservation for OBCs in government jobs and educational institutions, leading to greater representation of OBCs in the public sphere. The judgment has led to a debate on the efficacy of reservation as a tool for social justice. While some have argued that reservation has led to the empowerment of the socially and economically backward classes, others have argued that it has perpetuated caste-based discrimination and led to a decline in the standards of education and administration.

Conclusion and Suggestions

The Supreme Court upheld the government’s decision to provide reservations for SEBCs in a limited manner, while also placing certain restrictions on the quantum of reservation and the definition of SEBCs.

The case’s conclusion and suggestions include:

The government can provide reservations for SEBCs, but it should be based on their social and educational backwardness, not their economic status. The reservation for SEBCs should not exceed 50% of the total seats/jobs, and there should be no reservation for the creamy layer. The government should regularly review the list of SEBCs to ensure that only the truly backward classes receive the benefits of reservation. The reservation policy should not undermine the merit-based selection process, and the reserved category candidates must meet the minimum qualifying standards. The government should also work on improving the educational and social status of the backward classes to reduce their dependence on reservations.

This case analysis is done by Vishal Menon, from Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad.

–Report by Arun Bhattacharya

A nearly two-decade-old issue of landowners who have been divested from their lands for the construction of Express Highway was relieved on receiving orders regarding due compensation by the hon’ble Supreme Court of India on Wednesday (15th February 2023) in the matter of RAVINDER KUMAR GOEL versus THE STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.

FACTS:

A certain extent of 798 Kanals and 2 Marlas of land were acquired by the Haryana Government Industries Department in 2005 due to the construction of Express highway Phase VII which would connect National Highway numbers 1,10,8 and 2. The District Revenue cum Land Acquisition Collector had declared an amount of approximately twelve lakh rupees per acre for the said lands. On seeking reference from the Reference Court, they were given a consideration of approximately forty-three lakh rupees per acre which was again enhanced by the High Court to nearly sixty-two lakh rupees per acre amount.

FIRST APPEAL:

Both the landowners and the State had filed appeals before the apex court under the title Surender Singh v. State of Haryana whereby the matters were remanded back to the Reference court which after further consideration revalued the amount of compensation to approximately twenty-two lakh rupees per acre. Appeals by both parties were again filed before the High Court which rectified the amount again to nearly fourteen lakh rupees per acre. On such occasion, the land losers filed another appeal to the apex court with the demand for further rectification of the said compensation value.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION:

The appellants primarily contended the fact that the lands which were under consideration were part of an urban agglomeration and had served purposes other than merely agricultural and hence the determination of compensation on such lands assuming them to be purely agricultural would be faulty. They also highlighted their grievance regarding the Reference Court’s decision to deduction of 35 per cent as development charges. They argued that since the purpose of such acquisition was for the construction of roadways hence such acquisitions must be treated as sale deeds and compensation thereby must be determined in compliance with their market values.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:

The Reference Court had relied upon certain Exemplars which were in connection to lands which amounted to 798 Kanals 2 Marlas while determining the compensation in the present case. This was pointed out to be unjustified due to the non-representation of the true value of such lands. They further pointed out that the Land Acquisition Officer was correct in his determination of compensation since he had relied upon nine sale Exemplars during the very same period wherein large extents of agricultural lands were sold and per acre value for those said transactions were lower than what was determined by the LAO.

JUDGEMENT:

The hon’ble apex court did an in-depth analysis of the contentions of both parties, relied upon different judgments like State of Gujarat vs. Kakhot SinghJi VajesinghJi Vaghela observed that “the principle that the price agreed between a willing seller and a willing purchaser would be the price which is generally prevailing in the market in respect of the lands having similar advantages which can be the basis to determine the market value of acquired lands if such sale instances are brought on record.” Considering all the valid points referred by the Reference Court, the apex court stated that since the purpose of such acquisition was the construction of roadways, it is prudent that development charges are bound to occur and declared that twenty-five per cent of charges must be paid in accordance to development cost which resulted in a deduction of nearly eight lakh rupees from the initial thirty-three lakhs. Thus the final amount to be paid in compensation was calculated to be twenty-five lakhs per acre approximately by the apex court concluding a nearly two-decades-long litigation.

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