Tag: #recentjudgement

-Report by Sejal Jethva

In the present case MINAKSHI CHITRA MANDIR SAILU THROUGH ITS PROPRIETOR SANJAY PRABHAKAR RAJURKAR Vs THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH THE COLLECTOR LATUR based on that petitioner is exempt from entertainment tax but still collects it from customers. Who received the money collected—the state or the petitioner?

FACTS:

In Sailu, District Parbhani, the petitioner operates a movie theatre that is now a multiplex cinema under the name and branding Minakshi Chitra Mandir, Sailu. The theatre in question is legally operated by the petitioner. The petitioner requested for an exemption from paying the entertainment tax after renovating the entire theatre in accordance with a State Government plan.

According to the Maharashtra Entertainment Duty Act, respondent number two Divisional Commissioner Aurangabad granted the petitioner a five-year exemption from paying entertainment tax from 26.6.2014 to 15.6.2019. When the entertainment tax was exempt, the theatre was inspected, and the inspector discovered that the tickets had the caption “entertainment tax” and that money had been taken from patrons towards “entertainment tax.” As a result, the petitioner was found responsible for paying the entertainment tax. Collector, Respondent No. 3, assessed the aforementioned tax at Rs. 7,97,514/-. In addition, Respondent No. 3 imposed a penalty equal to double the amount of the responsibility and mandated payment of a total of Rs. 23,92,542.00. The

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:

The State is not permitted to collect the exemption from the petitioner under section 3 of the Maharashtra Entertainment Duty Act once it has been granted in accordance with section 9 (1) of the aforementioned Act. The knowledgeable attorney for the petitioner contends that because the ticket roles received approval from the relevant authorities, they are prohibited from requesting the entertainment tax’s deposit. The petitioner’s main and most significant argument is that once the entertainment tax exemption has been granted, even though the tax was mentioned on the entire value of the ticket, the respondent/State is not entitled to receive the entertainment tax, and the entire amount collected as ticket price, including the amount collected under the caption “entertainment.”

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:

Despite the petitioner receiving an exemption from entertainment tax, respondent No. 2 – Divisional Commissioner claimed that the petitioner was still obligated to pay the entertainment tax to the State Government because the amount was displayed on the petitioner’s ticket and was money that was taken from customers. The present writ petition is brought because the aforementioned orders of respondents Nos. 2 and 3 have wronged the petitioner.

JUDGEMENT:

1. Neither the petitioner is allowed to retain the money obtained under the caption ‘entertainment tax’, nor the State is entitled to receive the amount collected under the caption ‘entertainment tax’, as there is an exemption given by the State. The amount that the petitioner placed in this Court is not one that either the State or the petitioner is entitled to receive; therefore, the question of how best to use that money arises.

2. The deposited money in this case is used to acquire the defibrillator device, which will be done by a committee of three people made up of the Registrar (Administration) of the High Court Bench in Aurangabad, the President of the Bar Association of the High Court, Aurangabad, and Dr. Sanjay Varade, Medical Officer of the High Court Medical Clinic. Upon request from the Committee, the Registry will pay for the machine. The device would be used for anyone in need of emergency medical care and would stay in possession and under the supervision of the Medical Officer connected to the High Court Medical Dispensary.

3. The Registrar (Administration) of the High Court Bench in Aurangabad and the Medical Officer of the High Court Medical Dispensary. On the Committee’s instruction, the Registry will pay for the machine. The device will continue to be held in custody and under the direction of the Medical Officer assigned to the High Court Medical Dispensary, and it will be used for anyone in need of urgent medical attention.

4. Any remaining funds, if any, will be split equally between the Government Cancer Hospital in Aurangabad and the non-profit organisation “Shantivan,” which runs an orphanage for children who have lost their parents in Arvi, Tq. Shirur Kasar, District Beed.

READ FULL JUDGMENT: https://bit.ly/3Zs4iTc

-Report by Anurag Sinha

The present case of Gurjit Singh (D) Through LRs…Versus Union Territory, Chandigarh & Ors., is based on a dispute between a tenant and a landlord. Both of them had marketing licenses but after a period of time, the appellant passed an eviction order against the respondent. Herein, the respondent moved to another shop but was not granted a license for the same. He later was allotted another shop in front of his previous landlord to which the appellant claimed ownership.

FACTS:

The judgment made by the learned Judge, Mr. J Shah, on23.10.2013 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, and these sequent order dated 17.12.2013, by which, the Division Bench of the High Court has dismissed the said letters and Patent Appeals. Gurjit Singh, the appellant stated and informed that he had bought Shop no. 27 from the Agricultural Produce Market, Chandigarh and that respondent no. 5 was the tenant of that shop. Both the appellant and respondent no. 5 had market licenses. The appellant evicted respondent no. 5 shortly after. The High Court upheld the eviction. Hence, in 2007, respondentNo. 5 moved as a tenant to Shop No. 12 and applied for a change of address, but it was refused and he was told to surrender his license and apply for a new one. State Agricultural Marketing Board granted the appellant’s fruit/vegetable license. Since then, the appellant runs the business from his Shop No. 27. Respondent No. 5 filed a writ petition with the High Courtchallenging the judgment dated 05.07.2007 that denied his requestto move to Shop No. 12. 05.07.2007 order stayed. The stay was extended until respondent No. 5’s license expired on 31.03.2009. The Market Committee, Chandigarh denied respondent No. 5’slicense renewal application.

Under the order passed by the High Court, respondent No. 5 continued to operate under the former license per the Supreme Court order. That the Licence Committee under Licensing of Auction Platform Regulations, 1981 resolved to allot the platform site based on “One Site One Shop” and listed respondent No. 5 as co-allottee with the appellant.

Aggrieved by this, the appellant filed a writ petition. The HighCourt granted respondent No. 5’s writ petition and renewed his license on 26 September 2011. The High Court further ruled thatrespondent No. 5 can use the platform in front of Store No. 27unless the Act or Regulations are amended to provide alternativeplatform rights. The knowledgeable Single Judge also found thatthe right to utilize the platform and the license to do business in the market region were distinct and unrelated.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS:

The appellant herein is doing business, has a license, and is granted shop No. 27, thus he is entitled to the auction platform adjacent to and/or in front of it. Respondent No. 5 is doing business in shop No. 12, therefore not allowing the appellant(s) todo business on the auction platform, which is close

to shop No. 27, and allotting it to him is unjust and arbitrary. Then, the appellant challenged the site co-allotment to respondent No. 5 before the learned Single Judge. If the appellant fails, they cannot be worse off than before filing the writ petition. Hence, Market Committee sheds collapsed on 10.06.2007 and were rebuilt in 2009. Soon thereafter, the Secretary of Agriculture, U.T. Chandigarh handed down the principles and rules at the first instance, allottees who were assigned sheds for working previousto the collapse of shed 8 on 10.06.2007 were entitled to shed/space as they existed on that day. The appellant was awarded the license on 16.07.2007, however, the sheds collapsed on 10.06.2007, hencehis case is not covered by the policy. The Market Committee’sallocation of sheds follows the Secretary, Agricultural Department, Chandigarh’s guidelines/policy.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:

Respondent No. 5 has had a valid license since 1970 and was operating on the platform when the shed collapsed on 10.06.2007. However, at the time of the allotment of freshly constructed sheds, the firm’s license was not valid owing to non-renewal, and theCommittee’s office was considering granting the license, which was finally granted in February 2010. After the Committee was formed, respondent No. 5, Committee licensee and shed owner before its collapse—was allotted the shed. The above arguments request that the appeals be dismissed.

JUDGMENT:

In view of the above and for the reasons stated above and in absence of any specific rule/regulation to the contrary and when the sheds are allotted as per the principles/guidelines of the Secretary, Agriculture, reproduced hereinabove, and in absence ofany specific rule in favor of the appellant, right to claim the allotment just in front of his shop and/or adjacent to the same and when the allotment in favor of respondent No. 5 is made as per. As both the learned Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court have rightly held against the appellant and have rightly dismissed the writ petition and appeal. The supreme court was in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court.

The present appeals lacked merit and were dismissed for the reasons indicated above.

READ FULL JUDGMENT: https://bit.ly/3ZKjJpC

-Report by Sakshi Muttur

It was held by the Honourable Supreme Court of India in the case of STATE OF HARYANA VS SATPAL AND OTHERS that the students of the school are entitled to a good environment inclusive of a playground that was illegally occupied by the encroachers namely, the respondents. It overruled the order passed by the High Court of Punjab.

FACTS:

The above case was an appeal filed by the Appellants which is the State of Haryana against the order passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dated 12.05.2016. The said respondents were held to be in unauthorized possession of the land that surrounded a school belonging to the Gram Panchayat. Certain demarcations were carried out on the application to the Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat. 

The eviction proceedings were carried out against the respondents on 25.03.2009 under Section 7(2) of the Punjab Village Common Land (Regulation) Act which explains the ejectment process. It was passed by the Assistant Collector on 30.08.2011.

The respondents, aggrieved by the previous order of ejectment, filed for an appeal before the Collector which was rejected by order dated 02.05.2012.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:

The respondents proposed a Civil Writ Petition No. 3167 of 2015 before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana to override the previous orders. Upon the preliminary hearing dated 23.02.2015, it was disclosed that land occupied by the original writ petitioners is encroached upon and is a part of the school premises. However, the petitioners were ready to give the equivalent vacant land adjoining the school premises as a playground for the school.  

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION:

The High Court dated 12.05.2016, directed the newly constituted Gram Panchayat to invoke the powers under Rule12 and assess the market value of the land where houses are constructed and wherever the vacant area can be segregated from the residential house, it can be separated and utilized for earmarked purpose, i.e., school premises. The needful was to be done within four months from the dated order. Thus, the writ petition was disposed of by the High Court.

Following the order passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, the appellants filed for an appeal in the Supreme Court, which was heard by the Honourable Court on 29.03.2022.

COURT’S JUDGEMENT:

The Court ordered the Assistant Collector to submit a report pointing out the exact measurement of the land which was earmarked for the school and playground. In the report, it shall also be mentioned the total area of the land and the measurement of the area occupied as the school and the area to be used for the playground, and that whether in the land other than being used for School there are any other encroachers or no other than the respondents.

Upon receiving the report filed before the court, it was found that there was no playground at the school and the land near, was owned by another person who was not ready to give up his ownership. Thus, it was established that the original writ petitioners had encroached on the land up to 200 sq. yds. belonging to the Gram Panchayat, which had been earmarked for the school.

The Court overruled the order of the High Court which passed an order that wherever the vacant area can be segregated from the residential house, it can be separated and utilized for earmarked purposes, i.e., school premises. It was held that these directions made by the High Court could not be implemented.

The school was surrounded by unauthorized construction made by the original writ petitioners and therefore, the land which was reserved for the school cannot be legalized. The Court held that the students are entitled to good environment and there cannot be a school without a playground. 

The respondents were granted a period of 12 months to vacate the land which was occupied by them forbiddingly and if they failed to vacate the premises, the appropriate authority is directed to remove their unauthorised and illegal occupation and possession.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3IP7WQd

-Report by Umang Kanwat

If the High Court is the common High Court for two or more States under Article 231 of the Constitution and both the Civil Courts (transferor and transferee) are subordinate to it, the power under Section 24 of the Civil Code of Procedure may be exercised by the High Court even for the interstate transfer of a suit, appeal, or another proceeding. Section 25 applies to the interstate transfer of a suit, appeal, or another proceeding where both States have a High Court under Article 214 of the Constitution. The present case of Shah Newaz Khan & Ors. V State Of Nagaland & Ors. deals with an appeal regarding the issue of such an interstate transfer of suits between courts.

FACTS:

A request to transfer a case from the district judge’s court in Dimapur, Nagaland, to the district judge’s court in Guwahati, Assam, was denied by the Gauhati High Court in this case. Two issues, in particular, were raised before the Apex Court in the present appeal :

(1) According to section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereafter referred to as “the CPC”), is the Supreme Court the only body with the authority to order the transfer of a lawsuit, appeal, or another process from a civil court in one state to a civil court in another state?
(2) Is it permissible for a High Court to consider a transfer request under section 24 of the CPC and transfer a suit, appeal, or another proceeding from one Civil Court to another Civil Court for consideration and decision if the High Court is the common High Court for two or more States?

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS:

The appellant argued that if the High Court is the common High Court for two or more States according to Article 231 of the Constitution and both the Civil Courts (transferor and transferee) are subordinate to it, the power under Section 24 of the CPC may be exercised by the High Court even for the interstate transfer of a suit, appeal, or another proceeding. Section 25 applies to the interstate transfer of a suit, appeal, or another proceeding where both States have a High Court according to Article 214 of the Constitution. The learned advocate prayed before the court for a new review of the appellants’ request under section 24 of the CPC. As an alternative, he argued that section 25 applicability can be taken into account by us on its own merits.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:

The respondent retaliated that the provisions of both sections 24 and 25 of the Code must be examined because this involves an inter-State transfer and not an intra-State transfer simplicity to understand whether the common High Court has the authority to withdraw any suit, appeal, or other proceeding pending before any Court subordinate to it from one State and to transfer the same to any Court subordinate to it, in another State. After taking into account the arguments made, it is obvious that the legislative intent was clear: under section 25 of the CPC, only the Supreme Court has the power to ordain the transfer of a lawsuit, appeal, or another legal proceeding from one civil court in a state to another civil court in a different state. The CPC’s section 25 expressly and only grants this authority, hence a High Court cannot use it.

The legal counsel for the respondent argued in favour of upholding the contested judgement rather than having it overturned.

JUDGEMENT:

The questions framed at the beginning of this case were answered by concluding that :

(1) Section 25 of the CPC applies to an interstate transfer of a lawsuit, appeal, or another proceeding when both States have a high court under Article 214 of the Constitution, but not when both States have a common high court under Article 231 of the Constitution; and 46.

(2)Additionally, if the High Court is the common High Court for two or more States under Article 231 of the Constitution and both the Civil Courts (transferor and transferee) are subordinate to it, it may exercise the power under Section 24 of the CPC even for the inter-State transfer of a suit, appeal, or another proceeding.

The supreme court asked the Gauhati High Court to give the application under section 24 of the CPC a reasonable amount of priority and to resolve it as soon as feasible, provided that it is convenient for all parties. Additionally, it directed the Parties to pay their expenses.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3Ye9N6D

-Report by Eshna Ray

The Supreme Court in the recent judgement of AMAN SEMI-CONDUCTORS (PVT.) LTD. VERSUS HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVLOPMENT CORPORATION LTD. & ANR., passes required conditions that the Respondent needs to follow for the industrial plot allotment, failure to comply which will have consequences.

FACTS:

The appeals, brought by special leave, concern orders issued by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC). The NCDRC allowed a revision petition filed by the respondent corporation, Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation (HSIDC), which had resumed an industrial plot allotted to the appellant, a proprietary concern, for failing to fulfill the terms and conditions of the allotment. The appellant had applied for the plot in 1994, and possession was handed over in 1995, but no concrete steps were taken to set up the industrial unit on the site. The appellant sought extensions of time, citing the absence of basic infrastructure facilities, but failed to produce any concrete evidence or document to satisfy HSIDC. The NCDRC held that the appellant’s grounds and reasons were vague and evasive and that HSIDC was justified in resuming the plot. These appeals challenge the NCDRC’s orders.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS:

The appellant’s learned counsel, Mr. Rajiv K. Garg, argued that the appellant did not violate any of the terms of the allotment letter and had taken all the necessary steps in accordance with the terms of the allotment letter. The appellant had obtained the required certificate from the Industrial Department, applied for a power connection from the electrical department and deposited the requisite amount with the HSEB, and applied for financial assistance with the Financial Corporation. The appellant had also arranged for the required facilities from outside when they were not granted due to a change in government policy. The appellant’s counsel argued that the appellant did not violate any terms of the allotment letter and had taken all necessary steps, including obtaining certificates and applying for power connection and financial assistance. The appellant’s delay was due to government policy changes and not releasing capital. The counsel also contended that the resumption order was issued without granting an opportunity to the appellant and was non-speaking, which violated the principles of natural justice.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:

In response to Mr. Garg’s arguments, Mr. Sangwan urged the court not to interfere with the NCDRC’s findings. He stated that the record showed that the appellant was given sufficient opportunity and a show cause notice was issued to him asking why he had not taken steps to construct an industrial unit on the plot. He argued that the overall objective of the scheme under which plots were allotted was to promote industrialization and ensure employment, and the persistent inaction of the appellant suggested that he was not interested in using the plot for any industrial activity.

Mr. Sangwan further highlighted that the allotment was based on the appraisal of the project proposed by the applicant and its feasibility, and the appellant was obliged to take swift and timely action towards putting up the unit as per the conditions in the allotment letter. He also argued that the allotment was hedged with several conditions, and many of them, upon violation, entailed cancellation. Therefore, he contended that HSIDC’s action in resuming the plot was not abhorrent or reprehensible.

JUDGEMENT:

The case revolves around the appellant’s allotment of an industrial plot by HSIDC and the subsequent cancellation of the allotment. The appellant claims that the cancellation was done without a hearing and violated principles of natural justice. Additionally, the lack of essential infrastructural facilities prevented construction within the stipulated time frame. The allotment had conditions for construction and production, and failure to comply could result in resumption by HSIDC. HSIDC could also call for periodical reports about the project’s progress.

Conditions for the industrial plot allotment included starting construction within six months and completing it within 1 1/2 years, as well as commencing production within two years of possession after constructing a minimum of 25% of the permissible covered area. Failure to meet these requirements would result in HSIDC resuming the plot, and the corporation could request periodic reports every six months about the project’s progress.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3kJn5u9

-Report by Tannu Dahiya

Bombay High Court while hearing the petition on 27th February 2023 in the case Sandeep Arjun Kudale v. State of Maharashtra directed the police to carefully look into the matter and must find whether an offence has been made or not before arresting a person. 

Facts

The facts of the case are as follows:

In Writ petition no. 21880 of 2022

The complainant is a resident of Kothrud, Pune. One fine day while browsing on Twitter, he came across a video which was uploaded by the petitioner on his account wherein he was seen standing in front of the bungalow of Mr Chandrakant Patil, Minister of Higher and Technical Education and Cabinet Minister, Maharashtra State and Palak Mantri (Guardian Minister), making objectionable remark against him which has created disharmony in the communities and has provoked the sentiments of people belonging to Dr. Ambedkar and Phule’s community.Hence he registered an FIR against him alleging offences punishable under Sections 153A(1)(a) and 153A(1)(b) of the IPC, on 11.12.2022.

In the 2nd writ petition no. 21886 of 2022

Here the complainant is a resident of Wajre, Pune. He is an active social worker of the BJP. He mentioned that Mr. Chandrakant Patil mentioned about Dr. Ambedkar and Mahatma Phule in his speech which was misinterpreted by the petitioner.It is alleged that the petitioner by uploading the video had created an negative opinion of the said Minister and had also promoted enmity among the different groups in society. 

Petitioner’s contentions

The petitioner seeks to quash both the FIR against him. 

Mr Desai learned counsel for the petitioner submits that no offence as alleged has been disclosed against the petitioner in both the FIRs. The FIR was made with a political motive and the sole intention was to harass the petitioner who is also a member of the Congress Party. He was also arrested and kept in custody for two days without any justification. He was falsely framed in this case as he questioned one of the sitting cabinet members of the state. By lodging, this complaint his fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression is clearly violated. Hence the learned counsel pleads that both FIRs should be quashed and set aside. He also relied on the judgements made in Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra & AnrBalwant Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab, and Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of Andhra Pradesh. 

Respondent’s contentions

Dr Saraf learned Advocate General opposed the petition claiming that the sections have been rightly invoked by the police. He submits that the video posted by the petitioner has created an atmosphere of enmity between different groups in society. He also argues that the Police were correct in every manner to register the FIRs as it is their duty to maintain public peace and tranquillity. 

Judgement

Since the issues involved in both the writ petitions are the same, they are heard together. The court made observations regarding different cases. In the Manzar Sayeed Khan case the Apex court held that it was not only the words of the book which should be for provoking the charge. It is the language of the book which decides its intention. 

In Balwant singh case, held that the appellants have committed an offence under Sections 124A and 153A of the IPC, for raising anti-national slogans after Indra Gandhi’s assassination.  In this case, the Court had accepted that mens rea is an essential ingredient of the offence

under Section 153-A and the spoken or written words must have an intention of creating public disorder for disturbance of law and order or affect public “tranquillity”, in order to commit an offence. Having considered the provision of law, the court held that no offence has been committed in this case and the FIRs are quashed and set aside. 

The reasons stated for this are that the petitioner in the video can be seen just commenting on the speech of the Minister which is clearly his opinion and he has the right to freedom of speech and expression as guaranteed under the Constitution. There is clearly no intention of the petitioner to create public disharmony and disturb the public “tranquillity”. The court asked the police to apply their mind before arresting a person as arrest makes a serious impact on the person as well his family’s reputation and mental health. 

The law cannot be used as a tool to harass people and stop them from expressing their views and raising their voices which the Constitution guarantees them. Hence the petitions are disposed of accordingly. The court also directed the state Government to pay Rs25000/- for the unjustified arrest made within four weeks of the order. 

Citation: C. W. P no. 21880 of 2022
               C. W. P no. 21886 of 2022

-Report by Arun Bhattacharya

The honourable Supreme Court of India on Monday (27^th of February, 2023) while allowing an appeal matter (SIRAJUDHEEN versus ZEENATH & Ors.) observed that “merely because a particular evidence which ought to have been adduced but had not been adduced, the Appellate Court cannot adopt the soft course of remanding the matter.” 

FACTS

The original matter concerned a civil suit filed by one of the sisters who were involved in an agreement regarding their father’s property. The primary cause of action arose because of a fraudulent or coercive sale deed executed between the original plaintiff and the present appellant which as per the former’s claim was signed under the misconception that it was an agreement of a completely different subject matter but later found out to be a sale of her portion or share in the partitioned property. The trial court dismissed the suit while the High Court in the appeal is not satisfied by the evidences and was confused to appropriately provide relief and hence remanded the matter back to the Trial Court for further incorporation of evidences. The respondents in that matter happened to be aggrieved by the same and filed the present appeal before the apex court.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION

The counsel for the appellants primarily contended the fact that the honourable High Court was just in remanding the matter back to the Trial Court whereby giving the original plaintiffs another opportunity to adduce further evidences. This fact was a point of contention since it was their obligation while filing the initial suit and such ignorance should not be and cannot be made ground for furthering a matter which is already predisposed off. 

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

The respondent/ original plaintiff’s counsel tried to convince the apex court of the vitality of the stance of the High Court while remanding the matter. They highlighted the merits of the case that since the document/ sale deed was void, it was appropriate on part of the High Court to provide such an opportunity to the aggrieved parties to submit further documents in favour of supporting the same.

JUDGEMENT

The honourable apex court while pointing out some of the errors committed by the High Court while deciding the aforementioned appeal observed that

“the High Court has not at all referred to the findings of the Trial Court and it is difficult to find from the judgment impugned as to why at all those findings were not to be sustained or the decree was required to be reversed”.

The fundamental factor that the honourable Supreme Court of India emphasised was that the High Court was unable to provide just and proper reasons for remanding the matter back to the Trial Court when the latter had already concluded the same. Thus the lack of particular evidences which was expected by one party to be submitted but was not cannot be a just reason to remand the matter back to a court which had already concluded the matter on the basis of already provided evidences. This was the stance of the apex court while allowing the appeal and setting aside the impugned order of the High Court.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3KFGFCl

-Report by Eshna Ray

The Constitution of India has been invoked by the petitioners under Article 32 to seek relief regarding the constitution of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi after the elections held on December 4, 2022. The elections were held to elect 250 Councillors, and the first petitioner is a prospective candidate for the post of Mayor. Despite over two months passed since the election, the election of the Mayor has not taken place. The matter is now before the Court, seeking a resolution to this delay in the constitution of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi.

Fact

The Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 is an act that establishes the municipal corporation in Delhi. Chapter II of the Act deals with the establishment of the corporation, and Section 35(1) provides for the election of the chairperson, known as the Mayor. Chapter V of the Act deals with the procedure and transaction of business by the corporation, and Section 72(1) provides for monthly meetings.

The controversy in the case before the court was whether aldermen nominated by the Administrator have the right to vote at the first meeting of the corporation where the Mayor is elected and the order of holding elections. The opposing views were that the aldermen should not have the right to vote, and all elections should be held simultaneously, respectively.

Article 243R of the Indian Constitution deals with municipalities, and Clause (1) stipulates that all seats in a municipality shall be filled by direct election. An exception is provided in Clause (2) of the Article, which allows the legislature of a state to provide for representation in a municipality of persons with special knowledge or experience in municipal administration. The Court heard arguments from both sides and considered the provisions of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, and Article 243R of the Constitution.

Judgement

In this case, the Court was dealing with the question of the order in which the election of the Mayor, Deputy Mayor, and members of the Standing Committee of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi should be conducted. The Court referred to the relevant provisions of the Constitution and the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, and also relied on the judgment in Ramesh Mehta v Sanwal Chand Singh (2004) 5 SCC 409.

Article 243R of the Constitution provides for the composition of Municipalities. Clause (1) of the Article provides for direct election to all the seats in a Municipality, subject to exceptions provided in clause (2). Clause (2) contains provisions, inter alia, for the representation in a Municipality of persons having special knowledge or experience in Municipal administration as well as other persons such as members of the House of the People and the Legislative Assembly and members of the Council of States and the Legislative Council of the States representing the specific constituency and the Chairpersons of the Committees constituted under clause (5) of Article 243S. The Constitution has imposed a restriction in terms of which nominated members who are brought in on account of their special knowledge or experience in Municipal administration do not have the right to vote. The same restriction finds statutory recognition in Section 3(3)(b)(i) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957.

The Court held that the election of the Mayor should be held first, and upon the election of the Mayor, the Mayor shall act as the presiding authority for conducting the election of the Deputy Mayor and the members of the Standing Committee. The Court clarified that the prohibition on the exercise of vote by the nominated members in terms of Section 3(3)(b)(i) shall continue to operate even during the election of the Deputy Mayor and members of the Standing Committee. The Court directed that the notice convening the first meeting of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi should be issued within a period of twenty-four hours and should fix the date for convening the first meeting at which the election of the Mayor, Deputy Mayor, and members of the Standing Committee shall be conducted in terms of the above directions.

The Supreme Court issued directions for the first meeting of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, which includes holding elections for the Mayor and Deputy Mayor posts, and members of the Standing Committee. Members nominated in Section 3(3)(b)(i) of the Act cannot vote in these elections. The elected Mayor will preside over the elections for Deputy Mayor and Standing Committee members, where the same prohibition on voting by nominated members will apply. The notice for the first meeting must be issued within 24 hours and should include the dates for the elections as per the Court’s directions.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3xUyvOL

-Report by Eshna Ray

The Andhra Pradesh State Judicial Service members have filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking appropriate writs or orders to be issued to respondent no. 1. The primary relief sought is the calling of judgments of the petitioners for elevation to the High Court as judicial officers as defined in Art. 217(2)(a) of the Constitution of India. The petitioners have also sought any other writ, direction, or order that the Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper under the facts and circumstances of the case.

FACTS:

The petitioners, who served as District & Sessions Judge Fast Track, have filed a writ petition claiming that their service should be considered as a judicial service for the purpose of their elevation to the High Court. The Registry had prepared a list of eligible officers for elevation to the High Court, in which the names of the petitioners were not included as they did not have 10 years of regular judicial service. The petitioners claimed that their service as Fast Track Court Judges should be considered as a judicial service, but the Supreme Court, relying on its earlier judgment, held that the petitioners were not entitled to seniority from the date of their initial appointment as Fast Track Court Judges. the plea raised by the petitioners to consider their service as judicial service for the purpose of Article 217(2)(a) of the Constitution is not legally sustainable.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:

According to the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents, the petitioners were appointed on an ad-hoc basis to preside over Fast Track Courts under the Andhra Pradesh State Higher Judicial Service Special Rules for AdhocAppointments, 2001. Later, they were appointed on a regular basis in the cadre of District & Sessions Judge under the Andhra Pradesh State Judicial Service Rules, 2007, after going through the selection process. The petitioners’ names appeared in the seniority list of officers working in the District & Sessions Judge cadre, which was notified by the respondents on 5th January 2022. However, despite their seniority, they were not elevated to the High Court, while officers who were junior to them in seniority were elevated. The respondents have defended their decision to overlook the petitioners’ claims for elevation to the High Court.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:

The primary grievance of the petitioners is that their service as a District & Sessions Judge Fast Track, which they rendered on appointment from 6th October 2003, has not been considered as judicial service for the purposes of their elevation to the High Court bench as defined under Article 217(2)(a) of the Constitution. The petitioners have alleged that despite being eligible for consideration, their names were not considered by the collegium as they had not completed 10 years of regular judicial service, which is the requirement of Article 217(2)(a) of the Constitution. The petitioners have also pointed out that there were nine vacancies in the High Court for elevation from judicial service and a list of 27 eligible officers was placed before the collegium, but their names were not considered. Instead, officers who had completed 10 years of judicial service were considered for elevation.

JUDGEMENT:

The present case concerns a writ petition filed by certain District & Sessions Judges who were not considered for elevation to the Bench of the High Court as defined under Article 217(2)(a) of the Constitution. The petitioners contended that their service rendered as a District & Sessions Judge Fast Track should have been considered as a judicial service for the purposes of their elevation to the Bench of the High Court.

The Supreme Court, in its judgment, referred to the case of Kum C. Yamini Vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. (Civil Appeal No. 6296 of 2019 decided on 14th August, 2019), where it had examined the nature of appointment of the District & Sessions Judges Fast Track and had held that the petitioners were not entitled to claim the benefit of seniority from the date of their initial appointment as District & Sessions Judge Fast Track and other consequential reliefs prayed for.

The Court held that the services rendered by the petitioners as Fast Track Court Judges have not been recognized for the purpose of seniority except for pensionary and other retirement benefits. Therefore, the plea raised by the petitioners to consider their service rendered as Fast Track Court Judges as a judicial service for the purpose of Article 217(2)(a) of the Constitution was not legally sustainable.Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed as without substance. Pending application(s), if any, stood disposed of.

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-Report by Sakshi Sneha

The current review petition in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. Versus Chandervir Singh Negi has been filed on the grounds that defendants/the State were ordered to begin the acquisition procedures for the land in question within three months of the judgment’s entry and to conclude those proceedings within one year of that date in order to acquire the land. It was argued that the court’s orders are invalid and should be amended, and that the plaintiff, ChanderVir Singh Negi’s action should be dismissed since the plaintiff had previously given the state of Himachal Pradesh the land utilised for the building of the road on June 28, 2016.

FACTS:

Feeling resentful and unsatisfied with the contested judgement and order dated 09.08.2019 issued by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Shimla in Regular Second Appeal No. 270 of 2007 by which the High Court allowed the said appeal and set aside the judgement and decree issued by the learned Trial Court dismissing the suit and subsequently decreeing the suit directing the appellant to file an appeal.

CONTENTIONS OF RESPONDENT:

The original plaintiff filed the lawsuit before the experienced Trial Court in order to obtain a declaration, a mandatory injunction, and a directive instructing the appellants in this case—original defendants—to begin and finish the acquisition proceedings with regard to the plaintiff’s land and any harm to his fruit-bearing trees. Without following the rules of the Land Acquisition Act, the plaintiff claims that the appellants in this case—original defendant nos. 1, 2, and 3—built the “Tikkari­Larot Bodra Kwar road” on his or her property without paying him or her any compensation. The fruit-bearing plants also sustained harm.

CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANT:

The initial defendants disputed the lawsuit, arguing, among other things, that the claim was waived because the plaintiff waived his right to compensation because the road was built with his consent in 1987 while he was working as a Mate in the Department and in accordance with his request. They also claimed that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the plaintiff is eligible for the declaration relief that has been requested for?

2. Whether the plaintiff is eligible for the compensation claimed?

3. Whether or not the case cannot be maintained?

4. If the lawsuit has run out of time?

5. Whether his actions and behaviour estop the plaintiff from bringing the case?

6. Does the lawsuit need to be correctly appraised for court costs and jurisdictional purposes?7. Whether the plaintiff lacks a legal claim?

8. Relief?

JUDGMENT:

The First Appellate Court upheld the challenged decision and order issued by the High Court as well as the conclusions noted by the knowledgeable Trial Court. According to the plaintiff’s witnesses’ depositions, the retaining wall and the parcel of land in dispute were both built in 1987 on the plaintiff’s property. The plaintiff’s witnesses confirmed that fruit trees were damaged or destroyed in 1987, and the suit’s claimed cause of action was the building of the road in that year. In exercising its authority under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Court should not have interfered with the factual findings in light of the aforementioned facts and circumstances.

The High Court’s contested decision and order should be annulled and overturned because they lack merit. In regards to the restriction and/or the litigation being barred by limitation, the High Court has not established any significant legal issues. The reality remains that the plaintiff’s land is where the retaining/protection wall was built in 2003, the road was built in 1987, and any trees were damaged or destroyed in the same year. Because the lawsuit was filed in 2003, it was time-barred under Articles 58 and 72 of the Limitation Act.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3Sts1ji