Tag: #recentjudgement

–Report by Harishri

In the case of The Chief Engineer, Water Resources Department & Ors. Versus Rattan India Power Limited through its Director & Ors., the appeal was filed by the State of Maharashtra against the judgement of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, whereby the High Court has reduced the ‘irrigation restoration charges’ that the Respondent has contracted to pay.

Facts:

The State of Maharashtra came up with a circular prescribing that when water is diverted for non-irrigation purposes, then the entity using such water shall pay 50,000 per hectare irrigation restoration charges. It also prescribed that no water shall be diverted unless an agreement is entered into between the concerned industry and the government.

Sophie Power Company Ltd. Intended to set up a thermal power plant. A communication was sent by the respondent to the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation to confirm the availability of 240 million litres of water per day to facilitate smooth running. Pursuant to the application made by SPCL granted approval for the usage of water. This was subject to SPCL paying capital contributions and irrigation restoration charges. The Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation granted final approval for the usage of water. SPCL was directed to pay Rs.100000 per hectare. The respondent sent a letter to the government against the levy of higher charges. Later, the charge was increased to Rs.100000 per hectare by the government. Ultimately, the Appellant and Respondent entered into a water supply agreement to pay Rs. 100000 as in 5 instalments. Six months after signing the agreement, he initiated a writ petition before the High Court of Judicature of Bombay at Nagpur to direct him to pay irrigation restoration charges at Rs.50000 per hectare. It was held that it would be appropriate for the rate prevailing as of the date of the grant of in-principal approval.

Appellant’s Contention:

The appellant contended that the order is against the agreement dated 22.05.2012 entered into between the appellant and the respondent. It is submitted that after accepting Rs.100000 as irrigation restoration charges, the respondent is not entitled to challenge it. The essence of his contention was that a contract is sacrosanct and must be respected.

Respondent’s Contention:

The respondent contended that the irrigation restoration charge is directly linked to the date of approval and the relevant date since the circular dated 21.02.2004 was applicable. The appellant could have only levied Rs.50,000 per hectare. Also, similarly placed companies were given the relief that the Respondent was seeking. It was also contended that the undertaking given by the respondent after signing the agreement was not unconditional. It was subject to numerous representations by the respondent for the reduction of the irrigation restoration charge. The Government Circular will apply prospectively and will not apply to ongoing contracts.

Decision:

The bench was not satisfied with the approach adopted by the High Court when the respondent himself wilfully and deliberately entered into an agreement knowing the legal and business consequences. The High Court has committed an error in entertaining a fresh writ petition, which effectively claimed the same reliefs as the previous one. It also has committed a mistake in supplanting its view over that of the contract. The bench also directed that the balance amount due payable towards the irrigation restoration charge shall be paid by the respondent on or before 30.06.2023. Further, interest @ 12% p.a. shall be payable from the date the instalment fell due till the date of the impugned order. The bench allowed the civil appeal and set aside the impugned final judgement.

-Report by Nawvi Kamalnathan

In the case of Jabir and Others (hereinafter referred to as the appellants) Versus the State of Uttarakhand (hereinafter referred to as the respondents) the Supreme Court has decoded the need to understand the time frame between seeing the accused or deceased to the actual offence having occurred and thus the doctrine of last seen cant be applied in every case where the witnesses testify for seeing someone on relation to the case as it has its own limitations.

FACTS

Haseen, the son of Prosecution Witness 1, is about 7 years old and went missing on 08.10.1999 around 4.30 pm. Later on, on 10.10.1999, his dead body was found in a sugarcane field in a village situated at a distance from his village. The post-mortem report showed the death occurred two days earlier.

After an order from the magistrate, the First information report was investigated and witnesses were produced by the police officers in charge. Also, in their final reports, the police alleged the appellants to be guilty of the crime.
The appellants were convicted under sections 302, 364, and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and were sentenced to life imprisonment, seven years, and five years imprisonment respectively. The sentence and the conviction were upheld by the High Court of Uttarakhand.

PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTIONS

The counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants contended that the conviction and the sentence given by the trial court are unsustainable, as there were no reasons as to why the FIR was delayed by almost five weeks after the seven-year-old deceased went missing.

Further, it was contended that the application under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was moved only after a month and no such application was sent to any officer. The police witness didn’t seem to support the statement made by the PW-1 (father of the deceased boy) and said to contain suspicions.

Per the testimonies of a few witnesses, it could be understood that the role of the accused was not known to PW-1. However, it could not be inferred from the inquest report. The complete point of focus of the counsel for appellants was that they were named as a result of enmity with the father of the deceased and his family.

It was highlighted that all the witnesses bought before the court from the prosecution’s side were members of the deceased and his family. The enmity could be traced back to an FIR lodged by the appellant’s family against the PW-2 the previous year to this incident.

DEFENDANT’S CONTENTIONS

The counsel appearing on behalf of the defendants contended that the court shall not disturb the current findings of the lower and the High Court. First dealing with the issue concerning the delay to file FIR the counsel said PW-1 didn’t sense anything unnatural and went to search for his son throughout.

Only after obtaining knowledge of the dead body did, he go to the police station after the post-mortem. The last-seen theory was not inaccurate in this case because as per A-1 to A-3’s statement, they have seen the boy latest with the appellants.

The inquest conducted following the day of the death was found to have occurred under suspicious circumstances. The investigations conducted by the police were not satisfactory as it was done much later to the death.

JUDGEMENT

The court held that as per the basic principle of criminal jurisprudence, in case of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution shall be obliged to prove beyond any reasonable doubt. That all the links between the circumstances shall be established so as to complete the chain of the crime.

The court was also of the opinion besides crucial infirmities as there was no evidence in any form be it oral or objective that creates a connection between the appellant or the accused in this crime. The doctrine of last seen shall also have its limitations considering the time lag between the time the deceased was last seen with the accused and the time between the murder.

Therefore, the appellant-accused’s conviction and sentence passed by the lower courts shall not be sustained and the impugned judgment was set aside, thus ordering the acquittal of the accused.

-Report by Pragati Prajeeta

In the case of Delhi Development Authority Vs Manpreet Singh with Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Secretary Land & Building Department vs Manpreet Singh, a common question of law and facts arose in appeals out of the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, and hence both the appeals are being decided and disposed of together in a common judgment and order by the Supreme Court of India. And the main question, in this case, was Whether a subsequent purchaser has the locus to challenge the acquisition and/or lapsing of the acquisition?

FACTS

The subsequent purchaser is the original writ petitioner, who in the year 2018 acquired the rights and interest in the land. But the original writ petitioner was not the recorded owner when under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, of 1894 the award was issued concerning the land in question. And from all the records, it appeared before the High Court, that the claimed right by the original writ petitioner was based on the 2015 Assignment. Under Section 4 of the Act, 1894 notifications in this present case were issued and the award was declared.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS

The appellants vehemently submitted that as such the respondent is the subsequent purchaser and is the original writ petitioner, who after the Act,2013 came into force purchased the property hence therefore as observed by this Court in the case, they held that he had no locus to challenge the acquisition/lapsing of the acquisition proceedings under the Act, 2013 as he is a subsequent purchaser. Then it was submitted that the High Court declared material that the acquisition is deemed to lapse in the writ petition filed about because of the reason that the respondent is a subsequent purchaser, and had no locus to challenge it as observed and held by the Court.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

The learned senior counsel, however, has submitted that the decision of this Court needs some re-consideration under the Act, 2013 for certain relevant aspects which have not been previously dealt with and/or have been considered. But at the same time, he is not disputing or contradicting the fact that the subsequent purchaser is the original writ petitioner, who in the year 2018 acquired the right, title and interest in the disputed property or even after Act, 2013 came into force.

JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court after looking into the facts and reasons stated the appeal is successful. And in the view of the latter case, the High Court committed some serious error while for instance entertaining the writ petition of the response that is the original writ petitioner. Then it was also seen that the court has materially erred while declaring concerning the land in question, acquisition under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 has lapsed in a writ petition filed by, the original writ petitioner, the respondent who is a subsequent purchaser.

The Supreme Court then held that the judgment and order passed by the High Court are hereby quashed and set aside. The original Writ Petition filed before the High Court stands dismissed. At the same time all the pending applications, stand disposed of and the present appeals are allowed accordingly. But at the same time looking into the facts and circumstances of the case, it held that there shall be no order as to costs.

–Report by Hans Rathi

The High Court of Delhi recently held in the case of TARUN DUTT versus GOVERNMENT OF NCT, DELHI that undertrial prisoners cannot be detained in custody for an indefinite period. It stated that an undertrial accused cannot be made to spend the entire period of trial in custody especially when the trial is likely to take considerable time. The court reasoned that once the majority of the co-accused are out on Bail it cannot be argued that it is only the accused person against whom there is an apprehension that he will tamper with the evidence and influence the witnesses. The Hon’ble Mr Justice Amit Mahajan presided over the case.

Facts:

An FIR was registered on a complaint of Shri Matadeen Gora, who alleged to have been dishonestly induced on the pretext of receiving the insurance policy bonus amount and the insurance gratuity value on the lapsed insurance policies from the year 2013 till date. He claimed that a group of people had called him from different mobile numbers claiming to be senior officials from the insurance regulatory body. They induced him by stating that the unclaimed insurance amount can be released to the complainant. On the allurement, he deposited a sum of ₹ 80 lakhs and another sum of ₹ 39 lakhs at different times. The chargesheet has already been filed in the present case. It was found that most of the money was transferred to the accounts of accused persons including one main accused herein. In a disclosure statement made by one of the accused, the present applicant was arrested on 14.01.2021. The applicant had joined the other accused persons – Arvind and Sunil, as partners in a fake insurance bonus scam and has cheated innocent victims/persons on the pretext of receiving a huge insurance policy bonus. The applicant is alleged to be the main caller who induced the complainant and impersonated himself as Senior Director of Income Tax and MCA. The co-accused Sunil was admitted on bail by an order dated 30.05.2022 passed by the learned ASJ and the co-accused Arvind was granted bail by this Court by order dated 28.02.2022, whereas one co-accused person Ratnesh Chauhan is stated to be released on interim bail granted by the learned ASJ by order dated 28.04.2022. The present appeal is filed by the main accused still in custody under Section 439, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“Cr.P.C.”), seeking regular bail in FIR No. 0012/2021 dated 08.01.2021 registered at Vasant Kunj. 

Petitioner’s Contentions 

Learned senior counsel for the applicant argued that the applicant was in the employment of the main accused and has been falsely implicated in the case. 13. He further submits that all the other four co-accused have been already enlarged on bail and despite that the applicant is languishing in jail and his application for grant of bail was dismissed by the Trial Court on an erroneous presumption that the applicant is likely to tinker with the ongoing investigation. In the present case, even though the FIR was registered way back in January 2021 and the chargesheet was filed long back, still even as per the prosecution there is a major part of the investigation which is still in progress. Therefore, the trial is not likely to proceed and will take a long period of time before it gets over. The Applicant is in custody for almost 2 years and has a family to look after, including a six-year-old daughter and an eleven months old son. 15. He further submits that when all the main accused persons have already been enlarged on bail, no purpose would be served by keeping the applicant in further incarceration and he is also entitled to bail on the ground of parity.

Respondent Contentions

Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for the State opposes the bail application and submits that the gravity of the offense and the manner in which the accused persons are found to have cheated the complainant, disentitles the Applicant of any discretion.

Judgment

The court in the present case held that undertrial prisoners cannot be detained in custody for an indefinite period. The speedy trial in the present case does not seem a possibility. Keeping the applicant in further incarceration would cause deprivation of his right to legal defence. It further reasoned that once the majority of the co-accused are out on Bail it cannot be argued that it is only the applicant against whom there is an apprehension that he will tamper with the evidence and influence the witnesses. Therefore, the court directed the appellant to be released on bail on furnishing a bail bond for a sum of ₹50,000 with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court / Duty Metropolitan Magistrate, subject to some terms and conditions.

–Report by Anjali Pandey

Without commenting further on the merits of the case, keeping the facts and circumstances in mind and the fact that the trial is likely to take some time, I am satisfied that the applicant has made out a case for a grant of regular bail. In the event of there being any FIR/DD entry/ complaint lodged against the applicant, it would be open to the State to seek redressal by way of seeking cancellation of bail. It is also made clear that the observations made in the present case are only to consider the bail application and should not influence the outcome of the trial and not be taken as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.

FACTS:

The FIR was registered on a complaint made by the father of the deceased, Shri Sarvesh Kumar, alleging that the son of the applicant, Sonu was married to the deceased, Neha, who committed suicide on 19.09.2021, due to harassment and torture, being caused by her husband, Sonu, and his family members, including the applicant, Ram Ashre. The applicant is the father-in-law of the deceased.

Learned Counsel for the applicant submits that the accused, husband and the mother-in-law of the deceased who has been specifically named by the complainant are in judicial custody. He submits that no role has been alleged to the applicant and a vague allegation has been made that the entire family of the husband was responsible for the dowry death.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:

Learned Counsel for the applicant submits that the accused, husband and the mother-in-law of the deceased who has been specifically named by the complainant are in judicial custody. He submits that no role has been alleged to the applicant and a vague allegation has been made that the entire family of the husband was responsible for the dowry death.

He further submits that the learned Trial Court, by order dated 12.11.2021, has already granted pre-arrest bail to the brother-in-law of the deceased, specifically noting that the prime witness, Anisha, whose statement has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution, had only named the husband, Sonu, the mother-in-law, Maya Devi, and she had also specifically said in the statement that the deceased did not take anyone else’s name.

JUDGMENT:

Without commenting further on the merits of the case, keeping the facts and circumstances in mind and the fact that the trial is likely to take some time, I am satisfied that the applicant has made out a case for a grant of regular bail.

The applicant is, therefore, directed to be released on bail on furnishing a bail bond for a sum of ₹50,000/- (rupees Fifty thousand only) with two sureties of the like amount to the satisfaction of learned Trial Court / Duty Metropolitan Magistrate on the following conditions:a) He shall under no circumstance leave Delhi without informing the concerned IO / SHO.b) He shall not take adjournment and attend the Trial Court proceedings on every date.c) He shall join and cooperate in further investigation.d) The applicant shall not, in any manner, try to contact any of the witnesses.e) He shall provide his mobile number to the investigating officer (IO) concerned/SHO concerned at the time of release which shall be kept in always working conditions.

In the event of there being any FIR/DD entry/ complaint lodged against the applicant, it would be open to the State to seek redressal by way of seeking cancellation of bail.

-Report by Gaurav Raj

The special leave petition in the case ANJALI BHARADWAJ v/s CPIO, was dismissed by the Supreme court on 9th December because one cannot rely on news articles and reports.

FACT

Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Delhi high court, the petitioner filed an appeal by Special Leave in the Supreme Court. The petitioner herein preferred an RTI application before CPIO, Supreme court regarding the decision taken in collegiums of supreme court held on December 12, 2018.

Vide communication dated 12 December 2018, the said application was turned down. Due to this, the appellant further filed an appeal before the First appellate authority under RTI Act, 2005. The authority rejected the appeal by contending that there has not been any final decision taken in the collegiums dated 12.12.2018. The second appeal by the petitioner was also turned down by the single judge bench by reiterating that there has not been any final decision taken in the subsequent meeting dated 10.01.2019. The learned single judge believed that there was no formal resolution came to be drawn up so there is no question of providing any information regarding the decision taken on 12.12.2018. The order passed by the learned single judge was upheld by the Division bench of the high court by impugned judgement and order. Feeling Aggrieved by the order and judgement the petitioner has preferred the present appeal.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION

Shri Prashant Bhushan, appearing on the behalf of petition contended that certain decisions were taken by the collegiums in the meeting held on 12.12.2018. and it must be uploaded into the public domain the decision taken by the collegiums is required to be informed under the RTI act 2005.

Shri Prashant Bhushan heavily relied upon an article uploaded by Bar and Bench that one of the members of the collegium had stated that he was disappointed that the decision taken by the collegiums was not uploaded on the supreme court’s website.

It is submitted that as per the article certain decisions were taken by the collegiums in the meeting held on 12.12.2018. However, it cannot be contended that no decision was taken at the meeting held on 12.12.2018 only because the decision was altered at a subsequent meeting held on 10.01.2019. it was submitted that everybody has the right to be informed about the decision taken in collegiums as per the previous resolution of the high court dated 03,10,2017.

COURT’S DECISION

The learned court has refused to comment upon the statement given by one of the members of the collegiums. The court is of the view that, in the earlier meeting dated 10.01.2019, it was mentioned that in the meeting dated 12.10.2018, the process for consultation was not over and remained un- concluded and it is only after the final resolution is drawn and signed by the members of the collegiums, the same to be published on the website of the Supreme Court of India as per resolution date 03.10.2017. Therefore, no reliance can be made on any news article in the media. What is to be seen is the final resolution signed by the members of the collegium. So, there is no substance in the above special leave to appeal and the same deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.

-Report by Asma Khan

The Honourable Apex Court in the case of Amit Singh Vs. Ravindra Nath Pandey & Ors. Etc., upheld the decision of both the single and division bench of the Allahabad High Court and held that the list of seniority prepared in 2005 has no stance and must be quashed.

FACTS

The appellant and the respondents both were appointed to the post of Assistant Consolidation Officers (hereinafter referred to as the ACOs) in the year 1997-1998 respectively. The appellants were appointed as direct recruits on 18th August 1997 whereas the respondents were promoted on 16th December 1997. The promoters were promoted to the post of ACOs whereas the direct recruits were directly appointed to the post of ACOs through the Uttar Pradesh Subordinate Services Selection Commission and were given seniority over the promoters because of the seniority list of 29th July 2005. The promoters filed a petition before a single judge in the High Court of Allahabad claiming that they should be given seniority over the direct recruits as per Rule 8(3) of the U.P. Government Servants Seniority Rules, 1991. The learned judge observed that seniority should be given based on the 1991 rules and quashed the 29th July 2005 list which gave seniority to direct recruits and held that promotions should be given superiority over direct recruits. The direct recruits then appealed to the Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad, Lucknow and the division bench on 4th September 2014 upheld the order of the single judge but also held that the State must apply the rota system in case the direct recruits or the promoters are appointed in the same year.

The appellant, that is, the direct recruits appealed to the apex court. 

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION 

The learned counsel for the appellant contended that when the direct recruits were appointed to the post of ACOs, the promotees had not even entered the Cadre and so the 2005 list of seniority was right in placing direct recruits above the promotees and the 1991 rules had an overriding effect and so cannot be applied here. He also contended that the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court was not right in applying the rota system for the recruitment of the same year. He also contended that the promoters would be promoted retrospectively if the decision of the bench of the High Court is taken into consideration. He referred to the case Uttaranchal Forest Rangers’ Assn. (Direct recruit ) and Ors. V. State of UP and Ors.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION 

The respondent contended that the order of the single bench and the division bench should not be interfered with because both the direct recruits and the promotions were recruited in the same year.

JUDGEMENT 

As per Rule 8(1) of the 1991 Rules, if recruitments are made in the same year for promotions and direct recruits then seniority would depend upon the date of order of substantive appointment and it shall be in the order in which their names are arranged. Further, if appointments are made by direct recruitment and promotion on the result of any one selection, then seniority will be in a cyclic order, that is, the promoter will be Senior. Therefore, if the ratio is 1:1 then the first post will go to a promoter and the second to a direct recruiter. 

New rules were issued on 25th March 1992 and they had an overriding effect on the existing rules and orders. Rule 3 (m) of the 1992 rules laid down “Year of recruitment” shall amount to “12 months starting from 1st day of July”. Further, rule 5 provided that 33% of posts would be filled by promotions and 66% by direct recruits.

A combined list shall be prepared as per Rule 18 and rule 19 (2) states that when both appointments are made in the same year then it shall be made from both sources and it is mandatory to prepare a combined list. As per Rule 19(3), names must be arranged in cyclic order if appointments are made by both direct recruitment and promotion. 

The court further observed that 1992 rules shall have supersession over other rules and orders. The court relied on the case of Pawan Pratap Singh and others V. Relevant Singh and Ors. As per this case, the date on which the selection procedure starts or the advertisement of the post is issued is the date of selection and if this process is not followed then it would be inconsistent with both articles. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The apex court in this case held that seniority cannot be determined as per the date of vacancy and cannot be given retrospectively because it would affect those employees who were already appointed. 

As per the 1992 rules, the year of recruitment in the present case is from 1st July 1997 to 30th June 1998. On 15th September 2003, a combined seniority list was prepared based on 1992 rules but the list of 25th July 2005 changed it. The Court observed that the list of 25th July was in contravention of rules 18 and 19 of 1992 rules because the 2005 list provided seniority to direct recruits over the promotees and as per the rules if appointments are made both by direct recruitment and by promotion then a combined shall be prepared and selections must be made from both the sources. 

The court further pointed out the case of Uttaranchal Forest Rangers Assn. which was relied upon by the appellants and observed that in this case the promoters were appointed in 1991 and the direct recruits were appointed in 1990 and so 1992 rules did not apply here. 

-Report by Akshita Singh

In the case of The State of Uttarakhand Vs. Nalanda College of Education and Others, it was held by the Supreme Court that the High Court committed a serious error in holding the communication/order of the State Government to be arbitrary as the State Government is expected to make its recommendations or comments to the Regional Committee in accordance with Rule 7(5) of the NCTE Regulations, 2014, upon receipt of the notification from the office of the Regional Committee to the State.

FACTS

The State of Uttarakhand has filed the current appeal in response to the learned Single Judge’s decision on July 16, 2013, which nullified the State Government’s order rejecting the new B.Ed. colleges’ application for recognition and instead ordered the National Council for Teachers Education (NCTE) to make the proper determination regarding respondent No. 1’s request to increase the number of seats in the B.Ed. course. On 22.02.2008, Respondent No.1, in this case, Nalanda College of Education, Dehradun, received recognition from the NCTE under Section 14(1) of the NCTE Act for B.Ed. degree course with a one-year duration and an annual intake of 100 students.

The initial writ petitioner was affiliated with the HNB University after being recognised under the 1973 U.P. State University Act. The College requested an increase in student admission seats from the Northern Regional Committee of the NCTE for the academic year 2013–2014. According to the NCTE Regulations, 2014 the State Government’s viewpoint was requested. According to the State Government’s order/communication dated 16.07.2013, the majority of B.Ed. graduates would be jobless because only 2500 teachers are required against the 13000 students who complete the programme each year. As a result, the State Government recommended that no new recognition be provided for those pursuing a B.Ed. course and that the recognition of the College is revoked. 

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS

Shri Krishnam Mehra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Uttarakhand argued that a deliberate policy decision was made by the State Government not to grant recognition to the new colleges for B.ed. course based on valid grounds and the High Court’s Division Bench made grave mistakes in rescinding the communication/order dated 16.07.2013 as the High Court did not need to intervene with it to exercise its authority under article 226 of the Indian constitution. He further submitted that according to the NCTE Regulations, before the Regional Committee decides to award recognition or expand the intake capacity, the State Government’s opinion, which includes the comprehensive grounds with the appropriate facts, is the sine qua non, therefore the State Government’s decision was not arbitrary as it was also backed by the required facts and statistics and by declaring it to be arbitrary and throwing it aside, the High Court made a grave error.

Ms Manisha T. Karia, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the NCTE also supported the appellant by relying on the cases namely, Maa Vaishno Devi Mahila Mahavidyalaya v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, in which this court had not interfered with the similar decisions of the State Governments. Also, in State of Rajasthan v. LBS B.Ed. College & Others, (2016) 16 SCC 110 it was stated that the State has a crucial role to play in providing appropriate comments supported by adequate reasoning, hence NCTE is compelled to consider the State Government’s viewpoint.

COURT’S DECISION

The issue before the Court was,

“whether the policy decision taken by the State Government can be said to be arbitrary which calls for interference of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India?”

The court by applying the law laid down in Vidharbha Sikshan Vyawasthapak Mahasangh held that the High Court committed a serious error in holding the communication/order of the State Government to be arbitrary as the State Government is expected to make its recommendations or comments to the Regional Committee in accordance with Rule 7(5) of the NCTE Regulations, 2014, upon receipt of the notification from the office of the Regional Committee to the State. It further stipulates that the State Government must offer specific justifications for its opposition to the recommendation, together with any appropriate statistics, so that the concerned Regional Committee can take them into account when deciding how to proceed with the application. As a result, the need and/or requirement are included when the State Government is expected to give thorough justifications against the award of recognition with appropriate figures. As a result, the State Government was perfectly within its rights to advise against continued recognition of the new B.Ed. colleges and/or express this opinion.

-Report by Manya Sharma

The Supreme Court after considering the arguments of both the counsels and the income of the Defendant, directed an enhanced compensation of Rs.32,82,000/- with an interest rate of 7.5%, to the claimants.

FACTS 

An automobile accident caused the untimely death of the appellant’s wife. The deceased was 25 years old and worked as a homemaker at the time of her death. The Motor Accident Claim Tribunal concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to Rs.19,12,200 in total compensation, including 7.5% interest. Taking into account the Defendant’s monthly income of Rs. 1,500/­, the Learned Tribunal found that the loss of dependency was worth Rs. 3,24,000/­. The learned Tribunal ordered an additional Rs. 50,000/­ for the foetus. The High Court enhanced the amount of compensation to Rs.29,34,000/- under various heads. Feeling aggrieved by the distribution of the amount and the total amount, the aggrieved party went to the Supreme Court.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION

It was contended that the calculation of the amount under different heads was not proper in the High Court’s judgment. The amount under the head’s loss of dependency was decided to be Rs.6,000/- keeping the income of the deceased in mind but this was not proper as even minimum wages payable to workers was more than that amount and also the prospects of the deceased were not taken into consideration while calculating the amount. It is also contended the High Court miscalculated the amount towards the foetus, the same being Rs.50,000/-, where it should be Rs.40,000/- each towards loss of consortium or loss of love and affection. 

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

The respondents contended that the deceased was only a housewife and therefore the High Court’s calculation of Rs.6,000/- towards loss of dependency was fair. The respondents also fairly conceded that the High Court should have considered the prospects while awarding loss of dependency.

COURT’S DECISION

The Court, after hearing the learned counsels of the appellants and the respondents, decided that after considering the income of the deceased, who was a 25 years old housewife, should be at least Rs.7,500/- per month. The position of law on the calculation of the amount under the head of loss of dependency provides that 40% of the income is to be added to prospects. The claimants will be entitled to an amount of Rs. 1 lakh for the loss of the foetus and an amount of Rs.40,000/- each for loss of consortium or loss of love and affection. Therefore, in total, an enhanced compensation of Rs.32,82,000/- with an interest rate of 7.5%, was awarded to the claimants.

–Report by Annette Abraham

The United Health Group Inc. Subsidiary, OptumRX is set to pay $15 Million towards a settlement concerning a suit filed against them in the United State District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The suit, filed in March 2022, claimed that OptumRX overcharged the Ohio Bureau of Workers Compensation on standard drugs. 

FACTS

OptumRX is a Pharmacy Benefit Manager. PBMs are companies that manage the costs of the prescription drugs that go into the market. Ideally, these companies are expected to serve as middlemen to negotiate for lower prices and discounts on behalf of an individual’s health plan or insurance. 

OptumRX was contracted by the Ohio Bureau of Workers Compensation, an agency that provides compensation as well as medical benefits for work-related injuries, diseases or death. The Bureau is funded by regular sums taken out of employees’ paychecks. The contract detailed that OptumRX would manage prescription drug costs for the state agency’s employees under a health insurance scheme. Through the contract, OptumRX was required to charge the Bureau the lowest of four potential prices for generic drugs. 

Through a series of emails uncovered by Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost and his team, it was discovered that OptumRX did not follow the terms of the contract, which led to an overcharge on over 57% of the 2.3 million prescription claims that the bureau received from injured workers in the state between January 2014 and September 2018. 

RESULT

The dispute was settled extra-judicially, with Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost and the team representing OptumRX coming to an agreement on the terms of the settlement and the compensation owed to the State of Ohio. The office of the Attorney General of Ohio released a statement through their official website on Tuesday (EDT), stating: “OptumRx will repay the state $15 million in prescription-drug overcharges assessed to the Ohio BWC”.

This is not the first time the Ohio court has levied charges against the company with respect to contract breaches and lack of transparency. A suit filed against them in November of 2019 contained similar charges against the PBM, accusing them of misappropriating $16 Million dollars through malpractices. Following this suit, The bureau discontinued its contract with OptumRX.

Attorney General Dave Yost has a history of uncovering the malpractices and misconducts that Pharmacy Benefit Managers often commit through their contracts both with private as well as government-funded organizations and parties. In fact, this lawsuit is a crowning one in AG Dave Yost’s rally against PBMs, his total recoveries from these companies following the OptumRX settlement amounts to more than $100 million. 

PBMs misappropriating funds and misquoting cheques is not a new phenomenon. In 2018, an investigation commissioned by the Ohio Department of Medicaid found that in 2017, USA’s biggest PBMs CVS and OptumRX had together charged taxpayers $244 million more than what they paid the pharmacies that provide Medicaid drugs to the people under various government organizations, pocketing the difference. This investigation was in part, instigated by the auditor of state Dave Yost. 

Previously, Attorney General Dale Yost had recovered $88 million from Centene, a Pharmacy Benefits Manager based out of St. Louis, Missouri. In this lawsuit, various subsidiaries of Centene had been accused of misrepresenting reimbursement requests that had already been paid by third parties. The arrangement of the subsidiaries of Centene also led to artificially inflated dispensing fees. 

Currently, a similar suit is being pursued by Attorney General Dave Yost against a PBM owned by Cigna, Express Scripts, in relation to their contract with Ohio Highway Patrol Retirement System. 22 states have currently issued claims against Centene, with Kansas, Mississippi, Illinois and Arkansas following Ohio in reaching settlements with the PBM. 

CONCLUSION

OptumRX is one of the many PBMs that are currently using loopholes and malpractices to misappropriate money from state-managed organizations funded by the US taxpayers. The Ohio Attorney General’s lawsuit against the company is one of many that aim to reduce the impact of such practices on the common man and to return funds to the state. Currently, OptumRX will pay a total sum of $15 million to the state of Ohio to settle the money misappropriated through false charges filed by the company for prescription drugs.