-Report by Anjana C

It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Union of India & Anr. v. Subhash Chander Sehgal & Ors. that If there is no lapse in acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, the land remains in the possession of the appellant. 

Facts

Unsatisfied with the decision of the Delhi High Court, the petitioner has appealed. The possession of the land was taken by the authority in 1987and was utilized as a park by the East Delhi Municipal Corporation. However, the High Court of Delhi held that the acquisition proceedings with respect to subject land had lapsed in terms of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement Act, 2013.

The decision in the case of Indore Development Authority versus Manoharlal and others, (2020) 8 SCC 129 was cited and the following was said that has been applied to this case: 

  • According to Section 24(1)(a), there is no lapse in proceedings if there is an award on the date of commencement of the 2013 Act. 
  • If the award has been made within 5 years (excluding the period of an interim order of the Court), the proceedings will be according to the 2013 Act under Section 24(1)(b) under the 1894 Act, regarding it as not repealed. 
  • If the possession of land has been taken over and compensation has not been paid, there is no lapse. 
  • If compensation is not paid and possession has not been taken, there is no lapse. 
  • If the compensation has not been deposited in court, all beneficiaries to the landholding will be entitled, as on the date of notification, to compensation under Section 4 of the 2013 Act.  
  • Non-deposit does not result in a lapse of land acquisition proceedings. 
  • If compensation has been tendered under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, he cannot state that the acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) as a result of non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in Court. 
  • The obligation to pay is complete when the amount due is tendered in accordance with Section 31(1). 
  • Landowners refusing to accept compensation/ who seek reference for a higher compensation are not in the position to claim lapse under Section 24(2) under the 2013 Act.
  • The method of acquiring land under the 1894 Act under Section 24(2) is by making an inquest report/ memorandum. 
  • Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the 2013 Act. It does not reopen cases/ proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of the mode of possession.

Judgment

It was observed that if there is no lapse in acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, the land remains in the possession of the appellant. There will be no question of payment of compensation to the petitioners. It was said that the writ petitioners were entitled to compensation according to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. All of the above taken into consideration, the Court declared the High Court’s order to be quashed and set aside. The writ petition filed before the High Court was dismissed. The present appeal was allowed, and no order was given regarding costs incurred by the parties.

-Report by Avinash Pandey

The Karnataka High Court observed in Sri Shivaswamy vs The State Of Karnataka the importance of possession of the property to allege trespass. In this case, the respondent had filed a complaint against the petitioner alleging that he had trespassed into her property, threatened the tenants to vacate, and also caused some loss by disconnecting electricity. Furthermore, the petitioner had trespassed on multiple properties in that area. On the above-stated contentions, the complainant was filed under sections 143, 149, 427, 447, 448, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code.

The petitioners had filed this petition to quash the proceedings of the complaint. The counsel from the side of the petitioners contested that, the case is not criminal in nature but is inclined more towards civil originality. It was further stated that the petitioners are trying to arm-twist the case as they had lost all the papers and prior litigations for the property in contention. Furthermore, the complaint was registered after a delay of 7 months. The delay in the filing shows that the complaint was filed with mala fide intention. The respondents on the other hand refuted the contentions and claimed that they had possession of the property.

The Single judge bench comprising Justice M Nagaprasanna made the initial observation that the land, in this case, was purchased duly by the Bangalore Development Authority to make the rightful use for the NTI Housing Co-operative Society. The petitioner purchased the property from the society with a registered sale deed and all the petitioners have purchased their portions via a registered sale deed. After some time had purchased the property with all the paperwork and the revenue records replaced with their names. The complainants had challenged the acquisition in a different case before the Karnataka High court wherein it was held that the petitioners hold the possession of the property and the claim of the complainants have no merit.

The court made the observation that for a case to be made under section 447 the possession should be there. Section 447 read with section 441 of the IPC is an “interplay between a civil right and a crime”. The respondents had also contended that the petition has been filed 3 years after the complaint and hence should be rejected on account of the delay, to which the court replied that it has power under section 482 of the CrPC to allow a petition despite a delay for prevention of miscarriage of justice. The case relied upon by the respondents were also held to be irrelevant.

In the current case, it was seen that the documents provided by the petitioner party were enough for the court to acknowledge their stand and to overpower the documents presented by the respondents. It was observed:

“…The case at hand is for offence under Section 447 of the IPC, for which the most relevant factor would be exclusive possession of the property, on which the accused is alleged to have trespassed. If exclusive possession is not with the complainant, the complaint of criminal trespass into the property and damage to that property under Section 427 of the IPC can hardly be alleged, as observed hereinabove.”

In the judgment the court allowed the Petition to prevent the miscarriage of justice and quashed the criminal complaint against them.

-Report by ESHAN SHARMA

The current appeal has been filed by an encroacher on evacuee land of 0-14 acre-guntha of Survey No.191/2 in Godhara, Gujarat, since 1976, where he has been operating an auto shop known as Bharat Motor Garage. On October 24, 2013, the appellant’s writ suit challenging the eviction order dated 23.6.1992 was dismissed by the Learned Single Bench. The learned Division Bench sustained the order. The appellant, who is still aggrieved, has brought his case to this Court.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION

On 16.07.1992, the appellant filed a writ suit in the Gujarat High Court in Ahmedabad, bearing Special Civil Application (SCA) No. 4700 of 1992. Along with the SCA filed by the appellant, another SCA No.2940 of 1992 brought by one Srikant Deviprasad Joshi was heard. Shri Joshi claimed ownership of the property in question based on an allocation made to him on September 20, 1972, as enemy property. On December 6, 1974, the land assigned to Shri Joshi was annulled. On July 15, 1975, the appeal against the stated order was denied. Shri Joshi then filed an SCA with the High Court, which was dismissed on October 24, 2013. The said order had finally attained finality qua Shri Joshi.

KEY HIGHLIGHTS

  • On January 20, 2014, an order was issued in an intra-court appeal remanding both SCAs to the learned Single Bench. However, the application and the Letters Patent Appeal were both dismissed on March 10, 2014.
  • The learned counsel argued for the appellant before this court is founded upon the policy dated 20.6.1978 for allotment of evacuee land to encroachers and the resolution dated 8.1.1980 in respect of allotment of another public land to encroachers. The appellant as an encroacher is covered by one or both of the insurance, therefore, is entitled to claim regularization of his ownership.
  • On 24.10.2013, the appellant’s writ suit contesting the eviction order dated 23.6.1992 was dismissed by the Learned Single Bench. The ruling has been sustained by the learned Division Bench. The appellant is back in court, still aggrieved.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

The learned counsel count on the judgments in the cases of:

Ramesh Parsram Malani v. State of Telangana

Based on a government policy decision of 20.06.1978, the displaced person-respondent is claiming allotment. The evacuee land must be given to a displaced person because it is part of the compensation pool under Section 14 of the Act and can only be allotted under Section 20. Only one displaced person can be assigned to the evacuee land. After all of the displaced people have been settled, the allocation to non-displaced people can be considered. As a result, the paragraph in the policy dated 20.6.1978 that allows evacuee land to encroachers is contrary to the Act’s design and purpose. However, any allotment made to an encroacher that has reached finality will not be reopened. As a result, an encroacher has no right to regularize evacuee land in the presence of a displaced person entitled to the allotment to achieve the Act’s goal.

COURT JUDGEMENT

“The possession of the land was taken over by the government on January 24, 2014, according to the report. The appellant’s claim now is for restoration of possession by an encroacher, which is completely untenable in above observations.”

The rule is made an outright and present appeal and the same is dismissed.