Tag: #legalnews

-Report by Harshit Yadav

The present case involves a revision petition filed by tenants who are challenging an eviction order passed by the Senior Civil Judge-cum-Rent Controller in Delhi. The landlord had filed an eviction petition on the grounds of the bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises, which is a shop measuring 83.4 sq. ft. The landlord, who owns the subject property, which consists of ground-floor shops, had been running his business in one of the shops, which was not sufficient for his business requirements. The tenants, in their application seeking leave to defend, had failed to raise any triable issues, and the court had dismissed their application and passed the eviction order in favor of the landlord. The tenants have challenged the order on the grounds that the landlord has sufficient alternate suitable accommodation for carrying on his business from other shops in the same property and has no bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises.

FACTS:

A revision petition was filed by tenants against an eviction order passed by the Senior Civil Judge-cum-Rent Controller in Delhi. The tenants were occupying shop no. 3 on the ground floor of a property owned by the landlord. The landlord had filed an eviction petition on the grounds of the bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises for expanding his business of sale of utensils. The tenants had challenged the eviction order by stating that the landlord had sufficient alternative accommodation for his business, but the Trial Court had dismissed their application seeking leave to defend. The present revision petition has been filed against the said order. The document contains the submissions of the parties, relevant facts, and the findings of the Court.

ISSUES RAISED:

Whether the Petitioners’ leave to defend failed to raise any triable issues and the contents of the said application failed to rebut the presumption of bona fide requirement of the Respondent?

Whether the Respondent has no bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises as he has sufficient pension income post-retirement and has possession of shop nos. 1, 2 and 4 in the subject property?

Whether the plea of the Respondent that he intends to carry on business from the tenanted premises is a triable issue, which the Trial Court ought to have appreciated and thus granted the leave to defend?

Whether shop nos. 1 and 2, being used by the sons of the Respondent for carrying out their separate and independent businesses, are not available to the Respondent to carry on his own business and thus, the tenanted premises are required by the Respondent for properly keeping his stock so as to display the same and invite customers, as the space available in the existing shop no. 4 is grossly insufficient?

CONTENTIONS:

The Petitioners’ counsel contended that the Respondent has no bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises as he has sufficient pension income post-retirement, and he has possession of shop nos. 1, 2, and 4 in the subject property. Therefore, the Respondent has alternate suitable accommodation for carrying on his business. However, the Respondent’s counsel submitted that shop nos. 1 and 2 are being used by his sons for carrying out their independent businesses, and shop no. 4, which the Respondent uses for his business, is very small in size. He stated that the Respondent needs the tenanted premises to display his stock properly and invite customers.

The Court considered the submissions of both parties and perused the record. It held that the Respondent has a bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises for expanding his business, as shop no. 4, where he currently operates his business, is not sufficient for him. The Court also noted that the Respondent’s sons are using shops nos. 1 and 2 for their independent businesses, and shop no. 4 is too small for the Respondent’s business. Therefore, the Court dismissed the Petitioners’ revision petition and upheld the eviction order passed by the Trial Court in favour of the Respondent.

JUDGEMENT:

In this case, the tenants have filed a revision petition challenging the eviction order passed by the Senior Civil Judge-cum-Rent Controller in RC ARC No. 5589/16, whereby the Petitioners’ application seeking leave to defend was dismissed, and the impugned eviction order was passed in favor of the landlord with respect to shop no.3.

The Respondent, the landlord, filed an eviction petition for the recovery of the tenanted premises, which abuts his shop no.4, as it was not sufficient for carrying on his business. The Trial Court found that the Petitioners’ leave to defend failed to raise any triable issues and the contents of the said application failed to rebut the presumption of bona fide requirement of the Respondent.

The learned counsel for the Petitioners argued that the Respondent has no bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises, as he has sufficient pension income post-retirement and has alternate suitable accommodation for carrying on his business. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the Respondent argued that shop nos. 1 and 2 are being used by the sons of the Respondent for their independent businesses, and shop no.4, which admeasures 8.5 sq. ft, is being used by the Respondent for running his independent sale of utensils etc.

After considering the submissions of the parties and perusing the record, this Court finds that the Respondent has a bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises. Admittedly, shop nos. 1 and 2 are being used by the sons of the Respondent for their independent businesses, and shop no.4, which admeasures 8.5 sq. ft, is being used by the Respondent for running his independent sale of utensils etc.

The Respondent has stated that the tenanted premises are required for properly keeping his stock so as to display the same and invite customers, as the space available in the existing shop no. 4 is grossly insufficient. This Court finds that the Respondent has a genuine need for the tenanted premises, and the Petitioners have failed to raise any triable issues in this regard.

Therefore, this Court upholds the impugned eviction order passed by the Trial Court and dismisses the present revision petition filed by the Petitioners. The Respondent is entitled to possession of the tenanted premises. The Petitioners are directed to hand over vacant possession of the tenanted premises to the Respondent within a period of four weeks from the date of this judgment.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3JVacal

-Report by Harsh Singh Rajput

In the case of GPSK CAPITAL PRIVATE LIMITED (FORMERLY KNOWN AS MANTRI FINANCE LIMITED) vs THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA, the said company appealed to get an exemption from the registration fees because of Shrikant Mantri, from who they have acquired the membership card of CSE(Calcutta Stock Exchange) and that appeal, got rejected by The Securities and Exchange Board of India.

FACTS:

On 30th Nov 1992, Shrikant Mantri became a member of CSE(Calcutta Stock Exchange) and got registered as a stockbroker with it. And later in 1997, he decided to transfer his membership card CSE to Mantri Finance Ltd. (hereinafter being referred to as ‘company’). This company was a member of NSE. And on the 17th of October, 1995 it also obtained the membership of NSE as a stock broker. After the membership card is given to the company. It got itself registered as a stockbroker on 1st April 1998.

Now, the company raised the issue that Shrikant Mantra had already paid the fees for registration. So, it should be exempted from the payment of registration fees for the period for which Shrikant Mantra had already paid. It further stated that the company is also entitled to compensation as all the conditions prescribed under para 4 of Schedule 3rd to the Regulation were also fulfilled.

But the board rejected this appeal of the company by order dated 7th May 2007. The board justify this action by saying that Shrikant in his three years of the period of membership acted only as a director of the company and as he was not the permanent director, therefore the company will not be entitled to such exemption as the condition under para 4 of schedule 3rd were also not followed properly.

Then the company filed an appeal against the order of the Board dated 07 May 2007 and highlighted the two issues.

Those two issues were read as:

(i) Whether the stock broker requires multiple registrations to operate on more than one stock exchange(s) or a single registration will suffice for all the stock exchanges.

(ii)Whether the appellant-Company is entitled to fee continuity benefits provided under para 4 of Schedule III.

For issue no 1., The learned tribunal held that single registration will be sufficient, even after having multiple memberships by the stockbroker. So, with ordering the board, the learned tribunal said to the board to calculate the registration fee payable again based on registration w.e.f 17th Oct 1995.

For issue no 2., the learned tribunal held that the appellant will not be exempted from the payment fee for which Shrikant Mantri had already paid, as the company fails to satisfy the conditions of clause (4) of Schedule 3rd to the registration.

And both sides were aggrieved by this decision by the tribunal, they preferred the appeal being Civil Appeal No(s). 2402 and CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 5636 against the impugned judgment by tribunal dated 09th Aug 2007.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION:

The learned counsel on behalf of the company submitted that Shrikant Mantra applies for conversion of his membership to a corporate identity and membership of the old entity under para 4 of schedule 3rd.

The learned counsel also stated that the board made an apparent error even after all the conditions are being fulfilled as indicated in para 4.

He also added that the interpretation of para 4 should also be done with the intention with which it was added. And stated that para 4 also mandates that from the converted corporate entity, no fresh fee will be collected.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:

Learned counsel on behalf of the respondent submitted that if an individual or partnership is being converted to a corporate entity then, a director( not being a temporary director ) and the corporate entity are entitled to claim exemption from paying the registration fees.

And in this case, he also added that Shrikant Mantra transferred his membership card CSE to the company and did not convert himself into a corporate identity.

They also supported the board’s decision not to give the appellant exemption.

JUDGEMENT:

The honourable Supreme Court after taking into consideration para 4 of schedule 3rd of the regulation, 1992, and both sides’ facts stated that Shrikant Mantra is not the whole time director, transferred his membership. And also there is nothing that shows the designation of Shrikant Mantra as a full-time director rather he’s been designated as ‘Director’.

And the appellant company failed to satisfy the condition that prevailed in para 4 of schedule 3rd of the regulation.

So, the honourable court dismissed the appeal of the appellant and held that the company will not be exempted from the registration fees.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3nanwP9

-Report by Radhika Mittal

This is a case about an eviction notice issued by the Public Welfare Department for the land occupied by the Appellant, which is a Trust established for the purpose of maintaining a Shiv Temple and Gaushala located in New Delhi. This case delves into the rights of the aggrieved slum dwellers as well as the statutory adherence to government policy.

FACTS :

The Appellant is aggrieved by the Eviction Notice and filed a petition seeking quashing of the Impugned Notice and the issuance of appropriate directions prohibiting the Respondents from carrying out demolition/evacuation proceedings in the said premises.

The learned Single Judge, while disposing of the petition, found that the premises in question do not come within the jhuggi cluster which has been notified as per the Delhi Slum and JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy, 2015. The learned Single Judge, therefore, held that the occupants of the premises were not entitled to protection from demolition.

Aggrieved by the Impugned Order, the Appellant filed an instant appeal. The Appellant contends that the cow shelter and temple have been present on the said premises for more than 15 years and that the Impugned Notice is illegal and arbitrary. The Respondent, on the other hand, has defended the Impugned Order by bringing to the attention of this Court that the place where the premises exist does not come within any notified cluster as notified under the Delhi Slum and JJ Rehabilitation Relocation Policy, 2015.

The Court analyzed the said Policy and held that in order to get the benefit of the said Policy, a jhuggi jhopri basti cluster defined under the Act ought to have been in existence prior or 01.01.2006 and the person should have constructed his jhuggi within the cluster prior to 01.01.2015. The Court held that the premises in question do not come within any notified cluster and, therefore, the demolition cannot be stayed for the said premises.

CONTENTIONS :

This is an appeal against an order passed by a Single Judge in a writ petition filed by the Appellant challenging an eviction notice issued by the Respondent Public Welfare Department for the land occupied by the Appellant’s Trust, which runs a Shiv Temple and Gaushala, and provides shelter to ailing, old and abandoned cows. The notice was issued to all occupants of the premises, including the Appellant’s Trust, directing them to vacate the premises within 15 days. The eviction notice stated that if the occupants failed to do so, they would be removed and relocated to a Shelter Home at Dwarka, Geeta Colony, where they could reside for a period of 3 months. The Single Judge found that the premises did not come within the jhuggi cluster that had been notified under the Delhi Slum and JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy, 2015, and therefore the occupants were not entitled to protection from demolition. The Single Judge directed the Respondent to allot an alternate accommodation for the cow shelter within a week, and further that such alternate cow shelter would be exempt from the maximum stay period of three months. The Appellant challenged this order in the instant appeal, arguing that the cow shelter and temple have been present on the said premises for more than 15 years and that the eviction notice is illegal and arbitrary. The Respondent argued that the place where the premises exist does not come within any notified cluster as notified under the Delhi Slum and JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy, 2015, and therefore the demolition cannot be stayed for the said premises.

JUDGEMENT :

The court heard both parties and perused the material on record, including the Delhi Slum and JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy, 2015, and the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board Act, 2010, and held that in order to get the benefit of the said Policy, a jhuggi jhopri basti cluster defined under the Act, ought to have been in existence prior or 01.01.2006 and the person should have constructed his jhuggi within the cluster prior to 01.01.2015. A survey was conducted to identify various clusters which were entitled to get the benefit of the said Policy. The court found that the premises in question did not come within any notified cluster and the occupants were not entitled to protection from demolition. However, the court directed the Respondent to allot an alternate accommodation for the cow shelter within a week, and such alternate cow shelter would be exempt from the maximum stay period of three months.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/40glb3l

-Report by Sejal Jethva

The parties involved in this case are SUBHASH SOLANKI (Appellant) and DELHI URBAN SHELTER IMPROVEMENT BOARD & ORS. (Respondents). The appellant is allegedly occupying the store illegally and it is claimed that he continued to run his business out of the aforementioned shop after his father passed away and that no one else took over the operation.

FACTS:

The business in dispute was reportedly given to the appellant’s father in 1976 when he was just 14 years old. According to the claim, the appellant was not aware of the terms and circumstances of the allotment at the time of his father’s death in 2009, and as a result, he was unable to submit an application to change the name of the business in question as his father’s legitimate heir. According to the claim, the father of the appellant died away on July 1, 2010, and that day the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board was established.

It is claimed that the appellant kept operating his company out of the aforementioned shop following the death of the father and that no one else took over the operation.

APPELLANTS CONTENTION:

The skilled attorney for the appellant claims that just a possession slip has been given to the appellant’s father in relation to the store in question, and no official allocation letter has been issued in his favour. It is argued that the appellant was unable to request a shop’s modification since he was not aware of the terms and circumstances of the allotment.

The knowledgeable Attorney for the Appellant further asserts that there is no disputing the fact that the Appellant’s father owned the store in question, hence the DUSIB had no difficulty transferring ownership of the shop to the Appellant.

The learned attorney representing the appellant claims that the DUSIB’s policy should be to grant mutation in favour of the legal heirs if there is no dispute regarding who is the initial allottee’s legal heirs so that they can make a living from the store or property that had been allocated to the initial allottee.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:

In contrast, Mr. Parvinder Chauhan, knowledgeable Counsel representing the DUSIB, argued that not only had it been established that the original allottee had entered into an agreement to hire or transfer the appellant to the shop in question, but also that the shop had undergone significant unpermitted construction. The knowledgeable attorney for the DUSIB further notes that shop No. 38, which is currently occupied by the appellant, was also discovered to have been amalgamated with shop No. 37, which is obviously against the terms of allotment and the policy under which the shop was initially allotted to the allottee.

The knowledgeable Attorney for DUSIB also asserts that following the death of his father, the appellant never requested a formal allocation of the store in issue from the authorities.

The evidence on file demonstrates that the Appellant was the subject of proceedings under Sections 41/42 of the DUSIB Act, 2010 for eviction from the aforementioned store. Records show that the in-issue store was given on a licensee fee basis and that the sale or purchase of the shop was prohibited under the terms and circumstances.

JUDGEMENT:

1. The appellant in this case currently resides in Shop No.38 Block-4, Dakshinpuri Extn., New Delhi, and his wife Meena Solanki currently resides in Shop No.37 Block-4, Dakshinpuri Extn., New Delhi. According to documents, one Sh. Ram Lal S/o Sh. Giasi Ram was given this business on a licensee fee basis in 1976. The sale or purchase of the shop is prohibited under the terms and conditions. During a study by the DUSIB survey unit, it was discovered that the shop had been sold to the original allottee, that it had been combined with Shop No. 37, and that there had been extensive unlawful development up to five floors and encroachment on departmental land. The store is being illegally occupied by

2. The learned Single Judge declined to overturn the authorities’ contemporaneous conclusions. The following are the briefly listed requirements for allocation:

1. “a) The sole basis for the allocation was a license;
2. The allotment was made for commercial use and not for residential purposes;
3. the allottee(s) do not have any right to transfer, alienate, or in any other way dispose of the allotted shop(s) in favour of a third party;
4. the allottee(s) do not have any right to carry out structural additions or alterations in the premises without prior written permission from the DUSIB; and
5. as a matter of public policy

3. As a result, the appeal is rejected together with any outstanding applications, if any.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3ZWH881

–Report by Harshit Yadav

In the case of Raj Kumar Versus. The State, National Capital Territory Of Delhi, the petitioner/applicant, Mr. Raj Kumar Singh, has been accused of pushing his sister-in-law off the terrace of her matrimonial house, resulting in grievous injuries. The victim has alleged that she was subjected to cruelty and harassment by her in-laws for dowry and was restrained from communicating with her parents and husband. The applicant denied the allegations and claimed that the victim had jumped off the terrace herself. The court has dismissed the applicant’s previous bail applications, and the present application is being heard.

FACTS:

The petitioner is seeking regular bail in FIR No. 512/2022 under Sections 307/498A/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), registered at PS Ranhola, New Delhi. The FIR was registered on June 21, 2022, after a PCR call was received at PS Ranhola, Delhi regarding a lady (complainant) falling from the roof of her matrimonial house. Upon receiving information, the SDM Punjabi Bagh reached the hospital and recorded the statement of the victim. The victim alleged that she had married Mr. Ram Kumar and Rs. 2.5 lakhs were paid as dowry. After her marriage, she was taunted, beaten, and threatened for dowry as well as restrained from communicating and or meeting with her parents and husband. The victim has alleged that on June 21, 2022, by reason of her request to meet her mother, the present applicant, Mr. Raj Kumar Singh (brother-in-law) along with other accused persons namely, Nempal Singh (father-in-law), Mamta (mother-in-law), & Monica (sister-in-law) dragged her to the terrace and pushed her from there. During the course of investigation, the statement of an eyewitness, Ms. Babita was recorded, she stated that the complainant herself jumped from the roof. However, during the further course of the investigation, the said eyewitness retracted her previous statement. During the investigation, Call Detail Records were obtained & analyzed as well as a supplementary statement of the complainant was also recorded under Section 161 of CrPC. After the completion of the investigation, a chargesheet was filed before the Court of competent jurisdiction. The present applicant had filed two bail applications, which were dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-05 and learned Additional Sessions Judge-09. The present application seeks grant of regular bail.

ISSUES RAISED:

Whether the petitioner/applicant is entitled to be granted regular bail under Sections 439 and 482 of the CrPC in FIR No. 512/2022 under Sections 307/498A/34 of the IPC.

Whether the allegations of cruelty and dowry harassment against the petitioner/applicant and other co-accused persons are true or false.

Whether the complainant jumped from the terrace of her matrimonial home or was pushed by the petitioner/applicant and other co-accused persons.

Whether the eyewitness, Ms. Babita, retracted from her previous statement due to any pressure or influence from the petitioner/applicant and other co-accused persons.

Whether the supplementary statement of the complainant under Section 161 of CrPC and the call records support the allegations made against the petitioner/applicant and other co-accused persons.

Whether the grant of anticipatory bail to Ms. Monica, the wife of the petitioner/applicant, is relevant to the present case.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:

The applicant’s counsel has contended that the allegations are false and no specific allegations have been made against the present applicant. They have argued that the complainant herself jumped off the terrace, and this has been corroborated by an eye witness. They have also pointed out that the complainant’s husband has not been accused in the case.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:

The prosecution, on the other hand, has argued that there is sufficient evidence to establish the involvement of the present applicant in the crime. They have presented the complainant’s statement alleging cruelty and dowry demands by the accused, corroborated by the supplementary statement of an eye witness. They have also cited the recovery of three handwritten slips thrown by the complainant, requesting help from her relatives, and the admission of the complainant in her additional statement that she communicated with her family through the accused’s phone.

JUDGEMENT:

In this case, the petitioner/applicant has sought regular bail in FIR No. 512/2022 under Sections 307/498A/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), registered at PS Ranhola, New Delhi. The petitioner is accused of pushing his sister-in-law from the terrace of her matrimonial home, among other charges.

The court has considered the facts of the case, including the statement of the victim, who alleges that she was taunted, beaten, and threatened for dowry, and was restrained from communicating or meeting with her parents and husband. The victim has also alleged that the present applicant, along with other accused persons, dragged her to the terrace and pushed her from there.

During the course of the investigation, an eye witness initially stated that the complainant had jumped from the roof, but later retracted her statement and stated that the complainant was hanging from the roof and fell down due to a loosening of her grip. The complainant admitted to communicating with her mother, brother, and husband through the phone of the present applicant and his wife, and stated that her relatives witnessed her being abused and misbehaved at the hands of the present applicant and his family. She further stated that the present applicant, along with the other co-accused persons, threw her from the terrace after she expressed a desire to leave her matrimonial home.

The court has also considered the fact that the present applicant’s wife, Ms. Monica, was granted anticipatory bail by the Additional Sessions Judge-09, Tis Hazari Courts.

Based on the above facts and circumstances, the court is of the opinion that the allegations against the present applicant are serious in nature and require further investigation. The court further notes that the applicant’s previous bail applications have been dismissed by the competent courts.

The court, therefore, finds no ground to grant regular bail to the present applicant at this stage. The application is dismissed

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3JMlYDP

–Report by Radhika Mitta

This is a case summary of an application for anticipatory bail in FIR No. 512/2022 under Sections 307/498A/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), registered at PS Ranhola, New Delhi.

FACTS:

The incident involved a lady who fell from the roof of her matrimonial house and sustained grievous injuries. She alleged that she was taunted, beaten, and threatened for dowry and was restrained from communicating or meeting with her parents and husband. The victim accused the present applicant, Ms. Mamta (mother-in-law), along with other accused persons of dragging her to the terrace and pushing her from there. During the course of the investigation, the statement of an eyewitness was recorded, who initially stated that the complainant herself jumped from the roof but later retracted her statement. The complainant admitted to communicating with her mother, brother, and husband through the phone of the present applicant’s son and his wife. The complainant’s father and brother-in-law also visited her matrimonial house and witnessed her being abused and misbehaved with at the hands of the present applicant and his family. The present applicant was not found at her expected address during the investigation as she was undergoing treatment at a hospital. A chargesheet was filed, and the anticipatory bail application of the present applicant was dismissed. A non-bailable warrant was issued against the present applicant by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Tis Hazari Courts.

PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTIONS:

The contentions of the plaintiff/complainant are not explicitly stated in the given case summary. However, it can be inferred that the complainant had filed a First Information Report (FIR) against the applicant (present respondent) and had made serious allegations against her, including allegations of cruelty and harassment at her matrimonial home.

DEFENDANT’S CONTENTIONS:

The learned counsel for the applicant (present respondent) argued that the allegations made in the FIR were false and that no specific allegations had been made against the applicant. The counsel also submitted that the complainant had jumped from the terrace of her matrimonial home and that an eyewitness had corroborated this fact. The counsel further urged that the applicant was an old woman with health issues and required frequent medical attention. The defence counsel argued that no material had been placed on record to substantiate the prosecution’s claim that the applicant posed a threat to the complainant or could tamper with evidence.

JUDGEMENT:

In view of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the application for anticipatory bail is allowed. In the event of her arrest in connection with the present FIR, the applicant is directed to be released forthwith, upon her furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand) along with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the Investigating Officer/Arresting Officer. In case it is established that the applicant tried to tamper with the evidence, the bail granted to the applicant shall stand cancelled forthwith.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3TnmMSG

-Report by Sejal Jethva

ASHUTOSH SAMANTA (D) BY LRS. & ORS. VS SM. RANJAN BALA DASI & ORS., In this case, 3 related brothers’ property was distributed by will. In this case sections 68,69 and 71 of the Indian Evidence Act discuss.

FACTS

Three sons, Upendra, Anukul, and Mahadev were born to one Gosaidas Samanta (hence, “testator”). He left a will dated 16.11.1929 behind when he passed away, leaving behind his widow Bhagbati Das and three boys. Three heirs received the testator’s estate: his sons Anukul and Mahadev, as well as his grandson Shibu, who is the son of Upendra (who was not granted any share). A division deed was drawn between these three co-sharers on February 21, 1945. Upendra, who signed a disclaimer document for one portion of the assets Shibu sold with his share, appears to have accepted this arrangement.

The current appellant filed a claim in 1952, claiming that he was in possession of some of the testator’s real estate and that he had acquired them from Upendra.

APPELLANTS CONTENTION

Mr. Ranjan Mukherjee, Ld. Advocate contended on behalf of the appellant that the courts below could not have relied on the will and given the letters of administration in the absence of any proof that the will was properly performed. Given that the propounder had made several arguments, including one for adverse possession in a prior suit for division, it was argued that there were suspicious circumstances surrounding the will’s execution that raised questions about its veracity. Additionally, it was claimed that the lower courts could not have accepted the will based on Section 90 of the Evidence Act of 1872 and relied on the 1945 partition document or the ‘Nabadi’ alleged to have been

The appellant’s principal contention is that the courts below erred by relying on Section 90 of the Evidence Act of 1872 because the application for letters of administration was submitted after a significant amount of time had passed.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

On the other hand, Mr. Bikash Kar Gupta, Ld. Advocate argued on behalf of the respondents that this court should not intervene in the current matter because the courts have made concurring factual findings. It was argued that the will had been properly proved and that there was no need to wait to ask the court for letters of administration.

The respondent argued that both the trial court and the High Court consistently expressed satisfaction that the elements required to prove the will had been met and that the courts did not base their conclusions solely on the assumption that the document was old. The respondent relied on the record and the findings made by both the trial court and the High Court.

JUDGEMENT

1. Wills cannot be proved only based on their age; wills must also be proven in accordance with Sections 63(c) of the Succession Act of 1925 and Section 68 of the Evidence Act of 1872, which preclude the use of Section 90’s presumption regarding the regularity of papers older than 30 years.

2. There are frequently circumstances when wills that would have otherwise met the legal conditions for being attested cannot be proven in accordance with the aforementioned two sections because the attesting witnesses are unavailable or if one of the witnesses denies having attested the will. Evidence Act of 1872 Sections 69 and 71.

3. In addition to the testimony of witnesses, the trial court also referred to the partition agreement that gave it effect and in which shares were distributed in line with the conditions of the will. This document was registered, and the appellant’s predecessor, the late Upendra, also signed a document acknowledging the will’s existence.

4. There can be only one conclusion, i.e., that the will was duly executed, and the propounder/respondent herein was successful in proving it, if all the aforementioned circumstances are taken into account in their entirety and one also keeps in mind the fact that none of Upendra’s heirs contested the grant of letters of administration.

5. After considering the discussion above, this court concludes that the conclusions in the High Court’s contested judgement are sound. As a result, the appeal is denied and rejected. There won’t be a cost-related order.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3YQttxZ

-Report by Karan Gautum

Heard Ganesh Datt Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri B.N. Pathak, learned standing counsel for the state-respondents.

FACTS

The petitioner is an educational institution run by a society registered under the Society Registration Act, 1860, and Ram Yagya Chaudhary executed a registered gift deed of his agricultural land in favour of the petitioner’s institution on 20.9.2016. However, the Assistant Inspector General (Registration) reported that the gift deed was undervalued and the valuation was not shown on the market value. The dispute was referred to the Collector and the petitioner filed an objection. Stamp Case No.27/281/D-2016171404706 (State vs. Ram Yagya Tara Devi Chaudhary Inter College) was registered under Section 47A of the Stamp Act. The petitioner challenged the order dated 29.5.2017 and filed a Writ Petition No.3447 of 2018, granting interim protection to the effect that further recovery in pursuance of the impugned order shall remain stayed and the revision shall be decided by respondent no.1 within a period of 6 months.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION

This Court passed an interim order granting four weeks’ time to file the counter affidavit and two weeks to file the rejoinder affidavit. It also directed the petitioner to deposit 50% of the deficient stamp amount, which in the instant case is to the tune of Rs. 4,21,500/- and the sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- towards the amount fixed under the head of penalty, within one month from today. Any amount already deposited by the petitioner shall be adjusted towards the amount directed to be deposited. The petitioner submitted that the demand of deficient stamp duty by the respondent authorities is illegal, as according to the provisions of Section 47-A of the Indian Stamp Act, the value of the property as provided under Article 33 of Schedule I B of the Stamp Act will be applicable and the deficiency determined by the respondent nos. 1 & 2 based on market value is illegal. Counsel also submitted that the impugned orders be set aside and the writ petition be allowed.

RESPONDANT’S CONTENTION 

B.N. Pathak, learned standing counsel, submitted that the impugned order has been rightly passed and that the rate for the agricultural plot cannot be fixed for payment of stamp duty. He also cited Sections 27 & 47-A of the Indian Stamp Act to demonstrate that the power has been rightly exercised by the respondents against the petitioner. He submitted that no interference is required in the matter and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. The Court has held that on the ground of the future potential of the property, the stamp duty cannot be imposed in respect of the property in dispute. The true test for determination by the Collector is the market value of the property on the date of the instrument, as every instrument is required to be stamped before or at the time of execution.

JUDGEMENT

The judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition (C) no. 66621 of 2010, Sumit Gupta vs State of U.P. and others, states that there is a difference in the language used in Article 33 of the Schedule I-B of the Act and Section 47-A of the Act when levying stamp duty on a gift-deed. The legislature has deliberately used the word “value of the property” in Article 33 while subjecting the gift to stamp duty and has refrained from using the term “market value”. This means that when the market value is not at all relevant, the provisions of the Act do not come into play which necessitates the determination of market value. This court has followed the earlier judgment of AWC 1087, Ram Khelawan alias Bachcha Vs State of U.P. and Shiva Dutt Mishra Vs. Commissioner Gorakhpur Division and 2 Others on the point of imposition of stamp duty on the gift deed in respect to the agricultural plot. Paragraphs 5,6 and 7 of these judgments.

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CITATION: WRIT – C No. – 43196/2018

-Report by

The present case concerns a writ petition filed by the wife of a deceased physical education
teacher seeking the release of outstanding dues payable to her late husband on account of pay
revision under the 7th Central Pay Commission (CPC) recommendations. The petitioner’s
husband was the sole bread earner of the family, and all his legal heirs were dependent on
him. The petitioner alleged that despite repeated requests, the school had not released the
arrears of salary and allowances owed to her husband. The respondents, including the school
and the Directorate of Education, did not dispute the petitioner’s claim to the outstanding dues
payable to her husband. The court allowed the writ petition and directed the school to
calculate and disburse the outstanding dues to the petitioner within four weeks from the date
of the order.

Facts:

The present writ petition was filed by the petitioner seeking the release of outstanding dues
payable to her late husband, who was working as a Physical Education Teacher at the National
Public School for over 30 years. Her husband died due to fatal injuries sustained in an
accident on 10.08.2022, leaving behind the petitioner and his legal heirs, who were dependent
on him. The petitioner’s grievance was that the school had not granted the benefits of pay
revision under the 7th Pay Commission (CPC) and released the arrears of salary and allowances
of her late husband.

Issue:

The issue raised in the present writ petition was the non-grant of benefits of pay revision
under 7th CPC and the release of arrears of salary and allowances of the petitioner’s late
husband by the school.

Petitioner’s Contentions:

The petitioner in this case, the wife of a deceased physical education teacher, contended that
her husband was entitled to receive the benefits of pay revision under the 7th Central Pay
Commission (CPC) recommendations, as directed by circulars issued by the Directorate of
Education. She alleged that despite repeated requests from her son, the school had not
released the arrears of salary and allowances owed to her husband, who was the sole bread
earner of the family.

Respondent’s Contentions:

On the other hand, the respondents, including the school and the Directorate of Education,
did not dispute the petitioner’s claim to the outstanding dues payable to her husband.
However, they requested the petitioner to provide any additional information or documents
required by the school to release the payments. They also argued that the grant of benefits of
pay revisions under the Central Pay Commissions’ Recommendations and the consequent
fixation of pay scales etc. of employees of recognized private schools at par with employees
of the corresponding status in schools run by Appropriate Authority, by virtue of provisions of
Section 10 of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973, was not in dispute, citing relevant court
judgments.

Judgment:

The court allowed the writ petition and recorded the assurance given on behalf of
Respondents No.1 to 3 that all outstanding dues payable to the petitioner’s husband on
account of pay revision under the 7th CPC shall be released within four weeks from the date of
the judgment. The court also directed that the calculations of the amounts disbursed to the
petitioner shall be furnished to her to enable her to ascertain if anything further remains to be
paid. In case the petitioner finds that any balance amounts are payable, she is at liberty to
approach the school management in this regard and, in case of any surviving grievance, she
may take recourse to remedies available to her in accordance with the law. The court disposed of
the writ petition in the aforesaid terms.

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-Report by Anurag Sinha

As part of a petition contesting the blood donor standards, the Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare has filed an affidavit challenging the guidelines’ outright restriction on transgender people, gay males, female sex workers, and others donating blood.

It has been reported that the National Blood Transfusion Council (NBTC, an organisation made up of medical and scientific professionals) is responsible for determining which groups of people are barred from being blood donors and that this conclusion is grounded in data from scientific studies.

The affidavit begins by arguing that the petition’s concerns are within the purview of the executive and must be evaluated from the perspective of public health rather than individual rights.

Facts:

The Public Interest Litigation by a member of the Transgender community. Thangjam Santa A lawsuit against Singh, represented by lawyer Anindita Pujari, was filed in federal court “Under the auspices of the Central Health Ministry, the National Blood Transfusion Council and the National Aids Control Organization released their 2017 Guidelines for Blood Donor Selection and Blood Donor Referral in October.

Guidelines clauses 12 and 51 exclude transgender people, gay males, and female sex workers from donating blood since they are a high-risk group for contracting HIV/AIDS. The Ministry now claims in its affidavit that there is sufficient information to show “HIV, Hepatitis B, and Hepatitis C diseases pose a threat for transgender people, men who have sex with males, and female sex workers. It claims that the petitioners haven’t contested the exclusion of people at risk for HIV, Hepatitis B, or Hepatitis C infections, but rather the inclusion of transgender people, gay males, and female sex workers in the ‘at risk’ category. The affidavit responded to the challenge by citing the following academic papers in an effort to back up its assertion that the named persons were, in fact, at risk.

Two gay men from Hyderabad have filed a new public interest litigation (PIL) with the Supreme Court of India, arguing for the legalisation of same-sex marriage in India under the Special Marriage Act of 1954.

Our Chief Justice DY. Chandrachud will preside over a Supreme Court bench today.

Supriyo Chakraborty and Abhay Dang, the petitioners, have been in a relationship for over a decade. Because of the epidemic, both couples and their families were reminded of life’s fragility. They were both infected with COVID during the second wave. As soon as they felt well, they made plans to celebrate their 9th anniversary with family and friends by having a wedding-cum-commitment ceremony. In December 2021, they conducted a commitment ceremony when their loved ones gave their approval to their partnership.

Plaintiff’s Contention:

Petitioners argued that the Special Marriage Act violates India’s constitution because it treats same-sex couples differently than those of the opposite sex by denying them the legal protections, social recognition, and legal standing that come with marriage. The petitioners state that the Indian Supreme Court has historically upheld the freedom to marry anyone regardless of caste or religion. The constitutional movement towards same-sex marriage is an extension of this trend. As the Supreme Court has already ruled in the Navtej Singh Johar and Puttaswamy cases that LGBTQ+ people have the same rights to equality, dignity, and privacy as any other citizen, the Petitioners contend that the right to marry the person of one’s choice should also apply to LGBTQ+ people.

Judgement:

The Special Marriage Act, Foreign Marriage Act, and Hindu Marriage Act have all been challenged in nine separate cases before the Delhi High Court and the Kerala High Court, all seeking to recognise same-sex marriage. The Ministry’s Deputy Solicitor General told the Kerala High Court earlier this month that preparations are being made to have all writ petitions transferred to the Supreme Court.

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